A 12-year-old girl from northern Togo, orphaned and displaced to northern Benin with her siblings, is now attending school and benefiting from a cash programme, which supports vulnerable girls’ education and wellbeing. Credit: UNICEF/UNI970733/Njiokiktjien

By Ana Patricia Muñoz and George Laryea-Adjei
WASHINGTON DC / NEW YORK, Jul 8 2026 (IPS)

Almost half of the world’s population now lives in countries that spend more money paying interest on their debts than on education or health. New data shows the cost of borrowing for African countries in particular rose 91% since 2020. Rising debt payments have reduced governments’ capacity to invest in children and build their human capital.

This week UN officials and government leaders gather in New York for the High-level Political Forum, where the Sustainable Development Goal on financing and global partnership (SDG 17) comes up for its in-depth review. They must go beyond short-term fixes and drive sustainable solutions to the debt crisis and its impact on children’s futures. Too many countries are struggling to keep pace with debt payments and facing a stark and painful choice: spend less on children or default. This fiscal crunch has a disproportionate impact on girls, especially in marginalized and remote communities, as efforts to narrow the gender gap in educational attainment are undercut by debt servicing. In 2024, the 10 countries facing the worst barriers to girls’ education spent, on average, four times more on debt servicing than on education.

Debt choices today are also silently eroding children’s prospects and future economic growth. UNICEF analysis shows that African countries spend, on average, just 6.5 per cent of their child-related budgets on the critical first five years of life, while G20 countries invest roughly four times as much. As debt servicing consumes an increasing share of public resources in many countries, governments face difficult fiscal trade-offs that can further reduce investments in children. The result is not only a loss for this generation, but also lower productivity, diminished human capital and weaker long-term growth. The World Bank estimates that today’s children could lose up to half of their future lifetime earnings because of deficits in learning and human capital development.

Work by the International Budget Partnership shows that the global debt crisis is also an accountability crisis. The Open Budget Survey 2025 finds that 50% of surveyed countries do not provide information on the composition of debt in their budget proposals, and just 18% publish any information on the sustainability of government finances over the next ten years. In a recent assessment of 11 African countries, only one country published a borrowing plan that was connected to the annual budget cycle and linked borrowing to specific sectors or projects. In all 11 countries, parliaments approve borrowing without access to comprehensive information on how those funds will be used or what development outcomes they are expected to deliver. Debt crises will continue to recur if governments continue to borrow without telling oversight bodies or the public how they’re borrowing, why or on what terms.

Debt transparency alone will not solve the debt crisis unless it is matched by accountability and smarter financing choices.

Domestic constituencies who live with the consequences of debt decisions should be at the heart of accountability efforts – this includes children. Legal frameworks should mandate governments to release information about who is responsible for debt decisions, what is counted as debt, what it is being used for and what tradeoffs were considered. Governments should embed debt and fiscal sustainability information into the budget process so that there can be regular scrutiny by oversight bodies. Legislators, national auditors and independent legislative bodies need technical support and mandates to deliver informed and accessible analysis of the long-term fiscal implications and risks of these decisions. That analysis must also be accessible to the public. Equipping civil society groups so that they are better able to engage with debt information and better understand how these seemingly esoteric decisions ultimately impact their health centers, schools and children, must be part of any debt accountability agenda. These accountability levers are critical to ensure debt fuels development instead of holding it back, and that public spending choices reflect the rights and needs of children.

We also need financing solutions to address the current emergency and these efforts should support rather than displace domestic accountability. The SDG bond of the Government of Benin has shown that debt instruments linked to social outcomes and public reporting are already working. Debt is not inherently the enemy of development, but must be borrowed transparently, invested productively and subject to public scrutiny. Debt relief frameworks must catch up with reality: as sovereign debt shifts toward private, foreign-currency creditors existing restructuring mechanisms leave too many countries without meaningful relief. Reforming the legal frameworks that govern sovereign debt contracts is long overdue.

The Sevilla Commitment, adopted by leaders at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, underscored the value of pursuing these options and the importance of prioritizing investments in children. The High-level Political Forum should address how new financing options can avoid opacity by requiring governments to report to legislatures and the public how funds are used and by supporting civil society to track whether resources deliver tangible results.

When decisions with lifelong consequences are made behind closed doors, children inevitably lose first, and longest. We must use all the tools at our disposal to address the debt crisis and demand accountability to ensure public money works for all, especially for children and future generations.

Ana Patricia Muñoz is Executive Director, International Budget Partnership; George Laryea-Adjei is Director of Global Programme Division, UNICEF

IPS UN Bureau

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres (left) and Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (right). They have called for the universal abolition of the death penalty. Credit: UN Photo/Violaine Martin

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

While the movement for the universal abolition of the death penalty advances, this progress “cannot be taken for granted,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres as he greeted the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty.

In his video message, Mr. Guterres said, “the death penalty does not deliver justice. It is an inhumane form of punishment. It puts innocent lives at risk. And it has no place in the 21st century.” Worldwide, the push for abolition has gained momentum, with the Secretary-General reaffirming the UN’s full commitment to universal abolition “firmly and without exception.”

The 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty, taking place in Paris between June 30th and July 2, 2026, convenes governments, UN officials, legal professionals, journalists, and activists to discuss concrete steps to reform and ultimately abolish the death penalty. The Congress is organised by ECPM (Together Against the Death Penalty), a leading French NGO that began campaigning for universal abolition in 2000 and has organised all 9 World Congresses Against the Death Penalty. The Congress is sponsored by France, and the European Union and Switzerland are co-sponsors.

At the opening of the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Volker Türk, further underscored the UN’s staunch position on universal abolition. In his opening remarks, Volker Türk urged “all States, everywhere, to join the overwhelming, and principled, global consensus that use of the death penalty must end, everywhere, for all offenses.”

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, mirrored Mr. Türk’s remarks, speaking at the Congress to the fact that “the death penalty has never made a society safer.”

“Never, because it does not act as a deterrent. It’s crazy. It has been demonstrated, observed and measured. The death penalty has never had the deterrent effect that certain, often authoritarian, authorities who defend it would like to attribute to it,” said Macron.

Prior to the start of the Congress, the European Union (EU) put forth a statement to the UN Human Rights Council on June 18, highlighting how capital punishment is a discriminatory practice that violates the inalienable right to life. The statement stressed how the death penalty is incompatible with human dignity and called for a moratorium by states as the first step towards abolition.

The EU Statement reiterates the key points from a May 21st statement from 41 Members of the Inter-Regional Task Force on the Moratorium on the use of the Death Penalty. While more than two-thirds of UN member states have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice, there has been a recent and significant increase in executions among the few retentionist states. The signatories of the statement emphasized how the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty represents an immense opportunity to reaffirm the global commitment to universal abolition.

Within the retentionist states, recent data from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) highlights an alarming spike in capital punishment. These increases were due to executions for drug-related violations for crimes that people committed as children and offences that did not meet the ‘most serious crimes’ criteria. Examples of actions by retentionist states include Iran, with over 1,500 individuals executed in 2025, 47 percent of which related to drug offences. Israel, which has set forth a series of legislative proposals introducing mandatory capital punishment provisions that would apply only to Palestinians. Other countries, including the United States, Somalia and Singapore, have also seen increases in executions.

While these numbers are startling, there has been immense progress towards abolition. 170 countries have either abolished or introduced a moratorium on the death penalty in law and/or in practice. Some states that have not yet fully abolished the death penalty but have taken encouraging steps to limit capital punishment include Vietnam, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Malaysia, and Kyrgyzstan.

These trends confirm that abolition is a core testament of the international community’s commitment to human rights and upholding international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by 175 states, guarantees the “inherent right to life” and that the death penalty may “be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law” for the countries that have not yet abolished it. The 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty presents an opportunity to take concrete steps towards the path of abolition, with the full support of the UN and Secretary-General António Guterres behind the Congress.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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By Shihana Mohamed
NEW YORK, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

At the Annual General Meeting of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org) on 21 May 2026, I was invited to share my reflections on both the pre and post separation phases of my UN journey. This provided me with a valuable opportunity to critically examine my decision to leave the UN service after many years at the ICSC.

I recently closed one of the most defining chapters of my professional life, after more than 25 years serving the United Nations (UN) —including two decades at the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). Importantly, my decision was made entirely on personal and professional grounds, independent of any budgetary or post-related considerations. As a jointly funded UN body, the ICSC is not affected by budget cuts or post reductions.

Why I Decided to Leave Early
My decision to leave under the UN’s Early Separation Programme was guided by reflection, self-respect, and a desire to preserve the enthusiasm and integrity that have always defined my work.

Leaving before the normal retirement age was not an impulsive choice—it was a deliberate act of self-preservation. Over time, I found that the institutional culture I had once admired had begun to erode the very principles it was meant to uphold. The UN’s mission remains noble, but its internal systems often fail to reflect that nobility.

My decision was shaped by several factors:

• Health and wellbeing: The relentless pace and stress of bureaucratic politics and petty backbiting were taking a toll. I wanted to reclaim balance and joy.
• Self-respect and dignity: When merit is overshadowed by favoritism, and integrity is compromised by internal politics, staying becomes a form of silent complicity.
• Desire to serve differently: I wanted to continue contributing to global governance—but from a space of independence, integrity, authenticity, and creativity.

Lessons Learned Before Leaving the UN
Before separation, I faced the same fears many colleagues quietly harbor: visa uncertainty, financial stability, and the daunting question of identity beyond the UN badge. The organization offers structure and prestige, but it can also create dependency. I learned that preparation—both practical and emotional—is essential.

• Plan early and thoroughly: Understand your entitlements, pension, and visa implications.
• Prioritize health and dignity: No professional title is worth sacrificing well-being.
• Seek clarity, not comfort: Reflect deeply on what you want to preserve and what you need to change.
• Build bridges before you leave: Relationships grounded in respect and trust endure beyond institutions.

Lessons After Leaving the UN
The months following my departure were both disorienting and illuminating. Freed from the constraints of bureaucracy, I rediscovered creativity, autonomy, and a renewed sense of purpose. I learned to shape my own rhythm, engage with global issues from a more independent perspective, and reawakened the joy of contributing without the shadow of ineffective bureaucracy.

• Structure your days: Routine restores stability and purpose.
• Embrace uncertainty: It is the space where reinvention begins.
• Stay connected: Continue engaging with colleagues and networks that share your values.
• Reclaim your voice: Independence allows you to speak truth without institutional filters.

Transforming the UN’s Culture
Overall, my time with the UN was a meaningful chapter in my life, offering a firsthand view of the power and potential of global governance and multilateralism in action. I continue to believe deeply in the ideals of the UN Charter—principles that remain both necessary and inspirational in an increasingly interconnected world.

At the same time, honest reflection requires acknowledging the institution’s shortcomings. While the mission of the UN is noble, the work itself is not inherently complex; too often, it is made unnecessarily difficult by people, entrenched cultures, bureaucratic practices, and systems that prioritize connections over competence. Environments that tolerate inequity and erode dignity rather than uphold it continue to undermine the organization’s credibility and effectiveness.

Ideals alone cannot sustain trust. When recruitment and promotion are shaped by back channels rather than merit, when accountability is applied selectively, and when organizational culture enables toxicity instead of transparency, the institution risks losing its moral authority. These are systemic challenges that demand introspection, accountability, and meaningful reform.

This was one reality of my journey, and I know I am not alone in recognizing it. These challenges tested me, but they also strengthened me—sharpening my sense of purpose, reinforcing the importance of competence, fairness, and integrity, and reminding me that institutions are judged not only by their ideals, but by the values they practice every day.

If the UN is to remain credible and effective in the decades ahead, it must confront its internal contradictions with honesty and urgency. Reform must go beyond structures and policies—it must also transform culture. Its strength lies in its people, and its future depends on creating an environment where they can thrive.

Key priorities include:

• Reinforce meritocracy: Recruitment and promotion must be based on competence and educational credentials, not connections. Transparent criteria and external oversight can help restore fairness.
• Empower accountability: Managers should be evaluated not only on outputs but also on conduct, how they treat staff, foster inclusion, and uphold dignity, as well as on the ethical stewardship of public funds and resources.
• Diversify leadership: Representation from all regions must be substantive, not symbolic. Talented and committed staff from developing countries deserve equal access to leadership pathways.
• Model integrity from the top: Ethical leadership must be visible, consistent, and enforced. Leaders should also meet clear minimum standards, including relevant educational credentials and demonstrated competence.
• Cultivate psychological safety: Encourage open dialogue, dissent, and innovation without fear of retaliation.

Practical Tips for Others Considering Separation
For those contemplating a similar transition, my advice is simple but vital:

• Prepare practically and emotionally: Plan your finances, entitlements, and visa matters early, while also preparing for the emotional shift of leaving a structured system. Practical readiness and emotional resilience go hand in hand.
• Develop skills beyond the UN system: The UN ecosystem is unique, and its experience does not always translate directly elsewhere. Build adaptability through new learning, volunteering, or personal pursuits that foster creativity, patience, and perspective.
• Expand your external network: Engage with academia, civil society, philanthropy, the private sector, and local community. Relationships beyond the UN can open doors to new opportunities and collaborations.
• Define your next purpose early: Clarify what motivates you and how you want to contribute next. A clear sense of direction brings meaning and stability during transition.
• Protect your integrity: Leave with professionalism, gratitude, grace, and honesty. How you exit shapes your legacy just as much as how you served the UN. Carry your professionalism and values into your next chapter.
• Transform experience into impact: Use what you learned to create something meaningful. Reinvention is not an ending—it is evolution.

Global service beyond the United Nations
Leaving the UN was both an ending and a beginning. It gave me the opportunity to step outside the system and rethink what global service could be—more inclusive, representative, and accountable. That vision led to the founding of Asia Global Forum, a nonprofit organization committed to addressing imbalances in global governance and ensuring that Asia’s diversity and perspectives are recognized as central to global progress—from governance and economic development to cultural dialogue—while strengthening collaboration with other regional communities.

I leave the UN with appreciation for what was good, respect for those who serve with integrity, and lessons from more difficult moments. At the same time, I leave with the conviction that meaningful transformation often begins outside established systems. Asia Global Forum is my way of continuing that service—building a movement that places representation, merit, and accountability at the center of a fairer global order.

Purpose does not end with an institution—it evolves beyond it.

Shihana Mohamed, a Sri Lankan national, is President of Asia Global Network (www.AsiaGlobalForum.org) and a US Public Voices Fellow with The OpEd Project and Equality Now on advancing the rights of women and girls. She is also a founding member and Coordinator of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org). A dedicated human rights activist, she is a strong advocate for gender equality and the advancement of women. She served the United Nations for over 25 years.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses Mexico’s enforced disappearance crisis with Angélica Orozco, a member of Fuerzas Unidas por Nuestros Desaparecidos en Nuevo León (FUNDENL), a collective of relatives of disappeared people and people who support them. Since 2012, FUNDENL has been searching for the disappeared and documenting the human rights crisis.

Angélica Orozco

What are your demands?

There are over 133,000 people missing in Mexico. To put this into perspective, the disappeared would fill the stadium where four World Cup matches are being played in Monterrey almost two and a half times over. You could put together over 5,100 football teams, and it would take 107 World Cups to see them all play. The UN warns that only about two in 10 of these crimes are reported, so the actual figure could be much higher.

We have been searching by every means possible for nearly 15 years, with almost no support, using our own resources. We have written books, occupied public squares, organised protests and taken part in conferences. The World Cup is yet another opportunity to raise global awareness of the humanitarian crisis caused by enforced disappearances. As the world’s attention is now focused on Canada, Mexico and the USA, we want everyone to know about our struggle.

We are not against football. We are simply asking that the authorities search for our loved ones, bring them home and ensure that no one else is disappeared. For this to happen, prevention is key. When FUNDENL detects recurring cases in an area, we issue alerts to the public. It’s a simple step that the authorities, who have first-hand information, should be taking but are not. They should also enforce the laws and protocols we already have, thanks to the struggle of families and campaign groups. The law mandates a national register of missing persons, but the existing one is incomplete, with misspelt names and duplicate entries. The law also requires search and investigation plans to be drawn up, yet these do not exist.

We simply want the government to do its job. Instead, it’s investing millions in the World Cup to give the impression that everything is fine, while the search for the disappeared continues to receive neither the attention nor the necessary resources. It should work to find the disappeared with the same dedication it has put into organising this tournament.

To this end, we are holding various protests in the host cities. We have translated our slogan, ‘Where are they?’, into 10 languages: the eight languages of the countries visiting Monterrey, plus English and Chinese. Using AI, we have dressed 21 missing people in the Mexican national team’s shirt and called them ‘Mexico’s national team’, because that’s the team the authorities don’t want to see. We’ve also played street football matches in solidarity and put up over 150 photographs of missing people outside the stadium in Monterrey.

How have authorities responded?

The response has been deplorable. Instead of addressing our demands, the state criminalises and stigmatises victims. In Mexico City, there was a heavy police presence to contain the marches. The Secretary of the Interior cast doubt on the funding for the families’ journey from Jalisco to the capital and announced she would investigate the source of the funds. It was an absurd insinuation. We have always organised ourselves using our own resources, precisely because the state has never supported us.

President Claudia Sheinbaum also played down the significance of the protests. She even went so far as to say, amidst laughter, that there were more staff from the search commissions and victim support services than protesters. For us, it’s not about numbers, but about our 133,000 loved ones who are no longer with us. These are people with families, homes and lives that were snatched away from them.

We’d hoped that this government, which prided itself on being progressive, would be different. It wasn’t to be. The first sign was clear. In her inaugural speech, President Sheinbaum made no mention of the disappeared or their families. She’s said so herself: what’s not named doesn’t exist. She’s never met with the families. Like previous governments, it seems she prefers to ignore this humanitarian crisis.

The determination to conceal this reality is evident. Here in Nuevo León, the governor put up tarpaulins in poor neighbourhoods to hide the poverty. He placed giant planters in front of the Square of the Disappeared, which we occupied in 2014, so the faces of our loved ones couldn’t be seen from the street. We protested and stuck their photographs on the planters, and the next day we got the government to remove them.

On that square, we had written a sign on the pavement that read ‘130,000 disappeared’. Against the backdrop of the World Cup, we went back to refresh the paint and update the figure to include a further 3,000 who have gone missing since. The effect was immediate. Some people from Sweden who were visiting the city came over to ask us for more information.

What makes these enforced disappearances?

For a disappearance to be considered enforced, there must be state involvement, whether direct or indirect. And such involvement exists, even if Sheinbaum wishes to deny it.

There isn’t always a video proving it was a public official who took a person away, but there are omissions that prove it. An official who fails to request call records in time, for example, becomes an accomplice, because that information is key to the search, but it’s only kept for two years, and if it isn’t requested before the deadline, it’s lost forever.

In many cases, there’s direct involvement. There have been instances where men wearing municipal police vests have taken people away and cases where traffic police intervened in a road accident and the people involved subsequently disappeared. The constant is that the evidence implicating them always vanishes.

Added to this is the state’s refusal to acknowledge the crisis. It’s like with illnesses. If you don’t recognise you have one, you can’t cure it. That also makes them responsible.

We are not the only ones saying this. The UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances has recognised the gravity of the situation and referred the case to the General Assembly.

Who are the victims and who is responsible?

Anyone can be made to disappear, in everyday circumstances. Some people have disappeared on their way home, or while popping out for a soft drink, or following a road accident.

Nuevo León is the state with the fifth-highest number of missing persons in Mexico, with over 7,000. Between January and May this year, a further 433 people went missing – an average of three a day – and around 70 per cent have still not been found.

If we are disappeared, it’s because the conditions for this to happen exist. The main one is impunity. Out of over 133,000 missing people, only 3,869 have an investigation file open, according to government figures. That’s almost absolute impunity.

Nor are there any consequences for officials who fail to investigate. They are simply moved to a different post. The official who currently heads the Local Search Commission spent three decades in the public prosecutor’s office and is repeating the same practices in her new role. The current mayor of Monterrey was the state attorney-general during the most violent years. Instead of being punished for their failure to act, they appear to have been rewarded. The same applies to criminals. We have come across people responsible for crimes in 2010 and 2011 who are still at large and committing the same crimes years later.

As the state fails to take responsibility, we have taken it upon ourselves to search for our missing loved ones, and what we have found is appalling. In Nuevo León, we have reported the existence of 10 extermination camps. In one of them, Las Abejas, we found over 250,000 fragments of human remains and more than 100 DNA profiles. This means 100 people haven’t returned home. There are also over 3,000 unidentified bodies and remains in mass graves in Nuevo León and over 70,000 across Mexico. Figures like these cannot be reached without a system set up to make people disappear with the complicity of the authorities.

What are you asking of the international community?

We ask our international visitors to turn their attention to this crisis, learn about our missing loved ones, show solidarity and help us search for them, because we don’t know whether any of them have been taken out of the country. We also ask them to take this demand to their governments, so they can add to the pressure on the Mexican authorities.

Pressure matters. That’s why we welcome the decision of the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances. When it was made public, the Mexican state rejected it and treated it as an attack, rather than engaging with it.

Enforced disappearance is a crime against humanity. When someone is disappeared, they are torn away from their family and their entire community. That’s why we appeal to humanity: no person, anywhere in the world, should be made to disappear. As long as disappearances continue, we will not live in complete peace or democracy.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
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World Cup: ‘FIFA has placed itself on the side of the polluters, not the rest of the planet’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Frank Huisingh 15.Jun.2026
The disappeared: Mexico’s industrial-scale human rights crisis CIVICUS Lens 22.Apr.2025

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UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed with Resident Coordinators from the Latin America and Caribbean region. Credit: United Nations

By Mohammed Chiraz Baly
GENEVA, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

A letter to staff unions from economists working in the resident coordinator system, blows the whistle on a restructuring that could damage the development pillar and downgrade support to middle income countries.

For memory, UN resident coordinators are tasked with aligning the work of different UN agencies in 162 countries with respective government priorities.

Resident coordinators don’t have funds to get agencies to work together. They rely on their powers of persuasion and importantly, their office’s analytical and data handling capacity.

They therefore have a country economist, who provides evidence-based advice to the UN country team on improving development impact and helps mobilise financing from international financial institutions. These economists also represent non-resident agencies such as mine, UNCTAD, in discussions with the government. As agencies shut their country offices, this becomes more important.

The current system has existed since 2019 and the General Assembly has asked the Deputy Secretary-General, who oversees the system, for a review.

According to the letter (there is no other source of information as the process is a tightly-guarded secret), the proposal is a restructuring that, surprisingly, reduces analytical capacity resident coordinator offices in the over 100 middle income developing countries through a blanket downgrading of economist posts, undermining resident coordinators in the process.

There doesn’t seem to be an assessment in the rushed process of different countries’ circumstances nor the situations they’re going through.

It is not clear why middle-income countries, which constitute most UN member states, are being targeted and this appears to run counter to UN policy.

DESA has warned against abandoning support for middle income countries (https://lnkd.in/edKWFJgM) noting they “are a large and heterogenous group. They differ widely in their development needs and challenges, and in their capacity to mobilise domestic and external resources.”

Rebeca Grynspan has called out the middle-income country trap.

Last month the Secretary-General warned not to judge the challenges facing countries by GDP alone (https://lnkd.in/eaB85QFg).

Although, member states have already voiced concerns with the restructuring; it is being imposed regardless, and being rushed through before they can have a further say.

A large number of staff, originating from all regions, some recruited only last year, will therefore be removed from their posts, while UN support to and ability to mobilise financing for middle income countries will be reduced.

As the restructuring is cost-neutral, the savings from cutting staff in the field would appear to then provide more posts to regional offices and at senior level, and upgrade management posts.

The letter alleges an absence of meaningful consultation with unions and resident coordinators. In some countries, the entire cadre of international and national professional staff in a country could be replaced.

There is consensus that the resident coordinator system should be improved and we know resources are limited. It’s not clear though if downgrading substantive and analytical capacity is the right solution. Perhaps a more comprehensive assessment is needed, without the ticking clock of the end of mandate, so that the fragile development pillar isn’t damaged further.

Extracts from the letter are published below :

We write as economists serving in UN Resident Coordinator’s Offices across Standard, Complex, and Multi-Country settings. We come from different regions, work in countries spanning very different development contexts and income categories, and some of us started our careers as national officers. We raise these concerns in good faith and ask for a structured dialogue before the proposals are finalised.

1. The case for economic expertise in the RC system

The RCO economist provides analytical support independent of government preference and agency programming logic — on fiscal space, debt dynamics, structural transformation, SDG financing, and trade shocks. It draws on experience across multiple country contexts and IFI networks. The seniority of the posts matters: it enables credible engagement with finance ministers, private sector counterparts, and development finance institutions — the partnerships needed to mobilise SDG financing. Abolishing those posts removes that standing. At the ECOSOC OAS in June 2026, delegations spanning the G77, the African Group, AOSIS, India, Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, Canada, the United States, and the Republic of Korea called explicitly for “strengthening capacities in strategic planning, economic analysis, SDG financing, data, digitalization, communications, climate and resilience.” The recalibration moves in the opposite direction, weeks after that mandate was given.

