The global financial architecture needs a deeper reset; it should build a country's capacity to withstand shocks and grow over time. Credit: Shutterstock

By External Source
Jun 15 2026 (IPS)

When G7 leaders arrive in Evian-les-Bains this month, France will host more than another summit. It will host a test of whether rich-country coordination can still solve problems that no country can manage alone. Aid budgets are shrinking, debt-service bills are crowding out investment, climate shocks are damaging infrastructure, and private capital remains scarce and expensive where it is needed most.

France has rightly made reducing global imbalances a priority of its G7 presidency. The G7 must show how finance should move differently and with global impact.

The urgent focus is development finance. G7 ministers have acknowledged that many partner countries face repeated crises, structural vulnerabilities, rising debt, food insecurity, and humanitarian needs. France has also placed African investment and the role of public development banks on the G7 agenda.

These issues are not separate. A drought that cuts harvests can weaken revenue, raise debt distress, damage health, interrupt schooling, and make the next investment more expensive. The current Ebola outbreak reminds us how vulnerable we all are to these crises.

The current global financial architecture was built for a world that believed growth could be separated from ecology, projects from systems, and risk from resilience. That world is gone

The dominant development finance paradigm treats each problem in its own box. The world no longer works that way.

That is why the global financial architecture needs a deeper reset; it should build a country’s capacity to withstand shocks and grow over time. Investments should work together. A solar plant that cannot feed a resilient grid, a road washed away by the next flood, or a hospital without reliable water, power, and social services support may look good in a project document and still fail the economy.

First, the world needs a better measure of wealth. GDP is useful, but incomplete. It counts activity; it does not tell us whether a country is building or consuming the assets on which future prosperity depends. A forest cleared for short-term export can raise GDP, and so can rebuilding after a flood.

Neither means that a country is becoming richer if its soils, water, skills, and institutional trust are deteriorating. A reset should ask whether produced assets, natural systems, people’s capabilities, and public institutions are becoming stronger together.

The practical step is not abstract. Finance ministries could require comprehensive wealth impact statements. When a government considers a debt-financed power system, port, irrigation program, or disaster-risk loan, it should show not only the likely effect on deficits and growth, but also the likely impact on water security, land-use management, public health, skills, and future disaster losses.

Creditors and rating agencies should look at the same evidence. A country that protects floodplains, strengthens schools, and reduces energy vulnerability is making itself a safer borrower, even if those gains remain invisible in conventional accounts.

Second, the world needs to appraise investment portfolios, not isolated projects. This is where many well-intentioned plans underperform. A seawall without drainage and mangrove protection may shift risk rather than reduce it.

Climate-smart agriculture without storage, cold chains, and roads leaves farmers exposed. Solar panels without grid upgrades and reliable payment systems can leave generations stranded. The question should not be which project has the highest standalone return, but which combination of investments most improves resilience, productivity, and long-term wealth in the public interest.

This approach would also help mobilize private capital. Investors are often told that developing countries are too risky. But part of that risk reflects weak systems: unreliable power, poor maintenance, exposed supply chains, thin insurance, and fragile public finances.

Coordinated ublic investments should be used to lower these risks at the portfolio level by preparing interconnected pipelines, funding data, providing guarantees, supporting local-currency finance, and strengthening early-warning systems and building the institutions that keep assets working when shocks hit. Capacity building would not be a charity; it would be risk reduction.

Third, states and markets need clearer rules for allocating capital. For policymakers, this means that budgets, debt strategies, and industrial plans should include the assets and vulnerabilities they create. For multilateral development banks, the IMF, credit-rating agencies, and regulators, it means treating climate adaptation, nature protection, social capability, and debt sustainability as one conversation, not four.

Country platforms should bring them into a single investment plan with clear priorities and accountability. For investors, assets that protect water, power, food systems, health, and skills should be viewed as infrastructure for returns, not as ESG decoration.

The G7 can make this pivot at Evian. It could agree that major development-finance packages should include wealth impact statements; that multilateral development-bank country strategies should use portfolio appraisal; that public development banks should standardize guarantees and project preparation for resilience; that debt workouts and new lending terms should reward verified investments that reduce future losses; and that private co-financing should be linked to transparent outcomes. These reforms simply require an acceptance by institutions to judge success differently.

None of this is anti-market, anti-growth, or anti-finance. It is pro-accuracy, pro-stability, and pro-prosperity. The central task is simple: build a financial architecture that strengthens society’s productive capacity and the planet that sustains it, not that merely flatters the next quarter’s accounts.

The current global financial architecture was built for a world that believed growth could be separated from ecology, projects from systems, and risk from resilience. That world is gone.

France’s G7 presidency offers a chance to replace it with a financial system that measures real wealth, funds investments that work together, and rewards countries for reducing the risks that threaten everyone. That is how we move from fragmented finance to resilient prosperity and from short-term gain to long-term global public investment.

Hyginus ‘Gene’ Leon is the Executive Director of the Development Bank for Resilient Prosperity and was the sixth President of Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). Simon Reid-Henry, PhD is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

Du Hung Viet (left), President of the Eleventh Review Conference for the NPT 2026, chairs the closing session of the NPT Review Conference (27 April-22 May). Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 15 2026 (IPS)

On principle, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that unites the international community. But for a select few states, these principles came with conditions and a refusal to compromise on their security strategy.

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 22, 2026 without member states reaching consensus on a final outcome document. It was the culmination of four weeks of extensive debates starting on April 27, along with the special meetings, consultations and briefings that preceded the conference.

Compared to earlier editions shared before and during the conference, the final draft weakened much of the language surrounding the obligations of nuclear states, including those that related to disarmament efforts. Yet even with these concessions, for the third time in a row after 2015 and 2022, the NPT parties failed to adopt an outcome document.

At the closing session of the conference, Do Hung Viet, President of the NPT Conference and the UN Permanent Representative of Vietnam, remarked that the collective threat posed by nuclear weapons requires a collective response. He warned that in 2031, the NPT would pass 20 years without an outcome. It was the responsibility of state parties, he said, to uphold the NPT until Article VI, which calls for parties to pursue disarmament measures in good faith, could be implemented, and they needed to bolster the treaty as a tool to address modern threats.

Following the closing of the conference, Viet told reporters that the current state of the international environment requires “urgent action” in the face of recent tensions. Although the conference could not reach consensus, Viet attempted to find some positives in the proceedings, in that the engagement “highlights the value of the NPT and multilateralism as a whole”. Yet he expressed concern for the health of the treaty going forward as it related to state parties’ commitments.

Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, added that if parties to the NPT wanted to prevent a “further decrease of confidence” in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, then they “need to visibly make a commitment” through measurable steps.

She remarked that the international community at large needed to take lessons from the proceedings, starting with the acceleration of disarmament commitments under existing treaties. There were also increased calls for a “strengthening of the review process”, or enhancing accountability and transparency measures over the implementation of countries’ commitments to the NPT.

“Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear weapons states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just adhered to without nuclear weapons states’ commitment and implementation of disarmament commitments under Article 6,” said Nakamitsu.

Susi Snyder (left), ICAN Director of Programmes, and Seth Shelden (right), ICAN’s UN Liaison, at a press briefing held on the final day of the NPT 2026 Review Conference. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

Parties to the NPT, including nuclear-armed states, repeatedly acknowledged the NPT as a “cornerstone” for multilateral diplomacy and the nuclear disarmament regime. However, when it came to other nuclear treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), such acknowledgements were scarce. The final outcome draft makes a limited few references to these treaties but does not elaborate on the disarmament requirements outlined in them.

The final outcome document draft was noteworthy for its references to the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear testing for the first time in the context of the NPT Review Conference. Experts from the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) noted that this was possible thanks to the advocacy efforts of civil society and of the communities impacted by nuclear weapons use and testing.

In particular, the draft “recognise[s] the growing calls for assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing and for environmental remediation following nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing” and “welcome[s] efforts already undertaken in this regard”.

The draft also included a call for member states to “take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, including through education, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” by sharing the experiences of peoples and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing.

Recognition of the NPT stood in contradiction to the actions and statements made by nuclear-armed states. These states, which include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all maintain positions that contradict the principles of the NPT and broader efforts toward disarmament. These states have openly made plans to expand their nuclear arsenals and weave in the salience of nuclear weapons into their security strategy by justifying it through concepts of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ and nuclear sharing with other countries considering their own nuclear expansion. Two members of the Security Council are engaged in separate, active conflicts that have only exacerbated geopolitical tensions, while also dredging up anxieties around nuclear weapons as a security strategy. With seemingly no end in sight to these conflicts, those anxieties have only deepened, and has shaped global and regional security policies for years to come.

For a civil society group like ICAN, the lack of outcome for the NPT is emblematic of increasing risks of proliferation among nuclear-armed states and their allies.

“There is a reason why the countries that claim protection from nuclear weapons are afraid of discussion of what these weapons actually do to people and the environment. They simply don’t want people to know the true extent of the horror and cruelty nuclear weapons wreak, because acknowledging these harms will eliminate any credible legitimacy for retaining nuclear weapons,” said Susi Snyder, ICAN’s Director of Programmes.

What will it take, therefore, for these countries to reverse their positions? Snyder told Inter Press Service that “increasing the stigmatisation” of nuclear weapons would be one such tactic. Reinforcing the nuclear taboo by raising awareness among the populations of these countries is critical for them to recognise the complete destruction that a nuclear weapon would bring about, and the impact this would have on targeted communities and on themselves. Snyder noted the literal cost of proliferation, claiming that in 2024 nuclear-armed states spent over USD 3000 per second on their arsenals.

Finally, security doctrines built on the theory of nuclear deterrence need to be challenged. Seth Shelden, the UN liaison for ICAN, noted that if nuclear weapons can be seen as useless from a military perspective and unsustainable from a policy perspective, nuclear-armed states would reevaluate their positions. “Nuclear weapons are irrational. Nuclear deterrence is a fable. And all technology is abandoned once it is seen as no longer useful,” Shelden said.

Though the 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without consensus, member states still have other avenues to pursue the nuclear disarmament agenda, both within and outside the NPT process. There still remain specific nuclear weapon-free zone agreements among countries and treaties like the CTBT and the TPNW which also contain legally binding obligations for their signatories. Snyder confirmed that the TPNW will host its first review conference at the end of this year. Meanwhile, the NPT remains in its current form and state parties recognise its obligations and safeguards on the nuclear regime.

In 2024, the UN General Assembly pushed to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of a potential nuclear war, whose panellists will present their findings in 2027.

Galvanising the world public opinion on the nuclear regime is critical to restoring faith in the nuclear regime. Otherwise, Nakamitsu warned, the world is in “the trajectory of a very dangerous path.

“Let’s get back to a path that is more sustainable peace rather than creating arms race dynamics.”

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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The German government, along with a number of other countries, are currently organising flights to evacuate travellers and influencers stranded in the Gulf states. For many citizens of other nationalities, however, there is no such assistance. They remain stuck in precarious situations, marked by exploitation and insecurity.

Robin Frisch

A system based on exploitation

The fact that these migrant workers cannot be evacuated is due to structural reasons. In the Gulf monarchies, the kafala system binds migrant workers to a kafil, or sponsor. This modern form of servitude gives employers virtually unlimited control over their workforce. The Gulf model only functions because workers are permanently kept in temporary employment. They are imported, but not integrated. Their rights remain limited, social security is minimal and political participation not permitted. This arrangement is not a shortcoming but a prerequisite for maximum flexibility and low costs.

The fact that the Gulf states’ economic model is reaching its limits is also increasingly the subject of current debate. In a much-discussed New York Times essay, Richard Florida explains that the economic model in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is actually exacerbating the crisis. His question – ‘Could this be the end of Dubai?’ – can certainly be answered in the affirmative, at least from a social perspective. The Gulf states have all failed to provide a social safety net for their millions of workers. The mere import of workers, and complete absence of integration or social security, signal the end of the Dubai model. For decades, the Gulf states have profited from permanently keeping their workers in temporary employment. This model may be economically efficient, but it is structurally vulnerable.

The current war is acting as a stress test for this system. And it has shown that there are no institutional mechanisms in place to protect migrant workers. While citizens are being evacuated, millions of migrant workers are left behind. While supply chains are being secured, there remains a lack of the most basic protection for those who keep those chains running. Nobody is taking responsibility — it is just being passed from pillar to post, between countries of origin, employers and governments.

An International Labour Organization (ILO) study showed that social security, if it exists at all, only ever applies to formal employment contracts. In almost all the Gulf states, these regulations place the burden on the employee. Health insurance is mandatory and must be purchased privately. Not one Gulf state has a functioning system of unemployment insurance. Saudi Arabia is the only state that provides social security coverage for workers from certain countries of origin. This model of temporary migration appears to be so successful that even the current crisis will not change it. It is not in the interests of the Gulf states to provide social security as they derive no benefit from it themselves.

Not a single Gulf country has ratified the landmark ILO Convention 189 on decent work for domestic workers, though Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have at least made slight improvements to their national legislation and acknowledge the problems. In Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, union activity is not strictly prohibited, and trade unions are working to better integrate migrant workers. However, the crisis caused by the war is now so dire that the extent to which the situation has improved for domestic workers seems of secondary importance. Whether through trade unions, government measures or employer obligations, what matters is that the situation for migrant workers in the Gulf states is fundamentally improved. Reforms will achieve little. It is time for systemic change.

Developing a social safety net

The executive secretary of the Arab Trade Union Confederation, Hind Benammar, has criticised the kafala system, but at the same time advocates for channels of communication to be opened with Saudi Arabia. Such diplomatic efforts are important now as they can help initiate reforms and resolve conflicts between governments. But the fundamental problem remains: How can working conditions be improved in the long term, and what form might an effective social security net take?

The victims of Iranian attacks in Dubai and the UAE were almost all migrant workers. In Dubai, there were even alarming social media posts about labour migrants being imprisoned. The strict internet censorship in these countries complicates the situation, as members of migrant communities are often unable to openly discuss the conditions on the ground. The fact that in this situation, it is the migrant networks – not governments – that are picking up the slack is not a sign of resilience but systematic failure.

One of the few organisations that are actually helping migrant workers at the moment is the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). The IDWF organises emergency accommodation and coordinates aid, thereby effectively replacing government safety nets. Social security only exists where it is improvised. The millions of jobs as cleaners, nannies and nurses are primarily carried out by women. Domestic workers are often not even allowed to leave their workplaces, let alone move freely in public spaces. The social isolation of these workers is reminiscent of the pandemic. Here, too, they had nobody to rely on except for their own communities.

When governments, employers and insurances fail to provide assistance, communities must step into the breach. The IDWF approaches the embassies of workers’ countries of origin, calls for repatriation flights to be organised and provides its members with individual-level safeguards. They make contact with domestic workers through community leaders. These individuals, who together play a role similar to that of a works council, provide information about the situation, offer support in emergencies and organise training sessions on issues such as mental health, which is becoming increasingly important in light of the severe social isolation. In some of the Gulf states, this work has been criminalised, and several community leaders have even been detained. For domestic workers, but also for those in the construction and transportation sectors, this is a matter of sheer survival. For the most part, however, the Gulf states have no established trade union tradition. In the Gulf monarchies, policy-making is controlled by a handful of powerful men.

Over the last few years, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have sought to make financial contributions to the ILO. But the Gulf states will not be able to simply buy themselves a clean slate. Ambet Yuson, general secretary of the six-million-member Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), has condemned the fact that Saudi Arabia’s reforms by no means signify an abolition of the kafala system, claiming they are in fact little more than rebranding. In Saudi Arabia, stadiums for the 2034 World Cup are currently being built, but the construction sector also lacks a basic social safety net. It would be disastrous if the mistakes made in Qatar were to be repeated here. There, too, the kafala system resulted in exploitation, as any worker who lost their job found it nigh on impossible to switch to a new sponsor. Recruitment practices and indebtedness in the home country further exacerbate this dependence.

Thus, the war has not only exposed a crisis — it has marked a boundary. A model that consistently shifts risks onto legally marginalised workers will only remain stable provided no shocks occur. As soon as they do, it becomes clear that there is no social security because uncertainty is an inherent part of the system. The Gulf crisis shows just how important it is to develop the social safety net that the trade unions are advocating for. The much-discussed question of reforms does not go far enough. The real problem is structural. Yet this does not automatically result in systemic change. On the contrary: reactions so far suggest that the cost of the crisis will, in fact, continue to be shifted onto migrant workers.

Change will therefore not come from the Gulf states alone. Here, external and transnational levers are crucial. Countries of origin must enforce stronger protection mechanisms and binding social security agreements; international organisations such as the ILO must strengthen minimum standards; and European countries must take responsibility, for instance by regulating recruitment practices, supply chains and labour standards.

Robin Frisch is the head of the regional trade union project in the MENA region and of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s office in Algeria.

Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.

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GA During NPT Review Conference. Credit: Jonathan Granoff

By Jonathan Granoff
NEW YORK, Jun 10 2026 (IPS)

Martin Luther King Jr. , when he received the Nobel Peace Prize, reminded us of “The fact that most of the time human beings put the truth about the nature and risks of the nuclear war out of their minds because it is too painful and therefore not ‘acceptable’, does not alter the nature and risks of such war. The device of ‘rejection’ may temporarily cover up anxiety, but it does not bestow peace of mind and emotional security.” I have devoted many decades of my life to not ignoring the risk of nuclear annihilation and since 1995 have attended every Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to learn and hopefully contributed to a saner safer world.

The 191 nations which are parties to the third most important legal instrument of the 20th Century, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), recently finished a Review Conference at the United Nations in which the future of humanity was soberly discussed. It took place from April 27-May 22, 2026. Social media, major news outlets, and other media virtually ignored the gravity and importance of the deliberations. Only the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are arguably of greater significance than the NPT.

Without it there would likely be dozens of states with nuclear arsenals. Because of it there are only nine. Five – US, UK, France, China, and Russia — are members of the Treaty and India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea are the only nations in the world not parties to the Treaty.

The NPT arose because intelligence estimates during the 1960s reported that, by the end of the 1970s, there would be twenty-five to thirty states with nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals and ready for use. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. It is based on a bargain. In exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapon states (today, some 186 nations) not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards intended to verify compliance with the commitment, the five NPT nuclear weapon states promised unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies (e.g. nuclear power reactors and nuclear medicine), and pledged to engage in good faith disarmament negotiations to achieve the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

This promise of disarmament is the only expression by the five that they are legally bound to negotiate nuclear disarmament. It is reinforced by the historic 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which unanimously ruled that an obligation exists to pursue in good faith and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict, effective international control. This finding interpreted Article VI of the NPT as a binding requirement not to just negotiate in good faith but asserted an affirmative obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.

The Treaty had a provision that after 25 years it would be reviewed to be determined whether it would terminate, be extended for another specific period of time, or be extended indefinitely. It was agreed in 1995 that it would be extended indefinitely. However, there is an ongoing legal obligation that every five years there is a review conference to analyze compliance and establish commitments to action to fulfill the core bargain. This process should not be ignored.

A context of previous commitments that have been made and remain outstanding are worth noting. Yes, diplomatic and especially legal language is boring but remember these words are the best tools we have for preventing suffering at scales and horror beyond our capacity to imagine.

The choice is either the tools of law and diplomacy or facing the consequence of explosions giving off heat three times the face of the sun, fireballs tens of miles wide throwing tons of soot into the stratosphere rending the agricultural base of civilization destroyed, radiation spreading across the globe, and the callous use of devices which dwarf the destruction of Hiroshima or Nagasaki by magnitudes the mind cannot easily grasp.

The atomic bombs of World War II were each less than the equivalent of 20 tons of TNT. There are now bombs in the million tons ranges. If used they will not discriminate between children, elderly, or even other species. As the first generation that must decide not to be the last, we will have failed our duty to future generations and our duty to live as human beings during our brief journey together.

So, please look at the progress that has taken place and could take place again if we can generate the knowledge in the public and political will of leaders to simply save humanity from a fire of our own creation.

A bargain to gain the indefinite extension of the NPT was obtained in 1995. It was based on a Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament which “politically, if not legally, condition[ed] the indefinite extension of the treaty.” The Statement pledged to accomplish the following:

1. Complete a “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end of 1996”
2. Reaffirm the commitment “to pursue . . . nuclear disarmament”
3. Commence “negotiations for a treaty to stop” production “of nuclear bomb material[s]”
4. “[S]harply reduce global nuclear arsenals”
5. Encourage “the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones”
6. Vigorously work to make the treaty universal by bringing in Israel, Pakistan and India, who have nuclear weapons and remain outside the treaty
7. Enhance IAEA [ Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards and verification capacity 8. Reinforce negative security assurances already given to NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapons States) “against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them . . . .” (This means to not threaten to use nuclear weapons against states which have renounced nuclear weapons for themselves .)

At the first Review Conference of the Treaty in 2000 the here are some of the terms upon which unanimous agreement was obtained:

1. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

2. Nuclear Test Moratorium

A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

6. Elimination of Nuclear Arsenals

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The START II, START III, and ABM Treaties

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. (These treaties have been ended.)

9. Other Nuclear-Weapon States’ Actions

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

– Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally

– Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament

– The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process

– Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems

– A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination

– The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons

10. Excess Fissile Material

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

13. Verification

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

In 2010 over 60 further commitments to making the world safer were made.

I recount the accomplishment of these commitments to highlight the diplomatic failure of the 2026 Conference where no final statement of agreement could be reached. We must be sober and recognize that the five states with nuclear weapons are either modernizing and thus making more usable their nuclear arsenals and/or expanding them, and the web of agreements that have constrained and contained proliferation and reduced risk have been eliminated by the actions of Russia and the US which possess over 85% of the world’s over 12,000 nuclear weapons. Threats of use are daily reported in the papers.

