At the Africa Food Systems Forum in Kigali, Rwanda, experts explored how renewable energy can ease the burden on farmers. Here Shifra Ainomugisha poses beside a solar-powered irrigation system in Uganda. She was named the 2026 Commonwealth Young Person of the Year for the development of AI and solar-powered agricultural technologies. Credit: Solar Farm Uganda

By Farai Shawn Matiashe
KIGALI, Oct 2 2026 (IPS)

Post-harvest losses, particularly in rural areas, threaten the gains Africa is making in agricultural production and export capacity.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, up to 40% of farm produce is lost because of a lack of cold storage, according to industry players.

Highly perishable farm produce, like fruits and vegetables, can go as high as 70%.

With agriculture accounting for one-third of the Gross Domestic Product and employing over 60%, such a loss threatens jobs and the livelihoods of millions of people.

Farmers in Africa grapple with a lack of reliable refrigeration, an underdeveloped cold chain and unreliable power storage, leaving harvests to heat and spoilage.

Poor road networks and limited refrigerated transport options also worsen the situation. Farmers transport fruits long distances to processing centres under non-ideal conditions, resulting in losses.

Renewable Energy Offers an Opportunity

At the Africa Food Systems Forum in Kigali, Rwanda, experts are exploring how renewable energy can ease the burden on farmers who often turn to diesel generators to cool their farms’ fresh produce.

Olamide Niyi-Afuye, Chief Executive Officer at Africa Minigrid Developers Association (AMDA), an industry association working to improve the operating environment for mini-grids, said the biggest gap is not awareness but aggregation and intentional market design.

“We already see individual examples of mini-grids powering agro-processing, cold storage and other productive activities,” he said.

“The challenge is that these are still too often treated as individual projects rather than part of a scalable commercial model.”

Mugwe Manga, a Climate Finance Lead at Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD Kenya), an independent trust supporting micro and small enterprises, said energy presents a tremendous opportunity for smallholder farmers to capture more value from what they produce.

“Solar, increasingly combined with battery energy storage, is particularly important because it is modular, increasingly affordable and can be deployed relatively quickly in rural areas,” he said.

“Solar-powered irrigation, cold storage, drying, milling, cooling and agro-processing can reduce post-harvest losses, increase productivity, improve product quality and allow farmers to sell into higher-value markets.”

Manga said energy can become an important enabler of both climate resilience and higher farmer incomes.

“The productive use of energy for cold storage, solar-pumped irrigation, and agro-processing is critical to value capture, climate resilience, and adaptation that will strengthen smallholder farmers,” he said.

Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest economies, lost between $2.3bn and $3.3bn to post-harvest inefficiencies in 2025, according to industry players.

The food wasted due to poor storage and transport networks amounted to up to 40 million metric tonnes.

South Africa loses an estimated 10.3 million tonnes of food annually, about 19% of its fresh produce, according to a 2021 report titled Waste Research Development and Innovation Roadmap Research.

Funding Cooperatives Is a Better Funding Model

Renewable energy offers reliable and accessible solutions to cold storage and processing problems in Africa, but funding remains a major challenge.

Though prices of solar panels and batteries shipped from China have been declining in recent years, current prices remain high for many farmers, particularly smallholders in rural areas.

With low capital amid limited access to grants and loans, many cannot afford solar-powered agro-processing and cold storage facilities.

Experts said that clean energy is the cheapest technology to deploy when farmers work together.

“Due to the capital expenditure of some of these, it is important for farmers to organise themselves and come together as a collective in order to take advantage of economies of scale and the power of aggregation that can use energy for all, as opposed to rolling out these solutions to individual smallholders that may not be cost-effective,” said Manga.

Niyi-Afuye said there is a need to bring energy developers and agribusinesses together much earlier, aggregate demand across agricultural value chains, and structure projects around credible productive loads from the outset.

“The opportunity is to stop treating energy and food systems as two separate investment cases and start building bankable opportunities at the intersection of both,” he said.

Manga said one of the key lessons from distributed energy is that the economics are often stronger when players move away from financing individual assets for individual farmers and instead aggregate demand.

“Farmers can organise through cooperatives, producer organisations, aggregators or rural enterprises and invest in shared infrastructure that serves many producers,” he said.

“This creates economies of scale, improves asset utilisation and creates a stronger and more predictable revenue base.”

Manga said aggregation also makes these projects more attractive to financiers by reducing transaction costs and perceived risk.

“Rather than lending against hundreds of individual smallholders, investors can finance a productive asset with an identifiable operator, clear cash flows and an aggregated customer base,” he said.

Niyi-Afuye said the better model is to aggregate projects into investable portfolios, combine commercial capital with appropriate credit enhancement and risk-sharing mechanisms, and increase access to patient, local-currency financing.

“Financing infrastructure in dollars while the underlying customers earn in Nigerian Naira or Kenyan shillings creates a structural mismatch,” he said.

Pratik Patel, Bureau Chief for East and Southern Africa at AfriCatalyist, a global development advisory firm headquartered in Senegal, said a public-private-producer partnership is the model that can make renewables affordable.

“Instead of a cold storage facility or cold chain operator trying to stand alone as a single commercial enterprise, it’s embedded in a collective plan that covers the full journey from farm to table, production, aggregation through farmer cooperatives, storage, processing, and market access, with clear roles and coordination at each stage,” he said.

He said the approach matters for financing because it gives investors what a standalone facility cannot, such as a defined use case, identified long-term clients, and a credible route to market.

“When responsibility for each link in the chain is assigned to the actor best suited to manage it, the plan becomes legible and de-risked, which is what ultimately builds investor confidence,” he said.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Members of Smallholder Farmer Alliance in Haiti with first harvest of regenerative cotton. Credit: Thomas Norielle/SFA

By Hugh Locke
NEW YORK, Oct 2 2026 (IPS)

In November 1952, the United States detonated the world’s first thermonuclear device at Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The test, code-named Ivy Mike, erased the island of Elugelab and scattered a signature of plutonium across the planet that remains in lake beds, ice sheets and ocean sediments today.

This month, scientists writing in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment proposed this moment as the start of the Anthropocene, a geological epoch shaped by human activity. Co-author Victor Galaz of the Stockholm Resilience Centre called the date “a tragic reminder of the highly unjust impacts of planetary change.”

I take that proposal seriously, because it carries hope as well as warning, and it connects to the argument of my new book, Whole Earth Farming.

Hugh Locke

The idea of the Anthropocene was popularized in 2000 by Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen. In 2020, a paper in Nature found that human-made materials now outweigh all living things on Earth. Yet in 2024, the International Union of Geological Sciences declined to formally recognize the Anthropocene. Officially, we are still in the Holocene.

The new paper, led by Jan Zalasiewicz, Colin Waters and Martin J. Head, draws on 12 stratigraphic records worldwide and identifies the 1952 rise in plutonium as the clearest marker of the new epoch. Whatever the geologists decide, the substance stands: human beings have become a force of planetary consequence.

Nobody set out to launch a new geological epoch. The Anthropocene is the unintended result of billions of decisions about energy, industry, consumption and land use. That is sobering. It is also, strangely, encouraging.

If humanity can alter the chemistry of the atmosphere without meaning to, then we are clearly capable of transformation at planetary scale. The only question is whether we can do it on purpose, in a direction that heals rather than harms.

Galaz’s point about injustice matters too. The Marshall Islanders had no say in what happened at Enewetak, yet bore its consequences. Those who contributed least to planetary change are often hit hardest, among them the world’s smallholder farmers. Any real transformation must put them at the center.

There are some 475 million smallholder farming families in the world, roughly one quarter of humanity, and yet they are largely absent from conversations about the future of food and climate.

Whole Earth Farming argues that these families could lead an agricultural revolution. It draws on 21 farmer stories from 18 countries and on decades of work, including in Haiti, where I co-founded the Smallholder Farmers Alliance. Its central argument is that if half the world’s smallholders adopted regenerative practices, they could produce all the additional food needed by 2050 while reducing agriculture’s net climate impact.

There is a fitting symmetry here. The Holocene began with a climate stable enough for humans to start farming. The Anthropocene could likewise coincide with a new global agricultural movement, one that restores the land rather than depleting it.

The changes of the 1950s spread without any global plan, as new tools and habits moved from place to place until they gathered their own momentum. A regenerative transformation can spread the same way: through practices that work, farmers who see them working on a neighbor’s land, and the support to adopt them.

The farmers in the book are already rebuilding soil, planting trees alongside crops and restoring water cycles. What they lack is not ingenuity but recognition, investment and connection to one another.

I once suggested that the historical epoch now taking shape will one day be named for the moment we began to reorganize ourselves around the principle of oneness. I still believe that.

The Anthropocene is, in one sense, the geological record of our failure to see ourselves as one people sharing one planet. A regenerative transformation led by smallholders would be the opposite: a practical expression of oneness, rooted in the recognition that the health of the land, the wellbeing of the farmer and the future of humanity are inseparable.

If a single morning in 1952 can mark a new chapter in the Earth’s geological history, then surely the choices of hundreds of millions of farming families can mark a new chapter in human history. We have already proven that we can change the planet. Now it is time to prove that we can do so with intention, with justice, and with the whole Earth in mind.

Hugh Locke is president and co-founder of the Smallholder Farmers Alliance, president of the Impact Farming Foundation and author of Whole Earth Farming: Smallholders and the Great Regenerative Transformation (George Ronald Publisher, 2026).

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

From a distance, an island nation can appear to possess everything: pristine waters, a thriving tourism industry and a strong cultural identity. Its income figures may suggest prosperity.

James Alix Michel

This is the paradox confronting small island states. We are judged by what we earn on paper, while our future is shaped by what we must endure in reality. President Dr Patrick Herminie of Seychelles brought this question to the United Nations this month, urging international finance to “measure reality correctly”. He called for affordable, accessible, long-term finance, meaningful debt relief and effective implementation of the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI).

His appeal continues a case Seychelles has made for many years.

In 2009, Seychelles warned at the United Nations that small economies were especially exposed to global economic instability and the impacts of climate change. In 2013, it called for financing mechanisms and concessional conditions tailored to small island developing states. In 2015, it argued that attaining a higher-income classification should not automatically exclude an island nation from concessional support. The message has remained consistent: development gains do not erase structural vulnerability.

For too long, eligibility for grants and affordable loans has depended heavily on GDP or gross national income per capita. Income matters, but it cannot tell the whole story. It reveals little about a country’s exposure to shocks or its capacity to recover. A small state must maintain ports, airports, hospitals, schools, power systems, water supplies and coastal defences with a limited population and tax base. It may depend on one or two sectors, such as tourism or fisheries. When global prices rise or supply chains fail, the consequences can be felt across the entire nation at once.

This is not an argument against sound national management. It is an argument for recognising realities that good management alone cannot remove. Countries may graduate from an income category; they do not graduate from geography, climate exposure or limited economic scale.

Nor is this a Seychelles concern alone. From the Caribbean to the Pacific and across the Indian Ocean, island countries have long pressed for international finance to reflect vulnerability rather than income alone. Barbados has advocated measures that better capture vulnerability and resilience, while the Alliance of Small Island States has argued that the financial system must recognise the distinctive circumstances of its members. There is a shared understanding here: a prosperous-looking average can hide a profoundly fragile foundation.

The MVI offers a way to make that foundation visible. It is intended to complement, not replace, income measures by assessing structural vulnerability and resilience across economic, environmental and social dimensions. It asks decision-makers to look beyond a single number towards the pressures an island country faces: remoteness, economic concentration, disaster risk, climate exposure and the limited room to absorb shocks.

In August 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 78/322 on the MVI, an important recognition that national income alone is an inadequate guide. But adoption is only the beginning. An index will not protect a coastline, keep a hospital open or help a family recover after a storm unless it changes financing decisions. Will lenders and development partners use it to widen access to concessional finance? Will it help countries obtain adaptation funds before disaster strikes? Will it inform debt arrangements that leave governments room to protect essential services after a crisis?

That is the true test of the international community’s commitment. A fairer system would provide more grants and affordable long-term finance for resilience. It would include clauses that pause debt repayments after major disasters. It would treat coastal protection, water security, renewable energy and the restoration of reefs and mangroves as essential investments, not discretionary extras to be considered only when funds remain.
We know the price of waiting. When a storm destroys infrastructure, a country may have to borrow to rebuild what it could not afford to protect. Debt then limits future investment, leaving it more exposed to the next shock. Financing resilience in advance can break that cycle. It protects lives, public finances and development gains. This is not charity; it is sound economics.

The question also reaches beyond island states. Across the developing world, countries facing climate shocks, volatile markets and heavy debt are too often assessed through indicators that overlook their lived circumstances. When scarce public money goes towards expensive borrowing instead of health, education or adaptation, the poorest communities bear the greatest cost. A financial system that responds only after calamity is neither efficient nor just.

Seychelles has voiced this concern since 2009, and President Herminie’s appeal shows why it remains urgent. The MVI gives the world an opportunity to turn recognition into action. Those who govern international lending must now decide whether vulnerability will matter when resources are allocated, not merely when speeches are delivered.

An island is more than an income figure. It is a society, a culture, an ecosystem and a future, living close to risks often created far beyond its shores. To measure that reality correctly is the beginning of fairness. To finance it fairly must follow.

James Alix Michel, is Former President of the Republic of Seychelles

IPS UN Bureau

Media personnel watch a digital screen showing leaders of member states gather for a family photograph during the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 13 September 2026. Credit: Arun Sankar/AFP

By Samuel King and Inés M. Pousadela
BRUSSELS, Belgium / MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 30 2026 (IPS)

At the 18th BRICS Summit, held on 12 and 13 September in New Delhi, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi brought together presidents Xi Jinping of China, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran, along with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince, Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed, representing the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Around the table sat longstanding rivals such as India and China and, in the case of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, states on opposite sides of an ongoing war. That the summit produced a joint declaration every member could sign was a modest multilateralist success.

The summit took place against a fast-changing backdrop. With the USA under Donald Trump an unreliable partner and often a hostile power bent on bullying others into submission, numerous states are seeking new alliances as a counterweight. BRICS, whose 11 members account for 49 per cent of the world’s population and 28 per cent of the global economy, could become a more significant forum as a result. But what is on offer is a profoundly old-fashioned, state-centric form of multilateralism, in which the people in whose name states claim to act have little say.

A hollow declaration

At the summit, Xi called for international rules to be ‘written by all countries’, even though he leads a one-party state where increasingly only he writes the rules. Putin urges greater representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America at the UN Security Council, while routinely wielding his veto to stop the council acting on his war in Ukraine.

The New Delhi Declaration’s silences speak loudest. It is explicit on Palestine, calling on Israel to end its war on Gaza and backing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. But on the war in Iran, it only urges ‘maximum restraint’ without naming the warring parties, reflecting the fact that Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sat around the same table. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not mentioned at all, a regression from past declarations and a troubling sign that Putin has no interest in ending the fighting. The text condemns ‘indiscriminate rising tariffs’ and ‘unilateral sanctions’ without naming the USA, sparing the blushes of members such as India, which is reportedly finalising a trade deal with Washington. The declaration preserves consensus at the expense of resolve.

Closed civic space, open defiance

Most BRICS governments have no fear of being held domestically accountable for the compromises they have made. Civic space is closed in seven of BRICS’ 11 states and obstructed or repressed in the rest. Russia jails and exiles opposition voices and has made protest almost impossible. China subjects its people to mass surveillance and crushes any expression that departs from ruling-party lines. Iran violently suppresses protest movements, including through the death penalty. Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognise no legitimate role for independent civil society. Host and self-styled mediator India has seen Modi’s government erode press freedom, restrict civil society funding and stoke hostility towards religious minorities.

Domestic repression translates directly into a closed international forum. After 18 summits, BRICS still has no treaty, no published membership criteria, no permanent secretariat, no budget and no mechanism for civil society to hold its members to account. This is no accident. It leaves powerful leaders free to pursue their interests, and it means civil society has less influence in BRICS than in comparable blocs such as the G20, and much less than in UN processes.

Civil society mobilised regardless. Three weeks before the summit, over 200 delegates from farmers’ organisations, people’s movements, trade unions, women’s organisations and other civil society groups gathered in New Delhi for the People’s BRICS Summit. Its resolution denounced BRICS states for reproducing extractivist, inequitable development models, and insisted that cooperation between global south states be judged by the dignity and rights it delivers to people and communities, not by the freedom it grants states and capital. It called for debt restructuring, a publicly accountable energy transition, food sovereignty, universal social security, women’s political representation and an end to the persecution of civil society activists, and for BRICS to take a clear stand against military intervention, occupation and genocide. BRICS governments chose not to listen.

