Trump and Netanyahu went all out for regime change in Tehran. This month, their electorates gave them regime changes, albeit not quite what they wanted. The wars continue, but the politics have changed.

Trump’s military spending
In Trump’s second term, the US president and the outgoing Republican-controlled Congress have shown even less respect for the Constitution.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Trump wanted a $1.5 trillion military budget for fiscal 2027, starting in October, up from $860 billion in Biden’s last budget, an increase of over $600 billion, or nearly 2.0% of GDP!

Financing the massive increase in US military spending would require substantial tax increases. Without them, Trump would have to increase the budget deficit, risking even higher interest rates.

Greater military spending and higher interest rates have diverted economic and human resources from more socially useful purposes. Besides exhausting the economy, it is also economically and socially wasteful.

War raises interest rates
Before Trump and Netanyahu attacked Iran on 28 February, the interest rate on 10-year US Treasury bonds was around 4.0%. It subsequently rose to around 4.7% by late August.

Higher interest rates make borrowing more expensive for individuals and governments. Having to pay more, corporate borrowers will surely pass the costs on.

Higher expected inflation alone cannot explain the higher interest rates. Unexpectedly, after more than six months of war, expectations of future inflation were slightly lower than in February!

Higher interest rates probably reflect broader changes in expectations, as investors now expect much larger US budget deficits than early this year.

The US Federal Reserve now projects that the Fed funds rate, widely seen as reflecting investor attitudes, will be higher in 2027 and 2028 than before the war.

Likewise, long-term interest rates on other countries’ debt have risen, indicating Trump’s war has raised interest rates worldwide.

Raising interest rates ineffective
Raising interest rates does little to address inflation caused by deliberate supply-side disruptions. Trump appointed Kevin Warsh as Fed Chair to bring down interest rates, but the Chairman has not obliged so far.

Inflation has been above the Fed’s 2.0% target for over half a decade. With US unemployment rising in 2024, it lowered interest rates. After Trump’s re-election, inflation rose due to stockpiling in anticipation of his tariffs, and then the tariffs themselves.

Inflation would probably have declined again if not for the second attack on Iran, which pushed oil and other prices up. Relief from inflation now hinges on the very uncertain prospects of ending the war.

As higher inflation has been the pretext for the Fed to raise interest rates, it should lower rates if prices fell. Likewise, when the AI bubble bursts, interest rates would likely decline too.

Macroeconomist Dean Baker suggests that the Fed has kept interest rates up to appear to be doing something. With wage growth barely over 3.0% and falling, income has been shifting from wages to profits.

If wage-profit shares stabilise, even the usual productivity growth rate of 1.5% should keep inflation under 2.0%, as higher productivity more than offsets rising wage costs.

If the productivity boom that AI proponents are promising were to materialise, inflation would be well under target, even with wages rising at current rates. Clearly, wage inflation is not accelerating.

Meanwhile, Trump may raise tariffs again or start another war, raising prices further. But again, raising Fed interest rates cannot help.

Affordability
The popular consensus is that the Iran war was largely responsible for the Republican Party setback in last week’s US mid-term elections.

The war and its consequences are widely seen as primarily responsible for the current US affordability crisis. Trump has raised inflation, not only by waging war, but also by imposing tariffs on most trading partners and sanctions on some.

As higher inflation has been the pretext for the Fed to raise interest rates, it should lower rates if prices fall. And when the AI bubble bursts, interest rates should decline.

Fuel prices jumped by $1.50 per US gallon after the war started and remain over a dollar higher than before. Diesel prices rose by almost $3 per gallon at their peak and remain over $2.50 above their pre-war level.

Food prices are also expected to rise further in the new year due to fertiliser shortages, as much of the world’s supply has come from the Persian Gulf region.

Ironically, Trump’s war has accelerated the green energy transition worldwide, with electric vehicle and solar panel sales soaring, thereby reducing demand for oil and gas in the longer term.

Ending the April 2025 Liberation Day tariffs did not return prices to earlier levels. Similarly, ending the war will only partially reverse the economic disruption and damage caused.

IPS UN Bureau

Tens of thousands of people take to the streets late into the night to celebrate the student-led opposition coalition's victory in Belgrade, Serbia, on 26 October 2026. Credit: Aleksandar Jovicic/NurPhoto

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Nov 9 2026 (IPS)

On the night of 25 October, tens of thousands filled the streets of Belgrade and other cities, as they’d so often done in protest over the past two years. But this time they came out to celebrate. In that day’s National Assembly election, Student List, a slate of political newcomers, defeated Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), in power since 2012. The student-led movement behind the protests, which rose up against corruption, has given Serbia the opportunity for a democratic reset.

From grief to protest

Serbia became steadily more autocratic under Vučić. Public institutions served ruling-party interests amid a web of corruption, patronage, coercion and impunity. Public media became a ruling party mouthpiece.

Civic freedoms deteriorated dramatically. In 2018, the CIVICUS Monitor rated Serbia’s civic space as narrowed, meaning that fundamental rights were broadly respected. By the end of Vučić’s rule, the rating had collapsed to repressed, meaning that criticising those in power carried severe risks. The state used violence against protests and treated civil society as a security threat, targeting it with spyware and subjecting organisations to raids and police investigations.

The seismic shift began in November 2024 with the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city. Sixteen people died. The government insisted it was a tragic accident, but the station had only recently been renovated and, with construction contracts shrouded in secrecy, many suspected corners had been cut. For protesters, this was a lethal symbol of the costs of corruption, negligence and impunity. No one has been held accountable.

Students held vigils and mass protests on a scale unseen since 2000, when demonstrations ousted Slobodan Milošević, the infamous authoritarian leader and accused war criminal. This time, their most effective tactic was a months-long education strike in which they blockaded and occupied universities.

As the protest movement grew it connected with existing groups, including environmental and legal aid organisations, independent media and, crucially, academics, university administrators and education unions, who took solidarity strike action. This built wider public support, backed by a ‘students in every village’ campaign that saw students meet with rural communities to ask about what mattered most to them.

State attempts to suppress the movement failed, including mass arrests, violence by security forces and gangs of ruling-party supporters and an extensive campaign of disinformation and smears. Vučić vilified protesters as agents of foreign powers bent on subversion and the government fired education sector employees for taking part in strikes.

Change on the cards

Ultimately, the protests forced Vučić’s hand. Constitutionally barred from seeking a third term as president, he announced an early parliamentary election in June and stood down as president in September, making clear his intention to hold onto power as prime minister. He presumably gambled that a skewed playing field, characterised by intimidation and biased coverage, would let him win again and unleash an even fiercer crackdown.

The gamble failed because of the movement’s discipline and the smart choices it made. Throughout, students resisted opposition parties’ attempts to co-opt them, insisting that deeper change was needed to re-establish the rule of law, free public institutions from political capture and tackle corruption. From its early days, the movement practised internal democracy, taking decisions in university plenums, open assemblies where people debated, learned and decided together. When it decided to field a slate of candidates, it used the same method to select them. Students didn’t put themselves forward, choosing instead public figures untainted by association with established politics and likely to command broad support. Those who’ve won seats include academics, actors, former sports stars and medical professionals.

The result surpassed all predictions. According to projections based on the preliminary count, Student List has around 53 per cent of the vote, which would give it a clear majority of 141 of the National Assembly’s 250 seats. The SNS-led bloc trails on around 39 per cent. The margin was such that Vučić had to concede quickly.

Challenges of power

After the euphoria comes the challenge of moving from protest to power. A movement that has refused to have formal leaders must now unite behind a prime minister. Once the National Assembly convenes, Student List will have 90 days to form a government. Its deliberately broad campaign focused on major questions of national renewal but offered little detail. This strategy papered over political differences among representatives who range from nationalist to more liberal, which can be expected to surface if the incoming government succeeds in restoring the space for normal political debate. There’s also the question of how those elected will relate to the student movement.

As in Hungary, where long-term autocratic leader Viktor Orbán finally fell to electoral defeat in April, the new government will face the difficult task of reorienting state institutions that have bent to the former ruling party’s interests. An early sign of change came when the public broadcaster apologised to viewers for its bias towards the SNS, something that also happened in Hungary. The government will need to repay voters’ faith by rooting out corruption, which will mean overhauling institutions including the judiciary and police. All this will unfold alongside a presidential election that’s due by the end of the year.

Challenges lie ahead, but a population that has rediscovered the power of collective action can face them with confidence. Serbia also offers a vital source of international inspiration. Together with Hungary’s example, it shows there’s nothing permanent about autocratic rule. The world’s many Gen Z-led movements that have self-organised to demand a fairer distribution of economic and political power, and civil society more broadly, can take heart. Serbia has shown that organising and protesting works, and change is possible.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

By Saber Azam
GENEVA, Nov 9 2026 (IPS)

This piece focuses on the responsibilities of other prominent figures, leaders of intergovernmental organizations, senior diplomats, and business tycoons for the world’s current appalling state and the calamities that may await future generations. When democracy fails; when people in authority remain silent and prioritize self-interest; when regional entities become redundant; when appearance becomes more important than substance; when diplomacy is outsmarted by warmongers; when prejudice infects minds; and when business chooses unlawfulness, I continue to assert:

Saber Azam

Other prominent figures—heads of political parties, senior members of legislative and judicial bodies, high-level bureaucrats and military commanders, and even some prominent artists—also bear significant responsibility for upholding their countries’ constitutions and for demanding accountability from their leaders. Many succumb to the influence of questionable lobbies or circles to strengthen their power base, secure re-election, obtain better positions, advance their careers, or defend particular interests.

Unlawful wars and mass killings occur live on camera, and major investigations and judicial processes sometimes appear to align with the political ambitions of those who rule their countries, regardless of the gravity of the crimes committed. Election rigging has become standard practice in many places around the world. White-collar and covert bribery is tolerated as long as it serves those in power or dominant circles. Underhanded tactics used to disqualify lawful competitors have become the bread and butter of many influential figures and even institutions. The rule of law often seems to apply most strictly to those with little or no means. Many high-ranking military officers appear to lack the resolve to resist unconstitutional orders.

Social and economic development, as well as political freedom, remain elusive in many “developing” countries decades after independence. Large segments of the population on earth still live in absolute poverty, while a small number of powerful figures in political, economic, and other key spheres amass vast wealth. As a result, many prominent figures worldwide have failed in their political, legislative, judicial, administrative, defense, or artistic responsibilities.

I Accuse Leaders of the Regional Intergovernmental Organizations

Contrary to the “world-loving” spirit of the United Nations (UN), regional intergovernmental organizations were established to safeguard peace and security and to promote social, political, and economic development within their respective jurisdictions. Yet they have not been immune to individual interests, superpower intervention, or the influence of economically prosperous countries and powerful industries.

To date, few regions appear politically stable. Internal crises, wars between neighbors, and regional conflicts persist across many parts of the world. Some regional entities’ resolutions remain unimplemented, fail to address underlying issues, or are framed unrealistically to “respect” the demands of actors who may not belong to the region but can influence it through military or financial power. Hidden actors exploit racial, ethnic, and religious divisions, undermining cohesion among states and peoples. Despite regional intergovernmental organizations’ obligation to address major peace, security, and development challenges collectively, many have failed to do so.

Few “poor countries” have emerged from the ocean of debt and mounting loan interest. Foreign companies often extract and exploit enormous natural wealth while paying little or nothing to its rightful owners. The regional organizations to which these countries belong either cannot rescue them or choose not to intervene. Violations of human rights and dignity follow a similar pattern. Western nations often apply these principles “à la carte,” while their defense has become rhetoric rather than a genuine concern for regional intergovernmental entities and their leaders, who, too, bear responsibility for the deplorable conditions prevailing in many parts of the world.

I Accuse Senior Diplomats

Diplomacy is defined as “an established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence.” It is also “the process and practice of communication and negotiation between actors in the international system to achieve their goals and resolve their conflicts and disputes.” The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations establishes an international legal framework for diplomatic relations, privileges, and immunities. The definition and practice of diplomacy therefore imply a process characterized by negotiated outcomes and the absence of treachery and violence. This rationale is central to building trust between adversaries and to sustaining long-term peace and security.

However, like politics, multilateral and bilateral diplomacy seems increasingly to be the art of deceiving the interlocutor, whether friend or foe. The spirit of win-win scenarios seems abandoned. Military actions by powerful countries during negotiations undermine diplomatic efforts and erode trust. Likewise, providing diplomatic cover for espionage, even within multilateral institutions, and deploying career diplomats at tactical and operational levels in war zones create further contradictions. Senior diplomats from many “poor countries” aspire to secure prominent positions in international or regional entities that offer significant political and financial advantages. In contrast, most diplomats from wealthy countries rarely oppose their governments’ policies and actions, even when those policies and actions violate international norms.