• The current moment is the wrong time to reduce analytical capacity. Countries face compounding pressures: COVID-19 structural aftereffects, Russia-Ukraine trade and energy disruptions, US-Iran escalation, and a fragmenting multilateral trading system. At the ECOSOC OAS, USG Li Junhua (DESA) noted ODA fell a record 23% in 2025 and the SDG financing gap stands above USD 4 trillion. Agency analytical capacity is simultaneously contracting: UNDP has abolished its economist programme for Africa and budgets and staffing have been cut across multiple entities. As agency footprints shrink, the RCO economist is often the only independent macroeconomic analyst the RC and host government can draw on.

• The Standard RCO category is a coordination label, not an economic complexity assessment. Across the 101 Standard RCO countries, analytical complexity does not track income category. DESA, UNCTAD, and the regional commissions have all cautioned against using GDP per capita as a proxy for development support needs. Applying that filter to determine where independent economic analysis is necessary is inconsistent with the UN’s own guidance.

• Adding senior headquarters posts while cutting country capacity contradicts a direct General Assembly mandate. The recalibration creates new D2 posts at headquarters and increases regional staffing. In December 2025, paragraph 16 of GA resolution A/C.5/80/L.4 requested the Secretary-General to include proposals “with the aim to reduce or reclassify the overall number of USG, ASG, D-2 and D-1 posts markedly” under UN80. Adding D2 posts at headquarters while abolishing and nationalising field posts moves in the opposite direction. Norway at the ECOSOC OAS stated this is “not the time to weaken” the RC system. Member States including AOSIS, Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, Canada, and Switzerland also questioned “whether expertise-on-demand can substitute for sustained presence.” It cannot. Cross-country policy and financing work requires continuity, institutional memory, and relationships — not episodic inputs from a regional hub.

• The recalibration contradicts UN 2.0 priorities and discards a recent investment in talent. Under UN 2.0, the Secretary-General prioritised data-driven decision-making — a competency assessed in recruiting these positions — and called for international staff mobility across headquarters, regional bodies, and the field. The RCO economist role was one of the few routes enabling that rotation. Converting posts to national roles closes it off. Several colleagues joined within the past 12 to 18 months on the basis of a clear signal that country-level analytical capacity was being strengthened. Reversing course without explanation wastes the investment and will deter future talent.

2. The analytical basis for this decision does not hold

The recalibration of 130 RCOs has been summarised on a single slide with four columns — no within-category differentiation, no country-specific analysis, no assessment of capacity lost in any specific setting. The UN80 Staff Support Policy Framework (OHR/PG/2025/4, June 2025) requires that “decision-makers must provide reasons for any administrative decisions, supported by facts.” No such reasons have been provided. Income-based categories — which the UN’s own analytical bodies warn against using as a proxy for development complexity — are the primary basis for determining where independent economic analysis is needed.

3. Process concerns

• RCs were not meaningfully consulted. Engagement happened shortly before public rollout, not during the design phase. Earlier discussions reportedly included giving RCs discretion over the economist profile in their office. That option was dropped without explanation, in direct tension with the principle that country team configurations should reflect RC judgment.

• No written rationale has been provided. The town hall did not explain why economist positions are being nationalised or downgraded, why income categories are the organising variable, or how any of this improves efficiency or advances UN 2.0. Without a written rationale, staff and Member States are being asked to accept a significant structural change on trust.

• The process does not meet the Organisation’s own standards for staff consultation. Staff Regulation 8.1(a) requires “effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work.” OHR/PG/2025/4 commits management to engage through the Staff Management Committee “on a regular and timely basis regarding proposals that will impact staff.” Staff learned of this recalibration at a town hall after the configuration was designed. Whatever engagement occurred with staff representatives fell short of these requirements — and staff at large had no involvement at all.

• The pace of implementation risks bypassing Member State oversight. ACABQ and the Fifth Committee will consider RC system funding in autumn 2026. DCO’s extrabudgetary discretion means restructuring can proceed before that review. Rushing this through before a new Secretary-General is named makes the situation harder to revisit.

4. What we are asking for

• A written rationale — including the evidence base, efficiency gains claimed, and an honest account of what analytical capacity is lost.

• Genuine RC consultation before any finalisation on the economist profile appropriate for each country context. RC discretion should be the default, not the exception.

• Structured Staff Council engagement before the configuration is operationalised, consistent with Staff Regulation 8.1 and Staff Rule 8.1(h).

• Reconsideration of the blanket approach, with scope for RCs to retain or request an international economist where conditions warrant — an option reportedly still under discussion before this proposal was finalised.

• An assessment of the HR costs — relocations, repatriations, terminations — given the RC system’s current financial constraints.

Mohammed Chiraz Baly is a staff representative and former General Secretary of the CCISUA staff union federation. He is also a data analyst at UNCTAD focusing on investment financing in developing countries.

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With elections likely to be held in August, the young people in Haiti are moving ahead, creating opportunities in music and digitalization and agricultural cooperatives, which are reinventing food self-sufficiency. Credit: Shutterstock

By Xavier Michon
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti, Jun 29 2026 (IPS)

There is a question that is never asked plainly enough in reports on Haiti: why, despite decades of analysis, billions in international aid, and an abundance of national strategies, does the potential of Haitian youth remain so consistently underutilized? This report, The Silent Transformation, is an attempt at an honest answer.

And that answer begins with an admission: for too long, we have viewed this generation as a problem to manage rather than a solution to mobilize.

Haiti is one of the youngest countries in the Western Hemisphere. More than one in two Haitians is under the age of 25. This reality should be at the heart of every policy decision, every investment strategy, every dialogue with international partners. It is not yet. And it is precisely to change this that this report exists.

We are at a turning point unlike any in the country’s recent history. For the first time since 2016, general elections are on the horizon. What may appear as an institutional milestone is, in fact, a deeply human one: an entire generation is preparing to vote for the first time. Citizens who were between 8 and 17 years old during the last general election. Since then, they have built businesses, lived through an earthquake, a pandemic, a presidential assassination and an unprecedented security crisis—and at no point during all of this were they consulted about the future of their own country.

Ten years without elections. Ten years of shaping their own lives without their institutions recognizing them as full actors. This paradox lies at the heart of this report.

Because this generation has not waited for permission to begin its transformation. It has done so on its own, in adversity, with whatever tools were within reach. And this is where the central thesis of this document lies: Haitian youth are not waiting for development. They are already producing it.

Mannitòks are inventing fintech without waiting for banks to modernize. Agricultural cooperatives are reinventing food self-sufficiency in secure areas. Coding clubs in Cap-Haïtien and Carrefour are training the next generation of developers without formal computer science schools. Designers in Pétion-Ville, musicians exporting kompa and Kreyòl rap to global platforms, DJs connecting Port-au-Prince to the diaspora, and artisans in Noailles are sustaining a cultural economy still absent from official economic radars.

These are not isolated success stories. They are signs of a structural transformation unfolding before our eyes—quietly, because we have not yet learned how to see it with the right tools.

This report is an attempt to develop those tools. It documents, analyzes, and recommends. But it also does something rarer in development literature: it shifts the perspective. It starts from the creative genius of Haitian youth and works upward toward public policy, rather than moving from policy down to beneficiaries.

This inversion is not rhetorical—it is methodological. And it changes what we see.

What it reveals is demanding for all of us. It shows that the main barrier to youth development in Haiti is not a lack of potential, but a lack of recognition of that potential. It shows that the most effective policies will not be those designed for young people, but those designed with them. And it shows, finally, that the international community—including UNDP—must embrace a new kind of humility: sometimes, to support means to step back, to remove obstacles rather than impose solutions.

UNDP supports these dynamics: we promote digital skills, access to finance and innovation ecosystems. Our initiatives—from supporting Fab Labs to advancing regulatory reforms—aim to create an environment in which youth-led enterprises can thrive. But we also know that our most valuable role is the one we build on the ground, alongside those who are already taking action. This report calls on us to listen as much as we act.

I warmly thank Group Croissance and CEDEL Haiti, whose field expertise and unwavering commitment have shaped every page of this document. Above all, I thank the young Haitians who shared their experiences, their vision and their clarity—because this is their report before it is ours.

To them, I want to say this: your determination is not only your strength—it is, objectively, the most valuable resource Haiti possesses. The upcoming election will be your first meeting with the ballot box. It will not be your last. And if this report helps ensure that this moment lives up to what you have already built without itin adversity, without permission, with unwavering ambition, then it will have achieved its essential purpose.

None of this happens in isolation. Canada has been a trusted partner in Haiti’s development journey, and its continued support for initiatives that invest in people, ideas and long-term possibilities reflects exactly the kind of partnership Haiti needs. To the Government of Canada and Global Affairs Canada: thank you. Your commitment to a Haiti defined by its potential—not only its challenges—helps make initiatives like this one possible.

The path ahead requires courage, collaboration and clear-eyed reflection on what has not worked—but above all, renewed faith in what is possible. Because while the past teaches us caution, it is the future this generation is already shaping that must guide our choices.

Let us take this path together—by letting you show the way.

XAVIER MICHON IS Resident Representative, UNDP Haiti

Source: UNDP

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Credit: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/IMF Photo

By Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, Athene Laws and Hamza Mighri
WASHINGTON DC, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

For decades, official development assistance has been a central pillar of financing in sub-Saharan Africa. That pillar is now weakening—quickly and broadly.

In 2025, bilateral aid to the region fell sharply, with early estimates pointing to cuts of about 26 percent in a single year. Multilateral support is also under pressure, with major institutions projecting sizeable budget reductions. More cuts may follow as donors reset priorities in a shifting geopolitical environment.

As we explain in chapter 2 of the IMF’s recent Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not a routine fluctuation. It is hitting countries that have limited room to adjust and few alternative sources of financing.

Why aid matters

Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest aid dependency globally in 2024. On average, aid accounted for 3 percent of GDP at the regional level. But that average hid sharp differences. In low-income countries and fragile states, aid often reached the equivalent of 6 percent of GDP or more, and in some cases far higher.

Over half of that aid was used to finance essential services such as health, education, and humanitarian assistance. And because development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often deliver services directly to people in need, aid cuts can also curtail the very systems that people rely on. Effective responses to crises such as the Ebola emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the high and rising needs of people forcibly displaced by conflict, and the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa rely heavily on the health and humanitarian infrastructure that aid has consistently helped to build.

A different reality

Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.

The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.

The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.

Tough trade-offs

Governments now face difficult choices. Many have limited fiscal space, rising debt, and low reserves.

IMF-administered surveys covering 28 African countries suggest four broad policy responses:

o Some governments are not replacing lost aid, allowing programs to lapse. This limits immediate fiscal strain but carries high social costs.
o Many are reprioritizing spending, often cutting public investment—easier politically, but damaging to future growth.
o Others are borrowing more, including domestically, increasing debt risks.
o Some are stepping up revenue mobilization, though results take time.

Each option comes with trade-offs. Replacing lost aid can protect services and growth, but at the cost of wider deficits and external imbalances. Not replacing it stabilizes budgets and protects debt sustainability, but risks lasting damage to human capital and development.

There are no easy choices.

How to respond

The policy challenge is to manage the adjustment while preserving core development gains. Three priorities stand out.

First, protect and target high-impact aid.
With resources scarce, allocation matters more. Aid should be directed toward the countries and sectors where it has the greatest effect—especially low-income countries and fragile states, and essential humanitarian needs. Stronger coordination can reduce fragmentation and avoid duplication.

Second, broaden the financing toolkit.
Grant financing will remain essential, particularly in humanitarian contexts. But other instruments can play a larger role. Blended finance—using public funds to mobilize private investment—can help expand financing for infrastructure, energy, and agriculture. It is not a substitute for aid: it is harder to scale, more complex, and can add to debt if poorly designed. Managing these trade-offs will be critical.

Third, strengthen domestic capacity.
With aid less predictable, resilience increasingly depends on domestic institutions. This means mobilizing more revenue, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening policy design and service delivery. Aid has often provided both funding and implementation; replacing that capacity will take time and sustained investment.

A turning point

The shift that began in 2025 is unlikely to be temporary. It reflects a broader reconfiguration of development finance, shaped by tighter donor budgets and changing priorities.

The implications will vary by country, depending on exposure, initial buffers, and policy choices. But the direction is clear: reliance on external aid will become more uncertain, and domestic policy will matter more.

The immediate task is to manage the decline in aid without backsliding on the significant human development achievements of the past decades. The longer-term challenge is to adapt to a world where aid is less abundant and less predictable. How countries navigate both will shape growth and development outcomes for years to come.

Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, and Athene Laws are economists in the IMF’s African Department, where Hamza Mighri is a research analyst.

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A lab technician conducts an HIV screening test at a medical centre in Hayatabad in the Peshawar district of Pakistan. Credit: WHO/Asad Zaidi

By Winnie Byanyima
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 24 2026 (IPS)

I am honoured to address this High-Level Meeting. I thank very much the President of the General Assembly for her leadership, our Co-Facilitators, and all the Member States for the extraordinary effort that brought us here now.

I also pay special tribute to the communities that have carried the AIDS response on their shoulders for four decades. These are people living with HIV; women and girls; gay men and other men who have sex with men; transgender people; people who inject drugs; sex workers. I also salute health workers; scientists; philanthropists; and development partners. Millions are alive because of your courage and brilliant contributions.

Twenty-five years ago, world leaders gathered in this hall for the first-ever United Nations General Assembly Special Session on a health crisis.

At the height of the pandemic, they made a promise: that AIDS would be stopped; that treatment and prevention would be accessible to all people in all countries; that funding would be mobilized to enable every country to fight the disease; that communities would lead; and that the United Nations would coordinate a global, multisectoral response unseen before.

As AIDS deaths peaked, my friend Diana, in my country Uganda, widowed by the virus, called me in tears. She said “I am ill. I may die. Please take care of my three children.” I kept my promise to her that day. Today those children are thriving adults — a lawyer, an accountant, an administrator.

Winnie Byanyima, Executive Director of UNAIDS

Millions kept that promise. Communities, governments, scientists, health workers and companies kept the promise. That is the global AIDS response. And what progress we have made. Of 40 million people living with HIV today, 32.1 million are now on treatment, living long and healthy lives.

But let us not confuse progress with success. Nearly 9 million people are still not on treatment, and last year there were 1.2 million people who were newly infected. This is our last High-Level Meeting before the 2030 promise to end AIDS as a public health threat. We are just four years away. And the opportunity is extraordinary. Breathtaking science like long-acting medicines can now protect people from HIV with just two injections a year — it is not a vaccine, but it is the closest we have come. Research could yet give us a cure. Ending AIDS is possible.

Yet we meet at a perilous moment.

Multilateralism is at its weakest in a generation, and two threats are poised to reverse all our gains: the collapse in development financing, and the rollback of human rights, gender equality and civic space.

According to the OECD, development finance fell 23% in 2025 — the sharpest drop on record — HIV programmes in high-burden, low-income countries were hit hard. Our new UNAIDS data released last week show fragility. HIV testing has fallen 22% in high-burden settings, meaning people do not know their status and the virus continues to spread. Funding for condoms has been cut by more than 90% in some places. Prevention is being dismantled at the very moment we should be scaling innovations like new long-acting medicines.

Evidence also shows that countries that protect rights achieve stronger HIV outcomes. Yet we are seeing a dangerous rollback of the rights of those at highest risk — women and girls, gay men, trans people, people who inject drugs, sex workers. For the first time since UNAIDS began tracking, criminalisation is rising: over the past 10 to 15 years the trend has been of decriminalization. Last year two more countries criminalised same-sex relationships, and one increased penalties in 2026. These laws undermine services and allow HIV to spread. The shrinking of civic space is disabling community-led organizations that have proven the most effective in delivering services to people living with and affected by HIV. One study across 47 countries found community services to those most in need cut by 50 to 85%.

And yet Excellencies we can still seize the opportunity to stop this pandemic.

I stand here on behalf of UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. We were created in a moment of crisis — it is in our DNA to operate in crisis.

And here is what gives me hope.

52 countries have committed to increasing domestic financing since the rapid cuts. Regional initiatives — the Accra Reset led by President Mahama of Ghana, the African Union Roadmap, the Alliance for the Elimination of HIV in the Americas — are building health sovereignty. Financing agencies—the Global Fund, called for in this hall by Kofi Annan; the US bilateral programme—have secured new funding even in times of challenge. And we call for more.

Brazil’s G20 initiative is advancing regional production of medicines. And everywhere, communities refuse to give up and die —they continue to deliver services and defend one another under attack.

Governments of the world: are we going to keep the promise?

Five UN resolutions before now have driven progress up to here. The global AIDS response is perhaps the greatest, most successful story of multilateralism in forty years. Surely we can find a way to build on that success.

This Political Declaration is our chance to build on 25 years of commitment and point the way to 2030, and actually show multilateralism can deliver. We cannot fail, because we know what we must do:

• Commit to multilateralism, and to the shared targets before you.
• Sustain international financing, as countries mobilise their own resources.
• Protect the rights of people living with HIV to reach lifesaving services.
• Free the space, and let communities lead for their people
• Spur the science, so that innovations reach everyone in need as fast as possible

If we do these things, we can end AIDS.

Excellencies, when we walk out of this hall, let us look 40 million people living with HIV around the world in the eye and say: we kept our promise.

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By UN Women
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 23 2026 (IPS)

A study of 133 AI systems found that 44 per cent demonstrated gender bias and 26 per cent demonstrated both gender and racial bias. Yet only 51 per cent of marketers currently use human oversight to test AI-generated creative before release. Ahead of the United Nations Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance from 6 – 7 July and AI for Good Global Summit in Geneva, Switzerland from 7-10 July, UN Women sets out what is at stake – and what must change – to build a gender-equal digital future.

1. The AI content era is here. And the window to shape it is closing fast.

Generative AI is now among the most widely used technologies in day-to-day marketing and communications work, in the United Kingdom (UK) alone, 88 per cent of advertising and media agencies are already using it in some form. Discriminatory algorithms could therefore further perpetuate gender inequality and discrimination. As AI tools become embedded in content generation and media buying at scale, decisions about who gets seen, how they are portrayed, and whose stories get told are being made at speed, and largely without human scrutiny or gender perspective.

2. Bias and discriminatory algorithms are not a glitch in AI – it is a pattern documented across systems at scale.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been found to consistently associate women with “home,” “family,” and “children,” and men with “business,” “executive,” “salary,” and “career.” When tasked with completing sentences that start with a person’s gender, about 20 per cent of responses from LLMs exhibited sexist and misogynistic attitudes, including portrayals of women as sex objects and property of their husbands. These are the predictable output of AI systems trained on decades of unequal representation of women and men. AI bias is not only a system design problem, but also a policy problem. Of 138 countries assessed, only 24 referenced gender in a national AI strategy, and just 18 included substantive gender-responsive provisions, risking inequality being “baked in” to future systems.

3. AI is intensifying violence against women and girls in digital spaces.

According to UN Women data, women and girls globally already have less access to digital spaces – and when they do, they are far more likely to experience online violence. Almost one in four surveyed women human rights defenders, activists and journalists had experienced AI-assisted online violence and 12 per cent report having experienced the non-consensual sharing of personal images, including intimate or sexual content. Six per cent say they have been targeted through “deepfakes” or manipulated images/video, while more than one in four have received unsolicited sexual advances through digital messaging. AI is compounding this. Deepfakes are among the most visible examples of AI-enabled abuse that disproportionately targets women and girls. As AI-generated content becomes the norm, the tools for harassment, manipulation, and image-based abuse are scaling alongside it.

4. Women are being locked out of the rooms where AI is built.

Gen AI is expected to drive job growth in tech-intensive sectors, yet women remain underrepresented in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) and AI, making up only 30 per cent of the AI workforce globally. The people designing these systems are not representative of the billions of people the systems are expected to serve – and that glaring gap is compounding the problem.

5. The economic disruption of AI will fall hardest on women.

Women outside the AI sector are nearly twice as likely as men to hold jobs at high risk of automation. AI disparity does not manifest in gender inequality alone – harms are multiplied across race, disability, socioeconomic status, and geography. The communities already most underrepresented in media and labour markets face the greatest risk of being left further behind.

6. Inclusive AI is a commercial imperative.

In a first-ever global study, the Unstereotype Alliance, an industry-led initiative convened by UN Women, proved that inclusive advertising has a positive impact on business profit, sales and brand value. Brands that create inclusive advertising, free of gender stereotypes, enjoy +3.46 per cent short-term sales and +16.26 per cent long-term sales uplift. They are 62 per cent more likely to be a consumer’s first choice, have 54 per cent higher pricing power, and experience 15 per cent higher customer loyalty. As AI becomes central to how campaigns are planned and produced, the brands that embed inclusion into those processes stand to gain – and those that do not, face significant reputational and commercial risk. The Unstereotype Alliance playbook launched in June 2026 gives marketers a way to catch bias before it ships, every time they use generative AI.

UN Women calls for gender equality and the rights and experiences of women and girls to be embedded at every stage of AI life cycle from development, deployment, and governance. When designed with safety and used with intention, AI can help detect stereotypes, broaden representation, and improve accessibility at scale. The choice of whether it does lies with the people making decisions – in governments, in companies, in experts researching and developing AI – and it depends on whether we incorporate the voice, expertise, and lived experience of women and girls from diverse contexts, civil society organizations who work with them and know their issues deeply.

For interviews or more information, contact the UN Women media team at media.team@unwomen.org.

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Credit: Coalition of Governments on Global Public Investment

By Ben Phillips
BANGKOK, Thailand, Jun 22 2026 (IPS)

The fallout from the sudden collapse of the old system of financing international cooperation has been disastrous, unleashing a wave of harm and leaving the world more vulnerable to shocks and less able to respond to them. The wreckage is plain to see. The issue is what to do next.

Calling attention to the damage done, several commentators in the Global North have made the case for putting back up what had been pulled down. That will not happen, however. The crisis of financing for international cooperation was a reflection of a crisis of support for the model, and for the narrative of paternalism it embodied. The structure collapsed so fast because it was unsound.

Another set of commentators in the Global North, calling themselves “realists”, have advanced two low-hope ideas for the future international cooperation.

One idea put forward is to accept and find ways to cope with ever shrinking resources for shared global challenges, trying to “do more with less”. This approach would fail. The real-world consequence of attempting it would be failing to adequately resource collective responses to global threats – including pandemics, energy insecurity, natural disasters, and more. This would be existentially dangerous, and orders-of-magnitude more costly for every country than tackling shared threats upstream.

Another idea put forward is to ask the private sector to take over responsibilities which have previously been intergovernmental. This approach would fail too. The real-world consequence of pursuing it would not only be desperately inadequate resourcing of shared threats, and the supercharging of extreme inequality, but also the surrender of accountability and power to oligarchy.

This triptych of unworkable ideas – keep trying to restore the old order, accept managed decline or hand over to the private sector – dominates much of the attention in the Global North.

Thankfully, however, a growing group of Global South governments have been hard at work shaping a solution for the financing of shared global challenges.

Co-convened by the Foreign Ministers of Senegal and Colombia, more than 30 countries have come together in the Coalition of Governments on Global Public Investment, to transform the current global inflection point into a moment of renewal.

“Our challenges are shared; our risks are shared; and increasingly, our solutions must also be shared,” observes Martín Clavijo, Director of Uruguay’s Agency for International Cooperation. “We need an evolution in how we understand cooperation towards a framework in which all countries contribute according to their capacities, all benefit according to their needs, and all participate as equals in decisions about the use of resources.”

“Global public investment is the smart, 21st-century answer to how governments can work together to overcome the challenges and crises that affect us all,” remarks Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio Mapy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia and co-chair of the coalition. “A significant increase in public financing is essential — and crucially, these resources must be governed under more representative and effective frameworks.”

“We are moving beyond traditional donor-recipient paradigms, towards a more horizontal, inclusive, and partnership-based approach,” shares Cheikh Niang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal and co-chair of the coalition. “All countries, regardless of their level of development, have both contributions to make and legitimate expectations to express. To solve our national, regional, and global problems, we can’t rely on philanthropy alone, and we can’t just look to the private sector to save us. We need more and better public money to solve our collective challenges.”

Launched in July 2025 at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, the coalition held its inaugural planning meeting in September 2025 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. This year the governments have gathered in Bogota in March, and in Nairobi in May, and will gather again in New York in September.

Anchored in the Global South, the coalition is also reaching out to countries in the Global North. “We are not looking for sympathy. What we want is an equal partnership,” emphasises Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ghana.

“The future of international cooperation must evolve toward approaches that better reflect shared responsibility and collective interest,” points out Limpho Tau, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lesotho.

The governments are working closely with civil society. “The leaders coming together are pioneers renewing and remaking multilateralism,” says María Elena Agüero, Secretary General of Club de Madrid. “The approach they’re developing together will be fairer than approaches inherited from the last century, by ensuring all countries have a voice and a stake. It will also be much more effective, helping to improve lives across the world.”

The leaders insist on the need to go beyond simply cushioning the present disruption. They are clear that past approaches will not and should not return. Instead, they are working to turn breakdown into breakthrough by bringing countries together as equals to redesign international finance for an interdependent world.

“There is an urgent need for a renewed international financial architecture that is more inclusive, more representative and better aligned with contemporary global realities,” observes Korir Singoei, Principal Secretary, Department for Foreign Affairs of Kenya.

“Do we want to be the generation that managed a crisis — or the generation that transformed the course of global cooperation?” asks Javier Eduardo Martínez-Acha Vásquez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama. “Global public investment can enable us not only to transform international cooperation but to transform the future of humanity.”

The leaders have put together a roadmap for transforming international cooperation by 2030: “A great deal of intellectual effort has been made over years to ensure that an appropriate model was brought forward,” remarks Alva Baptiste, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saint Lucia. “Now”, he concludes, “we are mandated to get airborne.”