Ambition without accountability

BRICS’ biggest ambition, on display in the New Delhi Declaration, is to reshape international finance. Development of payment systems independent of the US dollar would chip away at the USA’s unique ability to sustain its power by printing more dollars, despite mountainous debt, to meet unceasing demand. But it would also let repressive states such as Iran and Russia sell oil and gas more easily, funding their repression while blunting international sanctions.

This ambition comes with no commitment to accountability. The bloc has no channel through which the people most affected by its decisions can make their voices heard, and no human rights conditions are attached to its initiatives.

None of the emerging responses to the rapidly changing international order promises to be more democratic than the current system. So far, neither BRICS nor any of the other alternatives now taking shape has matched its growing ambition with greater accountability.

Samuel King is a researcher at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, working on ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition, a Horizon Europe-funded project. Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Member of Smallholder Farmer Alliance in Haiti with tree she is about to plant. Credit: A.F. Cortes/SFA

By Hugh Locke
NEW YORK, Sep 30 2026 (IPS)

Years ago, standing in a small farmer’s field in Haiti, I began to suspect that we had agriculture backward. The development world saw a man in need of rescue. I saw a farmer who might help rescue the rest of us.

That distinction matters. Over the next 25 years, humanity will need to grow much more food on a planet with degraded soils, shrinking biodiversity and a destabilizing climate. The usual instinct is to seek a technical fix. I want to suggest another source of help: a moral idea rooted in religion.

I am not a theologian. I am a development worker. In 2010, Haitian agronomist Timote Georges and I co-founded the Smallholder Farmers Alliance. We now work with about 10,000 farmers throughout Haiti who grow more food while rebuilding degraded land. Our “tree currency” rewards them for planting and caring for trees with credits they can exchange for seeds, tools and training.

Hugh Locke

Roughly 475 million smallholder farms, each under five acres, already produce about 30% of the world’s food despite limited access to finance, markets or technical support. In my new book, Whole Earth Farming, I argue that if even half of these families received support to adopt regenerative methods, they could produce the additional food humanity will need through 2050 on 12% of the world’s arable land, with a climate benefit comparable to offsetting the aviation industry’s annual emissions.

The Green Revolution averted famine, but its gains often came with degraded soils, diminished biodiversity and polluted water. Regenerative farming aims not merely to limit damage but to restore soil, rebuild biodiversity, improve farmers’ wellbeing and deliver a net climate benefit.

That is the language investors expect. Yet a case study more than a century old anticipated this approach, and its foundation was not market logic but morality.

From 1901 to 1921, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, one of the central figures of the Baha’i Faith, directed a farming settlement called ‘Adasiyyih in the Jordan Valley. Long before the term “regenerative agriculture” existed, the community used crop rotation, agroforestry, water conservation and integrated livestock management to make the land productive without exhausting it. Just as important was the framework behind those techniques: the belief that the earth is one country and humanity one interdependent family, expressed through consultation, equality and a rejection of extraction for its own sake. Farming at ‘Adasiyyih was not simply commodity production. It was a way to build community.

Regenerative agriculture does not require religious belief. Many successful regenerative farmers are secular, and the science stands on its own. But ‘Adasiyyih addressed, on a limited scale, a coordination problem that still hinders the movement: how can independent farmers, financiers, governments and companies be persuaded to treat soil health, water and biodiversity as a shared obligation?

‘Adasiyyih began with a moral premise rather than a technical formula. That premise is worth borrowing, whether one calls it stewardship or enlightened self-interest. Farmers, buyers and governments must act as though what happens to one plot of land is everyone’s concern, because increasingly it is. For generations we have asked how much the earth can give us. We should also ask what we owe in return.

Regenerative agriculture is at a fragile moment. By my estimate, some 15 million farms and ranches worldwide now use regenerative practices, and some 25 million acres, mostly in the United States, are certified under third-party standards, though almost none of that land is farmed by smallholders. The movement is growing faster than the systems meant to support it. Farmers can face lower yields and higher costs during the transition, there is no consensus on how to measure results, and financing, training and market rewards lag well behind farmers’ interest. A shared obligation is what can turn these isolated successes into lasting change.

This is not a case for religious agricultural policy, which would be unworkable in a pluralistic world. Smallholders are not waiting for a new theology. They need capital, training and markets. But the case for providing that support may rest more persuasively on the old idea of shared stewardship than on another spreadsheet of carbon calculations.

The next great agricultural transformation may begin not on the world’s largest farms but on hundreds of millions of its smallest. Given the means, smallholders may help determine whether the next 25 years of food production heal the planet or finish degrading it.

Hugh Locke is president of the Impact Farming Foundation and author of Whole Earth Farming: Smallholders and the Great Regenerative Transformation (George Ronald Publisher, 2026).

IPS UN Bureau

Credit: Amanda Cotton / Ocean Image Bank

By Gareth Johnstone and Jan Thomas Odegard
OSLO, Norway, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

As Norway undertakes Vendepunkt, or “Turning Point,” its reflection on the future of Norwegian development policy, it is critical that oceans remain a priority. Donors around the world are running similar audits, deciding which long-term partnerships to keep, and why. Norway has decades of expertise to offer, but also something significant at stake: healthy and well-governed oceans underpin food, livelihoods and economic activity in partner countries while supporting global seafood supply chains in which Norway itself participates.

West Africa demonstrates what sustained investment in oceans can achieve. More than a decade of cooperation on illegal fishing has helped countries strengthen their own capacity to monitor and protect their waters. But the ocean cannot be managed country by country. Fish stocks are shared, vessels move across borders, and climate change is shifting marine resources into new waters. Strong national capacity must therefore be matched by the ability of countries to cooperate.

That cooperation depends on the relationships between countries that allow information to be shared, trust to develop and authorities to act together. These relationships are not simply a by-product of capacity building. They are essential development infrastructures particularly when the resources being protected cross borders.

Gareth Johnstone

The connection between West Africa and Norway makes this tangible. Fish caught off West Africa enters international supply chains as fishmeal and fish oil, including feed used in aquaculture thousands of kilometres away. A fish caught off Guinea-Bissau can ultimately help feed a salmon in a Norwegian fjord. In one investigation supported by TMT, authorities took action against the factory vessel TIAN YI HE 6 after it received fish from a Turkish-flagged vessel, with the resulting fishmeal transported onwards to international markets. The case resulted in fines for unauthorized fishing operations, illegal transshipment and obstruction of inspectors.

Jan Thomas Odegard

Technology has transformed what fisheries authorities can do. An inspector can now examine a vessel’s movements and history before deciding whether it should enter port. Recorded use of the Vessel Tracking Tool, developed by fisheries intelligence organisaiton, TMT, more than doubled between 2024 and 2025.

Despite this, turning information into action requires trained officials, functioning institutions and trust between agencies and countries. In the West African region where TMT, and its partners have focused support, the relationships resulted in the deterrence of illegal fishing took more than a decade to build. An independent assessment by Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management of this work, supported by Norway, found that some of the strongest results came when governments shared information regionally.

One case began with a concern raised by a fisheries inspector in Ghana about the vessel NOVA ZEELANDIA. Officials in Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and South Africa checked their records and shared information. Angola subsequently fined associated trawlers for unauthorized transshipment and barred NOVA ZEELANDIA from its waters, while Cameroon separately fined the vessel owners US$2.1 million for breaches of inspection rules.

The vessel later changed its name and flag and remains in operation. It is a reminder that effective ocean governance requires sustained cooperation across jurisdictions.

Relationships are development infrastructure

Development programmes routinely count the numbers of people trained, systems established and institutions strengthened. The value of the relationships built alongside them is harder to measure. Yet a fisheries officer knowing who to contact in a neighbouring country can be as important as the technology on their desk.

These relationships take years to build and can be fragile. One or two funding cycles may establish a system or deliver training, yet they are less likely to embed the institutional memory, expertise and relationships that allow it to survive and adapt.

Long-running development partnerships and support should therefore not automatically be viewed as evidence that localisation has failed to materialise. A better test is whether they are evolving toward stronger national institutions, greater regional leadership and with less dependence on external technical expertise, while preserving cooperation where challenges remain shared.

Oceans belong in Norway’s Turning Point

Norway brings decades of experience in fisheries management, marine research and ocean governance. Norway is itself a fishing and aquaculture nation, connected through the same ocean systems and global seafood supply chains.

Norway’s investment in oceans can therefore combine locally led capacity with international cooperation because illegal vessels do not respect borders.

The evidence from West Africa shows why sustained investment matters. National enforcement capability and regional networks have been built over more than a decade. Withdrawing support before those systems are sufficiently resilient risks losing hard-won gains, continuing to invest allows national leadership to deepen and relationships to mature.

Norway’s challenge is not unique. Development partners are increasingly being asked to make harder choices and reduce dependency without dismantling the relationships and cooperation needed to address problems that are inherently international. As Turning Point asks where Norway has particular strengths and where its development cooperation can have greatest impact, oceans deserve a prominent place in the answer.

The question should not simply be which partnerships Norway can eventually leave. It should also be which are worth sustaining and deepening because the same fish stocks, vessels and networks are what is at stake. Strong national capacity and international relationships are not competing goals. One makes the other possible. And in an ocean that connects Guinea-Bissau’s fishing communities with Norway’s fjords, Norway has both the expertise and the interest to keep investing in both.

Gareth Johnstone is the Executive Director of Norwegian based fisheries intelligence organization, Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT). He has over 30 years’ experience as an environmental scientist, researcher and policy expert. He is also the former Director General of WorldFish.

Jan Thomas Odegard is a Norwegian environmental and development expert with 30 years’ experience spanning the UN, NGOs, private sector and research. He is co-founder and Chair of the Trygg Mat Tracking Board and former Secretary General of Friends of the Earth Norway.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

Dr. Agnes Kalibata, speaking at the opening ceremony of the Africa Food Systems Forum in 2019. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

By Agnes Kalibata
NAIROBI, Kenya, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

I was born in Rwanda, but my family soon became refugees in Uganda during the conflict and unrest on the cusp of independence. My father was a teacher and went to great lengths to make sure I was well educated. My parents were also smallholder farmers, and I saw firsthand the challenges my parents and other refugee families faced.

After I received my doctoral degree from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, I returned to a new Rwanda in 2005, managing a World Bank agriculture project with the government. In 2008, I became Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources, and over the next six years, I oversaw the country’s transition from food deficit to food security, as Rwanda cut its global hunger index by more than 50 percent. We implemented what we understood to be true: effective deliberate agricultural investment drives poverty down.

Agricultural growth is up to four times more effective at reducing poverty than growth in other sectors, and it underpins food security besides. Yet despite that evidence, Africa’s agriculture sector faces an estimated $200 billion annual financing gap.

Less than a year ago, I joined the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) as Co-Chair of the Steering Committee because I have seen firsthand how GAFSP is a collaborative platform that connects governments, farmers, civil society and leverages the private sector and multiple partners to tackle food insecurity. Among its inaugural investments was a 60 million dollar investment in Rwanda’s Land Husbandry and terracing program which allowed farmers to reclaim degraded land by mobilizing more than 10 times this initial capital, reached hundreds of farmers and contributed to land restoration, food security and poverty reduction all at the same time.

GAFSP’s Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT) has made its second allocation (its first allocation was to the African Development Bank). Announced at the Africa Food Systems Forum “Investing in Africa’s Agri-Food Systems: Nourishing Nations, Growing Jobs, Building Resilience,” Rwanda’s BIFT allocation is a concrete step toward the GAFSP vision that sharing risk deliberately, and cooperatively, rather than leaving it with farmers alone, moves capital that reduces food insecurity. This $6 million allocation has already unlocked $15 million more from IFAD, the Bank of Kigali and Aceli Africa – 2.5 times GAFSP’s own contribution – reaching an expected 215 farmers’ organizations and 35,000 smallholders.

What is most encouraging about this funding is the paradigm shift it represents against the challenging context of reduced Overseas Development Assistance. Capital structured to absorb risk can shift lender considerations to bring private finance into a domain the private sector has avoided, catalyzing transformational change for smallholder borrowers.

The central obstacle isn’t capital or conviction – it’s risk. Agricultural lending is constrained by the risk of accelerating climate shocks and by the practical cost of financing smaller loans. Roughly 90 percent of staple food production in Sub-Saharan Africa depends on rain-fed agriculture, leaving households with no buffer when a season fails. Farmers in low-income countries bear the highest burden of worsening weather conditions, while African countries lose the most GDP to escalating natural disasters, from drought to surging storms. Finally, the loans these farmers need are relatively small, and small loans cost lenders more to appraise and administer.

As Rwanda’s Agriculture Minister, coordinating across ministries to run programs like the Land husbandry program mentioned above alongside the One Cow per Poor Family – a critical source of nutrition for poor families taught me that risk-sharing across government agencies, communities and financiers is what makes ambitious programs work.

It is now a question of scale. What worked for smallholders in Rwanda can work for millions more, if development finance institutions and private lenders treat risk-sharing as standard practice. I have spent my career watching farmers do more with less. Give them the finance they’ve earned, and there is no question they will transform the food system to be more efficient, resilient and a stronger driver of prosperity at scale.

IPS UN Bureau

Solar energy panels installed in a dry rural landscape powering agricultural irrigation infrastructure alongside a traditional windmill. Credit: Katja Forster/iStock

By Debisi Araba
KIGALI, Rwanda, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

Africa is emerging as the world’s fastest-growing technology market, with its innovation ecosystem attracting increasing global investment. The European Investment Bank’s recent €40 million commitment to the sector underscores this growing confidence.

However, this surge in technological innovation has yet to address some of the continent’s most persistent challenges – hunger, food insecurity, and poverty. Agricultural productivity still depends more on land expansion than on innovation and efficiency gains. The recently concluded Africa Food Systems Forum in Kigali focused on investing in Africa’s agrifood systems, exploring policy interventions to attract investment, boost productivity, build resilience to multidimensional shocks, and improve livelihoods. Discussions at the 9th Africa Agriculture Science Week in Abuja reinforced a clear message: Africa must invest far more in agricultural innovation systems and capabilities.

The continent’s population is projected to reach nearly 2.5 billion by 2050, thereby accounting for a quarter of the world’s population. Rapid urbanization and changing diets are accelerating food demand, creating significant opportunities for market expansion. However, climate shocks and slow-growing productivity have stalled progress toward food security.

The productivity gap is not rooted in a lack of promising technologies. Rather, it reflects limited adoption, weak complementary investments, and high transaction costs that constrain farmers and markets alike. Accelerating progress toward ending hunger and eradicating poverty in Africa will therefore require a coordinated bundle of technical, institutional, and socio-political innovations, designed not only to raise yields but also to strengthen the systems that enable productivity gains to take hold and endure.

Shaping Africa’s Technological Transformation: The Policy Landscape

Africa already possesses sound policy frameworks designed to promote technology-driven transformation. Agenda 2063, the continent’s blueprint for sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, places technology at the center of Africa’s long-term trajectory.

Similarly, the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa sets out a continental framework to harness digital technologies for inclusive growth, job creation, poverty reduction, and the narrowing of digital divides, while safeguarding Africa’s ownership of its digital future.

Together with the recently adopted Kampala Declaration, these frameworks lay important foundations for technological acceleration.

How, then, can Africa make the technological leap? The answer lies not in a proliferation of new pilot projects, but in the systematic deployment and scaling of existing technologies, backed by coordinated action across institutions and sectors.

The “technology frontier” is therefore not a single breakthrough, but the integration of biological, digital, engineering, ecological, and institutional innovations within a supportive political economy that enables scale, equity, and resilience.

Scaling Technological Interventions for Africa’s Agrifood System Transformation

Across the continent, the building blocks of technological advancements are already visible. From climate-resilient seeds and precision irrigation to AI-enabled advisory platforms and digital marketplaces, many of the tools needed to raise productivity and strengthen food security are already being deployed.

For example, in Mali and Senegal, AI-enabled geospatial tools are improving yield forecasting, helping farmers plan further ahead. Meanwhile, digital advisory platforms in Kenya are improving decision-making and market access, helping farmers increase productivity and sell their produce. Advances in gene-edited crops, such as drought-tolerant and pest-resistant crops, are narrowing yield gaps and strengthening resilience in countries like Nigeria, where improved maize and cowpea varieties are already delivering measurable productivity gains.

The challenge is coordination and scale. The 17th edition of the Annual Trends and Outlook Report underscores this point, calling for deliberate, system-wide interventions to expand the application of existing and emerging technologies and ensure their widespread, efficient use.

Africa’s Path to Technology Leadership

Against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding portfolio of complementary tools, Africa is well-positioned to translate its technological potential into system-wide performance. Realizing that ambition, however, will require coordination across five key areas.