Treaty words and promises must mean something or else bullets become the verbs of communication. In the nuclear age this is too dangerous.

If the people of the world knew what diplomats could achieve if they were given the authority to use the skills of law and diplomacy, if they knew the daily risk of use of these devices by accident, design, or madness and the dozens of near uses by mistake, if they knew there is a better way, we could follow the path President Reagan and President Gorbachev opened which led to the reduction of the world’s nuclear arsenals by over 80%.

Today fear is an abused currency. In recent times we have seen how much can be created when hope and trust are invoked. The current downward spiral arising from the abusive arrogance of power exemplified by nuclear threats cannot lead to a better place. Our common humanity alone can bring us common security. It has been done before and it can be done again.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference demonstrated a failure by the five nuclear weapons states to work together to make the world a safer place.

Let us take the advice of Martin Luther King Jr. whose words when he won the Noble Peace Prize remain resonant today. “I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of thermonuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word in reality. This is why right temporarily defeated is stronger than evil triumphant.‬”

That is why in the face of apathy, ignorance, fear, war, dishonesty, and violence, those of us who know the life lived without caring, compassion, sincerity and the pursuit of truth is hollow cannot turn away from the imperative that is both moral and practical. The work to fulfill the legal duty to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and obtain their legal, verifiable elimination must continue. Working for peace is not an inconvenient truth but a blessing available to all of us.

Jonathan Granoff is President of the Global Security Institute.

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(AI image for representative purpose)

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 9 2026 (IPS)

As ongoing military conflicts in Europe and the Middle East continue with no signsof winding down, there is increasing focus on nuclear weaponsamid heightened risks of escalation.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),in its annual assessment of the state of armaments, disarmament and international security, singles out key findings in its SIPRI Yearbook 2026 that “states are increasingly relying on nuclear weapons as instruments of national power—reversing decades of efforts to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons—even as the risks of miscalculation and escalation are rising”.

World’s nuclear arsenals expanded and upgraded

The world’s nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Israel—continued programmes to modernize and enhance their nuclear arsenals in 2025, and most deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems during the year, said SIPRI.

The current military conflicts include a nuclear Russia vs non-nuclear Ukraine, a nuclear US vs non-nuclear Iran and a nuclear Israel vs non-nuclear Palestine and Lebanon.

Of the total global inventory of an estimated 12, 187 warheads in January 2026, about 9,745 were in military stockpiles for potential use.

An estimated 4,012 of those warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft and the rest were in central storage. Between 2100 and 2200 of the deployed warheads were kept in a state of high operational alert on ballistic missiles, according to the report.

Nearly all of these warheads belonged to Russia or the USA, and to a lesser extent France and the UK, but China and India may now occasionally deploy a small number of warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime.

‘Influential voices, including some world leaders, are advocating nuclear weapons as a guarantee against attack by a hostile state. But making national defence and security strategies dependent—or more dependent—on nuclear weapons could significantly increase nuclear risks,’ said SIPRI Director Karim Haggag.

‘The dangers associated with nuclear weapons are growing due to advances in weapon technology, the breakdown of nuclear arms control and heightened geopolitical tensions, among a range of other factors. At the same time, world events—not least the outbreak of conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan—are challenging nuclear deterrence logic.’

Dr M. V. Ramana, Professor and Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security, Director pro tem, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, told Inter Press Service the continued modernization of nuclear weapons and the increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in military doctrines is a dangerous trend, especially when this is happening when many of the most military powerful countries in the world are resorting to attacking other countries with bombs, missiles, and drones rather than diplomatically settling differences.

“Any of these ongoing wars can easily escalate into ones where some country resorts to using nuclear weapons, which would result in destruction an order of magnitude greater than what is already being wrought by the weapons being used currently,” he pointed out.

Such a contingency becomes even more imaginable with the integration of Artificial Intelligence and other software tools to accelerate the kill chain, and possibly removing people from the process of deciding who to attack and what weapons to use, h argued.

Countries without nuclear weapons currently are also witnessing recommendations from influential spokespeople to consider developing a nuclear arsenal. Such a race can quickly spiral out of control, making it urgent that the world collectively step away from expanding nuclear arsenals and considering their use, and more generally, cease the use of militaristic violence to settle differences, said Dr Ramana.

Since the end of the cold war, says SIPRI, the gradual dismantlement of retired warheads by Russia and the USA has normally outstripped the deployment of new warheads, resulting in an overall year-on-year decrease in the global inventory of nuclear weapons. This trend is likely to be reversed in the coming years, as the pace of dismantlement is slowing, while the deployment of new nuclear weapons is accelerating.

‘The evidence is growing that the nuclear weapon states are sidelining, and even walking away from, their disarmament commitments and are instead flexing their nuclear muscles,’ said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

‘By reaching for nuclear solutions, states are creating new risks and fuelling arms-race dynamics,’ he said.

Dr. Natalie Goldring, the Acronym Institute’s representative at the United Nations, told IPS the nine countries with nuclear weapons are engaged in extremely destabilizing behaviors — developing new weapons, increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals, abandoning arms control frameworks and verification systems, and threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional weapons attacks, among other dangerous moves. Each of these choices increases risk; taken together, the potential consequences are terrifying.

Even the existence of nuclear weapons poses enormous military, economic, and environmental threats, among others. Fortunately, there’s a promising way forward — the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which rejects the contention that nuclear deterrence and continued development of new nuclear weapons somehow make us safer.

Under the TPNW, States commit themselves to not develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The TPNW has 74 States Parties, with an additional 25 signatories that have not yet become States Parties. It’s arguably our best hope of breaking the cycle of continual upgrades and “modernization” of weapons, while decreasing nuclear threats.

“We don’t know whether the fact that nuclear weapons haven’t been used in wartime since the United States military dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is because of luck, skill (including deterrence), or a combination of those factors. Proponents of deterrence don’t tend to talk about the role of luck. They also don’t tend to talk about the risk of nuclear use through accident or miscalculation. That’s a short-sighted, high-risk approach. Militaries frequently have accidents; they also frequently fail to correctly calculate their adversaries’ capabilities and motivations.”

“The inherent risks of these weapons are compounded by the individuals involved. For example, US President Donald Trump is a threat to international security. He is unpredictable, prone to fits of rage, disinclined to listen to or learn from experts, and poorly informed about specific and general US military policies. And because of US nuclear weapons policy, he has the authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons without anyone else needing to confirm that order. That’s an extraordinarily dangerous situation, especially given his volatility.”

Recent events also increase risk. For example, the New START Treaty limited the number of deployed nuclear weapons for both the United States and Russia and contained useful verification provisions. Unfortunately, the treaty expired in February 2026, removing both the numerical limits on US and Russian nuclear stockpiles and the verification procedures.

Another example is the recent conclusion of the 2026 Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This conference continued the pattern from the previous two review conferences, as States were not even able to agree on an outcome document. More importantly, the five nuclear weapons states defined by the treaty (the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France) continue to fail to meet their commitment to disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

“The US’s stated reliance on the idea of nuclear deterrence may have encouraged other countries to do the same. I remember being at a meeting many years ago, where a South Asian diplomat asked me why the US government was so arrogant that it thought it had a monopoly on nuclear deterrence. He said there was no reason that India and Pakistan couldn’t or shouldn’t have a similar set of strategies. TPNW provides a more sensible answer – all of these States should renounce nuclear weapons.”

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Recent geopolitical trends threaten more food crises, especially in developing countries. A new IPES-Food report urges a strategy of ‘resilient self-reliance’, proposing available opportunities to improve equity, sustainability and solidarity.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Geopolitics – referring to political sanctions, trade disputes, military conflicts, multilateral challenges, aid cuts, planetary heating, and corporate interests – is affecting food availability worldwide.

Corporate interests have increasingly reshaped food systems over the last half-century – promoting selective trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, financialization and cost reductions, ostensibly to improve food security efficiently.

Prioritising cost and fiscal savings led to the neglect and closure of buffer stocks. Food systems became more vulnerable as price volatility worsened.

Just-in-time supply chains have also been more susceptible to geopolitical shocks, planetary heating, and market manipulation.

World Bank structural adjustment programmes made developing countries more reliant on food and input imports. Tariffs and sanctions have disrupted food supplies worldwide.

Felice Noelle Rodriguez

Wars in Ukraine, Iran and elsewhere have disrupted supplies, spiking prices, and have most hit poor food-importing countries. Powerful governments have also weaponised food supplies for political reasons, as against Cuba.

Major donor countries have cut aid, with lethal consequences for the most vulnerable, as in Sudan, Palestine, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions – such as the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Health Organization (WHO) – have been deliberately undermined by superpowers abusing international arrangements for their own advantage.

Food prices have been much higher since 2020, following the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine and Iran wars, and other major disruptions. For instance, the Hormuz fertiliser disruptions will hurt food supply for some time to come.

Import bills have risen sharply, worsening debt burdens in poor food-importing countries. Food inflation has hurt low-income communities most, especially when governments juggle imports with debt servicing.

Corporate concentration has also worsened fertiliser and food supply and price volatility, especially hurting smaller producers. Powerful interests have also abused food crises for profit.

Geopolitics has also worsened environmental crises, as planetary heating intensifies extreme weather events, hurting crop yields and food availability.

Managing markets
To enhance food security, governments must effectively influence markets with appropriate policy instruments.

The report proposes adapting policy tools once widely used before corporate-inspired neoliberal reforms, to improve contemporary market management, supply resilience and price stability.

Public stockholdings (PSHs) involve government procurement, storage, and timely release of stocks to enhance food security, including by stabilising prices. PSHs can thus help smallholdings while improving emergency preparations.

Using minimum support prices with its Targeted Public Distribution System, India subsidises grain for two-thirds of its people, while insulating national food prices from international volatility.

Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established a Regional Food Security Reserve to pool members’ stocks and collectively respond to crises.

Supply management
Other supply management mechanisms include production quotas, marketing boards, and import controls.

Market management has also supported other policy goals aimed at improving rural vitality, equity, food sovereignty, environmental sustainability, and democratic participation.

Thus, unlike in the US, Canada’s dairy, poultry, and egg production is subject to quotas and negotiated minimum prices to limit price volatility and stabilise farm incomes.

But policy implementation remains challenging. PSH programmes are often complex and costly, and risk leakage, corruption, and inefficiency.

Government commitments, such as trade agreements, limit policy options. Supply management measures may also raise consumer prices and favour wealthier farmers, as neoliberal critics have been quick to exaggerate.

But these policy tools can also support small-scale producers, reduce waste, strengthen national supply chains, and mitigate risks posed by highly centralised industrial agriculture.

Resilient Self-Reliance
The report promotes resilient self-reliance, requiring appropriate market management to stabilise food supplies and improve equity, sustainability, and food sovereignty.

Resilient self-reliance combines resilience (the ability to withstand and recover from shocks) with food self-reliance (the capacity to meet food needs with domestic production and cooperative trade).

The report recommends innovative trade partnerships, including international buffer stocks and cooperative regionalism, citing CARICOM’s regional food strategy.

Resilient self-reliance upholds food sovereignty norms, emphasising farmer rights, agroecology, territorial markets, and democratic governance, stressing equity, diversity, ecological balance, and flexibility.

Managing markets can also support agroecological transitions, culturally appropriate food diversity, territorial markets, and strategic reserves to cushion shocks.

Vulnerable countries, often due to earlier neoliberal reforms, typically try to reduce their susceptibility to international market volatility, but are usually less able to do so.

Market management mechanisms, agroecological practices, territorial markets, and cooperative trade arrangements can help ensure more stable and equitable food systems.

Stressing the urgent need for policy reform, the authors argue that recent geopolitics not only threatens crises but also offers new opportunities to reform food systems for greater equity, solidarity and sustainability.

For instance, the Hormuz crisis may spur developing economies to accelerate transitions to more renewable energy, thereby reducing their vulnerability to fossil fuel and other energy imports.

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Picture alliance/Anadolu/Selcuk Acar. Annalena Baerbock, President of the UN General Assembly and former German Foreign Minister.
 
Germany’s humiliating defeat in the race for a UN Security Council seat reveals the price of a foreign policy increasingly seen as hypocritical abroad.
 
The United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday elected Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe to the 15-member U.N. Security Council for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2027.
 
Germany, which had lobbied hard for a seat, came third for the two places contested by the Western European and Others Group, with 104 votes, against 134 for Portugal and 131 for Austria.-- Reuters

By Marcus Schneider
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jun 8 2026 (IPS)

This is the downfall of a diplomatic superstar. Germany’s defeat in the election to the UN Security Council is the consequence of a foreign policy that has proven disastrous in recent times, failing to uphold either the values or the interests of the Federal Republic.

The fact that the second-largest contributor to the UN has been punished so severely by Portugal and Austria highlights a global loss of trust that had not yet been fully realised in political Berlin.

‘We are seen as someone who defends the rules-based order; as an advocate of international law’, Foreign Minister Johann Wampold lectured just hours before the election. And in doing so, he revealed the gulf between Germany’s self-perception and the way it is perceived internationally. It is quite clear that on this very issue – the extent to which the Federal Republic actually stands up for binding rules and international law – there has been massive damage to its reputation, which is now, for the first time, resulting in political consequences.

International law à la carte

Germany’s global alienation can be traced very precisely to the Israeli war in Gaza, which stirred up international passions like hardly any other conflict. The problem here is not merely the stance perceived as highly one-sided in large parts of the world.

It is the palpable discrepancy with Germany’s conduct in Ukraine and with the general self-image of a country that likes to parade through the world with a particularly raised moral finger.

If in one instance – quite rightly – one loudly condemns war crimes and calls on the whole world even more loudly to do the same, yet in the other case remains silent, grants the perpetrators diplomatic and political cover, and even supplies them with weapons (even though the crimes are far more serious by all objective standards), it is hardly surprising to be accused of double standards and hypocrisy.

The damage to Germany’s reputation is all the more severe because the country was regarded for decades as a safe bet in foreign policy. Like hardly any other state, the Federal Republic stood for strengthening multilateral institutions.

First, the former capital of West Germany, Bonn, then Berlin, supported the development of an international judiciary. Precisely as a lesson from its own history and in its own well-understood interest as a country at the heart of a continent once ravaged by war, Germany committed itself with vigour and generosity to peace and the balancing of interests.

It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

For a long time, incidentally, it was possible to adopt a stance on the Middle East conflict that did justice both to Germany’s historical responsibility towards Israel and to the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians and Arabs. It is only in recent times that the ‘reason of state’, now invoked like a mantra, has emerged, towering above all else as a foreign-policy creed imbued with an almost sacred significance.

Foreign countries in particular, which do indeed take note of the largely self-referential German discourse, may well ask: does this raison d’état actually have any moral limits? Or does it also cover up war crimes, ethnic cleansing and what even highly reputable experts and institutions describe – to put it mildly – as genocidal conditions?

For the raison d’état is, after all, not a product of realpolitik interests, but is proclaimed as a kind of higher morality, and thus as a lesson from German history that other countries should, please, understand. Many there see rather a German failure to draw universal lessons from its own history, possibly even a kind of unwelcome historical continuity.

The self-portrayal as a ‘champion of international law’ – which was, after all, the main argument put forward for the now-failed German campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council – also seems rather odd in light of a series of statements made by the Chancellor. For instance, Friedrich Merz thanked Israel for doing the ‘dirty work’ with regard to the war of aggression against Iran — which, according to the overwhelming majority of legal opinion, is illegal under international law.

He described the legal assessment of the kidnapping of the Venezuelan head of state as ‘complex’, whilst explicitly refraining from offering lectures on international law regarding the recent Israeli-American war of aggression against Iran. As opposition leader, he had expressed outrage over the arrest warrant for the alleged Israeli war criminal Netanyahu, who is accused of serious crimes against humanity. After all, he claimed, the International Criminal Court had supposedly been established solely to ‘hold despots and authoritarian leaders to account’.

One gets the impression of a Chancellor who – speaking for a significant portion of the country’s political and media elites – seeks to replace the rule of law with a kind of higher moral order. Under this system, the supposedly ‘good’ – that is, ourselves and our democratic allies – are effectively permitted to do anything. They are no longer bound by any rules.

It is international law, if it exists at all, à la carte. Above all, it marks a departure from Germany’s decades-long belief in the civilising of international relations through their codification. From the perspective of many states that have withheld their vote from Berlin, the Federal Republic is now too unreliable a partner for the highest body of the global legal order.

Time for a reassessment

The election defeat is not merely a humiliation; it is accompanied by a real loss of influence and prestige for what is, after all, the largest and economically strongest country in the European Union. In future international crises, Berlin will now find itself at the back of the room. For Germany, this should be a moment of self-reflection at best.

What values and interests should guide our policy? In a phase of extreme geopolitical upheaval, the rise of the Global South and the US distancing itself from the world order it once imposed, Germany is dependent not on less, but on more and on resilient international cooperation.

Clearly, the international legal order is not perfect. The institutions of collective security are frequently paralysed, and, as in the past, there will be dilemmas where interests and values make it necessary to strike a balance between politics and law.

However, a complete descent into a dog-eat-dog world – where military might is the only thing that counts, where wars of aggression are launched at will, where warfare is becoming increasingly brutal, and where the international community is sinking into global cultural conflicts – cannot be in Germany’s interests.

Such a world would, sooner or later, also threaten the enduring peace within the EU. As a country with few natural resources, highly integrated economically and dependent on global trade flows, the Federal Republic is reliant on a reasonably functioning world order in which fundamental principles apply even across the boundaries of political regimes.

It is disconcerting to see how much the German government, particularly its conservative wing, celebrates its friendship with an Israeli government in which war criminals and right-wing extremists call the shots.

The restoration of Germany’s lost soft power will also necessitate a reassessment of German Middle East policy. Hardly anyone expects a triumphant switch to the camp of Palestine’s supporters. But a more measured and balanced approach would certainly be appropriate. It is disconcerting to see how much the German government, particularly its conservative wing, celebrates its friendship with an Israeli government in which war criminals and right-wing extremists call the shots.

The fact that, in the global perception, one aligns oneself so closely with a group that is knowingly threatening to turn its own country into an international pariah state defies any rational explanation. The costs of this stance are very real, and they are damaging to Germany.

The embarrassing defeat at the UN may not be a one-off blunder in this matter. In a few years’ time, the International Court of Justice will rule on the case of genocide in Gaza. Further trouble looms here. For those who, for ethical reasons, cannot bring themselves to resolve the completely untenable conditions in the occupied territories through a solution acceptable to the international community, Germany’s well-understood self-interest should tip the balance by then at the latest.

For unlike so many conflicts where Berlin’s contribution is limited to expressing deep concern, the Federal Republic would actually have influence here. So far, this influence has been used very successfully to block any European pressure on a government that wants a great deal, but certainly not a sustainable peace. As soon as that changes, two things would be on the rise again: peace — and Germany’s tarnished reputation.

Marcus Schneider heads the FES regional project for peace and security in the Middle East, based in Beirut, Lebanon. Previously, he worked for the FES as head of the offices in Botswana and Madagascar, among others.

Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels

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In the hard-to-reach rural community of West Pokot, Kenya, 156 young women crossed a threshold that once seemed out of reach. Their graduation from HER Lab, a workforce skills programme for marginalized rural young women, was more than a ceremony. It demonstrated the power of targeted investment, trusted local partnerships and women’s economic empowerment.

Neven Mimica

The EU’s budget crossroads

The European Union faces a critical moment as it negotiates its post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). While the European Commission has described the draft as its “most ambitious ever”, rising debt repayments and interest costs mean that, in real terms, funding for external action and development is stagnating or declining.

The new MFF prioritises competitiveness, industrial policy and defence. These priorities are understandable in a volatile geopolitical context, but they risk coming at the expense of development cooperation, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and gender-focused programmes — particularly those supporting Africa.

This is not abstract. Cohesion and Common Agricultural Policy budgets are shrinking, while development funding is increasingly consolidated into broader external action instruments. Member states have warned that any real increase is marginal and that adjustment costs will fall on the most vulnerable, within and beyond Europe.

Strategic partnerships: promise and pitfall

The Global Gateway Initiative, launched to mobilise up to €300 billion by 2027, with half for Africa, was presented as a new partnership model. Yet it has generated concern among civil society and parliamentarians.

Its focus on “bankable” projects and private sector-led delivery risks sidelining the actors best placed to deliver inclusive development: local communities, women’s organisations and grassroots NGOs. Civil society engagement remains inconsistent, funding flows lack transparency, and safeguards to ensure gender equality as a core objective are weak.

Strategic partnerships may therefore displace direct support for proven grassroots models, undermining the local capacity and social trust Europe claims to champion.

A global aid crisis

This policy drift comes at a dangerous moment. In 2025, global aid fell by a record margin following a 9% decline in 2024. France cut ODA by 11%, Germany by 17%, the UK reduced bilateral aid to Africa by 12%, and the United States slashed overseas aid contracts by more than 90%.

The consequences are immediate. Programmes supporting girls’ education, health services and women’s economic empowerment across Africa are being scaled back or closed.

The EU, long a champion of gender equality and development, cannot afford to follow this path. Grassroots gains are under threat. Since 2013, the Global Give Back Circle’s HER Lab programme alone has transitioned more than 800 rural young women in Kenya, into employment, entrepreneurship or further education. These are not isolated successes, but foundations of resilient societies and credible European engagement.

This is not an isolated case. The Women Action Foundation (WAF) has enabled women’s economic participation by addressing a critical but often overlooked barrier in Kenya: childcare. By establishing community-run childcare hubs alongside skills training and livelihood support, WAF has enabled women in low-income communities to enter work, launch micro-enterprises and sustain economic independence — demonstrating again that locally designed solutions can deliver high impact with modest resources.

