IInternational experts have reported a uptick of human rights violations committed in Iran, notably arbitrary executions of protestors since January 2026. Credit: Amir Sarabadani/Wikimedia Commons

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 3 2026 (IPS)

Over the past several weeks, the humanitarian landscape in the Middle East has deteriorated significantly, exacerbated by escalating security concerns and serious human rights violations. In late July, the United Nations (UN) highlighted a sharp uptick in hostilities between the United States and Iran, alongside growing concerns over wider regional instability.

On July 30, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that the “humanitarian consequences of the Middle East escalation are worsening by the day.” The conflict between the United States and Iran has grown increasingly volatile over recent months, with both parties intermittently resuming bombardment following the breakdown of the April ceasefire.

On July 28, Iranian forces attempted a series of ballistic missile attacks targeting U.S. bases in Jordan and vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. This prompted an immediate military response from the U.S. military, with defense officials confirming that it had completed a “heavy wave” of airstrikes targeting numerous bases affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This recent wave of airstrikes in Iran affected numerous provinces—including Hormozgan, Bushehr, Fars, and Khuzestan—notably impacting the country’s primary oil-producing region. According to the Iranian Ministry of Health, at least 60 civilian deaths and 670 injuries have been recorded over the past month alone. On July 30, a strike in Qeshm in Hormozgan province hit a residential building, killing three civilians, including a two-year-old child.

This conflict has severely disrupted global shipping and oil production, driving a considerable increase in domestic gasoline prices in the U.S. and compounding Iran’s economic collapse. On July 29, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern about the risk of a broader regional conflict if effective diplomacy is not established soon.

Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Farhan Haq, told reporters that current developments are “not positive”, noting that Guterres is hoping for an immediate cessation of hostilities. “The Secretary-General has been worried for some time that if the parties do not return to negotiations, you could have a widening of the conflict, and that seems to be what has been happening in recent hours,” said Haq at a press briefing at the UN Headquarters.

“These are not positive developments, and he wants to make sure that the parties can cease fighting and again return to the diplomatic efforts, including the mediation efforts being pressed forward by Pakistan, Qatar and others…Having more parties involved in the fighting, having the fighting spread to a larger number of countries, all of these are adverse developments and could get us into a much worse situation even than before.”

Following discussions with regional allies, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on August 1 that he had halted planned military strikes against Iran as negotiations toward a de-escalation of hostilities are scheduled to pick up on August 3. Contingent on both sides “rapidly” securing a deal, Trump told reporters that these plans include frameworks for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which would allow for the immediate decongestion of stalled global cargo traffic and the resumption of commercial oil shipments.

In response, Iranian officials confirmed that Tehran did not ask the U.S. to halt these strikes, stating that Iran remains “on high alert and ready for any eventuality.” As of August 3, no new negotiations were held between the U.S. and Iran. Esmail Baghaie, the spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry, has said that there are no plans to send an Iranian delegation, nor to receive any delegations, however diplomatic engagement is ongoing.

Although the Strait of Hormuz is currently closed, Jordan and Egypt remain critical lifelines for humanitarian aid deliveries and medical evacuations for struggling Iranian communities.

Furthermore, Iran continues to grapple with a sharp rise in human rights violations recorded over the course of 2026. Since March 19, the Center for Human Rights in Iran recorded the executions of at least 46 civilians on politically motivated charges. Reflecting a considerable surge in the use of the death penalty to repress civilian dissent, at least 23 of those convicted were protestors arrested during the protests in January.

On July 23, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran urged Iranian authorities to halt all executions and establish frameworks on the use of the death penalty in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Mission condemned the arbitrary executions of two young protestors, 18-year-old Erfan Esfandiari and 23-year-old Mohammad Mohammadi on July 19.

In the wake of these executions, Iranian authorities proceeded to publicly execute protestors Amir Hossein Safari and Abolfazl Sepahi following what Amnesty International described as a “grossly unfair mass trail involving dozens of defendants.” Ten additional Iranian men now face an imminent threat of arbitrary execution over their involvement in the January demonstrations, with the Mission calling for an immediate halt to these executions.

“The Iranian authorities are unleashing a horrifying wave of executions and death sentences to punish and suppress dissent and project an image of strength and absolute control in the wake of the January popular uprising and amid ongoing attacks by US and Israeli forces,” said Heba Morayef, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

“The muted response from the international community emboldens the Iranian authorities to continue their deadly rampage. UN member states must take urgent coordinated diplomatic action to press the Iranian authorities to halt further executions. They must place Iran’s human rights and impunity crisis high on their agenda, support the creation of an independent international justice mechanism for Iran and urge the UN Security Council to refer the situation in Iran to the International Criminal Court.”

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Galala city, Egypt, the southern exit to the Suez Canal. Credit: Unsplash/M abnodey

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 3 2026 (IPS)

As the United States and Iran continue to escalate with military strikes across both fronts, the conflict took a new turn with Saudi Arabia becoming militarily involved on July 29, following coordinated airstrikes with U.S. Central Command according to the Saudi Ministry of Defence.

These strikes were carried out under what the Kingdom says was its right to self-defense, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the Saudi armed forces coordinating with U.S. Central Command to target Iranian-backed proxies operating from Iraqi territory, after interception of several UAVs which were attempting to target oil facilities in Eastern and Riyadh regions. The Kingdom reiterated that it does not seek escalation but will respond decisively to any aggression directed against it, according to the Saudi Press Agency (SPA).

On Saturday, August 1, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on his platform, Truth Social, that Iran and other Middle Eastern Countries have asked the U.S. to “hold off any attack in that the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to.” Trump added that “This would include the Immediate, Complete, and Total OPENING OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT, and an end to Iran’s nuclear threat.” Following this, the U.S. has canceled a planned attack on Iran, but Tehran still has not claimed that these talks are ongoing, let alone any measure of mediation. The cancellation of the planned attack, however, does not mean U.S. military operations have ceased.

On Sunday, August 2, The Saudi Press Agency reported that HRH Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman spoke by phone with U.S. President Trump and “stressed the need to prioritize dialogue to reduce escalation and the importance of making every possible effort to achieve calm that paves the way for diplomatic solutions” in order to preserve both regional and international security. Prior to these latest updates, Washington has maintained that the U.S. and Iran were already engaged in what was described as “very friendly negotiations” following a pause in military strikes. However, Tehran had publicly denied holding direct talks with Washington. According to Axios, Oman is leading the mediation effort, with Qatar, Pakistan and Egypt involved alongside Washington envoys.

Last week on July 30, Saudi Arabia announced a multinational Red Sea maritime defense alliance, seeking the support of over 50 countries and organizations. Thirteen countries other than Saudi Arabia have already signed on, including Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Nigeria, Jordan, Bangladesh, Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia. Other participating countries have also expressed support and are in the process of completing their internal procedures and approvals to join the declaration.

The declaration remains open to other interested parties. The Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and Oman have not yet signed, despite having similar security objectives. Representatives from 43 of the 51 countries and organizations invited to join the alliance attended a meeting on Thursday in Riyadh, the headquarters of the operation.

The initiative effectively places Saudi Arabia at the center of multinational maritime security in the Red Sea at a time when U.S. naval resources are increasingly divided between deterring Iran in the Gulf and protecting commercial shipping.

The Saudi Defence Ministry noted that the EU already has a naval protection mission in the Red Sea, with a delegation from the European Union being present at the meeting. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman also held a meeting with President Trump and Vice President JD Vance on Wednesday, however he reportedly told Washington that the Kingdom was opposed to further escalation of the wider U.S.-Israel war, and its objective is to “defend itself”.

The Kingdom reportedly told Washington that it can manage the situation with the Houthis in Yemen itself, and does not need the U.S. to get involved.

Why is the Red Sea so crucial?

The Red Sea forms part of the maritime corridor leading to the Suez Canal, through which around 15 percent of global maritime trade moves. When security in the Strait cannot be guaranteed, shipping carriers are rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid sailing through an active military zone, where cargo is at risk and war-risk insurance premiums can increase significantly.

Beginning in 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels similarly targeted carriers in the Red Sea, which reduced container tonnage moving through the Suez Canal by 82 percent, and increased booking a voyage on short notice from Shanghai to Europe by 256 percent.

The Houthis demonstrated in that conflict that they did not need to strike every ship in order to create an incentive to avoid the Strait. However, when carriers chose to avoid the Strait, major consequences arose, significantly increasing the cost of every ton of cargo.

Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope can add roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles, approximately seven to 10 days in additional sailing time, for a Europe to Singapore voyage. For some routes, consequences are substantially greater. A tanker carrying Saudi crude from Yanbu to Taiwan that avoids the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could extend the voyage from 19 to 48 days, adding roughly USD 2.5 million in cost, according to a Reuters analysis based on Kpler and LSEG data.

All of this is compounded by the severe disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, where on Aug 2, only 19 ships transited in 24 hours, representing only 31 percent of pre-conflict traffic, which has limited deadweight tonnage throughput (DWT) to 3.2 million of the 10.3 million pre-conflict average. However, this is an increase from Friday, August 1, where only 10 transits were recorded in 24 hours, marking only 11.4 percent of transits and 1.2 million DWT compared to pre-conflict levels.

Before the conflict, 25 percent of global seaborne oil trade moved through the Strait, alongside 29 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade, 38 percent of liquefied petroleum gas trade, 19 percent of crude oil trade, 19 percent of refined petroleum products trade, and 13 percent of chemical trade. Together, severe disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb would simultaneously constrain Gulf energy exports and render the shortest maritime route connecting Asia and Europe increasingly untenable for commercial shipping.

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Dominica's geothermal power plant. As Caribbean countries seek to reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels, renewable energy remains a key pillar of the regional resilience agenda advanced by CARICOM leaders. Credit: Alison Kentish/IPS

By Alison Kentish
GROS ISLET, Saint Lucia , Aug 3 2026 (IPS)

From wars that drive up fuel prices to supply chain disruptions, inflation and increasingly frequent climate disasters, Caribbean leaders say many of the forces shaping the region’s future lie beyond their control.

Their response, however, is not resignation.

Instead, leaders of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the region’s largest economic grouping, are pursuing a strategy built on strengthening the systems they believe they can influence, hoping to make one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions more resilient to external shocks. These include food and energy security, transportation, healthcare, artificial intelligence and regional trade.

At their recent summit in Saint Lucia, the leaders argued that CARICOM must be judged less by declarations than by whether regional cooperation improves people’s daily lives.

“Our discussions have been guided by one central objective, ensuring that CARICOM delivers results that people can see and feel in their everyday lives,” CARICOM Chairman and Saint Lucia Prime Minister Philip J. Pierre said as he outlined the meeting’s outcomes.

“Heads of government focused on the issues that matter most to the people of the region.”

Those priorities included the rising cost of living, food security, affordable transportation, disaster resilience and the challenge of building stronger economies in an uncertain global environment.

Leaders acknowledged that inflation in food, fuel, freight and electricity has largely been driven by global conflicts, supply chain disruptions and commodity price shocks, which small island economies have little ability to influence. While several governments have introduced temporary measures to cushion households, they argued that lasting relief will require deeper regional cooperation on transportation, consumer protection and trade.

“We will work together,” said Barbados Prime Minister Mia Amor Mottley, who leads CARICOM’s work on the Caribbean Single Market and Economy. “None of us is omniscient, none of us has all the answers, and none of us are omnipotent as well.”

One of the summit’s most tangible initiatives was renewed work toward an affordable intra-regional ferry service, long viewed as critical to reducing freight costs, improving travel and strengthening food security. Leaders said the proposal would begin with a proof of concept using existing ferry capacity while governments harmonise regulations governing licensing, insurance and vehicle movement across borders.

The initiative complements CARICOM’s “25 by 2025 Plus Five” programme, which aims to reduce the region’s food import bill by expanding agricultural production and strengthening regional supply chains. Leaders argued that producing and transporting more food within the Caribbean would make the region less vulnerable to global disruptions.

Energy security emerged as another defining theme.

Prime Minister Terrance Drew of St Kitts and Nevis said that the Caribbean’s greatest vulnerability is not a lack of energy resources but its continued dependence on imported fossil fuels.

“We don’t have an energy issue,” Drew said. “We have an energy-harnessing issue.”

Pointing to the region’s abundant solar, geothermal, wind and wave resources, Drew said renewable energy offers perhaps the greatest long-term opportunity to stabilise Caribbean economies, reduce electricity costs and improve living standards.

“There’s nothing that can really stabilise our economy, or transform our economy, or deal with this constant up and down, like stabilising our energy sources,” he said.

Recognising that technological change will also reshape the region’s future, CARICOM agreed to establish a regional Blue Ribbon Commission on Artificial Intelligence. Leaders said the commission will develop regional guidance on AI, helping member states capitalise on its benefits while managing risks around jobs, privacy and ethics.

Climate resilience also remained central to the discussions.

Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius while continuing to advocate internationally for the special circumstances of Small Island Developing States. They also advanced work on a regional insurance and reinsurance strategy aimed at improving financial protection for governments, businesses and households, as climate-related disasters become more frequent and more costly.

Historical justice remained firmly on the regional agenda. Leaders endorsed renewed efforts to advance CARICOM’s Ten-Point Plan for Reparatory Justice through closer engagement with the African Union, upcoming Commonwealth meetings and other international forums.

The agenda set in Gros Islet, Saint Lucia, has effectively set CARICOM’s agenda for the months ahead. From advancing ferry connectivity and renewable energy to strengthening food security, disaster resilience and artificial intelligence governance, the challenge now is implementation.

For Caribbean citizens, the measure of success will not be the number of declarations adopted but whether regional cooperation delivers tangible improvements in everyday life.

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Excerpt:

For the last few years, Artificial intelligence has been making increasingly intrusive demands for our attention.

It burst onto the scene like a child prodigy, enthralling us with feats of brilliance. With consummate ease, it removed drudgery from our tasks and began helping us achieve our personal and workplace objectives.

Daud Khan

As is the case with adolescents, there have been calls to set rules and regulations on AI, applying appropriate limits on what AI can and cannot do. The aim being to allow us time to deal with its immediate impacts on, for example, the jobs market, on media and communication, and on its military use.

But would government imposed regulations solve the problem? The answer is no for several reasons.

Firstly, there is the siren call of easier access to vast stores of knowledge, top quality writing skills and polished images and infographics. It is hard to resist the temptation to delegate boring tasks to AI, such as drafting emails that respond to routine messages. From there it is a slippery slope towards AI writing our university or job applications, office memos, or manuals and instructional content. However, these are tasks that define who we are and how others perceive us. And this reliance on AI kills creativity, individuality and human relations – there is no longer a turn of phrase or a spelling mistake that makes the message special.

Thomas McMahon

Secondly, AI Psychosis is becoming a pervasive disruptor of social relations. AI models are purposely designed for “engagement farming” – a fancy term for hooking people into an ever-increasing reliance on these services. It achieves this through sycophantic responses that feed one’s ego or anxieties, releasing endorphins and creating a craving for more.

We can now access gratifying, yet wholly synthetic, social interactions at our fingertips via chatbots. Consequently, we risk crafting individualised reality bubbles that are unchecked by the social norms we experience in the real world. Will it become easier and more pleasurable to interact with an intelligent machine to fulfill our need to talk, to discuss books, or for emotional engagement without fear of rejection – at any time of day or night?

Thirdly, if we allow machines to shape our thoughts and emotions, we risk destroying diversity of opinion, crushing creativity and resulting in a unified, monolithic narrative that is controlled by the megacorporations providing these AI services.

Pope Leo XIV expressed this concern in his recent encyclical where he warned of “the idolatry of profit that sacrifices the weak, a uniformity that neutralizes differences, and the pretense that a single language — even a digital one — can translate everything, including the mystery of the person, into data and performance”.

Lastly, it is essential to consider how the mismanagement of AI has the potential to drive a further wedge between rich and poor populations. The Pope cautions us of being misled by “a technology that promises to free us from all weakness, and models of wellbeing that leave behind entire populations”.

Increased focus is being placed on the impact of data centers within local communities, given their inordinate usage of electricity and water and the constant noise pollution these facilities generate. At full capacity, processing a daily 10 billion Gigabytes of data, a 100 MW data center consumes up to 2.4 million KWh of electricity and 2 million litres of water per day – more than a small city.

The human brain can process 74 Gigabytes of data while sipping a tiny 0.3 KWh of electricity (260 calories or 12% of total daily energy intake). Our bodies require a daily ration of 2.5 litres of water to function normally. Contrast this with preparing a 100-word email using ChatGPT, where each prompt-and-response interaction consumes the water in a standard 500 ml bottle. Even from a strictly environmentally-conscious viewpoint, surely it would be better to use our brains for this instead?

However, whatever our concerns, the genie is out of the bottle and there is no going back – we must learn to use AI properly. We need to better understand its limitations and where it delivers greatest impact, given the resources required.

AI should not be seen as a substitute for human expertise but instead complementary to it. Indeed, the more expertise one has in any given field, the more valuable a contribution AI makes. Experts can better formulate more pertinent questions and redirect the conversation should the AI meander off course. Experts also detect errors more easily in what may appear to be perfectly valid responses.

It is essential that we encourage people, particularly our young people, to continue learning and perfecting their chosen crafts, ignoring the wild marketing claims that various professions have been largely solved by AI already. The more knowledge and expertise the younger generation can build, the more judiciously and selectively they can deploy AI in their work and for society’s future benefit.

Daud Khan is a retired UN staff based in Rome. He has degrees in economics from LSE and Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar; and a degree in Environmental Management from Imperial College London.

Thomas McMahon is a Data Engineer who specialises in developing bespoke AI systems for UN agencies.

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In Jabalia, north of the Gaza Strip, children received polio vaccines as part of the vaccination campaign conducted by UNICEF and its partners in 2025. Credit: UNICEF/Mohammed Nateel

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 27 2026 (IPS)

On Monday July 20, a team from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) visited two displacement sites in Gaza where they found two family tents decimated by domestic fires. This incident is indicative of the increasing frequency of domestic fires in Gaza.

Families are resorting to burning waste, cardboard, and trash to help prepare meals following the ban on gas cylinders and cooking stoves from entering Gaza since October 2023. While cooking gas is available, it is only offered in limited quantities and at extremely high prices.

The domestic fire risk in Gaza is situated within a larger, much more dire humanitarian access crisis, as documented in UNICEF’s Humanitarian Situation Update Mid-Year Review. Access restrictions and operational constraints continue to disrupt humanitarian delivery, with only 44 percent of aid trucks from Egypt able to offload between May and June. Severe restrictions remain in place for the entry of fuel, spare parts, and essential materials, which have driven system failures across health and water services. Across the Gaza Strip, an estimated 82 percent of families are water insecure, and nearly 90 percent of water and sanitation infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

Violence against civilians has also intensified across Gaza. The UN Human Rights Office reported that Israeli forces killed at least 57 people, including women and children, between July 13th and July 20th.

UN Spokesperson to the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric also detailed the aftermath of an Israeli drone strike on July 17th west of the Nuseirat refugee camp, in which seven people were reportedly killed and others injured as the strike coincided with mourners leaving a nearby funeral prayer.

On July 15th, a teacher was injured after being shot by Israeli forces while she was working at a temporary learning space west of Khan Younis. Since the start of 2026, OCHA has reported 26 education-related incidents. These findings echo their Humanitarian Situation Report from July 16th, in which 84 schools are under pending demolition or stop-work orders.