First, Africa must invest in its innovation ecosystems. Frontier technologies cannot scale without strong science institutions, stable R&D financing, and coherent regulatory systems. Scaling new technologies demands long-term public investment and regional collaboration, not episodic pilot projects.

Second, technological dissemination must become inclusive and structured. Technologies spread fastest when embedded within trusted networks. Digitally enabled producer organizations, strengthened extension systems, and service-market models for mechanization and irrigation can aggregate demand, lower transaction costs, and ensure that marginalized groups and small-scale farmers are not excluded from the benefits of innovation.

Third, digital and climate intelligence infrastructure must expand. Precision agriculture, digital twins, and AI forecasting depend on reliable geospatial data, weather networks, compatible data standards, and rural connectivity. In this data-powered era, digital public infrastructure will become as essential to agriculture as roads and irrigation canals.

Fourth, climate adaptation and resilience must be mainstreamed into technological agendas. Drought-tolerant crops, solar-powered irrigation, water-efficient production systems, low-emission livestock practices, and circular bio-based innovations are not optional enhancements but prerequisites for resilient growth across the continent as it battles the harshest impacts of climate change.

Finally, governance and accountability must keep pace with innovation. An estimated US$77 billion in annual financing will be needed for transforming Africa’s agrifood systems by 2030. Coordinated public–private partnerships, harmonized regulatory frameworks, and transparent monitoring systems will be key to mobilizing private capital, boosting productivity, scaling innovation, and sustaining reforms – while placing farmers at the center of Africa’s agrifood transformation.

With its vast arable land, youthful workforce, and expanding digital capacity, Africa is uniquely positioned to pioneer climate-smart, resource-efficient agricultural models. The continent does not need another wave of breakthrough inventions to transform its food systems; what it requires is a decisive shift from fragmented adoption to system-wide modernization. The challenge is no longer to experiment at the margins, but to redesign the system at scale.

Debisi Araba is Managing Director, AKADEMIYA2063

IPS UN Bureau

The UN General Assembly will soon vote – most likely favourably – on Bangladesh’s request to postpone the country’s graduation from the UN’s Least Developed Country (LDC) category, currently scheduled for November this year. The request for a 3-year extension was endorsed by the ECOSOC following the recommendation of the UN’s Committee for Development Policy (CDP). It is highly likely that the extension will also be justifiably granted to Nepal and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao, PDR) – the two other countries scheduled to graduate with Bangladesh, given the fast deteriorating global economic situation and recent natural disaster in Nepal. In fact, the same argument for an extension may be admissible to all prospective graduating countries, such as Solomon Islands (2027), Cambodia (2029) and Senegal (2029).

Anis Chowdhury

The background

The United Nations established the LDC category in 1971 for low-income countries facing severe structural barriers to sustainable development and to direct special international support toward them such as preferential market access, financial aid, and technical cooperation. The idea of a special category for low-income, structurally weak countries originated in the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Since the creation of the LDC category, the UN organised five international conferences, the first being in 1981, to draw up comprehensive ten-year frameworks for supports with specific goals. The current programme is the Doha Programme of Action (DPOA) for the Decade 2022–2031, preceded by the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPOA) for the Decade 2011–2020.

The decision to establish a separate LDC category was undoubtedly commendable. The global consensus around the comprehensive action programmes also reflected the goodwill of the international community.

However, none of the programmes could reduce the vulnerability of LDCs. The number of LDCs steadily increased from the 1971 list of 25 countries, reaching a peak of 51 countries in 2003. The number now stands at 46, still nearly double that of the original list. Only 9 countries exited the list – one, Sikkim, through India’s annexation in 1975.

Although the inclusion of newly independent countries partly explains the lengthening of the LDC list, one cannot avoid the judgement of an overall failure of the international community’s good-intentioned programmes. This is especially so in light of the development successes of countries which did not join the group despite their eligibility.

The Reckoning

The failure became staggering by the time the international community met in Istanbul in 2011. After four decades since the special LDC category was created, only three countries – Botswana, Cabo Verde and Maldives – exited the group. Furthermore, the post-graduation experience has been disappointing.

For example, life-expectancy in Botswana, the first country to exit the LDC group, declined from 61.6 years in 1988 to 50.08 years in 2003, while it remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, holding the 9th highest income Gini coefficient globally. Botswana, although hailed for macroeconomic stability, failed to transform structurally with the share of manufacturing hovering below 6% of GDP, and it remains extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity markets, especially diamond. Thus, growth has declined significantly since the mid-2000s and the unemployment rate has increased to very high levels, around 26%.

Therefore, the core goals and targets of the IPOA included:

• Enable half of all LDCs to achieve graduation status by 2020.
• Attain sustained, equitable, and inclusive economic growth of at least 7% annually.
• Strengthen education, health, and nutrition.
• Build productive bases and diversify economies to generate decent jobs, especially for youth

Unfortunately, only 6 countries – Maldives, Samoa, Equatorial Guinea, Vanuatu, Bhutan and São Tomé and Príncipe graduated – during 2011-2024, and 3 countries – Bangladesh, Nepal and Lao PDR – became eligible to graduate this year. Again, the experience is not very encouraging for the graduated countries, while the fear of graduation has gripped the countries soon to graduate.

In 2021, UNCTAD concluded that 50 years of LDC experience is “sobering”. It found that half of the LDCs fell behind the rest of the world in terms of per capita income and other dimensions of development. Hence, the economic gap between these countries and the rest of the world has widened over the last 50 years.

Rejecting “LDC insult”

Zimbabwe, a land-locked country, rejected the UN’s recommendation to be classified as a LDC in 2006 despite facing severe economic hardships. Zimbabwe viewed the UN recommendation “to be downgraded to LDC status” as an insult, while the neighbouring land-locked Zambia was among the first group of countries classified as an LDC in 1971.

When Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP plunged to USD341 in 2008, resource-rich Zambia’s per capita GDP was around USD1,376. Today, after more than half a century as an LDC, the per capita GDP of Zambia, one of the world’s leading producers of copper, cobalt, and semi-precious gemstones like emeralds, is around USD1,318, while Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP recovered within a decade to around USD3,445 in 2017.

Vietnam, coming out of a quarter century long devasting war in 1975, facing the challenge of unifying the country during the worst global economic situation with a paltry per capita income of around USD85, chose not to join the LDC group. Instead of aid dependence, it opted for the trade and investment route to development. Today, its per capita GDP is approximately USD5,066, while Bangladesh which joined the LDC group in 1975 with a per capita income of around USD230 could manage to raise its per capita GDP to approximately USD2,960.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), one of the poorest countries of the world in the 1960s, could also join the LDC group in 1971 when it was created; but it did not. Maintaining its policy independence and choosing the trade and investment route, ROK has become a full-fledged developed country in 1996 (member of OECD) within three decades. It managed to increase its per capita GDP from USD158 in 1960 to USD36,227 in 2025.

What may have gone wrong?

UNCTAD attributed the “sobering” experience to the LDCs’ inability to exploit international support measures (ISMs) strategically to develop their productive capacity. Others offered different reasons such as failure to understand the complex development process and appreciate the dangers associated with increased integration of structurally weak economies to the rapidly changing global economic system.

Add to these, complicity. Countries joining the group took ISMs as guaranteed; they did not take serious steps to mobilise domestic resources, diversify their economies and expand markets. Take the case of Bangladesh, a country regarded as the best utiliser of ISMs.

Bangladesh’s tax-GDP ratio is dismally low, experiencing a decline from a peak of around 10% to around 7%. Its ready-made garment (RMG) sector’s dominance increased from around 67% of export earnings in 2018 when the country first met the graduation criteria to around 85% by 2025 while it should have been declining as the graduation deadline was approaching.

Bangladesh has also failed to diversify its export markets away from the EU and the USA, accounting for close to 80% of RMG exports. It does not have any meaningful trade agreement with any country or trading bloc, while Vietnam has 17 bilateral FTA and is a member of Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free trade agreement, covering roughly 30% of global GDP.

Ironically, the sector that propelled Bangladesh’s industrialisation, made the country more vulnerable. Worst, too big to ignore, the RMG sector has captured Bangladesh’s political and policy space. The CDP’s recommendation in favour of Bangladesh’s extension request has been made subject to the country’s commitment to reforms. However, political will for reforms may waver when the state is captured by a dominant sector.

Curse or Boon?

Thus, what was supposed to be a boon, for many LDCs, the category has become a curse, trapping them in a perpetual state of underdevelopment and vulnerability. It fits the narrative of William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden; unfortunately, the international community may feel burdened and grant an extension to the “fearful” LDCs even when its “good-intentioned” efforts have produced so little good.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com; a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu

IPS UN Bureau

A delegate walking past a billboard at the Africa Food Systems Forum at Kigali Convention Centre in Rwanda's capital. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS

By Farai Shawn Matiashe
KIGALI, Sep 14 2026 (IPS)

When the African continent experiences erratic rains, crops fail, leaving millions of people facing hunger.

Approximately 95% of Africa’s arable land depends heavily on rainfall, which is vulnerable to climate shocks such as drought.

El Niño-induced drought expected to hit some parts of Africa, particularly southern Africa, is going to worsen the situation.

At the Africa Food Systems Forum in Kigali, Rwanda, governments and development partners are calling for more investment in irrigation systems to reduce dependence on rain-fed agriculture by farmers, including small holders who make up 80% of all farmers in sub-saharan Africa.

Building More Irrigation Systems

Only 5% of Africa’s arable land is under irrigation. Asia irrigates about 7 times more than Africa, as it holds about three-quarters of the entire world’s irrigated land.

“Some irrigation systems have been developed. The task now is to take it to scale,” said Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture, Senator Abubakar Kyari, at a side event organised by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). “The technology is there and the workforce is there. What we need is collective action.”

IWMI is a global research organisation addressing water challenges in developing countries, working with governments, civil society, and businesses.

When El Niño hit the southern Africa region in the 2023/2024 agriculture season, it triggered one of the driest mid-seasons in over 40 years. It devastated rain-fed maize production, leaving over 26 million people facing hunger in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia.

These countries declared national drought disasters to mobilise resources from the public purse, private sector and humanitarian agencies.

In preparing for the next El Nino, Abubakar said agriculture cannot remain at the mercy of the seasons. He said Africa should sustainably manage and deploy its vast water schemes. “This is not a continent of scarcity but of strategic abundance,” he said. “Our task now is not to apportion blame but to break that cycle.”

Africa holds about 9% of the world’s renewable freshwater systems.

Abubakar proposed the adoption and operationalisation of the African Union Framework on Irrigation Development and Agricultural Water Management to enhance water control and increase farmer-led irrigation. This framework is a continental blueprint published in 2020 to boost food security, adapt to climate change, and modernise agriculture across member states.

Abubakar said there is a need to innovate financing to close the investment gap and to strengthen transboundary water appropriation. “We must move from sharing drops to sharing benefits. Establishment of enforceable cooperative frameworks. To scale up climate-smart irrigation and put farmers at the centre of irrigation development. Also to open opportunities for young people in irrigated value chains,” he said

“We must turn continental commitments into actionable delivery. We have articulated the future we want. We must translate that.”

Policy is key to enabling a working, favourable environment for increasing investment in the agriculture sector.

Speaking at the same event, Vincent Kabuti, Irrigation Secretary in the Ministry of Water, said governments should be able to put in place mechanisms for farmers to hold the government accountable.

He said large commercial irrigation systems are essential in complementing farmer-led irrigation systems.

“We have a lot of water, but it is the investment that we do not have,”

Preparing for the next El Niño

Southern Africa expects the next El Niño in the 2026/2027 agricultural season, according to scientists.

The weather phenomenon was officially declared on 11 June by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA confirmed that ocean temperatures in equatorial areas of the Pacific Ocean had remained more than 0.5 °C above average for several months.

El Niño occurs when trade winds in the Pacific reverse direction, causing warmer water to flow into central and eastern areas of the world’s largest ocean.

In Africa, it normally brings El contrasting weather extremes, causing severe droughts in southern Africa and heavy, flood-triggering rains across East Africa.

Drier conditions, which scientists are anticipating, are expected to threaten staple crop yields like maize in southern Africa. Reduced food security risks compounding pressure on food price inflation and acute malnutrition among children.

Abubakar said irrigation systems cushion farmers from droughts and boost food security, create jobs and boost the livelihoods of approximately 439 million Africans living in extreme poverty.

Tilahun Amede, a director of Climate Sustainable Productivity and Resilience at Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an institution focused on scaling agricultural innovations that help smallholder farmers towards increased incomes, better livelihoods, and improved food security, said countries must integrate water in every aspect of agriculture. “African governments must invest in water and irrigation systems,” he said.

“We also need to create a market for farmers to increase their incomes so that they can adopt irrigation systems.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

Most free trade advocates falsely claim that comparative advantage ensures developmental gains from trade liberalisation. Mainstream trade theory does not promise that partial trade liberalisation guarantees optimal international specialisation.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Why should developing countries specialise in producing and exporting mineral or agricultural primary commodities? After all, most economists recognise the greater gains in growth, employment, and income from dynamic modern activities, especially manufacturing.

Comparative advantage supposedly gained by trade liberalisation supposedly ensures gains from international specialisation. However, tropical agriculture has instead experienced falling relative prices rather than higher-value-added secondary and tertiary activities in the North.

As Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch showed in 1950, export prices for primary commodities have fallen much more over the long term relative to the prices of manufactures. Bilge Erten has shown these trends continuing into the early 21st century.

Evidence since the late 20th century suggests that the prices of manufactured goods produced by developing countries have fallen relative to those of more sophisticated, high-tech goods from more developed economies.

Intellectual property rents
Due to intense competition among developing countries producing ‘generic’ manufactures, developed-country firms secure higher rents from intellectual property rights (IPRs) – namely, ‘surplus’ from monopoly power so conferred – on their manufactured exports.

The latter are priced higher due to the ‘exclusive’ monopoly power protected by IPRs and ‘branding’ strengthened by transnational law with the establishment of the multilateral World Trade Organization and related law on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS).

In fact, the prices of generic primary commodities and ‘unbranded’ manufactures have fallen due to more intense competition. In contrast, the prices of ‘exclusive’ products, due to monopoly IPRs and transnational corporate branding, remain higher.

However, such rents do not accrue to mass-produced generic products, whether primary commodities or manufactures made with easily accessible materials and production techniques, subject to intense market competition.

The last decade-long commodity ‘super-cycle’ price boom, which ended around 2004, generated windfall earnings and investible capital. While it undoubtedly lifted many boats for growth, if not development, it did not contradict longer-term trends.

Biased theory
The economic literature on development, trade, and monopolistic competition recognises the possibility of increasing – not just diminishing – returns to scale in manufacturing, enabling average costs to fall.

Such gains from trade are not from one-time ‘static’ improvements in resource allocation. Instead, these benefits stem from dynamic changes driven by production expansion, specialisation, and differentiation for larger markets.

Potential gains from greater external market access can be significant, but only if building on an existing industrial base, capacity and capabilities. Proactive support through appropriate industrial, investment, and technology policies can be crucial.

This pragmatic developmental approach to trade policy contradicts the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin ‘pure’ trade theory, the received conventional wisdom invoked by contemporary advocates of trade liberalisation.

Some Keynesian economists promoted balance-of-payments-constrained growth. Cross-border flows of goods and services are determined by the level and growth rate of economic activity, with the exchange rate determining relative prices.

This approach, implying fewer gains from trade, is rejected by trade liberalisation advocates. Developing countries’ gains from specialisation are reduced by falling relative prices, with consumers benefiting from productivity gains at the expense of producers.

If developing-country firms do not manufacture products at productivity levels comparable to those in developed countries, claims of trade gains from consumers’ ‘love of variety’ become quite irrelevant.

Agricultural trade liberalisation
The Western push for agricultural trade liberalisation sought to eliminate tariffs to ensure food security while ignoring subsidies that developed countries could afford.

Although agricultural export subsidies have been largely eliminated, OECD food producers continue to benefit from production subsidies, thereby enabling productivity and trade gains.

As many developing countries became net importers of subsidised agribusiness exports from OECD exporters, price increases due to subsidy withdrawal hurt consumers, especially in developing countries.

Comparable gains in developing-country agriculture have often been modest due to the decline in infrastructure and support services, especially after the imposition of the ‘neoliberal’ Washington Consensus by the West in the 1980s.

The increasing private foreign corporate domination of agricultural research, development, and extension has also significantly reduced net gains to developing-country smallholder farmers.