Serving one’s nation in any capacity is an honor for a civil servant. The question, however, is why senior diplomats do not speak out when their governments’ policies and actions cross every imaginable red line of unlawfulness and abuse the status and principles of their profession. They therefore bear a heavy responsibility when regional or international peace and security are jeopardized.

I Accuse the Business Tycoons

Business is the lawful activity of producing, buying, and selling products or services for profit. Its foundations are legality, trust, quality, and honesty. Yet some prominent tycoons and institutions have transformed business into a platform for particular political interests. Maximizing returns at all costs, crushing competitors through unlawful acts, applying double standards, or deceiving customers also appear in supposedly “non-political” commerce. Powerful individuals have long manipulated markets in free economies, undermining lawful trade and fair risk-taking.

The weapons industry has become increasingly profitable. In addition to official transactions, the sale of light and semi-heavy weapons to non-state actors through dubious traffickers contributes to countless deaths each year and fuels proxy wars in many regions. While some countries maintain an “open-door” policy on private gun ownership, most nations restrict or prohibit their citizens from possessing and using firearms. Illicit trade, however, undermines these policies.

Beyond their devastating political dimensions, the current energy crises that threaten the peace, security, and safety of billions of people in “poor” or “developing” countries appear to benefit parts of the oil and gas industry, including actors engaged in illicit activity.

In many circumstances, bankruptcy has become an effective “legal” means of stripping ordinary people of their savings and wealth. Offshore companies can also harm national economies while benefiting only a few.

The quality of certain products on the market is increasingly questioned because some manufacturers use unsafe chemicals to make them more appealing to consumers. In many nations, particularly those with weak economies, quality control is inadequate, and child labor is practiced openly. Despite numerous international platforms that bring policymakers and financial actors together, too little is being done to curb wrongdoing. This endangers the foundations of market economies and seriously damages the social and economic progress of countless countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Oceanic Islands. Business leaders bear primary responsibility for keeping their fields of activity lawful, clean, and trustworthy.

[To be continued]

Saber Azam is a former UN official. He is the author of Soraya: The Other Princess and Hell’s Mouth: A Journey to the Heart of West African Jungles. His third book, Nowhere to Go, will be published soon.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

This is the third article in a four-part series. The final article will follow.

The Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. Credit: Mathias Reding on Unsplash

By Sigrid Lipott
GENEVA, Nov 6 2026 (IPS)

A right under pressure

No one disputes freedom of association. It is in the Constitutions of almost every country, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22 of the ICCPR, and in regional Articles in Europe, America, and Africa. What it has never had, at the universal level, is sincere implementation by governments.

Regional organisations and courts have filled that space in limited ways. Courts and human rights commissions have issued decisions that have not always been followed. States are left to interpret these obligations themselves for citizens and non-citizens in their jurisdiction.

Violations of the right to free association have risen 50% in two years, according to CIVICUS Monitor. The rise is not only a matter of scale. Governments are no longer relying mainly on administrative interference or political pressure to constrain civil society. They devise restrictive laws governing who can organise, on what terms, and access to resources. Restricting international funding for civil society, particularly through foreign agents’ laws, is now a global trend and poses unprecedented significant challenges. In 2025, restrictive laws affecting civic freedoms were recorded in at least 66 countries, the ninth most prevalent civic space violation worldwide.

Sigrid Lipott

Rights and recognition for everyone

Article 22 clearly says everyone has the right to come together, but it does not specify who counts. On protest rights, General Comment No. 37 says all citizens and non-citizens hold the right, including migrants , asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people. Article 22 should follow the precedent.

Most of the world’s organising happens in grassroots movements, digital networks, and fluid conflict and humanitarian contexts, not with registered organisations. Restrictions fall hardest on those already excluded from decision-making and resources.

The article defines qualifications on national security, public order, and safeguards and rights of others. Without clarity, they have remained fluid since 1966. The Committee needs to clarify the scope.

States cannot be left to interpret the article. Amid rising authoritarianism and divisive politics impacting civic life and participatory governance, minorities and excluded people need strong freedom of association protection to defend their rights.

Registration is among the worst restrictions because authorities treat it as routine paperwork rather than a decision about whether a group may exist at all. The Committee should state plainly that registration means notifying the authorities, not asking permission, and that any procedure must be simple, quick, and free of official discretion. Organisations should not be required to comply with “national interest ” or meet disproportionate reporting demands. Penalties for administrative slip-ups should fit the offence, and only a court should be able to shut an organisation down, as a last resort.

Funding is critical for survival

Foreign agents’ laws have spread from a handful of states to dozens, with vague definitions of “foreign influence” and “political activity” that let officials choose their targets. These come with heavy reporting duties, frequent audits, and penalties ranging from fines to licence withdrawal and prison.

Other measures achieve the same effect without the label: prior approval for foreign grants, punitive taxes, or rules forcing funds through state-controlled accounts. Where foreign support is the only resource available, organisations will struggle to survive.

Funding is critical to securing freedom. The Committee should recognise the right to seek, receive and use resources from domestic, foreign and international sources, whether or not a group is registered.

Online and across borders

Groups now recruit, debate and organise online, so internet shutdowns and surveillance strike directly at freedom of association. Governments imposed a record 313 shutdowns in 2025, up from 304 the year before, according to Access Now, and people in 100 countries have lived through one since tracking began. Blanket shutdowns are disproportionate, even in conflict zones.

Governments increasingly pursue critics abroad through surveillance, harassment of relatives back home, misuse of Interpol and stripping of nationality, cutting exiles off from organisations at home. This transnational repression is also a restriction on association and should be named.

No justification without limits

In dozens of countries, counter-terrorism laws criminalise people for exercising basic freedoms. A government’s own definition of “security” cannot override its treaty obligations, and none of these grounds justifies criminalising organisations for lawful work. Emergency powers follow the same pattern.

At least 50 states restricted freedom of association during the pandemic, and many of those measures outlasted the crisis, as independent UN human rights experts warned they might. The Committee should set out categories of emergency and the limits each can justify, matching the real scale of the threat.

Enabling environment without

Governments must also create the conditions for civil society to thrive, including laws that meet international standards, access to information, a real say in decisions and lasting access to resources. A good law achieves little if officials publicly smear the groups it protects.

That means protecting people from intimidation, arbitrary arrest, smear campaigns, travel bans and reprisals for cooperating with the UN. Freedom of association cannot be separated from freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. According to the CIVICUS Monitor, just 7% of the world’s population lives in countries where these civic freedoms are broadly respected.

Building on regional courts

The European Court of Human Rights has built a rich body of case law treating freedom of association as essential to a pluralist democracy. In 2020, the EU’s Court of Justice struck down Hungary’s 2017 law on foreign-funded organisations as incompatible with freedom of association. The African and Inter-American human rights commissions have also set progressive standards.

But these rulings apply only within their regions, and even there, groups defending minority rights or exposing sensitive issues still come under attack. A universal standard would give everyone, everywhere, something to invoke.

Sixty years, one opportunity

Article 22 has waited, and the wait has had consequences. Restrictive laws survive because the standard is vague enough to accommodate them: a registration regime is presented as administration, a funding restriction as transparency, a ban as security. At the global level, nothing has tested those claims.

General Comment No. 38 can change that. It can give parliaments, courts and governments the detail they need to draft laws, interpret them and respect the limits of their power, at a moment when restrictions are spreading faster than the standards meant to contain them.

Freedom of association is a right that makes other freedoms enforceable. The Covenants turn sixty this year. At this critical juncture, the Committee must give it the clarity it deserves.

Sigrid Lipott is an international treaties specialist and the UN adviser at CIVICUS. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, she leads CIVICUS’s engagement with UN human rights mechanisms. CIVICUS is a global alliance of more than 17,000 civil society organisations and activists from 175 countries working to strengthen citizen action and defend civic freedoms worldwide.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS discusses India’s Gen Z-led protest movement and civic space restrictions with Avinash Kumar, National Co-convenor of Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, a network that works on government accountability. Avinash is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Equity Studies.

Avinash Kumar

How did the cockroach movement emerge?

It started with this year’s national medical entrance exam, which was held on 3 May and cancelled on 12 May after a paper leak. The re-exam took place on 21 June, and in the meantime several students died by suicide. This was the latest failure of a highly centralised education system, in which engineering, humanities and medical entrance exams are all run centrally. The government has also pushed curriculum changes to suit its Hindu nationalist agenda.

Students’ anger needed an outlet. The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a movement born out of satire, channelled it by demanding Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation. It could do so because the education crisis was only the tip of the iceberg. India is among the youngest countries in the world, with around two-thirds of its people under 35, yet young people face high unemployment and growing reliance on informal work. They make up about 83 per cent of unemployed people, while close to 90 per cent of all workers are in informal jobs. On top of this come a divisive communal agenda and failures on security and women’s safety.

The CJP captured the imagination of largely unorganised young people. Left-wing student organisations gave it organisational muscle, climate activist Sonam Wangchuk lent it wider legitimacy among everyday people and opposition parties led by Rahul Gandhi helped spread it. Pradhan resigned on 25 July. Although other protest movements had challenged the government before, this was the government’s first major retreat, and it resonated widely.

How did protests evolve after the minister’s resignation?

Within months, the protests widened to target the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, a nationwide review of voter lists. Civil society had been raising concerns about it for a while. But when The Indian Express and other media reported leaked disagreements within the Election Commission, the issue spread across the country and across sectors. Roughly 130 million names have been dropped from the rolls, about an eighth of the electorate. The Election Commission says it is only removing dead, duplicate and ineligible voters, but many fear it’s targeting Muslims.

The CJP became one of several organisations calling for a full rollback of the SIR, a review of recent state elections whose results are in doubt and the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Over 300 civil society organisations have joined this campaign. In this phase, opposition parties and left-wing student groups have taken the lead, with figures such as Neha Bora of the All India Students’ Association and Aishe Ghosh of the Students’ Federation of India at the forefront. The CJP still mobilises people on the streets.

This gives the movement a much broader base than earlier ones. Past protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act and the National Register of Citizens, led by students and Muslims, as well as the 2020–2021 farmers’ protest movement, were largely seen as serving specific sections of the population. This one began with education and has expanded to the SIR, which people fear is a conspiracy to take away their votes and their basic rights as citizens. Because that threat concerns everyone, the movement cuts across classes, regions and religions.

How has the state responded?

The government has responded with massive force. In Delhi on 10 October, authorities deployed over 30,000 police and paramilitary personnel, detained more than 7,000 people and stopped many others before they could reach Jantar Mantar, the city’s designated protest site near Parliament. They shut metro stations, suspended internet services and used a sports stadium to hold detainees. Two days later, Delhi Police removed Jantar Mantar from the list of approved protest locations.

The government has turned the police into a partisan, brutal force and let pro-government mobs target protesters and independent media. Right-wing mobs have turned up at protests, and members of a group calling itself the Hindu Raksha Dal were arrested for allegedly assaulting students and manhandling women at one of them.

Women and girls have been repeatedly beaten and detained, yet they keep coming back. That resilience owes much to the anger over sexual assaults in Delhi and elsewhere, and women had already been mobilising in towns including Patna, Prayagraj and Varanasi.

How do these reactions fit into a wider pattern of civic space restrictions, and how is civil society responding?

They’re part of a longer trend. Civic space keeps worsening, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term has aggravated patterns set in the first two. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), which governs international funding, is choking civil society’s resources. By March 2026, over 21,900 organisations had lost their FCRA licences. A bill to amend the law would go further. If passed, it would allow the state to seize the assets of civil society organisations whose licences have lapsed or been cancelled, and require the central government’s approval before any agency investigates FCRA complaints.

Human rights defenders are jailed for years without trial. Student activists Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid have spent over six years in prison. They were arrested in 2020, accused of conspiring to incite riots in Delhi during the protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. In January, the Supreme Court denied them bail, ruling that delay is no ground for bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and in July a Delhi court rejected fresh pleas. Sonam Wangchuk was held under the National Security Act, 1980, for around six months before the central government revoked the order.

Protests are crushed across the country, in mining areas and on the streets of Delhi and Mumbai. In July, police detained over 150 people who protested against the Ken–Betwa river-linking project in central India, including their leader, Amit Bhatnagar. Authorities routinely ban gatherings under section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, India’s criminal procedure code, and internet shutdowns and surveillance add to the pressure. A compromised judiciary and a largely pliant media make all this possible.