Responsibility and opportunity

Europe’s global credibility rests on aligning values with action. As negotiations on the post-2027 MFF intensify, the EU must decide whether to uphold its commitment to development cooperation and gender equality or allow them to be diluted within broader strategic priorities.

HER Lab shows what works. Graduates are launching businesses, saving collectively, and mentoring others, with 74 per cent moving into employment, entrepreneurship or further education and unemployment falling sharply after programme completion. These are not abstract gains, but measurable outcomes.

The Global Gateway can still play a vital role if it moves beyond large scale infrastructure and meaningfully integrates grassroots, locally led and gender-focused partnerships. To remain credible, the EU must ring-fence funding for development cooperation and gender equality, make civil society co-designers of programmes, and insist on transparent impact reporting.

Beyond its own budget, it should also use its diplomatic influence to help reverse the global aid decline and mobilise private and impact investment behind women’s empowerment.

A beacon worth protecting

The graduation ceremony in West Pokot shows what is possible when civil society and local partners work directly with communities. Locally led, women-centred programmes deliver lasting impact, often with modest resources but deep social trust.

Europe’s promise to marginalised women is not made in communiqués, but in the funding and partnership decisions taken now. Investing in African women through proven, grassroots-led models strengthens communities, builds resilience from the ground up, and underpins the credibility the European Union seeks to project as a global actor.

If Europe is serious about matching its values with action, it must choose to support and scale what works. That means protecting funding for development cooperation and gender equality, and ensuring that grassroots organisations are partners of choice, not afterthoughts, in EU external action.

Neven Mimica is a Croatian politician and diplomat who served as European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development from 2014 to 2019. He previously was Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia.

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Picture alliance/abaca. Even the world’s strongest fleet is reaching its limits. Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels
 
The US failure in Iran exposes the limits of power. But it also shows a deeper loss of moral and leadership capital that may be harder to recover

By Dan Smith
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jun 4 2026 (IPS)

The outcome of the current Iran war is still in doubt, but one consequence is already becoming clear: it has weakened America’s capacity to project power. Many are asking who won. The more important question may be what the war has cost.

The Gulf’s geo-economic position means that this war, short and small by historic standards, will have long-lasting global effects. One of the most important concerns the future US capacity to project power. A quick look at the balance sheet helps identify how that may play out.

Gains and losses

The losses, of course, include the impact on nature, on the people of Iran and on the Gulf states. The poor in other regions will suffer as food insecurity rises. On the sidelines, Putin’s Russia has benefitted by being able to sell more oil, but its support for Iran will cost it friends and investment capital from the Gulf. Meanwhile, Ukraine has also benefitted because several Gulf states want its drones and technical support.

Of the main combatants, Israel gained some freedom of action in Gaza and Lebanon. But it is piling up problems for the future, just as it did when it escalated in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Iran has gained a kind of win by not losing while, conversely, the US loses by not winning. And this will have a serious impact on its capacity to project power in the coming years.

There are two aspects to this. One is material and concerns the ability to coerce; the other is non-material and concerns influence. The material aspect would be significant even if the war had been more successful.

The US struck over 13 000 targets in Iran in 39 days of fighting. It used up more than half its stealth cruise missiles. At current rates of production, replacing them will take five to six years. It used as many Tomahawk cruise missiles as it produced in 10 years and about two years’ worth of Patriot interceptor missiles.

The US still has huge capacity to use force, though it may have to use it differently.

Not surprisingly, some anxiety has been expressed that the US military capacity to respond to another crisis has been reduced. Equally unsurprisingly, top-level military leaders and civilian officials assure allies and adversaries alike that the US can still handle all contingencies and project its power at will.

The amount of weaponry used is emphasised by critics because they see that the US has gained nothing by it. But even if the victory the President has frequently proclaimed were real, the weapons would still have been used. If reduced weapon stockpiles cause a problem, it is a problem regardless of the war’s outcome.

Both the concern and the complacency are overstated. The US still has huge capacity to use force, though it may have to use it differently if the President sees a new need or opportunity for military action. It remains a military superpower, but one with thinner margins, more difficult trade-offs and less freedom to respond simultaneously to crises in different regions.

The non-material aspect is even more significant. Influence takes many forms — political, economic and cultural. One source of political influence is military superiority. States that are seen as overwhelmingly powerful often gain friends and persuade adversaries to give way. The Gulf war, however, has exposed the limits of that logic.

President Trump is not wrong when he praises US military prowess. But his boasts during the Iran War have only drawn attention to the tightly limited utility of all that force. Iran’s military capacity has been damaged, and the economy is in terrible condition, but the regime is still in power, with a harder line and tighter control. When the ceasefire started, it still had 70 per cent of its pre-war stock of missiles and has doubtless produced more by now.

The US is no closer than it was the day before the war to getting Iran’s enriched uranium out of the country. It can only do that with Iranian agreement, which will take time and require US concessions over sanctions. And whereas shipping moved freely through the Strait of Hormuz before the war, now it does not, and Iran has turned that into a bargaining chip.

Trapped again

The lesson is that superior force can knock things down and kill people, but does not necessarily give its holder the power to achieve objectives. The same lesson is unfolding in another theatre of operations: in the American campaign against drug traffickers, there have been over 60 attacks on small boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing more than 200 people. According to the latest studies, this has had no effect on the street price and availability of cocaine in US cities.

The problem in the Gulf is that Trump has taken his government into a hole from which it is hard to see a way out. We have encountered this before. It is a characteristic dilemma of a great power facing a resilient foe. Think not just Iran, but Ukraine. Think Vietnam.

In March 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, as American opinion began turning decisively against it, Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy’s former speechwriter, depicted the US predicament as being trapped in a six-sided box, which he described with three simple sentences: America’s military primacy could not produce victory, while its political primacy made withdrawal humiliating.

It could not impose its will on South Vietnam or break the will of North Vietnam. Escalation risked Chinese or Soviet intervention, while serious negotiation meant accepting the possibility of a Communist South Vietnam.

It is not hard to apply the underlying analysis to the US against Iran. Some translation is needed: the war is unwinnable but withdrawal is humiliating; no ally is giving meaningful help and the enemy is too stubborn; all-out escalation is unthinkable, while good-faith negotiation means acknowledging that the war was wrong from the outset.

Hedging against US unreliability will be part of Europe’s and other US allies’ long-term policies for years to come

The US never managed to break out of that box in Vietnam and will probably be unable to do so in the Gulf. This failure – there is no other word for it – is draining the US capacity for strategic leadership. Allies are faced with reckless behaviour, frequent disregard and contempt, demands to back actions on which they were not consulted and which they oppose, inconsistent and misleading statements, and a war without strategy, legality or ethics.

It is hard to see how the US will regain the moral capital and leadership capacity it has lost this year. More bluster will not do it. Nor will resuming the war or coming to an agreement that makes major concessions to Iran. And it is currently impossible to see why Iran would make concessions to the US.

The United States remains the most powerful military actor in the world. But even the world’s strongest military cannot automatically translate force into political success. The danger is that future leaders continue to believe otherwise.

A strategically astute president who does not casually abuse and threaten allies may emerge in the future. But if the US electorate can do it twice, it can do it a third time — if not with Trump, due to age and the constitution, then with Vance, Rubio, Hegseth or someone else.

Accordingly, hedging against US unreliability will be part of Europe’s and other US allies’ long-term policies for years to come, maybe forever. As they become less dependent on the US, they will also be less compliant. In a few years, the US can restore much of its material power. Its non-material power will grow back only slowly, if at all.

Therein lies the most serious risk: that Trump, or a future leader, continues to believe against all the evidence that force equates to power, and uses it destructively, desperately and pointlessly.

Dan Smith is a Senior Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and conducts research on issues relating to peace, security and international politics, with a focus on the Middle East and North-East Asia.

Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels

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Credit: Dmitriy Prayzel / shutterstock.com

By Jordan Ryan
Jun 3 2026 (IPS)

 
The joint declaration issued by Russia and China on 20 May, Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations, has been read in sharply different ways. Some welcome its language of sovereign equality, multilateralism and a UN-centred international order. Others dismiss it as legal rhetoric deployed in bad faith. Both responses miss the more important point.

The declaration matters less for what it promises than for what it reveals. It shows how the language of the United Nations Charter has become a field of political struggle. Russia and China are challenging parts of the existing order in different ways. They are competing to shape the meaning of that order and to present themselves as its more authentic defenders.

That is why the declaration should be read closely. Its appeal to sovereign equality, indivisible security and the democratisation of international relations is not incidental. It is a claim to normative authority. The text seeks to occupy the language of legitimacy at a moment when the authority of the United Nations itself has weakened.

The gap between that language and the conduct of its authors is striking, though the two cases are not identical. Russia is waging a war in Ukraine in open violation of the principles it invokes. China presents a more complicated challenge. It should be criticised for internal repression, coercive pressure on Taiwan, its rejection of the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea, and its continuing support for Russia despite Moscow’s aggression. Yet China has also shown a degree of strategic restraint and continues to frame its global role in terms of sovereignty, non-interference and a state-based international order. That distinction does not absolve Beijing. It does suggest that any serious strategy for UN renewal should test China’s stated commitment to non-aggression and multilateral restraint against its actual conduct, especially in the South China Sea. None of this removes the hypocrisy. It makes the diplomacy more important.

Still, the erosion of the United Nations system cannot be laid only at the feet of Moscow and Beijing. Western governments have also weakened the authority of the rules they claim to defend. Broad unilateral sanctions on Venezuela were criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures for their severe humanitarian impact and for undermining the principles they purported to uphold. In February 2026, the Secretary-General condemned the use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the subsequent retaliation by Iran across the region, as a military escalation that undermined international peace and security. When major powers treat Charter constraints as optional, they invite others to do the same.

This matters because hypocrisy alone does not explain the moment. Great powers have always said one thing about rules and done another in practice. The deeper problem is that the authority to define legitimate state conduct has weakened. The Charter remains the best available foundation for international order, but the institutional machinery built around it no longer commands the same confidence or compliance.

That is what gives the Sino-Russian message traction beyond its authors. Its critique of Western hegemony resonates across much of the Global South because it draws on real grievances. Many states remain underrepresented in global decision-making, face conditionality in external partnerships and see an international economic order that has not delivered equitable development. Moscow and Beijing are exploiting those frustrations, though not always in the same way and not with identical records under the Charter.

At the same time, many governments are watching carefully what Sino-Russian partnership actually offers in practice. Some Belt and Road projects have generated concerns about debt sustainability and strategic dependency, with Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port frequently cited, even if interpretations of that case differ. In parts of Africa, Russia’s growing security footprint through Wagner’s legacy structures and successor arrangements has reinforced authoritarian partners while securing access to strategic resources. The language of emancipation can easily mask new forms of dependency.

For the United Nations, this is not just a messaging problem. It is a structural one. The Security Council veto produces paralysis in the crises where collective action is most needed. Financing depends on obligations that major powers treat as politically negotiable. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations remains uneven and vulnerable to manipulation. A system designed in 1945 for 51 member states has not adapted adequately to a far more plural and contested world.

That is why the next Secretary-General will need more than administrative skill. The task is not simply to defend the Charter against selective or cynical misuse. It is to rebuild political confidence that the institution can apply its principles with greater consistency, broader legitimacy and stronger operational capacity. That will require coalition-building across regions, especially with states that want reform, without abandoning multilateral restraint.

The Sino-Russian declaration therefore sets a test that extends well beyond Russia and China. The question is not whether its authors believe in the Charter in the same way or violate it in identical forms. They do not. The real question is whether the United Nations still has the political authority and institutional capacity to make the Charter matter.

Related articles from this author:
Governing the Ungovernable
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Credit: Adobe Stock Photo / Source: UN News
 
A staggering 55 million people across West and Central Africa are expected to suffer crisis levels of hunger, or worse, during the lean season from June to August as funding cuts to humanitarian operations continue amid rising violence and displacement. UN News January 2026

By Kester Kenn Klomegah
MOSCOW, Jun 3 2026 (IPS)

Within the framework of the Expert Council on Africa at Russia’s State Duma, the lower chamber of parliamentarians, during its annual round-table conference, held in late May 2026, focused concretely on food security in Africa.

The Expert Council has further outlined a strategic roadmap to raise collaboration in the sphere of food security, emphasizing the necessity to address policy inconsistencies that have generally dominated Russian-African relations since the Soviet collapse.

Under the chairmanship of Deputy Speaker of the State Duma, Alexander Babakov, the council’s round-table session on—Russian-African cooperation in the field of ensuring food security, introduction of closed cycle technologies in agricultural and bioeconomy projects—was held in the State Duma.

Opening the meeting, Alexander Babakov, noted the importance of continuing cooperation with African countries already in the new convocation of the State Duma, to which elections will be held in September 2026.

“I am sure that right from the beginning of the work of the new convocation, the theme of cooperation between Russia and African countries will work as an example for circulation and use in other areas,” he said.

A member of the Committee on the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, deputy chairman of the Expert Council on Africa, Nikolai Novichkov, in his speech stressed the importance of a gradual transition to trade with African high-tech countries. “Our African partners are interested in producing and processing food locally, including earning a living on it,” the parliamentarian stated.

The Director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Tatiana Dovgalenko, drew attention to the continued importance of the humanitarian component of Russian-African cooperation, which, despite efforts, “unforeseen including and along the lines of specialized UN agencies, the number of hungry people in the world, has been growing over the past few years.” According to Dovgalenko, the food crisis is localized in about 10 countries, four of which are in Africa.

There are still a few points to underline here: Russia is committed to supporting African countries in need of humanitarian assistance, while strengthening the prospects of developing and expanding aspects of bilateral cooperation. Russia has offered many African countries with food supplies over the years.

As traditionally expected, Africa can leverage for Russia’s food supplies. It is essential to acknowledge that serious efforts are being directed at coordinating mechanisms in advancing political dialogue and pursuing other sectoral cooperation with African partners.

At the same time, Foreign Ministry’s records show stages of supporting food security and African beneficiaries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Madagascar, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Mostly, ethnic-conflicting African countries are the beneficiaries, and many reasons are assigned for Russia’s engagement in this aspect of diplomacy.

Reasons for Development Assistance

Russia’s humanitarian and development assistance to Africa is primarily driven by its geopolitical ambitions to expand its global influence, counter Western isolation, secure access to vital natural resources, and foster dependency among African nations.

Countering Western Influence: Russia seeks to position itself as an alternative to Western powers, often advocating for a “multipolar world” and non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states. This approach is particularly appealing to authoritarian regimes on the continent.

Securing Diplomatic Alliances:
African nations represent a significant voting bloc at the United Nations General Assembly. Humanitarian outreach, such as free delivery of grains, helps Russia secure diplomatic support, strengthen food security and votes on key international resolutions.

Leveraging “Grain Diplomacy”:
By providing humanitarian food aid, Moscow mitigates the effects of the global food shortages and supply chain disruptions caused by its own military actions in Ukraine. It uses these provisions to maintain African countries within its geopolitical orbit.

Food Aid Deals:
Aid serves as an entry point for deeper strategic ties. Russia utilizes this assistance as part of its diplomacy to project an image of a benevolent global power. Funding and providing food assistance helps build long-term relationships with the continent’s future leaders and local populations.

As first deputy chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Alexei Chepa noted at the State Duma, the food crisis and a number of other serious threats on the African continent are today exacerbated by a complex international, United States and Israel vs. Iran causing rising energy prices worldwide.

“This has also reflected on the cost of fertilizers that needed to be purchased previously. Even if prices fall in a few months, the yield still won’t. And there will be problems in Africa. At the same time, we understand that population growth in the coming years will be at Africa’s expense,” Chepa underlined in his contribution at the meeting.

Chepa also mentioned the special role of security enhancement in Africa, including in countering extremism and terrorism.

As part of the continuation of the work of the roundtable to promote cooperation with African countries in ensuring food security, the introduction of closed-loop technologies in agricultural and bio economics projects was discussed. As traditional procedure, some recommendations are addressed to the Government of the Russian Federation.

In addition to representatives of the State Duma, the State Duma’s deputy chairman Alexander Babakov, brought also representatives of ministries, related-agencies and departments, and the expert community to develop concrete steps directed toward raising connectivity between Russia and Africa, the main reason for establishing the State Duma’s Expert Council on the Development and Support of Comprehensive Partnerships with African Countries.

Kester Kenn Klomegah focuses on current geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development-related questions in Africa with external countries. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted in several reputable foreign media.

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As Gaza’s fragile ceasefire frays and humanitarian conditions deteriorate, a senior UN envoy warned the Security Council last week that delays in implementing the Council-backed transition plan for the enclave will only increase suffering and undermine recovery. Credit: UN News

By James E. Jennings
ATLANTA, USA, May 29 2026 (IPS)

If you have been paying attention to the ongoing wars in Ukraine, Iran, Lebanon, and many other places, perhaps you have noticed that battles today are far different from those of the last century. Now it’s not only tanks and planes but also scores of long-range missiles and massive flights of drones linked to cybernetic warfare.

The tragedy of military and civilian deaths continues, however, with the number of casualties among Russian soldiers in Ukraine reportedly reaching an astonishing 25,000 every month. As always in warfare, civilians are unfairly targeted and suffer the most, with senseless random missile and drone attacks killing innocent people on both sides with regularity.

Professed lovers of peace, like US President Trump and Israel’s Mr. Netanyahu, both of whom have agreed to brokered ceasefire agreements in Gaza and in Lebanon, continue to bomb the other side with impunity. For the most part they are getting away with it, without protests from anybody except a few ineffective agencies and lonely voices.

That is indeed a new, inventive way of war: the combatants agree to a ceasefire, and then one side keeps bombing but insists that the other stop because of the agreed ceasefire. Under such circumstances, all a ceasefire really means is “Your side must stop firing—but we’ll fire at will.”

Such nonsense is a game of meaningless words with no resolution in sight. The increasingly Nazified Likud Party in Israel continues to bomb cities, villages, and individual homes and apartment buildings in Lebanon as if it were licensed to do so, with little effective pushback from the world community.

That is perhaps to be expected since the world has largely stood by silently for almost four years during the certifiable genocide in Gaza. And by now more than 1.2 million people have been driven out of their homes in South Lebanon into a life of desperation and uncertainty.

The efficient US-backed Israeli killing machine in Lebanon has continued to smash residential buildings with impunity and pile up an obscene list of civilians murdered—innocent mothers, fathers, grandparents, and many children.

In Gaza, Palestinian sources have recorded more than 2,000 Israeli violations of the so-called “ceasefire” between October 2025 and March 2026, with a total of over 700 Palestinians killed.

Only a temporary hold from the United States has kept Israel from continuing to bomb Iran. Israel refuses to listen to any restrictions on bombing Lebanon even though there is supposedly a ceasefire in effect.

Deaths there since the short April 17 “ceasefire” continue to escalate day by day. In Iran, both Israel and the US have promised to keep obliterating what was long ago announced as already obliterated.

The number of Iranians killed and wounded in the first three months of the joint US-Israeli aggression has been announced by the Tehran government as in the tens of thousands, and the war is not over yet. Most memorable is the massacre of 120 schoolchildren, mainly girls, on the first day of US bombing at Minab, Iran. Casualties so far on the US side number 13 killed and several dozens wounded. That’s the definition of one-sided warfare.

Modern wars may puzzle observers, but the art of twisting words and phrases and their associated meanings is as old as time. Lying, obfuscation, and obscene claims are the essence of war’s primary weapon, deception. Words can kill and do. “Ceasefire” is the latest lie. For Israel and the US, it means “You cease—we fire.”

James E. Jennings is the Founder and President of the aid agency Conscience International www.conscienceinternational.org and a longtime Middle East Peace Advocate.

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Voting by secret ballot. Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 29 2026 (IPS)

The year 2026 seems to be an eventful year at the United Nations –a new President of the General Assembly (PGA), who will officially preside over the 81st session in mid-September, plus the election and appointment of a new Secretary-General (SG) who will takeover in January 2027 after the conclusion of a 10-year tenure by the outgoing SG Antonio Guterres.

When UN member states competed in elections– or sought votes for membership in the Security Council or in various UN bodies– the voting in the 1960s and 70s was largely tainted by cheque-book diplomacy — while promises of increased aid to the world’s poorer nations came mostly with heavy strings attached.

In the 1950s and 60s, voting was by a show of hands, particularly in committee rooms. But in later years, a more sophisticated electronic board, high up in the General Assembly Hall, tallied the votes or in the case of elections to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice, the voting was by secret ballot.

In one of the hard-fought elections many moons ago, there were rumors that an oil-soaked Middle Eastern country was doling out high-end, Swiss-made wrist watches and also stocks in the former Arabian-American Oil Company, then one of the world’s largest oil companies, to UN diplomats as a trade-off for their votes.

So, when hands, both from right-handed and left-handed delegates, went up at voting time in the Committee room, the largest number of hands raised in favor of the oil-blessed candidate sported Swiss watches.

As anecdotes go, it symbolized the corruption that once prevailed in voting in inter-governmental organizations, including the United Nations — perhaps much like most national elections the world over.

Just ahead of a crucial election, one Western European country offered free Mediterranean luxury cruises in return for votes while another country dished out — openly in the General Assembly hall— boxes of gift-wrapped expensive Swiss chocolates.

Fathulla Jameel, a former UN Ambassador and later Foreign Minister of the Maldives told Inter Press Service of how his resource-poor island nation, categorized by the UN as a Small Island Developing State (SID), would appeal to richer nations to help fund some of country’s infrastructure projects.

At least one rich Asian country, a traditional donor, was the first to respond – and magnanimously too, he said. The project would be fully funded —free, gratis and for nothing. But there was a catch: “If there is a vote at the UN, and it is not of any national interest to your country”, said the donor country’s foreign ministry, “we would like to get your vote.”