Neoliberal reforms, including structural adjustment programmes, have reduced, contracted out or privatised government and public-sector alternatives. This raised the costs of credit, marketing, and inputs, including seeds, fertilisers, herbicides, pesticides, machinery and fuel.

While trade liberalisation of manufactured imports eroded the policy space needed for investment and technology policies for development, agricultural trade liberalisation has undermined ‘food security’ in most developing countries.

Thus, many African net food-exporting nations became net food importers in the 1980s, following the neoliberal reforms imposed by structural adjustment programmes on indebted nations.

IPS UN Bureau

Rodney Bay Marina, Saint Lucia. Rising seas are among the mounting risks for small island states as the world heads towards an expected overshoot of 1.5°C. Credit: Alison Kentish/IPS

By Alison Kentish
CASTRIES, Saint Lucia, Sep 8 2026 (IPS)

The world is now expected to breach the 1.5 degrees Celsius warming limit that small island states have spent years defending as a threshold for survival.

For people in the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean, the consequences will not begin only when islands disappear beneath the sea. They include saltwater intrusion into freshwater supplies and agricultural land, coral reef loss, more damaging coastal flooding and mounting pressure on already limited resources for recovery and adaptation.

That is the stark warning emerging from the United Nations Environment Programme’s Limiting Overshoot report, launched on September 2. The report examines a future in which average global temperatures rise beyond 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels before, potentially, being brought back down.

The report concludes that the world is now expected to cross the 1.5°C threshold. What is still uncertain is how far above it temperatures will rise, how long they will remain there and how quickly they can eventually be brought back down.

Dr Shobha Maharaj, a Caribbean scientist and one of the lead authors of the report’s Chapter Four, says the expected breach raises a new set of questions for small island states.

“For years, the goal was to avoid crossing 1.5°C. But this report now says very clearly that we are going to cross it,” she said. “The question now is how deep is this overshoot going to go? How long is it going to last? And how do we live through it while we work to bring temperatures back down to 1.5°C?”

No buffer

The Paris Agreement committed countries to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. Small island states were among the strongest advocates for the 1.5°C target, arguing that higher levels of warming would pose an existential threat.

“For small islands, it is because we live closest to the thresholds,” Maharaj said. “In a wealthy, temperate country, an additional half-degree of warming would still carry serious costs. But on a small island, it could determine whether a reef recovers or not, or whether an aquifer stays fresh or turns salty for good.”

“There is no higher ground to move to, no deep treasury to draw on and no second reef when one of them dies,” she added. There is no higher ground to move to, no deep treasury to draw on and no second reef when one of them dies.

The danger is not limited to dramatic disasters, she said. Habitability can erode quietly.

“Saltwater can contaminate groundwater and soil. A kitchen garden that has fed a family for generations may stop producing. High tides can reach roads, homes and public infrastructure even on clear days. When reefs die, communities lose not only fish and tourism income but also natural barriers that weaken waves before they reach the shore.”

“None of this requires an island to vanish,” Maharaj said. “Habitability begins to collapse first, quietly, through water, food and the loss of the everyday things that make a place home. By the time submergence becomes the headline, people have often already been forced to leave.”

The report warns that sea-level rise will continue for centuries and that falling global temperatures would not reverse all the damage accumulated during overshoot. Some ecosystem, biodiversity and glacier losses would persist, meaning a return to 1.5°C would not restore the world that existed before the threshold was crossed.

Small Islands, Different Realities

SIDS are often discussed as a single group, but Maharaj cautioned that their circumstances and options differ.

Pacific atoll states face acute threats because of their extremely low elevation and vulnerable freshwater lenses. Some Pacific islands are also experiencing land subsidence, compounding the effects of rising seas.

Several Caribbean states have higher terrain, but much of their population, infrastructure and economic activity is concentrated along narrow coastal areas. Indian Ocean states face their own combination of risks.

“What we share is a structural predicament, narrow room for retreat, limited finances and economies that are exposed to single shocks,” Maharaj said.

But she warned against transferring solutions indiscriminately between regions.

“The right response in Tuvalu, for example, is not automatically the right response in Barbados or the Maldives.”

Adaptation Buys Time, Not Immunity

For decades, adaptation has been presented as the principal defence for countries already living with climate impacts. But the UNEP report says many existing approaches were designed for gradual, one-directional warming, not temperatures that rise, plateau and may eventually decline.

Strategies fixed to one set of conditions could become ineffective or even increase vulnerability as conditions change. The report calls instead for adaptation that is flexible, forward-looking and capable of evolving throughout the different stages of overshoot.

“Adaptation buys time, not immunity,” Maharaj said.

She said the large gap between adaptation planning and implementation may provide a narrow opportunity to revise projects before they are built for conditions they can no longer withstand.

“We have a lot of plans, but many of them have not yet been implemented,” she said. “That gives us a window, although not a large one, to recalibrate those plans for a post-1.5°C world.”

That shift will require money before disasters strike.

Many developing countries are already trying to adapt, recover from extreme events, transform their economies and reduce emissions while servicing heavy debt. Climate finance, Maharaj said, arrives too slowly and is often supplied through loans that add to that burden.

“A disaster drains public funds into emergency response and reconstruction. That leaves less money to reduce the risks posed by the next event, which then hits a weakened country even harder. Each turn of that wheel reduces the very capacity we need to climb out of it.”

Breaking the cycle will require grants, upfront financing and investment in prevention, rather than repeatedly paying to rebuild after losses.

A Deeper Injustice

Overshoot also raises questions of climate justice, particularly for countries with little historical responsibility for the emissions driving warming.

“The harms concentrated during this period, especially those that turn out to be irreversible, fall hardest on the countries least responsible for the emissions that caused them,” Maharaj said.

Maharaj said contributing to the report carried a particular weight for her as a Caribbean scientist.

“For those of us from these islands, 1.5°C was never simply a number on a chart. It was the line we were told represented survival. It was the line at which we were told survival was still possible,” she said. “Now, helping to write the science of what lies beyond that line is a heavy thing, both personally and professionally.”

Crossing 1.5°C, she said, represents “a profound failure of collective will” but not permission to give up.

“How high the peak rises, how long we remain there and how quickly temperatures are brought back down are all still ours to decide,” Maharaj said. “Every one of those choices will be measured in lives and livelihoods here in our region and across small islands.”

For small islands, limiting the overshoot could mean the difference between mounting losses and holding on to the places people call home.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Excerpt:

Farmer Field Day held at Mariira, to demonstrate the different Climate Smart Technologies used in farming. December 22nd, 2022. Murang'a county, Kenya. Credit: 2022 CIAT/Owen Kimani

By Ismahane Elouafi
KIGALI, Rwanda, Sep 3 2026 (IPS)

As leaders gather in Kigali for the Africa Food Systems Forum, they face an urgent question: why do so many proven agricultural innovations still fail to reach the farmers and communities that need them most?

For the first time, Africa is home to the largest number of people facing hunger. This is despite decades of agricultural innovation developed to address the continent’s food and agriculture challenges. Between 2022 and 2024, CGIAR – the world’s largest partnership dedicated to transforming food, land and water systems in a climate crisis – developed more than 470 innovations, reaching at least six million farmers across the continent.

Africa’s food systems challenges are not the result of a lack of innovation. Rather, a set of overlapping, complex and increasingly severe pressures is undermining progress at a critical point in the continent’s transformation.

Climate-driven weather impacts are becoming more frequent and severe. A predicted “super” El Niño in the coming months is forecast to create drier than usual conditions across parts of West and Central Africa. In East Africa, it is forecast to reduce normal rainfall in some regions and to lead to severe rainfall and flooding in others. According to the World Meteorological Organization, Africa is warming faster than the global average.

Escalating conflicts across several African countries are disrupting food supply chains and increasing the risk of severe food emergencies. At the same time, geopolitical instability has driven up the cost of agricultural inputs and transport, creating further barriers to sustainable farming. All this is taking place against a backdrop of reduced funding for agricultural development and an unprecedented decline in international aid to sub-Saharan Africa.

African countries are confronting this confluence of challenges as they begin implementing the new 10-year Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme Strategy and Action Plan (2026–2035), the African Union-led roadmap for transforming the continent’s agrifood systems into more resilient drivers of economic growth, food security and healthy diets.

The roadmap sets the ambition. What is missing is the architecture to make that happen: the “missing middle” between proven agricultural innovation and the large-scale public investment, partnerships and delivery capacity needed to take it to scale.

Bridging this missing middle requires development funders to rethink how they support agricultural innovation. Governments, international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and African development finance institutions must move beyond portfolios of disparate projects and invest instead in coherent innovation pathways. Science and evidence must be integrated from the outset, before investment decisions are made.

Innovation pathways provide a route for moving tried-and-tested solutions to scale. They allow governments, funders, scientific organizations and partners to work together to identify, validate, scale and measure the impact of the most promising innovations.

Bundling complementary innovations into investable packages can also help accelerate deployment and impact, opening opportunities for ambitious young Africans to build firms, provide services and create jobs within their own food systems.

African governments must remain in the driver’s seat throughout this process. That is essential to ensure investments respond to national priorities and align with country agrifood systems investment plans under CAADP.

CGIAR is working to build precisely these connections between country demand, science, finance and delivery. One example is the partnership between CGIAR Scaling for Impact with the African Development Bank to support the Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) and its Clearinghouse. It demonstrates how large-scale development finance and scientific expertise can be brought together to meet national agricultural priorities and deliver proven, science-backed technologies at scale.

The TAAT Clearinghouse connects country demand and AfDB financing with proven innovations, CGIAR expertise and the technical support needed for effective delivery. It is currently linking approximately US$1.5 billion in AfDB-backed investments in Nigeria, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with science-backed technologies and expertise.

In 2026 alone, CGIAR innovations funded and scaled through the TAAT Clearinghouse are expected to reach 3.4 million farmers across the continent.

The Africa Food Systems Forum must therefore be more than a place to showcase promising ideas. It should be a critical inflection point for moving from commitment to credible investment, action and delivery. African policymakers, investors, development finance institutions and researchers should use the Forum to build a more systematic science-to-finance compact—one that places proven innovation at the heart of national investment and delivery.

In an era of less aid and greater instability, Africa cannot afford for proven science to remain stranded in pilot projects—or for billions in development finance to be invested without the best available evidence. Connecting the two is one of the fastest ways to turn Africa’s food systems ambitions into results at scale.

Dr. Ismahane Elouafi is Executive Managing Director, CGIAR

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Excerpt:

Lars Løkke Rasmussen (right), Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and President of the Security Council for the month of August, addresses the Security Council meeting entitled ‘Food Under Fire: The Security Council's Role in Mitigating Global and Local Food Crises’, under the agenda item of maintenance of international peace and security. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 28 2026 (IPS)

Across the board, UN officials and humanitarian organizations urged the Security Council to act before the consequences of food insecurity and famines hit, during a high-level open debate on Tuesday, August 25. More than 80 representatives took part in Tuesday’s conversation on conflict-related food insecurity under the theme “Food under fire: the Security Council’s role in mitigating global and local food crises”.

In 2018, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2417, which strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, as well as the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. Resolution 2417 solidified the link between armed conflict and food insecurity. Most importantly, the resolution stated the Security Council’s willingness to consider adopting sanctions against individuals or entities deliberately obstructing the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. The resolution was a landmark achievement that, for the first time, treated hunger not as a result of war but as a humanitarian security threat that the Security Council is obligated to protect.

Eight years after resolution 2417 was passed, 2025 marked the highest year on record of global acute hunger, with more than 266 million people facing acute food insecurity and, for the first time this century, two famines simultaneously confirmed in Sudan and Gaza. On Tuesday, August 25, representative after representative discussed how resolution 2417 has gone largely unused.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres opened Tuesday’s session reminding the members of the sanction provisions in the resolution, stating: “This council expressed its willingness to consider information on the unlawful denial of humanitarian access and take appropriate steps, including sanction measures.” Guterres explicitly called on the Security Council “to make every effort to ensure accountability”.

Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, presided over the session and candidly stated how “resolution 2417 [is] a powerful tool, but its potential remains untapped, particularly when it comes to early warning.” Testament to that fact is how the resolution’s original text cited 74 million people worldwide facing conflict-induced hunger, a figure that has now doubled to 147 million people.

During Tuesday’s session, the representatives present, notably the elected members of the Security Council, narrowed in on the same point, that being that the famines occurring worldwide are completely preventable.

While discussing the famines in Sudan and Gaza, Dace Melbārde, Latvia’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, called the dual crises proof that “these famines are not natural disasters. They are man-made, and they are entirely preventable”. Ms. Melbārde urged the Security Council to “consider targeted sanctions and other appropriate measures against those who deliberately weaponize food and obstruct humanitarian access,” warning that “impunity cannot become another driver of hunger.”

“This is not fate. It is a choice. And when there is a choice, there is culpability,” said Lewis Garsheedah Brown, II, Liberia’s Permanent Representative to the UN. Brown also focused on how the dual famines devastating Sudan and Gaza are not fate or acts of nature, but instead predictable results of the Security Council’s inaction.

Carl Skau, the Acting Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), admitted institutional failure when it came to acting on the warning signs of Sudan’s famine. Examining Sudan’s Darfur region, Mr. Skau said: “We all saw the atrocities in al-Fashir coming, but the international community, including this Council, failed to act on those warnings.” Mr. Skau went on to say that “waiting for famine to be declared is a total failure of duty”. The famine in Sudan was compared to the crisis in 2017 and 2022 in Somalia, where early implemented Security Council-backed action helped to avert catastrophic famine.

Perrine Benoist, Co-CEO, Action Against Hunger and Member of the Global Coalition Against Conflict and Hunger (Rule 39), addresses the Security Council meeting. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

Also during Tuesday’s session, Dr. Perrine Benoist, Co-CEO of Action Against Hunger, presented figures that highlighted the level of inaction the Security Council has taken despite the universal adoption of resolution 2417. Dr. Benoist detailed how there have been more than 9,300 incidents where conflict-related violence impacted food systems in over 45 countries. These incidents include more than 3,200 bombings of markets, agricultural land and water systems.

“Time and again, its provisions have been violated by parties to conflict, while implementation by the members of this Council has fallen far short of what the resolution demands,” Dr. Benoist said of resolution 2417.

However, despite the emphasis placed on strengthening and acting on resolution 2417, not every representative agreed to the scale of the action on Tuesday. Ambassador Vassily A. Nebenzia of the Russian Federation rejected the calls from other representatives to broaden the resolution’s application. Mr. Nebenzia argued that “resolution 2417 does not need an expanded interpretation or new mechanisms. It requires country-interest application where conflict does indeed create hunger.”

For the millions living through the famines in Sudan and Gaza and the tens of millions the WFP warned could be pushed into food insecurity, the consequences of the Security Council’s inaction are not abstract.

“We cannot wait for famine or catastrophic conditions to be formally confirmed,” said Guterres. “I call on this Council to act when the warning lights are flashing.”

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By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Aug 26 2026 (IPS)

Across this vast ocean, the latest monitoring by Mercator Ocean International shows marine heatwave conditions ranging from moderate to severe. At the same time, the World Meteorological Organization expects a strong El Niño to intensify through August to October, with a positive Indian Ocean Dipole also likely to develop. These are not distant scientific signals. They are an urgent warning that the ocean system on which millions depend is under mounting stress.

The Indian Ocean in particular has sustained communities for generations. It provides food and livelihoods, carries trade and travel, shapes our cultures and moderates our climate. It is also one connected living system – its currents carry heat, nutrients, fish (as well as pollution, unfortunately) across borders drawn on maps. Its coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass meadows and open waters support people from the eastern coast of Africa to South Asia, and from the islands of the western Indian Ocean to the Maldives and beyond. When ocean temperatures rise abnormally, the consequences are not confined to a scientific bulletin. They are seen in the health of coral reefs, in the movement and abundance of fish, in the safety of coastal communities, and in the future of tourism and fisheries. They are felt in the weakening of the natural protection that reefs, mangroves and coastal habitats provide against erosion, flooding and storms.

Coral reefs are especially vulnerable. They can sometimes recover from an isolated bleaching event if temperatures fall quickly enough. But repeated bleaching and prolonged heat stress allow too little time for recovery. When reefs deteriorate, the consequences extend beyond biodiversity: fish habitats are lost, shorelines become more exposed, tourism suffers and communities lose part of their natural and cultural inheritance. This is why ocean warming is not simply an environmental issue. It is an issue of food security, jobs, development, economic stability and justice.