Ben Phillips is the author of How to Fight Inequality, and Public Good: Building a Winning Narrative to Bring the World Together.

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Secretary-General Kofi Annan speaks at a ceremony to unveil the official portrait of his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 22 2026 (IPS)

When Egypt’s onetime Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali was running for the post of U.N. Secretary-General in late 1991, he had to contend with the rival candidacy of Bernard Chidzero, then foreign minister of Zimbabwe.

As the campaign began to intensify, Boutros-Ghali recounted a brief encounter with Chidzero, a longstanding friend, at a conference in Africa, a continent that at that time claimed the job of U.N. chief on the basis of geographical rotation.

Chidzero, who hailed from an English-speaking country and was backed by the UK and the 54-member Commonwealth of mostly ex-British colonies, was in conversation with Boutros-Ghali when he suddenly switched from English to French.

Having picked up the subtle message, Boutros-Ghali said he put his arms around Chidzero and jokingly remarked, “Bernard, if you want the approval of France, you must not only speak French, but also speak English with a French accent.”

France, a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, has been so passionately protective of its language that it may well have exercised its veto on any candidate who did not speak French.

And no one who aspires to be the Secretary-General of the United Nations can expect to be elected to office if he or she does not have a working knowledge of French—or at least promise to eventually master the language—because France considers it the “language of international diplomacy.”

Which triggers the question: How many of the candidates, both male and female, now running for the next UN Secretary-General are fluent in both English and French?

Over the last 81 years, the two working languages of the United Nations have been primarily English and French, although there are four other official languages recognized by the world body: Chinese, Arabic, Spanish and Russian.

Boutros-Ghali, who was fluent in English, Arabic and French, held “the world’s most impossible job” from January 1992 through December 1996. Asked at a briefing with reporters about his fluency in three languages, Boutros-Ghali jokingly said his primary language was Arabic “because when I fight with my wife, I fight in Arabic.”

The independence of the Secretary-General, he pointed out, is a longstanding myth perpetuated mostly outside the United Nations. As an international civil servant, he is expected to shed his political loyalties when he takes office, and more importantly, never seek or receive instructions from any governments.

But virtually every single Secretary-General—nine at last count—has played ball with the world’s major powers in violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter. Boutros-Ghali, the only Secretary-General to be denied a second term because of a negative US veto, unveiled the insidious political maneuvering that goes inside the glass house.

The US, which preaches the concept of majority rule to the outside world, exercised its veto even though Boutros-Ghali had 14 of the 15 votes in the Security Council, including the votes of the other four permanent members of the Council, namely the UK, France, Russia and China.

In such circumstances, tradition would demand the dissenting US abstain on the vote and respect the wishes of the overwhelming majority in the Security Council. But the US refused to acknowledge the vibrant political support that Boutros-Ghali had garnered in the world body.

Unlike most of his predecessors and successors, Boutros-Ghali refused to blindly play ball with the US despite the fact that he occasionally caved into US pressure at a time when Washington had gained notoriety for trying to manipulate the world body to protect its own national interests.

Going down memory lane, Samir Sanbar, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General, told Inter Press Service last week when Boutros-Ghali met Bernard Chidzero after leaving his post, his former competitor for the SG office asked how come the U.S. insisted on blocking his re-election although he was perceived to be “America’s Yes Man”. With his sense of humor intact, Boutros-Ghali responded that the U.S. Administration did not want just a “Yes, Man but a “Yes Sir, Man”

In his 368-page book titled “Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga” (Random House, 1999), he provided an insider’s view of how the United Nations and its chief administrative officer (CAO) were manipulated by the Organization’s most powerful member: the United States.

Although he was accused by Washington of being “too independent” of the US, he eventually did everything in his power to please the Americans. But still the US was the only country to say “no” to a second five-year term for Boutros-Ghali.

In his book, Boutros-Ghali recalls a meeting in which he tells the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher that many Americans had been appointed to UN jobs “at Washington’s request over the objections of other UN member states.”

“I had done so, I said, because I wanted American support to succeed in my job (as Secretary-General),” Boutros-Ghali says. But Christopher refused to respond.

When he was elected Secretary-General in January 1992, Boutros-Ghali noted that 50 percent of the staff assigned to the UN’s administration and management were Americans, although Washington paid only 25 percent of the UN’s regular budget.

When the Clinton administration took office in Washington in January 1993, Boutros-Ghali was signaled that two of the highest-ranking UN staffers appointed on the recommendation of the outgoing Bush administration– Under-Secretary-General Richard Thornburgh and Under-Secretary-General Joseph Verner Reed — were to be dismissed despite the fact that they were theoretically “international civil servants” answerable only to the world body.

They were both replaced by two other Americans who had the blessings of the Clinton Administration. Just before his election in November 1991, Boutros-Ghali remembers someone telling him that John Bolton, the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, was “at odds” with the earlier Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar because he had “been insufficiently attentive to American interests.”

“I assured Bolton of my own serious regard for US policy.” “Without American support” Boutros-Ghali told Bolton, “the United Nations would be paralyzed.”

The former UN chief recalls a meeting in which he tells the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher that many Americans had been appointed to UN jobs “at Washington’s request over the objections of other UN member states.” “I had done so, I said, because I wanted American support to succeed in my job (as Secretary-General),” Boutros-Ghali says. But Christopher refused to respond.

Boutros-Ghali also recounted how Secretary of State Warren Christopher had tried to convince him to publicly declare that he would not run for a second term as Secretary-General. But he refused. “Surely, you cannot dismiss the Secretary-General of the United Nations by a unilateral diktat of the United States. What about the rights of the other (14) Security Council members”?, he asked Christopher. But Christopher “mumbled something inaudible and hung up, deeply displeased.”

Boutros-Ghali also said that in late 1996, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, on instructions from the US State Department, was fixated on a single issue that had dominated her life for months: the “elimination” of Boutros-Ghali.

Under-Secretary-General Joseph Verner Reed, an American, is quoted as saying that he had heard Albright say: “I will make Boutros think I am his friend; then I will break his legs.” After meticulously observing her, Boutros-Ghali concludes that Albright had accomplished her diplomatic mission with skill.

“She had carried out her campaign with determination, letting pass no opportunity to demolish my authority and tarnish my image, all the while showing a serene face, wearing a friendly smile, and repeating expressions of friendship and admiration,” he writes. “I recalled what a Hindu scholar once said to me: there is no difference between diplomacy and deception.”

In his book, Boutros-Ghali says he was also urged by then-US President Bill Clinton to appoint William Foege, a former head of the US Centres for Disease Control, as UNICEF chief to succeed James Grant, also an American.

Since Belgium and Finland had already put forward “outstanding” women candidates — and since the US had refused to pay its UN dues and was also making “disparaging” remarks about the world body — “there was no longer automatic acceptance by other nations that the director of UNICEF must inevitably be an American man or woman,” said Boutros-Ghali.

“The US should select a woman candidate,” Boutros-Ghali told Albright, “and then I will see what I can do,” since the appointment involved consultation with the then 36-member UNICEF Executive Board.

Albright rolled her eyes and made a face, repeating what had become her standard expression of frustration with me,” he writes.

When the US kept pressing Foege’s candidacy, Boutros-Ghali says that “many countries on the UNICEF Board were angry and (told) me to tell the United States to go to hell.”

The US eventually submitted an alternate woman candidate: Carol Bellamy, a former director of the Peace Corps.

Although Elizabeth Rehn of Finland received 15 votes to Bellamy’s 12 in a straw poll, Boutros-Ghali said he asked the Board president to convince the members to achieve consensus on Bellamy so that the US could continue a monopoly it had held since UNICEF was created in 1947.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment—and Don’t Quote Me on That,” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.amazon.com/No-Comment-dont-quote-that/dp/064811838X

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Security Council. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 18 2026 (IPS)

As the campaign for a new UN secretary-general gathers momentum, will the US exercise the decisive vote — or the veto– in the final selection?

The US has publicly declared its opposition to some of the basic goals in the UN’s socio-economic agenda, including gender empowerment and policies relating to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI), while dismissing climate change as “a hoax” and a “giant scam.”

The Trump administration has also downplayed human rights and adherence to international laws—two concepts ingrained in the UN system.

When NASA announced last week that the astronauts who would fly on Artemis III, the next return-to-the-moon mission, the New York Times pointed out the crew consisted of four men and no women, triggering a question from the Times: “Was this part of the push by the Trump administration against DEI policies?”

If the US administration continues to take a hard line against DEI, what are the chances of the US administration supporting a female candidature for the next Secretary-General?

In an interview with the Times last January, President Trump said he does not “need international law” to guide his actions, arguing that only his own “morality” and “mind” will constrain his global powers.

So, what would be the fate of any candidate— male or female—who vociferously advocates these UN goals?

James E. Jennings, President, Conscience International, told Inter Press Service, the reason the United States has been disproportionately influential at the UN since the founding of the organization is because of its global leadership position and its long-term financial support for many of its programs.

However, he said, things have greatly changed in the last two years, with the US Administration abolishing the United States’ massive aid programs and trying to sideline or replace the UN with Republican-branded regressive policies.

“President Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms dovetailed with the ideals of the UN Charter, but Washington’s atavistic regime is determined to dominate the globe, not through equality but intimidation”.

“Such actions will be a disaster for both the UN and the US, whose soft power has been a major contributor to its strength through attraction of immigrants, investment, and generous aid programs. No more”.

It is difficult to reconcile Trump’s policies, Jennings argued, based on fear with those of the UN’s charter and goals of mutual respect among nations. Strong and unified pushback from the majority of UN member states with explicit support for independent, visionary global leadership will advance peace and protect vulnerable people everywhere.

“It is unimaginable that the US under the current MAGA Republican leadership would NOT try to select the next US Secretary-General outright, or if unable to do that would not try to block anyone considered unfit from Mr. Trump’s point of view. Personal leadership qualities and policy beliefs will matter less than whether the next head of the UN body kowtows to the US President”.

That fact alone makes it difficult to select a courageous and principled person. At a time of critical challenges for the world body, installation of UN leadership that would be intimidated by or under the thumb of Washington might well be the death knell for what is indubitably one of history’s grandest and most visionary efforts at peace and prosperity for all, he pointed out.

Meanwhile, come election time, will there be a battle of the vetoes – as it happened in a bygone era?

In 1981, Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania was backed by the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and China. But his bid was blocked by a US veto.

In 1996, a second five-year term for Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt was vetoed by the US—even though he received the support of 14 of 15 members in the Security Council.

In 1981, China cast a record 16 vetoes against Kurt Waldheim to prevent a third term, leading to his withdrawal and the selection of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Asked for his perspective, Mandeep Tiwana, Secretary-General, CIVICUS told IPS “The veto power wielded by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is the most anti-people feature of the UN system. Civil Society groups have for years been calling for its voluntary relinquishment but to little or no avail”.

It is time, he said, for a fundamental reconsideration of the veto power. No process can be considered fair or transparent if any one state, however populous, has the power to block it.”

Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and Program Director for Middle Eastern Studies, University of San Francisco, who has written extensively on the politics of the UN, told IPS under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has blocked the election of candidates for Secretary General, even when they had the support of the fourteen other members of the Security Council.

“Given how Trump has been even more prone to attack the United Nations and bully member states, including ostensible U.S. allies, it is likely that the United States will make it even more difficult this round for the UN to choose its next administrator,” he said.

So far, the list of candidates for the post of Secretary-General include: Michelle Bachelet Jeria (Chile): former President of Chile and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador): former President of the UN General Assembly. Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina): Current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis (Costa Rica): Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Macky Sall (Senegal): former President of Senegal and Maria Fernandez Espinosa Garces, former President of the UN General Assembly and former Foreign Minister of Ecuador.

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CIVICUS discusses a proposed United Nations (UN) tax treaty with Jenny Ricks, General Secretary of Fight Inequality Alliance, a global movement that organises to counter the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite.

Jenny Ricks

Why do we need a global tax treaty, and what would an ambitious one look like?

Every year, trillions of dollars are drained from public services through tax avoidance, tax havens and sweetheart deals negotiated by and for the wealthiest corporations and people on the planet. This is a system designed by a powerful few, and it’s working exactly as intended. Countries across the global majority are losing money they urgently need for climate adaptation, hospitals and schools while billionaires park fortunes in jurisdictions that ask no questions.

An ambitious treaty must set minimum effective tax rates on corporate profits and extreme wealth, make automatic information sharing a baseline rather than an aspiration, and put in place binding commitments rather than voluntary frameworks that elites can walk away from when the political heat rises. The goal has to be redistribution at scale. Anything less is rearranging deck chairs on a sinking ship.

How does the UN Convention compare to the OECD’s approach, and where might it fall short?

The OECD process was built by rich countries, for rich countries. The global majority had only observer status in negotiations that fundamentally shaped their economic futures. That’s the original sin of the existing framework and no amount of technical refinement changes the underlying power imbalance baked into it.

The UN Convention changes the venue and potentially changes the power balance. When every country has a voice and a vote, the interests of the majority of the world’s people have at least a fighting chance of being reflected in the outcome.

The shortcomings are real, though. Ambition gets negotiated down. Large economies drag their feet, threaten opt-outs or simply refuse to ratify. The convention’s potential is significant, but potential and outcome are very different things, and we have seen promising processes hollowed out before. Without a fundamental rethinking of the international system, including the UN itself, to put power firmly in the hands of the global majority, enforcement will remain elusive.

Who’s pushing the treaty forward, and who’s standing in the way?

States with the most to gain have shown the most political courage, while those that have profited most from the existing architecture are throwing sand in the gears. This pattern is not coincidental. Governments protecting the interests of their wealthiest people and most powerful corporations are the obstacle. The barriers are political, rooted in elite self-interest, and naming that clearly matters.

The negotiations are ongoing and fast-moving. For the latest developments, the Tax Justice Network database is the best place to look.

How is civil society influencing the treaty process?

The movement to tax the super-rich has to be built from the national to the global level. Movements shape what’s considered possible before politicians decide what’s acceptable. When we mobilise people in Kenya, Malaysia and Peru, in the streets and in people’s assemblies, we change the political cost calculation for decision-makers domestically and internationally. We demonstrate that there’s a constituency demanding this change, that it’s a matter of survival for millions of families, not an abstraction debated in Geneva conference rooms.

Fight Inequality Alliance and our allies have worked to surface frontline voices and lived experience in spaces that tend to run on position papers and spreadsheets. We have supported national alliances to bring their governments to the table with clear demands. We have made visible who benefits from the status quo, and that visibility increases accountability. Civil society doesn’t win these fights alone, but without sustained pressure from organised movements, the political space to win them simply doesn’t open.

What do civil society and states need to do to ensure equitable global taxation?

States that have pushed hardest for an ambitious convention must hold firm. Dilution always comes in the final stages, when powerful interests feel threatened. They should ratify promptly, implement genuinely and resist pressure from wealthier governments to hollow out enforcement mechanisms.

For civil society, the task is sustained pressure and political education. People need to understand the connection between tax justice and the hospital that closed, the school that’s crumbling, the debt that their governments cannot escape. That connection is real and it’s political, and once people see it, they don’t unsee it. That’s how movements grow and how the terms of debate shift. We need more of that, faster and bigger, and we need organisations with resources and reach to invest in building those connections alongside us, rather than commenting on the process from a distance.

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SEE ALSO
Global governance: power politics tests global rules CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
UN at 80: a struggle for renewal in a time of crises CIVICUS Lens 19.Sep.2025
Trillions at stake in quest for tax justice CIVICUS Lens 31.Mar.2025

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In the human body, connective tissue rarely gets the attention given to the heart, lungs or brain. But without it, even the strongest organs cannot function as a system. It binds, supports and connects a healthy body.

Fiscal systems work in a similar way.

Warren Krafchik

But they are not enough.

The fiscal crisis is already here, and so is the crisis of trust around it. As governments face harder choices over debt, climate costs, slower growth, inequality and public investment, the challenge is no longer simply to balance the books. It is to make fiscal choices more accountable, equitable and trusted by the public.

That cannot be achieved by strengthening finance ministries or other individual institutions one by one. It requires investing in the connective tissue between these institutions: the relationships among legislatures, auditors, courts, civil society, journalists, reformers inside government and citizens that support legitimacy and effective scrutiny.

Case in point: Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa have all strengthened public finance institutions in important ways, yet still face deep challenges around oversight, legitimacy and equity, according to the synthesis paper, Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems for Accountability and Equity. In each country, formal systems may look strong on paper, but fiscal decisions can still be shaped by political capture, weak scrutiny and unequal access to power.

The reason is that public finance is not simply a technical exercise. It is a political one. Budgets determine who gets health care, education, infrastructure, climate protection and social support. Tax systems determine who contributes and who is spared. Debt decisions can bind future generations. Fiscal choices are among the clearest expressions of a government’s priorities.

Paolo de Renzio

Accountability happens when those institutions are connected to one another and are able to collaborate. It happens when civic actors can engage them, when media can investigate, when courts can intervene where necessary, when legislatures can scrutinize executive decisions, and when public pressure can turn information into consequences.

Such a “fiscal ecosystem” includes ministries of finance, legislatures, supreme audit institutions, courts, civil society organizations, journalists, reformers inside government, social movements, citizens and the relationships among them. It also includes the informal realities that shape how power actually operates, such as party bargains, patronage networks, institutional rivalries, elite coalitions and unequal access to decision-makers.

This gap between formal rules and real power is where many fiscal reforms fall short. A country may have a budget law that clearly defines the role of parliament, but legislators may lack the independence or capacity to challenge executive choices. A supreme audit institution may produce strong reports, but those findings may go nowhere if the executive does not act on them. Civil society organizations may uncover misuse of public funds, but struggle to get a response from those with the power to impose sanctions.

Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa each followed different reform paths. But across all three cases, especially during crises, accountability often depended not on a single institution performing perfectly, but on formal and informal collaborations forming across the fiscal ecosystem. Auditors worked with communities. Media investigations collected evidence and amplified public pressure. Courts intervened when other institutions fell short. Reformers inside and outside the state found ways to connect scrutiny with action.

These efforts are often fragile. They are also essential.

The global public finance community should draw a clear conclusion. The next phase of fiscal reform must move beyond an institution-by-institution approach, and invest in the relationships, coalitions and channels that connect oversight actors and allow accountability to take root.

For international financial institutions, development agencies and technical assistance providers, this means recognizing that fiscal legitimacy cannot be built through executive capacity alone. Supporting ministries of finance remains important, but it should be matched by greater attention to the institutions, inside and outside government, and the connections between them that balance fiscal power.

For ministries of finance, it means supporting connected oversight systems by responding in a timely way to legislature and audit processes and recommendations and creating additional formal spaces for civil society organizations and communities to contribute to policy choices and implementation. Oversight bodies need pathways for their actions to matter.

For civil society and media, it means ensuring that transparency is not treated as the end goal but as a starting point. Public access to fiscal information is only powerful when citizens, journalists and civic actors have the resources, protections and channels needed to use it.

For philanthropy, the implication is especially urgent. Too much support for accountability work remains fragmented by institution, sector or issue area. Funders have a critical opportunity to invest in the connective tissue executive, oversight, and civic actors that makes fiscal accountability possible. That means supporting civic actors who can follow public money, connect budget decisions to lived experience, work with the ministries of finance and oversight institutions and help communities demand answers when public resources are at risk.

Fiscal reform must therefore be understood as a democratic project, not simply a managerial one. Strong finance ministries are necessary. But they cannot carry the burden of legitimacy alone. If governments want citizens to accept difficult trade-offs, they must build systems where people can see how decisions are made, contribute to those decisions, challenge abuses of power and trust that public resources are being used in the public interest.

The future of fiscal reform will not be won by strengthening one institution at a time. It will depend on building fiscal accountability ecosystems strong enough to keep public finance connected to the public good.

Warren Krafchik is a Public Finance Consultant at the Trust, Accountability and Inclusion Collaborative and Co-lead of the Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems project.

Paolo de Renzio is a Senior Lecturer at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration of Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, and Co-lead of the Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems project.

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An illustration by Serhiy Ofitserov, a Ukrainian civilian currently held in Russian captivity. Serhiy began drawing while in prison; here is a view of his prison cell. Courtesy: Hennadiy Ofitserov

By Mykhailo Savva and Oleh Martynenko
KYIV, Jun 16 2026 (IPS)

People often discuss Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine in terms of drones, missiles, shifting front lines, and territorial borders. But this war has another dimension — the human one.

More than 90,000 Ukrainians are considered missing under special circumstances. These are official data. Some of them are currently held captive by Russia — both prisoners of war and civilians. The latter ended up behind bars when Russian forces occupied the territories where they lived.

In March 2026, in an interview with Axios, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump sees no other way to end the war except by handing over the entire Donbas to Russia. But it is important to understand this – it is not just about land but also about the people who live there. And occupation is not peace.

Mykhailo Savva is a Doctor of Political Sciences and an expert at the Center for Civil Liberties.

Oleh Martynenko is a Doctor of Law, a Professor, a criminologist, a veteran of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and also an expert at the Center for Civil Liberties.

‘The Chain of Persecution’

The terrorisation of the civilian population is one of the tactics that Russia is using in its war against Ukraine. Imprisonment has become a punishment for failing to comply with the rules established by the occupying authorities.

At the heart of this system lies what might be called “the chain of persecution.” This pattern is repeated in all occupied regions.

Stage 1: Identification. Local officials, teachers, journalists, volunteers, and ordinary residents who express even the simplest pro-Ukrainian views come under the scrutiny of the occupying authorities. Sometimes, an overheard conversation or a social media post is enough.

Russia has been using this method since 2014: it tested it in occupied Crimea and later expanded it to all occupied territories. For example, in March 2026,  a resident of Alupka was arrested in  Crimea after Russian security forces accused him of “justifying terrorism” based on posts in a messaging app.

The words on this drawing are “Hold on. I’m holding on.” This phrase reflects the emotional state of both those held in captivity and those waiting for their loved ones to return from imprisonment. The illustrator, Serhiy Ofitserov, has been in detention since August 2022. In January 2026, he was sentenced to 17 years on fabricated charges; he turned 50 in May. Courtesy: Hennadiy Ofitserov

Stage 2. Enforced disappearance. Detainees are not officially registered. Their whereabouts are concealed or denied. Relatives are left in the dark. This is done deliberately so that everything that happens next remains beyond their control.

Stage 3. Cruel treatment. Torture is not an exception but a systematic practice. Survivors describe beatings, electric shocks, mock executions, and prolonged deprivation of food and water. Sexual violence is used against both men and women.

“They’d take a person out into the hallway, where there were no cameras, where everyone was, let’s say, on their side. No one would object. And there, they’d simply beat the person as much as they saw fit. They used stun guns. And this was with about 10 to 12 people there. If not more. They said, “You’ve had your little taste of life – well, that’s enough – you’ve already experienced what it’s like. You won’t have any more of that,’” recalls Viktoria Andrusha, a teacher whom the occupiers took from her parents’ home on September 25, 2022.

During the search, they found messages on her phone from chatbots about the movement of Russian military equipment. Viktoria was accused of “spying” and taken away: first, she was held in a makeshift detention centre in the boiler room of the neighbouring village of Novy Bykiv, and later in a pre-trial detention centre in the Kursk region of Russia. She was released in October 2023.

Stage 4: The Sham Trial. Detainees are often transported over long distances. Such transfers sever ties with their communities, complicate search efforts, and further deprive people of legal protection.

Next comes the “trial”, which merely mimics legality. Civilians are prosecuted on trumped-up charges — extremism, terrorism, or espionage.

For example, Yana Suvorova, the administrator of the Telegram channel “Melitopol Is Ukraine”, was sentenced to 14 years in a general-regime penal colony after nearly two years of unlawful detention. The verdict was handed down by the Southern District Military Court of Rostov-on-Don on October 23, 2025.

Southern District Military Court of Rostov-on-Don, October 23, 2025.

Stage 5: Imprisonment. People are placed in a network of detention facilities where supervision is minimal or nonexistent. Conditions are often inhumane. Contact with families is restricted or completely prohibited. For many, this stage becomes indefinite.

What the world will face if this is not stopped

Each of these stages violates human rights and international norms. But together, they form something more—a system in which crimes against humanity occur sequentially and reinforce one another.

Persecution, unlawful detention, deportation, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and imprisonment are not isolated incidents. They are parts of a single, integrated, and deliberate structure.

The goal of this system is to consolidate control over the occupied territories, create an atmosphere of fear, and force people to submit to imposed rules—legal, administrative, and educational. The message is clear: people are expected to be submissive. In effect, the occupation is turning into a form of criminal governance.

This poses a question to the international community: if such systems are allowed to operate without consequences, what precedent will this set for future conflicts?

Normalising the “chain of persecution” risks cementing these practices as tools of modern warfare. And then this model of control will extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Therefore, the issue of accountability concerns more than just Ukraine. The task is complex—but the law is clear.

All that remains is the will to act. If that will is lacking, this practice will become the norm rather than the exception. And the price for this will be paid not only by those currently behind bars, but also by the very integrity of international law.

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Du Hung Viet (left), President of the Eleventh Review Conference for the NPT 2026, chairs the closing session of the NPT Review Conference (27 April-22 May). Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 15 2026 (IPS)

On principle, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that unites the international community. But for a select few states, these principles came with conditions and a refusal to compromise on their security strategy.