Despite operational constraints and security risks, humanitarian organizations have been working to restore and expand access to education after more than two years of disruption. At the beginning of 2026, UN partners helped 435,000 pre-primary and school-aged children, including 9,300 children with disabilities, access structured learning at 610 temporary learning spaces. Furthermore, 344,000 children received learning materials and 11,000 teachers were supported. UNICEF’s Mid-Year Review reported helping 266,000 children access formal and non-formal education opportunities, which has helped provide children with a sense of normalcy amid the ongoing upheaval and crisis.

Since the ceasefire was reached last October, there have been some improvements and gains in food security and nutrition levels, thanks to expanded humanitarian food, nutrition and agricultural assistance. But those gains are still fragile. UNICEF, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme warned that families are struggling to meet basic needs, and these gains will be reversed without continuous humanitarian aid, funding and investment in recovery in the Gaza Strip. As of now, only one crossing, the Kerem Shalom/Abu Salem crossing in the south of Gaza, remains open for humanitarian assistance. The latest analysis on food security shows that an estimated 1.4 million people, or 67 percent of Gaza’s population, are experiencing crisis or worse levels of food insecurity.

Health and infrastructure remain heavily strained across the Gaza Strip. On July 20th, the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Susanne Tkalec met with leadership members of the Emirati Hospital in Rafah to determine solutions to strengthen the medical waste management systems in Gaza amid ongoing health and sanitation system stress.

Despite hospitals being explicitly protected under international humanitarian law, “healthcare workers, patients, ambulances, and hospitals have all been targeted,” said Dr. Javid Abdelmoneim, International President of Médecins Sans Frontières. Dr. Abdelmoneim went on to explain that “whether through direct violence, dismantling the healthcare system or obstructuring humanitarian assistance, inducing famine, weaponising water, causing higher levels of prematurity and mortality among infants and high levels of miscarriage, or denying care… it’s clear: the number one health issue in Palestine is Israel’s occupation.”

Shelter needs across Gaza remain outmatched by supply. In the first ten days of July, UN humanitarian partners provided 2,300 households with bedding items, tarpaulins and tents, and 13,000 families received kitchen sets. However, access to cooking fuel is still severely limited, as noted by the domestic fires. In addition, the supply stockpiles themselves are severely limited, with less than 1,000 tents currently available and only enough essential household supplies to support 7,000 families.

Across the occupied Palestinian territory, UN agencies continue to warn that violence, funding gaps, and access restrictions have created an unprecedented need that continues to outpace what can be delivered in terms of water, healthcare, education, and shelter.

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A view of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. Credit: Unsplash/Ekrem Osmanoglu

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 27 2026 (IPS)

On Wednesday, July 22, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, and Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy, HRH Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, best known as a 123 agreement, as well as an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement, according to the U.S. Department of Energy and the Saudi Ministry of Energy.

While the agreement was expected to be submitted to Congress for review, President Donald Trump has conditioned U.S. nuclear cooperation on Riyadh, normalizing relations with Israel in order to receive U.S. nuclear technology. A condition that appears difficult to satisfy given the Kingdom’s hardline stance that it will not normalize relations with Israel until a Palestinian state is established with East Jerusalem as its capital, according to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader.

Washington mentions that these two agreements “lay the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar partnership that advances several priority economic and strategic objectives, including nuclear nonproliferation.” The agreement has a 30-year term.

The 123 agreement, named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – a U.S. federal law – provides the legal framework for long-term civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and partner countries. The 123 agreement is mandatory before any significant exports of U.S.-origin nuclear material, such as nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel, and other major components can go to any partner.

Saudi Arabia’s nuclear agreement with the U.S. is more than an energy deal. It has the potential to reshape the Kingdom’s relationship with oil, and its geopolitical role in building the Middle East’s next-generation clean-energy infrastructure.

The advent of nuclear energy could also free up the amount of hydrocarbons Saudi Arabia can export. The Kingdom produced 22,744,529.0 TJ of oil and oil products in 2023, having consumed 6.4 million TJ domestically, equivalent to approximately 28 percent of its production. The Kingdom also produced 3,640,348.0 TJ of natural gas, having consumed all of its domestically produced natural gas that year. For reference, 3,600 TJ is equal to 1 TWh.

Expressed in barrels of oil equivalent (boe), Saudi Arabia produced the energy equivalent to 3.72 billion barrels of oil, in oil and oil products in 2023, consuming 1.05 billion barrels of that oil. This indicates that roughly 72 percent of the Kingdom’s oil and oil products, measured in energy terms, are not domestically consumed, leaving a substantial share available for exports and other uses. Saudi Arabia is the world’s second to third largest exporter of oil, producing 11 percent of global demand.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), transport accounts for roughly 30 percent of Saudi Arabia’s final energy consumption, followed by non-energy uses (29.7 percent), industry (19.9 percent), and commercial and public services (11 percent).

Although the pace at which Saudi Arabia can transition away from fossil fuels remains uncertain, nuclear power could gradually reduce domestic oil consumption, freeing up oil for export. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), a reactor can take about five or more years to be built after licensing and regulatory approvals are already completed.

Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear plant is expected to consist of two reactors, each producing around 1.4 GW, bringing the plant to a total capacity of 2.8 GW (2,800 MW). Assuming a 90 percent capacity factor, annual energy generation will be 22.1 TWh per year, nearly five percent of Saudi Arabia’s 431.9 TWh electricity generation.

Although Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear plant would account for only about 5 percent of the Kingdom’s current electricity generation, it would represent an important step toward reducing domestic hydrocarbon consumption in support of the country’s national strategy, Vision 2030.

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Satellite image of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb strait being at the bottom right opening. Credit: Wikimedia/NASA

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 24 2026 (IPS)

With regional friction between Iran and the Gulf monarchies escalating, Houthi leadership in Yemen has proclaimed a total maritime blockade against all vessels linked to Saudi shipping. While this declaration does not constitute a verified military obstruction of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it significantly heightens the risk of volatility at the Red Sea’s southern gateway, potentially severing the primary arterial link to the Suez Canal.

The embargo is already being framed as more than a simple ban on Saudi-flagged vessels. In messages sent to shipping companies navigating the Strait, the Houthis warned against any activities at Saudi ports, including by non-Saudi-flagged ships, saying that vessels could be targeted “in any location.” This is significant as Saudi Arabia’s maritime infrastructure managed 331 million tonnes of freight in 2024—a volume roughly equal to 12 million fully laden 20-foot containers.

Within days of these threats being made, five ships have been recorded turning around after heading towards the Bab el-Mandeb passage. Among these ships, the Xin Long Yang, a VLCC loaded at Yanbu and bound for Qinzhou, China, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude, initially reversed north towards the Suez Canal. The vessel later reversed course again, choosing to resume its original route heading south towards Bab el-Mandeb.

Additionally, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that two Saudi oil tankers, named Encelia and Layla, were targeted for their “violation of the blockade decision issued by the armed forces.”

Jeddah Islamic Port, the Kingdom’s principal commercial gateway on the Red Sea, received 3,805 vessel calls in 2024, more than any other Saudi port. Yanbu has become Saudi Arabia’s critical Red Sea oil-export network, where crude is moved from eastern fields using the East–West pipeline before being loaded onto tankers. With the Strait of Hormuz severely disrupted, the Red Sea corridor is no longer simply an alternative route: it is Saudi Arabia’s critical remaining maritime outlet to Asian markets.

Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port was loading approximately 4 million b/d in mid-July, close to 4 percent of daily global oil demand. Disruptions at Bab el-Mandeb would also affect the Suez Canal, which carried approximately 22 percent of global seaborne container trade in 2023 and acts as the link between European and Asian markets. Of the cargo which transits through Bab el-Mandeb, 3.97 million b/d of crude passed through its gates in March, according to Kpler.

If the Houthis can continue to enforce their threat and create enough uncertainty, even selective attacks on some vessels can increase wartime insurance costs and undermine security guarantees, which could push carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa.

Credit: Maximilian Malawista

For an Asia–Europe container voyage, rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope can add roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles and approximately seven to ten days of sailing time. This also increases the cost of the voyage, heightening fuel costs, requiring more vessel capacity to maintain scheduled services, and exposing cargo to higher insurance premiums. The World Bank has estimated that the additional fuel bill alone could reach USD 1 million for a round trip. Analysis by the OECD put the wider cost increase at USD 1.7 million for a medium-sized container ship on an Asia–Europe round trip—roughly an increase of USD 272, or 19 percent, for one standard 40-foot container.

In late 2023, similar Houthi threats, which led to selective attacks against commercial vessels, led major carriers to avoid the Red Sea passage and use the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope. In just three months, by mid-February 2024, UNCTAD had recorded 586 container vessels taking the longer route around Africa, while container tonnage moving through the Suez Canal had simultaneously fallen 82 percent. Spot rates—the price of booking a container on short notice—also rose by 256 percent during the same period on voyages from Shanghai to Europe.

The Suez Canal in Egypt. Credit: Unsplash/Samuel Hanna

For Yemen, the consequences could be especially severe. The country relies on imports for more than 90 percent of its staple foods, including about 90 percent of its wheat and all of its rice requirements. Much of that supply enters through the ports of Aden and Hodeidah. The World Food Programme estimates that 18.2 million people in Yemen require humanitarian aid, being in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection services.

Even considering that the Houthis formally exempt humanitarian cargo from the embargo, an escalation of insecurity can delay vessels and raise freight and insurance costs, deterring commercial shipping lines from calling at Yemeni ports. Humanitarian aid will not be nearly enough to replace the normal commercial flow of food and fuel, which affects Yemeni civilians first, who are already facing hunger and economic collapse.

The central question is not whether the Houthis can permanently seal Bab el-Mandeb. It is whether they can make the route risky enough that insurers, carriers, and oil traders abandon it themselves.

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Amir Saeid Iravani, Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council high-level debate on the safety of global waterways, amid growing concerns over threats to shipping and freedom of navigation, held on April 27, 2026. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 23 2026 (IPS)

Prior to the latest round of hostilities between the United States and Iran, freight traffic had been increasing in the Strait of Hormuz, and negotiations were underway for a new agreement to fully restore trade through this channel.

According to UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), energy markets were likely to bounce back to normal pre-conflict levels faster than that of food, public finance, and transport, leaving many vulnerable economies worse off. UNCTAD research shows a change from about 125 daily ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz in 2026, January 1st through February 27th, to a drop of around 10 daily transits from February 28th through June 14th during the conflict, marking a 92 percent decrease in overall transit ability.

According to UNCTAD and the Strait of Hormuz monitor, levels on June 2nd recorded around 40 ship transits, with an average of 60 through the days after signing the MOU (The Memorandum of Understanding signed by both US and Iranian delegations). This represents roughly half of pre-conflict transit levels.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from Strait of Hormuz Trade Tracker (WTO)
Note: Daily outbound shipments represent AIS-traceable crude oil tanker departures from the Strait of Hormuz to destinations outside the Persian Gulf. Additionally, this graph is roughly similar to overall shipments of LNG, fertilizer, and Agricultural products through the same period.

Following the closure of the Strait, the daily price of crude oil jumped to USD 120 per barrel, then averaged around USD 100 per barrel throughout the conflict. The daily price of crude oil fell to USD 70 per barrel upon the signing of the MOU, roughly returning to pre-conflict levels. However, following the latest escalations and the breaking of the MOU, crude prices have risen again to approximately USD 100, indicating that agreements to cease conflicts can quickly bring prices down significantly, if agreed to once more.

On the contrary, the IGC Grains and Oilseeds Freight index (GOFI), indicates a slow decrease of the heightened costs of transporting both grains and oilseeds by sea (e.g., Wheat, Corn, Barley, Sorghum, Soybeans, Rapeseed (canola), Sunflower seed), across 68 key exporting origins in the regions of the United States, The European Union, Canada, the Black Sea region, Brazil, Australia, and Argentina.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from the International Grains Council (IGC).
Note: The index is normalized so that 100 represents the average grain and oilseed freight rate on January 1, 2013. During the conflict, the index rose to approximately 190, representing a 90 percent increase relative to the base value and a 30 percent increase from the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026.

As a result of the heightened price of grains and oilseeds, among other agriculture components, UNCTAD says, “Past input price shocks remain a risk to future food security,” laying out the cycle in which costs can amount:

1. Traffic through the strait was disrupted.
2. Limited freight traffic constricts the availability and raises the cost of oil, gas and nitrogenous fertilizer.
3. A decrease in energy exports creates higher energy prices, increasing transport and shipping costs.
4. Further fuel inflation slows down the global economy.
5. Agricultural production costs increase.
6. Food production may be affected by the increased cost of agricultural components such as fertilizer, pushing domestic food prices further up.
7. Vulnerable populations may face greater food insecurity and hunger, as a result of the heightened cost of importing food, and domestic agriculture production.

This process has exposed 61 vulnerable economies to dual impact of higher oil and cereal import prices. (e.g., wheat, rice, corn, barley, oats, sorghum, millet, rye) These countries consist of 35 least developed countries and 26 small island states, with seven of those countries being both least developed and small island developing states.

According to UNCTAD, the pressure is “sharpest for economies that rely heavily on imported fuel”, citing an example in Cabo Verde where net imports of oil and petroleum products averaged 24.6 percent of GDP within recent years. This dependence on fuel imports means that those extra costs can quickly make food prices, electricity, transport, and public finances more expensive.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from UNCTADStat.
Notes: Orange countries are small island states, and blue countries are least developed countries (LDCs).

Yemen was also cited to be at high risk, with analysis showing that net imports of cereal and cereal products averaged 10.8 percent of GDP. For countries like Yemen dealing with conflict, hyperinflation, debt pressure, and limited public financing, a higher import bill for grain compounds an already declining situation.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from UNCTADStat.
Notes: Orange countries are small island states, and blue countries are least developed countries (LDCs).

UNCTAD analysis indicates that a real increase of food cost by just 5 percent is associated with a higher risk of child wasting (a life-threatening form of acute malnutrition), especially among poor children and children living in rural landless households.

While restoring full trade through the strait is a necessary step to recovery, this will not undo the aftermath that higher import bills, delayed shipments, and higher priced food and energy have on the global economy, especially vulnerable economies.

“The policy task is therefore broader than reopening a route. Vulnerable economies need support to manage higher import bills, protect households from food and fuel shocks, and invest in systems that reduce exposure before the next disruption hits household budgets,” said UNCTAD, indicating the importance for vulnerable economies to develop supply chain resilience, sustainable systems, and have less reliance on concentrated international trade for vital goods such as food and energy, among financial support from the international system.

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By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

Despite rising geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions and calls to bring production back to domestic shores, the global economy remains more interconnected than it may appear. Trade through global value chains (GVCs) reached historic levels in 2024, according to a new report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

GVCs, the cross-border production networks through which countries exchange materials, services and intermediate inputs used to produce goods and services, accounted for roughly 17 percent of global GDP in real terms between 2022 and 2024. This is up from approximately 16 percent before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

The findings stand to challenge expectations that the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions would have on the campaign of de-globalization. GVC trade expanded rapidly before the Global Financial Crisis and later stabilized at historically high levels. Nevertheless, in 2024 inflation-adjusted GVC trade remained close to its 2022 peak, even as total global trade declined slightly from its 2022 level.

The distinction between real and nominal figures is particularly important following years of elevated inflation and volatile commodity prices. Rising prices can inflate the apparent value of international trade without representing an actual increase in the volume of goods and services exchanged. The OECD’s inflation-adjusted figures indicate that cross-border production itself has remained historically high.

Beneath that overall stability, however, industries have moved in markedly different directions. Manufacturing and transportation remain among the sectors most dependent on internationally sourced inputs.

Coke – a carbon-rich fuel produced from coal and primarily used in steelmaking – refined petroleum products, water and air transport, information and communication technology, electronics, rubber, plastics, chemicals, basic metals and motor vehicles all recorded GVC trade exceeding 35 percent of their gross output in 2024, indicating their heavy reliance on cross-border production networks.

While gains were recorded in those sectors, the motor vehicle industry became less internationally integrated over the period examined, falling from the sixth-most internationalized sector in 2011 to tenth in 2024, being overtaken by chemicals, air transport and electronic equipment.

Pharmaceuticals moved in the opposite direction. Despite increased policy attention toward strengthening domestic medical supply chains following the COVID-19 pandemic, pharmaceutical production became more dependent on internationally sourced inputs between 2011 and 2024.

GVC participation also increased notably in air transport and warehousing, highlighting the continued importance of globally connected logistics networks in supporting production.

The differences illustrate the uneven nature of supply-chain reconfiguration: while some industries have reduced their reliance on foreign inputs, others have become increasingly integrated into cross-border production networks.

The same pattern is visible across national economies. Of the 80 economies examined by the OECD, 49 had a higher share of foreign value added embedded in their exports in 2024 than in 2011.

Across the economies examined, countries generally relied more heavily on foreign inputs to produce their exports than they contributed inputs to exports produced elsewhere. For example, a country importing foreign-made components to manufacture and export a car is participating backward in a GVC. A country supplying steel that is then used to manufacture and export that car elsewhere is participating forward.

These patterns vary depending on the structure of each economy. Large economies such as the United States, China and Brazil are generally less reliant on foreign inputs because more of their production can be sourced domestically. Major commodity exporters such as Norway and Kazakhstan, meanwhile, rank highly in forward participation because their domestically-produced energy and raw materials become inputs in production and exports elsewhere.

Yet, increased GVC participation does not necessarily mean companies are simply buying more supplies from abroad.

Between 2019 and 2024, China, Japan, the United States and the European Union all became more reliant on foreign value in their exports. However, the OECD found that this was not primarily because companies shifted toward foreign suppliers. Instead, these economies increasingly produced and exported goods and services that themselves relied more heavily on international supply chains.

For example, an economy could begin sourcing more car parts domestically but simultaneously increase its exports of cars, which depend heavily on globally connected production networks. Its individual supply chains may become more domestic, while its overall economy becomes more integrated into global production.

The findings suggest that efforts to bring parts of production closer to home can therefore occur alongside deeper global economic integration.

Trade flows – the movement of goods and services across borders – only captures part of that interconnectedness. Multinational companies (MNCs) also operate and produce directly in foreign markets through foreign affiliates — companies they own or control outside their home country.

If a German MNC owns a factory in the United States, that American operation is a foreign affiliate. Products it manufactures and sells within the United States would not count as international trade, as they never crossed a border, yet the factory remains part of the German company’s global production network.

In 2023, foreign affiliates generated approximately USD 25.6 trillion in output, equivalent to one-quarter of global GDP and only slightly below the USD 26.6 trillion value of total world trade in goods and cross-border services.Together, MNCs and their foreign affiliates accounted for roughly 35 percent of world gross output in 2023 but only 60 percent of world exports, demonstrating their outsized role in international trade.

The geography of MNC production is also gradually broadening. While companies headquartered in OECD economies still controlled nearly 85 percent of foreign-affiliate output in 2023, the share of production involving non-OECD companies operating in non-OECD markets, nearly doubled from 4.9 percent in 2011 to 9.3 percent.

The report’s findings suggest that globalization is not simply retreating in the face of geopolitical fragmentation, rather global production is being reorganized across industries, companies and countries. Supply chains may be shifting, diversifying and adapting to new risks, but the networks connecting the global economy remain deeply entrenched and central to the production of goods and services.