Human rights organisations have adapted to these restrictions in different ways. Some have taken to the streets alongside student groups and political organisations. Others have turned to building international support, mobilising global opinion and working with diaspora groups. They also support communities fighting on specific issues in different parts of India, challenge government decisions in the courts and build wider alliances.

How can civil society in other countries, international bodies and states support Indian protesters and civil society?

Governments, institutions and civil society abroad must name and shame the regime in all international forums and challenge its attempts to paint a glorious picture of itself. They should use the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and its Universal Periodic Review process, treaty-body reviews and the UN Special Procedures, whose experts have formally raised the demolition of Muslim homes with the Indian government. They should also draw on reports from Amnesty International, CIVICUS and Human Rights Watch, and press freedom rankings such as those of Reporters Without Borders.

In November, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions will review the accreditation of India’s National Human Rights Commission. This is another opportunity, and it should be backed by international political pressure through bilateral dialogues and parliamentary resolutions.

Funders and partners should protect human rights defenders through legal support, trial observation and visible solidarity with those in jail. Beyond that, human rights groups and social movements need to reconfigure their alliances with progressive student groups, and the international community can help create spaces for these conversations. Relying on diaspora groups is not enough.

What has the movement achieved so far, and what are your hopes?

Despite its aggressive stance, the government is already on the back foot, even if it government won’t admit it, and has announced measures to reinstate people removed from the voter rolls. But the revelations keep coming, people remain on the streets, and the movement refuses to die down.

People now openly distrust how elections are run, and many will not accept more elections under this government. But the Indian state is mighty and may try to wait until people’s energy runs out. The home minister boasts that his party will rule for another 30 or 50 years, but it is now clear that ideological hegemony alone won’t achieve that. Whatever happens next, the government’s legitimacy is now in doubt.

My hope rests on the student movement. It builds on the legacy of earlier movements and those still under way across India, and it’s part of a global wave of student protests. If it holds, as it seems to be doing, it could follow the path of neighbouring countries. The challenge is to rebuild a truly democratic state and the institutions that have been compromised and decimated. We must also restore a democratic culture and the values of the Indian Constitution, which are those of a secular, diverse and federal country.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Gen Z protests: new resistance rises CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
India’s young people find their voice CIVICUS Lens 07.Aug.2026
India: ‘The Cockroach Janta Party brings together everyone who has been neglected for years’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Harshit Singh 03.Aug.2026

As in previous elections, the latest Israeli national election offered people no real choice. They had to choose between bad Zionists and good Zionists. Thus, unsurprisingly, there is no clear winner – both major blocs are neck and neck as usual. The only difference this time is the Arab voting power. By uniting and turning out in record numbers, the Arab coalition secured 19 seats (nearly double the 10 it won in 2022), against the Netanyahu-led bloc’s 53 and the Gadi Eisenkot-led bloc’s 48. Neither bloc has a governable majority, so many are looking to the Arab bloc as a kingmaker, either joining formally or supporting one of the blocs on the no-confidence and supply bills. But they are on the horns of a dilemma, caught between a rock and a hard place.

Anis Chowdhury

The Gaza genocide and state-sponsored unprecedented settler violence have made Benjamin Netanyahu and his extreme rightist coalition partners bad Zionists. They have become indefensible to the so-called liberal Zionist friends of apartheid Israel. So, they have pinned their hope on a good Zionist retired General Gadi Eisenkot. To them, General Gadi Eisenkot is a good Zionist, not because he will stop Gaza genocide or ethnic cleansing of the occupied West Bank, but because he will apparently manage it better or make Zionism’s ugly face less visible to the world. So, in the lead-up to Israel’s 27 October election, the liberal Zionists declared this would be “the most consequential” in Israel’s history.

However, there is no good Zionist for the Palestinians or Arabs. The so-called good Zionist Eisenkot served in Netanyahu’s government for eight months during the Gaza genocide. He resigned not because he opposed the Gaza genocide; he differed with Netanyahu only on strategies. So, he is responsible for a long list of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Eisenkot was the Israeli military’s chief of staff when Israeli soldiers massacred nearly 200 unarmed Palestinians in Gaza in 2018. He is credited with being the mastermind of the Israeli’s army’s “Dahiya Doctrine”, which calls for disproportionate force against civilians. Eisenkot opposes Palestinian statehood, wants to perpetuate Israel’s apartheid system, and supports Israel’s illegal settlement in the occupied West Bank.

Eisenkot’s coalition partner, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, entered politics as Netanyahu’s chief of staff. He served in the Sayeret Matkal and Maglan special forces units of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and was accused of involvement in the massacre of more than one hundred Lebanese civilians in Qana in 1996. Bennett has openly called for the extrajudicial killing of Palestinians, while he reportedly told a national security advisor, “If you catch terrorists (i.e., a Palestinian), you simply have to kill them”.

Eisenkot’s other coalition partner, Avigdor Liberman, a former Netanyahu minister, has advocated that Israel’s citizens should sign a loyalty oath or lose their right to vote.

Lieberman justified the killing of at least 189 unarmed Palestinian protesters during the great March of Return in April 2018 by declaring that there are “no innocents in Gaza”.

Another Eisenkot coalition partner, General Yair Golan, considered the most “left-wing”, was previously the army’s deputy chief of staff. He has been one of the most strident advocates of genocidal crimes against Palestinians in Gaza. On 13 October 2023, Golan said in an interview with Ynet: “First of all, close all the electricity switches to Gaza. I think that in this battle, it is forbidden to allow a humanitarian effort. We need to say to them: listen, until the [captives] are released, from our side, you can die from starvation. It’s totally legitimate”. Thus, Golan echoed Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s infamous statement that Gaza would receive “no power, no food, no gas” because Israel is “fighting human animals, and will act accordingly.”

Therefore, the Eisenkot-led coalition cannot offer any hope to the Palestinians. If bad Zionist Netanyahu is a rock, Eisenkot-led anti-Netanyahu is a hard place for them.

No good Zionist

There is simply no good Zionist. As the UK Green Party’s recently adopted motion says, Zionism is a form of racism. Pulitzer Prize winner Benjamin Moser, a Jewish child of Holocaust survivors, exposed the ugly truth about Zionism in his rigorously researched book, Anti-Zionism: A Jewish History.

Another child of Holocaust survivors, political scientist Norman Finkelstein has been more critical of the Zionist project, as contained in his several books, the most recent being Gaza’s Gravediggers: An Inquiry Into Corruption in High Places. His research has exposed the darkest side of the Zionist project, the apartheid state of Israel.

The Devil you know and the Devil you don’t know

The newly found Arab power will be most effective by accelerating the downfall of the apartheid state. This can only happen if the known Devil Netanyahu remains in power and the delusion of good Zionism is buried. Netanyahu is not the problem as the so-called liberal Zionists are trying to present; the problem is the Zionist project itself.

The New York Times insists “Israel has always been two things: a Jewish state and a liberal democracy”. One should not be misled by such nice slogans. An apartheid state cannot be a liberal democracy. It is an oxymoron.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com; a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu.au

IPS UN Bureau

People protest against proposed federal voter ID and proof-of-citizenship mandates outside the US Capitol in Washington, DC, on 18 March 2026. Credit: Bryan Dozier/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Nov 3 2026 (IPS)

In the run-up to the US midterms, armed federal agents have been knocking on the doors of voters suspected of being non-citizens. Republican-led states have redrawn electoral districts in their party’s favour, removing power from Black voters. Federal agencies have invaded people’s privacy, combing voter rolls for non-citizens while finding hardly any.

The USA increasingly resembles a competitive authoritarian regime, where elections take place and the opposition can win, but the incumbent abuses state power to stack the odds against rivals. The CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks civic freedoms worldwide, downgraded the USA’s civic space to obstructed last December, after placing it on its Watchlist of countries experiencing rapid decline.

For the first time since 2002, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will not observe a US federal election. On 23 September, the body announced it had not received an invitation, putting the USA on a par with Belarus and Russia, which failed to allow OSCE observers for their latest national elections. Meanwhile, the Carter Center, which has observed over 100 elections worldwide, mostly in fragile and fledgling democracies, is training and deploying volunteer observers in the USA, having first observed a US election in 2020, when it monitored the presidential recount in the US state of Georgia in the face of Donald Trump’s attempt to overturn his defeat.

Manufactured majorities

Gerrymandering has a long history in US politics, but 2025 brought the first coordinated national gerrymandering campaign. Trump pressured Republican-led states to redraw their maps mid-decade, and several complied. Democrats hit back where they could, and now nine states are voting under new maps that could hand Republicans up to 15 extra seats compared with six for Democrats. This means Republicans could lose a significant share of the vote without it costing them a corresponding number of seats.

In practice, partisan and racial gerrymandering are hard to separate. In the South, where Black voters overwhelmingly back Democrats, maps drawn to eliminate Democratic seats often do so by breaking up districts with substantial numbers of Black voters. It is illegal to dilute minority votes, but the Supreme Court has made it easier to get away with it. On 29 April, it struck down a Louisiana map drawn to comply with the Voting Rights Act, ruling that voters must now prove lawmakers intended to discriminate. Louisiana promptly eliminated a majority-Black district. The Justice Department has pledged to review similar districts nationwide.

Voters under suspicion

The administration has built its election agenda on the false claim that large numbers of non-citizens vote. The Justice Department demanded complete voter registration lists from 49 states and the District of Columbia and sued the 31 jurisdictions that refused. All 26 judges who had ruled by mid-October threw out the lawsuits. On 9 October, in a case brought by Common Cause, a federal judge struck down the department’s voter roll collection programme.

The hunt has turned up almost nothing. Trump claimed in July that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had found nearly 16,000 non-citizens registered in Nevada. DHS later confirmed only 185, and Nevada officials found they were all citizens. A database DHS overhauled so states could run bulk checks on voter rolls has made numerous mistakes, leaving some Texan citizens unable to vote in the March primary. Across seven states with 35 million voters, it flagged roughly 4,200 people, around 0.01 per cent of the electorate. A federal judge ruled the overhaul unlawful, but the Supreme Court paused the ruling, and over half the states kept using the database.

The administration has also tried to restrict postal voting, ordering the Postal Service to deliver ballots only to voters on lists compiled by DHS, and has sued to stop California counting over 20,000 postal ballots. Courts have blocked both for this election.

Intimidation has extended to voters’ homes. Armed DHS agents have gone door to door to question people suspected of voting while ineligible, including naturalised citizens. The DHS stepped up the operation as early voting began, but on 21 October a federal judge ruled that it likely amounted to voter intimidation and barred agents from questioning people until the polls close, a ban an appeals court has kept in force. However, fear has had an impact. In Minnesota, an organisation serving African immigrant communities reported a single new registration this year, compared with hundreds ahead of previous elections.

The decentralised system that withstood Trump’s attempt to overturn his 2020 defeat is under strain. Earlier this year, Trump urged Republicans to ‘nationalize’ voting, arguing that states run elections as agents of the federal government. But the US Constitution says otherwise. The administration has cut close to 1,000 staff from the federal agency that helps election officials fend off cyberattacks, despite warnings of potential foreign interference. Meanwhile, threats and harassment have helped push turnover among local election officials to its highest level in at least 25 years.

Civil society on guard

Civil society is resisting and has won most of its court battles, including those that halted the voter data programme, kept postal voting restrictions on hold and stopped door-to-door visits. The Vote Safe initiative is placing trusted community figures at polling places in four states to reassure voters, and Common Cause has trained over 400 volunteer observers in Texas alone.

This work is, however, under attack. Federal agents have raided a voter registration group’s office without explanation, and the Justice Department has indicted the Southern Poverty Law Center. Funders and financial institutions have distanced themselves from targeted groups, in some cases cutting off donations or banking services. Major law firms have largely stepped back from challenging the administration, leaving most litigation to civil society and small firms.

Civil society is keeping up its work despite the pressure, and that work won’t stop when the polls close. Whether Trump will accept results he doesn’t like is an open question. If results are challenged, the records kept by thousands of volunteer observers may prove vital to ensuring voters’ choices are respected.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director of and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

By Saber Azam
GENEVA, Nov 2 2026 (IPS)

Émile Zola, the well-known French journalist, novelist, playwright, and key figure in theatrical naturalism, who played a significant role in France’s “political liberalization,” inspired me to speak out.