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 22, 2026 without member states reaching consensus on a final outcome document. It was the culmination of four weeks of extensive debates starting on April 27, along with the special meetings, consultations and briefings that preceded the conference.

Compared to earlier editions shared before and during the conference, the final draft weakened much of the language surrounding the obligations of nuclear states, including those that related to disarmament efforts. Yet even with these concessions, for the third time in a row after 2015 and 2022, the NPT parties failed to adopt an outcome document.

At the closing session of the conference, Do Hung Viet, President of the NPT Conference and the UN Permanent Representative of Vietnam, remarked that the collective threat posed by nuclear weapons requires a collective response. He warned that in 2031, the NPT would pass 20 years without an outcome. It was the responsibility of state parties, he said, to uphold the NPT until Article VI, which calls for parties to pursue disarmament measures in good faith, could be implemented, and they needed to bolster the treaty as a tool to address modern threats.

Following the closing of the conference, Viet told reporters that the current state of the international environment requires “urgent action” in the face of recent tensions. Although the conference could not reach consensus, Viet attempted to find some positives in the proceedings, in that the engagement “highlights the value of the NPT and multilateralism as a whole”. Yet he expressed concern for the health of the treaty going forward as it related to state parties’ commitments.

Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, added that if parties to the NPT wanted to prevent a “further decrease of confidence” in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, then they “need to visibly make a commitment” through measurable steps.

She remarked that the international community at large needed to take lessons from the proceedings, starting with the acceleration of disarmament commitments under existing treaties. There were also increased calls for a “strengthening of the review process”, or enhancing accountability and transparency measures over the implementation of countries’ commitments to the NPT.

“Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear weapons states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just adhered to without nuclear weapons states’ commitment and implementation of disarmament commitments under Article 6,” said Nakamitsu.

Susi Snyder (left), ICAN Director of Programmes, and Seth Shelden (right), ICAN’s UN Liaison, at a press briefing held on the final day of the NPT 2026 Review Conference. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

Parties to the NPT, including nuclear-armed states, repeatedly acknowledged the NPT as a “cornerstone” for multilateral diplomacy and the nuclear disarmament regime. However, when it came to other nuclear treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), such acknowledgements were scarce. The final outcome draft makes a limited few references to these treaties but does not elaborate on the disarmament requirements outlined in them.

The final outcome document draft was noteworthy for its references to the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear testing for the first time in the context of the NPT Review Conference. Experts from the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) noted that this was possible thanks to the advocacy efforts of civil society and of the communities impacted by nuclear weapons use and testing.

In particular, the draft “recognise[s] the growing calls for assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing and for environmental remediation following nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing” and “welcome[s] efforts already undertaken in this regard”.

The draft also included a call for member states to “take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, including through education, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” by sharing the experiences of peoples and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing.

Recognition of the NPT stood in contradiction to the actions and statements made by nuclear-armed states. These states, which include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all maintain positions that contradict the principles of the NPT and broader efforts toward disarmament. These states have openly made plans to expand their nuclear arsenals and weave in the salience of nuclear weapons into their security strategy by justifying it through concepts of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ and nuclear sharing with other countries considering their own nuclear expansion. Two members of the Security Council are engaged in separate, active conflicts that have only exacerbated geopolitical tensions, while also dredging up anxieties around nuclear weapons as a security strategy. With seemingly no end in sight to these conflicts, those anxieties have only deepened, and has shaped global and regional security policies for years to come.

For a civil society group like ICAN, the lack of outcome for the NPT is emblematic of increasing risks of proliferation among nuclear-armed states and their allies.

“There is a reason why the countries that claim protection from nuclear weapons are afraid of discussion of what these weapons actually do to people and the environment. They simply don’t want people to know the true extent of the horror and cruelty nuclear weapons wreak, because acknowledging these harms will eliminate any credible legitimacy for retaining nuclear weapons,” said Susi Snyder, ICAN’s Director of Programmes.

What will it take, therefore, for these countries to reverse their positions? Snyder told Inter Press Service that “increasing the stigmatisation” of nuclear weapons would be one such tactic. Reinforcing the nuclear taboo by raising awareness among the populations of these countries is critical for them to recognise the complete destruction that a nuclear weapon would bring about, and the impact this would have on targeted communities and on themselves. Snyder noted the literal cost of proliferation, claiming that in 2024 nuclear-armed states spent over USD 3000 per second on their arsenals.

Finally, security doctrines built on the theory of nuclear deterrence need to be challenged. Seth Shelden, the UN liaison for ICAN, noted that if nuclear weapons can be seen as useless from a military perspective and unsustainable from a policy perspective, nuclear-armed states would reevaluate their positions. “Nuclear weapons are irrational. Nuclear deterrence is a fable. And all technology is abandoned once it is seen as no longer useful,” Shelden said.

Though the 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without consensus, member states still have other avenues to pursue the nuclear disarmament agenda, both within and outside the NPT process. There still remain specific nuclear weapon-free zone agreements among countries and treaties like the CTBT and the TPNW which also contain legally binding obligations for their signatories. Snyder confirmed that the TPNW will host its first review conference at the end of this year. Meanwhile, the NPT remains in its current form and state parties recognise its obligations and safeguards on the nuclear regime.

In 2024, the UN General Assembly pushed to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of a potential nuclear war, whose panellists will present their findings in 2027.

Galvanising the world public opinion on the nuclear regime is critical to restoring faith in the nuclear regime. Otherwise, Nakamitsu warned, the world is in “the trajectory of a very dangerous path.

“Let’s get back to a path that is more sustainable peace rather than creating arms race dynamics.”

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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CIVICUS discusses Botswana’s decriminalisation of same-sex relations with Faith Gunda, a Botswana-based law student and human rights defender, a member of the CIVICUS Protest Lab and co-founder of Sisterhood Chain International, a solidarity initiative that supports grassroots groups and amplifies young women’s voices.

Faith Gunda

What does repeal mean for LGBTQI+ people?

The formal repeal is symbolic, but symbols matter because they tell people whether they belong. For years, criminal provisions sent a message to LGBTQI+ people in Botswana: you are criminals. Even after the courts ruled these provisions unconstitutional in 2019, they remained on the books, a constant reminder that the state saw their identities as a threat. Their removal aligns written law with constitutional values of dignity, equality, liberty and privacy. But more importantly, it says that LGBTQI+ people are not criminals.

This changes everything for young people. When the law no longer criminalises your identity, it has positive impacts on mental health, belonging and civic participation. It lets LGBTQI+ people report violence, seek healthcare and live openly without fear. People can breathe a little easier. They can imagine futures they couldn’t before.

This progress didn’t come from above. It came from years of relentless advocacy by LGBTQI+ activists, LGBTQI+ organisations such as Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana and everyday people willing to risk everything to challenge entrenched stigma. The formal repeal is not the end of a struggle. It’s a foundation for the next phase. The work continues.

Why did it take so long to remove provisions courts declared unconstitutional?

Legal victories and political change don’t move at the same pace. The courts were clear in 2019 that the law was unconstitutional. But court rulings cannot implement themselves. Colonial-era laws remain embedded in statute books because removing them takes political will and politicians fear backlash. For six years, LGBTQI+ people lived with a law the courts had already called unjust.

What finally made change happen was sustained pressure. Civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers refused to let this go. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in 2021, and activists kept speaking up, organising and demanding implementation. In March, the law finally changed. So, this is the lesson: court rulings matter, but it’s sustained civic action that turns them into real protection.

What barriers remain, and what comes next?

Decriminalisation isn’t the same as equality, but it’s the foundation for it. Real equality means marriage rights, family recognition and anti-discrimination protections. The marriage equality case due to be heard in court in July will test whether constitutional protections reach beyond private intimacy into full citizenship and whether same-sex couples can access the dignity and legal recognition marriage provides.

But legal barriers are only a part of the story. Social barriers persist too, including stigma in families, healthcare systems, schools and workplaces. Legal reform creates protection, but it cannot instantly change rooted attitudes. Young people in Botswana increasingly believe everyone should be able to live authentically without fear. They are organising, speaking openly, refusing the silence previous generations endured. This generational shift is becoming the most powerful driver of change.

The journey is not linear, but the direction is undeniable. Meaningful reform takes continuous civic engagement. This means activists documenting and defending civic space, grassroots organisations amplifying youth leadership and people refusing to accept anything less than full humanity.

Is Botswana an example for Africa?

Botswana’s progress shouldn’t be romanticised. The country still faces social conservatism and discrimination, and its gains will be vulnerable unless they are continuously defended. But it offers a model to follow.

Botswana stands out on the continent because it succeeded through civic advocacy, constitutionalism and judicial independence. This matters all the more now, when several African governments are passing harsher anti-LGBTQI+ laws and dismissing these rights as ‘un-African’, even though the laws banning same-sex relations were colonial imports.

Botswana’s path challenges that narrative. It shows that African constitutional democracies can interpret dignity, equality and liberty inclusively, without abandoning local legal traditions. For human rights defenders across the region, Botswana is proof that civic engagement, sustained advocacy and strategic litigation can produce meaningful change even in difficult political climates.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Botswana: criminalisation of same-sex relations off the books CIVICUS Lens 21.May.2026
Gender rights: rollback and resistance CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Namibia: LGBTQI+ rights victory amid regression CIVICUS Lens 05.Jul.2024

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CIVICUS discusses the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla on its mission to bring humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza with Musa Roshdy, a humanitarian activist who took part in the flotilla.

Musa Roshdy

What’s the Global Sumud Flotilla and why is it important?

The Global Sumud Flotilla was the second civilian maritime mission launched by a coalition of Palestinian solidarity organisations advocating for aid delivery to Palestinians in Gaza and the end of Israel’s illegal siege of Gaza. While it was the Global Sumud Flotilla’s second mission, this was the 39th sea-based attempt to break Israel’s illegal blockade. The Spring 2026 flotilla was organised in direct response to a call for aid put out by civil society organisations on the ground in Palestine.

On 15 April, we sailed from Barcelona with several hundred activists from dozens of countries including Brazil and Spain, determined to deliver aid to Palestinians facing severe deprivation. Our mission highlighted a crucial reality: if everyday civilians from all over the world can mobilise and get this close to establishing a humanitarian corridor, then governments can certainly do it. What’s missing is not ability or infrastructure, but political will. The flotilla represents civilian solidarity with Palestinians and a direct challenge to the illegal blockade. We were prepared for interception after Israel arrested the previous flotilla last year, but not for the scale of violence that followed.

How were you kidnapped?

I was kidnapped by the Israeli navy in the interception that occurred on 29 April, when we were sailing in international waters over 600 miles from occupied Palestine, off the coast of Crete. They attacked us in the middle of the night. We had little warning before military motorboats approached us at high speed. They pointed rifles at us and announced on a megaphone that they were the Israeli navy, they were boarding our vessel and we needed to go inside immediately or they would shoot us.

That night, the Israeli military stopped 22 of the 54 boats in the flotilla en route to Gaza. There’s no legal precedent for military action so far from Israel’s sea borders. We were in the European Union’s search-and-rescue zone, under Greek jurisdiction. But instead of protecting us, Greek coastguard ships observed Israel’s raid and then received us after we were tortured for two days.

Israel’s legal claims were absurd. They accused us of illegal entry into Israel when we were sailing to Gaza and were kidnapped en route. Most of the 180 activists were released in Greece, but two of us were abducted and brought before Ashkelon Magistrate’s Court in Israel on charges with no legal basis.

This violated fundamental principles of international law. You cannot take military action in international waters so far from your territory. You cannot abduct foreign nationals without due process. You cannot torture detainees. Yet all this happened.

Israel acts with impunity because the international community has failed to hold it accountable.

What did you endure in detention?

It was clear from the start they were trying to denigrate us for standing with Palestinians. I was forced onto my hands and knees and held in uncomfortable positions for hours. Soldiers stole my shoes, then stomped on my feet with their combat boots. I was left in just leggings and a tank top. We were held in makeshift prisons built from shipping containers. The soldiers deliberately manipulated the temperature, wetting the floor to freeze us at night, then forcing us outside under intense heat during the day. I experienced hypothermia both nights, as confirmed by a doctor who was imprisoned with me. When comrades tried to give me sweaters, soldiers took them away. At one point, a soldier pointed a rifle at my comrade and threatened to kill him for offering me a jacket in the cold.

Soldiers banged on containers and shone huge lights while we slept to keep us awake. They threw flashbangs and used force to drag people into solitary confinement. On the last day, they shot activists at point-blank range with rubber bullets. They took photographs and videos that showed us collecting our medications when they kidnapped us, but then denied us access to our medications once we were on the prison boat. Sixty-one people went on hunger strike. The food they provided, mostly bread, was insufficient to feed the rest of us, even with a third of us not eating. This cruelty is consistent with what Palestinians experience in Israeli detention, though what we experienced pales in comparison with the cruelty they face.

The Israeli military intended to deter the humanitarians sailing to deliver aid to the people of Gaza, but they were unsuccessful. People around the world recognise that Palestinians in Gaza still have an overwhelming need for aid, legal protection and solidarity. Many activists who were detained with me on 29 April set sail again a few weeks later on 14 May and were intercepted off Cyprus just days later on 18 and 19 May.

What must change internationally?

What governments must do is clear but consistently absent. They must condemn the kidnapping of their citizens. They must impose targeted sanctions against Israeli officials, not humanitarian activists. They must denormalise diplomatic relations with Israel. For instance, Croatia’s leader just refused to approve Israel’s new ambassador to Croatia due to Israel’s current policies.

The most fundamental step is an arms embargo. If we stop supplying weapons to Israel, it cannot do what it is doing. Last year, civil society in Belgium won a court case preventing the transit of military equipment to Israel. France recognises Palestine but still supplies weapons. Governments know these mechanisms exist but lack the political will to prioritise Palestinian lives over strategic interests.

Western states are also complicit in other ways. Some of our torturers had US accents. Another had a German accent. Western governments allow their citizens to join the Israeli military, which commits war crimes and kidnaps and tortures their nationals, then lets them return home without consequence.

Instead of holding Israel accountable, many western states are restricting the space for pro-Palestinian activism. In the UK, Palestine Action faced an absurd terrorism designation for blocking weapons manufacturing. In Germany, authorities banned the watermelon symbol as antisemitic.

On 19 May, as the Israeli military was kidnapping humanitarians in international waters, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned four leaders of the Global Sumud Flotilla, calling humanitarian aid delivery ‘pro-terror’, and blocking all access to financial institutions in the USA. The mechanism used by the USA to sanction humanitarian activists was recently deemed illegal by a federal judge when applied to Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It criminalises support for Palestine and conflates it with support for terrorism.

What lies ahead for activism for Palestinian rights?

Our detention and torture were intended as a deterrent, but they failed. In practice, they had the opposite effect. Frontline work exacts a real human cost and people need time to recharge. But activism will continue because Palestinians in Gaza are still facing genocide.

What this moment teaches is that rights exist because we enact them. When everyday people learn from Palestinian courage how to stand up, call atrocities atrocities, and demand basic decency and access to life itself, movements spread across borders. People will continue to pursue humanitarian work, join future flotillas and resist authoritarian restrictions on civic space. Tactics will adapt, new symbols will emerge – as when the watermelon was adopted because Palestinians couldn’t display their flag – but the work won’t stop.

Credit: D.V. Bakke

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Global Sumud Flotilla/Instagram
Humans of the Global Sumud Flotilla/Instagram
Musa Roshdy/Instagram

SEE ALSO
USA: sanctions weaponised against human rights CIVICUS Lens 01.Jun.2026
Gaza: ceasefire an illusion CIVICUS Lens 16.Mar.2026
Palestine: ‘The EU cannot position itself as a defender of human rights while being one of Israel’s primary arms markets’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with 7amleh 26.Mar.2026

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Picture alliance/Anadolu/Selcuk Acar. Annalena Baerbock, President of the UN General Assembly and former German Foreign Minister.
 
Germany’s humiliating defeat in the race for a UN Security Council seat reveals the price of a foreign policy increasingly seen as hypocritical abroad.
 
The United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday elected Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe to the 15-member U.N. Security Council for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2027.
 
Germany, which had lobbied hard for a seat, came third for the two places contested by the Western European and Others Group, with 104 votes, against 134 for Portugal and 131 for Austria.-- Reuters

By Marcus Schneider
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jun 8 2026 (IPS)

This is the downfall of a diplomatic superstar. Germany’s defeat in the election to the UN Security Council is the consequence of a foreign policy that has proven disastrous in recent times, failing to uphold either the values or the interests of the Federal Republic.

The fact that the second-largest contributor to the UN has been punished so severely by Portugal and Austria highlights a global loss of trust that had not yet been fully realised in political Berlin.

‘We are seen as someone who defends the rules-based order; as an advocate of international law’, Foreign Minister Johann Wampold lectured just hours before the election. And in doing so, he revealed the gulf between Germany’s self-perception and the way it is perceived internationally. It is quite clear that on this very issue – the extent to which the Federal Republic actually stands up for binding rules and international law – there has been massive damage to its reputation, which is now, for the first time, resulting in political consequences.

International law à la carte

Germany’s global alienation can be traced very precisely to the Israeli war in Gaza, which stirred up international passions like hardly any other conflict. The problem here is not merely the stance perceived as highly one-sided in large parts of the world.

It is the palpable discrepancy with Germany’s conduct in Ukraine and with the general self-image of a country that likes to parade through the world with a particularly raised moral finger.

If in one instance – quite rightly – one loudly condemns war crimes and calls on the whole world even more loudly to do the same, yet in the other case remains silent, grants the perpetrators diplomatic and political cover, and even supplies them with weapons (even though the crimes are far more serious by all objective standards), it is hardly surprising to be accused of double standards and hypocrisy.

The damage to Germany’s reputation is all the more severe because the country was regarded for decades as a safe bet in foreign policy. Like hardly any other state, the Federal Republic stood for strengthening multilateral institutions.

First, the former capital of West Germany, Bonn, then Berlin, supported the development of an international judiciary. Precisely as a lesson from its own history and in its own well-understood interest as a country at the heart of a continent once ravaged by war, Germany committed itself with vigour and generosity to peace and the balancing of interests.

It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

For a long time, incidentally, it was possible to adopt a stance on the Middle East conflict that did justice both to Germany’s historical responsibility towards Israel and to the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians and Arabs. It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

Foreign countries in particular, which do indeed take note of the largely self-referential German discourse, may well ask: does this raison d’état actually have any moral limits? Or does it also cover up war crimes, ethnic cleansing and what even highly reputable experts and institutions describe – to put it mildly – as genocidal conditions?

For the raison d’état is, after all, not a product of realpolitik interests, but is proclaimed as a kind of higher morality, and thus as a lesson from German history that other countries should, please, understand. Many there see rather a German failure to draw universal lessons from its own history, possibly even a kind of unwelcome historical continuity.

The self-portrayal as a ‘champion of international law’ – which was, after all, the main argument put forward for the now-failed German campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council – also seems rather odd in light of a series of statements made by the Chancellor. For instance, Friedrich Merz thanked Israel for doing the ‘dirty work’ with regard to the war of aggression against Iran — which, according to the overwhelming majority of legal opinion, is illegal under international law.

He described the legal assessment of the kidnapping of the Venezuelan head of state as ‘complex’, whilst explicitly refraining from offering lectures on international law regarding the recent Israeli-American war of aggression against Iran. As opposition leader, he had expressed outrage over the arrest warrant for the alleged Israeli war criminal Netanyahu, who is accused of serious crimes against humanity. After all, he claimed, the International Criminal Court had supposedly been established solely to ‘hold despots and authoritarian leaders to account’.

One gets the impression of a Chancellor who – speaking for a significant portion of the country’s political and media elites – seeks to replace the rule of law with a kind of higher moral order. Under this system, the supposedly ‘good’ – that is, ourselves and our democratic allies – are effectively permitted to do anything. They are no longer bound by any rules.

It is international law, if it exists at all, à la carte. Above all, it marks a departure from Germany’s decades-long belief in the civilising of international relations through their codification. From the perspective of many states that have withheld their vote from Berlin, the Federal Republic is now too unreliable a partner for the highest body of the global legal order.

Time for a reassessment

The election defeat is not merely a humiliation; it is accompanied by a real loss of influence and prestige for what is, after all, the largest and economically strongest country in the European Union. In future international crises, Berlin will now find itself at the back of the room. For Germany, this should be a moment of self-reflection at best.

What values and interests should guide our policy? In a phase of extreme geopolitical upheaval, the rise of the Global South and the US distancing itself from the world order it once imposed, Germany is dependent not on less, but on more and on resilient international cooperation.

Clearly, the international legal order is not perfect. The institutions of collective security are frequently paralysed, and, as in the past, there will be dilemmas where interests and values make it necessary to strike a balance between politics and law.

However, a complete descent into a dog-eat-dog world – where military might is the only thing that counts, where wars of aggression are launched at will, where warfare is becoming increasingly brutal, and where the international community is sinking into global cultural conflicts – cannot be in Germany’s interests.

Such a world would, sooner or later, also threaten the enduring peace within the EU. As a country with few natural resources, highly integrated economically and dependent on global trade flows, the Federal Republic is reliant on a reasonably functioning world order in which fundamental principles apply even across the boundaries of political regimes.

It is disconcerting to see how much the German government, particularly its conservative wing, celebrates its friendship with an Israeli government in which war criminals and right-wing extremists call the shots.

The restoration of Germany’s lost soft power will also necessitate a reassessment of German Middle East policy. Hardly anyone expects a triumphant switch to the camp of Palestine’s supporters. But a more measured and balanced approach would certainly be appropriate. It is disconcerting to see how much the German government, particularly its conservative wing, celebrates its friendship with an Israeli government in which war criminals and right-wing extremists call the shots.

The fact that, in the global perception, one aligns oneself so closely with a group that is knowingly threatening to turn its own country into an international pariah state defies any rational explanation. The costs of this stance are very real, and they are damaging to Germany.

The embarrassing defeat at the UN may not be a one-off blunder in this matter. In a few years’ time, the International Court of Justice will rule on the case of genocide in Gaza. Further trouble looms here. For those who, for ethical reasons, cannot bring themselves to resolve the completely untenable conditions in the occupied territories through a solution acceptable to the international community, Germany’s well-understood self-interest should tip the balance by then at the latest.

For unlike so many conflicts where Berlin’s contribution is limited to expressing deep concern, the Federal Republic would actually have influence here. So far, this influence has been used very successfully to block any European pressure on a government that wants a great deal, but certainly not a sustainable peace. As soon as that changes, two things would be on the rise again: peace — and Germany’s tarnished reputation.

Marcus Schneider heads the FES regional project for peace and security in the Middle East, based in Beirut, Lebanon. Previously, he worked for the FES as head of the offices in Botswana and Madagascar, among others.

Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels

IPS UN Bureau

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Voting by secret ballot. Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 29 2026 (IPS)

The year 2026 seems to be an eventful year at the United Nations –a new President of the General Assembly (PGA), who will officially preside over the 81st session in mid-September, plus the election and appointment of a new Secretary-General (SG) who will takeover in January 2027 after the conclusion of a 10-year tenure by the outgoing SG Antonio Guterres.

When UN member states competed in elections– or sought votes for membership in the Security Council or in various UN bodies– the voting in the 1960s and 70s was largely tainted by cheque-book diplomacy — while promises of increased aid to the world’s poorer nations came mostly with heavy strings attached.

In the 1950s and 60s, voting was by a show of hands, particularly in committee rooms. But in later years, a more sophisticated electronic board, high up in the General Assembly Hall, tallied the votes or in the case of elections to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice, the voting was by secret ballot.

In one of the hard-fought elections many moons ago, there were rumors that an oil-soaked Middle Eastern country was doling out high-end, Swiss-made wrist watches and also stocks in the former Arabian-American Oil Company, then one of the world’s largest oil companies, to UN diplomats as a trade-off for their votes.

So, when hands, both from right-handed and left-handed delegates, went up at voting time in the Committee room, the largest number of hands raised in favor of the oil-blessed candidate sported Swiss watches.

As anecdotes go, it symbolized the corruption that once prevailed in voting in inter-governmental organizations, including the United Nations — perhaps much like most national elections the world over.

Just ahead of a crucial election, one Western European country offered free Mediterranean luxury cruises in return for votes while another country dished out — openly in the General Assembly hall— boxes of gift-wrapped expensive Swiss chocolates.

Fathulla Jameel, a former UN Ambassador and later Foreign Minister of the Maldives told Inter Press Service of how his resource-poor island nation, categorized by the UN as a Small Island Developing State (SID), would appeal to richer nations to help fund some of country’s infrastructure projects.

At least one rich Asian country, a traditional donor, was the first to respond – and magnanimously too, he said. The project would be fully funded —free, gratis and for nothing. But there was a catch: “If there is a vote at the UN, and it is not of any national interest to your country”, said the donor country’s foreign ministry, “we would like to get your vote.”

Perhaps for life – the life of the island nation itself which was threatened with sea-level rise and in danger of being wiped off the face of the earth. The offer was a clever political payback. Development aid with no visible strings attached.

There was at least one instance when the president of the General Assembly, the highest policy making body at the United Nations, was elected, on the luck of a draw -– following a dead heat.

With the Asian group failing to field a single candidate, the politically-memorable battle took place ahead of the 36th session of the General Assembly back in 1981 when three Asian candidates contested the presidency: Ismat Kittani of Iraq, Tommy Koh of Singapore and Kwaja Mohammed Kaiser of Bangladesh (described as the “battle of three Ks”—Kittani, Koh and Kaiser).