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People collect signatures against the construction of a massive Mitsui Fudosan datacentre in Hino City, Tokyo, 19 April 2026. Credit: Yasushi Wada/The Yomiuri Shimbun via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

Few things unite Donald Trump’s most ardent supporters with the Democratic Party’s progressive wing, but datacentres are one of them. Across the USA, communities are joining forces across the political divide to oppose developments few want but governments seem determined to impose.

Michigan residents are among those who’ve come together across party lines to oppose plans for over a dozen datacentres. Polling shows just 28 per cent of the state’s population support the proposals. Local communities are fighting back, and similar struggles are unfolding across the world.

Datacentre impacts

Datacentre construction is booming, driven by AI use, demanding increasing computing power that requires huge amounts of electricity and water for cooling.

A single question to an AI chatbot can use 10 times more energy than a conventional search. Generating an AI image takes around a thousand times more energy than generating text. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that datacentre electricity demand will double by 2030.

In Utah, despite thousands of objections, authorities recently approved one of the world’s largest datacentres. It will need more power than the entire state currently uses. The development will construct a gas-fired plant.

AI growth is driving the construction of such gas-powered plants, meaning that more datacentres cause more greenhouse gas emissions. According to the IEA, coal is currently the top energy source for datacentres and over half of all current datacentre power comes from fossil fuels. The agency expects renewables to eventually provide a bigger share of growing needs, but warns that datacentre demand is driving growth for fossil fuel-generated electricity.

Tech companies once pledged to be climate leaders, but that no longer rings true. Google promised to become net zero by 2030, but its greenhouse gas emissions leapt 48 per cent from 2019 to 2023 as it embraced gas-fired electricity for datacentres. In Mumbai, India, two coal plants due to close in 2024 have had their operational life extended to meet demand from Amazon datacentres. Last December, Irish authorities decided that datacentres can keep using fossil fuel electricity for six more years. The UK intends to burn gas to power over 100 planned new datacentres.

Fossil fuel corporations lobby for datacentres almost as hard as tech companies, because they help perpetuate a destructive business model otherwise threatened by the shift to renewables. Fossil fuel corporations were among Donald Trump’s top campaign backers, and they’re benefiting from his administration’s rollback of regulations and ambition to achieve ‘unchallenged global technological dominance’.

Water supplies are coming under greater strain. One large datacentre can use as much daily water as a town of 50,000 people, yet datacentres are being built in some of the world’s driest regions. Amazon plans to open new datacentres in Aragon, Spain, even as the regional government seeks European Union help for drought. Similar concerns surround plans for one of the world’s biggest datacentres in the United Arab Emirates.

Civil society resistance

The struggle against tech companies and their lobbying riches is an unequal one, but civil society is mounting an increasingly credible response.

Climate litigation is an established civil society tactic, and recent research indicates that lawsuits are an emerging response to datacentre developments, with recent examples in Ireland, the UK and the USA. Civil society groups are also filing objections in planning processes, including one recently lodged against a huge proposed datacentre in Cape Town, South Africa.

Legal action by two UK organisations forced the developer of a huge new datacentre in Buckinghamshire to commit to binding environmental impact mitigation measures. Lawsuits are also exposing how datacentre impacts are often understated and inadequately measured. A 2022 case forced Google to publish accurate water consumption figures for an Oregon datacentre.

Protests and campaigning are bringing successes. In 2023, protests driven by a recent drought forced Google to change plans for a datacentre to reduce water use in Uruguay. Similar protests in Chile caused Google to pause its plans. As of last year, public pressure had led to over US$42 billion worth of datacentre projects being changed, delayed or cancelled in Europe, and US$77 billion worth in the USA.

In the USA, civil society groups have forged alliances with sub-national administrations to develop stronger local environmental and accountability standards. While established politicians aren’t listening, there are signs that US local politics are shifting. Some candidates opposed to datacentres have won, and several local administrations have introduced bans or moratoriums.

Campaign successes are bringing new threats. US industry lobbyists have smeared activists as agents of foreign influence determined to sabotage the country’s technological supremacy. US government documents show a growing focus on what they call ‘anti-technological extremism’, suggesting that security forces may be gathering intelligence on campaigners, and peaceful protesters could be targeted for surveillance on national security grounds.

Tech companies that are driving datacentre development often present themselves as free speech champions. They should prove it by ensuring that wherever they develop, people are able to protest, and hold them to environmental standards. There’s widespread public opposition and no shortage of people bearing the climate and environmental costs of the datacentre boom. Their voices must be heard.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Map of the Strait of Hormuz. Credit: Wikimedia/Goran_tek-en

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 17 2026 (IPS)

A continuation of hostilities within the Strait of Hormuz is once again threatening one of the world’s most critical supply chain arteries, posing another wave of disruption which could choke the global energy, shipping and commodity markets. With roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade transiting through the Strait, alongside significant flows of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers, further constraints on commercial traffic could send new cost pressures cascading through supply chains that have yet to absorb the full effects of the earlier conflict.

Unlike the initial disruption, this latest escalation is hitting an already elevated and damaged cost base. U.S. President Donald Trump had proposed a 20 percent charge on cargo transiting the Strait, a plan he abandoned on July 14th after pressure from Gulf allies. At a current crude oil price of roughly USD 85 per barrel, a 20 percent levy on all cargo would amount to an additional USD 17 per barrel, around 17 times Iran’s previously proposed USD 1 per barrel toll.

Yet, the larger challenge remains whether an assurance of safety through the Strait can really be guaranteed. While Washington has promised to safeguard commercial vessels attempting to transit, multiple vessels have been struck by Iranian forces, including the UAE-flagged supertankers Mombasa and Al Bahiyah on July 12th. Both vessels have a capacity of roughly 2 million barrels of oil, placing the potential value of a full cargo at roughly USD 171 million before insurance, maintenance and transit costs are considered.

If continued attacks deter vessels from transiting the Strait, constrained oil flows could combine with increased insurance premiums and higher transport costs, pushing additional expenses through global supply chains and eventually onto consumers.

These effects are already visible when examining vessel movements. On July 15th, a total of five transits were recorded, three inbound and two outbound, with one of those ships being Iranian-flagged outbound. Daily throughput in deadweight tonnage (DWT) stood at 130,311 DWT, or just 1.27 percent of the 10.3 million DWT pre-conflict daily average. Meanwhile, approximately 450 vessels remain waiting to transit the Strait, including 120 tankers, 180 bulk carriers and 150 other vessels.

War risk premiums, the additional fees charged to insure vessels operating within conflict zones, have skyrocketed from a 0.15 percent pre-conflict rate to 5 percent, a more than 33-fold increase. Very large crude carriers (VLCCs) can be valued from USD 130 million to more than USD 170 million, meaning a five percent premium could add an additional cost of USD 6.5 million to USD 8.75 million per voyage. For a VLCC carrying 2 million barrels, that would amount to roughly USD 7.5 million, compared with approximately USD 2.225 million under Iran’s proposed USD 1-per-barrel toll combined with pre-conflict war-risk premiums.

However, the compounding effects extend beyond oil. Data from the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Strait of Hormuz Trade Tracker shows that while crude oil shipments had begun to recover marginally, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and fertilizer-related shipments remain at a virtual standstill, with zero outbound shipments currently recorded. Renewed escalations risk further restricting already depressed commodity flows, with approximately one-third of the world’s seaborne fertilizer trade and one-fifth of global LNG transiting through the Strait.

Using a volume index in which 100 represents average volume levels, the WTO recorded a volume index of 25.69 for LNG on July 5th, following nearly four months in which shipments were recorded on only four other days. Fertilizer-related shipments showed greater resilience, recording a volume index of 97.62 on June 23rd. However, no further fertilizer-related shipments have been recorded, leaving the trade flow at a standstill for more than three weeks.

These restrictions could be particularly damaging for energy- and food-importing economies, notably developing countries that spend significant shares of national income on essential imports of energy and food. Simultaneous increases in fuel, transportation, and agricultural inputs risk creating a broader inflationary shock. Higher fertilizer costs can increase agricultural production costs, while elevated energy and shipping expenses raise the cost of transporting goods from exporters to importers, leaving consumers exposed to several layers of the same disruption.

The disruption has also carried a significant human cost. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has warned against continued commercial transit through the Strait, with IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez urging shipowners, operators, and flag States, along with all relevant authorities to “avoid exposing seafarers to unnecessary danger by transiting the Strait.” At the same time, the United States has announced that it will resume a naval blockade targeting vessels transiting to and from Iranian ports. Iran, meanwhile, has framed its control over the Strait as a national security issue and has threatened that it will remain closed “until the end of America’s evils.”

At its 137th session, the IMO Council reaffirmed that the right of transit through straits used for international navigation “should not be threatened, impeded, denied, hampered, impaired or suspended,” reiterating that any measures taken by coastal states to regulate traffic in vital shipping lanes should be done in accordance with IMO regulations under the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The Council also stated that traffic through the Strait must “remain free of any tolls and charges, in accordance with international law, including the IMO Convention.”

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that “Reports on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are very alarming for their impact on human rights far beyond the region,” describing the Strait as “a vital lifeline on which millions are reliant.”

The dangers are also being borne directly by seafarers trapped in the Persian Gulf. Of approximately 20,000 seafarers stranded by the crisis, around 11,000 have been evacuated through an IMO-supported initiative. However, evacuation operations have reportedly been paused since June 25, leaving thousands still stranded.

The economic consequences of the initial disruption were already substantial before this latest escalation. According to the World Bank, global energy prices rose by 24 percent following the conflict’s onset, with fertilizer prices projected to rise by more than 30 percent in 2026. Renewed hostilities in the Strait now threaten to compound these pressures, demonstrating how insecurity within a narrow stretch of water can transmit costs across global supply chains, from ships at sea to businesses, households and economies around the world.

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A cargo vessel docked at a port facility. Credit: UNCTAD

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 16 2026 (IPS)

The full economic impact of the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz may not become clear until the second half of 2026, warns the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Prior to the closure, an average of 129 maritime vessels transited daily through the strait, carrying approximately 34 percent of globally traded crude oil and 20 percent of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG). Asia is by far the largest importer of Gulf crude and oil products, receiving 91 percent of Gulf crude and petroleum products or roughly 16.5 million barrels per day.

Daily oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz by destination, million barrels per day (mb/d). Credit: Maximilian Malawista (Data: IEA)

While much of the global economy appears to be absorbing the shock rather decently, UNCTAD warned that the broader consequences of the Strait of Hormuz disruption have yet to fully materialize.

“I should qualify that the full picture on Hormuz disruptions should become clearer in the second half of 2026, once the higher costs have been fully absorbed through value chains, the broader macroeconomy, and financial conditions.” UNCTADS’s Head of Macroeconomic and Development Policies, Anastasia Nesveailtova, told Inter Press Service.

Oil prices in recent months have reached an amount higher than USD 100 per barrel, up from roughly USD 60 per barrel last June. While the immediate effects have been largely visible in the energy markets, economists note that secondary shocks often take months to fully solidify through the broader global economy.

Higher fuel costs increase expenses for agricultural producers, shipping companies, and manufacturers, all which are heavily reliant on energy intensive operations. As businesses begin to absorb these costs, they are often felt later by the consumer as it takes time for the full supply chain costs to trickle down.

UNCTAD warned about these secondary effects as early as March this year, noting that “Freight rates for oil tankers and war risk insurance premiums are surging, while marine fuel costs are also rising, increasing shipping costs across supply chains.”

Credit: Maximilian Malawista (Data: UNCTAD)

Beyond transport costs, the disruption also threatens global agricultural supply chains. UNCTAD notes that “Around one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade (about 16 million tonnes) passes through the strait,” raising concerns that prolonged disruption of the strait could increase agricultural production costs by limiting access to fertilizer.

Several countries that rely heavily on fertilizer imports from the Persian Gulf are also major agricultural producers and exporters. According to UNCTAD, Australia for example sources 32 percent of its seaborne fertilizer imports from the Gulf. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Australia is among the world’s largest agricultural exporters, accounting for 12.8 percent of global agricultural exports, making it a top five exporter.

Likely as a result of fertilizer being a critical input to agricultural production, a decrease in supply of fertilizer signals an increase in price, meaning growing food becomes more costly. These effects also reach other exporters such as Pakistan, Thailand and New Zealand, but largely will affect them less than the secondary result of a supply constriction which raises regional food prices for vulnerable countries.

UNCTAD records that Sudan receives 54 percent of its fertilizer through seaborne imports from the Gulf, along with the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia, and Mozambique also receiving large percentages from the region. Sudan and Somalia in particular are currently in a humanitarian food insecurity crisis, with parts of Mozambique also continuing to experience food security pressures.

The economic consequences of the Strait of Hormuz’s disruption may therefore extend far beyond just energy markets, reaching consumers worldwide through higher transportation, agricultural and supply chain expenses.

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Trump insists the West must unite on his terms against the Rest, particularly China and Iran. Europe, however, wants greater Trump support for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime to replace Putin’s leadership of Russia.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

After Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich appeal for Western unity based on shared race, culture and imperial history, this appears to have been a European effort to strengthen its alliance with the US.

The unsubstantiated charge of Chinese military support to Russia against Ukraine, a claim never corroborated by Kyiv, is expected to worsen relations between Europe and China.

Portraying China as a strategic threat to Europe justifies greater belligerence against Beijing. It no longer seems to matter that China has never endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, China retains strong ties with Kyiv, calling for a ceasefire and political settlement, while repeatedly offering to mediate between the warring neighbours.

The G7summit of the seven largest rich economies in late June followed the EU in trying to consolidate Western strategic solidarity against Russia, China and Iran.

With financial crises from 1997 threatening G7 legitimacy, then US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers initiated the G20. But the recently expanded G7 role marginalises the more inclusive but less amenable G20.

Nurina Malek

More Chinese goods have entered European markets, with prices and quality that most others cannot match. For years, Western leaders happily enabled this by liberalising trade, appreciating cheap Chinese imports, for keeping inflation low.

After decades of state-encouraged investment, China’s still growing industrial capacity now supplies the world, enabled by Western-drafted WTO rules.

Before Trump 2.0, Washington had imposed investment restrictions, Section 301 measures, sanctions, tariffs and more following Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. Facing less US market access, more Chinese exports have gone elsewhere.

European industry can no longer compete, even where it once led. Instead of neoliberal WTO trade liberalisation, EU protectionism supposedly ‘levels the playing field’.

US advisers increasingly warn European officials that China’s industrial ‘overcapacity’ will soon scale up the ‘China shock’ in most industrially significant supply chains.

China now refines and processes most of the world’s ‘rare earth’ minerals, exercising near-monopsonistic leverage over suppliers by processing at scale at much lower cost.

With China successfully countering Trump’s trade policies, Western leaders worry Beijing will abuse its near-monopolistic control of rare earth elements, which downstream industries need.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that New York and London rare earth market reactions indicate major institutional investors view recent developments as significant.

G7 vs China
Protecting European industry, labour and economic sovereignty is now constrained by the rules Western leaders put in place over decades, often coordinated by the OECD.

Splits inside the EU soon extended beyond commercial faultlines to ostensible strategic interests defined by the fluid geopolitics after the first Cold War.

German car exports to China have been superseded by Chancellor Metz’s military Keynesianism, in line with Trump’s demand for NATO allies to spend much more on the military to greatly strengthen Western military power and global dominance.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier push for unaligned European ‘strategic autonomy’ has given way to a NATO+ strategic view embracing Western imperialism.

Meanwhile, smaller EU member states remain cautious, fearing the collateral effects of new Western ambitions, such as Chinese restrictions on imports that Europe depends on.

Great power rivalry
With the Iran war refusing to fade from daily headlines despite Trump’s on-off-on ceasefire, other myths are also evaporating. Few still believe Israel will accept a ‘two-state solution’ or that peace will prevail between trading partners.

NATO, OECD, G7, EU and other such arrangements have become variable links in the hegemonic US-led bloc. Such coalitions – including Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan – were never seamless together or fully fit-for-purpose.

Trump expects unilateral US aggression against Washington’s chosen enemies must be fully supported and subsidised by NATO allies, with reluctance deemed disloyal, even antagonistic.

Countries not aligned with the major poles may be alternatively courted and coerced by rival poles, especially by the affluent West. Cooperation among others may be seen and portrayed as proof of the existence of an antagonistic bloc.

Multiple poles are likely to coalesce into the West versus the Rest, competing for support and influence, as those courted try to gain from their suitors.

With reduced government engagement and less sustained inter-state cooperation and order, disruptions in an increasingly anarchic world economy have required governments to prioritise resilience as businesses, consumers and labour face rising costs.

As the US and its allies weaponise economic rules and arrangements to discipline both friends and foes, the world economy is slowing unevenly as prices rise sporadically.

The US-Israel war on Iran underscores how current conflicts can develop in unpredictable ways as states and other significant non-state ‘actors’ innovate strategically in unexpected conditions.

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Aerial view of the Port of Dubai Emirate located in Jebel Ali district, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Credit: WikiMedia/Imre Solt

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 14 2026 (IPS)

Despite the importance of international trade as an engine for economic growth and development, only fourteen of the twenty-two Arab states are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The remaining Arab states risk missing out on opportunities for greater integration into the global economy and the multilateral trading system facilitated by the WTO.

A new joint study produced by the WTO, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Centre for Development of Trade examines the benefits of WTO membership, the barriers facing Arab states seeking accession and the economic characteristics which define the region.

According to the publication, WTO membership has “facilitated and secured significant export opportunities in the markets of other WTO members,” while also developing “competitive market conditions and a business-friendly environment.” Membership can create the predictability and stability needed to attract foreign direct investment, while encouraging economic diversification and supporting regulatory reform.

The potential benefits of WTO membership can also be reflected by logistics performance of Arab economies. According to the World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index, Arab members of the WTO generally outperform non-member economies across infrastructure, international shipments, logistics competence, and other logistics related sectors.

The Index recorded that Arab WTO members had an average logistics score of 3.17 compared to an average of 2.25 among non-member states. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ranked the highest among Arab economies with a score of 4.0. In contrast, non-member states such as Somalia and Libya received scores of 2.0 and 1.9.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from International Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 2023, World Bank Group

Despite the potential benefits of WTO membership, WTO accession has proven to be a lengthy process for Arab states. Seven countries seeking membership — Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Syria — have been engaged in accession processes for an average of 18 or more years, with negotiations for some countries remaining inactive for extended periods.

The report attributed these delays to a combination of institutional challenges, political instability and economic turmoil. Political instability and conflict have especially disrupted investment and infrastructure which has halted much needed development across parts of the region, while weak regulatory frameworks have complicated efforts to align national policies with WTO requirements.

For accession to occur, it requires extensive legal and institutional reforms, coordination among regulatory agencies and ministries, and sustained political commitment throughout the years of negotiations. The report identifies the history of centrally planned economies as one of the defining characteristics which has complicated accession for some Arab states.

“An inevitable consequence of this history was the limited experience gained in regulating and governing a competitive private sector-led economy.” the report states. “A transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy model normally requires a fundamental shift in the government’s role from being a producer to becoming a regulator.”

These challenges are further complicated by the considerable economic differences among the Arab economies seeking integration within the global trading system.

Dependence on oil and gas for exports remains particularly significant. In 2020, 97 percent of Iraq’s total exports and 95 percent of both Algeria and Libya’s exports were fuel, all three of which are seeking WTO membership. The report argues that this dependence leaves economies vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity markets and calls for greater economic diversification.