Saber Azam

I do not claim the knowledge, charisma, distinction, or public recognition of the renowned writer. Yet I use my pen and raise my voice to express my indignation at injustice and prejudice against humanity and to decry those who have turned the world into an explosive time bomb. The world’s tragic state must sicken all who care about humankind’s destiny. International law and order are frequently violated, and bloody, unlawful wars are waged. When countless innocent children, women, and men are regularly slaughtered; when space is at risk of militarization; when treachery becomes the “art of the deal” in every field; when rights, virtue, and decency are systematically violated; when bigotry is practiced everywhere; when conflicts become a source of enormous wealth for a few; when notorious criminals are protected; and when family and other human bonds are destroyed, every active conscience must awaken and act to stop the madness. Our world faces not only threats of insecurity, social and financial collapse, religious confrontation and wars, and climate disasters, but also serious moral decay and ruin. These crises worsen daily.

I do not intend to write literary pieces or politically acceptable articles, but rather to make my points known in plain language despite the risks. Therefore, I raise my voice and declare:

I Accuse the World Leaders

After World War II, the United Nations (UN) was established to “maintain international peace and security … take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace … develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian nature, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Thus, this body was created with a “world-loving” spirit.

To this end, the Security Council, a powerful 15-member body, was established to act on behalf of all countries to “[maintain] international peace and security.” Its resolutions are binding. Five “superpowers”—the United States, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom, and France—were granted not only permanent membership in this esteemed body but also the right to veto proposals before the Council. The rest of the world had to settle for the remaining ten seats, allocated for two-year terms according to an uneven geographic distribution. This arrangement glaringly disregards the historical injustices committed against hundreds of millions of indigenous populations across the Americas, Asia, Africa, the Oceanic Islands, and Australia, as well as the principle of majority rule.

At the same time, “with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations,” the 54-member Economic and Social Council was established under Article 60 of the UN Charter to strengthen cooperation among nations in social and economic development and in universal respect for human rights and dignity. Each member state serves on this body for three years.

On the legal front, the 15-member International Court of Justice was also established to peacefully resolve disputes among states. Each judge serves a nine-year term. Article 65 of the UN Charter provides that this institution will intervene “at the request of whatever body [Member States] may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” to file a legal complaint against another state.

With the above internationally recognized political, social, economic, and judicial structures in place to maintain and strengthen peaceful cooperation, there was hope that they would be used earnestly for their intended purposes; that wars and destruction would end; that future generations would live in peace; that social and economic progress would be equitable; and that all challenges would be resolved in accordance with the UN Charter.

By 17 September 2026, the five permanent members of the Security Council, primarily the former Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the United States, had vetoed at least 248 resolutions to protect their interests and those of their closest allies, ignoring the “world-loving” spirit of cooperation they had previously embraced.

Article 4 of the Charter ties UN membership directly to a state’s “peace-loving” nature and its willingness to accept the obligations set out in the Charter. Articles 5 and 6 authorize the Security Council to recommend preventive or enforcement measures to the General Assembly, including suspending or expelling a member state that consistently violates the Charter’s principles. However, since its establishment in 1945, no rogue member state has been expelled from the UN.

Article 52 of the Charter states that nothing precludes the establishment of regional peace and security entities, provided their aims and activities are consistent with the UN’s. The article therefore implicitly recommends that, on matters of peace and security, disputes between or among states, and social, political, and economic development, all countries use the diverse “world-loving” UN structures. However, repeated Soviet vetoes in the Security Council may have prompted the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in February 1955. The Soviet Union requested NATO membership in 1954 but was denied. These regional military alliances certainly “pushed” the communist giant to establish the rival Warsaw Pact in May 1955, contributing to the Cold War and significantly diminishing the UN’s role in world peace and security.

Meanwhile, the Organization of American States was created in April 1948. The European Coal and Steel Community was established in April 1951, leading to the European Economic Community under the Rome Treaty in March 1957 and the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992. These developments prompted other regions to establish their own structures to protect their interests. The Organization of African Unity was created in May 1963 and became the African Union in July 2002 under the Sirte Declaration. Other regional entities included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (August 1967) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (1972), which became the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (June 2011). Additional military, political, and economic organizations of varying importance were created in other regions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (April 1996), the Union of South American States (May 2008), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (December 2011).

The International Court of Justice has been largely ineffective. Superpowers pressure it to support their “preferred belligerent” in interstate conflicts. The International Criminal Court, established in 2002 despite a long history of calls for its creation to punish genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, has been systematically hampered by powerful and wealthy countries from fulfilling its duties properly and consistently.

As a result, UN structures have failed to achieve peace, justice, prosperity, and progress for all, and most other entities have also fallen short of these objectives. The self-centered approach of influential countries, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, drives this flagrant disregard for the much-needed “world-loving” spirit of cooperation.

[To be continued]

Saber Azam is a former UN official. He is the author of Soraya: The Other Princess and Hell’s Mouth: A Journey to the Heart of West African Jungles. His third book, Nowhere to Go, will be published soon.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

This is the first article in a four-part series. The remaining three will follow.

WFP warehouse workers unloading supplies in Haiti. Credit: WFP

By WFP
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti, Nov 2 2026 (IPS)

Warnings by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) that Haiti’s fragile food security gains could quickly unravel are becoming a reality. New analysis indicates acute hunger in the country is continuing its upward trajectory and is set to reach record levels. Violence, economic instability, poor agricultural performance and displacement, along with the growing impact of El Niño, are driving this bleak outlook.

According to the latest analysis from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 6.35 million people are likely to be acutely food insecure from March through June 2027. This is an increase of more than half a million people compared to the same period in 2026. Almost two million people within this group will likely face Emergency (IPC 4) levels of hunger – this means they are likely to experience severe food shortages and may resort to extreme measures to meet basic food needs.

The dire estimate follows WFP’s warning earlier this year that modest improvements, compared to earlier projections, remained fragile and that sustained support was essential to protect any progress against entrenched food insecurity. WFP is urging the international community to step up and help Haiti.

With more than 1.5 million Haitians forced to flee their homes, people living in areas controlled by armed groups as well as those taking shelter in displacement sites are particularly vulnerable. Displaced families are unable to work or grow their own food. Most live in unhygienic and overcrowded conditions. Even with humanitarian food assistance providing some level of safety net, families are struggling to secure a meal every day.

“Our teams are witnessing increasing levels of desperation as violence continues to displace families,” said Lauren Landis, WFP Country Director in Haiti. “Many have been displaced multiple times and are arriving with nothing but the clothes on their backs. This, combined with the conditions they’re forced to live in, creates conditions ripe for hunger and malnutrition to take hold.”

Hunger outside urban centers is also projected to deepen. Food insecurity across several rural areas expected to deteriorate from Crisis (IPC 3) to Emergency (IPC 4) levels from March-June 2027 when compared to the same period in 2026. El Niño is causing concurrent droughts and floods that are already reducing harvests and compromising farmers’ capacities to prepare for the next planting season. At the same time, agricultural and market supply chains are constrained by the presence of armed groups, making it challenging for farmers to deliver their products to local markets.

“This multifaceted crisis reminds us how important it is to not just provide life-saving emergency food assistance, but also to scale up longer-term investments that help communities withstand shocks and protect their livelihoods from events like El Niño,” said Landis.

So far this year, WFP has worked together with the Government to support 2.6 million Haitians with assistance including emergency food and cash transfers, school meals (74 per cent of which are made with food grown by local farmers), social protection programmes, and malnutrition prevention for babies and young children.

WFP also supports vulnerable communities through anticipatory cash transfers, the rehabilitation of water management infrastructure and rural roads, and micro-insurance that protects farmers against crop losses caused by drought or excessive rainfall.

WFP urgently requires USD 78 million to sustain these operations through March.

IPS UN Bureau

A delegate casts his ballot at the Human Rights Council elections held during the 20th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Inés M. Pousadela and Victoria Ubierna
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay / BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, Nov 2 2026 (IPS)

On 13 October, Burundi won a second consecutive term on the UN Human Rights Council, the UN’s main human rights body. The CIVICUS Monitor rates civic space in Burundi as closed, the worst category. Its government has spent years silencing civil society, critics and opposition parties, including through extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and torture.

The Council was created 20 years ago to replace the Commission on Human Rights, which had lost credibility because states with poor rights records used their seats to shield themselves from scrutiny. Clearly, problems persist.

An election without choice

Burundi secured its seat because the vote was an election in name only. Each year, the UN General Assembly elects roughly a third of the Council’s 47 members, with seats allocated among five regional groups. The resolution that created the Council asks states to consider each candidate’s contribution to human rights and expects members to uphold the highest standards. But for the second year running, every regional group put forward exactly as many candidates as seats. All 15 candidates were elected, six for a second term. Burundi received 160 votes, the fewest of any candidate, a sign that some states withheld their support. With no other candidate standing, it made no difference.

This is a longstanding problem. The Council’s first election, in 2006, was the only one in which every regional group offered a choice. Of the 20 held since since, five, including the last two, featured uncompetitive slates in every group, and in most of the rest only one or two groups held a competitive vote. When there are no alternatives, even states with the worst records are guaranteed a seat.

Alongside Burundi, nine of this year’s 15 elected states have civic space rated as obstructed or repressed. In Jordan, Kuwait and Nigeria, people face serious risks when they speak out, organise or protest. Only six of the chosen states met most of the 17 criteria set out in the International Service for Human Rights’ scorecards, which include cooperating with UN experts and paying UN dues on time.

Selective scrutiny

The Council’s 63rd session, which ended on 7 October, showed what it can still do. Despite severe budget cuts, it renewed the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs on Afghanistan, Burundi and Russia, as well as the fact-finding missions on Sudan and Venezuela.

Many states, however, chose not to take sides, putting geopolitical calculations ahead of human rights principles. Three of the four country resolutions put to a vote saw high numbers of abstentions. On Sudan, the resolution stopped short of naming the foreign governments, notably the United Arab Emirates, that the UN’s fact-finding mission has identified as fuelling the war.

Other crises barely registered. In Bahrain, close to 300 people have been arrested for protests or social media posts since the start of the US–Israeli war on Iran, but the country received only a passing mention. Ecuador and India, which jail activists and attack journalists, received no attention, perhaps because both sit on the Council after being elected unopposed in 2025. Once again, the Council took no action on China, one of its members, four years after a UN report found that abuses against Uyghur people in Xinjiang may amount to crimes against humanity. Such silences reflect political choices by the Council’s members, many of which have little interest in strengthening scrutiny that could one day turn on them.

Reform deferred

The Council’s 20th anniversary offered a chance to fix some of these flaws, but states let it pass. In July, a long-awaited review kept the Council as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, rather than one with the same standing as the Security Council, and the next review is not due before 2035. Meanwhile, Israel, Nicaragua and the USA have said they will not cooperate with the Council, part of the wider crisis of multilateralism documented in CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report.

States’ failure to pay their dues has also pushed the UN into a liquidity crisis, and its response, the UN80 efficiency drive, has brought deep cuts, disproportionately affecting human rights functions. The UN Human Rights Office’s regular budget is 10 per cent smaller than last year’s, and it has shed over 110 posts. Support has been cut for around a quarter of thematic Special Procedures.

Civil society is paying the price too. Restrictions introduced as temporary, including a cut in the number of written statements accredited organisations can submit, remain in place. Meanwhile, people who share information with the UN or speak at the Council risk detention, smear campaigns, surveillance and travel bans, yet only 10 states raised concerns about reprisals. If engaging with the UN becomes too dangerous, the Council will lose the first-hand evidence it needs to respond to abuses.

A world where 73 per cent of people live in countries with repressed or closed civic space needs a Human Rights Council able to respond to grave violations and protect those who speak out. Competitive elections, adequate funding and stronger civil society participation are required to make the Council the body it needs to be.

Victoria Ubierna is Research Programme Officer at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Lana Nusseibeh from United Arab Emirates, candidate for the position of the next Secretary-General, briefs reporters after the informal dialogue held with the candidates for the position of the next Secretary-General. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

As the race for the next UN Secretary-General moves forward, the campaign of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Assistant Minister for Political Affairs, Lana Nusseibeh, has faced significant pushback over the country’s involvement in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.

Over the past three years, the conflict in Sudan has deteriorated into one of the world’s most dire humanitarian crises, marked by mass civilian displacement and casualties, rampant human rights abuses, and widespread hunger.

This month marks one year since the sharp escalation in hostilities in El Fasher following the siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), during which civilians were subjected to severe human rights violations and persistent obstructions to humanitarian aid, and entire communities were displaced.

Extensive data from the UN, human rights organizations, and U.S. intelligence show that the UAE has been a major supplier of weapons, vehicles, and logistical support to the RSF. In July, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN MENA) urged the UN General Assembly and member states to impose an immediate arms embargo on the UAE, citing grave acts of genocide targeting non-Arab communities in Darfur.