On the first ballot, Kittani got 64 votes; Kaiser, 46; and Koh, 40. Still, Kittani was short of a required majority — of the total number of members voting. On a second ballot, Kittani and Kaiser tied with 73 votes each (with 146 members present, and voting).

In order to break the tie, the outgoing General Assembly President drew lots, as specified in Article 21 relating to the procedures in the election of the president (and as recorded in the Repertory of Practice of the General Assembly).

And the luck of the draw, based purely on chance, favored Kittani, in that unprecedented General Assembly election. But according to a joke circulating at that time, it was rumored that the winner was decided by the flip of a coin — but the tossed coin apparently had two heads and no tail.

In more recent years, however, the regional groups, including the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean and the Western and Other Groups (WEOG) have called for a virtual ceasefire as they took turns according to geographical rotation. The Groups would name their candidates who get elected without any opposition.

But the seriousness of the UN’s far-reaching mandate has been tempered by occasional moments of levity which have rocked the Glass House by the East River— with laughter. The UN is a rich source of anecdotes—both real and apocryphal– in which the General Assembly (UNGA), takes center stage, along with the Security Council (UNSC) as a political sidekick.

When UN ambassadors and delegates congregate in the cavernous General Assembly hall at voting time, they have one of three options: either vote for, against, or abstain.

The most intriguing, however, is a fourth option: to be suddenly struck with an urge to rush to the toilet. The frantic attempt to leave your seat vacant — and consequently be counted as “absent”– takes place whenever the issue is politically-sensitive.

When delegates are unable to vote with their conscience– don’t want to incur the wrath of mostly Western aid donors or are taken unawares with no specific instructions from their capitals– they flee their seats and head for the toilet

At a lunch for reporters in his town house bordering Park Avenue in Manhattan, (“this was once owned by Gucci, now it is Fulci”), Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, an Italian envoy with a sharp sense of humor, described the fourth option as the “toilet factor” in UN voting.

And he jokingly suggested that the only way to resolve the problem is to install portable toilets in the back of the General Assembly hall so that delegates can still cast their votes while contemplating on their toilet seats. But for obvious reasons, there were no takers.

In most instances, the various regional groups and coalitions—including the Group of 77, the Latin American and Caribbean States, the African Union (AU) and the Western European and Others (WEOG)— take decisions behind closed doors ahead of voting and voted by consensus,

In the 1970s and 80s, the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961, was one of the largest and most powerful political coalitions at the UN led by countries such as Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Zambia, Cuba and Sri Lanka.

As a general rule, all 116 countries vote in unison on General Assembly resolutions rarely breaking ranks. A Sri Lankan ambassador once recounted a message transmitted from his Foreign Ministry in Colombo – primarily directed at newly-arrived delegates which read— “If you are faced with an unscheduled surprise vote, and do not have any instructions from the Foreign Ministry, look to the right to see how Yugoslavia is voting and look to the left to see how India is voting. If both ambassadors are seen bolting from their seats, just follow them to the toilet”.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment – and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/

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The headquarters of the United Nations with Trump World Tower looming in the foreground, in Manhattan, NY, on April 28, 2026. (SEBASTIAN CHRISTOPH GOLLNOW/PICTURE ALLIANCE VIA GETTY IMAGES) Source: Wahington Reports

By Ian Williams
NEW YORK, May 25 2026 (IPS)

AS THE WORLD HURTLES TO HELL (albeit in a SpaceX rather than a hand basket), it might seem of only academic interest which cipher vegetates on the 38th floor of the U.N. Headquarters. However, the choice is due by the end of the year, unless, as has happened in the past, the Security Council is veto-bound and asks António Guterres to stay on as interim Secretary General.

Guterres certainly has experience for a seat-warming position, since he has performed like an interim Secretary General ever since he was first appointed. At times when his voice could and should have made a difference, he has followed the guidance of the three wise monkeys (see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil). The Secretary General’s ability to put items on the council agenda and raise them publicly are his few effective powers in the face of the permanent members’ traditional lackadaisical stance.

His studied withdrawal from influence has infected other levels of the Secretariat and allowed the Security Council to reach new lows of subservience to power. So, if and when the council picks his successor, it’s unlikely that crowds will gather on U.N. Plaza to watch the white smoke rising to announce the anointment.

That is not only because Trump World Tower looms over the plaza like an escaped prop from “2001: A Space Odyssey,” but also because its eponymous owner has done so much to devalue the U.N. One could almost suspect that it is only allowed to hang on in New York because property values would plummet in the neighborhood if all the insouciant and complaisant diplomats who work in the U.N. complex had to leave.

The U.N.’s geopolitical absence certainly diminishes potential public interest in the race and is compounded by the increasing ineffectuality of the Security Council in the face of the erasure of the U.N. Charter. The guiding principle of the Secretariat often seems to be plucked from Arthur Hugh Clough’s old poem, “Thou shalt not kill/ But needs’t not strive, officiously to keep alive.”

However, the general membership is almost as complicit. Faced with the latest U.S. demand to reshape the organization before Washington even considers paying a part of its legally obligated payments, their response is to dicker about the depth of evisceration, not to challenge the assumptions. Of course, the U.N. needs reform—but not necessarily in the way the U.S. has been demanding for half a century.

Western signatories of the Rome Convention for the International Criminal Court have left their nationals, like Francesca Albanese and Karim Khan, to swing in the wind in the face of an entirely illegal U.S.–Israeli war on International Criminal Court staff. Even their home states’ declaration that they will provide government backed credit to the victims of U.S. sanctions would send a signal and some succor to the judges. A robust denunciation by the outgoing Secretary General (a lame duck and hence beyond significant U.S. payback) would have helped, but it was not forthcoming.

As the only figure who could coordinate (and heaven help us, lead) the defense, the forlorn position of the Secretary General is still essential despite the lackluster field. So, the choice is important—as well as boring.

So far, there is a growing consensus that the next leader needs to be a woman, which China has been very firm on, and should be from the Latin American and Caribbean region. So far, it’s a very uninspiring and, dare one say, “mature” field. Maybe there should be as much pressure for “youth’s” turn as there is for a woman, not least since both declared female candidates are of a certain age. The “most difficult job in the world” is not one for the elderly.

The April candidate forums at the U.N. featured four announced aspirants, but as the Book of Proverbs says, “Where there is no vision, the people perish: but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.” None of the candidates offered a vision: their presentations were more like an AI-generated resume for corporate human resources.

Even the candidates who showed some signs of integrity, like the “keeping the law” bit, seem to be missing the vision thing and, frankly, professed over-adherence to the law is a stretch for candidates who want to avoid a veto from the P5. Which is, of course, why there was conspicuous silence on the hustings about Israel and Iran. It also so far guaranteed candidates who will not rock the boat for Washington.

So in a field of lame horses, the three-legged one might limp home, and that could be former President of Senegal Macky Sall, who is not a woman, not Latin American and does not have the support of his own country or the African Union. His best qualification is the traditional U.N. promotion criterion: not being remembered for anything in particular. He could fall in the East River and not cause a ripple. But he is unlikely to be willing to undergo the gender transition necessary. China says it wants a woman and has historically been prepared to stand its ground with repeated vetoes.

Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet has the required diplomatic and political credentials, and she has clearly been playing the long game. As U.N. Human Rights Commissioner she sat upon a report about the People’s Republic of China’s abuse of the Uighurs, which might fend off a Chinese veto but raises questions about her integrity and independence.

It does suggest that she had acute political antennae since at that time pandering to China could have cost her support with the U.S. and Europeans—but now, perhaps not so much. Under the MAGA Trump Republicans, human rights are a now and then thing. More important perhaps to Washington, Chile’s new right-wing government pulled its endorsement of her which could burnish her credentials with what’s left of the progressive world. And her gender and Latin American origins tick other boxes.

In contrast, right-wing Argentinian President Javier Milei backs Rafael Grossi’s candidacy, which detracts from Grossi’s globalist credentials to head the U.N. However, as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), his equivocation about Iranian nuclear activities might well be negotiable into active U.S. support. He has been a deft tightrope walker, trying not to give Iran a clean bill of health, but avoiding complicity in an over-explicit casus belli to Washington, which would upset Moscow and Beijing (and may yet). But he has defied best practice for candidates by staying active in his U.N. role, which suggests he knows his IAEA position gives him cards to play.

Costa Rica’s Rebeca Grynspan is an uninspiring apparatchik who has presided over the effectual dismantlement of U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, the development agency that had been in the sights of Washington for decades. While one cannot hold family connections against her, many countries might also worry about the optics of a secretary general whose sister is an Israeli settler in the West Bank. However, she is backed by her government, unlike some other candidates, and is a Latina, so ticks two of the boxes, and is likely to get support from the U.S. (and Israel, which does not have a direct seat on the Security Council, but nevertheless is reputedly a presence).

Looking at the heavily handicapped slate so far, it’s good that there are nominations waiting in the wings. Barbadian PM Mia Amor Mottley would be an ideal candidate, ticking both the vision and law boxes. A woman from the Latin American and Caribbean region whose otherwise disqualifying integrity might pass the Trump test by speaking English and being previously accoladed by no less than the American Enterprise Institute! However, she has just won re-election in Barbados and would probably prefer to stay where she is now.

Another person who announced her candidacy is Ecuador’s María Fernanda Espinosa, former General Assembly President, who is also missing support from her own government, but she has shown both vision and integrity and has other backers. And she is not of pensionable age.

In the end, sadly, the odds are against anyone who meets the needs of the world and organization. Their very qualifications would be unlikely to survive the whims and prejudices of this U.S. administration, let alone survive scrutiny by Moscow or Beijing. Even if Russia and China pay lip service to the international order and sacrifice their immediate prejudices for the greater good, Washington is unlikely to be so forbearing.

Overall, the question is whether the U.N. is redeemable while some countries have veto power. At one time the U.S. realized the advantages of maintaining the U.N. as a thin blue fig leaf for its actual hegemony, but it no longer sees the need to cover its rampant MAGA-hood.

U.N. correspondent Ian Williams is president of the Foreign Press Association of the U.S. He is the author of U.N.told: The Real Story of the United Nations in Peace and War (available from Middle East Books and More).

Source: Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs
https://www.wrmea.org/north-america/the-search-is-on-for-the-next-u.n.-secretary-general-in-a-turbulent-world.html

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Budget shortfalls could force the organization to move closer to the communities that it's meant to serve.

By JB Bae
FORT COLLINS, Colorado USA, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The $1.2 billion renovation of the Palais des Nations was intended to reaffirm Geneva’s centrality to the multilateral system. Instead, the city’s international quarter is emptying.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has cut hundreds of positions. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is relocating core administrative roles to Rome and Budapest. Other agencies are scaling back or relocating operations. The United States, which funds roughly a quarter of the U.N.’s regular budget, now owes approximately $2.2 billion, about 95% of all unpaid contributions to the organization.

Many will read this as a harbinger of the decline, or perhaps even the demise, of the U.N. system. Yet the crisis in Geneva may be creating the conditions for a more resilient multilateralism.

Critics claim that American taxpayers subsidized a U.N. bureaucracy hostile to their interests, one lacking accountability and captured by priorities divorced from its founding purposes. There is some truth to this. However, these arguments have marginalized those who wish to refound the U.N. system, rather than dismantling multilateralism wholesale.

The erosion of U.S. funding may be doing what decades of reform efforts could not: forcing a realignment of the U.N.’s structure with its mission. Numerous proposals, secretary-general initiatives, and expert panels have failed to produce meaningful change.

The U.N.’s own 2021 Integration Review, drawing on input from over 200 staff members across the organization, found that institutional insulation undermined impact, calling for more decentralized decision-making and reforms responsive to field realities. Member states had pressed for the same for decades.

Meanwhile, Geneva came to embody the distance between those running the institution and the constituencies they were meant to serve. The compensation structure tells part of the story. Bureaucrats enjoyed tax-free salaries, exceptionally generous pension arrangements, housing allowances pegged to one of the world’s most expensive cities, business-class travel, and education grants that cover most of the cost of elite international-school tuition in Geneva, where annual fees often reach $45,000 per child per year.

One study of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operations found spending of roughly $600 per refugee annually (around $800-850 in today’s dollars). U.N. reimbursements for a single child’s school fees in Geneva, in other words, could support dozens of refugees for a year. These arrangements are not reserved for senior leadership. They define the terms of employment for the typical international civil servant.

These terms apply to a substantial workforce. Switzerland hosts roughly forty international organizations that employ more than 25,000 people, most concentrated in the Lake Geneva region. The World Health Organization, the largest, employs roughly 2,400 people at its Geneva headquarters and operated on a biennial budget of $5.3 billion for 2026-27 before recent cuts. The International Labour Organization (ILO), UNHCR, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and others maintain significant presences in Geneva.

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When the U.N. Secretary-General’s office issued a memo in April 2025 directing Geneva and New York to identify posts for relocation to lower-cost duty stations, the Geneva staff union’s response was telling: its official statement declared the union “alarmed,” hundreds of staff demonstrated on International Workers’ Day to protect their Geneva postings, and unions defended housing subsidies, education grants, and tax exemptions as essential. These numbers and reactions reflect the insulation of much of Geneva from the realities the institution nominally exists to address.

Yet the crisis is strengthening the position of those within the system who have long called for change. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF)’s consolidation of regional functions to Bangkok, the expansion of U.N. agency operations in Nairobi, and shifting administrative functions to lower-cost duty stations all reflect a shift toward where the work actually is. Technology and the remote collaboration it enables make justifying the Geneva-centric model even more difficult. What once required flights to Geneva can now happen across multiple continents simultaneously.

Simply relocating institutions to less costly settings, however, risks reproducing Geneva’s pathologies — insulated professional communities, compensation structures detached from local conditions, and organizational cultures oriented more toward one another than toward the populations they serve. More than simply moving offices, structural reform requires confronting how these institutions are staffed, incentivized, and embedded in the political contexts in which they operate.

A more promising direction is aligning institutions with the political support and capacity of host nations. This goes beyond decentralization and proximity to need, toward placing authority where capacity and political will already exist. Former aid recipients that have become donors and regional powers in their own right — Poland, Chile, and South Korea among them — are natural candidates for anchoring this kind of multilateralism. Having navigated conflict, development, refugee flows, and political transition themselves, they bring the political legitimacy and operational credibility that Geneva-centered bureaucracies cannot replicate.

The substance of the changes also matters for the legitimacy of the international order. A multilateral system whose centers of decision-making remain in Geneva, New York, and a handful of donor capitals is vulnerable to the accusation that it represents a historical moment that has long passed. Institutions whose operational weight sits closer to the communities they serve, staffed by professionals embedded in supportive settings, are harder to displace. What survives will be better able to compete for relevance in a more contested world order.

Geneva will survive this crisis as a conference center for highest-stakes diplomacy and backroom dialogues that only physical proximity can enable. But what emerges beyond Geneva, in the field offices of agencies closer to the populations they serve and potentially in the hands of actors with the legitimacy and experience to carry multilateralism forward, may prove closer to what the system was always intended to be.

Many of the structural problems that have long plagued the U.N. will remain. The shifts now under way will not solve them. But they change where influence accumulates, and who shapes the decisions that matter. This new multilateralism may prove more resilient, more legitimate, and harder to hold captive to the politics of any single donor.

JB Bae is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University. His research addresses issues in international security and foreign policy, with a focus on East Asia. He received his PhD from UCLA.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

Source: Responsible Statecraft

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Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN, speaks at the General Assembly. Credit : UN WEB TV

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, May 21 2026 (IPS)

Member states this week (May 20) deliberated over a draft resolution on states’ obligations in respect of climate change following the advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The General Assembly agreed to take measures to uphold the ICJ’s advisory opinion for member states to meet their existing obligations to climate justice under international law and multilateral frameworks.

The draft resolution (A/80/L.65) passed with 141 votes in favor, 8 votes against, and 28 abstentions. It was brought forward by the Republic of Vanuatu, along with the Core Group of States leading the UN General Assembly resolution responding to the ICJ advisory opinion. The resolution was introduced after a long period of consultations between member states. It outlines member states’ obligations to ensure the protection of the climate system by calling for multilateral cooperation to address what the ICJ has called an “existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet.”

“This day will be remembered. It will be remembered as the moment the United Nations received the considered judgment of its highest court of its defining challenge of our time and decided what to do with it. Vanuatu and the Core Group believe this Assembly should meet that moment with unity, with seriousness, and with respect for the law and one another,” said Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN.

Voting Record of Resolution A-80-L.65. Credit: UN TV

When introducing the draft resolution to the Assembly, Tevi remarked that the ICJ opinion “confirms that the protection of the climate system is a matter of legal obligation, not political discretion.” It would not replace or challenge existing agreements such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement, but rather reinforce them as the primary legislations and forums for the world’s response to climate change.

Amendments to the resolution were brought forward by a small group of member states, which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. Those that argued for the amendments posited that the current resolution required further legal clarity, particularly as it related to the measures required to support developing countries in mitigation and adaptation. At the same time, there were concerns that the amendments weakened the language around the actions and responsibilities of member states, and tabling them so late into the provision would risk undermining the careful negotiations. Ultimately though, the amendments did not pass and the resolution was adopted without them.

In their remarks following the vote, member states welcomed the adoption of the resolution in light of recognizing climate change as a defining existential issue of the modern age, commending Vanuatu for its leadership in pushing for the resolution.

Speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small-Island Developing States (SIDS), Filipo Tarakinikini, Permanent Representative of Fiji to the UN, welcomed the resolution, remarking that it was an “affirmation of survival” for island nations that have been uniquely threatened by climate change, experiencing lasting damages to their homes and their connection to heritage.

“We do not come to this hall asking for mercy. We come demanding justice. Justice that is today grounded in the authoritative voice of the world’s highest court. The Pacific will not disappear, and neither will our resolve,” said Tarakinikini.

Jérôme Bonnafont, Permanent Representative of France, said that this General Assembly decision was welcome in light of an “international context marred by many crises.”

“[France] will continue to defend ambitious climate action, multilateralism, respect for international law, and a science-based approach for sustainable development and for future generations,” Bonnafont said.

James Larsen, Permanent Representative of Australia, hoped that this resolution would “galvanize practical efforts” to protect the climate system and that the case for multilateralism has “never been stronger.” With Australia set to host COP31 later this year, Larsen remarked his country would continue working together with member states to accelerate climate action.

Among those that abstained from voting or were against the resolution are states accused of being major carbon emitters, including G77 members like India and Saudi Arabia. Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation voted against the resolution.

Prior to the vote, the United States expressed that their opposition was based on their “serious legal and policy concerns” about the resolution. The U.S. delegate noted that the resolution called for states to fulfill alleged obligations based on a non-binding ruling from the ICJ, and opposed the resolution’s “inappropriate political demands” to address climate issues.

The Russian Federation’s delegate argued after that member states’ climate obligations, such as the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold, were more of a political obligation rather than normative and that the resolution was an effort to circumvent existing climate agreements.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the adoption of the resolution, commending the leadership of Pacific Island countries, SIDs and the students and activists whose “moral clarity helped bring the world to this moment.”

“The world’s highest court has spoken. Today, the General Assembly has answered,” said Guterres. “This is a powerful affirmation of international law, climate justice, science, and the responsibility of states to protect people from the escalating climate crisis… Those least responsible for climate change are paying the highest price. That injustice must end.”

Reacting to the debate, Yamide Dagnet, NRDC’s Senior Vice President, International, said, “Climate justice prevails! The world sent a loud signal that multilateralism and science matter and can deliver for the people and the planet.”

While congratulating the Small Island States, the youths and frontline communities who refused to stand down for their energy, tenacity and leadership, she noted,  “There will be a lot of noise about the difficulty in enforcing this resolution, but the reality is that it represents a watershed moment for polluter accountability. Moving forward, regulators and courts have an additional tool in their arsenal to force nations and companies to look at how they can put people over pollution and better protect the world’s most impacted communities and countries with dignity.”

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Jotham Napat, said the country expressed profound gratitude to 141 Member States that voted in favor of the UNGA resolution welcoming the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on climate change and to the 90 States that stood together as co-sponsors of this historic initiative.

“This outcome is a powerful affirmation that the international community remains committed to the rule of law, multilateral cooperation, and climate justice at a time when these principles are being tested,” Napat said while acknowledging that the resolution was the first step in a new journey.

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The World Bank Group is consulting publicly on whether to merge its three independent complaint mechanisms. This note explains what is being proposed and how civil society organizations can participate in the consultation.

By Danny Bradlow and David Hunter
PRETORIA, South Africa / WASHINGTON DC, USA , May 19 2026 (IPS)

The World Bank made history in 1994 by creating the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism, at any international organisation. Its function is to investigate complaints from communities who allege they were harmed because the bank failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.

By establishing the three-member Inspection Panel, the World Bank showed support for a democrati Soth Arica/c vision of international governance based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals to take part in development decisions that affect their lives.

To date, the panel has received 186 complaints. Fifty-two have been from Africa. They involved projects in 56 countries, including 26 African countries. The complaints have raised issues such as the World Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies regarding public consultations, environmental and social impact assessments and involuntary resettlement in the projects that it funds.

The board has expanded the bank’s accountability process to include both compliance reviews and dispute resolution processes. Today, the World Bank Group has three independent accountability mechanisms:

• the Inspection Panel, which focuses on compliance reviews in public sector projects
• a separate dispute resolution mechanism for public sector projects
• the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, which offers both compliance reviews and dispute resolution services for private sector projects, primarily funded by the International Finance Corporation.

These accountability mechanisms have operated with mixed success. There have been some wins, for example in a case in Uganda involving risks for women and children associated with the building of a road. And some failures. An example is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman finding against the International Finance Corporation for noncompliance in a coal fired power plant in India that was ignored.

We were involved, as legal academics and working with civil society organisations, in the establishment of the Inspection Panel. We have been following the activities of these independent accountability mechanisms for over 30 years. We are concerned about their future.

The World Bank Group is seeking to become a “bigger and better” bank. This involves promoting more collaboration between the five entities that make up the group. It is doing so under the banner of “One WBG”. This is an important development because the World Bank is the only global multilateral development bank. It offers developing countries both financial and advisory services. For example, it is the biggest funder of development projects in Africa.

The increasing collaboration between the different institutions in the bank raises concerns about which of their policies are applicable to a particular project. It also raises the issue of whether the bank should integrate the group’s independent accountability mechanisms so that there is no question about which mechanism is applicable to the project.

We believe that resolving this issue offers the bank’s board an opportunity to improve the structure of its independent accountability mechanisms and their contribution to the bank’s operations.

The dangers

The board appointed a two-person task force in September 2025 to advise it on the feasibility of integrating the three organisations in a way that does not reduce their independence, accessibility and effectiveness. The task force prepared a thorough and well-reasoned draft report.

The report was finalised after public consultations and is being considered by the board. It shows that integration of the mechanisms is a feasible, but complex exercise. The existing mechanisms have different operating cultures, policies and practices and human resource needs. The report describes various models for integrating the existing mechanisms.

The report also demonstrates that if mishandled, the exercise could result in a less independent and less effective accountability mechanism. To avoid this risk, we propose that the board adopt a model consisting of two separate independent accountability mechanisms. One to cover compliance reviews across the entire group. The other to cover dispute resolution across the group. This will enable both functions to operate independently and efficiently.

Our proposal raises four issues.

First, it is important that each mechanism is independent of the bank’s management. Each mechanism must have sufficient resources to undertake effective compliance reviews or dispute resolutions. Their processes must also be robust enough to result in meaningful outcomes for the complainants.

Second, the new compliance mechanism must retain a three-member panel appointed by and reporting to the bank’s board. The panel should have a permanent chair serving a six-year term. The chair must have the authority to decide which cases need the panel’s attention. The other two panel members should also serve staggered six-year terms.

A three-person panel allows for some geographic, technical and experiential diversity. Gaining a consensus among the panel members improves the quality and increases the credibility of the panel reports. A three-member panel is better able to withstand pressure from the bank’s management and other stakeholders than is a mechanism headed by one person.

Third, the dispute resolution mechanism should be headed by an experienced dispute resolution professional at the vice-president level. This official should report to the president of the bank. Our view is that this arrangement could encourage the institution to play a more proactive role in resolving disputes.

To ensure that the unit has some independence it should also have regularly scheduled meetings with the board. The head of the unit should also be able to request a meeting with the board whenever they deem it necessary and without requiring the prior approval of the bank’s president.

Fourth, the process of consolidating accountability mechanisms will be complex. Consequently, the board should first decide on the basic structure: a compliance review unit headed by a three-member panel and a separate dispute resolution unit headed by a senior professional.

It should delay any decisions on the policies, principles and practices of the mechanisms until it receives advice from a multi-stakeholder working group that includes external stakeholders and management and is co-chaired by one person from each of the units being merged.

An opportunity to fix things

The bank has the opportunity to strengthen its development mission. The changes it makes should be designed to:

• help make the bank a better institution that supports higher quality projects
• make the bank a learning institution that openly accepts criticism and looks to implement solutions
• ensure it becomes an institution that recognises that people affected by bank-funded projects are stakeholders in its operations who may be forced to risk their well-being for the greater good.

Source: The Conversation Africa May 17, 2026

Daniel Bradlow is Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria; David Hunter is Professor Emeritus, The American University Washington College of Law, American University.