Economic disparities in the region can also be seen through merchandise trade composition. During 2022, Saudi Arabia had recorded a merchandise trade surplus of USD 221.3 billion, followed by the UAE at USD 112.3 billion and Qatar at USD 97.5 billion. Egypt on the other hand recorded a USD 37 billion trade deficit, while Morocco and Lebanon recorded deficits of USD 30.3 billion and USD 15.1 billion, reflecting their respective trade.

These trade compositions highlight the vastly different economic characteristics between Arab states and how they partake in the global trading system. Several of the region’s largest commodity exporters depend heavily on oil and gas, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya. Other Arab economies such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon, have smaller hydrocarbon sectors and greater dependence on imported goods.

These structural differences alongside varying levels of political stability and institutional capacity, mean that strategies for greater integration into the global trade system cannot be uniform. The report argues that WTO accession strategies must instead be tailored to individual economic and institutional circumstances of each country.

Although the Arab states might differ in how they trade, trade remains central to the region’s economic engine, accounting for 87 percent of GDP across the Arab economies in 2023. Intra-Arab trade on the other hand only accounted only for 9.9 percent of total exports, while intra-Arab imports represented 12.1 percent of total imports during the same period.

International organizations have sought to address some of the barriers facing countries seeking WTO membership. In Iraq, the European Union (EU) funded “strengthening the Agriculture and Agri-Food Value Chain and Improving Trade Policy project” (SAAVI) which has provided aid to Iraq’s WTO accession. SAAVI aims to align Iraq’s trade policies and international standards with the WTO framework through technical assistance, capacity building, and advisory services.

The report argues that greater involvement in the multilateral trading system can greatly support economic diversification and further integrate Arab economies into global value and supply chains. Especially when looking at the model of the gulf countries, where vital energy, petrochemicals, and metals have become nonnegotiable parts of the international trade system. However the report indicated that WTO membership alone cannot guarantee these outcomes. For the seven Arab states seeking accession, strengthening regulatory institutions, improving coordination across government agencies and maintaining sustained political commitment will be critical to advancing accession processes that have already lasted an average of more than 18 years.

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Satellite image of the Strait of Hormuz. Credit WikiMedia

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 10 2026 (IPS)

Renewed attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz have intensified concerns over global energy markets along with supply chain disruptions, as the United Nations calls for an end to escalating hostilities within the Persian Gulf.

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), three merchant vessels were reportedly struck amid new attacks, prompting IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez to condemn the violence and urge “maximum restraint and de-escalation”.

“No seafarer should have to risk their life simply for doing their job,” Dominguez said, warning flag states, ship owners and operators against exposing their crews to unnecessary danger by transiting through the Strait.”

Approximately 6,000 seafarers still remain stranded aboard hundreds of vessels. The Strait used to handle around 130 transits daily, now seeing around 30 transits as of July 10th daily, according to the Strait of Hormuz Tracker.

The disruptions have lasted more than 100 days, placing continuous pressure on global energy markets and countries dependent on imports from the Gulf. The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) warned that market volatility, elevated prices, and localized supply disruptions could continue for months.

“We can expect prices and price volatility to remain high and supply disruptions – especially in local markets – to continue for the months ahead,” said UNECE’s Dario Liguti, Director of Energy, Housing & Land Management Division (UNECE).

Liguti mentioned that although a global shortage of fuel and fertilizers have been avoided, the effects of this year’s disruption will still be felt “even if the situation normalizes rapidly”. Liguti also stressed that strategic oil reserves are at their lowest levels in decades.

For global supply chains, continued instability could increase transportation and insurance costs, along with complicating shipping schedules and further extending shipping delays. The Strait of Hormuz Tracker records a war-risk premium increase of 53.3 times normal rates, jumping from 0.15 percent to 8 percent. Currently 120 tankers, 90 bulk carriers, and 90 other ships are waiting to transit, raising production and transportation costs across industries, extending its damage far beyond countries directly dependent on Gulf energy exports.

The latest attacks come as diplomatic efforts to end the conflict have struggled to gain traction. Responding to renewed hostilities in the Strait, during a UN press briefing the Secretary-General’s Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric called for an immediate return to negotiations.

“This tit-for-tat needs to stop,” Dujarric said. “A return to diplomacy is urgently needed for the sake of stability in the region, for the sake of global stability.”

The renewed violence has also raised questions over the future of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) intended to put a cease on the conflict for at least sixty days. Accord Referring to the agreement, U.S. President Donald Trump said “As far as I’m concerned, it’s over.”

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has reiterated the UN’s readiness to aid diplomatic efforts. His personal envoy to the conflict in the Middle East, Jean Arnault, remains in contact with relevant parties, while the IMO continues to address maritime security within the Strait.

As the attacks continue, and diplomatic efforts remain uncertain, prolonged disruptions to one of the world’s most strategic waterways risks further destabilizing energy markets and global supply chains, which have faced months of disruptions. Continued instability will only worsen the effect, as Liguti reiterates

“If the instability does continue, we should get ready for another rise in prices and a larger-scale raw material shortage”.

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The demand for critical energy transition materials such as copper, lithium and cobalt is on the rise due to the expansion of clean energy technologies. Credit: Unsplash/Lj. Filipović

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

Demand for critical energy transition minerals (CETMs) is expected to surge over the coming decades as countries expand clean technology capacity, develop electric vehicles, create battery storage, implement renewable energy systems, and introduce digital infrastructure according to UNCTADs latest report, The Shifting Dynamics of Critical Minerals Trade.

CETMs include lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, making them vital to producing low carbon clean energy alternatives and renewable technologies used for electricity production and battery storage. These elements are also commonly found within datacenters, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and any field requiring digitalization.

According to the report, demand for lithium is projected to increase by 353 percent by 2040, followed by graphite (131 percent), nickel (69 percent), magnet rare earths (65 percent), cobalt (49 percent), and copper (28 percent).

Naturally this surge in CETM demand also has changed the composition of where CETMs are being used, with clean technologies absorbing a growing share in the industry of CETMs.

Share of Critical Mineral Demand for Clean Technologies. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Although these CETMs are experiencing a surge in demand, from mining to processing or refining, the entire value chain is geographically concentrated between a few countries, dominating the entire global output. This same pattern also follows for reserves of key minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements which are unevenly distributed among a few states.

According to UNCTAD, China accounts for 69 percent of rare earth element production, and produces 78 percent of natural graphite capacity. Indonesia accounts for 67 percent of global nickel production, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for 50 percent of global cobalt reserves and 47 percent of global cobalt mine production.

“Reserves” refer to mineral deposits which can be economically extracted using available technology, differing from total geological resources, which include deposits not yet commercially viable or known. Due to the situation of current reserves and mining output, only a few nations produce the majority of the capacity of critical minerals. The concentration of production and reserves leaves global supply chains highly vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions, and trade restrictions, among other shocks.

Represented is how much of the global reserves/mining output of CETMs is within just the top three countries. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Notably, mining output is slightly more concentrated than reserves for every mineral shown, indicating that mining production is controlled by an even smaller group of countries than the resource base itself.

This means that an overwhelming amount of these materials needed for some of the most critical functions for today and for our future rely on three countries for the entire global trade to function.

UNCTAD states: “Mining is capital-intensive and characterized by long lead times, limiting short-term supply responsiveness and leaving concentrated supply chains exposed to geopolitical risks, governance challenges, and environmental and social pressures.”

While the mining process receives much of the attention, UNCTAD argues in their report that refining represents an even larger vulnerability due to processing capacity being concentrated within a even smaller number of countries.

Refining and other downstream stages are even more concentrated” than that of mining, “creating critical bottlenecks in CETM supply chains,” An UNCTAD spokesperson told Inter Press Service. “A country may possess abundant mineral reserves yet remain dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers for refining, separation, precursor materials or advanced components.” They added explaining how there are “technical know-how, industrial capabilities, infrastructure and market power”, which means that “access to mineral resources alone does not necessarily translate into secure access to supply.”

UNCTAD also highlights that the concentration is also within only a few firms, in “several critical mineral markets” where a relatively small number of companies control “significant shares of mining, processing, trading, refining and technology.”

The issue as UNCTAD points out is that refining requires substantial long-term capital investment, access to advanced technologies, significant energy inputs, and specialized infrastructure, along with being an economy of scale to be cost competitive, which creates massive barriers to entry for new players.

Because global supply is concentrated, naturally international trade is the primary mechanism through which these minerals move between countries. The UNCTAD spokesperson remarked that “Cross-border trade in ores, concentrates, refined materials, and downstream components enables access to geographically dispersed stages of production across complex global value chains, particularly in high-technology sectors.”

What this means is that most countries depend on imports of CETMs at some point of their value chain for their manufacturing or developmental needs.

While diversification of processes would be necessary to alleviate risk associated with CETMs, since 2020 restrictive export measures on CETMs have been on the rise.

Mineral-rich economies like China, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are seeking to capture higher value stages of production, rather than just exporting raw materials alone. Restrictive export measures are increasingly being introduced to capture more of the downstream value, encouraging domestic refining, industrial development, and manufacturing, rather than solely relying on commodity exports.

Of these measures, licensing requirements, export taxes, and exports bans make the most common measures.

Since 2020, 37 licensing requirements, 31 export tax measures, 29 export bans, and 1 export quota have been recorded. 18 of these export measures were implemented by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with China introducing 16 followed by Indonesia at 12. Other countries such as Burundi and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have introduced 8 measures each, while Zimbabwe has 7.

While at the moment supply chains are extremely concentrated and are becoming even further concentrated creating higher risk for importers, UNCTAD notes that major CETM importers such as the European Union, Japan, and the United States are adopting strategies to alleviate risk by diversifying import sources, increasing domestic capacity development, recycling, and developing strategic partnerships. In a three-year period, since 2022 such agreements in developmental stages have grown from just 15, to an addition of 58 new agreements targeting a diversification across value chains, and securing mineral access and production in a safe and future proof manner through policy.

As demand for CETMs accelerates, governments are increasingly looking at supply chains with scrutiny, seeing them as a strategic asset. While producing CETM high-capacity nations are seeking to control more value through domestic production of other stages and create more industry, major importers are moving aggressively to diversify supply sources to build more resilient supply chains. The outcome could not only decide the speed at which the global energy transition occurs, but also shape which countries will emerge as the key trading hubs and industrial powerhouses of the clean-energy economy.

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The report - Military Escalation in the Middle East: Cushioning the Global Shock – reveals that low- and middle-income countries have partially protected their populations from soaring oil prices through fossil fuel subsidies, price caps, tax rebates and demand-management measures. Credit: UNDP

By UN Development Programme
NEW YORK, Jul 1 2026 (IPS)

Developing countries’ efforts to tackle the ongoing effects of conflict in the Middle East carry a high price that leaves little room for critical investments in education, health and other development priorities, according to a new report by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) released today.

The report – Military Escalation in the Middle East: Cushioning the Global Shock – reveals that low- and middle-income countries have partially protected their populations from soaring oil prices through fossil fuel subsidies, price caps, tax rebates and demand-management measures.

Fossil fuel subsidies, which had been on a downward trend globally, are on track to reach US$1.1 trillion in 2026 – US$ 410 billion more than in 2025, assuming the current average oil price settles at US$88.6 per barrel.

This projection climbs to as much as US$1.43 trillion in a ‘severe’ scenario where oil prices climb to an average of US$110 per barrel.

The UNDP report warns that while fossil fuel subsidies provide temporary relief, they ultimately undermine climate and development goals, locking countries into high-carbon pathways and limiting future investment.

“The global spillover of the Middle East conflict is profound and potentially long-lasting. Developing countries, many already struggling with debt, have temporarily managed to protect people from the worst of the energy shock,” said UNDP Administrator Alexander De Croo. “These countries are doing everything they can, but there is a hidden cost. To deal with today’s crisis, governments are postponing tomorrow’s investments. Money that should be building schools, hospitals, and clean energy systems is being used simply to keep economies afloat. Without international support, these countries won’t escape the shock. They are absorbing it at the expense of future growth.”

Close to half of the world’s poorest countries are already either ‘in’ or at ‘high risk’ of debt distress, and debt continues to crowd out development spending at an increasing rate, according to the report.

This year, it is estimated that the median developing economy will spend 9.53 percent of total government revenue on interest payments alone – double the share of a decade ago and the highest level seen in 25 years.

Averaged over the three-year period 2024 to 2026, 55 developing economies are estimated to pay more than 10 percent of revenue in interest payments, compared to 32 countries a decade ago.

“No country should have to sacrifice its future development to manage a crisis it did not create,” said De Croo. “First, we must unlock multilateral liquidity in ways that are easy to access for low and middle-income countries. Second, we must accelerate investment in renewable energy. Every clean energy investment reduces exposure to future shocks. The crisis has made one thing clear: energy security and the energy transition are no longer separate agendas. They are one and the same.”

The report is being launched in the context of the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC) taking place this week. The HSC is an annual high-level meeting that aims to foster new partnerships and collective action by global policymakers, private sector leaders, academia experts, and civil society representatives. The annual event is a joint initiative of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and the Michael Otto Foundation.

Full report
The full report is available online at https://www.undp.org/publications/military-escalation-middle-east-cushioning-global-shock

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Excerpt:

(L-R) Horacio (Luis) Carvalho, CEO of Climate Change Ventures, and Faraz Khan, MBE, at London Climate Action Week. Carvalho's firm advises on carbon mitigation and green investment projects. They signed an MOU to develop markets with Brazilian CPR Verde (green rural product certificate), a Brazilian financial credit instrument used to fund environmental preservation, forestry conservation, and carbon sequestration. The markets they are eyeing will be Saudi Arabia, Africa and Pakistan. Credit: Faraz Khan

By Zofeen Ebrahim
LONDON & KARACHI, Pakistan, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

The 30 COP gatherings may not have done what three months of US-Israeli war against Iran did: expose the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels.

As the world faced its biggest energy shock in a decade, the case for investing in clean energy suddenly became far more compelling.

As an intense heatwave grips Europe, with London’s Met Office issuing a “risk to life” warning and the closure of shops, offices and schools alongside disruptions to transport during the London Climate Action Week (LCAW), calls for this shift are gaining even greater momentum.

New Sense of Urgency

“The sentiment is palpable among policymakers, investors and business leaders,” conceded Faraz Khan, MBE.

A Pakistani entrepreneur and co-founder and partner of Pakistan-based Sustainadility, a technology, data and advisory firm, with over 25 years of experience in multi-stakeholder investments and in drafting environmental, sustainability and governance frameworks, is among those gathered to discuss the future of climate finance and the energy transition.

Speaking to IPS by phone on the sidelines of LCAW which closes on June 28, Khan stressed the urgency of transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy, saying the shift would not be possible without investors and businesses.

Khan described the mood at LCAW, as “optimistic” tempered by caution. He also welcomed the attention Pakistan was getting. “Our country was lauded for its efforts in brokering the peace deal,” referring to the Islamabad Memorandum between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From Rule-Making to Seeking Investment

Comparing the two events, he said the annual Bonn climate talks, held from June 8 to 18, focused on diplomatic negotiations and climate rule-making, while LCAW, also an annual event held since 2019, centres on mobilising private investment in sustainability and ESG and scaling these initiatives commercially.

“LCAW is more business- and private sector-orientated,” said Khan, who is also the founder and director of  SeedVentures, a Pakistan-based social impact organisation and impact investor.

Still, he said: “There are two sides to the coin. On the one hand, the US-Iran peace deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz have shown the world that oil remains crucial for the world to exist; but, on the other, many countries recognise that dependence on fossil fuels is not in their national interest and even poses a national security risk.”

Geopolitical conflicts have exposed the vulnerabilities associated with oil production, trade and transportation, which is why investment in alternative energy is expected to accelerate.

At a COP31 presidential meeting with the private sector at LCAW, which Khan attended, the conversation revolved around the circular economy, electrification and climate finance with some of the biggest names in the global climate community, including BlackRock, the World Bank, UNIDO, the IFC and several trade organisations.

“It was a gathering of the who’s who of the climate world,” Khan said with a laugh. “Even we made the cut.”

What was missing, however, Khan said, were women in decision-making roles. He was, however, impressed by those in the Turkish COP team, praising their intellectual rigour and commanding presence in the room, which he found to be “truly impressive”.

Beyond the composition of the meetings, Khan said the discussions themselves reflected a growing determination to move beyond rhetoric.

There was a strong sense in the room that a new precedent was about to be set by shifting the focus from negotiations to implementation, investment and action.

“Governments can create an enabling environment and UN frameworks can provide the rules, but ultimately it is investors, bankable projects and big businesses that will drive change,” he said.

While the Bonn climate talks focused on regulatory frameworks, LCAW’s focus is on climate finance and transactions, he noted. “And at Antalya, where the COP31 will be held this November, it will be about putting money where our mouths are—deploying capital into bankable projects and creating collaborative investment vehicles to scale climate action,” said Khan.

Private Sector Takes Centre Stage

He also observed that China was frequently cited as a global leader in clean energy investment.

“Across the various meetings, I sensed a strong and growing appetite for investment in renewable energy, and I believe this momentum will only accelerate,” he said.

Large businesses and institutions, he added, would be critical to delivering a just transition because their extensive operations and community links give them the reach needed to drive meaningful change.

The emphasis on electrification and reducing dependence on fossil fuels was echoed by Türkiye’s COP31 leadership.

Earlier this month, speaking to The Guardian on the sidelines of the climate talks in Bonn, Murat Kurum, Türkiye’s environment minister, said the 35% target would be “one of the defining priorities” of the COP31 presidency.

“By electrifying daily life, from transport to buildings and industry, we can protect families and businesses from volatile energy markets,” he told the media outlet.

Khan believed Pakistan has an opportunity to position itself at the forefront of this transition.

While Pakistan is frequently showcased as a victim of climate disasters, despite contributing less than 1% of global greenhouse gas emissions, Khan said the global focus on solar should also shine a light on the country’s “silent solar revolution”, which has transformed its investment landscape.

“Pakistan has become a global example of how solar adoption can evolve rapidly, opening up substantial investment opportunities in solar manufacturing and battery production,” he said, adding that modernising the grid and scaling up utility-scale energy storage have become increasingly urgent.

Investing in Nature

Beyond renewable energy, Khan saw significant opportunities in nature-based investments.

Khan said Pakistan’s rich biodiversity—from mangroves and forests to wetlands, rangelands and mountain ecosystems—offers enormous investment potential, with private capital capable of both restoring and protecting these natural assets.

Agriculture accounts for a large share of Pakistan’s economy and is a major driver of biodiversity loss. He said private businesses could invest in regenerative agriculture, agroforestry and sustainable rice and cotton production, either to meet sustainability goals or as part of emerging biodiversity credit markets.

“Just as there are carbon credits, there are biodiversity credits, and these are directly linked to food security and agriculture,” Khan said. Given agriculture’s central role in Pakistan’s economy, he argued that the country holds enormous potential for biodiversity credits. “I think this is going to be truly phenomenal because it presents enormous investment opportunities,” he said.

But realising this potential will depend on Pakistan’s ability to attract sustained private investment.

Investment Challenges

Sadly, there are few takers.

Khan said Pakistan’s high sovereign risk remains the biggest obstacle to attracting international climate investment at scale, although recent policy reforms, including the Pakistan Green Taxonomy, green banking guidelines and ESG standards, have improved investor confidence.

He also pointed to a shortage of bankable projects, with many failing to attract global investors despite their strong fundamentals. Still, he said, the investment potential remains enormous.