Perhaps for life – the life of the island nation itself which was threatened with sea-level rise and in danger of being wiped off the face of the earth. The offer was a clever political payback. Development aid with no visible strings attached.

There was at least one instance when the president of the General Assembly, the highest policy making body at the United Nations, was elected, on the luck of a draw -– following a dead heat.

With the Asian group failing to field a single candidate, the politically-memorable battle took place ahead of the 36th session of the General Assembly back in 1981 when three Asian candidates contested the presidency: Ismat Kittani of Iraq, Tommy Koh of Singapore and Kwaja Mohammed Kaiser of Bangladesh (described as the “battle of three Ks”—Kittani, Koh and Kaiser).

On the first ballot, Kittani got 64 votes; Kaiser, 46; and Koh, 40. Still, Kittani was short of a required majority — of the total number of members voting. On a second ballot, Kittani and Kaiser tied with 73 votes each (with 146 members present, and voting).

In order to break the tie, the outgoing General Assembly President drew lots, as specified in Article 21 relating to the procedures in the election of the president (and as recorded in the Repertory of Practice of the General Assembly).

And the luck of the draw, based purely on chance, favored Kittani, in that unprecedented General Assembly election. But according to a joke circulating at that time, it was rumored that the winner was decided by the flip of a coin — but the tossed coin apparently had two heads and no tail.

In more recent years, however, the regional groups, including the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean and the Western and Other Groups (WEOG) have called for a virtual ceasefire as they took turns according to geographical rotation. The Groups would name their candidates who get elected without any opposition.

But the seriousness of the UN’s far-reaching mandate has been tempered by occasional moments of levity which have rocked the Glass House by the East River— with laughter. The UN is a rich source of anecdotes—both real and apocryphal– in which the General Assembly (UNGA), takes center stage, along with the Security Council (UNSC) as a political sidekick.

When UN ambassadors and delegates congregate in the cavernous General Assembly hall at voting time, they have one of three options: either vote for, against, or abstain.

The most intriguing, however, is a fourth option: to be suddenly struck with an urge to rush to the toilet. The frantic attempt to leave your seat vacant — and consequently be counted as “absent”– takes place whenever the issue is politically-sensitive.

When delegates are unable to vote with their conscience– don’t want to incur the wrath of mostly Western aid donors or are taken unawares with no specific instructions from their capitals– they flee their seats and head for the toilet

At a lunch for reporters in his town house bordering Park Avenue in Manhattan, (“this was once owned by Gucci, now it is Fulci”), Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, an Italian envoy with a sharp sense of humor, described the fourth option as the “toilet factor” in UN voting.

And he jokingly suggested that the only way to resolve the problem is to install portable toilets in the back of the General Assembly hall so that delegates can still cast their votes while contemplating on their toilet seats. But for obvious reasons, there were no takers.

In most instances, the various regional groups and coalitions—including the Group of 77, the Latin American and Caribbean States, the African Union (AU) and the Western European and Others (WEOG)— take decisions behind closed doors ahead of voting and voted by consensus,

In the 1970s and 80s, the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961, was one of the largest and most powerful political coalitions at the UN led by countries such as Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Zambia, Cuba and Sri Lanka.

As a general rule, all 116 countries vote in unison on General Assembly resolutions rarely breaking ranks. A Sri Lankan ambassador once recounted a message transmitted from his Foreign Ministry in Colombo – primarily directed at newly-arrived delegates which read— “If you are faced with an unscheduled surprise vote, and do not have any instructions from the Foreign Ministry, look to the right to see how Yugoslavia is voting and look to the left to see how India is voting. If both ambassadors are seen bolting from their seats, just follow them to the toilet”.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment – and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/

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Credit: United Nations
 
At a time of accelerating global crises and transformation, the question is no longer whether young people should be at the table, but how power is being shared with them. With more than 2.6 billion people aged 15–35 worldwide, this generation is not only the largest in history, but a decisive force in shaping a more sustainable and inclusive future, according to the United Nations
 
Youth participation must move beyond visibility toward real influence and shared responsibility-UN Secretary-General António Guterres
 
Dr. Felipe Paullier of Uruguay assumed his mandate as the first-ever Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs in December 2023 at the age of 32. He is the youngest senior appointment in the history of the United Nations, and the youngest serving member of the Secretary-General’s senior management group.

By Bisma Qamar
UNITED NATIONS, May 28 2026 (IPS)

In this exclusive interview, Dr. Felipe Paullier, UN Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) and Head of the United Nations Youth Office shares his leadership approach, insights on youth engagement, and his vision for driving institutional change from the grassroot level — redefining what is possible and proving that age is just a number.

Bisma Qamar: As the youngest and first ASG of the United Nations Youth Office, what drives and shapes your leadership style?

Dr. Paullier: I focus on perspective. Young leaders naturally bring fresh ideas and question why processes exist, fostering creativity and improvement. My approach is human-centered. Issues like mental health and wellbeing indicate societal shifts and must be taken into consideration. Leadership should be accessible and empathetic while understanding one’s potential and well-being. Today’s teams value approachable, realistic leaders rather than authoritative leaders.

“Leadership must blend insight with empathy; people want leaders who understand and support individuals”

From Potential to Performance :

Qamar: As member states become informed and establish programs like the youth delegate program, which strategic aspects are key to truly empowering young voices and ensuring meaningful participation beyond symbolism?

Dr. Paullier: The main challenge is converting narratives into actionable participation. Institutions need inclusivity, structured funding, and support mechanisms. Multilateral collaboration is essential, and power must be genuinely shared with youth. Meaningful participation involves more than representation—it requires influence over decision-making.

UN Youth Forums: Advancing Inclusion and Participation

Qamar: How do forums such as ECOSOC and HLPF contribute to advancing inclusion and promoting equitable opportunities?

Dr. Paullier: ECOSOC and similar platforms provide a structured environment where youth voices can be heard and actively contribute to institutional change. They allow spaces to be created where meaningful dialogue across generations and individuals from diverse backgrounds are possible. These forums emphasize translating strategic narratives into tangible actions at both institutional and grassroots levels, encouraging participants to understand their potential impact as well as the limitations of the processes involved and the power of collaboration to create impact.

Insights from Youth Participation at ECOSOC 2026 :

Qamar: Reflecting on 2026, what are your insights on the impact and engagement such as the ECOSOC for instance?

Dr. Paullier: Geopolitical tensions made participation more difficult for some regions. Nonetheless, enthusiasm remained high. This demonstrates the resilience and determination of young participants who continue to assert their presence and contribute meaningfully, even amid complex global situations.

“Despite such challenges which may occur, youth engagement continues to be a powerful message of hope and influence.”

Conclusion

This conversation highlights the transformative power of human-centered leadership, grounded in trust, collaboration, and vision. Dr. Paullier embodies a model where young leaders not only challenge norms and drive innovation but also inspire inclusion and collective action. His message is clear and compelling: meaningful change is achievable because leaders who step forward, embrace responsibility, and demonstrate possibility.

Through platforms like the United Nations Youth Office, these principles translate into tangible impact, proving that when vision is coupled with courage and collaboration, nothing is impossible — change happens because leaders like him are present to make it so.

As he states “It’s possible, because I am here”

Bisma Qamar is Focal Person for UN and Global Youth Affairs, PMYP.

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Astana’s futuristic skyline and Japan’s urban landscape converge with symbols of clean energy, connectivity and peace, reflecting a partnership shaped by smart-city cooperation, energy security, and shared memories of nuclear suffering.　Credit: INPS Japan

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
TOKYO, Japan, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The relationship between Japan and Kazakhstan is often described in terms of diplomacy, investment and regional cooperation. But at a time of growing geopolitical uncertainty, it deserves to be understood in broader terms: as a partnership linking cities, resources, technology and peace.

Kisho Kurokawa

For Japan, however, Astana is not simply a distant capital. Its master plan was shaped in part by the late Kisho Kurokawa, one of Japan’s leading architects, who sought to combine Kazakhstan’s nomadic heritage, harsh natural environment and state-building ambitions with forward-looking urban design. That historical connection is now taking on new meaning as Japan and Kazakhstan expand cooperation in smart cities, green technologies, energy security and nuclear disarmament.

On May 22, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike in Astana to discuss cooperation in smart city development, digital technologies, finance, education, emergency response and sustainable urban management. Tokyo, one of the world’s most densely populated metropolitan areas, has developed advanced systems in public safety, disaster preparedness, transportation and administrative services. For rapidly growing Astana, Tokyo’s experience provides a valuable reference point.

Akorda

Yet the deepening Japan-Kazakhstan relationship cannot be explained by urban cooperation alone. Behind it lies a more urgent geopolitical reality: instability in the Middle East and the resulting anxiety over energy security.

Japan has long depended heavily on the Middle East for crude oil. Tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz pose risks that directly affect Japan’s economy and daily life. For Tokyo, diversifying energy sources, critical mineral supplies and transport routes is no longer simply a matter of trade policy. It has become a central element of economic security.

Middle Corridor. Photo credit: TITR

For Japan, rare earths, lithium and other critical minerals are essential to batteries, electronics, renewable energy systems and next-generation industries. Diversifying both sources of supply and transport routes is therefore an energy policy, an industrial policy and a security policy at once. Astana is increasingly becoming an important platform for Japan’s engagement with Central Asia.

Semipalatinsk Former Nuclear Weapon Test site. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

Urban development, environmental technologies, resource cooperation and logistics infrastructure are no longer separate policy fields. They are becoming part of a wider strategic framework in which Japan and Kazakhstan can complement each other: one with advanced technology and urban management experience, the other with resources, geography and a young capital still in the process of defining its future.

But there is a deeper layer to this relationship that should not be overlooked: the memory of nuclear suffering.

Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kazakhstan endured severe radiation damage from repeated Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site, where more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term consequences for local communities and public health.

In 1991, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk test site. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it gave up one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals remaining on its territory and chose the path of a non-nuclear-weapon state. That decision has become a defining feature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.

Japan and Kazakhstan both know, not as an abstract matter of security theory but through historical experience, what nuclear weapons can inflict on human beings, communities, the environment and future generations. This shared memory gives the bilateral relationship a distinct ethical foundation.

That memory has also shaped sustained cooperation among governments, civil society and international organizations. INPS Japan has reported on nuclear disarmament-related conferences and events involving Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Center for International Security and Policy, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Soka Gakkai International.

A Group photo of participants of the regional conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear-free-zone in Central Asia held on August 29, 2023. Photo Credit: Jibek Joly TV Channel

One notable example was the anti-nuclear exhibition “Everything You Treasure — For a World Free From Nuclear Weapons,” jointly organized in Astana by SGI, ICAN and Kazakhstan’s Center for International Security and Policy. Held in September 2022 at Keruen Mall in central Astana, the exhibition used photographs, illustrations and graphics to educate young people about the dangers of nuclear weapons, from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to the continuing humanitarian consequences of nuclear arms.

A documentary produced by CISP, a Kazakh NGO, with support from SGI.

Such initiatives are important because nuclear disarmament cannot be left to diplomats alone. If the memory of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Semipalatinsk is to shape policy, it must also be passed to younger generations. Exhibitions, survivor testimony, documentaries and civil society campaigns help ensure that nuclear weapons are discussed not only as instruments of deterrence, but also as weapons with catastrophic human, environmental and intergenerational consequences.

In 2023, a regional conference in Astana addressed the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, testimony from nuclear test victims, and victim assistance and environmental remediation under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Unlike debates that frame nuclear weapons mainly in terms of deterrence or national prestige, such forums place affected people, their families, communities and environment at the center.

A documentary on Kazakhstan’s nuclear test victims, I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon, produced by Kazakhstan’s CISP with support from SGI, has also helped bring the testimonies of second- and third-generation victims in the Semey region to international audiences. Together with workshops involving the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and discussions on cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, these efforts keep the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons at the center of global disarmament debates.

Akorda.kz

That message should be taken seriously. Japan and Kazakhstan do not occupy identical security positions. Japan continues to rely on the United States’ nuclear deterrence as part of its security policy, while Kazakhstan, having renounced nuclear weapons, is a member of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Yet both countries share common ground in seeking to transform the memory of nuclear harm into action for international peace.

Japan and Kazakhstan Draw Closer as Iran Crisis Reshapes Energy and Security Priorities. Credit: INPS Japan

At a time when crises in the Middle East are shaking the global energy order and nuclear risks are again moving to the forefront of international politics, the Japan-Kazakhstan relationship is no longer merely a story of friendship. It reflects Japan’s own choices in an age of uncertainty: whether to approach Central Asia only as a source of resources, or as a region with which it can build a broader partnership linking cities, technology, energy security and peace.

Astana, the futuristic capital shaped in part by a Japanese architect, has become more than a symbol of Kazakhstan’s ambitions. It is also a reminder that the future of international cooperation will depend not only on markets and infrastructure, but on memory, responsibility and the courage to imagine security beyond fear.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

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The headquarters of the United Nations with Trump World Tower looming in the foreground, in Manhattan, NY, on April 28, 2026. (SEBASTIAN CHRISTOPH GOLLNOW/PICTURE ALLIANCE VIA GETTY IMAGES) Source: Wahington Reports

By Ian Williams
NEW YORK, May 25 2026 (IPS)

AS THE WORLD HURTLES TO HELL (albeit in a SpaceX rather than a hand basket), it might seem of only academic interest which cipher vegetates on the 38th floor of the U.N. Headquarters. However, the choice is due by the end of the year, unless, as has happened in the past, the Security Council is veto-bound and asks António Guterres to stay on as interim Secretary General.

Guterres certainly has experience for a seat-warming position, since he has performed like an interim Secretary General ever since he was first appointed. At times when his voice could and should have made a difference, he has followed the guidance of the three wise monkeys (see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil). The Secretary General’s ability to put items on the council agenda and raise them publicly are his few effective powers in the face of the permanent members’ traditional lackadaisical stance.

His studied withdrawal from influence has infected other levels of the Secretariat and allowed the Security Council to reach new lows of subservience to power. So, if and when the council picks his successor, it’s unlikely that crowds will gather on U.N. Plaza to watch the white smoke rising to announce the anointment.

That is not only because Trump World Tower looms over the plaza like an escaped prop from “2001: A Space Odyssey,” but also because its eponymous owner has done so much to devalue the U.N. One could almost suspect that it is only allowed to hang on in New York because property values would plummet in the neighborhood if all the insouciant and complaisant diplomats who work in the U.N. complex had to leave.

The U.N.’s geopolitical absence certainly diminishes potential public interest in the race and is compounded by the increasing ineffectuality of the Security Council in the face of the erasure of the U.N. Charter. The guiding principle of the Secretariat often seems to be plucked from Arthur Hugh Clough’s old poem, “Thou shalt not kill/ But needs’t not strive, officiously to keep alive.”

However, the general membership is almost as complicit. Faced with the latest U.S. demand to reshape the organization before Washington even considers paying a part of its legally obligated payments, their response is to dicker about the depth of evisceration, not to challenge the assumptions. Of course, the U.N. needs reform—but not necessarily in the way the U.S. has been demanding for half a century.

Western signatories of the Rome Convention for the International Criminal Court have left their nationals, like Francesca Albanese and Karim Khan, to swing in the wind in the face of an entirely illegal U.S.–Israeli war on International Criminal Court staff. Even their home states’ declaration that they will provide government backed credit to the victims of U.S. sanctions would send a signal and some succor to the judges. A robust denunciation by the outgoing Secretary General (a lame duck and hence beyond significant U.S. payback) would have helped, but it was not forthcoming.

As the only figure who could coordinate (and heaven help us, lead) the defense, the forlorn position of the Secretary General is still essential despite the lackluster field. So, the choice is important—as well as boring.

So far, there is a growing consensus that the next leader needs to be a woman, which China has been very firm on, and should be from the Latin American and Caribbean region. So far, it’s a very uninspiring and, dare one say, “mature” field. Maybe there should be as much pressure for “youth’s” turn as there is for a woman, not least since both declared female candidates are of a certain age. The “most difficult job in the world” is not one for the elderly.

The April candidate forums at the U.N. featured four announced aspirants, but as the Book of Proverbs says, “Where there is no vision, the people perish: but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.” None of the candidates offered a vision: their presentations were more like an AI-generated resume for corporate human resources.

Even the candidates who showed some signs of integrity, like the “keeping the law” bit, seem to be missing the vision thing and, frankly, professed over-adherence to the law is a stretch for candidates who want to avoid a veto from the P5. Which is, of course, why there was conspicuous silence on the hustings about Israel and Iran. It also so far guaranteed candidates who will not rock the boat for Washington.

So in a field of lame horses, the three-legged one might limp home, and that could be former President of Senegal Macky Sall, who is not a woman, not Latin American and does not have the support of his own country or the African Union. His best qualification is the traditional U.N. promotion criterion: not being remembered for anything in particular. He could fall in the East River and not cause a ripple. But he is unlikely to be willing to undergo the gender transition necessary. China says it wants a woman and has historically been prepared to stand its ground with repeated vetoes.

Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet has the required diplomatic and political credentials, and she has clearly been playing the long game. As U.N. Human Rights Commissioner she sat upon a report about the People’s Republic of China’s abuse of the Uighurs, which might fend off a Chinese veto but raises questions about her integrity and independence.

It does suggest that she had acute political antennae since at that time pandering to China could have cost her support with the U.S. and Europeans—but now, perhaps not so much. Under the MAGA Trump Republicans, human rights are a now and then thing. More important perhaps to Washington, Chile’s new right-wing government pulled its endorsement of her which could burnish her credentials with what’s left of the progressive world. And her gender and Latin American origins tick other boxes.

In contrast, right-wing Argentinian President Javier Milei backs Rafael Grossi’s candidacy, which detracts from Grossi’s globalist credentials to head the U.N. However, as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), his equivocation about Iranian nuclear activities might well be negotiable into active U.S. support. He has been a deft tightrope walker, trying not to give Iran a clean bill of health, but avoiding complicity in an over-explicit casus belli to Washington, which would upset Moscow and Beijing (and may yet). But he has defied best practice for candidates by staying active in his U.N. role, which suggests he knows his IAEA position gives him cards to play.

Costa Rica’s Rebeca Grynspan is an uninspiring apparatchik who has presided over the effectual dismantlement of U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, the development agency that had been in the sights of Washington for decades. While one cannot hold family connections against her, many countries might also worry about the optics of a secretary general whose sister is an Israeli settler in the West Bank. However, she is backed by her government, unlike some other candidates, and is a Latina, so ticks two of the boxes, and is likely to get support from the U.S. (and Israel, which does not have a direct seat on the Security Council, but nevertheless is reputedly a presence).

Looking at the heavily handicapped slate so far, it’s good that there are nominations waiting in the wings. Barbadian PM Mia Amor Mottley would be an ideal candidate, ticking both the vision and law boxes. A woman from the Latin American and Caribbean region whose otherwise disqualifying integrity might pass the Trump test by speaking English and being previously accoladed by no less than the American Enterprise Institute! However, she has just won re-election in Barbados and would probably prefer to stay where she is now.

Another person who announced her candidacy is Ecuador’s María Fernanda Espinosa, former General Assembly President, who is also missing support from her own government, but she has shown both vision and integrity and has other backers. And she is not of pensionable age.

In the end, sadly, the odds are against anyone who meets the needs of the world and organization. Their very qualifications would be unlikely to survive the whims and prejudices of this U.S. administration, let alone survive scrutiny by Moscow or Beijing. Even if Russia and China pay lip service to the international order and sacrifice their immediate prejudices for the greater good, Washington is unlikely to be so forbearing.

Overall, the question is whether the U.N. is redeemable while some countries have veto power. At one time the U.S. realized the advantages of maintaining the U.N. as a thin blue fig leaf for its actual hegemony, but it no longer sees the need to cover its rampant MAGA-hood.

U.N. correspondent Ian Williams is president of the Foreign Press Association of the U.S. He is the author of U.N.told: The Real Story of the United Nations in Peace and War (available from Middle East Books and More).

Source: Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs
https://www.wrmea.org/north-america/the-search-is-on-for-the-next-u.n.-secretary-general-in-a-turbulent-world.html

IPS UN Bureau

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Budget shortfalls could force the organization to move closer to the communities that it's meant to serve.

By JB Bae
FORT COLLINS, Colorado USA, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The $1.2 billion renovation of the Palais des Nations was intended to reaffirm Geneva’s centrality to the multilateral system. Instead, the city’s international quarter is emptying.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has cut hundreds of positions. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is relocating core administrative roles to Rome and Budapest. Other agencies are scaling back or relocating operations. The United States, which funds roughly a quarter of the U.N.’s regular budget, now owes approximately $2.2 billion, about 95% of all unpaid contributions to the organization.

Many will read this as a harbinger of the decline, or perhaps even the demise, of the U.N. system. Yet the crisis in Geneva may be creating the conditions for a more resilient multilateralism.

Critics claim that American taxpayers subsidized a U.N. bureaucracy hostile to their interests, one lacking accountability and captured by priorities divorced from its founding purposes. There is some truth to this. However, these arguments have marginalized those who wish to refound the U.N. system, rather than dismantling multilateralism wholesale.

The erosion of U.S. funding may be doing what decades of reform efforts could not: forcing a realignment of the U.N.’s structure with its mission. Numerous proposals, secretary-general initiatives, and expert panels have failed to produce meaningful change.

The U.N.’s own 2021 Integration Review, drawing on input from over 200 staff members across the organization, found that institutional insulation undermined impact, calling for more decentralized decision-making and reforms responsive to field realities. Member states had pressed for the same for decades.