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The second quadrennial International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) 2026 will be held at the UN Headquarters in New York from 5-8 May 2026, preceded by a multi-stakeholder hearing on 4 May. This forum reviews progress on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and aims to produce an inter-governmentally agreed Progress Declaration to set future migration policy goals.
 
https://migrationnetwork.un.org/international-migration-review-forum-2026

By Simone Galimberti
KATHMANDU, Nepal, May 4 2026 (IPS)

Migration is a strange thing, hard to pin down. It is a complex phenomenon that transforms communities while shaping people’s identities and it is so multifaceted that individuals perceive it and live it in different ways.

It can turn to be a vehicle to security and prosperity for some but, on other hand, it can be also experienced with anguish and fear.

In short, migration is something personal that intimately affects both those settling into a new land and those communities that are supposed to co-exist with them.

A German’s state, Baden-Württembergwill soon will have its first state premier from Turkish origin, Cem Özdemir, a veteran green politician. In the past, Mr. Özdemir, according to DW report, has rejected the idea that he should be considered a “successful model of integration” because he always felt at home.

Özdemir’s unwillingness to be boxed into a fixed category of migrant contrasts those narratives that simplify and demean migration.

As we know, migration has been a toxic and divisive issue in many parts of the West, a dangerous problem that must be stopped at any cost. It is being portrayed through the lens of illegality as an open door that only invites violations of the law, including dangerous criminal activities.

While it is undeniable that security concerns can arise especially when there are massive flows of foreigners enter without papers into a new country, much less discussions are about the positive impact of migrants in the local economy.

But the level of politicization is so high that it ended up defining the whole issue. Migration has become something to be fixed, controlled in many parts of the Global North.

Such a framing ignores the fact that migration also occurs in large quantities also between developing nations and is not only about hordes of people from the Global South pushing their way into richer North.

It is unsurprising that the same logic also disregards the multiple and diverse “push factors” that bring individuals to migrate.

Poverty, discrimination and climate change are forcing millions of individuals to search for better places to live. This view has become so pervasive that it has delegitimized a different conversation, one based on exploring legal pathways to migration.

A different way of talking, discussing and regulating migration is possible.

The United Nations, over the last decades, have been trying to offer a venue to promote an approach leading to safe migration based on human rights, conducive, at least on paper, to a multilateralism centered governance of migration.

While far from being perfect, these mechanisms underpinning it, address migration in a way that goes past the deafening rhetoric that generally characterizes the debate on migration.

Because, as we know, migration if managed properly, taking into account the rights of migrants and bringing on board local communities in the destination countries with investment in social integration, instead offers a potent instrument to fight poverty while contributing to the economies of the Global North.

The International Migration Review Forum 2026 is one of these tools at the disposal of the UN to reframe the conversation about migration.

The United Nations in New York will host, from 5-8 May an essential conversation aimed at reviewing the Global Compact on Migration, GCM adopted on 19 December 2018.

Instead of being seen as an opportunity to reboot the conversation about immigration, this non-binding global blueprint, intended to offer a 360 degree approach to foster international cooperation to effectively and inclusively manage migration, ended up being instrumentalised by cunny politicians.

Since then, unfortunately the GCM has been overshadowed by the relentless politics of immigration based on the logic of “control” that has become more and more mainstream in the European Union and in the United States.

Making things more complicated is the fact that it is fitting for demagogues to conflate the issues of migrants with those of refugees. While these two categories often overlap, legally, they remain different concepts, a fact conveniently ignored by politicians.

It has not always been like this.

The international community, thanks also to a more favorable politics in the USA, on September 19, 2016, had successfully managed to create a united policy framework that would bring together both migration and the refugee’s related policies.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants led the foundations not only to the Global Compact on Migration but also to another tool, the Global Compact on Refugees approved just two days before the GCM.

These are two examples of soft law designed to ignite international support and cooperation even if they were criticized as attempts by the Global North of watering down the international human rights framework.

Yet in order for them to remain useful without diluting the international obligations of nations, they must remain as close as possible in terms of implementation.

The central question is if they revitalize and re-balance the conversation on immigration and refugee protection with practical cooperation and synergies among nations.

I doubt that IMRF 2026 can do much to elevate a new discussion about migration and challenge the status quo. After all, GCM has been designed to be structurally weak in terms of its governance.

For example, there is no mandatory reporting for its signatories.

A silver lining in the GCM’s framework is the existence of the United Nations Network on Migration that “coordinates system-wide, timely and practical support to Member States implementing the GCM.

Yet this is the only mechanism where the international community can holistically discuss immigration. No matter how battered the United Nations are amid drastic funding cuts and ongoing discussions about its re-organization and restructuring, multilateralism is needed more than ever in the areas of migration and refugees.

Yet it appears that the UN is not fighting the fight at political levels.

Reading the Report of the Secretary General on the Global Compact on Migration, you do not find a strong, vigorous push back against the politics that tackle immigration as a problem to be controlled.

There is only a small section on Dispelling Misleading Narratives and you could have expected a more punchy style and more space to counterattack this mainstream narrative on migration based on fear.

Perhaps the “immigration as a problem” approach has already metastasized and, inevitably, it adversely influences and restrains the United Nations. The International Migration Organization, the guardian of the GCM, remains a marginal institution within the UN system.

The Office of the High Commissioner on Refugees faced substantial funding cuts and underwent in 2025 a profound restructuring despite its essential role in many humanitarian situations.

At least the former Higher Commissioner, Fillippo Grandi who stepped down at the end of 2025, did not mince his words in criticizing the ways many governments in the West have been dealing with immigration.

“Building walls, sending boats back, offloading refugees and migrants on to other countries –, populists assure voters that controlling everything from borders and immigration numbers to job markets and national security will make their lives better” he wrote for The Guardian in 2024

“Few political tactics succeed like fear. But I can also tell you such claims of control are illusory”. he continued. It is not only the USA which has embraced this tactics.

Civil society organizations across Europe have been recently criticizing the European Union for the way it is drafting its Return Directive that, once approved, would streamline the return of non-EU nationals staying irregularly, including those whose asylum requests have been denied.

Yet amid this gloom, there are some best practices emerging.

Local governments have an important role to play.

The Local Coalition for Migrants and Refugees is showing an interest model to promote a bottom approach to migration. Moreover, some countries are stepping up.

For example, in 2025, Brazil approved a National Plan on Refugees, Migrants and Stateless while Kenya also brought in a new policy that would positively impact the more than 830,000 refugees and asylum-seekers that are hosted in the country.

At the same time, Ecuador reached an important milestone in 2025 with its National Implementation Plan (NIP) of GCM. Similarly, Malawi has finalized its first National Implementation Plan on Migration.

It is too early to see if these plans will be enforced and a lot will depend on the availability of international funding. Despite the constraints, the IOM remains steadfast in its mission of protecting the rights of migrants.

In 2024 a new Strategic Plan that aims at saving lives and protecting people on the move, driving solutions to displacement and facilitating pathways for regular migration, was introduced.

In a world in which 8,000 migrants were officially reported dead or missing worldwide in 2025, bringing the total since 2014 to more than 82,000 and with 117.3 million people worldwide are forcibly displaced, the international communities cannot stay indifferent.

Let’s remind ourselves of the real power of the GCM.

This Global Compact does not only recognize that safe, orderly and regular migration works for all when it takes place in a well-informed, planned and consensual manner. It is also a tool that highlights the role of the international community in helping create conducive policies for individuals to be able to lead peaceful and productive lives in their home nations.

In short, migration should never be an act of desperation.

While there are individuals of migrant origins like Cem Özdemir who offer a glaring example of successful achievements that allow himself to openly reject a stereotyped categorization, there is a sea of vulnerabilities and deaths affecting millions of others who voluntarily or forcibly left their homes.

This is the reason why legal tools like the International Refugees Convention, this year in its 75th anniversary and more limited but potentially useful mechanisms like IMRF this coming week and next Global Refugee Forum (GRF) 2027, do matter and we should all pay attention to them.

Simone Galimberti writes about the SDGs, youth-centered policy-making and a stronger and better United Nations.

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Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 1 2026 (IPS)

A longstanding rule bars international civil servants from publicly taking a political stand against member states, even against those accused of human rights violations, war crimes and genocide (and even barring staffers from participating in political demonstrations outside the UN).

And more importantly, the rules also forbid UN staffers from campaigning for– or against– candidates for secretary general, including the current race for a new UNSG.

Perhaps that’s a price one has to pay—forfeiting the right to political expression– when you are an international civil servant. But is it worth the sacrifice?

A new circular to UN staffers, released April 29, reiterates these restrictions cautioning against any participation in the run-up to the election of a new Secretary-General later this year.

“As recent and ongoing wars and conflicts continue, the UN remains indispensable as a platform for dialogue, human rights, and collective action and all staff play a vital role in this effort.

While it is understandable that many staff members feel compelled to share views about events that are unfolding, including in personal fora such as social media, we must be mindful at all times of our rights and duties as international civil servants, which require us to act independently and impartially,” says the circular.

Four candidates in the running for the next UN Secretary-General; Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Rafael Grossi (Argentina), Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rica), and Macky Sall (Senegal). Credit: United Nations

This applies to all public communications (including those shared through personal social media accounts) related to ongoing crises, political matters, and other elections and electoral processes, which should be framed in a manner that is consistent with the Organization’s positions and the statements of the Secretary-General.

Recent instances have also highlighted the need for particular caution with regard to public expressions of support for candidates in the selection process for the Secretary-General.

“Any such expressions—whether explicit or implicit—may be perceived as inconsistent with the independence and impartiality required of international civil servants and risk undermining the integrity of the process”, the circular cautions.

‘Disclaimers indicating that views are expressed in a personal capacity do not absolve us of our obligations under the Staff Regulations and Rules. The standards of conduct apply irrespective of the platform used or the capacity in which views are expressed,” the circular warns.

Dr Palitha Kohona, a former Chief of the UN Treaty Section, told Inter Press Service (IPS):
“It is undoubted that international civil servants must remain above national and sectarian differences. It is this quality that makes them and the Organization credible. Sometimes it may become difficult to remain silent in the face of gross abuses, and these circumstances present a dilemma”.

In this context, he pointed out, it is most important to bear in mind Article 101 of the Charter.

During the time of SG Kofi Annan (1997-2006), a more relaxed atmosphere prevailed and staff were permitted to express their views within their own areas of responsibility.

“Then again, one is constrained to ask whether staff should remain mute when the very fundamentals of the Charter are being violated. Whether they be human rights, or the prohibition or the threat of the use of force, or the commitment to live in peace and harmony,” he argued.

The leadership of the Organization must provide the guidelines within which the staff could express themselves. But not the wishy-washy stuff that we are increasingly getting used to.

But will the leadership ever call a spade a spade, declared Dr Kohona, a former Sri Lankan Permanent Representative to the UN, and until recently, Ambassador to China.

Samir Sanbar, a former Assistant Secretary-General and head of the Department of Public Information (DPI) told IPS: “I recall taking an “Oath of Office”‘ to “exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the united Nations only in view. and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the Organization”.

I am not clear, he said, whether that oath is currently required particularly after several former government officials joined the Secretariat.

Supporting a particular candidate proposed by a government –as officially required– for the post of Secretary General would be contrary to that oath of international civil service, he pointed out.

Recounting his strong personal relationship with a former Secretary-General, Sanbar said: “Kofi Annan was my closest United Nations colleague as we started our work at the same time and progressed together when he headed Peace keeping and I headed Public Information.”

He visited me at home on a Sunday evening, said Sanbar, to inform me of his candidacy for Secretary-General yet graciously agreed that my contacts with the media would not indicate public support until he was elected when we walked to the photo unit on the eighth floor for an official portrait.

Meanwhile, the UN circular also says : “We, as staff members must adhere to the policies set out in the Status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members; outside activities. The guidelines for the personal use of social media also include a number of useful tips including on privacy settings, liking or sharing posts, and reminders on information that has not been made public.’

In particular, staff regulation 1.2 (f) provides: “While staff members’ personal views and convictions, including their political and religious convictions, remain inviolable, staff members shall ensure that those views and convictions do not adversely affect their official duties or the interests of the United Nations.

They shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner befitting their status as international civil servants and shall not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties with the United Nations.

They shall avoid any action and, in particular, any kind of public pronouncement that may adversely reflect on their status, or on the integrity, independence and impartiality that are required by that status.”

The “2026 Guidance on Political Activities” issued on iSeek by the UN Ethics Office provides more guidance.

“We, as staff members, are obliged to comply with these provisions. Failure to do so can result in the initiation of a disciplinary process, which may result in disciplinary sanctions being imposed.”

Given the above, please also be aware, in accordance with staff rule 10.1 “Failure by staff members to comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations and Rules or other relevant administrative issuances or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international civil servant may amount to misconduct and may lead to the institution of a disciplinary process and the imposition of disciplinary measures for misconduct.”

In addition, affiliate (non-staff) personnel must also comply with the principles set out under the terms and conditions of their engagement as well as the administrative instructions that govern their modality of engagement such as ST/AI/2020/10 on United Nations Internship Programme, ST/AI/2013/4 on Consultants and Individual Contractors, ST/AI/231/Rev.1 on Non-Reimbursable Loan Experts, ST/AI/1999/6 on Gratis Personnel, and the MOU and Conditions of Service guidelines for UN Volunteers.

“This reminder is issued in the interest of protecting both individual staff members and the Organization, and to ensure that the United Nations continues to be perceived as an impartial and trusted institution by Member States and the public”.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses Bulgaria’s Gen Z-led protests with Aleksandar Tanev, founder of Students Against the Mafia, an informal student organisation that took part in mass protests against corruption and state capture.

Aleksandar Tanev

What brought you to activism and these protests?

I am a Russian-Bulgarian citizen, because my father is Bulgarian and my mother is Russian. I lived in Bulgaria until I was about five years old and then moved to Russia, where I lived until a few years ago. From around the age of 12 I became interested in politics and started asking questions. I took part in my first protest in Russia at age 17 and participated in campaigns for independent parliamentary candidates. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, my life changed drastically. On the first day I took part in a protest that turned out to be my last. I immediately started receiving threats, and on the same day I received a draft notice from the military registration office. I decided to leave.

Bulgaria was one of the first countries to suspend flights from Russia. But my brother, who was doing an internship at the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told me a humanitarian flight was being organised to evacuate Bulgarian citizens. I managed to sign up and flew to Sofia. I started a new life in Bulgaria, remembering the language and meeting new people.

When I arrived, I found so many people had been exposed to Russian propaganda. I had to explain over and over what the real situation in Russia was. For two and a half years I worked at the Bulgarian Red Cross helping Ukrainian refugees. I enrolled at Sofia University and gradually reintegrated into my home country.

When the protests broke out, I was in Germany and saw the photos and videos of young people taking to the streets. I thought the time had finally come to do something. What triggered the protests was a government budget that included tax increases but no institutional reforms. People may struggle to understand complex political issues, but when the government takes money from them, they understand. Very quickly, the protest went beyond the trigger issue and turned into a protest not just against the government, but against a whole system of corrupt governance and state capture.

At that moment, I realised students were the driving force, and started an informal group called Students Against the Mafia. We told major media about it and began preparing our first action. We attached a three-by-four metre banner reading ‘Students Against the Mafia’ to the balcony of Sofia University’s rector’s office while an international conference was being held inside. We held a student march and joined the big protest.

What’s the current level of trust in institutions?

Bulgarians, including young people, are very disappointed by the actions of those in power. Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy and people had a lot of expectations when it joined the European Union (EU) but have since become increasingly disappointed. Trust in state institutions is overall very low, and so is trust in civil society organisations and other parts of society. This is dangerous, because it may mean a loss of trust in democracy.

People don’t really understand the difference between government and civil society. They think NGOs are organisations created by the government to control society or financed by foreign states to lobby for their own interests. There is very little critical thinking. People don’t fact-check information and instead absorb propaganda and dangerous narratives.

My personal goal is to try to bring back trust in civil society, showing that civil society groups are instruments of people power. That’s why we show our faces, our goals and our actions.

Who took part in the protests?

Very different parts of Bulgarian society protested, and with very different ideas. There were pro-European people, Eurosceptics and people who had never been interested in politics before. What united them was that they were tired of the injustice of a system in which you can’t change anything for the better because power is captured by a small elite.

Politics is a revolving door: Boyko Borissov, the prime minister at the time, was prime minister three times, and his party was in power for over a decade. Delyan Peevski, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, was sanctioned under the US Magnitsky Act for corruption in a controversial scandal, representing a merger between political power, media influence, institutional dependence and impunity. The same group of politicians captured the government, parliament and the most important institution, the courts. This meant that change wasn’t going to come from institutions.

While protesters had many different complaints and demands, they all shared the hope for normal governance and the feeling that this couldn’t go on.

How were protests organised, and what role did social media play?

The first big protest was half organised, half spontaneous: the call came from a political party, but it echoed well beyond party supporters, so the turnout was much bigger than anybody expected. It was a broad national protest.

The organiser was the pro-European, anti-corruption coalition We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria. After the party made the announcement, people started sharing it on social media and in personal conversations, and soon there was this protest energy in the air. Everyone was talking about it.

In between protests, people waited for the signal from this political party to come back out. We didn’t think to organise our own protests. Instead, we prepared actions and performances to stage at the next protests the party organised. And each time, more and more people came, because those who had previously protested shared the call within their own small networks.

Social media helped us enormously, because traditional media in Bulgaria is captured too. Corrupt politicians have a strong influence over traditional television channels but they don’t control social media. So Facebook, Instagram and other platforms filled the space of independent media. On social media, we can share and talk freely. To Gen Z protesters, the protests became an extension of this space: they came to the protests to speak their minds.

One problem was that during the protests, the internet was very slow. We thought the authorities caused this deliberately, but it’s also possible mobile operators simply couldn’t handle so many people in one place. Either way, social media was key to the success of the protests.

Do you agree with the label that these were Gen Z protests?

I do. In fact, to one of the protests we brought a five-metre banner that read ‘Gen Z is coming’. It was shown by the Daily Mail, Reuters and other international media.

While I think the label is correct, we shouldn’t interpret it literally. Many different age groups took part in the protests. What made them Gen Z protests was the participation of so many young people who gave them a face of hope. But it was only because all Bulgarian society joined in that we succeeded in bringing down the government.

What risks did protesters face?

Honestly, compared to Russia, the risk wasn’t very high. But that doesn’t mean everything was okay. For instance, some students faced pressure from their universities not to go to protests. Students who helped me spread the word about Students Against the Mafia at their university got warnings from the administration not to do it again. That’s not acceptable. Students have the right to express their opinions freely, including through protest.

Provocateurs showed up towards the end of each protest. They covered their faces and brought some kind of explosives, and police started beating protesters. Because of this, most regular people left after a couple of hours. We think these provocateurs may have been sent by the parties in power to discredit protests.

Some people were unnecessarily scared. I protested very actively and nothing happened to me, though I should be honest that when you become visible, that gives you a degree of protection, and this may not be true of everyone.

What did the protests achieve, and what comes next?

The government fell. That’s a big achievement. And Bulgarian society woke up. A lot of people who previously thought politics was something dirty, something separate from their personal lives, understood they had a responsibility.

But there’s still a long way to go. All this protest energy needs to be transformed into electoral energy. Power is built not only in the streets but also within institutions. If we don’t turn this energy into votes, all the effort will have been useless. Voter turnout in the last election prior to the protests was under 40 per cent. This is not representative democracy; it is a disaster. We cannot expect change to happen when only 40 per cent of voters actually turn out.

Diaspora voting rights are also under threat. The opposition Revival party proposed limiting polling stations outside the EU to just 20 locations, far too few for the large Bulgarian communities in the UK, the USA and elsewhere. The proposal was backed by most governing parties; only Peevski opposed it. Revival’s stated aim was to limit votes from Turkey, which tend to go to Peevski’s party. But the measure would hit all diaspora communities: over 60,000 voter applications were submitted for the 19 April election, over twice the figure from the previous election. Unlike voters in Turkey, who can travel to Bulgaria to vote in person, those in the UK and USA cannot. This was a deliberate attempt to suppress the votes of people who have left and who tend to vote for change.

Following the main protests, we also started organising actions against the chief prosecutor, Borislav Sarafov, the one who ultimately decides whether a corruption case will be investigated. According to Bulgarian law, a temporary chief prosecutor can only hold the post for up to six months. But now they say that this law doesn’t apply to him because he was already in the role when the law was passed. So this temporary prosecutor can now potentially stay in this position for life. We have held four or five protests against him, but so far we have not succeeded.

What keeps me going is the desire to live in a fair society where the state is at the service of the people, and not the other way around. But in a democracy, you have to change things yourself. You can’t wait for someone to do it for you. Living in Russia, I understood that if you don’t fight for justice and truth, there is always a danger that power will take over everything. There’s this phrase I keep coming back to: if you are not interested in politics, politics will start to take an interest in you. That’s my motivation.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Gen Z protests: new resistance rises CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
‘People reacted to a system of governance shaped by informal powers and personal interests’ CIVICUS | Interview with Zahari Iankov 18.Dec.2025
Bulgaria: stuck in a loop? CIVICUS Lens 24.Oct.2022

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Global Summit on Indigenous Peacebuilding is scheduled to take place April 25-26 at the United Nations. Credit: International Peace Bureau: Disarmament for Development

By Binalakshmi Nepram
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 24 2026 (IPS)

About 132 wars are happening in the world today, displacing 200 million people. 80 percent of these conflicts are happening in sensitive biodiversity areas where Indigenous Peoples live.

An estimated 476 million Indigenous Peoples in the world, living across 90 countries and territories, speaking a majority of the world’s estimated 7,000 languages, represent 5,000 different cultures, faiths, and ways of life.

Currently many wars across the world are fought on land where Indigenous Peoples live. Indigenous Peoples live often in contested border areas on the front lines of violent conflict, insurgency, and organized crime with devastating humanitarian impact.

We remember all the lives that we have lost in our territories. We remember the wisdom which will get us through this that and will pave the way for healing people, for peace, and the one planet we all co-habitat together. Peace, not wars, will be the pathway.

Peace-making efforts are usually negotiated at high political levels where Indigenous Peoples are rarely represented. Relations between states and Indigenous Peoples must always be remembered if some of the world’s longest-running conflicts are to be solved.

The protection of peace, peoples and planet cannot be complete if Indigenous Peoples are left behind as also stated in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that nations around the world have pledged at the United Nations– to be achieved by 2030.

Any peace-building efforts in global conflicts must therefore involve and include Indigenous Peoples. The world of today needs meaningful peacebuilding that works for all.

Indigenous Peoples have their own traditions, culture, and spiritual practices that help to resolve violence and build local peace. While often highly successful, Indigenous People’s efforts are underappreciated by the peacebuilding community or ignored entirely in formal peace processes.

Two years ago, we started mapping some of the root causes of these violent conflicts that are currently happening, and we tried to analyze what is happening in the world today. This is what we this is what we found that to mitigate violent conflicts happening in our world today it is imperative that we understand what is happening in territories where Indigenous Peoples live and work with them to provide solutions.

Indigenous women across cultures and nations have also evolved, extraordinary forms of nonviolent protest and mechanisms to confront decades of militarization, weaponization and structural violence that have marked their lives for decades. We must put them in the forefront of national and global peacebuilding efforts.

Indigenous Peoples have lived for centuries with violence in their lives, yet the resilience that they showed in the face of entrenched violence is note-worthy.

Indigenous Peoples have since time immemorial evolved innovative ways of peacebuilding. We acknowledge the Great Law of Peace of the Haudenosaunee People as well as Loiyunmba Shinyen of Manipur, Indigenous forms of governance and constitution making that evolved in the 12th century in America as well as in Asia and in many other parts of the world.

We recognize the extraordinary role of Indigenous women, our mothers, grandmothers, and ancestors who have forged innovative peacebuilding methods against all odds.

Indigenous Peoples have been trying to engage with the United Nations since the 1970s to resolve, mitigate and prevent violent conflicts. We noted that the first time that special attention was paid to Indigenous Peoples by the peace area of the United Nations was in connection with the peace process in Guatemala in the year 1995 in the UN General Assembly Agenda Item 42 A/49/882 dated 10 April 1995.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) adopted in 2007 contains several articles that are very relevant to preventing conflict. 17 years since the adoption of UNDRIP, conflict in Indigenous lands and territories has increased more than ever. We are now in the search to find new solutions and pathways.

The issues of peace were excluded from the formal original mandate of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and it was only in May 2016 that the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) designated conflict, peace, and resolution as the special theme for its fifteenth session.

Two years ago, to address the issue, we organized the First Global Summit on Indigenous Peace building. The Summit was held in Washington DC on 11 & 12 April 2024 and brought together 120 Indigenous Peacebuilders from over 30 countries. Following the Summit, an International Declaration on Indigenous Peacebuilding was adopted and signed, and the Global Network of Indigenous Peacebuilders, Mediators and Negotiators was born.

Following the Summit, we worked with UN member states which led to a UN General Assembly Resolution on Indigenous Peacebuilding adopted in December 2024.

At the First International Declaration on Indigenous Peacebuilding adopted in April 2024, it was resolved that the Summit will be held every two years until we reduce conflicts in Indigenous territories by 50 percent.