For decades, humanity has relied on the ocean’s exceptional capacity to cushion the climate crisis. The ocean absorbs more than 90 percent of the excess heat trapped by greenhouse gas emissions. By doing so, it has moderated atmospheric warming and spared humanity even more severe disruption. But there is a limit to what we can ask of the sea. Small island developing states have contributed little to the cumulative emissions destabilising the global climate. Yet we are among the first to face the consequences. We cannot move our reefs. We cannot relocate our coastlines without immense social and economic cost. We cannot separate the wellbeing of our people and economies from the health of the ocean. For island people, climate vulnerability is not an abstract concept. It is a daily reality.

Still, island states must not be viewed only as victims. We are custodians of extensive ocean spaces, centres of practical innovation and partners in the search for sustainable solutions. Seychelles has tried to demonstrate that economic development and marine conservation need not be enemies. Through marine spatial planning, Seychelles has committed 30 percent of its waters to protection, while advancing a blue economy vision based on stewardship rather than depletion. This is not charity towards nature. It is a recognition that there can be no enduring prosperity if fish stocks decline, reefs deteriorate and coastal ecosystems are damaged beyond recovery.

Across the Indian Ocean, other island and coastal states are also restoring habitats, improving fisheries management, investing in renewable energy, strengthening marine conservation and building more resilient communities. Their efforts deserve recognition and support. They show that those most exposed to climate risk are not waiting passively for rescue. They are protecting a shared ocean heritage, often with scarce resources. But local and regional action cannot substitute for the choices that must be made globally.

First, the world must reduce greenhouse gas emissions much more rapidly. Adaptation is indispensable, particularly for small island developing states. We need stronger early-warning systems, more ocean observation, investment in reef and coastal restoration, secure water supplies and infrastructure designed for a changing climate. But adaptation cannot indefinitely protect an ocean that continues to accumulate heat. No sea wall, restoration programme or emergency plan can replace decisive action to reduce emissions.

Second, climate finance must become fairer, faster and easier to access. Island states should not have to devote years of limited institutional capacity to complex procedures simply to secure support for renewable energy, water security, coastal protection, marine research and ecosystem restoration. Those facing the greatest climate risks require genuine partnership – not delayed promises, burdensome processes and inadequate resources.

Third, the countries of the Indian Ocean must deepen regional cooperation. Marine heatwaves, coral bleaching, illegal fishing, biodiversity loss and coastal erosion do not stop at national boundaries. We need better ocean observation, data-sharing and regional early-warning systems. We need stronger scientific cooperation, responsible fisheries management and coordinated protection of the ecosystems connecting our islands and coasts.

The Indian Ocean should not be seen merely as a corridor for trade or a theatre for geopolitical competition. It is a shared living system, whose health is fundamental to the security and prosperity of everyone who depends on it. The current warming should also remind us that the ocean is not an inexhaustible resource. It has regulated our climate, sustained our communities, supported our economies and linked our peoples for generations. Yet we still behave as though its capacity to absorb our impacts has no limits. It does.

The islands of the Indian Ocean are not asking for sympathy. We are calling for shared responsibility. We know that ocean health is inseparable from the security of our people. We know that protecting nature and pursuing development must go hand in hand. And we know that every year of delay makes adaptation more costly, the damage more severe and the choices before us more difficult. As a result, the Indian Ocean is sounding the alarm. Its islands are among the first to hear it. But the warning is not ours alone. It is for every country whose climate, food security, economy and future depend on a living ocean.

James Michel, is Former President of the Republic of Seychelles

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Response in Colombia continues after the 7.4 earthquake. In Barrio Lleras, Buenaventura, more than 54 houses have been destroyed or are at risk of collapse. Credit: UNICEF

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 25 2026 (IPS)

Over the past week, the humanitarian crisis in Colombia has deteriorated significantly following the Mw 7.4–7.5 earthquake that struck the Chocó department on August 10. With the Colombian government declaring a State of Emergency across 15 departments, the nation continues to struggle with massive civilian casualties, immense damage to critical infrastructure, and the disruption of basic services. The national government and the humanitarian community continue to coordinate lifesaving responses and monitor conditions as they evolve.

The latest figures from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) show that the earthquake and the following aftershocks affected the majority of Colombia’s municipalities, including both densely populated urban environments and rural areas. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and El Equipo Humanitario País Colombia (EHP) estimate that roughly 282,700 people have been affected across 15 of the 32 departments, or roughly 153,300 households. As of August 24, there have been at least 329 fatalities.

Additionally, 4,548 people have been injured, 426 remain missing, and 356 have been rescued. IFRC has recorded over 134,342 damaged homes, while OCHA and EHP estimate that at least 31,400 homes have been completely destroyed. The earthquakes have decimated critical infrastructure in Colombia, with authorities reporting significant damage to educational facilities, health centers, water systems, and community spaces.

At least 3,443 educational facilities have been affected by the earthquake, with an additional 263 having partially or completely collapsed or projected to collapse imminently. Roughly 75,000 students have been stripped of access to safe education as a result. Furthermore, around 3,905 community centers have been impacted, significantly elevating the risks of psychosocial and developmental challenges for affected communities.

Local authorities have also underscored numerous disruptions to electricity, water supply, healthcare, and telecommunications over the several days, resulting in delays in comprehensive damage and needs assessments, while rendering numerous municipalities outside of humanitarian reach. According to IFRC, at least 413 roads have been damaged and five airports have been impacted.

“There’s communities that haven’t been accessed yet or have only been accessed once,” said Jean Philippe Antolin, the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Humanitarian Response and Recovery Specialist for Latin America and the Caribbean during a press briefing at the UN Headquarters on August 20.

“We must continue to provide blanket coverage of several items from shelter to food to health. Among those many most pressing urgent needs, I will say also the need for information. People need to know. People need to know whether the house is safe, structurally sound. From outside, some might not look affected, but if you go inside, you will see cracks everywhere. People are sleeping outside for fear of the roof collapsing over their heads.”

Entire communities are on the brink of collapse as delayed humanitarian responses continue to be exacerbated by pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities. Prior to the earthquake, roughly 7 million people in Colombia had been experiencing moderate to severe levels of food insecurity. The World Food Programme (WFP) notes that since the earthquake, approximately one-third of the population in Chocó and Valle del Cauca, two of the hardest-hit regions, are critically food insecure.

Additionally, widespread displacement and the disruption of community support networks have significantly amplified protection risks, with thousands of families across Colombia residing in overcrowded and unsanitary displacement shelters. The latest figures from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) show that women and girls residing in these shelters are at a heightened risk of gender-based violence, while pregnant women have limited access to lifesaving maternal healthcare including antenatal care, emergency obstetric services, and effective referral mechanisms.

Communities in overcrowded displacement shelters are especially vulnerable to vector-borne diseases as heavy rains across Pereira, Buenaventura and Quibdó worsen living conditions. Antolin warned that the rise of dengue is of particular concern, with water contamination further increasing the risk of diarrheal and respiratory illnesses.

Furthermore, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stresses that the full impact on rural communities remains unclear, noting a “critical information gap” regarding damage to crop harvests, livestock, irrigation systems, and artisanal fishing. Because the systems are lifelines for riverine, rural, and coastal communities, the disruption risks breaking production cycles and leaving families with far fewer resources for the next season.

“Humanitarian partners say more housing options, including community shelters, temporary hotel stays, host families and rent support are needed for families whose homes were destroyed, badly damaged or no longer safe,” said Antolin. “Repair kits and household basics such as sleeping mats, bedding, cooking supplies and items for privacy will be essential to help people live safely and with dignity. Getting these supplies to the hardest-to-reach areas remains a major challenge. and most partners are working together to overcome it. There is also an urgent need to strengthen roofing, drainage and waterproofing in existing locations while continuing to register affected populations, whether in collective sites with host families or rental housing.”

In the wake of the earthquake in Colombia, the United Nations and its partners have been on the frontlines providing direct support to affected communities, including healthcare, protection services, and food and cash assistance. IOM has launched a USD 30 million USD appeal focusing on providing shelter, water and sanitation (WASH) services, and protection services, alongside investments in community recovery and risk communication.

WFP is positioned to expand its current distribution of food assistance from Pereira and Quibdó to other critically vulnerable localities, aiming to reach approximately 100,000 civilians. Meanwhile, UNFPA has been deploying humanitarian personnel in Chocó to provide support for survivors of gender-based violence and pregnant women, while also providing hygiene and maternal supplies. Concurrently, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is collaborating with national authorities to expand child protection systems.

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Participants in traditional dress take part in a cultural welcome at the UNCCD COP17 venue in Ulaanbaatar on Aug. 17, 2026, highlighting the cultural diversity of communities whose livelihoods are closely linked to rangelands. Credit: UN photo

By Kizito Makoye
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Aug 17 2026 (IPS)

After moving more than 6,000 km across Eurasia, the Silk Road Caravan has reached Mongolia with stories from pastoralists whose livelihoods are increasingly threatened by drought, degraded land and shrinking access to grazing areas.

Since leaving Türkiye in May, the thud of horse hooves has echoed through landscapes in the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Along the way, its riders met pastoralists adapting to a harsher climate and deteriorating rangelands. Now their experiences have converged in Ulaanbaatar, where the caravan’s final leg coincides with the opening of COP17 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Governments, scientists, financial institutions, businesses and civil society have gathered there to address the pressures on the world’s drylands.

The journey has brought an old question into the spotlight: can global efforts to restore rangelands succeed without the knowledge of the people who have managed them for generations?

Delegates in traditional attire gather at the UNCCD COP17 venue in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, on Aug. 17, 2026, as the conference brings together pastoralists, Indigenous representatives and policymakers to discuss land degradation, drought and rangeland restoration. Credit: UN photo

For centuries, caravans travelling the ancient Silk Road carried goods, ideas and cultures between distant civilisations. This one has carried stories of communities trying to keep up their land productive and their livelihoods intact as drought and degradation spread across drylands from Eurasia to Africa.

Its arrival on the eve of COP17 highlights the conference’s challenge of turning commitments to land restoration into action on the ground.

Land Degradation

Land degradation and drought cost the global economy USD 900 billion annually and affect 40% of the world’s land and 3.2 billion people. Droughts have increased by almost one-third since 2000 and generate at least USD 300 billion in annual losses, according to UN data.

For Tanzania’s pastoralist communities, Neema Seki, an Indigenous women and youth advocate connected to the Pastoralist Women’s Council, urged world leaders in Ulaanbaatar to guarantee land security for pastoral communities.

“The most rapidly changing aspect is access to land. This by implication affects everything else in pastoral livelihoods. Without land tenure security, livestock health is impacted, mobility is affected, and family food security is affected,” she told IPS.

Her warning is central to the COP17 debate as land degradation increasingly threatens pastoralist women’s rights, livelihoods and mobility.

“In a pastoralist setting, women play a significant role that is oftentimes not stated. If livestock health deteriorates, women are mostly responsible for feeding them, bringing water from far distances to water the ailing or weak livestock,” Seki said.

She added that restrictions on pastoral livelihoods can also create a gendered burden that national climate and conservation policies rarely capture.

“Another aspect is a reality that when the pastoral livelihoods are dismantled by restrictions on access to resources, women oftentimes remain in the land to suffer while men are able to go into cities to look for work while women remain with children at home.”

Mongolian ceremonial guards stand beside the national flag during the opening of UNCCD COP17 in Ulaanbaatar on Aug. 17, 2026. The conference is focused on accelerating global action on land restoration and drought resilience. Credit: UN photo

That experience is echoed thousands of kilometres away in Niger, where Abarchi Harouna, a pastoralist leader with the association Nodde Nooto and co-chair of the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists for West and Central Africa, argues that mobility itself is an environmental management tool.

“Mobility is essential to pastoralism because it allows livestock keepers to search for water, pasture and salt wherever they are available,” Harouna told IPS.

For nomadic pastoralists such as Tanzania’s Maasai, restricting traditional migration corridors directly affects livelihoods.

“When governments restrict access to traditional routes and water points, nomadic pastoralists are deprived of pasture, water and salt,” he said.

“This can lead to a pastoral crisis, with significant livestock deaths and even conflicts between farmers and herders.”

Relevance in Mongolia

Similar pressures are evident in Mongolia, where pastoralism is key to the economy, yet nearly 77 percent of the country’s land suffers from degradation. Rangelands cover about 70 percent of its territory and support the livelihoods of roughly one-third of the population, leaving pastoral communities exposed to climate shocks.

Rangelands cover 54% of the Earth’s land surface, support about 2 billion people and provide nearly 70% of global livestock feed and one-sixth of the world’s food. Yet up to half are degraded, particularly in dry regions facing mounting climate pressures.

Harouna challenges a persistent narrative that pastoralism itself is responsible for land degradation.

“Livestock keepers are never responsible for land degradation. This narrative is incorrect. Livestock mobility ensures the health of pastures.”

He points instead to the ecological functions performed by mobile herds.

“Animals carry the seeds of grasses and woody plants from one place to another, thereby enriching biological diversity.”

Manure, he said, fertilises soils, while trampling can loosen compacted ground.

“The knowledge of livestock keepers helps governments and all stakeholders restore degraded land and improve resilience to climate change.

For Seki, a similar knowledge system exists in Tanzania but is increasingly undermined by government policies.

“One of the greatest traditional knowledge practices by pastoralists which is being wrongly discouraged by government policies is pastoral mobility,” she said.

The implications extend to a younger generation that, despite the pressures, has not necessarily abandoned pastoralism.

“Young pastoralists still see pastoralism as the best livelihood system. They are, however, daily confronting the ugliness caused by state-restrictive policies and the climate crisis,” Seki said.

The Economics of Waiting

COP17 organisers are seeking to frame restoration not just as an environmental obligation but also as an economic investment.

The conference estimates that about USD 355 billion is needed every year to combat land degradation and drought, compared with the current investment of roughly USD 77 billion. That leaves an annual financing gap of USD 278 billion.

The private sector currently contributes only around six percent of global finance for land restoration and drought resilience.

Closing that gap will be central to the negotiations.

The conference will explore ways of reducing investment risks and encouraging businesses, financial institutions and governments to finance regenerative landscapes. An initiative linked to the COP has recorded commitments of more than USD 9 billion across more than 210 million hectares.

The argument for investment is strengthened by the potential returns: every dollar invested in drought resilience can generate returns of up to USD 10, while some nature-based solutions can generate benefits many times their cost.

UNCCD Executive Secretary Yasmine Fouad has described the challenge bluntly: “The world does not lack solutions; the challenge is taking them to scale.”

From Commitments to Measurable Results

Mongolia’s Prime Minister N. Uchral has called for a shift “from talk to action, from targets to implementation, and from commitments to measurable results”.

The conference comes at a time when multilateral cooperation faces pressure and the world’s environmental crises grow increasingly interconnected. Land degradation affects food production. Drought intensifies water insecurity. Loss of vegetation contributes to biodiversity decline. Livelihood losses can drive migration and deepen competition over scarce resources.

As the first of the three Rio Convention COPs being held in 2026, COP17 offers an opportunity to connect land policy with negotiations on biodiversity and climate change later in the year.

It is also taking place during the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists, giving pastoral communities a prominent place in the global policy calendar.

Seki argues that women and young people should be recognised as custodians of knowledge and resources.

“Women and young people play a great role in the pastoral system. This role extends to forest stewardship and resource management.”

Yet, she said, traditional knowledge often gets sidelined.

“Both women and young people are discouraged by state policies and conservation policies from using traditional knowledge for ecology and nature sustainability.”

COP17’s agenda includes a proposed policy framework on rangelands and pastoralists and the launch of a Rangelands Flagship Initiative aimed at attracting long-term investment into sustainable rangeland management and pastoral livelihoods.

For Harouna, restrictions on livestock mobility potentially affect agriculture, pastoral production and the environment. He warns that declining soil fertility could trigger dismal crop yields, while degraded grazing areas could foster invasive pests, consequently affecting livestock and reducing milk and meat supplies.

Exchange of Knowledge

The Silk Road Caravan’s final journey across Mongolia will take participants from the Gobi Desert to the country’s central forests and grasslands. They are expected to meet nomadic herder families, researchers, local authorities and pastoral cooperatives and visit restoration projects.

The challenge for delegates is to ensure the caravan’s lessons continue beyond the conference.

For dryland communities in Tanzania, Niger and Mongolia, restoration can determine whether livestock survive, families remain on their land, food production continues and ecosystems endure.

As the conference opens under the theme “Restoring Land. Restoring Hope”, its success may depend on whether the afflicted communities living on vulnerable landscapes receive the space, resources and recognition they need to restore and manage them.

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Zambia’s Green Revolution campaign generated stagnant productivity and rising hunger. Credit: Timothy A. Wise

By Timothy A. Wise and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
CAMBRIDGE, MA, USA / KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Aug 17 2026 (IPS)

As AGRA turns 20, a new report exposes its worsening failure to double productivity and incomes and halve undernourishment in participating African nations as promised.