Meanwhile, Geneva came to embody the distance between those running the institution and the constituencies they were meant to serve. The compensation structure tells part of the story. Bureaucrats enjoyed tax-free salaries, exceptionally generous pension arrangements, housing allowances pegged to one of the world’s most expensive cities, business-class travel, and education grants that cover most of the cost of elite international-school tuition in Geneva, where annual fees often reach $45,000 per child per year.

One study of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operations found spending of roughly $600 per refugee annually (around $800-850 in today’s dollars). U.N. reimbursements for a single child’s school fees in Geneva, in other words, could support dozens of refugees for a year. These arrangements are not reserved for senior leadership. They define the terms of employment for the typical international civil servant.

These terms apply to a substantial workforce. Switzerland hosts roughly forty international organizations that employ more than 25,000 people, most concentrated in the Lake Geneva region. The World Health Organization, the largest, employs roughly 2,400 people at its Geneva headquarters and operated on a biennial budget of $5.3 billion for 2026-27 before recent cuts. The International Labour Organization (ILO), UNHCR, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and others maintain significant presences in Geneva.

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When the U.N. Secretary-General’s office issued a memo in April 2025 directing Geneva and New York to identify posts for relocation to lower-cost duty stations, the Geneva staff union’s response was telling: its official statement declared the union “alarmed,” hundreds of staff demonstrated on International Workers’ Day to protect their Geneva postings, and unions defended housing subsidies, education grants, and tax exemptions as essential. These numbers and reactions reflect the insulation of much of Geneva from the realities the institution nominally exists to address.

Yet the crisis is strengthening the position of those within the system who have long called for change. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF)’s consolidation of regional functions to Bangkok, the expansion of U.N. agency operations in Nairobi, and shifting administrative functions to lower-cost duty stations all reflect a shift toward where the work actually is. Technology and the remote collaboration it enables make justifying the Geneva-centric model even more difficult. What once required flights to Geneva can now happen across multiple continents simultaneously.

Simply relocating institutions to less costly settings, however, risks reproducing Geneva’s pathologies — insulated professional communities, compensation structures detached from local conditions, and organizational cultures oriented more toward one another than toward the populations they serve. More than simply moving offices, structural reform requires confronting how these institutions are staffed, incentivized, and embedded in the political contexts in which they operate.

A more promising direction is aligning institutions with the political support and capacity of host nations. This goes beyond decentralization and proximity to need, toward placing authority where capacity and political will already exist. Former aid recipients that have become donors and regional powers in their own right — Poland, Chile, and South Korea among them — are natural candidates for anchoring this kind of multilateralism. Having navigated conflict, development, refugee flows, and political transition themselves, they bring the political legitimacy and operational credibility that Geneva-centered bureaucracies cannot replicate.

The substance of the changes also matters for the legitimacy of the international order. A multilateral system whose centers of decision-making remain in Geneva, New York, and a handful of donor capitals is vulnerable to the accusation that it represents a historical moment that has long passed. Institutions whose operational weight sits closer to the communities they serve, staffed by professionals embedded in supportive settings, are harder to displace. What survives will be better able to compete for relevance in a more contested world order.

Geneva will survive this crisis as a conference center for highest-stakes diplomacy and backroom dialogues that only physical proximity can enable. But what emerges beyond Geneva, in the field offices of agencies closer to the populations they serve and potentially in the hands of actors with the legitimacy and experience to carry multilateralism forward, may prove closer to what the system was always intended to be.

Many of the structural problems that have long plagued the U.N. will remain. The shifts now under way will not solve them. But they change where influence accumulates, and who shapes the decisions that matter. This new multilateralism may prove more resilient, more legitimate, and harder to hold captive to the politics of any single donor.

JB Bae is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University. His research addresses issues in international security and foreign policy, with a focus on East Asia. He received his PhD from UCLA.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

Source: Responsible Statecraft

IPS UN Bureau

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UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Credit: UN Photo/Sourav Sarker

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The United Nations has had a longstanding tradition, described by some as a “privilege”, where most senior staffers are entitled to highly-expensive First Class or Business Class seats on trips worldwide.

But with the world body facing a severe cash crisis –and demands by the Trump administration calling for drastic cost-cutting—another privilege is likely to end up on the chopping block.

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/senior-management-group

Speaking off-the-record, a former UN official told Inter Press Service: “On the rare occasion I travelled with the UN for work, I was always shocked by the enormous amounts paid for air tickets. I find it interesting to see that it took the UN a deep financial crisis to invite the staff to a ”voluntary” downgrade”

Setting the record straight, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told IPS: “To be clear, a Secretary-General is the only person in the UN cleared for first class travel, and since about the start of the year, this Secretary-General no longer sits in the first class cabin.”

As part of the Organization’s ongoing efforts to reduce travel costs, and in response to the General Assembly’s call to strengthen measures to promote voluntary downgrades from business or first-class travel entitlements, the UN’s Human Resources Services Division (HRSD), in collaboration with the Travel and Transportation Section (TTS), in the Department of Operational Support (DOS), has launched the Voluntary Downgrade Pilot which introduced a set of new incentives to encourage voluntary downgrade for official air travels by United Nations travelers.

“The initiative is designed to encourage United Nations travelers to voluntarily downgrade from business class to premium economy, or equivalent cabins, by offering eligible travelers, a series of additional incentives aimed at maintaining comfort and convenience, while generating cost savings for the Organization,” says a circular released 18 May.

Meanwhile, in the latest figures released in one published report, the UN spent approximately $319 million on staff travel in one recent reporting year, covering roughly 98,000 trips.

Of those trips:

• About 12,000 flights were business class
• Only 51 flights were first class

The report also noted that the Secretary-General has recommended curbing first-class travel for senior officials.

Current UN travel rules state that:

• Most staff up to D-2 level normally travel economy, though some long-haul exceptions permit a higher class.
• Under-Secretaries-General (USGs) and Assistant Secretaries-General (ASGs) are entitled to “the class immediately below first class,” which in practice is generally business class on most airlines.

So, while the UN’s total annual travel spending has been in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars, the portion specifically attributable to senior officials flying business or first class is likely only a fraction of that total — probably in the tens of millions rather than hundreds of millions annually, based on the relatively small number of first-class tickets reported. The UN has steadily tightened rules on premium travel over the years, according to the report.

In addition to the existing entitlements for travelers, such as reimbursement for advance seat selection, in-flight meals and beverages, and one additional checked bag, the new incentives, according to the staff circular include:

Rest Periods (subject to supervisory approval)

• One additional day of rest upon arrival at the duty station, with up to one day of additional Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA), if arriving early.
• The option to remain at the official business location for one extra day prior to return, with DSA, if this reduces overall ticket cost.
• One additional calendar day of rest upon return to duty station (no DSA).

Reimbursement of costs for

• Lounge access at departure and connection points for both outbound and inbound travel (where applicable).
• Purchase of “extra space seating” including “couch style” in economy class, if offered by the airline.

The circular appeals to staffers to consider the above incentives when planning official travel, ”and should you opt for voluntary downgrade, you may select any combination, provided that the total cost is less than the entitled business class fare, keeping in mind, any additional rest periods selected under the pilot will remain subject to the approval of your first reporting officer.”

How to get started

• Explore details on iSeek: New incentives for travelers: Voluntary downgrade pilot launches | iSeek
• Check out how-to guides on how to opt in;
• Contact your local HR, Travel, or Admin Office for further information and support.

“We encourage all staff to take advantage of these options and contribute to more cost-effective travel practices across the Organization”.

HRSD in the Office of Support Operations (OSO) and TTS in the Facilities and Commercial Acitivites Service (FCAS) within the Division of Administration (DOA), are part of the Department of Operationsl Support (DOS).

Read about DOS on iSeek or our website and follow us on LinkedIn and X.

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Credit: Rizwan Tabassum/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, May 22 2026 (IPS)

Narges Mohammadi, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her human rights activism in Iran, has been allowed to go home. After guards found her unconscious in her cell, the apparent victim of a heart attack, she was granted temporary release from prison and transferred to a hospital. However, she still faces the threat of being taken back to jail once her condition has improved.

Mohammadi has been repeatedly imprisoned for criticising the theocratic regime, demanding women’s rights, advocating for prison reform and campaigning against the death penalty. Over her lifetime she’s been sentenced to a total of 44 years. She’s already spent more than a decade behind bars, including 161 days in solitary confinement, and has also been sentenced to 154 lashes. In February she was handed a further seven-and-a-half-year sentence. From prison – where she experienced cardiac and blood pressure problems and severe weight loss – she has documented systematic rights violations against political prisoners, including sexual and physical abuse of women detainees, torture and extensive use of solitary confinement.

Mohammadi’s case is one among many. While her ordeal has rightly drawn international attention, others more distant from the spotlight are in danger. Three more women human rights activists – Pakhshan Azizi, Sharifeh Mohammadi and Varisheh Moradi – are on death row at imminent risk of execution. The dangers they and countless others face have grown sharply since the current war began.

Repression tightens

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made clear he wants regime change in Iran. On 1 March, an Israeli strike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But if the intention was to topple the regime, it didn’t happen. Iran’s ruling theocratic structures run deep, with multiple layers of planned succession. Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, injured in the same attack, was quickly named his replacement, despite Iran’s official ideology formally rejecting hereditary succession.

While clerical leaders have been killed, Iran’s coercive apparatus has gained in its day-to-day power, hardening the theocracy into something closer to a military dictatorship, with the Basij, the paramilitary volunteer force long deployed to crush public dissent, now front and centre.

Israeli and US hopes that Iranians would rise up against the regime have been disappointed. Iran has seen successive mass protest waves, each crushed with large-scale lethal violence. They include the Green Movement that demanded democracy in 2009 and 2010 and the Woman, Life, Freedom protests that demanded women’s rights in 2022 and 2023. The latest uprising came in December 2025 and January 2026, triggered by economic collapse, forging a movement that united broad sections of society to demand an end to the theocratic regime. The state suppressed it with shocking brutality, killing thousands and detaining tens of thousands.

By February, the uprising had been crushed. The Israeli-US intervention was unlikely to reignite a meaningful mass protest movement. If anything, for some Iranians the war has stoked patriotism and more intense enmity towards Israel and the USA. The anticipated revolt simply hasn’t happened.

Much of Iran’s vast diaspora has rallied in support of the war as a means of toppling the regime. But while the diaspora is united in demanding change, its array of ethnic minority organisations, Islamist factions, leftists, monarchists and republicans is bitterly divided over what should come next. Reza Pahlavi, son of the last shah, enjoys some support but others are wary about monarchical nostalgia and his close ties to Israel and the USA. The most credible potential unifying figures inside Iran are imprisoned or otherwise silenced.

Instead of losing control, the regime has tightened its repression. Even as Iran’s leaders wage a social media propaganda war abroad, at home they’ve imposed a near-total internet shutdown, including a block on VPN services. The blackout has caused immense economic harm, disrupting businesses and financial transactions and hitting women the hardest. This comes on top of the economic effects of the current US blockade of Iranian ports, sending inflation and unemployment soaring.

Under the cover of war and the internet shutdown, the government has accelerated executions of political prisoners. While precise figures are hard to get, rights groups report close to 200 executions so far this year, most preceded by prolonged torture to extract false confessions. Secret hangings are reportedly being carried out on an almost daily basis. Among those killed are people detained during the January protests. On 4 May, it was reported that three people arrested at protests on 8 and 9 January – Ebrahim Dolatabadinejad, Mohammadreza Miri and Mehdi Rasouli – had been hanged. For families, the suffering doesn’t end there, as authorities reportedly refuse to return bodies and pressure relatives to stay silent.

Local priorities

Democracy and human rights in Iran depend on the regime’s departure. But the latest war isn’t about any of this. For Netanyahu, with an election impending and anger remaining at his corruption charges and Israel’s security failures around the 7 October Hamas attacks, permanent warfare is a political strategy. Donald Trump’s many social media announcements provide little clue of what motivates a president who promised not to mire the USA in foreign wars, but distraction from low popularity ratings and his many appearances in the Epstein files may be a factor.

This war isn’t the way to achieve change. The regime appears entrenched and capable of surviving a longer conflict. Any peace deal would leave it intact, which its rulers would treat as a victory.

Real change will come when protests can grow into a mass movement large enough to withstand the lethal repression the state will inevitably deploy. That can only happen with sustained support that respects the autonomy of local civil society leaders and strengthens their capacity. The immediate priorities must be to protect credible local sources of information amid the information blackout and ensure the safety and security of Iran’s democracy and human rights activists.

Above all, states must press the Iranian government to halt executions and release everyone detained for speaking out, protesting and demanding change, beginning with Narges Mohammadi. Temporary medical release is nowhere near enough. The Iranian regime must let her be free.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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CIVICUS discusses the cancellation of RightsCon 2026 with Barbora Bukovská, Senior Director for Law and Policy at ARTICLE 19, a human rights organisation that works on freedom of expression and information around the world.

Barbora Bukovská

Why does the cancellation of RightsCon matter?

This cancellation is significant on three levels. First, it means the loss of community. The human rights movement depends on relationships built across borders and over time. RightsCon was one of the few global spaces where civil society organisations, funders, governments, journalists, researchers and technology professionals could meet without political interference. Losing it means losing opportunities to build solidarity and strengthen the networks the movement runs on.

Second, it was a symbolic blow. RightsCon represented the idea that at least one global space existed where civil society could convene freely, protected from political pressure. That illusion is now shattered. The space proved vulnerable. It is yet more evidence of shrinking civic space globally, and the message it sends is chilling: no space is truly protected from state interference any more.

Third, it caused financial damage. Following funding cuts from the USA in early 2025 and reduced funding from other major donor governments, civil society is struggling to secure resources. Organisations had invested precious funding to attend RightsCon, covering travel, organising side events and preparing advocacy materials. These are resources vulnerable civil society organisations cannot afford to waste.

What does this episode reveal about transnational repression?

The cancellation lays bare how emboldened China feels to globalise its political red lines and exercise transnational repression. For years, it has applied pressure on governments to sideline Taiwanese participation in multilateral forums. Taiwan’s leading role in digital rights and technology has long irritated China. What’s new is other governments’ willingness to yield.

China’s tactics have grown more sophisticated. Rather than open confrontation, it leverages threats of diplomatic fallout or lost investment. The pressure now extends into spaces once thought beyond its reach, such as cultural institutions, rights conferences and universities. China has shown it can coerce governments across sectors and at multiple levels.

The wider context matters too. The USA, once a leading global supporter of internet freedom, has retreated from diplomatic and financial backing for digital rights. China’s influence on the African continent has expanded in the absence of rights-based alternatives. When democratic states withdraw support for civil society, authoritarian influence fills the void.

How do China’s leverage and Zambia’s democratic decline combine?

China’s leverage across Africa has grown substantially in recent years. Chinese funding has built major infrastructure in Zambia, including Mulungushi International Conference Centre, the venue where RightsCon was due to take place. Only days before the cancellation, China signed a new agreement to fund further development projects. Zambia carries roughly US$5 billion in debt to China, and that dependency comes with strings attached.

Domestically, the picture is similarly bleak. Despite President Hakainde Hichilema being elected in 2021 on a promise of democratic renewal, civic space has shrunk steadily since. In 2025, parliament passed cybersecurity laws now used to curtail freedom of expression online and detain political opponents. Ahead of the August 2026 general election, the government is enacting further laws designed to entrench its power. Political control is winning out over democratic commitments.

Yielding to Chinese pressure while restricting civic space at home calls Zambia’s commitment to the rule of law and human rights into serious doubt. The debt creates a channel through which China can extract political cooperation. Together, these dynamics create a dangerous precedent for other global south nations facing similar pressure.

What does this mean globally?

The danger extends well beyond Zambia. If a government can cancel a major international civil society gathering without serious diplomatic or institutional consequences, it sends the wrong signals. States must show that interference carries costs. Democratic states, multilateral organisations and regional institutions must impose costs through sustained pressure and exclusion from future convenings.

International human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, have already condemned Zambia’s decision. But statements alone are not enough. Zambia shouldn’t be considered a reliable host for rights-based global dialogue in future.

If governments can yield to authoritarian pressure at the expense of civil society protections without paying a price, the pattern will spread.

What steps should be taken to protect global civil society forums?

Civil society can adapt but cannot insulate its gatherings from state pressure on its own. Real responsibility lies with states that claim to support human rights. They must send a diplomatic and political signal that interference in global forums is costly and prevent other governments from following Zambia’s example. They must reaffirm their commitment to multi-stakeholder forums and invest in civil society’s ability to convene and participate.

That includes member states of international coalitions such as the Freedom Online Coalition and the Media Freedom Coalition. They must act against restrictions on civic space and freedom of expression, using these platforms to impose costs on governments that interfere with civil society. The behaviour Zambia has just normalised must be made costly.

The UN, other intergovernmental organisations and states must work to guarantee the safety and openness of global gatherings. As democratic states withdraw support and authoritarian states expand their reach, the spaces where global civil society can gather, build relationships and advance human rights will continue to shrink. What’s at stake is the infrastructure of global civil society coordination and solidarity.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Democracy: an enduring aspiration CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Zambia: ‘Constitutional changes in an election period tend to be driven by political expediency rather than the public interest’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Gideon Musonda 24.Dec.2025
Zambia: ‘The NGO Bill strengthens legal mechanisms designed to discredit or silence critical civil society voices’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Josiah Kalala 03.Jun.2025

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U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Aquidneck (WPB-1309) in the Strait of Hormuz, with a large container ship visible in the background as it transits the critical global trade route (Dec. 2, 2020). Credit: MC2 Indra Beaufort

By Lulseged Desta and Jonathan Mockshell
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Sharp surges in energy, fertilizer, and food prices triggered by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf strikingly illustrate the deep interconnections between geopolitical conflict, food insecurity, and the fragility of fossil fuel–dependent food systems.

Besides carrying roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day (about 27 percent of global oil exports), the Strait of Hormuz also handles 20–30 percent of internationally traded inorganic fertilizers, which uses natural gas as a key ingredient in its production. Its closure has immediately disrupted the flow of these essential commodities, triggering sharp price spikes in fuel and key agricultural inputs.

This situation demonstrates how geopolitical instability can rapidly disrupt essential agricultural functions under current input-dependent, industrial production systems that rely heavily on external energy and supply chains. This crisis highlights, more clearly than ever, a critical reality: food systems tied to fossil fuels are inherently unsustainable, continually undermine food sovereignty, and disproportionately affect farmers, particularly smallholders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). World Food Programme estimates warn that, if the conflict continues, the soaring oil, shipping and food costs will push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, driving the global total beyond its record 319 million¹.

Reducing food systems’ reliance on fossil fuels and external inputs is essential to strengthen our collective resilience to future shocks. The truth is that fossil fuels courses through every stage of the food system – from fertilizers and pesticides to processing, preservation, transportation, packaging, food waste disposal, and even food preparation. Moreover, entrenched economic and political structures lock in this fossil-fuel dependence through massive subsidies and price protections – estimated at over $1 trillion in recent years².

Food systems account for at least 15 percent of total fossil fuel use – mostly through synthetic fertilizers ⁴ – but also to power machinery and vehicles, and generate electricity and heat for key processes like irrigation, grain drying, livestock housing, and food storage.

Agroecological approaches to food production offer an alternative to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels while still meeting the needs of a growing global population. This supports a transition from energy-sink systems to regenerative ones, radically enhancing food systems’ resilience in the face of escalating geopolitical instability and environmental vulnerability.

Agroecology is based on natural processes and local resources for sustainable soil fertility. Crucially, many of these practices draw directly from indigenous knowledge systems, where local communities have long maintained soil health through time. Practical steps include the use of organic fertilization (often blended with minimal synthetic inputs), efficient soil microorganisms, nitrogen-fixing plants, and soil health practices like crop rotation, cover cropping, intercropping, reduced tillage, and crop-livestock integration.

Research consistently shows that agroecological approaches – such as farm diversification and tree integrated systems – outperform conventional systems in climate resilience, nutrient cycling, and soil health^5,6, often while boosting yields^7-9. Agroforestry also provides a source of wood fuel, making it a valuable alternative during fossil fuel shortages and price spikes.

Examples can be found worldwide. Peruvian cocoa farmers are using bokashi and bio-oil amendments to restore soil organic matter, regenerate microbial activity, and enhance nutrient cycling¹⁰. In Vietnam, rice-fish coculture systems optimize nutrient cycling, curb pests, and diversify outputs – lowering costs while stabilizing farmer incomes¹¹. Ethiopian farmers practicing wheat-fava bean rotations are cutting fertilizer needs while improving soil structure and building long-term fertility11. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF)’, delivers biodiversity benefits while more than doubling farmers’ economic profits and maintaining comparable crop yields, than chemical-based farming ^12,13.

Other farm-level steps to curb fossil fuel dependence include integrating renewable energy sources for on-site generation and operations – like solar panels, biogas digesters, and wind turbines; solar water pumps, adopting fuel-efficient engines and draft animals; and embracing practices such as minimum tillage, precision irrigation, integrated pest management, and low-input crop-livestock systems.

More fundamentally, shifting from global, industrial commodity chains toward territorial, agroecological food networks can relocalize production, processing, and consumption – shortening supply chains and reducing energy-intensive operations. Shorter, localized supply chains reduce reliance on long-distance transport, lower packaging demand, and promote reusable packaging systems, thereby decreasing fossil fuel consumption.

These efforts can be reinforced by complementary practices that strengthen food sovereignty, such as home gardens and urban agriculture. Crucially, agroecology also aligns with reduced production of ultra-processed foods – among the most energy-intensive products – helping to curb fossil fuel use while potentially improving public health.

In the short term, it is crucial that the allocation of emergency funds are earmarked to procure or purchase organic alternatives to synthetic fertilizers, particularly in the most affected regions. Longer-term, it is necessary to reduce structural barriers to farmers’ adoption of these agroecological approaches including reforms to agricultural subsidies and strengthening support for technical assistance and local governance.