On October 21, the UAE announced that Nusseibeh would enter the race to become the next UN Secretary-General, seeking to succeed incumbent Secretary-General António Guterres following the completion of his second term on December 31. Nusseibeh has previously dismissed claims of Emirati involvement in RSF activities as “baseless,” describing them as disinformation to “deflect responsibility and undermine international efforts to address the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.”

On October 27, a press briefing brought together international policy experts, human rights advocates, and Sudanese survivors to discuss Nusseibeh’s campaign and its potential implications for the UN’s credibility and ability to protect civilians.

Speaking at the event, Ibrahim Alduma, a native of El Fasher and Chief Programs Officer at Sudan Action Hub, shared a personal account of the civilian toll the country experienced following last year’s escalation. Alduma recounted how his family was trapped in El Fasher when hostiltiies erupted, faced with persistent telecommunications disruptions, to the point where he didn’t know if they were still alive. He also shared that his childhood friend was killed during the escalation, only to find out two days after the fact.

Alduma highlighted the U.S. government’s determination in February 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide and the following sanctions that were imposed on seven comapnies affiliated with the RSF, all of which were either based in or directly linked to the UAE.

“(Nusseibeh) is the one who was lobbying to remove UAE from the resolution of the European Parliament, and now she is running for United Nations Secretary General. So, mainly when we talk about policy, I know that the world has known everything about what happened in El Fasher, but the question is not if they’re informed or not,” Alduma said.

Kenneth Roth, former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a speaker at the briefing, noted that while member states face growing pressure to elect a female Secretary-General, Nusseibeh’s late entry reflects a broader difficulty within the UN to reach a consensus. Roth described Nusseibeh’s candidacy as both “inappropriate” and “unsuitable.”

“At this stage, I think it’s really beyond dispute that the UAE was sending arms and mercenaries to the RSF. I think it’s fair to say the RSF would not have been able to be nearly as successful militarily as it was and has been without that support from the UAE,” said Roth. “After having basically put El Fasher under siege for some 500 days a year ago, it (the RSF) went in and just started slaughtering people. Another genocide, and the reason I think Lana Nusseibeh is an utterly inappropriate candidate for UN Secretary-General is that she denies this reality.”

Roth further noted that Nusseibeh’s repeated denial of the UAE’s involvement in RSF military activity is not based on factual findings, declaring that she will “destroy her credibility.” He compared her to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, conversely describing Annan’s approach as firmly rooted in human rights and advocacy.

“We cannot afford to have the UN led by somebody who is a genocide denier, and indeed somebody who heads a government that has been aiding and abetting genocide, that is basically criminally complicit in that genocide, and she’s a lead person in covering that up,” said Roth.

Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health, emphasized the role of Western intelligence in tracking the crisis. He highlighted that U.S. and British intelligence actively tracked and were aware of substantial levels of Emirati involvement, concluding that the UAE provided the RSF with the support needed to execute its human rights violations.

“For those of us who worked in El Fasher, we first warned El Fasher to the U.N. Security Council in a private briefing in July 2023 to see diplomats asking how we make sure this doesn’t happen again. It’s a slap in the face for the dead and for the survivors. Let’s be clear. It’s a second dehumanization of these people because it’s acting like somehow this is a murder mystery. That this is Colombo. This is murder,” said Raymond.

“The intelligence worked. The early warning worked. These people died for one reason, because their lives matter less than the diplomatic, economic, and security relationships between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.A.E. That’s it. If you think there’s somehow a bigger thing here, there isn’t. That’s why they died, because they were just less important.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

Credit: UN Women/Samar Abu Elouf

By UN Women
NEW YORK, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

More than 37,000 civilians were killed in conflict last year. Women and girls accounted for one in four of these deaths – double their proportion in 2021 – according to the 2026 UN Secretary-General’s report on Women, Peace, and Security, released today.

Approximately 750 million women and girls now live within 50 kilometers of an active conflict, 40 million more than in 2024, and more than at any time since 1990.

“More women and girls are trapped in wars than at any point in decades. Yet military spending keeps rising and development assistance keeps falling, even as investing in women’s leadership, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding has never been more urgent”, said UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous.

For women and girls caught in war, the threat goes beyond bombs. Cases of conflict-related sexual violence verified by the United Nations nearly quadrupled between 2022 and 2025. War also drives women deeper into poverty and increases their unpaid care work. Around 170 million women and girls live in both conflict zones and extreme poverty, surviving on less than USD 3 a day. They account for almost 40 per cent of all women and girls living in extreme poverty globally. In conflict-affected countries, women and girls spend five times as many hours on unpaid domestic and care work as men and boys, double the global average.

These impacts are compounded by changing warfare and declining respect for international law. The increasing use of drones and long-range weapons in populated areas, including deliberate attacks on schools, markets, and hospitals – central to women’s daily lives – raises further safety concerns. Emerging AI-enabled military technologies add to these risks, particularly for women and girls already facing violence, displacement, and insecurity.

Even amid these challenges, women are working to protect communities and build peace.

“Every day, women around the world are working to end wars and build peace – protecting survivors, keeping communities together, and stopping violence before it starts. Their work is one of the best investments the world can make in peace”, continued the UN Women Executive Director.

Despite these contributions, the report shows that in 2025, women made up only five per cent of negotiators across 57 peace processes worldwide, down from seven per cent the year before.

Women’s exclusion from peace negotiations is compounded by a lack of investment in their work. Global military expenditure hit a record USD 2.9 trillion in 2025. Meanwhile, 40 per cent of women’s organizations in crisis-affected settings expect to shut down temporarily or permanently within the next year because of severe funding shortfalls. Women’s organizations are the backbone of lasting peace. They mediate local tensions, shelter the displaced, support survivors, and hold communities together. Their survival is essential to sustaining that peace.

UN Women calls for the protection of all women and girls and their rights, their meaningful participation in peace and security, and sustained investment in women-led conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We call for international law to be upheld and for an end to impunity.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

Dowry is still persisting in society in one form or another. This deeply entrenched social practice continues deepen household poverty and cause violence against women. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh has a law against dowry. It does. The more uncomfortable question is why the law has failed to make dowry socially unacceptable and practically difficult to demand. The Dowry Prohibition Act 2018 makes the demand for dowry a criminal offence. Direct or indirect demands can result in one to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to Tk 50,000, or both. Giving, taking or assisting in the giving or taking of dowry is also punishable. The law even makes dowry-related agreements void. Yet, the existence of legislation has not eliminated the practice. Instead, dowry has increasingly adapted itself to modern economic and social realities.

Shahiduzzaman

Research published in Development and Change in 2024 provides a disturbing illustration. In a study of 206 cases involving troubled marriages, 52 per cent involved complaints of continuing dowry demands. In 81 per cent of those cases, the demand was accompanied by violence against wives. The cases crossed economic classes, showing that dowry is not simply a problem of poor families.

The human rights consequences are profound. Dowry transforms marriage from a relationship between two individuals into an economic transaction in which a woman can be treated as a source of wealth. When the expected payment is not made, or when the husband or his family believes it is insufficient, the woman may face humiliation, threats, physical assault, psychological abuse, economic deprivation, abandonment or expulsion from the marital home.

The latest national evidence on violence against women makes the wider context impossible to ignore. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and UNFPA’s 2024 Violence Against Women Survey found that 76 per cent of ever-married women had experienced at least one form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime under the broader Bangladesh-specific definition. Nearly half, 49 per cent, experienced such violence during the previous 12 months. The survey specifically identifies dowry practices among the factors associated with increased risk of intimate partner violence.

This is not merely a women’s issue. It is a human rights issue involving the rights to life, dignity, equality, security and freedom from violence. The most frightening consequence is death. According to figures cited by the European Union Agency for Asylum from Ain o Salish Kendra monitoring, Bangladesh recorded 77 reported incidents of dowry-related violence against women in 2024. Of these, 36 women died as a result of the violence, and another seven reportedly died by suicide. During January-June 2025, 45 incidents were recorded, with 23 women reportedly dying from the violence.

These figures should not be interpreted as the total number of dowry-related deaths in Bangladesh. They represent documented cases recorded by a human rights monitoring organisation, and many incidents may never reach police, courts or the media. Indeed, the national violence survey found that 62 per cent of survivors never disclosed the violence they experienced.

The causes of dowry-related deaths are also revealing. They can include severe beatings, burns, strangulation, poisoning, forced or coerced suicide, and other forms of physical violence. In some cases, what is presented as suicide may follow prolonged harassment, threats and economic coercion. This is why every suspicious death of a married woman following allegations of dowry demand deserves an impartial investigation rather than being dismissed as a “family matter”.

Dowry also makes poor families poorer. For a low-income household, arranging a daughter’s marriage can mean selling land, livestock or productive assets, taking loans, borrowing from relatives or using savings accumulated over years. The World Bank has documented the strong relationship between poverty and dowry in Bangladesh.

This creates a vicious cycle. Poverty encourages families to see marriage as a financial necessity; dowry drains household resources; debt weakens the family’s economic security; and economic dependence can make women less able to leave abusive marriages. Dowry can also contribute to child marriage. UNICEF research notes that despite the 2018 law, families continue to face social pressure surrounding dowry. Because dowry can increase as girls grow older, some families marry daughters earlier to reduce the expected financial burden.

Bangladesh is not facing this problem alone. India offers an important comparison. Indian law not only prohibits dowry but also has a specific legal category for “dowry death”. Under Section 304B, now carried forward as Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, a woman’s unnatural death within seven years of marriage can be treated as dowry death when there is evidence of cruelty or harassment linked to dowry demands. The punishment is a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment and can extend to life imprisonment. But India’s experience also demonstrates that stronger legislation alone is not enough. Official Indian data recorded 6,156 dowry-death cases in 2023.

The lesson for Bangladesh is clear: criminalisation must be accompanied by effective enforcement, investigation, prosecution, survivor protection and social transformation. Bangladesh therefore needs to move beyond symbolic prohibition. First, police must treat dowry complaints as serious criminal allegations rather than private family disputes. Second, investigations into suspicious deaths of married women must examine previous dowry demands, financial transactions, messages, threats, medical records and testimony from neighbours and relatives. Third, victims need accessible legal aid, emergency shelter and economic support. A woman who has no income, no safe place to live and responsibility for children may remain with an abusive husband simply because leaving appears economically impossible.

The deeper problem is not the absence of law. It is the gap between law and social reality. A society cannot claim meaningful progress on women’s rights while a woman can be beaten because her family cannot provide money, forced to leave her marital home because a demand remains unpaid, or lose her life because marriage has been turned into a financial transaction.

The writer is the Editor and CEO of News Network

This story was originally published by The Daily Sun

IPS UN Bureau

By Mandeep S.Tiwana
NEW YORK, Oct 27 2026 (IPS)

Notwithstanding last minute shenanigans and the possibility of backroom deals by powerful states, two women from Latin America are leading contenders in the race for the UN’s next Secretary-General. After 80-plus years of men-only leadership, momentum is building to break the glass ceiling at the global institution dedicated to saving future generations from the scourge of war.

Design flaws in the somewhat opaque appointment process that bestow arbitrary veto powers on the five permanent UN Security Council members could, however, torpedo the aspiration for equitable representation for women at the helm for the world body. But there is still time to build public pressure on governments to do the right thing by appointing a feminist woman leader from Latin America and the Caribbean in deference to the principle of regional rotation.

UN in crisis

The next Secretary-General will preside over a fractious UN facing one of its hardest tests. Russia and the USA, which as Security Council permanent members are supposed to maintain international peace and security, are actively violating the UN Charter’s ban on aggression. Their ill-conceived invasions of Ukraine and Iran are causing large-scale death and destruction.

The USA has also recently imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court, making it harder to pursue justice for the Israeli genocide of Palestinians and conflicts fuelled by powerful states in Congo, Sudan and Yemen. China, another permanent Council member, continues to provide cover for crimes against humanity committed by Myanmar’s brutal military junta, currently embroiled in a civil war against dissidents.

Demands on the UN are increasing. Over 100 million forcibly displaced people need the UN’s support. But the institution faces a deep financial crisis caused by delays in payments of dues by bigger countries and an unnecessarily complicated funding model. The funding crisis comes as the challenges are mounting up. Climate commitments are being undermined by fossil fuel lobbies and petrostates as the world hurtles towards tipping points. Repressive states are pushing to reverse hard-won human rights that the UN is supposed to protect, including sexual and reproductive freedoms for women. Some two-thirds of Sustainable Development Goals targets, which seek to promote social progress and better standards of living, are not being met, driven by a combination of inadequate resourcing and escalating attacks on civic space.