We are therefore meeting for the Second Global Summit on Indigenous Peacebuilding that is bringing together over 200 extraordinary Indigenous Peace builders – Indigenous Elders, Women, Leaders and youth, from 80 countries belonging to seven socio-cultural regions of the world on 25 and 26 April 2026 in New York City alongside the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

The Global Summit is to empower us, to understand what is happening in the world, share Indigenous approaches to peace building, share knowledge, studies, science, research, practices to enable us to work to mitigate violent conflict. The Summit is held in the hope that future generations will help in healing people and the planet.

The aims of the Second Global Summit on Indigenous Peace Building are to find ways to implement the First International Declaration on Indigenous Peacebuilding adopted on 12 April 2024, reflect on 20 Years of UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and call to the UN and member states for an International Decade on Indigenous Peacebuilding, 2027-2037.

The Summit will also see the launch of Global Indigenous Mothers March for Peace, Healing and Unity that will commence from the Summit and go on for two years non-stop in areas around the world which are in conflict and will culminate at the Third Global Summit on Indigenous Peacebuilding in 2028.

Binalakshmi Nepram is Founder-President of Global Alliance of Indigenous Peoples, Gender Justice and Peace

IPS UN Bureau

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Protesters demonstrate outside the Columbia University campus in New York City. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider
 
For decades, five powerful actors—the United States, the Arab states, the European Union, AIPAC, and Israel’s own opposition—have all claimed to seek Israeli-Palestinian peace while enabling permanent occupation, together burying the two-state solution.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)

Every powerful actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict professes to seek peace. The US and EU repeat the two-state mantra, the Arab states invoke Palestinian rights, AIPAC proclaims its defense of Israel’s security, and Israeli opposition parties promise “responsible” leadership and stability.

Yet each, in its own way, has enabled and entrenched a destructive status quo—shielding Israel from accountability, normalizing permanent ruthless occupation, and rendering Palestinian statehood ever more illusory while fueling radicalization on both sides.

The US as the Prime Enabler

Successive US administrations have long recited support for a two-state solution, yet in practice, Washington has done more to bury that prospect than to realize it. For decades, the United States has shielded Israel from real international accountability while refusing to use its vast leverage to compel any meaningful movement toward Palestinian statehood.

By turning the “peace process” into an empty ritual, the US has provided cover for a status quo that is neither peaceful nor temporary.

At the same time, unconditional US military, financial, and diplomatic backing has enabled Israel’s relentless settlement expansion and creeping annexation of Palestinian land. American officials issue ritual complaints about settlements, but the financial and military aid kept flowing and the vetoes at the UN kept coming, signaling that no red line would ever be enforced.

This toxic mix of lofty rhetoric and impunity has locked both peoples into an ever more entrenched, zero-sum conflict and foreclosed the only viable formula—two states—for ending it.

The Gaza war has stripped away any remaining illusions. Even amid mass devastation and accusations of genocidal conduct, Washington has continued to arm and protect Israel diplomatically, becoming complicit in Israel’s war crimes. To be sure, in the name of protecting Israel, the United States has gravely imperiled Israel’s viability as a democratic state and its long-term security while setting the stage for the next violent conflagration, to Israel’s detriment.

The Arab States’ Shortcomings

The Arab states, though never tiring of affirming the justice of the Palestinian cause and the necessity of a two-state solution, have consistently fallen short of their words. Although they possess enormous strategic weight—withholding or granting diplomatic recognition, and opening markets, energy, airspace, and security cooperation—they have rarely used these tools to force Israel to choose between occupation and peace with the Palestinians.

This failure has signaled to Israel that it can normalize relations with some Arab states, à la the Abraham Accords, while maintaining its grip on Palestinian land without risking any backlash.

Even in the face of Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, most Arab governments limited themselves to statements, summits, and carefully choreographed outrage that stopped well short of meaningful pressure.

The Arab states that normalized relations with Israel continued to protect key political and economic ties, while the front-line states—Egypt and Jordan—maintained security coordination that shielded Israel from real strategic isolation.

By doing so little when so much was at stake, Arab states have become, in effect, accomplices to the perpetuation of the conflict they denounce. Their inaction has left Palestinians without a credible Arab shield, allowed Israel to entrench settlement and annexation, and pushed the two-state solution—the only realistic path to a just peace and security for both Israel and the Palestinians—to the wayside.

The EU’s Shortsightedness

The European Union is Israel’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment, technology, and diplomatic legitimacy. Yet, it has systematically refused to wield this considerable leverage to force a choice between occupation and peace with the Palestinians.

Instead of linking market access, research cooperation, or association agreements to clear benchmarks on settlements and Palestinian rights, Brussels has largely confined itself to criticism and symbolic measures that Israel has comfortably ignored.

The EU’s posture has effectively insulated Israel from serious economic or diplomatic consequences for entrenching an apartheid one-state reality of perpetual domination.

At the same time, although individual EU states, including France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, have recognized the Palestinian state, they have done virtually nothing to turn that recognition into hard power; arms exports and trade preferences continue with Israel as usual. Recognition becomes a cheap, cost-free declaration rather than a meaningful constraint on Israeli policy.

Thus, EU passivity has helped normalize occupation and settlement expansion while leaving Palestinians without an effective European counterweight, making a genuine two-state solution ever more remote, to the detriment of both Israel and the Palestinians.

AIPAC’s Culpability

AIPAC presents itself as a friend of Israel. Still, by relentlessly reinforcing the country’s most hardline positions, it has turned “pro-Israel” into a rigid orthodoxy that equates any pressure on Israeli governments with betrayal, thereby narrowing the range of policies American lawmakers feel politically safe to support.

For decades, AIPAC has backed Israeli governments without qualification—endorsing military campaigns, providing political cover for settlement expansion, and supporting a maximalist posture toward the Palestinians.

It rallies Congress behind unconditional aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic protection. This has helped Israeli leaders believe they can permanently deepen occupation and de facto annexation while still counting on automatic American support.

AIPAC has refused to use its considerable leverage to press for peace-oriented concessions and territorial compromise. Instead, it has rendered the two state solution an empty slogan while supporting the Israeli policies that make it impossible. In doing so, AIPAC has directly contributed to the ever worsening conflict and put Israel’s security under constant threat.

Still, AIPAC has not awakened from its blind support that jeopardizes Israel’s very existence and, with that, scuttles any prospect for an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Israeli Opposition Parties’ Dismal Failure

Israel’s opposition parties have failed to offer a credible, sustained alternative to the right’s permanent conflict paradigm, and in doing so have gravely weakened Israel’s chances for peace. Instead of forcefully championing a two-state solution, most opposition leaders tiptoe around the very words “Palestinian state,” intimidated by electoral backlash and the charge of being “soft” on security. Their political inaptitude has allowed the right to define what is “realistic,” narrowing the political options to endless occupation and recurrent war.

Thus, they have directly contributed to the current impasse, making the conflict ever more intractable. Without a major party willing to argue that Israel’s long-term security depends on a two-state solution, the public hears only variations of the same message: manage, contain, punish, but never resolve. This abdication cedes the strategic debate to the extremist Netanyahu and his messianic lunatics, who are creepingly implementing their scheme of greater Israel, which would bury any prospect for peace.

It is a dire reality for the country that the opposing parties failed to coalesce and present a united front to push for a two-state solution, even following the Gaza war, which has unequivocally demonstrated that after nearly 80 years of conflict, only peace would provide Israel with ultimate security.

Every leader from these parties feels they are the most qualified to be the prime minister, but has failed miserably to offer realistic plans to end the conflict.

By failing to unite, organize, educate, and mobilize Israelis around a clear two state vision, these parties are undermining Israel’s security, eroding its international standing, and endangering its very future as a Jewish, democratic state.

The record of these five enablers is devastating. They made a just peace ever more remote, pushing Israel precariously toward an apartheid one state reality it cannot sustain morally, demographically, or strategically, while abandoning the Palestinians to the cruelest, inhumane occupation.

They must change course now—or condemn Israelis and Palestinians to generations of bloodshed that will erase Israel’s reason for being and extinguish Palestinian nationhood.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

IPS UN Bureau

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The Leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, arrived at UN Headquarters by helicopter. A view of the helicopter, as it approached the North Lawn of the UN campus, on 13 November 1974. But Arafat was denied a US visa for a second visit to the UN in 1988, to address the General Assembly. Credit: UN Photo/Michos Tzovaras

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)

The United Nations faces two crucial elections later this year: the election of a new Secretary General, with no confirmed date for polling, and the election of a new President (PGA), scheduled for June 2, for the upcoming 81st session of the General Assembly.

In accordance with established geographical rotation, the president for the next session will be elected from the Asia-Pacific Group with two candidates in the running: Dr. Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh, currently serving as Foreign Minister, and Andreas S. Kakouris, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. A third declared candidate, Riyad Mansour (Palestine), withdrew from the race.

The dual candidacy breaks a longstanding tradition of a single candidate running for the office of PGA from each geographical group.

According to one of the established rules, speeches before the General Assembly were limited to 15 minutes– but rarely enforced.

The longest speech –269 minutes–was credited to Fidel Castro of Cuba at a meeting of the General Assembly on 26 September 1960. But the longest speech ever made at the UN was by V.K. Krishna Menon of India. His statement to the Security Council was given during three meetings on 23 and 24 January 1957 and lasted more than 8 hours.

In a bygone era, the General Assembly was also the center of several politically memorable events in the history of the world body.

When Yasser Arafat was denied a US visa to visit New York to address the United Nations back in 1988, the General Assembly defied the United States by temporarily moving the UN’s highest policy making body to Geneva– perhaps for the first time in UN history– providing a less-hostile political environment and a platform, for the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Arafat, who first addressed the UN in 1974, took a swipe at Washington when he prefaced his statement in Geneva by remarking: “it never occurred to me that my second meeting with this honorable Assembly, since 1974, would take place in the hospitable city of Geneva”.

On his 1974 visit to address the General Assembly, he avoided the hundreds of pro and anti-Arafat demonstrators outside the UN building by arriving in a helicopter which landed on the North Lawn of the UN campus adjoining the East River.

When he addressed the General Assembly, there were confusing reports whether or not Arafat carried a gun in his holster—“in a house of peace” — which was apparently not visible to delegates.

One news story said Arafat was seen “wearing his gun belt and holster and reluctantly removing his pistol before mounting the rostrum.” “Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand,” he told the Assembly.

Setting the record straight, Samir Sanbar, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General and head of the former Department of Public Information told Inter Press Service (IPS) it was discreetly agreed that Arafat would keep the holster while the gun was to be handed over to Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Foreign Minister and later President of Algeria (1999-2019).

Incidentally, when anti-Arafat New York protesters on First Avenue shouted: “Arafat Go Home”, his supporters responded that was precisely what he wanted—a home for the Palestinians to go to.

Although Arafat made it to the UN, some of the world’s most controversial leaders, including Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad, and North Korea’s Kim il Sung and his grandson Kim Jong-un never made it to the UN to address the General Assembly.

Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Minister of Industries of Cuba, addresses the General Assembly on Dec. 11, 1964. Credit: UN Photo/TC

Meanwhile, when the politically-charismatic Ernesto Che Guevara, once second-in-command to Cuban leader Fidel Castro, was at the UN to address the General Assembly sessions, back in 1964, the U.N. headquarters came under attack – literally. The speech by the Argentine-born Marxist revolutionary was momentarily drowned by the sound of an explosion.

The anti-Castro forces in the United States, reportedly backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had mounted an insidious campaign to stop Che Guevara from speaking. A 3.5-inch bazooka was fired at the 39-storeyed Secretariat building by the East River while a vociferous CIA-inspired anti-Castro, anti-Che Guevara demonstration was taking place outside the U.N. building on New York’s First Avenue and 42nd street.

But the rocket launcher – which was apparently not as sophisticated as today’s shoulder-fired missiles and rocket-propelled grenades – missed its target, rattled windows, and fell into the river about 200 yards from the building. One newspaper report described it as “one of the wildest episodes since the United Nations moved into its East River headquarters in 1952.”

As longtime U.N. staffers would recall, the failed 1964 bombing of the U.N. building took place when Che Guevara launched a blistering attack on U.S. foreign policy and denounced a proposed de-nuclearization pact for the Western hemisphere. It was one of the first known politically motivated terrorist attacks on the United Nations.

After his Assembly speech, Che Guevara was asked about the attack aimed at him. “The explosion has given the whole thing more flavor,” he joked, as he chomped on his Cuban cigar.

When he was told by a reporter that the New York City police had nabbed a woman, described as an anti-Castro Cuban exile, who had pulled out a hunting knife and jumped over the UN wall, intending to kill him, Che Guevara said: “It is better to be killed by a woman with a knife than by a man with a gun.”

Meanwhile, in 2004, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to the present African Union (AU), barred coup leaders from participating in African summits, Secretary-General Kofi Annan singled out the OAU decision as a future model to punish military dictators worldwide.

Annan went one step further and said he was hopeful that one day the General Assembly would follow in the footsteps of the OAU and bar leaders of military governments from addressing the General Assembly.

Annan’s proposal was a historic first. But it never came to pass in an institution where member states, not the Secretary-General, reign supreme.

The outspoken Annan, a national of Ghana, also said that “billions of dollars of public funds continue to be stashed away by some African leaders — even while roads are crumbling, health systems are failing, school children have neither books nor desks nor teachers, and phones do not work.” He also lashed out at African leaders who overthrow democratic regimes to grab power by military means.

Meanwhile, some of the military leaders who addressed the UN included Fidel Castro of Cuba, Col Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya, Amadou Toure of Mali (who assumed power following a coup in 1991 but later served as a democratically elected President), and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana (who seized power in 1979, executed former heads of state but later served as a civilian president voted into power in democratic elections). As the International Herald Tribune reported, Rawlings was “Africa’s first former military leader to allow the voters to choose his successor in a multi-party election”.

In October 2020, the New York Times reported that at least 10 African civilian leaders refused to step down from power and instead changed their constitutions to serve a third or fourth term – or serve for life.

These leaders included Presidents of Guinea (running for a third term), Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Ghana and Seychelles, among others. The only country where the incumbent was stepping down was Niger.

Condemning all military coups, the Times quoted Umaro Sissoco Embalo, the president of Guinea-Bissau, as saying: “Third terms also count as coups”

Back in 1977, a separatist activist/lawyer from London, Krishna Vaikunthavsan, who was campaigning for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka, surreptitiously gate-crashed into the UN, and virtually hijacked the General Assembly when he walked to the GA podium ahead of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister ACS Hameed, the listed speaker, and lashed out at his government for human rights violations and war crimes.

When the President of the Assembly realized he had an interloper, he cut off the mike within minutes and summoned security guards to bodily eject the intruder from the hall. And as he walked up to the podium, there was pin drop silence and the unflappable Hameed, unprompted by any of his delegates, produced a riveting punchline.

“I want to thank the previous speaker for keeping his speech short,” he said, as the Assembly, known to tolerate longwinded and boring speeches, broke into peals of laughter.

Meanwhile, a security officer once recalled an incident where the prime minister from an African country, addressing the General Assembly, was heckled by a group of African students. As is usual with hecklers, the boisterous group was taken off the visitor’s gallery, grilled, photographer and banned from entering the UN premises.

But about five years later, one of the hecklers returned to the UN —this time, as foreign minister of his country, and addressed the world body.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment – and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the UN General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/

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Amir Saeid Iravani, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Oritro Karim
NEW YORK, Apr 10 2026 (IPS)

The past several weeks have marked a significant escalation in hostilities across the Middle East, with tensions rising among Israel, Lebanon, Iran, and the United States following large-scale exchanges of bombardment. Recent statements from U.S. President Donald Trump, including threats of extensive destruction in Iran, have further inflamed regional tensions and complicated ongoing diplomatic efforts. Humanitarian experts warn that these developments risk further destabilizing cross-border relations and could trigger a broader regional conflict.

“Every day this war continues, human suffering grows. The scale of devastation grows. Indiscriminate attacks grow,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “The spiral of death and destruction must stop. To the United States and Israel, it is high time to stop the war that is inflicting immense human suffering and already triggering devastating economic consequences. Conflicts do not end on their own. They end when leaders choose dialogue over destruction. That choice still exists. And it must be made – now.”

In late February, Israel coordinated a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, triggering retaliatory drone and missile strikes from Iran. According to figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 3.8 million Iranians have been impacted by the war in Iran as of early April. Iran’s Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) reports that over 2,100 civilians have been killed as of April 3, including 216 children, 251 women and 24 health workers. Over 1,880 children, 4,610 women, and 116 health workers have been injured in that same period.

The scale of destruction to civilian infrastructure across Iran has been particularly severe. The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) estimates that roughly 115,193 civilian structures have sustained significant damage, including at least 763 schools. Israeli airstrikes have targeted numerous densely populated areas and critical civilian infrastructures, including airports, residential areas, hospitals, schools, industrial facilities, cultural heritage sites, water infrastructure, and a power plant in Khorramshahr, as well as nuclear facilities in Khonab, Yazd, and Bushehr.

Iran’s healthcare system has borne a massive toll, with damage to over 442 health facilities across the nation, disrupting access to lifesaving care for over 10 million people, including 2.2 million children. The Pasteur Institute of Iran—one of the oldest research and public health centers in the Middle East, and a critical source of vaccines for infectious diseases—has been severely damaged, leaving thousands of children increasingly vulnerable. Tofigh Darou, a key producer of pharmaceutical products for chronic conditions such as cancer, has been destroyed, raising broader concerns of a severe, nationwide health crisis.

These challenges are especially pronounced for Iran’s growing population of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which has swelled to approximately 3.2 million since the escalation of hostilities. Iran also currently hosts over 1.65 million refugees. These vulnerable communities are in dire need of access to basic services, many of which have been severely disrupted. IDPs and refugee communities face significant protection risks, alongside critical shortages of healthcare, food, clean water, and financial support for basic needs and relocation assistance.

“Unprovoked attacks by the US and Israel — launched amid diplomatic negotiations and without authorisation from the Security Council — violate the fundamental prohibition on the use of force, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the duty to peacefully settle disputes under Article 2 of the UN Charter. They also violate the right to life,” said a coalition of UN experts on April 4. “The targeting of civilians, educational facilities, and medical institutions constitutes a grave violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law….Calls by the US and Israel for Iranians to seize control of their own government are reckless and put countless civilian lives at risk.”

On April 8, the U.S. brokered a two-week ceasefire with Iran, mediated by Pakistan, in an effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway and one of the world’s most prominent oil and gas passes, and to de-escalate tensions in the 2026 Iran War. Immediately following the implementation of the ceasefire, Israel launched a series of large-scale airstrikes in Lebanon targeting Hezbollah sites, resulting in widespread damage to civilian infrastructure and a significant loss of human life.

Attacks across Lebanon have been widespread, with Israeli authorities reporting that they had carried out approximately 100 strikes across the country within 10 minutes. Southern Lebanon has experienced immense destruction, along with the southern suburbs of Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley, all reporting significant damage to civilian infrastructures. Attacks have been reported in the vicinity of the Hiram Hospital in Al-Aabbassiye near Tyre, as well as on an ambulance on the Islamic Health Authority in Qlaileh, causing three civilian deaths.

Figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) show that more than 1,500 people had been killed by Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon between early March and April 8, including over 200 women and children. Additional figures from the UN reveal that the attacks on April 8 alone resulted in more than 200 deaths and over 1,000 injuries across Lebanon. Many victims are believed to be still trapped beneath the rubble of destroyed infrastructure, as hospitals and rescue teams struggle to respond amid the overwhelming scale of casualties and urgent humanitarian needs.

“The scale of the killing and destruction in Lebanon today is nothing short of horrific,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. “Such carnage, within hours of agreeing to a ceasefire with Iran, defies belief. It places enormous pressure on a fragile peace, which is so desperately needed by civilians. The scale of such actions, coupled with statements by Israeli officials indicating an intention to occupy or even annex parts of southern Lebanon, is deeply troubling. Efforts to bring peace to the wider region will remain incomplete as long as the Lebanese people are living under continuing fire, forcibly displaced, and in fear of further attacks.”

On April 7, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a series of posts on social media in which he warned of potential large-scale destruction in Iran, which elicited significant concern and outrage from regional and international actors. His subsequent partial withdrawal of these comments did little to ease concerns and only further underscored the volatility of the U.S.’s role in foreign affairs.

“Today, the President of the United States again resorted to language that is not only deeply irresponsible but profoundly alarming, declaring that ‘the whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back’,” Amir Saeid Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, told the Security Council on April 7. He added that Trump’ s comments only acted as an open declaration of “intent to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity”, underscoring the troubling precents that the U.S. is setting for international conflicts.

“The announcement of a two-week ceasefire is a welcome step but it is partial, fragile, and incomplete. Most urgently, it does not include Lebanon, where I visited IRC programs last week and where airstrikes, evacuation orders and active hostilities not only continue to threaten civilians but intensify. A ceasefire that leaves one front of the conflict burning risks prolonging the crisis, not resolving it,” said David Miliband, President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee.

“The war in Iran has already triggered a dangerous domino effect, spreading humanitarian need, economic shock, and instability across the region and beyond. This moment must be used to expand the ceasefire, ensure the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and other critical routes remain open to allow scaled-up humanitarian aid and essential supplies to reach those in need, and to stabilize economies under strain. Without that, the gap between rising needs and shrinking resources will only deepen. Civilians must be given the space to begin rebuilding their lives with dignity which can only happen if there is a permanent cessation in hostilities,” he continued.

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres visiting a shelter hosting displaced people from areas affected by the ongoing conflict in the Dekwaneh area of Beirut during his visit to Lebanon in March 2026. Credit: UN Photo/Haider Fahs

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 9 2026 (IPS)

On April 8, Israeli military forces launched the deadliest series of airstrikes on Lebanon since hostilities escalated in early March, resulting in the deaths of at least 254 civilians. This latest incident threatens to further complicate humanitarian efforts in Lebanon that are already under immense pressure.

This latest escalation occurred just as a two-week ceasefire deal between the United States and Iran was announced the night prior on April 7, more than a month after the United States, Iran and Israel began engaging in military strikes against each other, which also led to Arab States in the Gulf getting caught in the crossfire. The parties targeted military bases and civilian infrastructure in Iran and Gulf states allied with the United States. Israeli and Lebanese armed forces exchanged fire across borders, which has resulted in a new wave of civilian casualties and mass displacement in a continuation of the conflict between the Israeli military and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. Israeli strikes on Lebanon have resulted in nearly 1,530 deaths since March 2, including more than 100 women and 130 children.

While the temporary ceasefire was welcomed, including by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, questions were raised about where it extended, even among major players in the negotiation process. Iran and Pakistan, a mediator in the peace negotiations, have stated that the deal includes Lebanon. Meanwhile, Israeli leadership initially claimed that the ceasefire did not include Lebanon and that the airstrikes specifically targeted Hezbollah-owned strongholds. Wednesday’s airstrikes targeted residential and commercial neighborhoods in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon.

Humanitarian actors expressed concern and alarm over the airstrikes and urged the parties involved to consider the safety and dignity of civilians in Lebanon.  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was “outraged” by the “devastating death and destruction” in Lebanon.

Displaced families at a makeshift shelter in a parking lot in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. Credit: WFP Arete/Ali Yunes

Oxfam International Executive Director Amitabh Behar welcomed the news of a ceasefire but said in a statement that until there was an end to the hostilities across the entire region, “no one will feel truly safe.”

“This pause must become a stepping stone for wider peace,” Behar said.

The war in Iran and the Middle East has put greater strain on humanitarian aid workers on the ground, including UN agencies.

Imran Riza, the UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Lebanon, explained that even before the latest escalation, the UN and its partners were aiming to support 1.5 million vulnerable people and that they have been forced to scale up their response with fewer resources than in previous years.

Less than a third of the emergency flash appeal for USD 308 million has been funded as of now. Yet despite these challenges, the UN and its partners have been able to provide more than four million meals and distribute more than 130,000 blankets and 105,000 mattresses to shelters. Multi-purpose cash assistance has also been provided to households as well.

Briefing reporters virtually from Beirut mere hours after the airstrikes, Riza commented on how civilians reacted to the news of a ceasefire.

“This morning, many people across Lebanon were cautiously optimistic about returning home—some even began to move. The events of the past hours, however, are likely to have triggered further displacement,” said Riza.

Also briefing from Lebanon was UNFPA Arab Regional Director Laila Baker, who described how the city of Beirut slowed to a standstill in the wake of the airstrikes. Cars are lining the streets while tents spread across the city as families seek shelter, she noted. She warned that the initial sense of unity that the Lebanese government and its partners had been working towards was now under threat due to the month-long “devastating aggression” from military forces.

“The risk is not only humanitarian collapse but also renewed fragmentation at a time when unity is most needed,” said Baker.

Displacement is already at an “unprecedented scale”, Riza said, as more than 1.1 million people—or one in five people in Lebanon—are internally displaced. More than 138,000 civilians, of which a third are children, are sheltering in 678 collective sites. The majority are dispersed across informal settings and host communities, which Riza noted leaves them with limited access to basic services. Overcrowding in shelters and limited sanitation services will likely lead to increased health risks.

The health system has also been overwhelmed and “under severe pressure.” Many facilities have been forced to close or have been damaged. Riza reported at least 106 attacks on healthcare, which have resulted in more than 50 deaths and 158 injuries among health workers.