References
1. Farge, E. Iran war may push 45 million people into acute hunger by June, WFP says. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-war-may-push-45-million-people-into-acute-hunger-by-june-wfp-says-2026-03-17/ (2026).

2. IPES-Food. Fuel to Fork: What Will It Take to Get Fossil Fuels out of Our Food Systems? https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FuelToFork.pdf (2025).

3. FAO, UNDP, and UNEP. A Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity – Repurposing Agricultural Support to Transform Food Systems. (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP, 2021). doi:10.4060/cb6562en.

4. Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Power Shift: Why We Need to Wean Industrial Food Systems off Fossil Fuels. https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ga_food-energy-nexus_report.pdf (2023).

5. Niether, W., Jacobi, J., Blaser, W. J., Andres, C. & Armengot, L. Cocoa agroforestry systems versus monocultures: a multi-dimensional meta-analysis. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104085 (2020).

6. Beillouin, D., Ben‐Ari, T., Malézieux, E., Seufert, V. & Makowski, D. Positive but variable effects of crop diversification on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Glob. Change Biol. 27, 4697–4710 (2021).

7. Dittmer, K. M. et al. Agroecology Can Promote Climate Change Adaptation Outcomes Without Compromising Yield In Smallholder Systems. Environ. Manage. 72, 333–342 (2023).

8. Rodenburg, J., Mollee, E., Coe, R. & Sinclair, F. Global analysis of yield benefits and risks from integrating trees with rice and implications for agroforestry research in Africa. Field Crops Res. 281, 108504 (2022).

9. Jones, S. K. et al. Achieving win-win outcomes for biodiversity and yield through diversified farming. Basic Appl. Ecol. 67, 14–31 (2023).

10. Altieri, M. A. & Nicholls, C. I. Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture. J. Peasant Stud. 47, 881–898 (2020).

11. FAO. The State of Food and Agriculture 2022. (FAO, 2022). doi:10.4060/cb9479en.

12. Berger, I. et al. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming’, delivers biodiversity and economic benefits without lowering yields. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 2057–2068 (2025).

13. O’Garra, T. Agroecology benefits people and planet. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 1973–1974 (2025).

14. IPES-Food. Food from Somewhere: Building Food Security and Resilience through Territorial Markets. https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FoodFromSomewhere.pdf (2024).

15. Einarsson, R. Nitrogen in the Food System. https://tabledebates.org/building-blocks/nitrogen-food-system (2024) doi:10.56661/2fa45626.

Lulseged Desta, CGIAR Multifunctional Landscapes Science Program; Jonathan Mockshell, Alliance Biodiversity International – CIAT

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Credit: Bibbi Abruzzini/Forus - Rabat, Morocco

By Silla Ristimäki, Miguel Santibañez, Emeline Siale Ilolahia and Aoi Horiuchi
HELSINKI, Finland / SANTIAGO, Chile / SUVA, Fiji / TOKYO, Japan, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Just four years of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development remain. What comes after 2030 is already a political battleground.

The next global development framework is being shaped now: through quiet agenda-setting, shifting alliances, financing choices, contested norms, and decisions about who gets to participate and who is pushed to the margins. That matters because the world that will shape what comes next is not the world that adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.

The context is harsher, more fractured and less generous. Geopolitical fragmentation is deepening. Armed conflicts are distorting priorities. Climate impacts are accelerating. Development finance is under growing strain. Civic space is shrinking. Public trust in multilateralism is weaker. And too often, the rights, equality and accountability commitments that gave the SDGs their normative force are treated as negotiable.

“We step into the next decade against the background of climate chaos, growing inequality and increasing poverty. The scaffolding for positive change shall be to infuse democratic values in the blood stream of all our governments from the Right to the Left,” says Dr. Moses Isooba, executive director of the Uganda National NGO Forum and Vice-Chair of Forus.

The post-2030 debate must confront the political and structural weaknesses that limited implementation the first time around.

As a civil society network, we have been here from the very beginning. We have secured the adoption of the SDGs with the Beyond 2015 campaign, pushed for innovation and ambition, challenged power, brought forward the voices of communities, and held systems accountable. That role evolves and as we now look “beyond 2030”, we remain present, engaged, and determined to influence what comes next.

One message comes through clearly: the next agenda will only be credible if we are clear about three things — what must be defended, what must be demanded, and what must be declined.

What must be defended

Some foundations of the current framework remain essential and must not be traded away for the sake of political convenience.

The first is universality. One of the most important achievements of the SDGs was to establish that sustainable development is not only a concern for lower income countries, but a universal responsibility. Policies, consumption patterns and economic models that drive inequality, exclusion and ecological harm must be addressed in all regions. High-income countries must not only finance development but also reform their own adverse policies. If the next framework weakens the recognition that sustainable development must integrate social justice, equality, environmental sustainability, peace and human rights, it will not move us forward. It will mark a retreat.

The second is civic space. Civil society participation is one of the conditions that makes accountability, inclusion and implementation possible yet it is increasingly constrained by financial pressures, exclusion from global decision-making processes and erosion of fundamental rights. A future agenda which prioritises resources and protection for civil society supports the building of stable, sustainable societies.

The third is local leadership. Communities and local civil society actors remain closest to the realities that global frameworks claim to address, yet they are still structurally under-resourced and under-represented. Localisation beyond the “buzzword” can bring essential resources for problem diagnosis and planning, increasing effectiveness and legitimacy for sustainable development and peacebuilding.

And finally, what must be defended is multilateralism itself, not as an abstract ideal, but as the shared political space where common commitments can still be built.

“Safeguarding the structures created to advance peace, cooperation and rights sustains global hope and possibilities to address common global challenges. This is in the interests of us all, future generations and the planet.” Silla Ristimäki, Adviser at Fingo. “This is why ambitious reform of the UN cannot be separated from the post-Agenda 2030 discussion.”

What must be demanded

Defending core principles is not enough. Negotiations about the future must also correct what the Agenda 2030 left unresolved.

At the centre of this is financing. A credible post-2030 framework cannot rest on the same unequal financial architecture that has constrained implementation for years. Debt burdens, unequal fiscal space, volatile aid flows and weak commitments have all narrowed the room for governments and communities to act. Financing reforms must include debt restructuring and relief, fairer lending terms, increased concessional finance, stronger domestic resource mobilisation, tax justice, policy coherence and predictable support for civil society.

“Many countries are spending more on debt than education or health. We need to reform the current unjust international financial architecture,” says Aoi Horiuchi, Senior Advocacy Officer at JANIC, the civil society network for international cooperation in Japan.

Accountability must also be stronger. Voluntary reporting and soft review mechanisms have not been enough. A future agenda must be backed by mandatory, transparent and regular review, with independent oversight and a formal role for civil society and local actors in tracking progress and exposing implementation gaps.

And participation must mean more than consultation after decisions are already taking shape. Civil society needs a formalised, meaningful and safe role in both negotiating and implementing the future framework, especially for local actors and groups continuing to face structural or political exclusion.

“Meaningful change comes from meaningful participation. That’s why we need to defend civic space,” says Horiuchi.

What must be declined

Some directions already visible in early discussions must be rejected outright.

A thinner agenda that lowers ambition in the name of consensus must be declined. So must any attempt to weaken universality, rights, gender equality, civic freedoms or climate ambition for political expediency.

The continuation of a financial status quo that deepens inequality while speaking the language of partnership must also be declined. So must accountability arrangements that remain symbolic, selective or performative.

And tokenistic participation must be named for what it is. A process that brings civil society into the room for appearance’s sake while excluding it from agenda-setting, decision-making and follow-through is managed exclusion.

Finally, as development governance evolves, the expanding role of private and philanthropic actors must not come without public-interest safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. Public goals cannot be left to unaccountable power.

We must get out of silos, create spaces of dialogue, of co-responsibility and raise the question of whether the post-2030 framework will be more honest about power, more serious about accountability, more capable of confronting structural inequality, and more open to those whose lives and rights are most at stake.

Our answer is here:
Defend what must not be lost.
Demand what must be corrected.
Decline what would weaken the future.

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By Jordan Ryan
May 19 2026 (IPS)

 
Where does real power reside in the UN development system? A new policy brief from Cepei, a Colombian development policy institute, and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), presented earlier in May, poses this deceptively simple question. The answer matters because institutions that cannot govern fairly or transparently struggle to sustain legitimacy, and legitimacy is essential for peace.

The Cepei-IDOS diagnosis identifies a “triple disconnect” that structures contemporary development governance. Formal oversight bodies (the Executive Boards, ECOSOC, the General Assembly) set policy directions but control only a fraction of financing. Real resources flow through bilateral arrangements between major donors and agency leadership, operating largely beyond collective scrutiny. The ten largest donors shape system priorities through informal channels of influence. Meanwhile, the programme countries that host the vast majority of UN development operations report significantly weaker upstream influence than traditional donor states. This misalignment between authority, resources and voice is no longer incidental. It has become embedded in the way the system operates.

What transforms this observation from an efficiency problem into a peace imperative is the reality that ungovernable systems cannot respond to prevention and peacebuilding needs. A development architecture shaped disproportionately by donor priorities and limited programme-country voice lacks the legitimacy, flexibility and democratic accountability required to address the structural drivers of conflict. When host countries experience UN operations as imposed rather than negotiated, and when funding priorities reflect donor interests rather than local prevention priorities, the development system becomes an actor in grievance production, not prevention.

The governance–legitimacy nexus works in both directions. Ungovernable institutions erode the multilateral system’s credibility in the Global South. Successive rounds of ineffective UN reform, driven by incremental adjustments within existing power structures, signal to programme countries that the system is designed to resist their inclusion. This perception is strengthened when donors can navigate around formal governance bodies through bilateral arrangements. Over time, institutional opacity breeds delegitimation. The UN is then weakened as a platform for both development cooperation and conflict prevention, because confidence in its democratic character has fractured.

The Cepei-IDOS brief positions the first 1000 days of the next Secretary-General’s term as a narrow window for visible structural change. The argument is neither revolutionary nor naive. It does not propose wholesale redesign of the UN system. Rather, it suggests that an incoming Secretary-General with political capital and an informed strategic agenda can make power visible, realign financial flows with governance decisions, strengthen coordination across fragmented programme delivery, and treat programme country inclusion not as charitable consultation but as an operational requirement. Small shifts in how decisions are made, where resources are allocated and whose voice is heard can accumulate into meaningful redistributions of power.

For those committed to multilateral peace and development, the brief is important precisely because it refuses the false choice between institutional realism and structural ambition. It recognises that the current system is durable and resistant to change. It also demonstrates that durability does not mean immutability. The Secretary-General occupies a unique position to convene, name problems and propose sequenced shifts in practice. Whether that role is exercised for incremental adjustment or for visible realignment of power depends on the strategic choices made in the first 1000 days, when institutional attention is high and political mandates are fresh.

The launch event captured something essential about the moment. Participants acknowledged that the system is ungovernable as presently designed while recognising that accepting that reality is not the same as accepting its inevitability. The brief itself can serve as an anchor for what peace advocates and policymakers need to argue in the months ahead: that the next Secretary-General should treat governance reform not as a technical fix but as a peace imperative. When multilateral institutions are trusted by the countries they purport to serve, they become more effective instruments of prevention and cooperation. When they are experienced as vehicles for donor capture, they become part of the problem they claim to address.

If the next Secretary-General treats governance reform as a peace imperative rather than a technical exercise, the UN development system can begin to rebuild the legitimacy it is steadily losing among the countries and communities it exists to serve.

Related articles from this author:
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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The World Bank Group is consulting publicly on whether to merge its three independent complaint mechanisms. This note explains what is being proposed and how civil society organizations can participate in the consultation.

By Danny Bradlow and David Hunter
PRETORIA, South Africa / WASHINGTON DC, USA , May 19 2026 (IPS)

The World Bank made history in 1994 by creating the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism, at any international organisation. Its function is to investigate complaints from communities who allege they were harmed because the bank failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.

By establishing the three-member Inspection Panel, the World Bank showed support for a democrati Soth Arica/c vision of international governance based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals to take part in development decisions that affect their lives.

To date, the panel has received 186 complaints. Fifty-two have been from Africa. They involved projects in 56 countries, including 26 African countries. The complaints have raised issues such as the World Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies regarding public consultations, environmental and social impact assessments and involuntary resettlement in the projects that it funds.

The board has expanded the bank’s accountability process to include both compliance reviews and dispute resolution processes. Today, the World Bank Group has three independent accountability mechanisms:

• the Inspection Panel, which focuses on compliance reviews in public sector projects
• a separate dispute resolution mechanism for public sector projects
• the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, which offers both compliance reviews and dispute resolution services for private sector projects, primarily funded by the International Finance Corporation.

These accountability mechanisms have operated with mixed success. There have been some wins, for example in a case in Uganda involving risks for women and children associated with the building of a road. And some failures. An example is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman finding against the International Finance Corporation for noncompliance in a coal fired power plant in India that was ignored.

We were involved, as legal academics and working with civil society organisations, in the establishment of the Inspection Panel. We have been following the activities of these independent accountability mechanisms for over 30 years. We are concerned about their future.

The World Bank Group is seeking to become a “bigger and better” bank. This involves promoting more collaboration between the five entities that make up the group. It is doing so under the banner of “One WBG”. This is an important development because the World Bank is the only global multilateral development bank. It offers developing countries both financial and advisory services. For example, it is the biggest funder of development projects in Africa.

The increasing collaboration between the different institutions in the bank raises concerns about which of their policies are applicable to a particular project. It also raises the issue of whether the bank should integrate the group’s independent accountability mechanisms so that there is no question about which mechanism is applicable to the project.

We believe that resolving this issue offers the bank’s board an opportunity to improve the structure of its independent accountability mechanisms and their contribution to the bank’s operations.

The dangers

The board appointed a two-person task force in September 2025 to advise it on the feasibility of integrating the three organisations in a way that does not reduce their independence, accessibility and effectiveness. The task force prepared a thorough and well-reasoned draft report.

The report was finalised after public consultations and is being considered by the board. It shows that integration of the mechanisms is a feasible, but complex exercise. The existing mechanisms have different operating cultures, policies and practices and human resource needs. The report describes various models for integrating the existing mechanisms.

The report also demonstrates that if mishandled, the exercise could result in a less independent and less effective accountability mechanism. To avoid this risk, we propose that the board adopt a model consisting of two separate independent accountability mechanisms. One to cover compliance reviews across the entire group. The other to cover dispute resolution across the group. This will enable both functions to operate independently and efficiently.

Our proposal raises four issues.

First, it is important that each mechanism is independent of the bank’s management. Each mechanism must have sufficient resources to undertake effective compliance reviews or dispute resolutions. Their processes must also be robust enough to result in meaningful outcomes for the complainants.

Second, the new compliance mechanism must retain a three-member panel appointed by and reporting to the bank’s board. The panel should have a permanent chair serving a six-year term. The chair must have the authority to decide which cases need the panel’s attention. The other two panel members should also serve staggered six-year terms.

A three-person panel allows for some geographic, technical and experiential diversity. Gaining a consensus among the panel members improves the quality and increases the credibility of the panel reports. A three-member panel is better able to withstand pressure from the bank’s management and other stakeholders than is a mechanism headed by one person.

Third, the dispute resolution mechanism should be headed by an experienced dispute resolution professional at the vice-president level. This official should report to the president of the bank. Our view is that this arrangement could encourage the institution to play a more proactive role in resolving disputes.

To ensure that the unit has some independence it should also have regularly scheduled meetings with the board. The head of the unit should also be able to request a meeting with the board whenever they deem it necessary and without requiring the prior approval of the bank’s president.

Fourth, the process of consolidating accountability mechanisms will be complex. Consequently, the board should first decide on the basic structure: a compliance review unit headed by a three-member panel and a separate dispute resolution unit headed by a senior professional.

It should delay any decisions on the policies, principles and practices of the mechanisms until it receives advice from a multi-stakeholder working group that includes external stakeholders and management and is co-chaired by one person from each of the units being merged.

An opportunity to fix things

The bank has the opportunity to strengthen its development mission. The changes it makes should be designed to:

• help make the bank a better institution that supports higher quality projects
• make the bank a learning institution that openly accepts criticism and looks to implement solutions
• ensure it becomes an institution that recognises that people affected by bank-funded projects are stakeholders in its operations who may be forced to risk their well-being for the greater good.

Source: The Conversation Africa May 17, 2026

Daniel Bradlow is Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria; David Hunter is Professor Emeritus, The American University Washington College of Law, American University.

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Credit: Emmanuel Herman/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Hannah Wheatley, Joanna Makhlouf and Taís Siqueira
BAGAMOYO, Tanzania / BEIRUT, Lebanon / WASHINGTON D.C., May 18 2026 (IPS)

In an era when civil society funding is in decline, it’s time to rebel against a broken system.

Today, too much is being asked from the people already doing the most. In a time of multiple and connected global crises – of climate, conflict, democracy, disinformation, global governance, human rights and inclusion – and in a context of intensifying civic space restrictions and collapsing funding, funders and the intermediary organisations that distribute resources somehow expect frontline organisations to transform systemic injustices that have built up over centuries. At the same time, these groups are expected to keep meeting inflexible targets, writing flawless reports and keeping their teams emotionally and physically afloat.

As governments, international organisations, investors, philanthropists, civil society and business leaders meet at the Global Partnerships Conference on the future of international development, it’s time to do things differently.

Let’s stop asking local leaders to transform their communities before they’ve had space to heal. Let’s stop training grassroots organisations to become international clones. Let’s stop intermediaries replicating burnout culture.

No single organisation can undo the long legacy of colonialism or the systemic problems of global capitalism. And they shouldn’t have to. The role of the civil society ecosystem must be to build and protect space, redistribute power and resources and, most of all, stop transferring institutional pressure downwards. If we truly trust local civil society, we must also trust its limits. That means intermediaries must stand their ground with funders, set realistic expectations and champion the right to do less when circumstances demand it.

At CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Labs – an initiative to tackle the barriers that get in the way of local leadership of development – partners often report feeling compelled to deliver ambitious workplans that involve them reaching every district, leading multiple initiatives and facilitating extensive community engagements, even as civic space is closing around them. Driven by passion and the need to prove their worth in a competitive ecosystem, many have overextended without realising the toll on their wellbeing and sustainability.

Burnout is not just about long hours. It stems from impossible expectations in unsafe, high-pressure contexts. Civil society is striving to stretch every grant dollar, prove its worth at every reporting cycle and ensure the survival of communities. In restrictive civic space conditions, these pressures are compounded by harassment, intimidation, surveillance and violence.

The result is a constant feeling of not doing enough, even when the demands are structurally impossible. Over time, this erodes morale, health and leadership sustainability.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, funders proved that another way was possible. They provided unrestricted funding and offered flexibility and simplified reporting. Trust was extended. Partnerships were strengthened. But that willingness to experiment has not lasted.

What must change

It must be recognised that in these conditions, scaling back is not failure. It is how movements endure.

We have seen that investing in healing and reflection is not a luxury. It is what sustains movements. At Local Leadership Labs, partners working with survivors of state violence realised they could not move forward without first addressing exhaustion and trauma. Their care-centred approach showed that the process itself can be the outcome. Taking time for healing and thoughtful collaboration produces more sustainable, transformational results.

This is what the civil society ecosystem should support: not chasing impossible targets, but creating conditions for dignity, reflection and resilience.

Addressing burnout requires more than acknowledgement. It calls for rethinking about how support is structured and how expectations are set. Funders and intermediaries can help break the cycle by:

1. Budgeting time and priority for healing
Leaders are often asked to deliver systemic change while carrying unaddressed trauma. Without space for healing, burnout is inevitable. Intermediaries can normalise pacing, integrate healing into workplans and advocate with funders for timelines that reflect reality.

2. Showing funders the way
Funders need guidance on becoming more adaptable to intensifying civic space conditions and contexts of high volatility. Intermediaries can convene learning spaces where funders reflect on how flexibility and responsiveness protect communities and sustain movements. They can also challenge extractive, funder-driven processes and advocate for spaces where local civil society can lead and influence on its own terms.

3. Bridging, connecting and humanising
Behind funders, intermediaries and frontline civil society are people, all under institutional pressure. Intermediaries can help in both directions, by shielding local partners from unrealistic demands while working with funders to develop an understanding of what’s achievable. By cultivating empathy, they can replace transactional directives with reciprocal accountability, unlocking collaborations that go beyond the extractive.

In many contexts, civil society is holding the line in the face of authoritarianism, even worse attacks on human rights and still stronger repression. The enemies of democracy and human rights thrive when those defending freedoms and demanding social justice burn out. When forced to compete for scarce resources, organisations try to over-deliver to prove their worth, further deepening stress and accelerating exhaustion.

In this context, supporting the wellbeing of local civil society is not optional. It is central to protecting the energy that drives activism. Funders and intermediaries must pause, reflect and reset expectations. If we create space for healing, rest and resilience, movements will survive the current storm, and emerge equipped to resist, transform and win.

Taís Siqueira is Local Leadership Labs Coordinator at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Hannah Wheatley is CIVICUS’s former Data Analyst and Joanna Makhlouf is a former member of the Local Leadership Labs implementation team.

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Credit: Africa Center for Strategic Studies

By Kester Kenn Klomegah
MOSCOW, May 18 2026 (IPS)

Under the auspices of the Faculty of Journalism of Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Russian-African Club, in late April, held its IV International Forum of Journalists from Russia and Africa, which marked another historical milestone. According to an established annual tradition, discussions were focused on aspects of the media, its structure, current performance, information contents, and challenges as well as future perspectives.