Yet time may be of the essence.

If the recent turmoil in the Middle East exposed the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels, Khan believes it also underscored the urgency of accelerating the clean energy transition. For Pakistan, he said, the opportunity is immense—but only if the country can create the conditions needed to attract the investment required to realise it.

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Smallholder farmers in Africa and Asia are likely to still be reeling from the fuel and fertilizer crisis caused by conflict in the Middle East when what forecasters expect to be a “super” El Niño arrives later this year.

Appolinaire Djikeng

Consensus is increasingly clear that tackling climate change to avert such crises is a legal duty under international law. Bringing down emissions requires both short-term and long-term action. And yet one of the most effective levers available — sustainable livestock farming — receives just 1 to 2 per cent of climate finance dedicated to agriculture. That is a vanishingly small share for a sector that, in many low- and middle-income countries, accounts for as much as 80 per cent of agricultural GDP.

This funding gap matters because livestock offer something relatively rare in climate policy: the chance to cut emissions fast while also building resilience. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide over the short term, which means reducing it delivers quicker climate benefits.

Cattle and other livestock are among the primary sources of methane emissions. But crucially, both direct and indirect methane emissions from livestock production are often higher than necessary because of the same factors that hold back productivity. Poor animal health, low quality feed and nutrition, and climate stress all undermine production and increase both direct emissions and emission intensity. Tackling these fundamental factors solves both challenges.

In Ethiopia, for example, poor animal health has been found to increase livestock emissions by 50 per cent while also resulting in lower meat, milk and egg yields. Parasites and other vector-borne diseases increase the methane produced in animals’ guts while stunting growth and development.

Simply by applying existing tools to improve animal health, such as vaccines, drugs that kill parasites and good nutrition, research suggests that emissions could be conservatively reduced by at least 15 per cent per unit of output. The same interventions also increase productivity and improve livelihoods.

New research is also uncovering new opportunities to reduce methane from livestock while also boosting productivity and resilience.

Scientists from CGIAR research centres and partners have analysed nearly 300 forage samples and found that varieties of African clover, cowpea and lablab could reduce methane emissions by up to 90 per cent. These plants contain compounds that alter the microbes in cows’ stomachs and block the process that generates methane.

Testing is now under way to identify varieties that could be grown as low-methane feed, which not only helps reduce emissions but also supports local seed systems.

Restoring rangelands adds another layer: it helps improve forage availability to support better animal nutrition, lower methane emissions and build stronger ecosystems. Last year, for example, participatory rangeland management (PRM) was strengthened across 340,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 50,000 hectares in Tanzania, improving rangeland health and supporting livestock production.

Many more solutions exist to improve livestock sustainability for short-term and long-term gains, including those developed by the Livestock and Climate Solutions Hub. But despite growing evidence of impact from livestock interventions, climate finance continues to flow elsewhere, away from the agricultural systems that hundreds of millions of people depend on most directly.

In a post-aid world, directing more climate finance towards sustainable livestock farming in low- and middle-income countries is an investment in global stability.

Investing in more sustainable livestock production has a ripple effect that improves food security, livelihoods, and economic growth and contributes to greater stability and resilience in the face of shocks like the “super” El Niño.

Climate vulnerability is costly. Building resilience through the primary sectors of low- and middle-income countries is an insurance against future crises.

Prof. Appolinaire Djikeng is Director General of the International Livestock Research Institute

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As of now, geopolitics overtook trade policy uncertainty as the primary concern for countries. Credit: Unsplash / Sajimon Sahadevan

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

Amidst increased geopolitical tensions, the risk of volatile energy markets, trade corridors, and regional stability in the Middle East has garnered more attention than trade policy in terms of its power to alter the global economy, according to new findings from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

In their report on trade and development, “Global Economy Faces a Geopolitical Challenge”, UNCTAD says that a protracted escalation “raises the likelihood of deeper disruptions in global trade and finance, potentially, foreshadowing a cascading crisis”.

Credit: UN Conference on Trade and Development (Trade and Development Foresights 2026)

Daily crude oil prices in the Middle East since the beginning of the conflict have risen from around USD 60-70, to a fluctuating rate between a high of over USD 110-. With oil prices surging more than 60 percent, and gas doubling in price, many markets have been left in an inflating scenario as higher energy prices increase macroeconomic pressure and overall slow and contract the economy.

The increase per barrel is largely due to a constriction of supply, where most Gulf economies can barely output oil due to a lack of transport ability through the strait of Hormuz. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) records a spike in the price of Brent crude rising over USD 100 per barrel and remaining at elevated levels, with European gas also jumping roughly “60 percent amid disruptions to LNG exports”.

The numbers are impacted by an estimated loss of capacity of 10 million barrels per day of oil and “about 500 million cubic meters per day of natural gas”. This is roughly 10 percent of global oil production, and roughly 5 percent of global natural gas production for every single day.

The IMF records the following:

Daily Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (in number of vessels) between 26 February and 6 April 2026. Credit: IMF

Oil being an inelastic good means that consumers won’t be able to curb their spending. Rather, they have to pay more for as long as the conflict lasts as fuels are needed for many essential routine tasks, from driving your car, to taking your vitamins, to growing your food, and having your Amazon packages shipped.

In their April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East and Central Asia, the IMF details that a continued conflict will likely for every 10 percent rise in the average oil price lead to a loss of about 0.5 percent of GDP and an inflation increase of around 1 percent in Gulf economies, ultimately affecting global markets heavily.

As the report notes, “Longer trade disruptions or greater damage to oil production capacity raises the possibility of higher and more sustained oil prices and a larger risk premium than is currently embedded in oil futures prices”.

However, for developing countries higher energy prices hit a lot harder to consumers in developing countries, which in this case don’t have the same money to spare. The IMF warns that “Low-income countries and other fragile and conflict-affected states in the MENAP region are especially vulnerable to higher energy, fertilizer, and food prices”.

Due to the conflict, estimates stand that vulnerable economies, mostly least developed countries (16.1 billion) and small island developing states (4.3 billion), could incur a USD 20 billion a year increase in spending, representing a huge composition of their GDP expenditure.

Among least-developed nations, Mauritania is recorded to have their bill increase by 7.3 percent, The Gambia 6.3 percent, Burkina Faso 5.0 percent, Liberia and Zambia 4.3 percent, with 17 other least developed countries also estimating to increase their spending by at least 0.5 percent in terms of GDP points.

Similarly for small-island developing states, Vanuatu is recorded to have an increase of 5.8 percent, Maldives 5.2 percent, Tonga 4.4 percent, Mauritius 4.2 percent, and Fiji 3.2 percent, with 18 other small developing states recording an increase of at least 0.6%.

UNCTAD also expects this conflict to take away capital investment into developing nations, as these assets are perceived as riskier. The UNCTAD report states that “the start of the Middle East conflict triggered a sell-off of developing countries’ assets, with equity markets of emerging markets sliding by more than 12 per cent between 28 February and 29 March.” Likely such effects will trigger a compacting of issues, contributing to an economic downturn that could take years to recover from depending on the length of the conflict.

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Shifra Ainomugisha from Uganda receives the 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year award from the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shirley Botchwey. Credit: Commonwealth

By Kizito Makoye
LONDON & DAR ES SALAAM, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

Before anyone called her an innovator, before artificial intelligence entered the conversation, before solar-powered cold rooms, before the language of sustainable development, Shifra Ainomugisha knew food loss in its painful form.

At dawn, she would grab a bucket and walk into rows of tomato plants on her family’s farm in Western Uganda to collect what had already been lost.

The tomatoes looked healthy from a distance. But many had softened, burst, or spoilt before reaching the market – the true meaning of food loss.

“I used to wake up every morning to collect rotten tomatoes and throw them away while trying to save whatever remained,” she recalled.

Almost half the family’s harvest disappeared this way.

Yet the labour never stopped.

Her parents worked relentlessly. Seasons came and went. Fields produced food. But income remained painfully uncertain.

“Meanwhile, we struggled to pay school fees,” she said. “Some children dropped out of school even though we worked very hard during holidays on the farm. We were producing food but could not earn enough money to support our education.”

Shifra Ainomugisha poses beside a solar-powered irrigation system in Uganda. She was named the 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year. Her contribution includes combining renewable energy and AI-enabled agricultural support to help smallholder farmers increase productivity and reduce post-harvest losses. Credit: Solafam, Uganda

Mission Accomplished

Those childhood memories – of abundance turning into loss and hard work failing to translate into opportunity – would eventually shape a mission that has now earned Ainomugisha recognition as the regional winner for Africa under SDG 2: Zero Hunger in the 2026 Commonwealth Youth Awards.

Selected from almost 1,000 applicants across the Commonwealth’s 56 member states after a two-stage adjudication process involving 57 judges, Ainomugisha joined 19 finalists recognised for advancing the Sustainable Development Goals through innovation and community impact.

But the award was not her only accolade.

Today, the Ugandan farmer and innovator earned the prestigious title of 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year at the 2026 Commonwealth Youth Awards ceremony in London.

The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shirley Botchwey, presented the award to Ainomugisha.

In her remarks Botchwey congratulated all the finalists.

“You are already winners. To be selected from across 56 nations is a testament to your courage and your creativity. You embody the very best of our family. You have shown resilience in the face of challenge and innovation in the face of constraint.”

She continued, “Today is not about recognition alone – it is about momentum. It is not about isolated excellence — it is about collective advancement. Together, we will continue to strengthen the Commonwealth Youth Programme as a flagship vehicle for youth development in the Commonwealth.”

A Journey That Began With a Big Question

For the young Ugandan entrepreneur, however, the journey did not begin with awards.

It began with a question she carried since childhood:

How can people who grow food still remain hungry?

“Nobody should die of hunger,” she tells IPS.

“Because we are here to help. Farmers are doing agriculture, and we are solving food waste, which means we are fighting hunger. That is one of the SDGs we are working on.”

Today, Ainomugisha serves as co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of  Solafam, Uganda Ltd, a social enterprise using solar-powered technologies and artificial intelligence to help smallholder farmers reduce food losses, improve yields and increase incomes.

Her work combines three interconnected interventions: solar-powered cold storage, solar irrigation systems and an AI-enabled advisory platform known as Lean AI – a WhatsApp chatbot designed to guide farmers on planting decisions, irrigation timing, pest management, post-harvest handling and market access.

Together, the technologies aim to solve one of Africa’s challenging agricultural paradoxes: producing food but losing too much of it before it reaches consumers.

According to regional agricultural estimates, post-harvest losses continue to absorb a huge share of food production across sub-Saharan Africa, undermining incomes, nutrition and rural resilience. Smallholder farmers – who form the backbone of food systems – are particularly vulnerable because many lack access to storage, irrigation and agricultural extension services.

For Ainomugisha, those statistics have faces.

Her mother’s face.

Her father’s.

Her neighbours’.

And her own.

“I come from a tomato-growing family,” she said.

“Growing up, we experienced food wastage and low returns despite all the hard labour we invested in farming.”

Her father became one of her earliest inspirations.

Although he never had the opportunity to pursue formal education, he constantly experimented with solutions.

“He tried solving it by buying a diesel irrigation pump to increase yields because we only have one major farming season,” she explained.

“If you don’t make enough money during that season, the whole year becomes difficult.”

He attempted to preserve produce in improvised storage spaces.

But tomatoes continued spoiling.

Years later, after gaining access to education and exposure to technology, Ainomugisha began thinking differently.

“First of all, it wasn’t simply my decision alone,” she reflected.

“It began with my father. My father did not get the opportunity to go to school, but I did. I felt I had a better chance to solve the problem than he did.”

That conviction followed her into university.

Shifra Ainomugisha (centre, in reflective vest), co-founder and CEO of Solafam, Uganda Ltd, stands with farmers and community members beside a solar panel installation that supports climate-smart agriculture initiatives. Through renewable energy and farmer-centred innovation, the project seeks to reduce food loss and improve rural incomes. Credit: Solafam, Uganda

Solar to AI to Filling Knowledge Gaps

Together with colleagues, she founded Solar Farm while still studying.

Initially, the concept was straightforward: cold-chain storage.

Support from entrepreneurship initiatives – including LEAP Africa – helped transform the idea into a functioning enterprise.

But customers quickly changed the direction.

People arriving at the cold rooms often revealed a deeper challenge.

Some had little produce to preserve.

Storage alone was not enough.

The team expanded.

Solar irrigation came next.

The goal was to help farmers reduce dependence on expensive diesel fuel and enable year-round production.

Farmers could access irrigation systems through a flexible financing model – paying 20 percent upfront and then making weekly payments of approximately USD 1.60 until ownership.

“We wanted to create a solution that farmers could actually afford,” she said.

Then came the next leap: artificial intelligence.

Ainomugisha says the AI component emerged from another observation.

Many farmers lacked access to agricultural training.

Knowledge gaps were driving losses.

“Many people are farming, but they are not always doing it the right way,” she explained.

“You might find a tomato farmer irrigating in the morning, yet tomatoes are better irrigated in the afternoon or evening.”

The team launched Lean AI – a chatbot accessible through WhatsApp that provides real-time agricultural guidance.

Farmers can ask questions and receive recommendations on farming practices, pest control, irrigation and post-harvest management.

The system is now being adapted to work via real-time messaging protocol known as USSD to reach users with basic mobile phones.

“We use AI to continue training farmers even when we are not physically present,” she said.

“We believe this will improve yields, increase incomes and eventually change the narrative that farming is only for the poor.”

Shifra Ainomugisha poses beside a solar-powered irrigation system in Uganda. She is combining renewable energy and AI-enabled agricultural support to help smallholder farmers increase productivity and reduce post-harvest losses. Credit: Solafam, Uganda

Changing the Narrative

That narrative matters deeply to her.

“In Uganda, there is a narrative that agriculture is for poor people,” she said.

“That is sad.”

She pauses.

“People believe that because despite hard work, they cannot escape poverty.”

One of the defining moments came in 2023.

After struggling to convince local markets to host their first cold room, the team installed it at her family home.

Her mother became the first customer.

Then came neighbours.

Then more farmers.

Initially, usage was free.

People needed proof.

One woman – a friend of Ainomugisha’s mother who traded fruits and vegetables – became an unexpected validation.

She stored produce for a month.

Fresh vegetables that once spoilt within days remained viable for nearly two weeks.

That extra time allowed her to wait for better prices instead of selling under pressure.

“She later realised how much it was helping her,” Ainomugisha said.

“Now she earns more from farming than she did before.”

Solafam eventually introduced a pay-per-use model.

The impact, Ainomugisha says, became measurable.

“What makes us proud is that we have increased farmers’ incomes by 28 percent.”

“We have also reduced post-harvest losses by about 30 percent.”

Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General (Programmes), Tanmaya Lal, Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shirley Botchwey, and Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General (Corporate), Tania Baumann, pose with the 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year and Africa Regional Winner, Shifra Ainomugisha, at the Commonwealth Youth Awards ceremony in London. Credit: Commonwealth Secretariat

Winning Reaction

Those outcomes helped propel Solafam onto the Commonwealth stage. The Commonwealth Youth Awards are an initiative of the Commonwealth Youth Programme, which has supported youth development work in member countries for over 50 years.

“I am honoured to be named the 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year.  This recognition is not only personal but also represents the farmers and communities in Uganda whom we serve.  It also affirms that solutions built from lived experience can create real impact. I cannot wait to continue this journey with the support of the Commonwealth and its remarkable network of partners.”

The Awards recognise young leaders advancing development solutions across member states.

For more than a decade, the programme has provided visibility, networks and funding opportunities to support youth-led initiatives.

This year’s finalists span sectors ranging from climate action and health innovation to entrepreneurship and communications.

For Ainomugisha, being selected is an honour.

“I’m glad to be a finalist for the Commonwealth Youth Award and a regional winner for Africa,” she said.

She believes three things contributed most to the selection.

Sustainability.

Impact.

Accessibility.

“First of all, our project is sustainable. We have maintained it from 2022 until now.”

“Secondly, we are creating meaningful impact.”

“Also, our technology is affordable for smallholder farmers.”

But perhaps what distinguishes her work most is who it centres.

Women.

“Because this problem is personal to me,” she said.

“I did not hear someone else’s story and decide to solve it.”

“I am a woman, and I saw how my mother worked every day on the farm, yet our lives were not improving.”

Across much of Africa, women form a large share of the agricultural workforce while often facing unequal access to land, financing, technologies and extension services.

Ainomugisha says designing with women in mind is not a strategy.

It is lived experience.

“Of course, we also work with men, but the majority of our beneficiaries are women.”

As global conversations increasingly focus on artificial intelligence, her message is clear.

Technology alone is not enough.

It must be accessible.

Affordable.

And designed around people’s realities.

Her next ambition is expansion—making agricultural intelligence available even to farmers without smartphones.

The larger vision is not simply digitising agriculture.

It is restoring dignity to farming.

The memory of rotten tomatoes remains.

So does the memory of school fees that almost went unpaid.

But today, those memories no longer represent failure.

They represent the beginning of a different harvest.

One where innovation is measured not only in algorithms or solar panels but also in whether families who grow food can finally afford to eat, learn and dream.

And for Ainomugisha, that future has already started.

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Data cables connected on network switches in a computer server room. Scott Rodgerson on Unsplash Credit: Africa Renewal

By United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 12 2026 (IPS)

African leaders are sharpening their focus on digital sovereignty, warning that the continent’s economic future will depend not just on connectivity, but on who controls its data—and where it is stored.

At a high-level roundtable during the 58th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Conference of Ministers, held in Tangiers, Morocco, in April 2026, policymakers and technology leaders signaled a decisive shift in Africa’s digital ambitions: from being consumers of technology to becoming architects of their own digital infrastructure and data ecosystems.

Central to this shift is the idea of “sovereign data”—ensuring that African data is stored, processed and governed within the continent.

Participants emphasized that digital independence is no longer optional; it is a prerequisite for economic security and national resilience.

“Digital public infrastructure is as vital today as electricity,” said Américo Muchanga, Mozambique’s Minister of Communications and Digital Transformation. But, he added, infrastructure alone is not enough. Governments must now decide how to classify and manage their data—what remains within national borders, and what can be shared—so that its value benefits African economies.

Beyond infrastructure: entering the “age of intelligence”

For years, Africa’s digital agenda has focused on expanding connectivity—laying fiber, increasing mobile access, and building platforms for public services. While that remains essential, leaders say the conversation must evolve.

Digital public infrastructure (DPI), often described as the “rails” of the digital economy, must now carry something more valuable: intelligence.

As artificial intelligence reshapes economies globally, Africa faces a critical question—will it simply adopt external systems, or build its own?

“Africa must prioritize local data processing and systems that reflect its realities,” said Ambassador Philip Thigo, Kenya’s Special Envoy on Technology. He warned that relying on imported models risks entrenching systems that do not capture African languages, contexts or economic needs.

The solution, participants argued, lies in investing in local talent and capabilities—from data science to AI model training—so that innovation is grounded in African realities.

Building the backbone: data centres and “AI factories”

A recurring theme was the urgent need for infrastructure that can support this transition. Data centres—described as the backbone of the digital economy—remain in short supply.

“Africa needs to increase its data centre capacity tenfold,” said Adil El Youssefi, CEO of Africa Data Centres at Cassava Technologies.

Currently, the continent generates less than 1% of global data despite accounting for nearly 20% of the world’s population.