Women and children are particularly vulnerable in this situation. Baker estimates that at least 620,000 women and girls have experienced displacement. Among them are at least 13,500 pregnant women who have been cut from essential maternal health services. At least 200 pregnant women will be delivering babies without essential support from midwives or nurses or with access to maternal and neonatal healthcare.

More than 52 primary healthcare facilities are no longer facilities and are forced to close. Among the six hospitals forced to close, five of them had maternity wards.

“These are not just statistics. They are grave violations of international humanitarian law – direct assaults on life, health, and dignity,” said Baker. “This is not only a humanitarian crisis – it is a crisis of humanity. It is a crisis of trust in the international system and in the principles meant to protect civilians.”

The UN and other humanitarian agencies urge for a permanent end to the fighting and call for international law to be upheld by all parties. Under the ceasefire agreement, all parties are urged to pursue diplomatic dialogue and work toward a long-term solution to the war.

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UN lobby with images of former UN secretaries-generals. Credit: United Nations
 
With the deadline for candidates’ nominations now passed, four names are officially in the frame. Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence size up the candidates.

By Felix Dodds and Chris Spence
APEX, North Carolina / SAN FRANCISCO, California, Apr 8 2026 (IPS)

Let the race begin!
April 1st was the deadline for candidates to be nominated for Secretary-General. Was it a coincidence that the deadline was April Fool’s Day? Judging by the quality of the official candidates, we suspect so.

Before looking at the four official finalists, however, it’s worth examining the state of global politics, since this will certainly have an impact on the likely outcome.

We are currently living in one of the most unstable times since the Second World War. Multilateralism is under threat and the UN is facing significant political and financial turbulence. To its credit, the UN is attempting to address these challenges through the UN80 process, which is trying to repurpose it for the years ahead. However, as the world becoming increasingly multipolar.

As the previous global order, shaped largely by the U.S. and its western allies, recedes into the rear-view mirror, there will still be plenty for a new Secretary General to do. In short, she or he will inherit an institution and a staff that is unclear about exactly what their future role should be.

One critical issue when looking at the candidates is to understand that any of the Permanent Five members of the powerful UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA) can veto a candidate. Will any of them exercise that power? Recent history suggests they may. Russia in particular has recently increased its use of the veto, and the US and China have also done so on occasion, although the UK and France have not exercised their “rights” in several decades.

Do the P5 share the same outlook in terms of a future Secretary General? For better or worse, it looks increasingly like the “big five” are looking for more of a “Secretary” than a “General”. On that basis, finding common ground may be possible.

What’s more, there is a general expectation that the successful candidate will probably be from Latin America and the Caribbean. This is based on a general sense among UN member states that leadership rotates through the various regional groups and that it is Latin America and the Caribbean’s ‘turn’.

So far, there has been no public disagreement with this approach, although the regional rotations are considered more of a guideline than a hard rule, and there have been exceptions in the past. For instance, present UN Secretary General, António Guterres of Portugal, was appointed at a time when it was generally expected that the successful candidate would come from Eastern Europe.

Another consideration is gender. The last time a Secretary General was appointed, there was a strong push to appoint a woman. This did not happen, even though seven qualified women were nominated.

In the straw polls held prior to this hiring process, António Guterres was the only candidate who did not attract a veto. In part, this was because he was the most experienced candidate and the first former head of state to stand. However, calls for a woman leader are perhaps even stronger this time around, backed by a sense that such an appointment is long overdue.

So, who are the four official candidates, and what happens next?

The four candidates that have been nominated will each have a three-hour “hustings” on the 21st or 22nd of April, which will be available to view live on UN web TV.

The candidates are:

MICHELLE BACHELET
Nominated by Brazil and Mexico (although her own country, Chile, has withdrawn its support). Bachelet is a former President of Chile. Her party was the Socialist Party of Chile, which is a member of the Progressive Alliance. Her hustings appearance will be on April 21st 10am to 1pm Eastern time.

Advantages
Seniority: Bachelet has held the top job in Chile not once, but twice. Not only that, but she has also held two senior roles within the UN. Her experience has been at the highest level, and her networks are impressive. It is hard to imagine someone with a more appropriate mix of expertise.

UN Credentials: As a former head of both UN Women and the UN High Commission for Human Rights, Bachelet’s insider knowledge is considerable. She would know how to navigate the organization effectively from her first day in the job.

A Female Leader: Michelle Bachelet would be a strong candidate to break the glass ceiling and become the first female leader of the UN.

A Latina Leader: With the tradition that the UN Secretary-General is chosen by rotating through the various UN regions, Bachelet would likely satisfy those who believe it is Latin America and the Caribbean’s “turn” to nominate Guterres’ successor.

Proven Impact: There are few potential candidates who could point to such broad impact both as a national leader and during two separate stints in high-level UN roles, especially in the fields of human rights and supporting vulnerable populations. Given the unprecedented uncertainty swirling around international diplomacy these days, a figure with a reputation as a “doer” may be welcomed.

Disadvantages

Objections from the Big Five? Bachelet has made comments in the past, particularly during her time as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, that may not have been welcomed by specific UN member states. With her own country withdrawing its support for her, it may make difficulties for her candidacy.

In spite of Bachelet’s obvious credentials, if even one of the “Big Five” members of the Security Council shows sensitivity to her past human rights comments, Bachelet may have her work cut out to change their views. Still, her credentials are impressive and even opponents might have a hard time making a case against her.

RAFAEL GROSSI
Nominated by Argentina, Italy, and Paraguay, Grossi is the present Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He is an Argentine career diplomat. His hustings are on April 21st from 3pm to 6pm.

Advantages

Seniority: He has held the post of Argentina Ambassador to Austria, Belgium, Slovenia, Slovakia, and International Organizations in Vienna, and the permanent representative of the United Nations Office at Geneva. While not as politically senior as some of the competition, his track record in diplomacy is certainly strong.

UN Credentials: He is the current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since December 3, 2019.

Proven Impact: Grossi has dealt with nuclear safety in conflict zones, doing shuttle diplomacy to maintain communications between warring parties. His work includes preventing nuclear accidents, particularly at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. He has also, through his “Atoms for Peace and Development”, modernized the IAEA, addressing issues of climate change, poverty, and fostering nuclear technology for development.

Latin Leader: Grossi also ticks the regional box, since he is from the Latin American and Caribbean Group.

Disadvantages

Objections from the Big Five? It’s hard to say. In spite of an exemplary record as a diplomat, in recent years Iranian officials accused him of aligning too closely with U.S. and Israeli interests. This is something Grossi’s supporters deny, and it is unclear how other in the P5, particularly China and Russia, might view the situation.

Not A Female Leader: Clearly not a woman, although it is unclear if this would be a deciding factor or deal breaker for the P5 under its current political leadership.

REBECCA GRYNSPAN
Grynspan was nominated by Costa Rica. She is the current Secretary-General of UNCTAD and a former Vice President of Costa Rica. She was a member of the National Liberation Party, which is a member of Socialist International. Hustings April 22nd, 10 am to 1 pm.

Advantages

Seniority: Grynspan may not have been a president or prime minister, but as Vice President of Costa Rica she climbed close to the summit of her country’s political mountain.

UN Experience: As the first female Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Grynspan has already broken one glass ceiling within the United Nations. She would also bring more than twenty years’ experience within the UN system, something that would surely be viewed as an asset during these uncertain times.

Additionally, she is familiar with the internal workings of the UN in Geneva, New York and across Latin America, giving her insights into decision making at both headquarters and regionally. This breadth of experience within the UN could be useful to any future UN leader.

Proven Impact: Grynspan is viewed as someone who can have an impact, a perception recognized by Forbes magazine, which named her among the 100 most powerful women in Central America four years running. She was also instrumental in the UN-brokered Black Sea Initiative, agreed by Russia, Türkiye, and Ukraine, that has allowed millions of tons of grain and other foodstuffs to leave Ukraine’s ports, playing an important role in global food security.

Connections: Grynspan has had many years of experience operating at the regional and global levels. Her networks may arguably not be as wide as some other candidates’, but would still provide a good platform for her to succeed.

A Female Leader: Grynspan offers the chance to break the glass ceiling and become the first female leader of the UN.

Climate and the Environment: Although Grynspan has strong credentials on trade, finance and development, it is only in recent years that she has taken a higher profile on climate change and some of the other big environmental issues of our time. Interestingly, this may be an advantage at this moment in time, since more some P5 members are now either lukewarm or hostile to candidates with a progressive track record on climate change.

Disadvantages

Peace and Security: Peace, security, and conflict resolution have not featured prominently in her background. If the UN Security Council members are looking for expertise in this area, might Grynspan’s relative lack of experience be considered a possible weakness?

Name Recognition: Although she is widely respected in her fields and across the UN, Grynspan may not have the same sort of name recognition among the public as some of the other candidates.

Objections from the Big Five? How might Grynspan’s political background play out in the current politically-charged atmosphere? Will her center-left credentials find a sympathetic audience among the current P5, or might some in the current conservative US administration object?

MACKY SALL
Nominated by Burundi, Sall is the former President of Senegal and Chairman of the African Union. Politically, his party (Alliance for the Republic) is a member of Liberal International. Hustings April 22nd, from 3pm to 6pm.

Advantages

Seniority: As the former President of Senegal (2012-2024) and former Prime Minister (2004-2007), he has the seniority that a UN Secretary General might well need these days.

Proven Impact: As Chairperson of the African Union, he succeeded in lobbying for the AU to join the G20. He has mediated in regional crises.

Objections from the Big Five? Sall is a center-right politician known to have forged positive ties with France’s Emmanual Macron. Will a right-wing administration in the US be drawn to a candidate also on the conservative side of the political spectrum?

Disadvantages

UN Credentials: Sall cannot claim strong UN credentials, but has been the chairperson of the African Union and a Special Envoy for the Paris Pact for the People and the Planet.

Not A Female Leader: While he would disappoint the many voices calling for the next UN head to be a woman, it’s unclear that would be a reason for any of the P5 to veto.

Not from Latin America: How important is it that the next Secretary-General be from the Latin American and Caribbean Group? At this point, it is hard to say if rotating around the regions “fairly” will be a big issue for members states. As noted earlier, it was not a deal breaker last time around.

A Late Entrant?

What if all four official candidates fail to win over the P5? We have seen in the past that new candidates appear after the nomination deadline. In fact, the process was only truly formalized as recently as 2015. Before that, the selection of a new UN leader was known for being opaque and characterized by back-room discussions and P5 deal making.

If consensus among the P5 cannot be reached, other candidates must emerge. Possibilities from the Latin American and Caribbean Group might include Ivonne Baki (Ecuador), Alicia Bárcena (Mexico), David Choquehuanca (Bolivia), María Fernanda Espinosa (Ecuador), Mia Mottley (Barbados), and Achim Steiner (Brazil).

There may also be interest from beyond the region, such as Amina Mohammed (Nigeria), who is the UN’s current Deputy Secretary-General. Additionally, Kristalina Georgieva (Bulgaria) and Vuk Jeremić (Serbia)—both former center-right European politicians with strong international credentials—have also been mentioned.

However, if the four official candidates all fail to find favor, then appointing a successor that all the P5 can agree on may take some deft diplomatic manoeuvring. At this point, the outcome of such haggling is pretty much anyone’s guess.

Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence have been involved with UN policy making since the 1990s. They recently wrote Environmental Lobbying at the United Nations: A Guide to Protecting Our Planet (Routledge, 2025) and co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022).

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Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

The US has spelled out in detail its own concept of what a restructured United Nations should look like: after drastic reductions in staff, cutting down its budget, avoiding duplication in mandates, slashing peacekeeping operations worldwide and deploying artificial intelligence (AI) for translations and interpretations in six languages.

As the biggest single contributor to the UN budget—and despite nearly $4.0 billion in unpaid dues—it is using its perceived financial clout to help radically change the world body.

The US says it wants to “make UN great again (MUNGA)”—a variation of President Trump’s oft-repeated slogan “Make America Great Again (MAGA).” ”.

But will it work? And is it feasible?

Ambassador Mike Waltz, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, addressing a Congressional Field Hearing on UN Reform, said last week, “As I stated in my confirmation hearing, the UN truly does need to get what we’re calling back to basics and back to its original mission, from its founding, back to maintaining international peace and security.

“As I’ve mentioned in my hearing then, the UN’s budget in the last 25 years has quadrupled. We have not seen, arguably, a quadrupling of peace and security around the world commensurate with those hard-earned dollars, he said.

“So, we are pressing it. We’re pressing it to streamline its bureaucracy, to eliminate duplication. We’ve made it clear that we will cease participation in some UN agencies that undermine our sovereignty and cannot be reformed.”

Earlier this year, he pointed out, President Trump announced “our withdrawal from 66 international organizations. That review is ongoing. And from my perspective, let me be clear, the U.S. will not fund organizations that act contrary to our interests.”

“On UN compensation and personnel,” he said, “We’re leading reforms to what are often exorbitant compensation and benefit standards that the over 100,000 UN staff receive. The UN pays 17% more than US equivalent civil servants, even though many of them are right here in New York.

“They also have additional generous benefits packages far exceeding what our great civil servants, both here and abroad, receive. And staff costs alone are 70% of their regular budget for these things we’re trying to bring back in line.

“So, we need to, and we are working to bring those compensation and benefits packages back in line with common-sense standards. Part of that will be the pension. There’s over $100 billion in management in the UN pension with 16%—I don’t know of an employer or a government out there that contributes 16% to their pension.”

And there are other reforms, he said.

For example, the number of interpreters and translators—times six for the six UN languages here—technology can be used, AI can be used, and remote translation can be used that will save a lot of the travel and the conference costs, said Waltz.

Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco and director of Middle Eastern Studies, who has written extensively on the politics of the United Nations, told Inter Press Service (IPS) this is not about cost-cutting or fiscal responsibility.

“Like cutbacks to important U.S. government agencies and domestic programs, the Trump administration appears determined to dismantle the system itself.”

This should be understood in the context of pulling out of international organizations and treaties, the establishment of the so-called “Board of Peace,” the Iran War, and the recently announced dramatic increases in military spending—it is about undermining international legal institutions and replacing them with an imperial order backed by raw military force, said Zunes.

Richard Gowan, Program Director, Global Issues and Institutions, at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told IPS in the first half of 2025, U.S. policy towards the UN was pretty chaotic, and diplomats from other countries really had no idea what Washington wanted from the world organization.

Like it or not, he said, Mike Waltz and his team have brought some message discipline and are clarifying their goals for the UN pretty sharply.

“Most diplomats say that Waltz can be reasonable in private and that ultimately, he and his team want to reshape the UN rather than just wreck it. There are times when Waltz goes out of his way to bash the UN and individual UN officials on social media, but I think that is partly him playing to the Republican base.”

Waltz is clear that he wants a slimmed-down UN, Gowan pointed out, and it is worth admitting that this is a popular message among many UN member states. The U.S. is not alone in thinking that the organization’s bureaucracy has grown too big and needs a tough financial diet.

“Trump, Rubio and Waltz are pretty consistent in arguing that the UN should focus on peace and security issues. But I think the administration has not really convinced most other UN members that it has a plan to make the UN deliver on conflict prevention and diplomacy again.”

Instead, he said, the U.S. appears to have a very selective and instrumentalist approach to when and how it uses the UN as a security partner. It wants the UN to help in Haiti but to get out of the way in Lebanon. I do not think there is really a coherent vision at work here. It is a very ad hoc, case-by-case approach.

“Trump’s boosting of the Board of Peace as a potential alternative to the UN has complicated Waltz’s position too. The fact that Trump is willing to flirt with the Board, even if it is not a very serious institution, makes it harder to believe that Washington really wants the UN to regain credibility on peace and security,” declared Gowan.

Meanwhile, excerpts from Ambassador Waltz’s testimony include the following:

• “On budget and staffing cuts, the UN should be doing less and doing it better. Let’s get it more focused and actually achieve more results. The 2026 UN regular budget was estimated at $3.45 billion. The U.S. funds roughly a fifth of that at $820 million in 2025 alone.
• Again, I think we need to reduce the UN’s size and assure every taxpayer dollar is spent responsibly, and thanks to the strong efforts by the United States, led by Ambassador Bartos here and his team in what we call the UN’s Fifth Committee, which approves its budget, we are working towards a leaner and better prioritized 2026 budget going forward.
• In December, we led Member States to adopt a historic 15% cut. $570 million out of the UN’s regular budget. That will eliminate nearly 3000 headquarters positions. And for our contribution, it will reduce our assessment by $126 million. So just in the six months that we’ve been here, we will see going forward, $126 million savings to the U.S. taxpayer.
• We’ve also pushed for a 25% reduction in peacekeeping troops, and I’ll talk a bit about other peacekeeping reforms in a moment that will also save us tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars while enabling what we call here the repatriation, the sending home of poorly performing peacekeeping troops.
• From an oversight perspective, beyond the salaries and benefits, oversight is essential. We’re leading efforts to empower oversight bodies to root out waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct.
• On peacekeeping reform, he said, the administration has been clear about focusing on the core mandate of peace and security, and we’re leading efforts to wind down some of these ineffective and costly peacekeeping missions.

“Some of them have been around for 30, 50, even 80 years. So, it’s one thing to stop a conflict, to insert an international force, to part ways with warring with the two sides, or to separate them to create the space for a political resolution.

“But it can’t then become an excuse to not have a political resolution. When you have a peacekeeping force, for example, in the DRC and Congo, at the cost of a billion dollars a year, that’s been there for 30 years—you can do the math and see how we have mission creep.

“So, what we’re looking to do is, as these peacekeeping forces come up for renewal, usually on an annual basis, tie them to a political process and use that as an opportunity to drive efficiencies along those lines, again, led by our reform team here that we have an ambassador, someone of an ambassador rank, dedicated to.

“This is just as a quick aside, the reimbursement for the equipment that these peacekeeping forces bring, sometimes to the tune of 10,000 18,000 soldiers. It’s quite significant. These countries were being reimbursed whether they used the equipment or not.

“All they had to do was bring it. So, there was an obvious incentive in place—and we received this feedback from the field—to not use the equipment very much, not have a lot of wear and tear, and countries would still receive the same level of reimbursement.

“We just negotiated new rules, the first time ever that put standards in place that the equipment actually has to be used for the peacekeeping force before you receive reimbursement. These are the kind of common-sense reforms that I think are pretty hard to argue with, although we received a lot of pushback, because for a lot of these countries, it’s a moneymaker for their ministries of defense. We were able to just get those reforms.

“Just a few examples: as we look to streamline these mandates, we’re also looking to draw some of them down. UNIFIL and Lebanon, we’ve made it clear, haven’t achieved their goals, haven’t lived up to its mandate and should be drawn down in the next year.

“We’re looking at a strategic review of the peacekeeping force in Western Sahara that has been there for 50 years. We are putting benchmarks in place for the peacekeeping force that’s in Southern Sudan. We just oversaw the orderly closure of UNAMI in Iraq, which will reduce costs by $87 million annually.

“We just pressed for closure of the special political mission in Yemen that will save $25 million annually. We streamlined missions in Colombia and Haiti, saving approximately $20 million annually. So again, these peacekeeping missions that solve problems do not exist indefinitely.

“On the humanitarian system, just as a personal aside, as someone who has served across Africa and the Middle East, I can’t tell you how many times I would pull up to this tiny ministry in a small country in Africa or in South Asia, and you have more UN vehicles in the parking lot than they have in their entire ministry from 16, 17, 18, different agencies, often with overlapping missions—all meaning well, all trying to help.

“But we’ve now pulled a lot of our funding that will force these agencies to use the same warehouses, use the same aviation, use the same vehicle fleets, and eliminate a lot of that duplication of waste in their back offices.

“So, moving forward, these reforms have made some significant steps. We have a long way to go—as I’m sure we’ll hear about today—to create a more focused, leaner and effective UN. We are just getting started.

“We’re building on this momentum heading into the next year with both long-overdue changes, the UN’s compensation system and pension plan, streamlining these peacekeeping missions, and halting waste that undermines effectiveness. And we’ll work with the UN leadership to align our reform agenda with the Secretary-General’s—what he calls his UN 80 mandate.

“We will have a new Secretary-General elected this year, and we’re having those conversations now with the candidates about what they seek to keep and continue or what new things they seek to put in place, but reform is at the top of our list as we meet with some of these candidates.

“So, this is a critical moment with senior leadership transitions approaching here over this next year. We need to have a clear message. We will prioritize qualified Americans. Representative DeLauro, along the lines of what you sought to do so many years ago, of having qualified Americans in UN leadership positions, not just here, but across the ecosystem in Geneva, in Vienna, and Nairobi and other places where you have UN agencies.

“And I’ll just conclude with echoing President Trump’s own words.

“As he said most recently at the General Assembly, the UN has tremendous potential. My charge from him is to help it realize that potential. We are dedicated to making the UN live up to that promise, to making the UN great again—if I can say so, our new acronym is MUNGA.

The UN is the one place where everyone can talk. If we walked away tomorrow—which neither I nor the president is advocating—it would be reinvented somewhere else. I will push hard and continuously to have it right here in the United States where it belongs.

And I look forward to keeping open dialogue with your committee. I thank you for the legislation, Chairman, that you pushed through. It adds additional arrows in our quiver to help make the UN great again,” declared Waltz.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Credit: Michaela Stache/AFP

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opened the 62nd Munich Security Conference by declaring that the post-war rules-based order ‘no longer exists’, there was plenty of evidence to back his claim. Israel is committing genocide in Gaza in defiance of international law, Russia is four years into its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the last nuclear arms control treaty between Russia and the USA has just expired and the USA has withdrawn from 66 international bodies and commitments. Since the conference, Israel and the USA have launched another war on Iran, threatening to spark a broader regional conflict. Meanwhile the UN is undergoing a funding crisis, cutting staff and programmes, and civil society organisations that relied on US Agency for International Development funding are facing closure.

Inaugurated in 1963 as a transatlantic defence meeting, the Munich Security Conference has grown into the most significant annual global security meeting, with heads of state, foreign ministers, civil society, think tanks and the media taking part. The 2026 edition focused on the theme ‘Under Destruction’ and convened over 1,000 participants from more than 115 countries, including over 60 national leaders, alongside China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the directors of multiple UN agencies.

The conference’s Munich Security Report 2026 provided the analytical backdrop. It argued that the world has entered a period of ‘wrecking-ball politics’, with the post-1945 order being demolished by political forces that prefer disruption to reform. The report’s Munich Security Index showed the scale of the crisis. In France, Germany and the UK, absolute majorities of respondents said their government’s policies would leave future generations worse off. Across most BRICS and G7 countries, the USA is now rated as a growing risk.

In the build-up the conference, the world had been bracing for Rubio’s keynote address. Last year, US Vice President JD Vance’s aggressive speech accused European governments of suppressing free speech and aligning with political extremism, with no apparent acknowledgement of irony. Rubio took a more conciliatory tone, calling Europe America’s ‘cherished allies and oldest friends’. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she was ‘very much reassured’. Half the hall rose to applaud.

The substance of the speech, however, followed every position Vance advanced the year before. Rubio defined the transatlantic relationship not around shared democratic institutions or international law, but around ‘Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, and ancestry’. This framing drew anger from global south delegates, who understood its explicit claim of global north cultural and racial superiority, excluding the majority of humanity.

The Trump administration was making a strategic calculation, having evidently concluded that Vance’s confrontational tone had backfired, bringing Europe closer to China and making it more reluctant to endorse US-led initiatives. So it switched to a softer messenger without changing the message.

Rubio’s post-conference itinerary made the USA’s current priorities clear. He flew directly from Munich to Budapest and Bratislava to meet two nationalist leaders, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. Both are pro-Trump and friendly towards Vladimir Putin. These are the European politicians the Trump administration considers its true allies. Now the USA is planning to fund right-wing think tanks and charities across Europe in a blatant attempt to influence the continent’s politics.

Friedrich Merz’s diagnosis led to a historic and disturbing move: he and French President Emmanuel Macron announced they’d begun talks on extending France’s nuclear umbrella to cover other European countries. This is a development it would have been hard to imagine just a year ago. For decades European countries have based their security policies on NATO and its article 5, the collective defence commitment. But the Trump administration has threatened not to respect article 5, driving European states to embark on the long and expensive process of detaching themselves from relying on NATO. Now this evidently includes the exploration of nuclear alternatives.

Von der Leyen described the move as a ‘European awakening’ and called for a ‘mutual defence clause’ to be brought to life. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for ‘hard power’ and readiness to fight if necessary. Poland’s nationalist President Karol Nawrocki said his country should get nuclear weapons. By responding in this way to the unravelling of the multilateral order, European states are further weakening the norms of non-proliferation and arms control that the post-war order sought to sustain. Responding to crisis with a second nuclear arms race could bring still further instability. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was the only European leader at the conference to warn against this.

The conference’s conclusion was that those who care about the international order must build new institutions, coalitions and frameworks that are fit for purpose and accountable to the people they are supposed to serve. This reasonable framing sidesteps crucial questions: whose interests institutions will serve, and who’s excluded as the blueprints are drawn.

Instead of a new nuclear arms race, European states’ reaction to the fraying of their old alliances with the USA must be anchored in human rights, genuine multilateralism and a commitment to international law. This will only happen if civil society is present as a partner at the table.

It’s clear the old order is broken, and those committed to human rights and opposed to militarisation and naked power politics can’t afford to be bystanders. Their responses need to be more assertive and inclusive. A new international architecture that continues to exclude civil society and sideline the global south will simply reproduce the structures that have failed to address today’s crises.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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