The shared common purpose was also to critically review whether the media, both in Africa and in the Russian Federation, have played its role in strengthening bilateral relations, and promoted the important goals set out during the first and second Russia-Africa summits. Why Media?

As largely expected, there were in-depth discussions. There were also controversies over the dynamics of media performance, with prominent participating experts raising narratives and criticisms, in the context of the forum’s theme: “Mass Media of Russia and Africa: The Role in Strengthening Friendship and Solidarity among the Peoples of the World.”

Elena Vartanova, dean of the Faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University, pointed to the fact that the media has to build diverse partnerships between Russia and Africa, further emphasized the importance of intercultural dialogue in creating a unified information space amid the complex global transformations of the modern world.

Yaroslav Skvortsov, dean of the Faculty of International Journalism at MGIMO, spoke about his recent unique trip to South Africa, noting that South Africa and the continent as a whole remain a “media blind spot” for Russian media, just as Russia receives very little coverage for African audiences.

The expert emphasized the need for serious, thoughtful, and in-depth reporting work in this area. The necessity to explore more opportunities in building strong ties, deepening the understanding of geopolitical developments, while fostering dialogue among the continent’s public.

Underlining Reasons

The media performance gap between Russia and Africa stems from overwhelming dominance of Western media outlets, a little of direct African reporting in Russia (including a lack of accredited African journalists), and limited institutional investment. These are some of the reasons highlighted during the discussions by an African studies journalist and columnist for the ITAR-TASS Analytical Center, Oleg Osipov, Timur Shafir, Secretary of the Union of Journalists of Russia and Head of the International Department of the Union of Journalists of Russia, and Louis Gowend, chairman of the Commission for Relations with African Diaspora and the Media of the Russian-African Club of Moscow State University, and president of the African Business Club.

Oleg Osipov, unreservedly, expressed concern about information deficit in Russian and African journalism, emphasized the urgent need to expand the network of Russian correspondent offices across the African continent, as well as getting a few experienced African media practitioners to Russia. This is especially important in today’s reality, as geopolitics heightens in the world.

Assessing current global trends, Russia needs to expand its presence in all spheres, and the media space is a crucial component of this process, the Russian expert believes. But for Timur Shafir, the thoughts were on the fact that it was especially important now to find common grounds in the mutual perceptions of the peoples and cultures of Russia and Africa through media communication.

In addition, he further emphasized that the media landscape is currently undergoing significant transformations, with technologies, audiences, and means of communication changing. Therefore, journalism is currently an area of particular responsibility and professional integrity, and direct dialogue between journalists in Russia and Africa has become crucial now.

Search for New Approach

The IV International Forum of Journalists from Russia and Africa, was considered as the new dawn, turning a new chapter with suggestion and paving the path for improving media performance in both regions. The participants offered a deafening applause to this position. The speakers expressed confidence that the Forum will serve as a starting point for many new joint initiatives.

According to Louis Gowend, the RusAfroMedia media platform—an information resource, which was created by the Moscow State University RA Club in 2022, for instance has to undergo serious facelifting, by strengthening cooperation and to improve the image of Russia-Africa cooperation.

This platform provides all the conditions for a free and frank exchange of opinions, relevant useful information, and the promotion of initiatives in all areas of cooperation between Russia and Africa. The speaker expressed concern over the fact that Russian journalists are much less active on the RusAfroMedia platform than their African counterparts and urged those present to make greater use of this resource.

In his contribution, Alexander Berdnikov, executive secretary of the Russian-African Club, distinctively noted that, at a time when new development trends are unfolding in the world, journalism and the entire media sphere are literally becoming a battlefield for information wars and special operations.

The speaker reminded that the Forum, being held ahead of the Third Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for October 2026, indicates how crucial for participants to develop solutions and initiatives for cooperation in journalism between Russia and Africa, and which will form the basis for practical recommendations in preparation for the forthcoming African leaders’ Summit.

Preserving Traditional Practice

Lyubov Sakhno, head of the Protocol and African Section of the TASS International Relations Department, represented Russia’s oldest news agency and spoke about ITAR-TASS’s consistent efforts to provide African media with foreign-language news feeds. But then, Russian media expansion faces limited budget constraints.

According to her, over 400 media outlets in Africa use these resources. She also discussed the organization’s media forum, which traditionally takes place on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit.

Sergey Grachev, deputy director of the Media Research and Analysis Directorate at Rossiya Segodnya International News Agency, agreed with his colleagues that today we are facing unprecedented pressure from Western media. African media, most often, depends on Western sources, which Russian officials argue creates a “vacuum” filled by biased or hostile information.

Despite this, Russian media projects in Africa continue to develop, presenting analytical models of Sputnik’s presence on social media, where it broadcasts in 33 foreign languages.

Editor-in-chief of the African Initiative news agency, Buinta Bembeeva, noted in her discussions that Africa has become noticeably, and more prominent in Russian news in recent years. The speaker discussed the African Initiative’s experience in Africa. The agency is noticeably represented in many African countries through cooperation agreements with local media outlets.

The agency also collaborates with bloggers and organizes a journalism school for young African journalists. This close, on-the-ground, direct collaboration with African media outlets is key to achieving full-scale journalistic activity.

Contributions from Nigerian Academics

Professor Babatunde Joseph, Kaduna State University, spoke about using strengthened strategic communications to strengthen partnerships and unite the cultures of African countries. He agreed with his Russian colleagues on the need to expand the presence of Russian news agencies in Africa and African media in Russia. The expert cited the example of a well-known British radio station that broadcasts in five languages in Nigeria alone: Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin English (called “Najin” there), and plain English. “This is a successful strategy,” the professor was forced to note.

Professor Mohammad Bashir Ali, Kaduna State University (Nigeria), leading the Nigerian delegation to the Forum, discussed at length, the traditional role of media in promoting economic and entrepreneurial cooperation between Russia and Africa. Despite the multiple challenges posed by the complex international environment in both Africa and Russia, there is enormous potential for opportunity in this area. He concluded that greater consolidation in the media sphere is essential.

Professors Yushau Ibrahim Ango and Ayodele Babatunde, both from Kaduna State University, presented a working paper entitled “African Creative Industries and Media Systems in the Context of Digitalization,” analyzing the impact of digital media on entrepreneurship in the Nigerian economy.

The paper, however, concluded that reliance on digital platforms introduces new vulnerabilities, including algorithmic unpredictability, into the economy. This paper contributed to entrepreneurship and media research by theorizing digital platforms as entrepreneurial infrastructure, which has implications for policy, platform governance, and understanding how media shapes economic life in the African context.

Concluding Remarks

Hafiz Basi, chairman of the Youth Projects Commission of the Russian-African Club, seriously echoed the opinion in closing remarks, stating that it is time to change outdated stereotypes that portray Russia and Africa through Soviet political clichés. “We need journalism that brings people together, not further distances,” Hafiz Basi emphasized. He also noted that the lack of accredited African journalists in Russia remains a pressing issue.

Meanwhile, African media outlets write about Russia primarily in political terms, failing to reveal the true depth of Russian culture and the soul of the Russian people. In his opinion, the Russia-Africa Journalists Forum, once more, demonstrated its importance, which discusses the most pressing issues, prospects, and strategies for strengthening media cooperation between Russia and Africa.

This is in reality, important during the time of rapid geopolitical changes, in response to the aggressive rhetoric of Western countries and their satellites, public diplomacy, soft power, and peacekeeping journalism which are becoming increasingly relevant careful analysis and take effective measures in building a solid foundation for Russian-African dialogue.

Kester Kenn Klomegah focuses on current geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development-related questions in Africa with external countries. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted in several reputable foreign media.

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A residential building in Beirut, Lebanon, lies in ruins. Credit: UNICEF/Fouad Choufany

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, May 13 2026 (IPS)

Violence has metastasized into humanity’s baseline condition. Yet international institutions remain paralyzed by vetoes and rivalry, offering hollow declarations while dehumanization becomes normalized. Coordinated action, not gestures, is desperately needed.

Global violence today is metastasizing, not contained; over 180,000 violent events reported globally by the International Institute for Strategic Studies signal a world in which conflict has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. More than 130 armed conflicts now rage—over twice the number of 15 years ago—shattering infrastructure, tearing apart social fabric, and normalizing dehumanization as a political weapon.

Women and children bear the brunt: hundreds of millions live within range of armed clashes, with millions of preventable deaths and lifelong trauma caused not only by bullets and bombs but by hunger, disease, and gender-based violence unleashed by war’s chaos.

Yet the UN system and the world’s democracies appear increasingly paralyzed—trapped in vetoes, geopolitical rivalries, and hollow declarations—offering gestures of concern rather than the coordinated, enforced accountability this modern plague of violence so desperately demands.

The global escalation of violence is a structural crisis rather than an aberration—one that reveals the failure of international institutions, exposing the normalization of suffering across political, economic, and societal dimensions.

The proliferation of violence signals not just an increase in armed confrontations but a breakdown in the very mechanisms meant to constrain conflict, rendering dehumanization a routine tool of power, as demonstrated in the following.

The Philosophical Angle

Violence represents the collapse of legitimate political authority and the rise of impotence masquerading as force. Hannah Arendt’s foundational insight remains essential: “Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course, it ends in power’s disappearance” (On Violence, 1970).

This speaks directly to today’s proliferation of conflicts, which indicate not state strength but institutional failure, where violence substitutes for the consent and legitimacy governments can no longer command. The resort to violence signals the exhaustion of political dialogue and the absence of legitimate power structures capable of resolving disputes.

Economic Disenfranchisement

Economic drivers are critical accelerants of contemporary violence through resource competition, commodity exploitation, and systemic inequality. Slavoj Žižek’s concept of systemic violence captures the pervasive economic roots: “Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than the direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions, but is purely ‘objective,’ systemic, anonymous.”

The greed-driven exploitation of natural resources—from diamonds in Sierra Leone to oil in Venezuela and cobalt and other conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo—finances rebellions and turns conflict into a profitable enterprise. Economic deprivation, geoeconomic confrontation through weaponized tariffs and sanctions, and commodity price shocks directly shape military capacity and conflict outcomes.

The Political Compulsion of Violence

Political violence emerges not merely from divergent interests but from the deliberate choice to pursue objectives through coercion rather than negotiation. The paralysis of the UNSC and democratic institutions reflects what Arendt identified as bureaucratic tyranny: “In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted. … everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act… where we are all equally powerless, we have a tyranny without a tyrant.”

This captures the international community’s inability to enforce accountability—vetoes and geopolitical rivalries create a structural void where violence thrives unchecked. Political fragility and weakening institutions, seen in Syria and Myanmar, make societies vulnerable to breakdown, radicalization, and violent dissent.

Societal Fragmentation

Societal conditions create climates where violence becomes normalized through inequality and the erosion of social cohesion. Thomas Hobbes’s bleak assessment of unconstrained human nature remains relevant: in the state of nature, “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” While Hobbes described a pre-political condition, his insight applies to societies where governance collapses and fear dominates, conditions now afflicting millions living within range of armed clashes.

Social norms that accept violence as conflict resolution, combined with economic inequalities and a lack of community participation, create environments where aggression flourishes. This normalizes dehumanization, where, as in Nigeria, Israel and South Africa, gendered violence, ethnic tensions, and historical grievances fuel recurring cycles of brutality.

Nationalism, Repression and State Complicity

State-level factors amplifying violence include the failure to address ethnic marginalization, resource competition, and the absence of functional governance. Walter Benjamin warned of violence’s relationship to law and state power: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (On the Concept of History, 1940).

This observation underscores how national institutions perpetuate violence through their foundational structures and exclusionary practices. Nations repeatedly falling victim to civil and international wars demonstrate governments’ inability to recognize and address destabilizing issues like political, religious, or ethnic marginalization. The weaponization of state apparatus through totalitarian mobilization of violence destroys the very space where political thinking and resistance might occur, as demonstrated in China and Eritrea.

Religious Instrumentalization

Religion, when co-opted by political actors or stripped of its ethical core, becomes a potent catalyst for violence, sanctifying exclusion and legitimizing brutality. Sectarian divides—whether in the Middle East, South Asia, or parts of Africa—transform identity into a battlefield where compromise is heresy and annihilation becomes duty. René Girard’s insight is instructive: “Religion shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion.” When faith is manipulated to justify power or grievance, such as in India, Israel or Iraq, it ceases to restrain violence and instead consecrates it, deepening cycles of retribution and rendering conflicts existential rather than negotiable.

The convergence of these dimensions explains why violence has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. Several measures must be considered to de-escalate global violence. Although effecting change is extremely difficult, every effort must still be made, provided the public leads the charge through sustained protest, continuous advocacy, and relentless pressure on policymakers to enact change.

Reform UN Security Council Veto Power

Governments must constrain veto authority by restricting its use in cases involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Permanent members should abstain when directly involved, transforming the veto from obstruction into accountability and addressing institutional paralysis that enables unchecked violence.

Establish Functional Early Warning Systems

International bodies should implement systems linking detection to preventive action, closing the warning-response gap. These must integrate predictive analytics, local expertise, and cross-border coordination to anticipate violence months before eruption, enabling timely diplomatic and humanitarian intervention.

Address Economic Inequality and Insecurity

Governments should implement policies that reduce income inequality—including wage increases, tax reform, and financial assistance—aimed at addressing violence triggers. Targeted lending, job creation, and redistributive policies alleviate financial strain that fuels conflict and crime, making structural prevention more effective than reactive measures.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is President of the Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution.

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By Mohamed Omar
MOGADISHU, Somalia , May 12 2026 (IPS)

When war erupted in the Middle East in late February, the most visible consequences were playing out in the Persian Gulf, with smoke rising from Dubai’s Jebel Ali port and shipping traffic across one of the world’s most critical maritime routes grinding to a near halt.

What was harder to see was a mother in Somalia, traveling 200 kilometers with a child too sick to sit upright, arriving at a stabilization center that was running low on the one product that could save her child’s life.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints, has sent shockwaves through global supply chains that reach far beyond the Gulf. Before the war began, roughly 3,000 vessels transited the strait each month.

In March, that number fell to just 154. The UN has warned that the resulting disruption is triggering a widening humanitarian and economic shock far beyond the Middle East, with rising oil prices and reduced maritime traffic driving up transport and food costs across import-dependent economies. We are certainly feeling that shock in Somalia.

Dr. Mohamed Omar is head of Health and Nutrition at Action Against Hunger in Somalia.

These children are treated with two products: Ready to Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) and therapeutic milk, specifically the formulas F-75 and F-100, which are produced exclusively by Nutriset in France. Before the Strait of Hormuz closure, those products arrived in Mogadishu in 30 to 35 days via the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden.

Ships now divert around the entire African continent, extending delivery times to 55 to 65 days. That is nearly double the original transit time, and it comes with far less certainty about when shipments will actually arrive.

The cost increases compound the delay. A carton of therapeutic milk that cost $139 in 2024 rose to $186 in 2025 after USAID funding cuts, and has since climbed to $200 in 2026 following the Strait of Hormuz closure, a 44 percent increase in two years.

Fuel costs inside Somalia have surged by 150 percent, raising both the price of food for households and the cost of transporting supplies from Mogadishu to remote program sites like Hudur in the Bakool region. They represent the difference between whether a child receives treatment and whether a facility can afford to stay open.

Action Against Hunger, which operates 10 of the 52 remaining stabilization centers in the country, currently has only 69 cartons of therapeutic milk on hand. That figure covers roughly two weeks to one month of supply under current demand, and demand is rising sharply. Admissions at our facilities increased 35 percent between the first quarter of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. At the same time, the number of stabilization centers across Somalia has already fallen from 71 to 52, after USAID’s termination order prompted facility closures earlier this year.

In areas such as Wajid, Somalia, Action Against Hunger replaced diesel-powered engines with solar-powered systems to supply water, reducing costs and providing a sustainable, long-term solution. Credit: Action Against Hunger

The funding gap to sustain nutrition interventions through 2026 stands at $2.9 million. That figure covers product procurement and in-country transportation costs. To put that in context: treating a child for severe acute malnutrition costs between $140 and $213. Preventing it costs $35. The math on early intervention is not complicated.

The Council on Foreign Relations has documented how shipping containers at Dubai’s International Humanitarian City now carry a $3,000 emergency surcharge, while the World Food Program has warned that supply chain pressures are driving up the costs of life-saving operations globally. These are systemic failures that compound each other.

There is a specific and urgent timeline here. UNICEF’s in-country stock of therapeutic milk is projected to run out by August 2026. Because of the extended shipping times caused by the Africa diversion route, funding must be committed by May or June for the product to arrive before that deadline.

Iran has agreed, in principle, to facilitate humanitarian aid shipments through the strait, and diplomatic efforts to reopen the waterway to commercial traffic are ongoing. But the ceasefire remains fragile, and even a partial reopening offers no guarantee that the specialized supply chains supporting therapeutic nutrition programs will recover in time.

The supply chain disruptions caused by the Iran war are a new layer on top of pre-existing funding deficits and a withdrawal of US foreign aid that was already forcing closures and rationing across the country.

The children arriving at stabilization centers and outpatient nutrition sites in Somalia did not cause any of these disruptions. They are the downstream consequence of a global logistics network absorbing simultaneous shocks it was never designed to handle. A $2.9 million funding gap is solvable. The question is whether the international community will respond in time.

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Attendees at the NPT Review Conference side event titled 'Preventing Nuclear Use and Escalation: Lessons from Nuclear Close Calls. ' Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The consequences of nuclear warfare would transcend borders and the impact would be felt across generations. Yet knowing this, member states, including nuclear-armed states, are increasingly flouting the nuclear taboo, while also relying heavily on deterrence to prevent fallout.

Throughout the Cold War period, there were stories of nuclear “close calls”—moments where the world could have been plunged into nuclear warfare were it not for human intervention or sheer luck. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Petrov incident of 1983 may be more well-known examples from history, but others may also reveal what lessons should be taken from these ‘close calls.’

At the sidelines of the 2026 NPT Review Conference, academics, government and civil society convened to discuss just that. On May 1, at an event convened by Soka Gakkai International (SGI) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), people came together to deliberate over past and present efforts to prevent nuclear escalation. The panelists argued that these stories demonstrate how nuclear deterrence may not be an effective security strategy towards disarmament or even nonproliferation.

Chie Sunada, Director of Disarmament and Human Rights, SGI Peace Center, speaks in a panel on nuclear escalation risks. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS

“The history of close calls—Cuba, Petrov, Black Brant—and many other less well-known events does not tell us that deterrence works. It tells us that deterrence has, on a number of documented occasions, almost failed,” said George-Wilhelm Gallhofer, Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Austria’s Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. “Luck is not a security strategy. And yet, the global security order, 60 years on, still rests on it.”

Gallhoffer went on to suggest that the nuclear taboo needs to be reinforced once more by promoting honest dialogue between nuclear powers and non-nuclear states, where the non-nuclear states remind all parties of the stakes at play. Doctrines like the NPT and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) should be regarded as security treaties, not only moral or ethical frameworks.

Elayne Whyte, a professor at Johns Hopkins and former UN Ambassador of Costa Rica, also echoed this sentiment, adding that the issue of nuclear danger is just as rooted at the societal level as it is through legal frameworks. The shared understanding of nuclear danger is not only produced through weapons systems or treaties but also through decision-makers and the values of society.

“It is [the] 21st century; we also have to acknowledge that the erosion of the nuclear taboo cannot be separated from the wider nationalist trends that rank human lives unequally and make it easier to imagine that mass destruction inflicted on others is […] tolerated,” said Whyte.

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence threaten to further complicate nuclear escalation, wherein nuclear states, in an effort to stay ahead of the curve, adopt these technologies for their perceived potential to reduce the human margin of error. The automation of decision-making in nuclear weapons use is not entirely new, as was seen in 1979 and 1980, when the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received several false alarms through errors in their missile warning system.

Yanliang Pan, a research associate at CNS, remarked that these cases proved that automated systems would still be susceptible to automation bias and compressed decision-making time, thus increasing the likelihood of accidents. Although humans should still have ‘meaningful’ control over decisions of nuclear use, Pan noted that these close calls occurred while humans were in control. “We should be talking about the effect of automation on the reliability of human control, rather than simply human control as an antidote to automation,” said Pan.

At present, academic research can uncover recurring patterns in how nuclear close calls were handled and what that can tell decision-makers about risk reduction in this space. According to Sarah Bidgood, a postdoctoral fellow at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, recent studies have looked into how there might not be a singular framework for crisis management that could apply across nuclear close calls. When it comes to crisis management and risk reduction, the dynamics of previous nuclear close calls do not exist in a monolith, but there are variations in the outcomes instead. The lessons that leaders take from such situations may not lead to a shift away from nuclear weapons. Instead, these events may reinforce what leaders already think about the risks and benefits of nuclear weapons. If a leader regards nuclear weapons for a perceived strategic value, then after a close call, they may be just as likely to embrace new capabilities that would allow them to threaten the use of weapons across multiple levels of conflict. Bidgood raised the question of what this scenario would mean for the future of risk reduction in the present geopolitical environment.

“We need to be quite skeptical of this conventional wisdom that we often hear in our community… which is that to get arms control and risk reduction back on track, maybe we need another event like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because if my theory is right, what this tells us is that the next crisis could just as easily lead us farther down a very, very different path. And that’s something that I don’t think we as scholars or practitioners have really accounted for,” said Bidgood.

Such near-misses may often be thanks to individual human judgement calls rather than the positions of nuclear states. Chie Sunada, Director of Disarmament and Human Rights at the SGI Peace Center, recalled the example of an incident during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, where a near-miss also brewed in the Pacific, which would have targeted an uninvolved third party. During this time, U.S. military bases hosted nuclear missiles in Japan that were powerful enough to level cities. The base in Okinawa received what seemed like authenticated launch orders. However, the most senior field officer on site, Captain William Bassett, found discrepancies with the launch orders and the missiles’ readiness level, including that the missiles at this base were primarily targeted at China. So he ordered subordinates to stand down.