AGRA still failing Africa’s farmers
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, now known simply as AGRA, was established in 2006.

Timothy A. Wise

After considerable evidence of failure became apparent, it abandoned its original ambitious goals in 2022, adopting AGRA 3.0, focusing on food systems and policy reforms.

It also ‘rebranded’ by changing its name to AGRA, removing its explicit association with the much criticised Green Revolution. Wise’s 2020 assessment of AGRA up to 2018 found progress on its own declared goals quite modest and uneven.

Wise’s latest review finds even slower productivity growth and worsening hunger under AGRA compared to before 2006. Its improved seeds and fertilizer promotion did not even achieve sustainable intensification, i.e., growing much more food on the same land.

Dubious progress
Increased food production and sales were supposed to reduce rural poverty and food insecurity.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

High-yielding seeds and related agrochemicals were not widely adopted by most smallholders except when heavily subsidised.

But subsidies have encouraged planting favoured crops on new farmland. Modest yield growth often failed to cover the costs of more expensive inputs, leaving farmers in debt.

Meanwhile, cultivation and yields of millet, a nutritious climate-resilient staple, has declined over the last two decades.

Instead of halving the number of hungry, undernourishment has risen by 58% in participating countries since 2006. Tragically, the number of hungry in the 13 AGRA countries nearly doubled over the last six years!

AGRA unmonitored
The African Union was induced to support AGRA by encouraging more government investments in food agriculture. In 2006, it launched the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP).

Despite generous Green Revolution subsidies in Malawi, hunger continues to rise. Credit: Timothy A. Wise

CAADP called for dramatically raising government spending on agriculture to 10% of government budgets. However, most governments failed to provide the required funding.

But many governments, particularly in AGRA countries, have spent large shares of their scarce public resources on agriculture. Many have invested in Green Revolution programmes.

Despite setting similar productivity, income, and hunger objectives, by 2025, no country met CAADP’s targets according to its rigorous biennial progress reports using more benchmarks.

High-yielding seeds and related agrochemicals were not widely adopted by most smallholders except when heavily subsidised.

AGRA’s main initiatives, involving input markets and industrial farming, are too costly for most small-scale farmers, benefiting wealthier farmers more.

For Wise, the poor outcomes are not solely or even primarily due to AGRA. Instead, he blames the Green Revolution approach, previously strongly supported by private foundations and now by the World Bank Group.

In contrast, Senegal, not one of the AGRA 13, has succeeded in halving hunger, with more diversified policies supporting a wider range of crops and farming methods.

What failure?
AGRA has never reported actual progress against its original goals of doubling productivity and incomes while halving hunger for 30 million farming households.

With fewer measurable goals, progress reports now focus on the number of commercial seeds produced, private financing generated, and enterprises launched.

Instead, AGRA claimed, “we directly reached 11 million farmers and indirectly reached 26 million farmers. This achievement significantly outstripped our initial targets to reach 30 million smallholder households.”

‘Reaching’ 37 million farmers, mostly ‘indirectly’, says little about its actual impacts on farmers. Unsurprisingly, most donors have cut support for AGRA.

Now, AGRA is influencing national and continent-wide policymaking to accelerate agricultural commercialisation. Its new focus on food systems and policies shifts attention as its website now makes little mention of productivity or small-scale farmers.

Whither AGRA?
Yield growth has been slow and uneven, mainly for a few food crops prioritised by AGRA. Those modest yield gains often did not cover the costs of expensive inputs, leaving many farmers in debt.

Increased food production and sales were supposed to reduce rural poverty and hunger. Instead, malnutrition has risen in most AGRA countries, as dietary diversity has declined with crop diversity.

Asia’s Green Revolution offered far more support to farmers than Africa’s, although its achievements have been more mixed than typically claimed. Africa’s Green Revolution has offered much less, mainly improved commercial seeds.

AGRA still denies the failure of its earlier policies. Instead, it now pays lip service to low-input approaches including agroecology.

In 2025, AGRA president Agnes Kalibata acknowledged, as she stepped down from her post, “Part of why [AGRA] rebranded was that the Green Revolution ship has sailed. We can’t continue pursuing what’s not working for others.”

After twenty years, AGRA should take heed of that advice.

The Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa will release its report, drawing on Wise’s research, on August 24.

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Geography of the Makkah Defence Agreement, illustrating the strategic triangle formed by the capitals of the three signatory states—Ankara, Türkiye, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Islamabad, Pakistan. Credit: Maximilian Malawista

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 11 2026 (IPS)

In Makkah, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic Türkiye, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan agreed to the framework for a joint defence agreement where an attack on any of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.

The agreement, signed on August 7, comes as Saudi Arabia is regularly attacked by Iranian strikes or proxies. Under the agreement, such attacks could fall within the pact’s collective defence provisions.

The Saudi Press Agency says “The agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defense cooperation among the three states.”

Strategically, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan form a triangle axis around Iran, with Türkiye and Pakistan both sharing land borders with Iran. This geographic positioning means any regional conflict involving Iran could potentially involve pressure from multiple directions, increasing the agreement’s deterrent value.

Iran, however, has played down concerns over the agreement. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Monday that Tehran sees no reason to be concerned, describing the pact as part of a broader shift toward greater regional self-reliance in security matters.

In the Strait of Hormuz, a framework is reportedly in its final stages to be signed as Iranian and Omani delegations finalize a proposed “temporary” commercial shipping agreement, aiming to allow traffic to resume flowing through the Strait.

“This understanding does not signify a full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, it represents a new model—distinct from the practice of the past sixty years—under which a significant portion of the shipping route will pass through Iran’s territorial waters,” said Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of Iran.

The geographic location of the proposed shipping route has been agreed upon, meaning a significant portion of commercial shipping would pass through Iranian territorial waters under the new framework.

Gharibabadi also mentioned that whether Iran would collect transit fees from vessels passing through the Strait would depend on decisions by the country’s highest authorities and on the United States’ conduct.

Baghaei has said the talks with Oman are focused on establishing a route for safe passage of shipping, but stressed that such an agreement would be a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition for reopening the Strait. The talks between Iran and Oman have been ongoing for two months, while Pakistan and Qatar are continuing efforts to reduce tensions, according to Iranian state media.

As long as the U.S. naval blockade of Iran remains in place, and what Tehran describes as U.S. military aggression continues, Baghaei said, there would be no significant change in the status of the Strait.

If implemented, the agreement could represent one of the most significant changes to commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in decades, shifting portions of international shipping into Iranian shipping lanes/territorial waters, potentially giving Tehran greater influence over one of the world’s busiest energy chokepoints.

These two developments together illustrate the competing dynamics unfolding in the Gulf. While Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are strengthening collective military deterrence, Iran is simultaneously attempting to reshape how global shipping and navigation occurs through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

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Chickpea farmers in Malawi where the new variety is being piloted. Picture supplied.

By Ignatius Banda
BULAWAYO, Zimbabwe , Aug 5 2026 (IPS)

New chickpea seed research and production have become the new frontier of climate resilience in southern Africa as farmers battle failing cereal production.

Farmers in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique are benefiting from a new chickpea variety which researchers say requires lower nitrogen fertiliser at a time such agriculture inputs have become the latest victim of global trade disruptions that are driving production costs.

The variety, high in its nutritional value, is also boosting farmer incomes while also driving exports, researchers say.

For a long time African farmers have struggled with both poor yields and low-nutrition crops amid concerns of stunted growth, especially among children.

These agriculture science interventions come at a time of concerns about how best the Global South, affected by climate change, can navigate what has increasingly become the complex nature of food production.

The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), with support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) through the Benefit-Sharing Fund (BSF) of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), is driving the efforts to “reduce dependency on costly agricultural inputs”.

According to a recent ICRISAT briefing, “The initiative is particularly relevant at a time when geopolitical instability, fertiliser supply disruptions, and rising production costs are affecting vulnerable dryland farming systems across Southern Africa.”

As a result of the disruption of global food distribution networks, prices of basic commodities have soared in Africa as governments scramble to boost both production and farmer incomes, while international finance institutions continue to urge governments to do away with agriculture subsidies.

“With fertiliser prices and agricultural production costs continuing to rise globally, resilient legume crops such as chickpeas are becoming increasingly important in helping farmers across Malawi and Southern Africa maintain productivity, strengthen food security, and reduce dependence on costly agricultural inputs,” said Dr Himanshu Pathak, ICRISAT director general.

Several southern African countries have experienced a series of climate and economic pressures, highlighting the urgency of strengthening resilience, ICRISAT researchers say.

According to the Famine Early Warning System Network, countries such as Zimbabwe will also face cereal deficits in low-rainfall regions up to the beginning of 2027, further highlighting the urgency of new drought-resistant varieties.

While developed countries have for years pledged to support poorer countries in dealing with the impact of climate change on food production, researchers say little has emerged to address Africa’s historic food insecurity.

According to the latest ICRISAT research, “chickpea requires lower nitrogen fertiliser inputs, making it an attractive option for farmers facing rising production costs and climate pressures.”

“Notably adapted to the semi-arid tropics, chickpea exhibits remarkable resilience in harsh environmental conditions, including heat and drought,” notes an ICRISAT update.

“Its high nutritional content, long shelf life, and culinary versatility make it a favourite ingredient in various traditional and modern dishes, further cementing its role in global diets,” the agency adds in a briefing charting the benefits of the chickpea variety.

“Across many dryland regions, farmers are facing rising production costs, declining soil fertility, and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns,” said Dr James Mwololo, a scientist leading the ICRISAT legume breeding project.

“Chickpea is emerging as a strategic crop for dryland agriculture because it offers farmers a viable pathway to maintain productivity and incomes under increasingly difficult growing conditions,” said Mwololo, who is also the project’s principal investigator.

Chickpea yields remain low in Malawi, with farmers harvesting a little over 800 kilograms per hectare last year “despite improved varieties having the potential to produce up to 3 tonnes per hectare,” Mwololo added.

“With greater access to quality seed, national production is expected to increase more than threefold from the 2022 baseline of 2,570 metric tonnes, while the number of farming households reached could expand from 22,000 to more than 66,000 by 2027,” Mwololo said.

These science-based interventions have been welcomed by farmer representatives, who say they see market opportunities for the new chickpea variety that ICRISAT says will improve incomes at the household level.

“Our partnership with ICRISAT goes beyond traditional improved seed development,” said Gloria Pekani, chief executive officer of Milele Agro-processors in Malawi.

“It is also about creating both stronger market opportunities and supporting livelihoods for farmers, processors, and communities that increasingly depend on resilient crops such as chickpea,” Pekani said.

Malawi is considered one of the poorest countries in the world, where nutrition concerns persist, and is among several countries where agro-science is touted as a long-term panacea for food insecurity.

In countries such as Sudan, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) says cereal production is at an all-time low because of the “ongoing conflict, rising agricultural inputs costs and disruptions to livelihoods and markets, further exacerbating food insecurity across the country”.

The new chickpea research is expected to address these concerns across the African continent, where countries such as Mozambique, where the research is being piloted, face the same civil conflict challenges as Sudan that have disrupted rural agricultural activities.

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By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 30 2026 (IPS)

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is battling the fastest-growing Ebola outbreak on record, with United Nations officials warning that hunger is actively undermining efforts to contain the spread.

“Ebola feeds on delay, fear and hunger,” said Carl Skau, acting director of the World Food Programme (WFP) on Wednesday, July 29.

The current outbreak, declared on May 15th and caused by the Bundibugyo species of Ebola, is the third largest outbreak ever recorded, said Dr. Chikwe Ihekweazu, Executive Director of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Health Emergencies Programme. The outbreak in the DRC is reaching unprecedented levels, Dr. Ihekweazu noted. “Over the last few days, we’ve seen some of the highest numbers of new infections in a single day.”

As of July 29th, the DRC outbreak has reached over 3,200 cases, with the virus spreading to 48 health zones across five provinces in eastern DRC. Unfortunately, WHO’s modeling has indicated that the true scale of the outbreak could be two to four times higher than the reported cases. Furthermore, 80 percent of new cases are coming from unknown chains of transmission, and many newly reported deaths are from people who never reached a health care facility or received care.

Julien Harneis, the UN’s Senior Ebola Coordinator, discussed how a critical driver for Ebola transmission is the fact that people are dying in their communities rather than in the care of a hospital or treatment center.

“Roughly 60 percent of deaths are occurring in the community, at the point when viral load — and risk to caregivers — is highest,” said Mr. Harneis.

WHO officials have mirrored this concern, calling deaths that occur outside of health facilities “the most alarming finding.” While there is no approved treatment for the Bundibugyo species of Ebola, the chances of survival are significantly higher with early supportive care.

On top of the outbreak is a severe hunger crisis that is exacerbating the impact and spread of Ebola. Across eastern DRC, nearly 10 million people are facing crisis- or emergency-level hunger. Ituri, the epicenter of the outbreak, is also the DRC’s most severe hunger hotspot, with 1.9 million people at crisis levels of food insecurity or worse. Mr. Skau emphasized how “food assistance is frontline Ebola containment. It helps families stay home, supports safe isolation, builds trust with communities and keeps health teams moving.”

The WFP has already delivered more than 160,000 hot meals to patients and frontline workers across 17 treatment and isolation centers. Dry food rations have been provided to 23,000 people, including 14,000 under quarantine, and an additional 36,000 people in Ebola-affected zones have been provided general food assistance. While discussing WFP’s work, Mr. Skau stressed how food logistics support is central to containing the outbreak. “You cannot force people to choose between hunger and health,” he said.

However, funding to tackle the interconnected hunger and Ebola crisis remains critically underfunded. WFP needs USD 293.6 million over the next six months to sustain all operations in DRC, including $76 million for the regional Ebola responses and $50 million for food and nutrition assistance.

“$76 million is the ask and that’s frankly just peanuts, if you look at the bigger scheme of things,” said Mr. Skau. Furthermore, while WFP’s logistics have been somewhat funded, the food element has received no funding. Mr. Skau emphasized, “if you want to be effective, you need to have an all rounded response. It’s not only the health response that is needed to be able to contain that.” Mr. Harneis added that in addition to the food assistance needed, the broader $1 billion Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan is only 45 percent funded.

WHO and WFP officials are urging the international community not to lose focus, as Dr. Ihekweazu warned: “now is not the time to drop the ball.” Mr. Harneis and Mr. Skau called for further action and to “scale up the Ebola response, three, four, five times of what we are doing now.”

Mr. Skau linked the urgent funding need to a broader appeal for political attention, describing the DRC as “exhausted from years of conflict, from repeated displacement, from crisis after crisis after crisis.” He argued that ending the outbreak will require more than just medical and food assistance: “We need peace, we need security…for all of this, we need funding…the funding that is coming here is far from enough and we need political attention.” In the weeks ahead, a rapid increase in funding and political will is needed to change the outbreak’s trajectory.

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Map of the Strait of Hormuz. Credit: Wikimedia/Goran_tek-en

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 17 2026 (IPS)

A continuation of hostilities within the Strait of Hormuz is once again threatening one of the world’s most critical supply chain arteries, posing another wave of disruption which could choke the global energy, shipping and commodity markets. With roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade transiting through the Strait, alongside significant flows of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers, further constraints on commercial traffic could send new cost pressures cascading through supply chains that have yet to absorb the full effects of the earlier conflict.

Unlike the initial disruption, this latest escalation is hitting an already elevated and damaged cost base. U.S. President Donald Trump had proposed a 20 percent charge on cargo transiting the Strait, a plan he abandoned on July 14th after pressure from Gulf allies. At a current crude oil price of roughly USD 85 per barrel, a 20 percent levy on all cargo would amount to an additional USD 17 per barrel, around 17 times Iran’s previously proposed USD 1 per barrel toll.

Yet, the larger challenge remains whether an assurance of safety through the Strait can really be guaranteed. While Washington has promised to safeguard commercial vessels attempting to transit, multiple vessels have been struck by Iranian forces, including the UAE-flagged supertankers Mombasa and Al Bahiyah on July 12th. Both vessels have a capacity of roughly 2 million barrels of oil, placing the potential value of a full cargo at roughly USD 171 million before insurance, maintenance and transit costs are considered.

If continued attacks deter vessels from transiting the Strait, constrained oil flows could combine with increased insurance premiums and higher transport costs, pushing additional expenses through global supply chains and eventually onto consumers.

These effects are already visible when examining vessel movements. On July 15th, a total of five transits were recorded, three inbound and two outbound, with one of those ships being Iranian-flagged outbound. Daily throughput in deadweight tonnage (DWT) stood at 130,311 DWT, or just 1.27 percent of the 10.3 million DWT pre-conflict daily average. Meanwhile, approximately 450 vessels remain waiting to transit the Strait, including 120 tankers, 180 bulk carriers and 150 other vessels.