To bridge this gap, participants called for the development of “AI factories”—facilities capable of storing and processing large volumes of data locally. These would not only support AI development but also ensure that the economic value derived from data remains within Africa.

However, such investments require reliable and affordable energy, as well as long-term financing—two persistent challenges across the continent.

A new model: data embassies and regional cooperation

Among the more innovative ideas discussed was the concept of “data embassies”—shared infrastructure that allows countries to store data securely across borders while maintaining sovereignty.

This model, participants said, could help smaller economies overcome the high costs of building standalone data infrastructure, while strengthening regional integration.

It also reflects a broader push toward collaboration.

Pius Chaya, Tanzania’s Deputy Minister for Planning and Investment, stressed the need for strong public-private partnerships, underpinned by robust cybersecurity and data protection frameworks.

Without trust, he noted, digital systems cannot scale.

From policy to execution

While Africa has made strides in developing digital strategies, leaders acknowledged a familiar challenge: implementation.

Ndaba Gaolathe, Vice President and Finance Minister of Botswana, pointed to a gap between policy ambition and real-world impact. Botswana, he said, is addressing this by using a universal service fund—financed through a levy on mobile operators—to expand connectivity to underserved communities.

“The time for planning alone is over,” he said. “We must now focus on execution.”

This call for “mega execution” reflects a growing urgency to translate strategies into tangible benefits—jobs, services, and economic growth.

Inclusion and measurement

Despite progress, nearly one billion Africans remain offline, even in areas with mobile coverage. Industry representatives, including the GSMA, urged governments to remove taxes on mobile devices to make digital access more affordable.

At the same time, measuring the economic impact of digital transformation remains a challenge.

“If we cannot measure the contribution of technology to GDP, we cannot monetize it,” said Claver Gatete, UNECA’s Executive Secretary. Strengthening national statistical systems, he added, is essential for evidence-based policymaking and accountability.

A defining moment

As Africa accelerates its digital transformation, the stakes are becoming clearer. Data is no longer just a byproduct of the digital economy—it is its most valuable asset.

The discussions in Tangier point to a continent at a crossroads: one that must decide whether to remain a consumer in the global digital order, or to assert control over its data, technologies and economic destiny.

The message from leaders was unmistakable—Africa’s digital future must be built in Africa, and for Africa.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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The World Bank considers corruption a major obstacle to eradicating global poverty. The Bank officially has a zero-tolerance policy against fraud and corruption in its projects. Concerned with widespread corruption in Bangladesh, the Bank and the Government agreed on the Governance-oriented Country Assistance Strategy (GCAS) in 2006 and the Bank’s subsequent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) ostensibly has been more selective on governance and anti-corruption (GAC) issues. Ironically, however, the Bank’s funding enables corruption. The Bank’s recent decision to advance a US$350 million loan allegedly for enhancing energy security is a glaring example.

Anis Chowdhury

The Interim Government’s White Paper on the state of the economy documented the extent of collusion and corruption in the energy sector. It noted the authoritarian kleptocratic government’s inflated demand forecast, disregarding professional projections. Thus, the installed capacity hugely exceeds actual demand. Against the peak summer demand of approximately 17,000 MW, the installed capacity is nearly 32,000 MW (or 30,000 MW considering aging infrastructure). According to the White paper, this artificially “increased capacity was driven by unscrupulous motivations” to benefit the regime’s cronies who formed a monopoly cartel in the power sector.

A series of dodgy moves facilitated unprecedented misappropriation of public money in the sector. The first was the awarding of contracts to 17 private rental plants through ‘negotiation’ in 2010, circumventing the Public Procurement Rules. The second was the Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special Provision) Act 2010, which protected energy contracts from competitive bidding and legal challenges. Such indemnity is a license for corruption, facilitating unchecked project approvals and non-transparent often dollar-denominated Power Purchase Agreements.

These agreements enabled the purchase of electricity from furnace-oil-based plants at prices 40-50% above market rates and from gas-fired plants at prices 45% above market rates, according to the Interim Government’s review committee. Initially established for a four-year period to address an emergency supply situation, the arrangement has been extended multiple times, allowing the cronies to be paid an exorbitant excess capacity charge.

The estimated total excess capacity/rental payment to the private sector from 2010-11 to 2023-24 was approximately US$2.93 billion. In the 2024-25 fiscal year alone the capacity charge was approximately US$3.42 billion, while nearly 63% of installed electricity generation capacity remained idle. According to the review committee, an estimated excess generation capacity of roughly 7,700 to 9,500 MW is causing an additional annual expenditure of US$900 million to US$1.5 billion in capacity payments.

The White Paper estimated that the rental power plants made as high as 35% profit against a standard 15%! The private sector power companies received payments from the government as rent for power plants under the guise of power purchase agreements, where corruption, rather than electricity supply, was the main objective.

Most of the operational private power plants in Bangladesh are owned/controlled by a group of five cronies. They control country’s power sector to loot vast amounts of money. While the kleptocratic regime beat the drum of “self-sufficiency” in electricity, its cronies were pillaging the state coffer.

While the cronies enjoyed excess profits through extraordinary corrupt practices, consumers paid the price. Electricity prices were increased 12 times at the wholesale level and 14 times at the retail level over 15 years during the kleptocratic regime, ostensibly to reduce losses and subsidy requirements. But neither losses nor subsidies declined.

The review committee recommended that contracts containing evidence of corruption should be cancelled immediately. It also recommended renegotiation of high-cost and unequal power purchase agreements to revise and convert them to a “take-and-pay” model following Pakistan’s example.

Instead of taking these recommended measures, the current government has chosen the path of the kleptocratic regime’s looting model. The decision to hike the electricity price will protect the fatty pockets of cronies at the expense of the common people.

The World Bank’s role

The Bank has been a prime advocate of privatisation of Bangladesh’s energy sector, citing widespread corruption and inefficiency of the publicly-owned power sector. It pushed for “unbundling” vertically integrated state monopolies, facilitating Independent Power Producers (IPPs), and mobilising private capital through financial guarantees – a strategy that supposedly should improve energy security and at the same time ease public fiscal burden.

The Bank has been providing loans ostensibly to help Bangladesh improve its energy security. But that has made the country heavily reliant on imported Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and fossil fuels and has locked Bangladesh into steep capacity payments, draining foreign exchange reserves. Thus, the Bank’s loans allegedly for ensuring energy sector security have created a vicious circle of debt burden and plunder of public coffer through hefty capacity payments.

Instead of further advancing loans of US$350 million, the Bank should have told the government to implement the recommendations of the Interim Government’s review committee; i.e., cancel the unscrupulous agreements with IPPs and stop fiscal bleeding through unfair capacity payments. The savings from the capacity charges would have been more than enough to pay for the imports of LNG without incurring additional debt burden.

The Bank’s anti-corruption record

Why does the Bank advance loans to the sector riddled with widespread corruption? The Bank’s anti-corruption record is at best disappointing globally. The Bank once took a firm anti-corruption stance in Bangladesh when it pulled out of the Padma Bridge project alleging corruption. But it scrambled to recover its lost ground when other lenders with strategic interests came forward to fill the gap.

Evaluating the Bank’s engagement in Bangladesh during 2011-2020, the World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group concluded, “Despite a trend of deterioration in the country’s institutional quality and economic management, the Bank Group significantly increased financing to Bangladesh over the review period, making Bangladesh one of the largest borrowers”.

As a lending agency, the Bank’s existence depends on debtor countries’ borrowings, regardless of its lofty ideals, such as poverty reduction. A fundamental flaw in the international aid system: “the donors are more desperate to give than the recipients are to receive”. Therefore, the Bank takes a “pragmatic” approach, and tolerates corruption.

Then why did the Bank declare zero-tolerance policy against corruption? Perhaps this is because it has to satisfy the public anti-corruption sentiment in creditor nations; their citizens do not want to see their tax dollars being misappropriated.

Renowned political economist, Robert Wade conceptualises this as gesturing to appease creditor governments while acting to the contrary to appease borrower governments. Thus, the Bank’s “organised hypocrisy” enables corruption in poor borrower countries.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. Anis has written extensively on macroeconomic issues, sustainable development, international financial architecture and political economy. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com; a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu.au

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Credit: UN News

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jun 5 2026 (IPS)

Ahead of World Environment Day, the UN General Assembly made a vital commitment to protect people from climate impacts, adopting a resolution on the climate change obligations of states. The resolution follows up on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion issued last year, which found that states have a legal duty to prevent activities that cause environmental harm. Most states voted for the resolution despite a concerted campaign by the Trump administration to block it.

From ruling to resolution

The ICJ ruling was a landmark moment. It made clear that climate change is a human rights issue, because the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is essential for human rights as a whole. Its ruling means that if states breach their climate obligations, it’s an intentionally wrongful act, opening them up to legal challenges.

The ICJ case was brought by the government of Vanuatu, but it was a victory for civil society, because the campaign to seek a ruling was started by law students who formed an organisation, Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, to pressure their governments to go to the court.

ICJ advisory opinions aren’t legally binding, but their reasoning often plays a part in litigation efforts, strengthening the climate lawsuits civil society is increasingly bringing against states and corporations. It’s already being referenced in court hearings. Last year, a Brazilian judge cited it when he ordered a coalmine and thermoelectric plant to cease operations, although his ruling is currently on hold pending an appeal.

However, at the latest global climate summit, COP30, the Saudi Arabian government vetoed any reference to the ICJ ruling. Vanuatu therefore pushed for the General Assembly resolution to recognise the international legal standing of the judgment and encourage greater implementation.

Approval was far from unanimous. The Trump administration urged its allies to pressure Vanuatu to withdraw the resolution, part of its extensive campaign to defend the interests of fossil fuel corporations. It has also renounced the Paris Agreement and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, withdrawn from an array of international climate and environmental bodies and blocked an agreement on global shipping emissions. It was one of eight states that voted against, alongside Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, a roll call of petrostates, countries that routinely ignore international rules and their close allies. The Trump administration continues to dispute the resolution, having issued a statement questioning its legality.

Momentum and resistance

States that backed the resolution have made clear that action on the climate crisis isn’t a question of political convenience, but a matter of respecting international law.

The resolution further contributes to the growing momentum behind climate action, despite attempts by a handful of powerful states to drag the world backwards. Renewables now provide around 30 per cent of global electricity, and renewable energy investments in 2025 were more than double those in fossil fuels. The First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, held in April, brought together 57 states to commit to developing national roadmaps to phase out fossil fuel production and consumption. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil supplies flow, has brought further recognition of the reality that fossil fuel dependence benefits only a handful of petrostates and leaves everyone else vulnerable.

These shifts are having an impact. In May, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change dropped its worst-case scenario for the possible effects of climate change, under which global temperatures could have risen to 4.5 degrees above preindustrial levels, because emissions cuts are making a difference.

Activists in the crosshairs

The ICJ case offers just one example of how civil society is making a crucial difference in pushing for climate action. Activists are urging ambition and resisting new fossil fuel projects. But they’re paying a heavy price. The Business and Human Rights Centre found that in 2025, three quarters of almost 800 attacks it documented against people who spoke out against businesses targeted those who mobilised on climate, environmental and land rights issues.

Ten activists from the Mother Nature Cambodia environmental group remain in jail, having been handed heavy sentences in 2024 in retaliation for their work to raise public awareness about the impacts of extractive and infrastructure projects. In Mexico, Kenia Hernandez, leader of the Zapata Vive peasant movement that protects land rights, is serving a ten-and-a-half year sentence on fabricated charges.

In Uganda, last year authorities arrested 11 activists for protesting against the construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. In January, police raided the home of Harjeet Singh, one of India’s most prominent environmental activists and a vocal campaigner for a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty. In Chile, where the government has weakened environmental laws, Indigenous women activists are experiencing intimidation, judicial harassment and violent attacks for opposing large-scale projects.

Last year the German government launched an inquiry into public funding of environmental groups, the Dutch parliament adopted a motion declaring Extinction Rebellion an ‘unlawful, society-disrupting and vandalistic organisation’ and the Portuguese government listed environmental groups in a section on terrorism of its annual security report. Authorities in Australia and New Zealand have arrested numerous people at climate and environmental protests, including in opposition to coal mining.

The UN resolution makes clear that criminalisation and violence are incompatible with states’ obligations, and everyone has a part to play in climate action. It calls on states to ‘ensure the full, meaningful and equal participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, people of African descent, women and girls, children and youth, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations in decision-making on climate action’.

States that backed the resolution are attacking the people it demands they work with. They can’t meet their climate obligations unless they stop repressing civil society. The resolution should give fresh impetus to civil society’s calls to replace repression with partnership.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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A street in Beirut, Lebanon, where civilian infrastructure has sustained significant damage. Credit: Pexels/Jo Kassis

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)

Last week on May 28, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) issued an evacuation order to Lebanese civilians ordering them to move north of the Zahrani River, approximately 25 miles from the Israeli border, and roughly 20 percent of the Lebanese territory. These new escalations bring the displaced population to more than 1.3 million people, including more than 300,000 of those people being children. 1.3 million people represents approximately 1/4th of the nation’s population of 5.3 million.

On Friday May 29th, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said the following regarding the current situation of displacement: “Just in the past 48 hours, renewed displacement orders by the Israeli Defence Forces have affected hundreds of thousands of people south of the Zahrani River, including in the cities of Tyre and Nabatieh. Collective shelters in Tyre and Saida in the South Governorate are reportedly full and can’t take in more people.”

On Friday May 22nd, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observed a continuation of Israeli military aggression along with Hezbollah attacks on Israeli force mission areas. In the following week, on Monday May 25th, the largest number of airspace violations at 91 occurrences, along with 399 firing incidents by the IDF were recorded. Additionally, on May 27th, 670 trajectories of projectiles were reported, making this the highest since the cessation of hostilities on April 17th. The IDF has also been attributed to separate incidents of firings on Saturday May 23rd and Sunday May 24th, at approximately 160 per day, with about 16 launches of projectiles by Hezbollah; along with large-scale engineering works, logistical traffic, and armored vehicle convoys through this escalation by the IDF.

Between May 21 and May 24, the World Health Organization (WHO) recorded 8 health workers killed and 45 injured, with 25 medical staff just on May 23rd being injured at the Hiram Hospital in the South governorate following airstrikes.

“We reiterate that attacks on health workers and health facilities are unacceptable. All parties to conflicts must immediately stop them and ensure protection for healthcare,” said Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Farhan Haq.

As of March 2026, a flash appeal has been submitted by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), acting as a funding instrument to garner USD 308.3 million to provide life-saving assistance and protection targeting up to 1 million people. Within this appeal, USD 61 million is planned to be allocated to Multi-purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA), $56 million to Food Security & Agriculture, $42.5 million to Shelter, and $40 million and $37 million to WASH and Health, along with other allocations to much needed life-saving sectors. Prior to these latest advancements, an estimated 3 million people were already requiring assistance, with 961,000 people facing acute food insecurity.

Although conditions are worsening, all ports remain operational and accessible, according to the latest report from Logistics Cluster. Airspace is open as well, however humanitarian and commercial access remains limited. Also, according to the same report from Logistics Cluster, many roads and bridges in southern Lebanon remain not passable or closed, limiting crucial movements of goods into the most affected areas of hostilities.

OCHA told Inter Press Service that these constraints have been “complicating planning and limiting sustained operations, even as partners continue to reach people where access permits.”

As of May 2026, fuel prices are higher in Lebanon than any other state in the region, besides Pakistan. Since February 28th 2026, the following increases have been recorded:

The estimated fuel increase by country since February 28th, 2026. Credit: Maximilian Malawista

OCHA added that “Rising costs are adding further pressure on an already fragile humanitarian response. Fuel prices have surged significantly, driving up transport and production costs, while the cost of basic food items has also increased.” OCHA warned that these trends are “undermining people’s ability to afford essentials”, and are “further complicating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”

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LED street lights have been installed in the area around Hyderabad's famous Necklace Road, a scenic boulevard in the heart of the city that curves around the Hussain Sagar Lake. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

By Stella Paul
HYDERABAD, India, May 28 2026 (IPS)

Ahead of the Eighth Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, governments and development institutions are grappling with a familiar challenge: How to finance environmental action at the scale required to meet rapidly growing needs.

As public budgets tighten and biodiversity and climate risks intensify, attention is increasingly turning to blended finance – an approach that combines concessional public funding with commercial investment to mobilise large-scale capital.

Supporters say this model can reduce investment risks and unlock private capital for projects that might otherwise struggle to secure funding. Critics caution that such approaches still depend heavily on public support and may not be easily replicable everywhere.

In Hyderabad, India, one of the world’s largest municipal LED streetlighting programs has emerged as a prominent example of how blended finance can work in practice.

Turning Streetlights into Climate Finance

Hyderabad, a rapidly expanding and climate-vulnerable metropolis, has sought to address rising temperatures and growing energy demand by retrofitting its street lighting system with energy-efficient LEDs under India’s Street Lighting National Programme (SLNP). The initiative was part of a broader programme – Creating and Sustaining Markets for Energy Efficiency – implemented by Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), with support from the GEF.

The program combined GEF grant funding with more than USD 434 million in co-financing to deploy energy-efficient technologies at scale.

“The environmental financing gap runs into hundreds of billions of dollars annually. This is a scale that grants and ODA alone cannot close,” said Fred Boltz, Head of Programming at the GEF.

“Mobilising private capital is essential to sustaining a healthy planet.”

Blended finance works by reducing risks for private investors – through concessional loans, guarantees, or grant support – making projects viable in markets where returns are uncertain. By absorbing part of the risk, public or philanthropic funding enables commercial investors to participate in sectors such as renewable energy, biodiversity, and sustainable infrastructure, which are often perceived as too risky.

In Hyderabad, EESL financed the installation of LED streetlights and recovered costs through future energy savings, eliminating the need for large upfront spending by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC).

More than 450,000 streetlights were replaced during the initial phases, with further expansion extending coverage across the city. Electricity consumption linked to public lighting dropped by roughly half, generating annual savings of more than ₹1 billion (about USD 12 million) while significantly reducing carbon emissions.

How Savings Became an Asset

The financing structure relied on a “deemed savings” model. Instead of paying upfront, municipal authorities repaid investments over time using verified reductions in electricity and maintenance costs.

Supporters say such arrangements help cities modernise infrastructure, despite budget constraints. But analysts warn that they depend on accurate projections, reliable maintenance, and strong institutional capacity.

Experts agree that blended finance works best when public institutions remain actively involved in implementation and oversight.

In Hyderabad, the programme incorporated a Centralised Monitoring and Control System (CCMS), allowing authorities to track electricity use, detect faults, and monitor performance in real time.

The system improved operational oversight while generating the data needed for performance-linked financing – where payments are tied to independently verified outcomes.

Newly retrofitted LED street lights on the eastern edge of Hyderabad, in India. LED lights are a cost- and energy-efficient alternative to other lighting and bring a sense of security to the areas where they are installed. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

Beyond Carbon: From Climate Finance to Everyday Life

For residents, the effects of the LED transition are often experienced less in financial or technical terms than in everyday routines and perceptions of safety.

Kavitha Ramavath (27) and her husband, Ravi Ramavath (35), recently moved with their two young children to Uppal Bhagath, a fast-growing neighbourhood on the eastern edge of Hyderabad. They previously lived in Uppal Kalan, about four kilometres away, where housing was cheaper, but the infrastructure was poor. Kavitha works as a domestic worker, while Ravi drives an auto-rickshaw.

Although their rent has nearly doubled, improved lighting has changed their daily lives.