The UN needs a leader who can break the mould by being much more than a bureaucrat beholden to states. The next Secretary-General should seek to derive legitimacy by representing the needs and aspirations of over eight billion people around the world. With confidence in multilateralism at breaking point, the exercise of feminist leadership principles that combine active listening, courage, consensus building and empathy for victims of abuses, will be crucial.

She must be able to bravely stand up for the UN Charter and its commitment to human dignity and justice under international law. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded that Dag Hammarskjöld resign as Secretary-General in 1960, he reminded the UN General Assembly that big powers are not the ones that need the UN for protection: “it is all the others.” In 2004, Kofi Annan had the courage to call the US invasion of Iraq illegal in a rebuke to US President George W. Bush.

Given the pressures, it may be a good idea for the next Secretary-General to declare they will stand for only one term, thereby avoiding the trap of being overly cautious towards the most powerful states in their first term so they can be re-elected. Security Council permanent members have shown they will block re-appointments if a Secretary-General does not do their bidding. In 1996, Boutros Boutros Ghali was denied a second term because of a US veto.

Civic engagement needed

A deep commitment to human rights and the quest for transparency, accountability and participation will determine how the next Secretary-General will be remembered by future generations in how approached this hard and often thankless job. Civic engagement should be at the heart of the UN’s agenda. Just 75 of 193 UN member states, accounting for only seven per cent of the world’s population, respect their people’s freedoms to organise, speak out and protest peacefully.

To start changing this, in her first 100 days, the next Secretary-General should appoint a UN Civil Society Envoy to drive the UN’s outreach to people and civil society around the world, elevate the issue of reprisals against activists who engage with the UN and highlight unfair blocking by states of civil society organisations that seek to participate in the UN’s work.

From the time of its founding in 1945 amid the ruins of war, oppressed people have looked to the UN to be the conscience of the world. In the second half of the 20th century, the UN, through leaders like U Thant, championed the aspirations of discriminated and colonised peoples for self-rule and dignity. The next Secretary-General should prioritise the voices of excluded peoples by bringing the voices of those on the sharp end of repression into rooms where decisions are made. She can build consensus the feminist way, by never letting a door close.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s, U Thant kept communication channels open with both the world’s superpowers, proposed the standstill that helped pull the world back from the brink of nuclear war and then persuaded Cuban leader Fidel Castro to de-escalate the situation. The next Secretary-General’s moral clarity can shape the world of tomorrow. She must be mindful of the needs and aspirations of young people who have the greatest to gain from a functioning UN but have the least voice.

Her leadership must be bold, inventive and unafraid to fail. Dag Hammarskjöld invented the UN’s peacekeeping role during the 1956 Suez crisis, going beyond the UN Charter. He died in 1961 attempting to broker a ceasefire in the Congo. Kofi Annan publicly owned the UN’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, then turned those lessons into the Responsibility to Protect. The world’s first woman Secretary-General must help the UN win back legitimacy and trust among the world’s people. To do that, she will need to be creative and not be constrained by tradition or fear of failure.

Mandeep S. Tiwana is the secretary general of civil society alliance, CIVICUS. He also serves as CIVICUS’s representative to the UN headquarters in New York.

IPS UN Bureau

IPS UN Bureau

Much of the world has been bemused by US President Donald Trump’s expectation of the Nobel Peace Prize. While aggressive towards most of the world, friend and foe alike, he has treated hostile nuclear powers more respectfully.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Outdoing every previous US president, Trump authorised over 500 bombings of ten countries in the first year of his second term.

Besides attacking Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Venezuela, he also threatened Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, and Greenland with attacks. But Trump is not alone.

Every US president since World War II has committed war crimes, violating the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention. Over 4.5 million died in these wars, which created 38 million refugees in 2001-19 alone!

Trump believes he deserves the Prize. After he won the November 2024 presidential election, he pledged, “We had no wars for years…I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars…

“We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end, and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”

Yet, Trump has also promised to build the world’s greatest military to achieve ‘peace through strength’, claiming he will not actually need to use it.

Barack Obama has acknowledged he does not know why he won the prize in the first year of his presidency. He then illegally bombed seven nations – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Syria, and Iraq – without UN Security Council approval!

George W. Bush attacked five countries while Trump 2.0 not only ‘re-bombed’ Obama’s seven, but also surpassed him by adding Nigeria, Iran, and Venezuela!

After Biden gave tens of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons to Israel to ‘carpet bomb’ Gaza, Trump surpassed his predecessor’s generosity despite his contempt for him.

New US military strategy
Trump boastfully rebranded the US Defense Department as the Department of War at the start of his second term, to signal a more offensive and aggressive stance.

The latest US National Defense Strategy (NDS) sees NATO allies “strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense”.

The NDS envisages US control of the Panama Canal and Greenland, echoing Trump’s ‘Donroe doctrine’ for the Western Hemisphere, while claiming to avoid future interventions abroad!

In 2024, worldwide military spending totalled $2.7 trillion, with the US accounting for over a third! US spending then exceeded the aggregate expenditure of the next nine largest spenders, all Washington allies except for China and Russia.

Fortune magazine projects that the new US military spending target of $1.5 trillion will exceed the combined expenditure of the next 35 highest-spending countries!

The new NDS reasserts Trump’s claims that US allies took advantage of earlier Washington administrations to subsidise their own defence.

When Trump demanded, during his first term, that they spend at least 2% of GDP on the military, their responses were largely lukewarm. In 2025, NATO allies agreed with Trump to increase military spending to 5% of GDP!

The NDS asserts its War Department will be key to NATO “even as we calibrate US force posture and activities in the European theater” to focus on US priorities.

While reiterating “Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future”, it envisages cutting US troops on Ukraine’s borders.

Unsurprisingly, the US’s NATO allies complain that Trump has created a ‘security vacuum’ undermining Europe’s confrontation of Russia.

China U-turn or American tai-chi?
The Biden NDS viewed China as the US’s main adversary. In contrast, Trump’s new NDS sees China as an established power in the Indo-Pacific region that only needs to be discouraged from dominating the US and its allies.

The goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them… This does not require regime change… Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China”!

Unlike Biden’s NDS commitment to “support Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense”, the new NDS gives no assurances on Taiwan, although Beijing remains committed to reunification, by force if necessary.

Incredibly, it seeks to “open a wider range of military-to-military communications” with counterparts in China. Unsurprisingly, the US has since also eschewed new trade wars with China.

So why does Trump expect the Nobel Peace Prize? He probably sees himself as less belligerent than his predecessors to ‘near peer’ powers such as China and Russia.

Attacking and bombing ‘insignificant’ small non-nuclear powers probably does not matter to him. His attitude towards ‘shithole’ countries is similar.

Likewise, Trump claimed no one died when the US raided Venezuela on 3 January, apparently referring only to US fatalities, although over a hundred Latin Americans were killed!

IPS UN Bureau

A young protester holds a sign that reads ‘Listen to us’ in Paris, France, on 22 October 2026. Credit: Eric Broncard/Hans Lucas via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Oct 26 2026 (IPS)

Classrooms with mouldy walls, riddled with cockroaches and rats, stifling in summer and freezing in winter: this is how French high school students describe the places where they’re meant to learn. These impossible-to-ignore symbols of underfunding and neglect sparked a protest movement that has shaken the country.

Students’ complaints centre on underfunding, teacher shortages, crumbling infrastructure, crowded classrooms and an opaque university admissions system. These matter in their own right and raise broader questions about whose interests economies and governments serve, and what futures people can look forward to.

When high school students blockaded their schools, it struck a chord. University students quickly joined in. Within weeks, at least 250,000 people were on the streets, with teachers, trade union members and supporters of the left-wing France Unbowed (LFI) party among those joining in. The government opened a consultation platform for students, announced the release of fuel reserves and promised school improvement policies, but these limited concessions didn’t stop the protests. Meanwhile the message spread across Europe.

A continental wave

Students organised school blockades in several cities in Belgium, while in Italy, thousands took to the streets to demand increased education spending, better school buildings and action on the cost of living.

In Spain, the crisis of unaffordable housing has brought nationwide protests, with many young people to the fore. The trigger was the eviction of 87-year-old María del Carmen Abascal, known as Maricarmen, from the Madrid apartment that was her home for over seven decades, after the investment firm that bought her building pushed the rent up by over 230 per cent. Weeks of protests followed across Spain and Madrid’s Puerta del Sol filled with over 1,200 protesters’ tents. When right-wing parties blocked emergency housing legislation, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap election.

In Portugal, thousands camped in public squares to protest at unaffordable housing, calling on the government to withdraw a draft law that will make it easier for landlords to evict tenants and end rent caps on new leases. In Greece, students protested against high student rents.

Protests have resurged in Albania. They were initially triggered by a luxury tourism development linked to the Trump family, which unleashed discontent over unaccountable politicians, oligarchical power and corruption. France’s protests gave the movement fresh impetus, with students mobilising against high education costs, poor university conditions and limited job prospects.

The triggers and demands of protest movements vary, but movements speak to a shared understanding among many young people that they aren’t being heard and growing economic difficulties aren’t being addressed.

Roots of a generational revolt

What has happened in France and other European countries is part of a broader global pattern. Young people expect few opportunities in economies that fail almost everyone but the super wealthy. They see bad public services get worse, including their schools and universities, while the cost of essentials soars, driven by the climate crisis and needless conflicts.

When young people leave education they enter impossible job markets and face handing over most of what they earn in rent. A housing crisis that has been bubbling up for years has become a mainstream issue. Private sector interests have turned a necessity into an object of financial speculation. Corporate landlords seek to extract as much rent as the market can bear and use their lobbying power to water down policies to control rents.

Many people view governments as not having the answers. In France, as elsewhere, the current plan is more economic austerity. Established centre-right and centre-left parties are widely seen as differing little.

At the same time, young people have seen the power of self-organising. Gen Z-led protest movements have arisen in many countries, motivated by anger at economic failures, corruption and unaccountable political power. In 2024, young people rose up in Kenya against a planned tax on essentials. In Bangladesh, young people protested against a quota that restricted entry to public sector jobs, toppling an authoritarian government.

In 2025, a ban on 26 social media platforms showed Nepal’s young people how out of touch their government was. Their protests ousted the prime minister, leading to an election that brought democratic change. This year, India’s Gen Z-led cockroach movement secured the resignation of the education minister over exam leaks and is now protesting against unfair changes to the electoral roll.

In 2025, Gen-Z led movements arose in countries as diverse as Madagascar, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Serbia and Togo, among many others. Movements share remarkably similar characteristics, practising internal democracy and sharing inspiration, tactics and symbols across borders. When movements broaden their support beyond their origins, connecting with established groups and organisations, Gen Z remains at their heart, driving them forward.

Repression and political opportunism

Because they question the distribution of economic and political power, Gen Z-led protests have invariably been met with state violence. In France, Amnesty International has tracked the use of batons, teargas and mass arrests, including against children. On 7 October, amid public outrage, the government was forced to suspend the police’s use of stun grenades after a 15-year-old boy lost a hand. Police have detained thousands of under-18s.

Protesters have mobilised overwhelmingly peacefully, apart from isolated acts of vandalism. But cost-of-living protests joined by hundreds of thousands over the weekend of 17 and 18 October ended in much more significant violence, with rioting and looting in several cities.

With a presidential election due in April, politicians have been quick to capitalise on the violence. Government spokespeople sought to blame LFI, while far-right leader Marine Le Pen, who currently tops the polls, has blamed the violence on what she calls ‘anarchic immigration’. Donald Trump and the Russian government have done the same, while far-right politicians across Europe have followed her lead.

Protesters don’t want a far-right victory, and if France or other countries shift further rightwards, the blame won’t lie with them. Public anger that demands disruption and seeks to punish elites can be channelled towards far-right populist and nationalist ends when no better alternatives are on offer. Economic and political failures, in countries with large Gen Z populations, all but guarantee further protests. The political establishment must start listening and offer a more positive response.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic progress over the past few decades. Its garment industry has become globally important, millions of people have entered the workforce, and private businesses have expanded across manufacturing, services, technology and trade. But economic growth alone does not create a healthy business environment. Businesses also need predictable laws, safe workplaces, fair competition, protection of property and contracts, and respect for the rights of workers, consumers and communities.