Sunada warned that the sense of urgency that informed decisions on nuclear de-escalation was missing from the current discourse and that the reality of nuclear fallout and the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be “fading into abstract history.” She urged that nuclear disarmament education would be a “vital mechanism” for maintaining “strategic restraint” by recognizing that a key element for its success is empathy for the pain of others, which is itself a form of deterrence.

“We cannot continue to outsource our survival to luck,” said Sunada. “We urge all state parties to recognize that risk reduction requires more than just adjusting military doctrines. It requires a fundamental shift in how we understand these weapons, driven by education. By cutting the chain of hatred and nurturing the heart that cherishes and is respectful to others, we achieve the ultimate disarmament and pure, proper peace education.”

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The 10-month-old Middle East conflict—which has triggered a rise in the cost of living worldwide, and an increase in the prices of food, groceries and gasoline—is likely to impose burdens on hundreds of UN staffers, delegates, journalists and civil society representatives– and thousands more, during the General Assembly sessions beginning September.

The proposed increases are mostly due to the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the battle between the US and Iran, specifically targeting ships entering or departing– and halting oil exports and trade.

The UN’s Department of Operational Support (DOS) has decided “as mitigating cost savings measure to increase café prices by approximately 5% in general, any up to 20% for items, including sodas, cakes, oatmeal, pastries and soups”.

“This cost savings measure is meant to reduce the organization subsidy amount from $2.1M to $1M. The measures also include reduction in the hours of café operations to lower labor cost”.

The UN Staff Union (UNSU), responding to the price hike, said early this week, it “strongly objected to the proposed cafeteria price increases, which places an undue financial burden on staff already facing rising living costs and limited on-site alternatives”.

This concern is amplified by the fact that the cafeteria (run by an outside contractor) “benefits from substantial organizational subsidized support, and bears no overhead cost such as rent, utilities, and maintenance expenses”, says a message from UNSU released early this week.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations. Taken together, these facts point to “disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases”, says Narda Cupidore, President of the UNSU Staff Council.

In this context, shifting additional costs to staff is neither transparent nor justified, particularly in the absence of meaningful prior consultation as required under the Terms of Reference of the Headquarters Catering Advisory Committee.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, one UN staffer told Inter Press Service: “At a time when there are reports of proposed salary cuts, as part of UN reforms, this hits us where it hurts us most –in our stomachs”.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations.

Taken together, these facts point to disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases.

The Staff Union calls for a suspension of the proposed price hikes at the Café and encourages the DOS to evaluate alternative financial strategies that could avoid passing on such a significant cost burden to staff.

“We remain committed to constructive engagement and continue to seek opportunities for open dialogue and clear answers from management. UNSU believes it is essential to be a partner in both the discussion and the solution, working collaboratively we can reach an outcome that is fair and minimizes the impact on staff. We will keep you informed of any developments.

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Students at GH Rusheshe School in Kucikiro District, Rwanda, identified through the monitoring system through the ZERO Out of School initiative.

By Noor Muhammad Ansari
DOHA, Qatar, May 7 2026 (IPS)

In 2024, 273 million children, adolescents, and youth were out of school globally as per the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. While that is a staggering number, the figure is incomplete. The 2026 Global Education Monitoring report warns that the global out of school population may be undercounted by at least 13 million once humanitarian sources are used to correct data gaps in conflict-affected contexts.

When education data fails, the children most likely to be excluded are not just the ones out of school. There are also those who are completely missing from the systems meant to find them.

This is why data gaps are not simply a technical issue, they are a structural driver of exclusion. If a child is not in the dataset, they are less likely to appear in school planning processes, teacher-allocation formula, textbook procurements systems, transport route, or targeted social protection programmes that could have kept them enrolled.

The 2026 GEM Report highlights the depth of the challenge. In primary and secondary education, one in three countries does not report disparities by urban–rural location and one in two does not report disparities by wealth. When such information is missing, education policies that rely on national averages mask the children who are furthest behind.

Why Children Disappear from Education Data

An Education Above All Foundation Occasional Paper on counting out-of-school children explains how administrative enrolment figures can diverge from reality in predictable ways. Systems may undercount children who attend but are not registered; undercount late registrants when data are captured only once at the start of the year; or overstate participation by counting registered children who never attend.

And, these are not minor measurement errors. They are precisely how children slip through institutional cracks, especially those affected by poverty, displacement, disability, language barriers, and gender discrimination.

Finding the Children who are Missing

Consider what happens when programmes treat identification as seriously as instruction.

In our joint project with Educate Girls in rural Rajasthan in India we found that official child-tracking data often missed children in remote hamlets. To address this, community volunteers conducted door-to-door surveys at scale, across more than three million households in over 9,000 villages to identify out of school girls.

The effort enabled the programme to identify, enrol, and retain tens of thousands of girls who had previously been absent from official records. The lesson from this exercise was straightforward: it is hard to serve children you cannot see. But when systems invest deliberately in identification and verification, those learners can be found.

The same challenge applies to children with disabilities, who are too often hidden by stigma and undercounted by systems that do not measure disability consistently. In our ten-country inclusive education programme implemented with Humanity & Inclusion across Africa, we sought to “bring children out of the shadows”, through community outreach, disability-sensitive identification tools, and sustained tracking of participation, the programme successfully enrolled more than 32,000 out of school children with disabilities and supported strong retention outcomes.

These experiences show that exclusion is not only about access to education. It is also about whether systems can identify and track children who face multiple barriers to participation.

What Stronger Education Data Systems Can Do

Across many countries, governments and partners are beginning to recognise that stronger education data systems are essential to identifying and supporting the most excluded learners. For instance, in Rwanda, the Zero Out of School Children initiative uses the Waliku application, a digital monitoring tool developed with partners including Save the Children and the Ministry of Education.

Teachers use the mobile platform to register out of school children, record attendance, and track patterns of absence. When repeated absences occur, the system generates follow-up alerts so schools or community workers can contact families and support re-enrolment.

In partnership with UNICEF and Government of The Gambia, efforts are underway to integrate education data with health and civil registration systems through DHIS2 for Education, helping authorities identify children who are missing from school records and coordinate responses across sectors.

Other partnerships illustrate how digital tools can strengthen identification and monitoring in different contexts.

In Nigeria, a partnership project with UNICEF developed the Tracking Re-entry of Children to Education (TRACE) system that combines community mapping and school records to track children from identification through enrolment and progression.

In Kenya, under EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership, a Digital Attendance Application enables near real-time monitoring of school attendance, allowing schools to detect patterns of absenteeism and intervene early.

Digital systems are also proving valuable in fragile contexts. In Syria, the EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership project developed a Self-Learning Programme Child Monitoring System to track children participating in alternative learning pathways when formal schooling has been disrupted.

In Zanzibar, the EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership project developed a mobile-based monitoring tool that supports community-level identification and follow-up of out-of-school children, while the EAA Foundation-World Bank partnership project in Djibouti developed digital tools that help track participation in alternative education programmes and support transitions into formal schooling.

In Zanzibar, a mobile-based monitoring tool that supports community-level identification and follow-up of out-of-school children.

Taken together, these initiatives illustrate an important shift: Education systems are moving from periodic aggregate reporting toward child-level identification, real-time monitoring, and early-warning systems.

As these systems evolve, particularly with advances in analytics and artificial intelligence, they offer the potential to predict dropout risks and guide targeted interventions, helping ensure that every child remains visible within the education system.

Rwanda’s school attendance register and tracking system, Waliku Application. Teachers use the mobile platform to register out of school children, record attendance, and track patterns of absence.

So, what should change?

Governments must treat education data as an inclusion tool, not only a reporting obligation. This means investing in learner-level education information systems that can uniquely identify learners, track attendance and progression, and safely link education data with civil registration, health, and social protection systems where appropriate.

Governments should also routinely combine and integrate data from various sources to correct blind spots in national statistics.

Secondly, development partners should fund data systems as core public infrastructure. It is untenable to finance classrooms, teachers, and learning materials while leaving ministries without the capacity to know which children are missing, where they are, and what barriers they face.

Results-based financing should also reward governments and implementers for verified inclusion outcomes, not only aggregate enrolment.

Education agencies and partners should standardise how the world counts ‘excluded.’ Globally tested tools already exist. For example, the UNICEF–Washington Group Child Functioning Module, provides a standardised approach for identifying children with disabilities in surveys and administrative systems.

For displaced learners, stronger coordination between education and humanitarian data systems is essential. According to UNHCR, there are 12.4 million refugee children of school age worldwide, and nearly 46% of them out of school.

The takeaway is straightforward: The most excluded children are often the least counted.

Closing the education gap requires closing the education data gap, so that every child is visible, reachable, and supported well before exclusion becomes permanent.

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Excerpt:

A conversation with Toril-Iren Pedersen, Director of the UNDP Global Policy Centre for Governance, and Michael Jarvis, Executive Director of the Trust, Accountability, and Inclusion (TAI) Collaborative

Q1: What is financial integrity and why is it important right now? Why is it relevant to TAI’s members?

Toril-Iren Pedersen

For us, the issue is not limited to one category of wrongdoing. It is about the connection between different parts of economic value, from public revenues to criminal flows, and the loopholes that exist within the regular financial system. Financial integrity cannot be considered in isolation. Weaknesses across tax, corruption, anti-money laundering and the broader global financial architecture all have to be understood together.

Michael Jarvis: At TAI, we see financial integrity as the need for systems to operate transparently, accountably and ethically. That is how people ideally manage their personal finances, and how we hope corporations run their businesses. But we are especially focused on governments and countries: how they strengthen the integrity of their financial systems, minimize corruption, encourage fairness and better steward public resources.

There is a clear development case for why this matters. TAI’s members are primarily U.S.-based philanthropies working internationally, and our work is organized around three priorities: strengthening healthy democracies, advancing climate accountability and improving fiscal accountability through fair and effective financial governance. Financial integrity underpins all three. Without it, progress in each area is weakened.

Michael Jarvis

When financial systems lack integrity, the damage is broad. It undermines trust in government, contributes to democratic disillusionment and weakens citizens’ confidence that public resources are being used fairly. It can also slow the energy transition, as we have seen with concerns around carbon markets. And it directly affects the ability of governments to raise and spend revenue effectively.

Toril-Iren Pedersen: I would add that declining trust in governments and in the multilateral system is higher than we have seen in a very long time. Lack of financial integrity contributes directly to that distrust.

Visible wealth inequality is one challenge, but so is the perception of invisible wealth being accumulated through the global financial architecture. When people sense that wealth is moving in the shadows, outside transparency and democratic control, it creates legitimate grounds for distrust. That is why lack of financial integrity must be understood as a systems failure that requires a systems approach.

Michael Jarvis: That is also the focus of the new paper from your team, the UNDP Global Policy Centre for Governance, which TAI supported. It emphasizes why progress requires action on multiple fronts and why no single actor or institution can solve this alone. Financial integrity is a collective action challenge.

Q2: How has UNDP’s Global Policy Centre for Governance worked on financial integrity over the past few years? What were your most important results and insights?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: The Centre’s work has taken place across several streams, but the most important contribution has been analyzing the system and the relationships among different actors. When we look at corruption and illicit financial flows, we have to ask who enables those flows within countries and across borders. Understanding those relationships is central to financial integrity.

The Centre has also convened actors within the UN and among practitioners, including country representatives involved in the Financing for Development negotiations in Sevilla last summer. That process helped produce stronger commitments to curb illicit financial flows and introduced more substantive language on financial integrity and corruption than we had seen in earlier iterations of the Financing for Development agenda.

The analytical work on the financial integrity ecosystem and the systems approach has also been developed in collaboration with several TAI members, including the MacArthur Foundation and Ford Foundation. Their support has been important both substantively and financially.

Q3: How will the Centre work on financial integrity going forward, under your leadership?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: The Centre has worked on a range of governance frontier issues. Going forward, we will focus on two areas: financial integrity, and data systems and data availability at the country level. The data agenda connects directly to financial integrity, but it also has broader relevance.

On financial integrity, we see a need to problem-solve the systemic challenges that are preventing progress at both the country and global levels. We will continue analyzing what is stopping countries from making substantive progress and what kinds of solutions and policy alternatives can be made available to them.

Some of these solutions already exist, but they are not always accessible. As a UNDP Policy Centre, our role is to make research, policy options and insights into systemic challenges available to UNDP country offices so they can be integrated into country-level programming. We also hope this work will help countries engage more effectively in global processes.

There is currently a disconnect. The Financial Action Task Force, the OECD tax framework and anti-corruption frameworks all rely on data from countries, but they do not always help solve what is fundamentally a systems challenge. We will continue engaging in those processes while breaking the work into more manageable areas where countries can take action nationally, regionally and globally.

Q4: What is the role of philanthropy in strengthening financial integrity against the backdrop of a fast-evolving global development landscape? What collaboration opportunities do you see between philanthropies, multilateral organizations and other stakeholders?

Michael Jarvis: Philanthropy’s role is a nimble one. The volume of finance philanthropy brings is not the same as government donors or what countries can mobilize themselves. The question is how philanthropy can prompt the right conversations and support work that moves the agenda more effectively.

Traditionally, philanthropy has supported civil society groups, independent media and think tanks at the global and national levels. Those actors investigate financial integrity issues, build evidence, raise public awareness and develop policy recommendations for governments and multilateral forums.

Philanthropy also has limits. Individual donors, including TAI members, often focus on a relatively small number of priority countries. They are not operating at a scale that covers all countries affected by these issues. That is where the UN system and international financial institutions can play a different role, because they work with nearly every country and have government relationships built into their mandates.

There are important complementarities. The MacArthur Foundation, for example, has made a major investment in Nigeria around financial integrity and anti-corruption, working with government agencies while also supporting civil society and media. More broadly, different actors bring different relationships, mandates and capacities.

The Financing for Development process in Sevilla is a good example. The outcome was stronger because many players were involved, from civil society groups working in-country to global and regional convenings that reinforced the message. Those efforts helped shape the negotiations and elevate financial integrity on the agenda.

An important opportunity is the Illicit Finance Summit, being hosted by the UK Government in June. It can bring together governments committed to addressing financial integrity challenges and create space for civil society, academia, philanthropy and others to develop practical solutions. Philanthropy should be part of that conversation and think about where its support can amplify or pilot ideas that emerge.

Visibility also matters because it helps attract resources. Funding for financial integrity work remains very limited. In a 2023 analysis, TAI estimated that about $150 million had been directed to illicit financial flows work since 2020, including efforts to address tax avoidance.

That averages roughly $30 million a year across different groups, countries and sectors. Compared with the scale of the problem, and compared with funding for fields such as climate or AI, that is extremely small.

The upcoming summit could serve as a call to action for philanthropy and other funders to invest more. The rise in fraud enabled by crypto and other technologies affects people directly and is creating grassroots demand for action. Partnership will be essential, including with UNDP, the World Bank, national governments, civil society and research networks.

Toril-Iren Pedersen: I agree. We need to mobilize more resources, but it is also important to recognize what has already been achieved with limited funding. Much of the momentum for change over the past 10 to 15 years has come from civil society organizations, journalist networks and collaborative investigations around leaks. Those efforts helped put issues such as tax fairness, transparency and beneficial ownership on national and global agendas.

This field has shown that limited resources can have an outsized effect when actors from different parts of the ecosystem work together. Anti-corruption, tax fairness and anti-money laundering were once treated as separate silos. Bringing those communities together around shared solutions is a cost-effective way of working.

Going forward, we also need to connect financial integrity to other development priorities, including climate finance and health financing. Each sector has its own financial integrity challenges. With the current development financing crunch, we cannot afford to leave money on the table, and we cannot afford to let resources disappear when policy action could prevent it.

Q5: Is there a case for involving the business community? What would the message be?

Toril-Iren Pedersen: Yes. Governance investments are one area we will be looking at closely. There is enormous pressure to mobilize funding from private actors and the private sector. Much of the focus has been on ensuring that specific investments comply with human rights and development standards. That remains important.

But financial integrity is also about longer-term systems de-risking. Investments in anti-corruption mechanisms, laws that reduce corruption risk and dispute-resolution frameworks can make markets more attractive for private investment. The goal is to build systems where private actors face lower real or perceived risk and can operate without relying as heavily on facilitated investment support.

In that sense, we need to distinguish between short-term and long-term de-risking, and between project-level and systems-level de-risking.

Michael Jarvis: There is a strong private sector incentive to support financial integrity, especially for companies operating across borders. But there is also a quid pro quo: corporate actors need to uphold their own standards of financial integrity. That includes thinking responsibly about the taxes they pay in different jurisdictions and avoiding excessive profit shifting.

The private sector benefits from stronger financial integrity systems, but it also has responsibilities within them. Beneficial ownership transparency is one example where progress has helped make it easier to identify who is behind corporate structures. These structures are still misused, but many legitimate private sector actors increasingly recognize that transparency can help distinguish them from bad actors and reduce reputational risk.

All of us have a role in the system. The challenge now is to make a clear case for why financial integrity deserves continued investment, government attention and policy bandwidth, especially at a time of aid cuts, foreign assistance pressures and tight country budgets. That is a collective challenge, and one we need to keep elevating.

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, May 4 2026 (IPS)

In January, the government of Algeria succeeded in locking two civil society groups out of access to the United Nations (UN). It raised questions at the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, known as the NGO Committee, about two civil society groups with accreditation. It alleged that Italian organisation Il Cenacolo was making politically motivated statements at the UN Human Rights Council and the Geneva-based International Committee for the Respect and Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (CIRAC) was selling UN grounds passes. Four days later, it called a vote to revoke their status. Other states urged delay, but the no-action motion failed, and 11 of the body’s 19 members voted to recommend that the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) revoke Il Cenacolo’s accreditation and suspend CIRAC’s for a year.

As the primary gatekeeper for civil society participation at the UN, the NGO Committee controls ECOSOC consultative status, which allows organisations to attend UN meetings, submit written statements, make oral interventions, organise side events and access UN premises. Its mandate, set out in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, is straightforward: to facilitate civil society access to the UN system.

Such access is particularly valuable for organisations working in repressive contexts, where domestic advocacy is suppressed. It can mean the difference between a community’s concerns being silenced or becoming a matter of international record. In practice, however, the Committee has so consistently worked to obstruct rather than enable access that it is widely known as the ‘anti-NGO Committee’.

On 8 April, in an almost entirely uncompetitive vote, ECOSOC members elected 19 states to serve on the NGO Committee for four-year terms. Only 20 candidates ran for the 19 seats. UN states are organised into five regional blocs, and four of them presented closed slates, putting forward only as many candidates as the number of seats available.

As a result, the Asia-Pacific group selected China, India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), states with consistent track records of silencing civil society. Latin America and the Caribbean is represented by the likes of Cuba and Nicaragua, which suppress dissent and routinely detain critics. Four of the five African states elected have repressed or closed civic space. Two states elected from the Western European and Other States group, Israel and Turkey, have also recently intensified their repression of civic space.

The one exception was the Eastern European group, where Estonia and Ukraine won seats in a three-way contest, keeping out authoritarian Belarus, which received only 23 votes against Estonia’s 44 and Ukraine’s 38. As in 2022, when Russia lost a similar race, the result showed that competitive elections open up scrutiny and produce better outcomes. The problem is they rarely happen.

Overall, 13 of 19 newly elected states are rated as having closed or repressed civic space by the CIVICUS Monitor, our research initiative that tracks the conditions for civil society around the world. Only one, Estonia, has open civic space. Fourteen of the 20 candidates had been named as carrying out reprisals against people engaging with the UN.

In the run-up to the election, the International Service for Human Rights published scorecards assessing all 20 candidates against eight criteria; 12 of the 20 met none. Over 80 civil society organisations called on ECOSOC member states to hold competitive elections and vote for candidates committed to civil society access. Forty independent UN human rights experts, including special rapporteurs on human rights defenders and on countries including Afghanistan, Iran and Russia, issued a statement warning that Committee members were abusing the accreditation process to block access for human rights organisations. All these warnings went unheeded.

The withdrawal of accreditation from Il Cenacolo and CIRAC, which awaits ECOSOC confirmation, was unprecedented, but it sits within a long pattern of obstruction. At the Committee’s latest regular session in January, 618 applications were under consideration, 381 of which had been deferred from previous sessions.

The backlog is no accident. States ask repetitive questions about minor details and make short-notice requests for complex documentation to repeatedly delay applications until future sessions. States that repress civil society at home do the same in the international arena, targeting organisations that work on issues they deem controversial or opposed to their interests. Three states – China, India and Pakistan– stand out as the worst abusers of this mechanism, having asked almost half of the 647 questions posed to applicants during the January session. Repeated deferrals raise the costs for civil society organisations, draining financial resources and time.

The UN’s current financial crisis is compounding the problem. The consequences of funding cuts were visible at the latest session, when the question-and-answer session was cancelled following an early adjournment. The loss of the only opportunity for organisations seeking accreditation to engage directly with the Committee fell hardest on smaller organisations that had travelled to New York to take part.

The UN’s current cost-cutting drive could at least be used as an opportunity to push for online participation and other efficiency reforms to reduce the bureaucratic burden of repeated requests for information. Beyond this, there’s a need to reassert that the Committee’s function is supposed to be that of an enabler rather than an obstructor.

The NGO Committee determines whether the voices of communities facing repression and violence can be heard in the UN system, and it’s been hijacked by states with every interest in ensuring that they cannot. The floor can’t be left clear for states that repress civil society to act as gatekeepers. States that claim to support civil society must be willing to put themselves forward.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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