“This area is more lively, with wider and better-lit roads,” Kavitha said, pointing toward an LED streetlight outside her lane. “Earlier, I used to feel scared walking alone to drop or pick up my children from tuition classes.”

Now, she says, her children can play outside longer in the evenings and nearby shops keep their shutters open later. Ravi adds that he can park his auto-rickshaw outside their home without worrying about theft or damage.

Urban planners say improved public lighting can influence mobility, informal economic activity, and perceptions of public safety – especially for women and children.

Last week, Kavitha started a small fruit cart outside her home. The brighter street allows her to continue working after dusk, when customer footfall increases.

For her family, the benefits are not measured in emissions reductions or financing structures but in the possibility of earning a little more income while feeling safer in public spaces.

From Local Streets to Global Finance Models

While Hyderabad’s experience highlights blended finance in climate mitigation, the model increasingly extends far beyond energy efficiency.

Across the world, GEF-backed blended finance initiatives are channelling investments into biodiversity conservation, ocean protection, and sustainable supply chains. These projects demonstrate how public funding can unlock private capital in sectors that have traditionally struggled to attract investment.

In Brazil, for instance, the Living Amazon Mechanism combines capital market instruments with philanthropic funding to support sustainable supply chains in the Amazon. It links cooperatives and local producers with financing while reducing risk through the participation of a corporate buyer, Natura, which acts as an investor and off-taker.

Similarly, global platforms such as the IFC–GEF Green Global Supply Chain Decarbonisation Initiative aim to provide long-term, green-linked loans to manufacturers and suppliers in emerging markets, helping address a critical barrier – access to affordable capital for decarbonisation.

At the sovereign level, blended finance is also enabling innovative debt and bond instruments. The Seychelles blue bond, supported by a World Bank guarantee and GEF concessional financing, has demonstrated how countries can raise private capital for marine conservation while reducing borrowing costs

In Latin America and the Caribbean, a new facility backed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and GEF is using blended finance to expand debt-for-nature conversions, which allow countries to refinance debt at lower costs and redirect savings toward biodiversity conservation and climate resilience.

These models share a common principle: public or concessional capital absorbs risks, enabling private investors to enter sectors where financial returns alone might not justify investment.

Building Markets Beyond Cities

The Hyderabad programme did not stop with municipal infrastructure. Through India’s UJALA initiative, EESL also expanded access to LED lighting in households by aggregating demand and procuring bulbs in bulk.

This approach helped reduce LED bulb prices dramatically, making energy-efficient lighting affordable for millions of households and introducing on-bill financing systems that allowed payments in small instalments.

By addressing both public infrastructure and household demand, the programme aimed not only to deploy energy-efficient technologies but also to create long-term, self-sustaining markets.

“The path to scalable environmental outcomes runs through blended finance. Public capital does what private capital won’t – it absorbs excess risk and funds the rigorous monitoring that turns lessons into lasting change. Crowd out the public, and you crowd out the results,” said Boltz.

A Test Case for Blended Finance

As global discussions on climate and biodiversity financing intensify, Hyderabad is increasingly being viewed as a test case for how blended finance can operate at the city level.

Srinivas Kona, a clean energy expert from the Hyderabad-based consultancy Proventure, says, “The LED programme demonstrated how concessional funding, public-sector implementation, and savings-based repayment structures can work together to expand urban infrastructure without large upfront municipal expenditure.”

At the same time, he cautions that challenges remain. “It’s not clear how easily such models can be replicated elsewhere, especially in smaller cities with weaker revenue systems and lower administrative capacity,” he said, noting reports of maintenance issues affecting some installations.

Still, Hyderabad’s experience offers a glimpse into how global finance debates translate into visible changes in everyday urban life.

Last week, Kavitha Ramavath stood beside her new fruit cart under a bright LED streetlight, arranging guavas and bananas as evening customers passed by.

Fruit vending comes with risks, she says, but the extra income could help her family manage rising rent and school expenses.

For Kavitha, the impact of blended finance is not measured in investment flows or policy frameworks. It is reflected in the ability to work longer hours safely, earn a little more money, and imagine a more stable future for her children.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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The Federal Reserve Bank’s turn to ‘reserve management’ exposes the limited policy options still available as the US seeks to protect itself against international stagflation stemming from President Trump’s policies.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Reserve management
Successive US administrations have long refused to address the roots of the worsening fiscal and debt problems.

As the US Treasury borrows ever more to continue funding federal government spending with less tax revenue, the accumulated public debt of $39 trillion now costs over a trillion dollars a year to service, even more than 2025 defence spending!

Total Fed losses since 2022 exceed $245 billion! But how does a central bank, that literally creates its own money, lose money?

The losses are blamed on the Fed paying banks over 4% interest on reserves after 2008. However, most Treasury bonds the Fed bought to fund the COVID crisis response yield only 1–2%!

This massive ‘negative carry trade’ is booked as a ‘deferred asset’. Such creative accounting implies the US is technically insolvent. But this is not a problem as long as Wall Street shapes its own narrative.

Nurina Malek

After over a decade of ‘quantitative easing’ (QE), which created money on a large scale, the Fed claimed it was reducing its balance sheet from 2022 to 2025 to curb inflation.

Risk diversification
Finance ministries and central banks worldwide increasingly worry about their vulnerability.

The US decision to freeze about $300 billion of Russian assets held in Western financial institutions is supported by its Western allies. Such actions have triggered broader concerns.

Threatened by the prospect of a softening bond market, the Fed turn to reserve management, which implies it has exhausted other options, including printing money.

Increasingly weaponised in recent years, the dollar is no longer trusted as a neutral reserve asset. Hence, central banks have been diversifying their heavily dollar-denominated reserve assets to reduce vulnerability.

Physical gold has been quietly acquired to change reserve portfolios. Over the past three years, non-US central banks have bought over 1,000 tons of gold annually.

Horns of dilemma
New Fed Chair Kevin Warsh has announced that reducing interest rates and shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet are his policy priorities. Both seem responsible and sensible.

Lowering rates benefits borrowers. But a smaller balance sheet implies less market intervention, requiring greater fiscal discipline and monetary credibility, both of which are desired by markets.

But Warsh’s two goals cannot be realised together in today’s US economy. Over $10 trillion in bonds are maturing and need refinancing over the coming year, as the Treasury borrows ever more to finance its faster-growing fiscal deficit.

The Fed balance sheet cannot be reduced while keeping rates low. The new Fed Chair will also have to choose between printing money and letting the bond market collapse. All his predecessors have chosen to print money.

In 2012, Jerome Powell was sceptical of QE, arguing it would never be enough. But by 2020, Fed chair Powell printed more dollars than ever before.

The Fed has long been expected to buy up Treasury bonds that private interests did not purchase. Increasing the money supply has kept the banking system liquid and depreciated the dollar, as desired by Trump 2.0.

As private investors and foreign central banks lose interest in US Treasury bonds, demand is at its weakest in decades.

Who will buy new US debt if the Fed does not buy Treasury bonds while rates remain low? Outgoing Fed chair Powell came to the rescue.

As ‘reserve management’ requires less market demand, he has given the dollar system an unexpected new lease of life without lowering interest rates, as Trump demanded.

However, the policy change will do little to reverse contractionary and inflationary pressures on the world economy, worsened by Trump’s various policies.

Oil accelerant
The Hormuz oil shock could accelerate this otherwise gradual transition. The slow energy transition away from fossil fuels has increased vulnerability.

In the last half-century, oil price hikes have raised energy costs, exacerbating inflation worldwide. In 1973, the OPEC embargo quadrupled petroleum prices overnight.

Over the following year, the gold price almost doubled. The 1979 Iranian revolution more than doubled crude oil prices, which in turn pushed gold prices even higher.

The conventional central bank response of raising rates to fight inflation could worsen stagflation, as inflation rises while economic growth slows.

Raising interest rates may check some sources of inflation, while increasing borrowing costs, squeezing investment and consumption, and hiking the costs of Treasury debt.

Interest payments on accumulated federal debt will exceed a trillion in 2026. As old debt issued during QE is refinanced at higher rates, fiscal and debt problems will accelerate.

Therefore, the Fed’s turn to reserve management is not merely a minor technical change in balance-sheet bookkeeping. It is trying to address worsening public finances as policy options run out.

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Astana’s futuristic skyline and Japan’s urban landscape converge with symbols of clean energy, connectivity and peace, reflecting a partnership shaped by smart-city cooperation, energy security, and shared memories of nuclear suffering.　Credit: INPS Japan

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
TOKYO, Japan, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The relationship between Japan and Kazakhstan is often described in terms of diplomacy, investment and regional cooperation. But at a time of growing geopolitical uncertainty, it deserves to be understood in broader terms: as a partnership linking cities, resources, technology and peace.

Kisho Kurokawa

For Japan, however, Astana is not simply a distant capital. Its master plan was shaped in part by the late Kisho Kurokawa, one of Japan’s leading architects, who sought to combine Kazakhstan’s nomadic heritage, harsh natural environment and state-building ambitions with forward-looking urban design. That historical connection is now taking on new meaning as Japan and Kazakhstan expand cooperation in smart cities, green technologies, energy security and nuclear disarmament.

On May 22, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike in Astana to discuss cooperation in smart city development, digital technologies, finance, education, emergency response and sustainable urban management. Tokyo, one of the world’s most densely populated metropolitan areas, has developed advanced systems in public safety, disaster preparedness, transportation and administrative services. For rapidly growing Astana, Tokyo’s experience provides a valuable reference point.

Akorda

Yet the deepening Japan-Kazakhstan relationship cannot be explained by urban cooperation alone. Behind it lies a more urgent geopolitical reality: instability in the Middle East and the resulting anxiety over energy security.

Japan has long depended heavily on the Middle East for crude oil. Tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz pose risks that directly affect Japan’s economy and daily life. For Tokyo, diversifying energy sources, critical mineral supplies and transport routes is no longer simply a matter of trade policy. It has become a central element of economic security.

Middle Corridor. Photo credit: TITR

For Japan, rare earths, lithium and other critical minerals are essential to batteries, electronics, renewable energy systems and next-generation industries. Diversifying both sources of supply and transport routes is therefore an energy policy, an industrial policy and a security policy at once. Astana is increasingly becoming an important platform for Japan’s engagement with Central Asia.

Semipalatinsk Former Nuclear Weapon Test site. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

Urban development, environmental technologies, resource cooperation and logistics infrastructure are no longer separate policy fields. They are becoming part of a wider strategic framework in which Japan and Kazakhstan can complement each other: one with advanced technology and urban management experience, the other with resources, geography and a young capital still in the process of defining its future.

But there is a deeper layer to this relationship that should not be overlooked: the memory of nuclear suffering.

Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kazakhstan endured severe radiation damage from repeated Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site, where more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term consequences for local communities and public health.

In 1991, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk test site. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it gave up one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals remaining on its territory and chose the path of a non-nuclear-weapon state. That decision has become a defining feature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.

Japan and Kazakhstan both know, not as an abstract matter of security theory but through historical experience, what nuclear weapons can inflict on human beings, communities, the environment and future generations. This shared memory gives the bilateral relationship a distinct ethical foundation.

That memory has also shaped sustained cooperation among governments, civil society and international organizations. INPS Japan has reported on nuclear disarmament-related conferences and events involving Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Center for International Security and Policy, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Soka Gakkai International.

A Group photo of participants of the regional conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear-free-zone in Central Asia held on August 29, 2023. Photo Credit: Jibek Joly TV Channel

One notable example was the anti-nuclear exhibition “Everything You Treasure — For a World Free From Nuclear Weapons,” jointly organized in Astana by SGI, ICAN and Kazakhstan’s Center for International Security and Policy. Held in September 2022 at Keruen Mall in central Astana, the exhibition used photographs, illustrations and graphics to educate young people about the dangers of nuclear weapons, from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to the continuing humanitarian consequences of nuclear arms.

A documentary produced by CISP, a Kazakh NGO, with support from SGI.

Such initiatives are important because nuclear disarmament cannot be left to diplomats alone. If the memory of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Semipalatinsk is to shape policy, it must also be passed to younger generations. Exhibitions, survivor testimony, documentaries and civil society campaigns help ensure that nuclear weapons are discussed not only as instruments of deterrence, but also as weapons with catastrophic human, environmental and intergenerational consequences.

In 2023, a regional conference in Astana addressed the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, testimony from nuclear test victims, and victim assistance and environmental remediation under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Unlike debates that frame nuclear weapons mainly in terms of deterrence or national prestige, such forums place affected people, their families, communities and environment at the center.

A documentary on Kazakhstan’s nuclear test victims, I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon, produced by Kazakhstan’s CISP with support from SGI, has also helped bring the testimonies of second- and third-generation victims in the Semey region to international audiences. Together with workshops involving the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and discussions on cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, these efforts keep the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons at the center of global disarmament debates.

Akorda.kz

That message should be taken seriously. Japan and Kazakhstan do not occupy identical security positions. Japan continues to rely on the United States’ nuclear deterrence as part of its security policy, while Kazakhstan, having renounced nuclear weapons, is a member of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Yet both countries share common ground in seeking to transform the memory of nuclear harm into action for international peace.

Japan and Kazakhstan Draw Closer as Iran Crisis Reshapes Energy and Security Priorities. Credit: INPS Japan

At a time when crises in the Middle East are shaking the global energy order and nuclear risks are again moving to the forefront of international politics, the Japan-Kazakhstan relationship is no longer merely a story of friendship. It reflects Japan’s own choices in an age of uncertainty: whether to approach Central Asia only as a source of resources, or as a region with which it can build a broader partnership linking cities, technology, energy security and peace.

Astana, the futuristic capital shaped in part by a Japanese architect, has become more than a symbol of Kazakhstan’s ambitions. It is also a reminder that the future of international cooperation will depend not only on markets and infrastructure, but on memory, responsibility and the courage to imagine security beyond fear.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

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U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Aquidneck (WPB-1309) in the Strait of Hormuz, with a large container ship visible in the background as it transits the critical global trade route (Dec. 2, 2020). Credit: MC2 Indra Beaufort

By Lulseged Desta and Jonathan Mockshell
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Sharp surges in energy, fertilizer, and food prices triggered by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf strikingly illustrate the deep interconnections between geopolitical conflict, food insecurity, and the fragility of fossil fuel–dependent food systems.

Besides carrying roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day (about 27 percent of global oil exports), the Strait of Hormuz also handles 20–30 percent of internationally traded inorganic fertilizers, which uses natural gas as a key ingredient in its production. Its closure has immediately disrupted the flow of these essential commodities, triggering sharp price spikes in fuel and key agricultural inputs.

This situation demonstrates how geopolitical instability can rapidly disrupt essential agricultural functions under current input-dependent, industrial production systems that rely heavily on external energy and supply chains. This crisis highlights, more clearly than ever, a critical reality: food systems tied to fossil fuels are inherently unsustainable, continually undermine food sovereignty, and disproportionately affect farmers, particularly smallholders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). World Food Programme estimates warn that, if the conflict continues, the soaring oil, shipping and food costs will push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, driving the global total beyond its record 319 million¹.

Reducing food systems’ reliance on fossil fuels and external inputs is essential to strengthen our collective resilience to future shocks. The truth is that fossil fuels courses through every stage of the food system – from fertilizers and pesticides to processing, preservation, transportation, packaging, food waste disposal, and even food preparation. Moreover, entrenched economic and political structures lock in this fossil-fuel dependence through massive subsidies and price protections – estimated at over $1 trillion in recent years².

Food systems account for at least 15 percent of total fossil fuel use – mostly through synthetic fertilizers ⁴ – but also to power machinery and vehicles, and generate electricity and heat for key processes like irrigation, grain drying, livestock housing, and food storage.

Agroecological approaches to food production offer an alternative to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels while still meeting the needs of a growing global population. This supports a transition from energy-sink systems to regenerative ones, radically enhancing food systems’ resilience in the face of escalating geopolitical instability and environmental vulnerability.

Agroecology is based on natural processes and local resources for sustainable soil fertility. Crucially, many of these practices draw directly from indigenous knowledge systems, where local communities have long maintained soil health through time. Practical steps include the use of organic fertilization (often blended with minimal synthetic inputs), efficient soil microorganisms, nitrogen-fixing plants, and soil health practices like crop rotation, cover cropping, intercropping, reduced tillage, and crop-livestock integration.

Research consistently shows that agroecological approaches – such as farm diversification and tree integrated systems – outperform conventional systems in climate resilience, nutrient cycling, and soil health^5,6, often while boosting yields^7-9. Agroforestry also provides a source of wood fuel, making it a valuable alternative during fossil fuel shortages and price spikes.

Examples can be found worldwide. Peruvian cocoa farmers are using bokashi and bio-oil amendments to restore soil organic matter, regenerate microbial activity, and enhance nutrient cycling¹⁰. In Vietnam, rice-fish coculture systems optimize nutrient cycling, curb pests, and diversify outputs – lowering costs while stabilizing farmer incomes¹¹. Ethiopian farmers practicing wheat-fava bean rotations are cutting fertilizer needs while improving soil structure and building long-term fertility11. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF)’, delivers biodiversity benefits while more than doubling farmers’ economic profits and maintaining comparable crop yields, than chemical-based farming ^12,13.

Other farm-level steps to curb fossil fuel dependence include integrating renewable energy sources for on-site generation and operations – like solar panels, biogas digesters, and wind turbines; solar water pumps, adopting fuel-efficient engines and draft animals; and embracing practices such as minimum tillage, precision irrigation, integrated pest management, and low-input crop-livestock systems.

More fundamentally, shifting from global, industrial commodity chains toward territorial, agroecological food networks can relocalize production, processing, and consumption – shortening supply chains and reducing energy-intensive operations. Shorter, localized supply chains reduce reliance on long-distance transport, lower packaging demand, and promote reusable packaging systems, thereby decreasing fossil fuel consumption.

These efforts can be reinforced by complementary practices that strengthen food sovereignty, such as home gardens and urban agriculture. Crucially, agroecology also aligns with reduced production of ultra-processed foods – among the most energy-intensive products – helping to curb fossil fuel use while potentially improving public health.

In the short term, it is crucial that the allocation of emergency funds are earmarked to procure or purchase organic alternatives to synthetic fertilizers, particularly in the most affected regions. Longer-term, it is necessary to reduce structural barriers to farmers’ adoption of these agroecological approaches including reforms to agricultural subsidies and strengthening support for technical assistance and local governance.

References
1. Farge, E. Iran war may push 45 million people into acute hunger by June, WFP says. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-war-may-push-45-million-people-into-acute-hunger-by-june-wfp-says-2026-03-17/ (2026).

2. IPES-Food. Fuel to Fork: What Will It Take to Get Fossil Fuels out of Our Food Systems? https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FuelToFork.pdf (2025).

3. FAO, UNDP, and UNEP. A Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity – Repurposing Agricultural Support to Transform Food Systems. (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP, 2021). doi:10.4060/cb6562en.

4. Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Power Shift: Why We Need to Wean Industrial Food Systems off Fossil Fuels. https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ga_food-energy-nexus_report.pdf (2023).

5. Niether, W., Jacobi, J., Blaser, W. J., Andres, C. & Armengot, L. Cocoa agroforestry systems versus monocultures: a multi-dimensional meta-analysis. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104085 (2020).

6. Beillouin, D., Ben‐Ari, T., Malézieux, E., Seufert, V. & Makowski, D. Positive but variable effects of crop diversification on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Glob. Change Biol. 27, 4697–4710 (2021).