Shahiduzzaman

There has been progress, but significant gaps remain. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys have repeatedly identified corruption, infrastructure, access to finance and regulatory obstacles among the challenges faced by businesses in Bangladesh. These problems increase the cost and uncertainty of doing business, particularly for smaller enterprises. The World Bank has also emphasised that effective regulations and institutions governing business registration, licensing, inspections and property rights are essential for reducing business risks while protecting consumers, public health and safety.

Corruption is particularly damaging because it creates an uneven playing field. When businesses believe that personal connections or unofficial payments are necessary to obtain services, licences or approvals, honest businesses can be placed at a disadvantage. It also weakens confidence in government institutions and discourages investment.

The problem is not necessarily a lack of laws. Bangladesh has numerous laws and regulatory agencies. The deeper problem is often implementation and enforcement. Rules that are reasonable on paper have little value if they are applied selectively, slowly or inconsistently.

This gap is also visible in the rule of law. The World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index ranked Bangladesh 125th among 143 countries, although Bangladesh’s overall score improved by 1.3 per cent from the previous year. The index examines areas including fundamental rights, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice and order and security.

Human rights and workplace safety are another critical part of responsible business.

Bangladesh has made important progress since the Rana Plaza disaster, particularly in the garment sector. More recently, the country took a significant step by ratifying ILO Conventions 155 and 187 on occupational safety and health and Convention 190 on violence and harassment at work in November 2025. The ILO described these ratifications as an important commitment to safer workplaces and workers’ rights.

However, ratification is not the same as implementation. The ILO itself makes clear that ratification represents a commitment to progressively align national laws and practices with international standards; it does not mean that full compliance automatically exists on the day of ratification.

The real challenge is therefore to ensure that workplace safety rules are consistently enforced, labour inspectors have adequate resources and independence, and workers can report violations without fear of retaliation.

Public safety and institutional trust are equally important. A business environment cannot be stable when citizens lack confidence in the institutions responsible for law enforcement and justice. The Asia Foundation’s 2024 survey of 6,510 Bangladeshis found that only 20.5 per cent considered the police to have very high integrity. Trust in the judiciary was 38.2 per cent. The survey also showed that trust in both institutions had declined from 2022 levels.

Other countries demonstrate that stronger institutions and economic development can advance together. Singapore provides one example of the importance of consistent enforcement and institutional integrity. According to Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Singapore scored 84 out of 100 and ranked third among 182 countries. The index measures perceptions of public-sector corruption, based on expert assessments and business surveys.

Vietnam provides another useful comparison because, like Bangladesh, it has built a strong export-oriented manufacturing economy. The World Bank says Vietnam’s economic success over recent decades has been strongly supported by export-oriented foreign investment, but argues that further growth requires regulatory reform and higher productivity. Vietnam has introduced a programme to simplify or reduce business regulations and, by December 2023, had simplified or reduced 2,789 regulations. Its National Public Services Portal had also digitised more than 70 per cent of public administrative services.

So, what should Bangladesh do?

First, the government must close the gap between laws and enforcement. Regulations should be clear, simple and applied equally.

Second, government services such as licences, permits, taxation, customs and inspections should increasingly be digitised. Clear deadlines, published fees and traceable decisions can reduce opportunities for unofficial payments.

Third, regulatory agencies must be more accountable. Complaints against officials should be independently investigated, and disciplinary measures should follow transparent procedures.

Fourth, labour inspection must be strengthened. Workplace safety should not become a priority only after accidents occur. Employers who violate safety standards should face meaningful consequences, while compliant businesses should not be placed at a competitive disadvantage.

Fifth, police and justice institutions need to rebuild public confidence through professional training, independent complaint mechanisms, timely investigations and equal application of the law.

Finally, businesses, workers, civil society and consumers should have meaningful opportunities to participate in regulatory reform. Policies imposed without consultation often fail to address problems experienced on the ground.

Bangladesh does not have to choose between business growth and human rights. In fact, sustainable economic growth increasingly depends on both. Safe workers are more productive, predictable regulations encourage investment, fair competition rewards innovation, and trusted institutions reduce the risks and costs of doing business.

The ultimate test is simple: Can an entrepreneur compete without connections? Can a worker work without fear? Can a consumer obtain justice? Can a business receive government services without unofficial payments? And can every citizen expect the law to be applied fairly?

If Bangladesh can answer these questions through effective institutions rather than promises, it can build a business environment based not only on economic opportunity, but also on human rights, public safety, fairness and public trust.

Shahiduzzaman is the Editor and CEO of News Network. shahiduzzaman@newsnetwork-bd.org

This story was originally published by The Financial Express

8 November 1996
Graca Machel (left), former Minister of Education of Mozambique and the Secretary-General's appointed Expert on the Impact of Armed Conflict of Children, presents her report titled "The United Nations Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict of Children" to the Third Committee. Right is Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Mikiko Otani
TOKYO, Japan, Oct 23 2026 (IPS)

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. The United Nations was established with this commitment.

Children, while constituting nearly a third of humanity, are disproportionately affected by war. Yet, children’s voices are rarely heard and children are largely absent from peace processes.

From Machel to Security Council Resolution 2427

Graça Machel, thirty years ago, in her groundbreaking report “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” already told the United Nations: “clearly the most effective way to protect children is to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts”; “All people need to feel that they have a fair share in decision-making,” emphasizing that young people should be seen as “active participants in creating solutions, not just as victims”.

The need for child participation was emphasized in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). While the participation of children received less attention in the original Machel report, it was highlighted as an important issue in the 10-year strategic review (2009), having an entire chapter devoted to “Children as Peacemakers”. This recognition was followed by Security Council resolution 2427 (2018), which called on Member States and the UN system “to ensure that the views of children are taken into account … throughout the conflict cycle”, and to fully incorporate and prioritize “empowerment” of children in the post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, taking into consideration the views of children.

Participation: a child’s right and a driver of peace

Participation is a right of the child under the most widely ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Children must be heard and have their views given due weight in all matters that affect them, including in the conflict context. Children’s participation is critical for conflict prevention, their protection in the conflict, recovery, reintegration and reparation. Children can also play an important role in bringing divided, torn communities together, as catalysts for social cohesion and building peace.

The momentum has been building for a further call for participation of children. The Security Council heard the views of a former child soldier from Colombia (2018), a 15-year-old girl from Mali (2020), and an 18-year-old peacebuilding activist from Cameroon (2023). All three speakers called for the participation of children.

In this year of special importance for children affected by conflict, 30th anniversary of the creation of the children and armed conflict mandate by the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council strengthened the scope of the call for child participation in its resolution 61/21 devoted to the rights of the child affected by armed conflict. It invites States to ensure the meaningful participation of children affected by armed conflict in the design, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of policies and programmes throughout the conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, peace and post-conflict processes, including protection, justice, accountability, reparation and recovery.

This resolution is particularly significant. Twenty-four children aged 12-17 from 10 countries in conflict situations shared their views in a consultation with the European Union, one of the penholders, and many of their recommendations helped shape the resolution (Child Rights Connect, meeting report and Child Friendly Guide, 2026).

The children and armed conflict agenda, deeply embedded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a basis for the Machel report, established by the General Assembly, strengthened by the Security Council, is now complemented by the Human Rights Council from the child rights perspective. This is very much in line with the call of the UN Secretary-General’s Guidance Note (2023) for mainstreaming child rights throughout the whole UN system including the peace and security pillar.

Three recommendations for the next steps

First, UN mechanisms, States and civil society should support and strengthen partnership with children and young people to make meaningful participation of children a reality. Second, children should be included in the Conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Paris Principles to be convened by France with UNICEF in February 2027, highlighting the transformative role that children associated with armed forces and armed groups can play as rights holders and agents of change. Third, children’s participation should be supported in the global peacebuilding architecture and space, starting from the annual peacebuilding week in June 2027, the beginning year of the International Decade of Strengthening of Peace for Future Generations (2027-2036) proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution 80/269 (2026).

Dr. Mikiko Otani, widely recognized as an international human rights lawyer, is currently the President of Child Rights Connect, a Geneva-based global NGO network promoting child rights. She was the Chair of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2021-2023) during her eight-year membership for two terms.

IPS UN Bureau

Boats in Villa Marina, Falcón State. Credit:Jujovar2010, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

By Francisco R. Rodríguez
DENVER, Colorado, USA, Oct 23 2026 (IPS)

 
Money chase

So, if Venezuela claims to be importing from the rest of the world roughly as much as it was exporting during those years, and the rest of the world confirms Venezuela’s story, then where could those additional $11 billion that presumably ended up in the bank accounts of Maduro’s cronies be?

Technically, there are some ways in which a country could spend as much as it earns and still have large sums go missing. The first obvious one is if there were $11 billion lying around to steal. Except we know there weren’t, because the Venezuelan government was broke and had all its international accounts frozen. Even the Central Bank didn’t have access to most of its international reserves at the time. And remember, the Times is telling us that these $11 billion were coming out of unpaid receivables. In other words, the oil was being sold, it was being loaded into ships, and the owners of these ships were promising to pay Venezuela for that oil but, according to the Times, never did.

Another possibility is that Venezuela was accumulating assets because someone was lending it money. But that explanation doesn’t pass the smell test either. Nobody in their right mind would have lent $11 billion to Venezuela in 2021 and 2022. The country was sanctioned, barred from issuing any type of debt in the United States, and even non-US investment funds wouldn’t go near it with a 10-foot pole. The country didn’t even have access to bank accounts where a loan of that size could be wired.

And, quite frankly, if, say, China or Russia had lent Venezuela $11 billion and somehow gotten those dollars to Venezuela, don’t you think the New York Times, or Reuters, or the Wall Street Journal, would have written a story about that? And, by the way, where is that $11 billion creditor trying to get their money back? No other Venezuela creditors seem to know about them, which is quite odd for a country that has just announced that it’s about to start restructuring its debt.

In sum, nobody lent Venezuela $11 billion in 2021–22 because anyone deluded enough to do so wouldn’t have been lending the money; they would have been giving it away. The country already had a debt that was well in excess of its capacity to pay, and country risk premiums were through the roof. The expected return on any Venezuela debt issuance in those years would have been zero.

Digging in

Now here it is actually worth stopping for a minute and looking carefully at the numbers in the country’s current account, because what the balance of payments data allows us to do is not just look at how much the country receives and spends in foreign exchange, but also where that money comes from and where it goes. And here the story gets interesting because, oddly enough, what these numbers seem to tell us is that the Venezuelan government did borrow around $11 billion (or, more precisely, $10.4 billion) in those two years. They also tell us that it accumulated some $14 billion in accounts receivable, precisely the ones that the New York Times is telling us were not paid.

So, say you had just come down from Mars, knew nothing about Venezuela’s pariah status at the time, and looked at these numbers. You would say: well yes, Venezuela borrowed $10 billion in those years and at the same time accumulated $14 billion in accounts receivable (that is, promises to pay in the future) for its oil sales. And if then, on your short trip from Mars, you picked up a copy of the New York Times and read it, you would say: well, it looks like of those $14 billion, around $11 billion never got paid.

So why does the country’s current account data get us these numbers that are so strange? Herein lies what I think is the resolution of the issue.

Below is a slide from a presentation prepared by PDVSA in late 2022, where it reports all of the oil that was sold between 2020 and 2022.[1] Note that $13.3 billion in invoices were ceded to the Republic. That’s actually a bit higher than the Times’ $11 billion because it includes 2020. In other words, the government was paying for its imports through oil shipments because it could not use international bank accounts as a result of US sanctions. Normally, PDVSA would have sold the oil, received dollars in payment, and sold those dollars to the Central Bank. Then the government would have gone to the Central Bank and bought dollars from it to pay importers.

Exhibit 1: November 2022 PDVSA Presentation Shows Receivables Ceded to Republic

Source: Ministry of Popular Power for Oil.

Since that mechanism could not be used, the government resorted to paying in-kind. It went to the importers and said: look, if you bring this much in imports into the country, we’ll let you go and collect from the people who bought our oil and who owe us money.

In fact, if you look at the decomposition of the supposed borrowing that the government did, you’ll find $6.3 billion of portfolio investment securities being issued by the government. And that rhythm of roughly $500 million per quarter continues until the end of 2025. That’s not because the government is issuing bonds. Believe me, if the government had issued a single bond, we would know about it (and whoever had bought that bond would have become the laughingstock of the securities world). But if you look at the fine print of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Manual, you’ll find that what characterizes portfolio investment is the fact that securities have to be negotiable. And this is precisely what Venezuela was giving importers: negotiable IOUs that they could exchange for oil receivables entitling them to receive payment for oil that Venezuela had sold.