War risk premiums, the additional fees charged to insure vessels operating within conflict zones, have skyrocketed from a 0.15 percent pre-conflict rate to 5 percent, a more than 33-fold increase. Very large crude carriers (VLCCs) can be valued from USD 130 million to more than USD 170 million, meaning a five percent premium could add an additional cost of USD 6.5 million to USD 8.75 million per voyage. For a VLCC carrying 2 million barrels, that would amount to roughly USD 7.5 million, compared with approximately USD 2.225 million under Iran’s proposed USD 1-per-barrel toll combined with pre-conflict war-risk premiums.

However, the compounding effects extend beyond oil. Data from the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Strait of Hormuz Trade Tracker shows that while crude oil shipments had begun to recover marginally, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and fertilizer-related shipments remain at a virtual standstill, with zero outbound shipments currently recorded. Renewed escalations risk further restricting already depressed commodity flows, with approximately one-third of the world’s seaborne fertilizer trade and one-fifth of global LNG transiting through the Strait.

Using a volume index in which 100 represents average volume levels, the WTO recorded a volume index of 25.69 for LNG on July 5th, following nearly four months in which shipments were recorded on only four other days. Fertilizer-related shipments showed greater resilience, recording a volume index of 97.62 on June 23rd. However, no further fertilizer-related shipments have been recorded, leaving the trade flow at a standstill for more than three weeks.

These restrictions could be particularly damaging for energy- and food-importing economies, notably developing countries that spend significant shares of national income on essential imports of energy and food. Simultaneous increases in fuel, transportation, and agricultural inputs risk creating a broader inflationary shock. Higher fertilizer costs can increase agricultural production costs, while elevated energy and shipping expenses raise the cost of transporting goods from exporters to importers, leaving consumers exposed to several layers of the same disruption.

The disruption has also carried a significant human cost. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has warned against continued commercial transit through the Strait, with IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez urging shipowners, operators, and flag States, along with all relevant authorities to “avoid exposing seafarers to unnecessary danger by transiting the Strait.” At the same time, the United States has announced that it will resume a naval blockade targeting vessels transiting to and from Iranian ports. Iran, meanwhile, has framed its control over the Strait as a national security issue and has threatened that it will remain closed “until the end of America’s evils.”

At its 137th session, the IMO Council reaffirmed that the right of transit through straits used for international navigation “should not be threatened, impeded, denied, hampered, impaired or suspended,” reiterating that any measures taken by coastal states to regulate traffic in vital shipping lanes should be done in accordance with IMO regulations under the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The Council also stated that traffic through the Strait must “remain free of any tolls and charges, in accordance with international law, including the IMO Convention.”

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that “Reports on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are very alarming for their impact on human rights far beyond the region,” describing the Strait as “a vital lifeline on which millions are reliant.”

The dangers are also being borne directly by seafarers trapped in the Persian Gulf. Of approximately 20,000 seafarers stranded by the crisis, around 11,000 have been evacuated through an IMO-supported initiative. However, evacuation operations have reportedly been paused since June 25, leaving thousands still stranded.

The economic consequences of the initial disruption were already substantial before this latest escalation. According to the World Bank, global energy prices rose by 24 percent following the conflict’s onset, with fertilizer prices projected to rise by more than 30 percent in 2026. Renewed hostilities in the Strait now threaten to compound these pressures, demonstrating how insecurity within a narrow stretch of water can transmit costs across global supply chains, from ships at sea to businesses, households and economies around the world.

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Ferdinand Wafula (left) explains a point to farmers during an exchange visit in Makueni, Kenya. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By Isaiah Esipisu
MAKUENI, Kenya, Jul 15 2026 (IPS)

At Yumbuni Village in Kenya’s Makueni County, farmers from Vihiga and Kakamega counties have travelled over 560 kilometres to join their colleagues in Kathonzweni Ward and see the progress of experiments being carried out on different homemade organic fertilisers and other farm inputs.

“In a special way, we are conducting community-led agroecology research, comparing the performance of different on-farm-made biofertilisers in three counties: Kakamega, Vihiga and here in Makueni,” said Ferdinand Wafula, Coordinator of Bio Gardening Innovations (BIOGI), a local non-profit organisation coordinating the activity with support from the Agroecology Fund and the Drylands Natural Resource Centre (DNRC).

On Daniel Mulinge’s farm, members of the Yumbuni Community-Based Organisation (CBO) have strategically planted some of the most commonly used drought-tolerant crops, such as pigeon peas, cowpeas, bush beans, and open-pollinated maize varieties, among others, on different small blocks and in rows.

Each row is labelled based on the type of biofertiliser used during planting, among them bokashi, solid biostimulants, inoculated compost and composted manure, with a control line, planted without any form of fertiliser.

“Unlike in conventional farming, where nutrients from synthetic fertilisers are introduced to dead soils so as to feed the plant directly, here, we are giving life to the soil using organic fertilisers so that the soil can eventually feed the plant,” said Mulinge, who is one of the Lead Farmers in Makueni.

After planting, each row is monitored from the time of germination, with all features recorded in terms of germination rate for each row and the strength and length of the shoots. The next record is taken during flowering, to determine which lines flower first and at maturity. For bush beans for example, they count the number of healthy plants in each row at maturity, the number of pods on each bush, and the number of beans in each pod.

They also record the weight of 100 beans from each row to determine which biofertiliser delivered the best quality.

“This is a practical farm model for agroecology transition, and through this exercise, farmers are finding practical answers through hands-on, farmer-led experimentations that strengthen their understanding and their confidence,” said Wafula. “Our objective is to identify practical actions that are needed to scale successful agroecolocal innovation from the existing few farmers to the entire community,” he said.

According to the Heinrich Böll Foundation, soil degradation in East Africa is a silent crisis. The organisation points out that over 40 percent of soils are degraded, which threatens the region’s agricultural foundation and resilience. Yet, among other reasons, the problem is caused by unsustainable farming practices.

But according to BIOGI, use of biofertilisers can easily heal the soil over time, reduce and eventually eliminate dependence on expensive synthetic fertilisers, conserve soil moisture and facilitate adaptation to the climate crisis.

So far, in the first season, bokashi biofertiliser is emerging as one of the best inputs in both the Makueni dryland ecosystem and the tropical environment of Kakamega and Vihiga counties.

Unlike traditional composters, bokashi is a fertiliser made by fermenting organic matter in an oxygen-free environment. The process uses an activator made of micro-organisms like lactic acid bacteria or yeasts to help decompose waste by promoting fermentation. They break down organic matter while inhibiting the proliferation of bacteria responsible for putrefaction.

This is a technique that originated from Japan, with farmers using kitchen wastes to make small quantities of bokashi for kitchen gardens. But in Kenya, farmers are now producing it in larger quantities and even selling it in agro-vets.

“For the beans, lines that were planted using bokashi were able to give between 20 and 25 pods per bush, followed by those planted using compost manure, which yielded up to 18 pods per bush on average,” said Mulinge. The same trend was observed in Vihiga and Kakamega.

“Bokashi has performed well on vegetables such as kale, pumpkin and scallions in Vihiga County,” said Julius Asitiba, one of the farmers who travelled for the knowledge exchange trip.

According to Wafula, these findings will be of great value to county governments that have unveiled their agroecology policies. “I call upon county governments to invest in such farm inputs and research so that farmers do not have to depend on imported inputs that are often affected by geopolitics,” he said.

The ongoing community-led research was designed for three long rainy seasons for both ecologies of Western and Eastern Kenya, considering that seasons are not constant in terms of amount of rainfall, among other climatic factors.

“This is just the first season,” said Wafula. “We intend to repeat the experiments for two more seasons so that we generate as much data as possible.”

Beyond documenting the performance of biofertilisers, farmers are also sharing indigenous knowledge on pest control and the conservation of biodiversity.

According to Mulinge, pests in all the trials in Makueni are controlled using biopesticides made from locally available materials that include hot chilli, leaves from the neem tree, garlic and onions, Mexican marigold and even tobacco leaves.

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Farmers planting paddy in Helambu, Sindhupalchowk. Their farming is dependent on precipitation and snow-fed rivers in the region. Credit: Bhagirathi Pandit

By Tanka Dhakal
KATHMANDU, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Monsoon season in South Asia, including Nepal, is a period of frequent rainfall, extreme heat, and a busy time of the year for farmers. Most farmers in Nepal depend on monsoon rain to plant paddey, the main source of food.

Puspa Subedi, a farmer from Pokhara‑31, Talbesi, Kaski, in Gandaki Province, is ready for the rice‑planting season.

“In our area, we primarily grow raithane (a local breed of rice), which is more resistant to drought than hybrid species, so we are less concerned about the forecasted dry monsoon,” he said. “Drought does impact our production, but the effect on farmers who are planting hybrid seeds would be more dire.”

Subedi, the coordinator of Sundaridanda Community Seed Bank in Kaski, where they conserve 53 local species of rice seeds, mentioned that monsoon drought is a major concern for most farmers in Nepal.

According to the regional seasonal weather forecast, the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region, also known as the ”Third Pole’, is heading toward a dry monsoon, which will impact agricultural activities in the region, including Nepal. The recently published HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026 projects lower‑than‑normal rainfall and above‑normal temperatures in countries across the region, including Nepal, India, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Scientists warn that intense rainfall in short bursts, rising temperatures, and increasing water stress could make this monsoon particularly dangerous.

“The outlook points to a drier monsoon overall, but that does not mean lower risk,” said Manish Shrestha, a hydrologist at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). “Short, intense rainfall events can still trigger serious hazards.”

The map shows the seasonal mean anomaly for the 2026 monsoon in the HKH region. Source: HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026.

This week the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said that El Niño conditions are developing and are set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns, increasing the risk of extreme weather over the coming months. This weather phenomenon generally brings a dry monsoon to Nepal. Unusually warm ocean waters in the tropical Pacific were fuelling the development of El Niño, which was set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns and increase the risk of extreme weather over the coming months.

“The science is clear: El Niño is arriving on our doorstep in the coming months with 90% certainty.  The world must treat it as the urgent climate warning it is. El Niño conditions will pour fuel on the fire of a warming world.  Impacts will hit even harder, travel even farther, and cross borders with devastating speed.  The only effective response is climate action equal to the crisis – ending the addiction to fossil fuels, accelerating the shift to renewables, protecting the most vulnerable, and delivering early warning systems for all,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

Impacts on agricultural 

The regional forecast expects the combination of erratic rainfall and rising temperatures to increase both drought and flood risks during the season. Long dry spells may be followed by sudden heavy downpours, creating conditions for flash floods and landslides, particularly in mountain areas. Monsoon drought directly impacts farmers, while rainfall‑induced floods may also affect frontline communities, including farmers.

The outlook warns that higher temperatures and lower water availability can lead to heat stress in crops and livestock, “reduce yields, and shorten growing seasons, particularly in the already marginal mountain farming system.” High temperatures can also cause the loss of soil moisture by intensifying evaporation.

In Nepal, and in most places in the HKH region, farmers depend on rain‑fed and snow‑fed water sources for agriculture. Last winter, snow persistence across the region was observed to be below the long‑term average – and with rising temperatures, “river flows, groundwater levels, and spring water availability may decline substantially during or after the monsoon season”, the regional weather outlook notes.

Lower snow persistence further weakens the region’s natural water buffer, making river systems and groundwater recharge more sensitive to rainfall variability. “Lower snow persistence means the region is entering the monsoon with a reduced seasonal water buffer,” said Sarthak Shrestha, co‑author of the outlook.

Farmers are already experiencing water stress, which is affecting their farming calendar. Farmers in Helambu‑7, Sindhupalchowk, are struggling to get water from a local community‑based informal irrigation system that is river‑fed. Tilak Bahadur Pandit, a local farmer, says he and his neighbours are already late in planting paddy due to water scarcity.

Source: Lenssen, N. J. L., L. Goddard, and S. Mason, 2020: Seasonal Forecast Skill of ENSO Teleconnection Maps. Credit: WMO

Dry monsoon doesn’t mean no disaster

As below‑normal precipitation is forecast, it is not expected to reduce disaster risks. Scientists warn that short bursts of intense rainfall, rising temperatures, and growing water stress could make the season increasingly dangerous.

“Even in a weaker monsoon, short periods of intense rainfall remain a major concern,” said Shrestha, a hydrologist at ICIMOD. “Communities and authorities need to closely follow short‑term forecasts and advisories.”

Experts say that drought and flood risks are interconnected and can no longer be managed in isolation. The latest State of the Climate in Asia report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also notes that across Asia and the Pacific, rising heat is increasing multi‑hazard risks, intersecting with food systems and public health while placing new pressures on livelihoods.

Arun Bhakta Shrestha, Senior Adviser at ICIMOD, says, “Early warning systems, short‑term forecasts, and locally driven preparedness need to work together to address increasingly complex hazards.”

The WMO on Wednesday (June 2)

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Smart farming enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture's environmental footprint. Credit: FAO

By Beth Bechdol
ROME, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

Farmers today are producing food under pressures that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. Input costs are rising and supply chains are unreliable. Water is scarcer. Weather is less predictable. And for a growing number of farmers — in Sudan, in Ukraine, in Myanmar, in Gaza — the challenge is producing food at all, in the middle of active conflict. These are not marginal conditions. They describe the reality facing hundreds of millions of people who grow the food the world depends on.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one. It helps farmers know when to plant, where fertilizer will generate the greatest return, how much water a crop actually needs, where pests are likely to emerge, and which risks are developing before they become crises.

Three agricultural revolutions got us here. The first gave humanity settled agriculture. The second transformed land use and productivity through new methods and early machinery. The third — the Green Revolution — combined improved seeds, fertilizers, and modern practice to feed a rapidly growing world. Each solved the defining challenge of its era … producing enough.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one

The fourth revolution faces a fundamentally different challenge. It is no longer simply about producing more food. It is about producing more with fewer and less reliable inputs, under greater uncertainty, on land under increasing stress, and while reducing agriculture’s environmental footprint.

The tools that drove the Green Revolution were extraordinary, but they are not infinitely scalable. Synthetic fertilizers depend on energy-intensive production and supply chains that have proven fragile. Aquifers in key agricultural regions are being drawn down faster than they recharge. The yield gains from conventional intensification are flattening. There is no endless supply of cheap water, cheap fertilizer, or cheap fuel to sustain food production the way we have for the past half-century.

Smart farming is how we meet this new challenge. It enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint. It is not a vision for the future. It is already happening.

FAO’s own operational programmes demonstrate what is already possible. Our Desert Locust early warning system uses satellite imagery, weather data, and field intelligence to forecast outbreaks before they reach crops, giving governments time to act rather than simply respond. The SoilFER programme is turning faster, more affordable soil mapping into actionable fertilizer recommendations for farmers in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative combines geospatial, market, and socioeconomic data so governments and investors can direct agricultural investment where it will have the greatest return. These are not pilots. They are operational programmes with measurable outcomes — and they include AI-driven tools that forecast pest and disease pressure, analyze crop stress, and help governments make better decisions faster than was previously possible.

My own family’s seven-generation grain farm in rural Indiana today uses GPS-guided equipment, variable-rate fertilizer applications based on soil sampling, yield mapping, and real-time weather tools to make planting and harvesting decisions. The technology works. The question is who has access to it.

That is the central challenge. The benefits of smart farming currently concentrate among producers who already have the resources, connectivity, and institutional support to adopt new tools. Smallholder farmers — who produce a third of the world’s food — are too often last in line. Women farmers and young producers face additional barriers to technology and financing, which means the whole system underperforms when they are excluded.

At FAO’s Global Conference on Smart Farming in Rome from 1 to 3 July, the commitments required are specific and clear. Governments need to modernize regulatory environments and invest in the digital infrastructure agriculture depends on. Development banks should finance data systems and precision agriculture as essential infrastructure rather than optional innovation. Private companies need business models that reach smallholders, not only large commercial farms. And organizations like FAO must ensure that technical knowledge becomes practical solutions farmers can actually us e.

The fourth agricultural revolution is already underway. What remains to be decided is whether its benefits reach the farmers who need them most — or whether the gap between what is possible and what is accessible becomes permanent.

Beth Bechdol is Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Exactly 15 years ago today rinderpest, or “cattle plague", was declared eradicated. Credit: Wolfgang Hasselmann/Unsplash

By Armin Wiesler
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Jun 27 2026 (IPS)

Animal disease is no longer a distant concern for farmers and veterinarians alone. It is increasingly visible in household budgets: global egg prices surged more than 60% during recent bird flu outbreaks. In South Africa, foot-and-mouth disease pushed beef prices up by 34%. These are not isolated fluctuations in price. They are reminders that when prevention falls short, families, farmers and food systems all pay the price.