7. Dittmer, K. M. et al. Agroecology Can Promote Climate Change Adaptation Outcomes Without Compromising Yield In Smallholder Systems. Environ. Manage. 72, 333–342 (2023).

8. Rodenburg, J., Mollee, E., Coe, R. & Sinclair, F. Global analysis of yield benefits and risks from integrating trees with rice and implications for agroforestry research in Africa. Field Crops Res. 281, 108504 (2022).

9. Jones, S. K. et al. Achieving win-win outcomes for biodiversity and yield through diversified farming. Basic Appl. Ecol. 67, 14–31 (2023).

10. Altieri, M. A. & Nicholls, C. I. Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture. J. Peasant Stud. 47, 881–898 (2020).

11. FAO. The State of Food and Agriculture 2022. (FAO, 2022). doi:10.4060/cb9479en.

12. Berger, I. et al. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming’, delivers biodiversity and economic benefits without lowering yields. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 2057–2068 (2025).

13. O’Garra, T. Agroecology benefits people and planet. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 1973–1974 (2025).

14. IPES-Food. Food from Somewhere: Building Food Security and Resilience through Territorial Markets. https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FoodFromSomewhere.pdf (2024).

15. Einarsson, R. Nitrogen in the Food System. https://tabledebates.org/building-blocks/nitrogen-food-system (2024) doi:10.56661/2fa45626.

Lulseged Desta, CGIAR Multifunctional Landscapes Science Program; Jonathan Mockshell, Alliance Biodiversity International – CIAT

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Khaled Khiari, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Middle East, Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, addresses the Security Council meeting on maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, May 18 2026 (IPS)

Four years after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, 2026 has marked a significant escalation in hostilities, with intensified bombardments from both sides causing immense destruction across the region, complicating humanitarian operations, and deepening an already severe humanitarian crisis. As exchanges of attacks have intensified in recent days, the United Nations (UN) warns that women and girls will be disproportionately impacted as violence disrupts access to basic, lifesaving services.

Last week on May 13, Russian forces launched a massive barrage of approximately 800 drones, targeting western regions of Ukraine, including areas that surround the Hungarian border. Local authorities informed the UN’s country office in Ukraine that the attacks resulted in multiple civilian casualties and extensive damage to critical infrastructure, including energy facilities and railway hubs. Significant destruction was reported in the Rivne, Volyn, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, where several sites came under fire.

This attack triggered what UN Ukraine described as “one of the most intense and prolonged attacks of the war to date,” with continuous hostilities from Russian forces reported across the country for nearly 24 hours. Violence intensified the following day in Kyiv, where drone and missile strikes targeted major residential neighborhoods and key civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian authorities reported that at least 140 Ukrainians were killed, including six children, with figures expected to rise as rescue operations continue. Officials also stated that a high-rise residential building in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district sustained significant damage following a direct strike, leaving numerous residents trapped beneath the rubble.

Approximately 24 civilians were killed and 48 others were injured in the strike, including three children who were found dead. UN Ukraine reported that emergency teams carried out search-and-rescue operations and extinguished fires despite immense risks, as strikes continued to land. That same day, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that a “clearly marked” UN vehicle was struck twice in Kherson City while delivering aid to vulnerable communities.

“Families should always feel safe,” said Bernadette Castel-Hollingsworth, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees’ (UNHCR) Representative in Ukraine. “Mothers should not be waiting to know if their children are alive under the rubble after these missile attacks,” she continued, stressing that attacks that target civilians are a violation of humanitarian law.

According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) , civilian casualties in Ukraine over the first four months of 2026 were higher than any four-month period recorded in any of the last three years. The Mission found that this is primarily due to a massive rise in the use of long-range weapons, which carry a far greater capacity for destruction and civilian harm, especially when used in densely populated urban areas.

HRMMU found that in April of this year, at least 84 civilians were killed and 628 others were injured as a direct result of long-range weapons use, accounting for approximately 43 percent of the total civilian casualties recorded during that period.

“I deplore the resumption of these large-scale attacks which have resulted in civilian casualties across the country,” said the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk on May 14. “Attacks by long-range weapons are one of the leading causes of civilian casualties in Ukraine. Their expanded use in populated areas will only increase the already mounting toll on civilians,” Turk added, urging for an immediate de-escalation of hostilities.

Ukrainian women and girls have been severely and disproportionately impacted by the war, with the first three months of 2026 marking the deadliest winter for women and girls since the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. According to figures from UN Women, approximately 199 women and girls were killed between January and March of this year. This follows a 27 percent increase in casualties among women between 2025 and 2024.

More than four years into the Russian invasion, women and girls in Ukraine are facing immense stress under the threats of war and subsequent attacks on energy infrastructure. Credit: UN Women/Aurel Obreja

During a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on May 12, UN Women’s Representative in Ukraine Sabine Friezer Gunes informed reporters that attacks on energy infrastructure have devastated mental and physical wellbeing for women across Ukraine, particularly those in caregiving roles. Gunes noted that many of these women are struggling to manage increasing household responsibilities, growing financial pressures, and shrinking access to essential resources, such as reliable electricity.

“Women are significantly more likely than men to report having no backup energy supply during disruptions – 73 per cent of women say that they have no alternative energy sources,” said Gunes. “Nearly eight in ten women’s organisations in Ukraine told UN Women that funding reductions are seriously affecting their work, including some organisations reporting having to reduce the number of women and girls supported by their services. Official donor assistance to support women has reduced, and inequalities in Ukraine are increasing.”

Over the weekend, on May 17, Ukraine launched one of its largest long-range drone offensives against Russia in over a year, mainly targeting Moscow. This attack, described by reporters as retaliation for the missile and drone strikes in Kyiv, killed at least three people and injured 12 others, while local authorities reported damage to several unspecified infrastructure and numerous high-rise buildings.

“Our responses to Russia’s prolongation of the war and attacks on our cities and communities are entirely justified,” said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a statement shared to X (formerly Twitter). “This time, Ukrainian long-distance sanctions have reached the Moscow region, and we are clearly telling the Russians: their state must end its war.”

Nigel Gould Davies, a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, warned that Ukraine’s retaliatory strikes against Russia will only work to exacerbate regional tensions going forward.

“There is no ongoing peace process to disrupt. What (the attack) is more likely to do is add to the darkening cloud of anxiety over Russia, which has developed palpably over the last three or four months,” said Davies. “The fact that Ukraine is reminding the Moscow population that it is vulnerable to these attacks is likely to intensify the mix of concerns now. I see no prospect, though, in the shorter term, that even these factors together will induce Russia to consider the compromises that will be necessary for peace negotiations.”

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UNICEF and partners established the first Primary Health Care (PHC) Centre and Child-Friendly Space/Learning Space in Jabalia, North Gaza on 12 January, 2026. Credit: UNICEF/Rawan Eleyan

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

Despite the implementation of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel last October, Israeli forces continue to launch airstrikes into the Occupied Palestinian Territory. This has resulted in extensive destruction of infrastructure, loss of human life and exacerbating immense health needs amid an increasingly strained health system in Gaza.

Recent months have marked a significant escalation in hostilities, with routine bombardment pushing communities that have been displaced multiple times to the brink, while continued blockages of humanitarian aid hinder relief efforts and deprive thousands of life-saving services.

“Gaza’s crisis is far from over. For millions of civilians, the emergency is ongoing, relentless, and life-threatening. Food insecurity remains widespread and severe,” said Faten, the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Senior Protection Manager in Gaza. “Gaza’s healthcare system has all but collapsed with 94% of Gaza’s hospitals destroyed or damaged.”

Findings from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) underscore the urgent state of crisis in the Gaza Strip. OCHA experts leading a safety report recorded a significant number of security incidents over the past week, noting that the figures are among the highest reported since the declaration of the ceasefire last year. Experts from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) note that Israeli forces continue to maintain a high level of activity across the Gaza Strip, most notably in the northern region, where the scale of needs is most pronounced.

According to figures from OCHA, between October 7, 2023, and April 29, 2026, a total of 72,599 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip and another 172,411 injured. UNRWA has also reported that over 391 UN personnel have been killed since the start of the war through May 7. Hostilities from Israeli forces remain a routine part of daily life for Palestinians across Gaza, with UN experts recording airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire across all areas, particularly densely populated ones.

In May, a UNRWA school in Jabalia was struck by gunfire, injuring two displaced civilians residing within the school for shelter. OCHA also recorded two separate incidents in which humanitarian facilities came under fire in May, alongside an airstrike landing near a UN warehouse and a stone-throwing incident that damaged humanitarian relief vehicles. The UN continues to underscore the urgency of all actors complying with international humanitarian law, including all parties’ obligations to facilitate humanitarian operations and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure in all contexts.

Displacement also remains widespread, with over 90 percent of the population having been internally displaced. Many communities have been displaced multiple times, with more than half of the displaced population being children. Thousands of families currently reside in poor-quality makeshift shelters, such as damaged residential buildings and schools, where they face increasingly limited access to basic essential services, such as food, water, fuel and sanitation.

It is estimated that UNRWA currently hosts over 65,000 displaced Palestinians across 82 collective emergency shelters throughout the enclave. Approximately 126 UNRWA displacement sites are located with the Yellow Line, as well as areas within the Orange Line, where humanitarian aid remains subject to Israeli monitoring and intervention.

Many of these displacement sites face severe security concerns, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions, while health responses fail to keep pace and mitigate the rapid spread of infectious disease and illnesses.

Gaza’s health system has borne the brunt of the crisis, being on the brink of collapse as the immense scale of needs continues to grow every day. Compounded by Israeli blockades on humanitarian aid deliveries, relief efforts have been severely hindered by a lack of supplies, such as batteries, lubricants, and spare parts.

“51 percent of essential medicines are currently at zero stock in Gaza, which is severely limiting the ability to treat patients with life-threatening conditions, including those requiring intensive care and cancer treatment,” said Faten. “Hospitals are overwhelmed, under-resourced, and increasingly unable to provide adequate care.”

Additionally, humanitarian movement remains severely constricted as armored vehicles break down, posing significant security risks to aid personnel as they attempt to assist vulnerable populations. Furthermore, continued restrictions on generators, engine oil, and other key supplies hinder sanitation efforts, debris clearance, food distribution, water trucking, ambulance services, and the delivery of educational and medical supplies.

Over the past several months, UNRWA teams on the frontlines have recorded a significant uptick in rodent infestations across multiple overcrowded displacement shelters across the enclave, being most pronounced in Khan Younis, as well as areas with large amounts of rubble, including northern Gaza.

Heath facilities have also reported a significant increase in the frequency of rat bites, which are linked to the transmission of rodent-borne diseases such as leptospirosis. Efforts to contain the spread of infection are hindered by a severe shortage of pesticides, anti-lice shampoos, and scabicidal medications. As a result, UNRWA has recorded a significant increase in cases of chickenpox, as well as ectoparasitic skin diseases, such as scabies, over the past few months.

“With designated landfills becoming inaccessible during hostilities, the market has been used as a major solid waste dump, with trash now covering an entire city block and exceeding four flights in height,” said Stéphane Dujarric, UN Spokesperson for the Secretary-General during a press briefing on May 7.

“Our sanitation partners report that Gaza’s two sanitary landfills are near the perimeter fence surrounding the Strip, where access needs to be enabled by Israeli authorities. They also stress the need for permissions to bring into Gaza the machinery to remove the waste, the rubble and explosive ordnance, as well as the spare parts required to operate that equipment. These permissions are also critical to address health risks linked to pests and rodents,” Dujarric continued.

Despite immense challenges, UNRWA remains on the frontlines of this crisis, providing lifesaving services to vulnerable, displaced communities. Since October 2023, the agency has conducted over 17.2 million health consultations, including over 71,800 consultations between April 20 and 26 of this year alone. UNRWA continues to support six health centers, four temporary centers, and 28 medical points across the enclave, and have provided psychosocial support services to over 730,000 displaced Palestinians, including 520,000 children. The agency also continues to provide protection services, which have proved to be instrumental as security concerns reach new highs, particularly around displacement sites.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Protests ahead of the 1st Conference Transitioning away from Fossil Fuels. Credit: Kefas Matos

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, Apr 24 2026 (IPS)

A high-stakes international summit in Colombia starting today (April 24) is expected to sharpen global efforts to phase out fossil fuels, as governments, scientists and Indigenous leaders warn that the world is running out of time to avert irreversible climate damage.

During a virtual press briefing on April 16, Colombia’s Environment Ministry and a diverse panel of experts outlined expectations from the upcoming Fossil Fuel Phase-Out Summit in Santa Marta. The event is being positioned as a critical platform to accelerate energy transition and address mounting pressure from Indigenous communities living on the frontlines of extraction.

It was at the Belém Climate Conference in 2025, wherein a coalition of over 80 countries unanimously decided to act decisively to phase out fossil fuels that have been driving three quarters of global greenhouse gas emissions.

On the sidelines, 24 countries went further: they issued the Belém Declaration, pledging to work collectively toward a just, orderly, and equitable transition aligned with 1.5°C pathways. To this end, Colombia and the Netherlands volunteered to co-host the First International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels.

The Conference is taking place from 24 to 29 April 2026 in Santa Marta, Colombia. The organisers invited 97 national governments and 30 subnational governments. The high-level segment convenes on April 28–29, 2026.

“We are in a moment of no return. It is clear that there is climate change and that there is no denialism. This is the moment… to accelerate the transition and the progressive elimination of fossil fuels,” said Luz Dary Carmona Moreno, Colombia’s Vice Minister for Environmental Land Use Planning.

The summit comes at a time of growing geopolitical tension and continued global dependence on fossil fuels. Carmona noted that conflicts and economic instability continue to be shaped by oil, gas, and coal and stressed that there is an urgent need for structural change.

“The economy continues depending on fossil fuels,” she said, pointing to global crises that reflect the entrenched role of hydrocarbons.

Colombia has framed the Santa Marta conference around three strategic pillars. The first focuses on overcoming global dependence on fossil fuels. The second addresses transformation of supply and demand systems. The third seeks to rethink multilateral cooperation frameworks.

Carmona emphasised that the conference aims to produce a concrete roadmap, backed by science, public participation, and political will.

“This conference seeks common points to accelerate the transition, concrete actions and enablers that allow that acceleration,” she said.

The event has already drawn strong international participation. According to Colombian officials, 45 countries have confirmed attendance, along with 13 ministers and a broad coalition of civil society groups, indigenous organisations, academics, and private sector actors.

More than 2,800 participants, including grassroots organisations, Indigenous communities, youth groups, and labour unions, have registered to take part.

Indigenous Leaders Warn of “Unjust Transition”

For Indigenous leaders, however, the urgency of the climate crisis is matched by frustration over what they describe as a gap between rhetoric and reality.

Oswaldo Muca, General Coordinator of the Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon (OPIAC), said communities continue to bear the brunt of extraction despite promises of a “just transition”.

“We are very concerned. We talk about a just transition, but in practice it is not true,” Muca said.

He described ongoing environmental degradation in Indigenous territories, including illegal mining, deforestation and mercury contamination.

“Mining continues. Extraction continues. Deforestation continues. The territories and Indigenous peoples continue suffering this problem, and it is becoming more serious every day,” he said.

Muca also criticised the lack of direct benefits for local communities, noting that profits from extraction often leave the country while environmental damage remains.

“The resources do not reach Indigenous territories but they destroy the territory and leave the damage,” he said.

He called for Indigenous participation at every stage of policymaking, from design to implementation, across technical, political, legal and financial dimensions.

Science Points to Sharp Cuts

Scientific findings presented during the briefing reinforced the scale of transformation required.

Dr Marcel Llavero Pasquina, a researcher at the University of Barcelona, said limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius would require drastic reductions in fossil fuel production.

“Eighty-six percent of oil and gas reserves currently under production should be prematurely decommissioned,” he said.

Even under a less ambitious 2-degree scenario, at least 12% of producing reserves would need to be phased out.

Pasquina also warned that no new fossil fuel exploration is compatible with global climate targets. “At least 10,000 of the existing oil and gas extraction contracts should be cancelled,” he said.

He highlighted the economic tensions shaping climate negotiations, noting that fossil fuel companies stand to lose trillions of dollars under transition scenarios.

“Fossil fuel companies… have a material and quantifiable conflict of interest,” he said, arguing they should be excluded from climate policymaking.

At the same time, governments face significant fiscal challenges, with potential revenue losses estimated at US$117 trillion globally under a 1.5-degree pathway. Still, Pasquina stressed that these costs are outweighed by the human and environmental toll of inaction.

“These transition costs are dwarfed by the climate costs communities would otherwise suffer,” he said.

Policy Momentum Builds

Despite the scale of the challenge, policy experts pointed to growing momentum worldwide.

Paola Yanguas Parra, a policy advisor at the International Institute for Sustainable Development, said governments have already begun implementing measures to restrict fossil fuel expansion.

“We found… 58 active restrictions, which go from bans and moratoria to exploration and licensing,” she said.

These measures include protections for ecologically and culturally significant areas such as the Amazon, as well as restrictions on extraction methods like fracking.

Yanguas Parra noted that such policies often make economic sense in addition to environmental benefits.

“You would take a huge environmental, social and climate cost… for something that would not even make you enough profit,” she said, referring to unviable extraction projects in remote regions.

She added that the summit offers an opportunity to shift global discussions from whether to transition away from fossil fuels to how to implement that transition effectively.

“This coalition will focus on implementation, on learning from each other,” she said.

Amazon at a Crossroads

Speakers from across the Amazon basin warned that the region is increasingly being treated as a new frontier for fossil fuel expansion.

Alana Manchineri, an Indigenous leader from Brazil, described the climate crisis as an immediate reality rather than a distant threat.

“There is no more space for delays,” she said.

She warned that oil and gas projects are already causing widespread damage, including water contamination, biodiversity loss and rising conflict.

“It is not just environmental damage but violations of rights and ways of life,” she said.

According to Indigenous organisations, more than 320,000 square kilometres of Indigenous land in the Amazon basin are already affected by oil and gas blocks.

Manchineri stressed that any transition must fully incorporate Indigenous knowledge and leadership.

“This path will only be legitimate and effective with the full participation of Indigenous peoples,” she said.

Beyond COP: Complement, Not Replacement

Panellists repeatedly emphasised that the Santa Marta summit is not intended to replace existing UN climate processes but to complement them.

“There are groups of countries… that have gathered to discuss more focused issues,” Yanguas Parra said, describing the summit as part of a broader ecosystem of climate cooperation.

Pasquina offered a more critical view, arguing that while UN climate negotiations have produced frameworks like the Paris Agreement, they have failed to curb rising emissions.

“The COP  has been a great success on paper. In reality, emissions have only been increasing,” he said.

He suggested that initiatives like Santa Marta could increase pressure on countries that have resisted stronger action.

A Test of Political Will

As preparations intensify, expectations for the summit remain high. Colombian officials say the final outcome will be a report outlining actionable steps and mechanisms to accelerate transition.

“We want the report not to remain just another document. We expect people to turn it into action,” Carmona said.

For many participants, the success of the summit will depend on whether it delivers concrete commitments rather than broad declarations.

Indigenous leaders, in particular, say the credibility of the process hinges on real inclusion and tangible change on the ground.

“If we do not take real and effective actions. We can talk about a just transition, but in reality, other mechanisms will continue destroying the territory,” Muca warned.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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