Exactly 15 years ago today, the world proved there is another way. On June 28, 2011, the United Nations (UN) declared rinderpest, or “cattle plague,” eradicated. It remains the only animal disease ever wiped from the planet. For centuries, the virus had killed millions of livestock animals, devastated herds and triggered famines across continents.

The eradication campaign succeeded because science, logistics and political commitment all came together. A global prevention effort was supported by surveillance, international coordination, and an effective, heat-stable vaccine that could reach remote, tropical areas without the need for refrigeration. This turned an ancient threat into a preventable one – and then into a disease of the past.

The lesson was not only scientific. It was economic. According to estimates by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, rinderpest control cost around $610 million while the annual benefits for Africa alone amounted to $1 billion. In other words, prevention did not just save animals. It protected livelihoods, strengthened food security and paid for itself many times over.

Yet, in the past 15 years, the world has not applied that lesson more broadly or consistently enough. When outbreaks occur, the response still too often defaults to emergency measures such as culling, movement restrictions and trade disruption. Rather than rapid deployment of preventive tools like surveillance, biosecurity measures, vaccination and close international cooperation.

Lumpy skin disease is a current case in point: diagnostics, biosecurity practices and effective vaccines exist, yet many countries struggle to use them quickly enough to stop spread and limit damage. The barriers are structural. International trade rules with potential economic risk impact decision-making, even when it is a necessity. Countries may face an impossible choice: protect their animals and farmers or protect access to export markets. The result is a system that remains perpetually reactive.

Meanwhile, these diseases continue to spread. Lumpy skin disease and peste des petits ruminants (PPR) reached new regions for the first time last year, disrupting trade, harming rural communities and undermining food security. For the more than one billion people who rely on livestock for food, income and livelihoods, these are not abstract events. They have a real economic and social impact.

That is why the rinderpest eradication anniversary should be more than a moment of reflection. It should be a reminder that prevention only works when it is planned before the next emergency, not improvised during it. National preparedness remains essential, but diseases respect no borders. No country can fully control animal health threats alone.

Global collaboration is needed to improve surveillance, align incentives for vaccination, and remove the trade and policy barriers that discourage prevention. This is the role initiatives such as the World Organisation for Animal Health’s PREVENT Forum can play: bringing governments, international organizations and the private sector together to help remove the barriers that individual countries cannot on their own.

But collaboration must move beyond discussion. It should lead to practical changes: stronger investment in surveillance and diagnostics, clearer pathways for the use and recognition of vaccination, and faster access to these tools during outbreaks. The goal should not be to respond better to every crisis. It should be to prevent more crises from happening.

The past three years alone have brought outbreaks of avian influenza, bluetongue virus, foot-and-mouth disease and Newcastle disease across continents. We do not yet know which animal disease will cause the next major shock, or where it will emerge.

But rinderpest proved that the world knows how to act when science, political will and global coordination are aligned. The question is not whether prevention is possible. The question is whether we will choose to make it a priority before the next crisis strikes.

Dr Armin Wiesler is President of HealthforAnimals

IPS UN Bureau

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Smallholder farmers in Africa and Asia are likely to still be reeling from the fuel and fertilizer crisis caused by conflict in the Middle East when what forecasters expect to be a “super” El Niño arrives later this year.

Appolinaire Djikeng

Consensus is increasingly clear that tackling climate change to avert such crises is a legal duty under international law. Bringing down emissions requires both short-term and long-term action. And yet one of the most effective levers available — sustainable livestock farming — receives just 1 to 2 per cent of climate finance dedicated to agriculture. That is a vanishingly small share for a sector that, in many low- and middle-income countries, accounts for as much as 80 per cent of agricultural GDP.

This funding gap matters because livestock offer something relatively rare in climate policy: the chance to cut emissions fast while also building resilience. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide over the short term, which means reducing it delivers quicker climate benefits.

Cattle and other livestock are among the primary sources of methane emissions. But crucially, both direct and indirect methane emissions from livestock production are often higher than necessary because of the same factors that hold back productivity. Poor animal health, low quality feed and nutrition, and climate stress all undermine production and increase both direct emissions and emission intensity. Tackling these fundamental factors solves both challenges.

In Ethiopia, for example, poor animal health has been found to increase livestock emissions by 50 per cent while also resulting in lower meat, milk and egg yields. Parasites and other vector-borne diseases increase the methane produced in animals’ guts while stunting growth and development.

Simply by applying existing tools to improve animal health, such as vaccines, drugs that kill parasites and good nutrition, research suggests that emissions could be conservatively reduced by at least 15 per cent per unit of output. The same interventions also increase productivity and improve livelihoods.

New research is also uncovering new opportunities to reduce methane from livestock while also boosting productivity and resilience.

Scientists from CGIAR research centres and partners have analysed nearly 300 forage samples and found that varieties of African clover, cowpea and lablab could reduce methane emissions by up to 90 per cent. These plants contain compounds that alter the microbes in cows’ stomachs and block the process that generates methane.

Testing is now under way to identify varieties that could be grown as low-methane feed, which not only helps reduce emissions but also supports local seed systems.

Restoring rangelands adds another layer: it helps improve forage availability to support better animal nutrition, lower methane emissions and build stronger ecosystems. Last year, for example, participatory rangeland management (PRM) was strengthened across 340,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 50,000 hectares in Tanzania, improving rangeland health and supporting livestock production.

Many more solutions exist to improve livestock sustainability for short-term and long-term gains, including those developed by the Livestock and Climate Solutions Hub. But despite growing evidence of impact from livestock interventions, climate finance continues to flow elsewhere, away from the agricultural systems that hundreds of millions of people depend on most directly.

In a post-aid world, directing more climate finance towards sustainable livestock farming in low- and middle-income countries is an investment in global stability.

Investing in more sustainable livestock production has a ripple effect that improves food security, livelihoods, and economic growth and contributes to greater stability and resilience in the face of shocks like the “super” El Niño.

Climate vulnerability is costly. Building resilience through the primary sectors of low- and middle-income countries is an insurance against future crises.

Prof. Appolinaire Djikeng is Director General of the International Livestock Research Institute

IPS UN Bureau

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Cécile Koffi and her colleagues collect salt from concrete pans on the beach in rural Benin. Credit: Neha Banka/IPS

By Neha Banka
OUIDAH, Benin, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

It is barely noon, and a group of women sit near the beach on the outskirts of Djégbadji village, in West Africa’s Benin, sifting through mounds of salt harvested from the Gulf of Guinea’s ocean.

Large concrete vats covered with black tarpaulin show traces of white salt sediment as the seawater slowly evaporates under Benin’s midday sun – except that instead of using fire, the group uses solar energy.

The women have been working as part of a grassroots project called ProSEL Benin, a collaborative effort of the governments of Benin along with India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that focuses on strengthening local salt-producing communities to access sustainable energy sources and create medium-sized enterprises for the production and marketing of local iodised salt.

Salt production is one of the main income-generating activities for the populations living in and around southern Benin.

Generations-Old Traditions

“In Benin’s coastal areas, women skim the salt from the coastal marshes… they put up their little huts and boil salt water in massive vats over an open fire inside the hut. They then sell the ‘cooked’ salt at the markets and on the roadsides. It’s an unhealthy practice for various reasons,” says Robina Marks, who served as South Africa’s ambassador to Benin and Togo from 2021 to 2024 and was closely involved in the implementation of the IBSA-backed project.

The traditional method of collecting and cooking the salt has been practised in Benin since at least the 15th century, primarily by women, and involves collecting saline soil, evaporating the water and filtering brine by burning chopped mangrove wood to produce salt.

The practice harms women’s health due to how they collect the salt and the conditions in which it is prepared.

“It takes a very long time and is very labour-intensive,” Marks says.

The ProSEL Benin project attempts to change this traditional practice and make the process of collecting salt healthier and cleaner.

Salt-making is an important source of income for communities here, relying heavily on the cutting down of mangroves.

ProSEL Benin’s research estimates that approximately 20,000 cubic metres of mangrove wood are cut down annually in coastal Benin for use as firewood in Indigenous salt-making.

The UNDP and the Benin government discussed the new method about five years ago.

“But the idea came from the people on the ground, who had the needs. The Benin government came up with the project and wanted to work with UNDP,” says Aoualé Mohamed Abchir, who served as the UNDP Resident Representative in Benin from 2020 to 2024 and was instrumental in its development.

ProSEL Benin, Abchir says, is an attempt to advance three out of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: gender equality; decent work and economic growth; and responsible consumption and production. This project aims to help rural women in Benin make and sell clean salt and become self-reliant.

In 2021, the Board of Directors of the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation Fund awarded USD 1 million to the UNDP to implement the salt project.

IBSA is an example of collaborative efforts between the three developing countries, as well as a South-South cooperation initiative within the United Nations that focuses on development cooperation among developing countries in the Global South.

When 60-year-old Cécile Koffi was first introduced to the salt project, it took some time to convince her to switch from the traditional method of making salt.

“There are a lot of things the salt does. Salt is intrinsic to the community’s women,” Koffi says, examining the day’s salt collection.

Salt is culturally important to Benin, and its uses go beyond culinary applications.

“It is not only used as food, but it also has a cultural aspect to it. It is regarded as sacred and is used in many of the vodoun practices,” says Marks.

“When we go to the market to sell our produce, we sprinkle salt on the ground and sweep it up before setting up our spot. It is believed that every bad spirit will go away if we do that. Salt is very important. We use it in a lot of rituals,” says Koffi.

Julienne Dekon collects saline water using the traditional method to make salt in rural Benin. Credit: Neha Banka/IPS

These deep-rooted cultural beliefs were one reason why it was difficult to get the women to change and adapt to the ProSEL Benin project, even though it was backed by the Benin government, explains Abchir.

Traditionally salt production is a cultural activity carried out by the Xwla populations of the coastal zone in Benin. The traditional production of salt by the salt farmers in the villages is subject to many prohibitions related to working days, village deities, and so on.

“The name Xwlajè is also intimately linked to the Xwla ethnic group,” says Luc Obale, national project director of ProSEL Benin. The Benin government has been working to certify the salt so that it can be sold with the label ‘Xwlajè’ to identify its cultural origin.

“The old method is their ancestral way of producing salt, so it has significance. Sometimes when you change the way you produce something, some people believe it may have negative implications. The women could have got the salt directly from the sea, but there is a reason why they weren’t doing that before the project,” says Abchir.

The ProSEL Benin project targeted five areas in coastal Benin where people have traditionally harvested salt: Sèmè Kpodji, Grand Popo, Ouidah, Kpomasse, Comè and Lokossa.

“In those other areas, people have been more open to using sea water to make salt, but Ouidah is Ouidah. It is very special. They believe that the best salt can only be cooked, not dried. They believe that they have to cook it,” explains Abchir.

Ground-Level Interventions

The ProSEL Benin project is not the first intervention programme that has attempted to make local salt cleaner and more environmentally sustainable, but it has been successful because caseworkers managed to get it off the ground, says Cessi Marlene Capo-Chichi, who works with UNDP as a project coordinator.

“Organisations have struggled to convince the local community to change their ways,” she says.

Some 500 metres from where the ProSEL project is ongoing by the beach, within the limits of Djégbadji village, is a coastal lagoon where women work inside a network of thatched huts, making salt in the traditional way.

“The traditional way of making salt is more laborious,” says 45-year-old Julienne Dekon, lifting a cane basket heavy with saline soil collected from the marshy land that surrounds her.

These days, the Benin government prevents the chopping down of mangroves for wood, and women are encouraged to use dried palm leaves and coconut shells for fuel instead.

Dekon says that she wants to continue working using the traditional method, although many of her friends have now switched to the modern method of salt making using seawater after joining the ProSEL project.

As she begins boiling the saline water inside her hut, smoke fills the small space.

“When I have to work a lot, I do get tired. But I don’t know much about how this affects my health,” says Dekon.

Dekon doesn’t remember when she started making salt, but it has been a very long time, and she is now accustomed to preparing using the traditional methods.

“The method on the beach (ProSEL project) is easy to do. But when it is raining, it is not possible to do it outside. But I can continue to make salt even in the rain, because I collect the soil and start cooking indoors. The two systems are too different,” says Dekon, referring to the open-air concrete salt vats by the sea that are susceptible to the vagaries of the weather.

However, the wet weather also affects the women using traditional methods.

From April to August, Benin experiences its rainy season, with short spells of rain between September and November, and the low-lying marshes near the lagoons are prone to flooding.

“We are pushing them to switch to the ProSEL system because during the rainy season the area where the salt is produced traditionally is inaccessible. It is completely flooded, and so for more than half the year, there is no production of salt. We needed to give them alternatives,” says Abchir.

While it is easier for the women to avoid the rains by tracking the weather, it is harder to bypass the persistent floods, he says.

Abchir says the project focused on giving the women access to seawater to make sure they could make salt and have steady income through the year.

“Using the seawater to make salt is less painful. You just get the water and let the sun evaporate it. You don’t have to cook it, and it is safer. You can also make more money,” says Abchir.

Just down the unpaved road from where Dekon works, a woman stands by the highway selling salt.

The difference between the salt produced by women like Dekon, who have been working using traditional methods and those engaged with ProSEL Benin is clear: the traditional salt is visibly yellow-brown with streaks of grey, colours that come due to the lack of a filtration process. The ProSEL Benin salt is clean and white, fortified with iodine that the women mix into the salt just before filling it into bags.

A one-kilogram bag of salt produced by women using the traditional method, sold in local marketplaces and by the road, would cost approximately 800 West African CFA franc (approx. USD 2), while the same amount produced by ProSEL Benin would sell for 1,000 CFA.

For Public Consumption

ProSEL research indicates there are about 4,000 women harvesting salt in Benin. The country imports most of its salt from countries like Ghana, Senegal and India because its Indigenous salt farming covers only a small fraction of the country’s actual needs.

Stakeholders realised that it was not enough to teach the women how to make cleaner salt; they also had to be given access to markets to sell it. One market that the project aims to tap into is the World Food Programme (WFP) under the UN’s Benin office, which helps feed over 1 million children annually with daily school meals. The WFP has been undertaking research to understand the feasibility of purchasing and using salt through these cooperatives led by women under ProSEL.

The Benin government has ambitious plans for the harvested salt.

In December 2025, Benin’s food safety agency, ABSSA, the Agence Béninoise de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, certified the salt for public consumption, after which the salt was prepared to be sold under the label Xwlajè.

Presently, the Xwlajè salt is sold in seven different supermarket chains across Cotonou, as well as in standalone shops located in the municipalities of Porto-Novo, Cotonou and Comè.

“In addition, steps are underway to market Xwlajè salt in the duty-free shops at Cotonou International Airport,” says Obale.

Abchir adds that a process that would take the women six hours now takes them two. Bringing about change has been difficult, he says, because it involved convincing people who were accustomed to working in a specific way for generations.

He admits that they wouldn’t have been able to do much without winning the trust of the women, their husbands who still oversee their lives, the mayor and the local community leaders.

“The local team went down to the women and understood their needs so that sensibilities could be understood and it would be accepted. It is very difficult in Benin when outsiders come in and tell them what to do.”

Abchir says that there is a high risk of undoing all that work if there is mistrust in the community towards the project.

“They are accepting the changes. Now we are trying to build construction for storage, keeping machines, etc. It is a sensitive phase, but we are hopeful that it will work.”

Benin’s government has prioritised tourism over the last few years, and its Indigenous salt farming practices are a key part of its plans to introduce tourists to Beninese culture.

The ProSEL project does not aim to fully remove the traditional method of salt farming, says Obale.

“The modern salt production unit is located not far from the traditional production site to allow tourists to see the difference between the two production methods,” he says.

Mireille Adjovi, a new mother in her 20s, has come to work at the ProSEL site with her infant sleeping on her back.

“With the money I get, I am able to take care of my children. I will be able to send them to school. I think about myself last: my husband and children come first. Maybe the men give money for the household, but women still suffer a lot. If women need something, husbands give the amount of money they want to give you, not what you need. The men don’t think about the women. So the project helps me earn my own money,” says Adjovi.

For women like Adjovi, making salt is not just about following the jobs women before her have done for generations.

She doesn’t know what the UN’s SDGs are or even what IBSA means, but the work at ProSEL Benin allows her to prioritise her own health and well-being while working collectively in a women-led cooperative.

When she talks to other women working at the site, she also thinks about the hard-earned independence and self-reliance she now has.

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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