We find a very direct statement of this in another slide of the PDVSA 2022 presentation, where the board states, in discussing cases of cesión de facturas (assignment of invoices) corresponding to shipments requested by the National Executive, that these were used to compensate debts with providers of the Republic.

There it is: we’ve found our mystery lender: importers who were being issued debt so that they could exchange them for oil shipments. So, when you see the balance of payments accounts say that the government was accumulating receivables and issuing debt, what you are really seeing is the way in which balance of payments statistics handle a practice that is as old as humanity: barter.

Oil and prejudice

Reality is often much more prosaic than what we want it to be. Government cronies did not walk away with $11 billion in unpaid oil shipments. What really happened is something much simpler: Venezuela didn’t have a way to pay in cash for the imports it needed, so it ended up paying with oil. And because PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, is legally distinct from the Republic, it did not directly collect on the shipments but rather transferred them to the Republic in payment of its tax and royalty obligations.

American journalist Sydney Harris once wrote that “we believe what we want to believe, what we like to believe, what suits our prejudices and fuels our passions.” And yes, the idea that Maduro’s henchmen walked off with $11 billion in oil shipments feeds well into many stereotypes of Venezuela under Maduro. Even if it sits awkwardly with the fact that he doesn’t seem to have money to pay for his defense in a Brooklyn court, most of us are predisposed to believe it.

Yes, Maduro’s regime was highly corrupt. No one puts that in doubt. But there is a long distance between recognizing its corruption and claiming that regime insiders walked away with half of the country’s oil exports. That image may fit a lot of political stereotypes and be useful for many political narratives. It just doesn’t fit the facts.

Francisco R. Rodríguez is a senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (cepr.net) in Washington, DC and a professor and fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies.

[1] I obtained this presentation two years ago from reporters who wrote stories on it and who asked me to see it to discuss their interpretation of it.

IPS UN Bureau

Estado Zulia - Venezuela. Credit: Breddyjgalvis, CC BY-SA 3.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

By Francisco R. Rodríguez
DENVER, Colorado, USA, Oct 21 2026 (IPS)

If you’ve been around Venezuelans for long enough, you know that we tend to speak in superlatives. We have the best baseball players, the most beautiful beaches, the tastiest arepas, and the wickedest dictators. But even being used to the scale of our superlatives didn’t quite prepare me for what I read in the May 5 edition of The New York Times, in a story called “In Venezuela, Trump Vowed to Show Accountability. Oil Deals Linger.” The story tells us that a network of shell companies controlled by Carlos Malpica (who is widely believed to be Maduro’s bagman) embezzled $11 billion of the country’s oil wealth in 2021 and 2022. In the Times’ words: “for every two dollars that Venezuela earned selling oil earlier this decade, one dollar was stolen, internal documents and official statistics show.”

Francisco R. Rodríguez

However, it is one thing to document the practice of corruption and another to argue that half of the country’s oil revenues were stolen. That conclusion is inconsistent with what we know about flows of currency into and out of Venezuela. Put simply, $11 billion of oil revenues could not have been stolen because if they had, Venezuela would not have been able to buy the goods that we know it purchased from the rest of the world.

The claim that half of oil revenues in 2021–22 were lost to corruption rests on a specific assumption: that if Venezuela’s state-owned oil company did not receive direct payment for its exports, the money must have been stolen. That interpretation misses one important fact. During this period, Venezuela was highly sanctioned, could not access bank accounts, and was paying for many of its imports directly with oil. That PDVSA did not directly receive cash payment on billions of dollars in receivables is not evidence of corruption; it is evidence of barter.

The mother of all kleptocracies

The claim that $11 billion were stolen is staggering because it would represent by far the largest corruption scandal ever uncovered. To take one example: the largest ever kleptocracy investigation, that for Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal, has been alleged to have diverted $4.5 billion over a seven-year period in a country whose GDP was approximately $270 billion a year. That works out to about 0.2 percent of Malaysian GDP over that period. Were the New York Times’ $11 billion figure correct, it would represent roughly 8 percent of Venezuela’s GDP over the period — approximately 32 times the size of the Malaysian graft relative to its economy. And if you take into account that estimates suggest that every dollar of oil revenue generates about 4 dollars of non-oil activity, you would reach the conclusion that the costs of Maduro’s alleged corruption was around 40 percent of Venezuelan GDP — several orders of magnitude higher than the cost of corruption found in numerous quantitative cross-national studies (and that[s even without counting the money other people were stealing). This would make Venezuela by far the mother of all kleptocracies.

The Times’ $11 billion number, if true, has major implications for the debates about Venezuela. For a long time, proponents of maximum pressure sanctions have argued that we shouldn’t worry about their detrimental effect on the country’s economy because the real cause of Venezuela’s collapse is corruption. That argument has always been strongly flawed: there’s no reason why corruption, mismanagement, poor policies and sanctions can’t all have contributed to the collapse. That said, if it were true that half of Venezuela’s oil income was being brazenly stolen, then the idea that external constraints are at most a secondary cause of Venezuela’s economic malaise acquires a greater ring of truth.

Reality check

Yet the story that Maduro’s henchmen stole $11 billion has a deep problem. If that money had really vanished, then Venezuela would not have been able to pay for the goods that it imported in those years.

In 2021 and 2022, Venezuela sold $26 billion in oil shipments, or an average of $13 billion a year. In addition, it generated another $11 billion in non-oil exports, of which a large part is mining, and received around $7 billion in remittances. That means the country received total foreign currency inflows of $44 billion in those two years. Now here’s the rub. We also know that the country was paying around $44 billion in imports of goods, services, and income payments to the rest of the world over the same two years. In fact, for 2021 and 2022 combined, the country’s foreign currency revenues exceeded its spending by just $0.04 billion. This difference, also known as the current account balance, was essentially zero. It means the country was spending as much money as was coming in, which makes sense for a country that had no assets to run down and no one to lend it money.

In sum in 2021–22, Venezuela was living paycheck to paycheck. And when you’re doing that, it’s very hard for half of your paychecks to go missing without you and everyone around you noticing.

Table 1: Venezuela Current Account Statistics, 2021–2022

Source: Own construction using balance of payments data from Venezuelan Central Bank.

Now you might say: wait a minute, if the money was stolen, then maybe it didn’t come in at all, and instead of those $44 billion we would have had $55 billion in foreign currency earnings. Except that the New York Times story tells us that the oil was sold and invoiced, and that PDVSA never directly received payment for it. But if that’s true, then we know they must have been registered as exports. That’s how balance of payments statistics are built: you count an export when it is sold and invoiced, not when it is paid for.

But what if the Central Bank is lying? What if it’s just claiming that Venezuela sold $26 billion in oil to hide evidence of the corruption? Or what if it’s inflating import numbers with the same purpose?

Certainly, that would not be beyond them. And, in fact, we know there are circumstances under which over-invoicing of imports distorts balance of payments statistics. But that tends to happen in different conditions — for example, when there are exchange controls and people claim to be importing more than they really are.

To check this, I put together data reported by Venezuela’s 31 most important trading partners. Scaling up to the economy’s total trade, I estimate total goods imports of $23 billion for 2021–22, quite close to the Central Bank’s $24 billion.[1] I also looked at estimates of exports from physical oil shipments constructed by independent agencies.[2] Again, the numbers match up with what the Central Bank is telling us.

Francisco R. Rodríguez is a senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (cepr.net) in Washington, DC and a professor and fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies.

[1] The calculation assumes that the share of trade with these partners remained stable between 2012 and 2021.

[2] Average oil exports from Venezuela in 2021 and 2022 were 627,000 and 616,500 barrels per day, respectively, according to data from Reuters and Refinitiv Eikon. Using these export volumes, the BCV’s implied sales price for Venezuelan oil would be $47.0 and $68.1 per barrel in 2021 and 2022, respectively, implying a discount of 10 percent on average relative to OPEC’s Merey price for those years. This is consistent with evidence that Venezuela sold some of its oil at a lower price than that of the market reference reported to OPEC (see, e.g., this story based on internal PDVSA reports and this New York indictment in a corruption case with direct numbers reflecting discounts on PDVSA sales). For Venezuela to have had a sizable current account surplus, the BCV would have to be understating its oil exports — but this would imply either substantially higher export volumes than those calculated by Reuters/Refinitiv Eikon based on tanker loading data, or that Venezuela was selling its oil at a substantially higher price. Both appear highly implausible.

IPS UN Bureau

 
CIVICUS discusses the persecution of Uyghurs and activism in exile with Rushan Abbas, an Uyghur American activist, founder and executive director of Campaign for Uyghurs and chair of the Executive Committee of the World Uyghur Congress.

Rushan Abbas

Why did you leave Xinjiang?

I was born in Ürümchi, Xinjiang’s regional capital, during the Cultural Revolution. I started my activism as a student at Xinjiang University, where I co-organised pro-democracy protests in 1985 and 1988. In 1985, we mobilised over 20,000 students from seven universities, institutes and technical schools across the city. We demanded equality and an end to the forced sterilisation of Uyghur women and to nuclear testing in the region.

Those years brought a brief period of openness, but retaliation against the organisers came quickly. I was interrogated and, although I graduated with the highest academic honours, my job offer was withdrawn. All my prospects were denied. So in 1989, I left for the USA to pursue higher education and look for freedom and democracy.

Has danger followed you into exile?

It has, and it hit my family directly. In the early 1990s, as soon as I started working with US politicians, my father, a high-level academic in Ürümchi, lost his job at 59 in retaliation for my advocacy. In 2018, just days after I spoke publicly at the Hudson Institute, a Washington DC think tank, about the mass detentions, Chinese authorities abducted my sister Gulshan Abbas. She’s a retired physician, a mother of two and a grandmother of four, and she had never been political.

In December 2019, Chinese state media outlet CGTN denied my sister existed and accused me of making up cases and spreading rumours overseas. In December 2020, the authorities finally acknowledged Gulshan had been secretly sentenced to 20 years in prison, obviously on fabricated charges. Her case is one of the clearest examples of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses kin punishment and transnational repression to silence Uyghurs. My sister turned 64 this June. She’s still in a Chinese prison because I exercised my freedom of speech. We have no picture or video of her. No one has been able to visit her and we have received no independent report on her health or wellbeing.

I quit my job after Gulshan’s detention to campaign full time for her freedom and for the Uyghurs suffering what’s effectively an ongoing genocide. Transnational repression has followed me ever since, in the form of cyberattacks, defamation, fabricated court documents, harassment and intimidation. A video appeared on YouTube calling for my execution and that of my husband, Abdulhakim Idris. I have received emails asking what colour rifle I would prefer to be shot with. After I published my memoir, fake books claiming to tell my life story appeared on Amazon. My organisation, Campaign for Uyghurs, has experienced persistent cyberattacks. My case is not unique. Uyghurs in the diaspora and those who speak out continue to suffer transnational repression.

Why does the Chinese government target Uyghurs?

The Chinese government targets us because of our distinct ethnic identity and heritage and because we are the owners of the land we inherited from our ancestors. Our Muslim faith and our culture and language stand in the way of Beijing’s absolute control. Our faith in God, rather than the CCP, as the ultimate authority threatens the regime. This fear drives the regime to try to erase our culture and beliefs.

Economic interests are also at stake. The Uyghur region is rich in natural resources, including coal, natural gas, petroleum, rare earths and critical minerals such as uranium. It accounts for 20 per cent of the world’s cotton, 35 per cent of its solar-grade polysilicon, used in solar panels, 10 per cent of its aluminium and PVC production and 70 per cent of China’s tomato production.

Geography matters too. The region connects China with Central Asia and the Middle East and is a gateway to Africa and Europe, including the Balkans. Once the heart of the ancient Silk Road, it now hosts four of the six major Belt and Road Initiative land routes, part of China’s global infrastructure programme. This makes it key to China’s economic and geopolitical ambitions. The result has been ever-tighter control and securitisation, which has escalated into full-fledged genocide.

What does this persecution look like?

The CCP imposes forced labour, mass arbitrary detention and imprisonment, mass surveillance and restrictions on cultural and religious life. In 2025, there were 3.36 million forced labour transfers and over a million children were placed in state-run boarding schools, where they are raised cut off from their cultural heritage. The Uyghur language is banned in schools. Uyghur books and religious texts have been burned. Uyghur women are subjected to forced abortion, sterilisation and marriage to men from the dominant Han ethnic group.

China’s government claims these policies bring stability, but stability for who? This is a system where the government exercises unchecked power to detain, punish, silence and watch people for their beliefs, their identity and their demands for human dignity.

How is Campaign for Uyghurs pushing for accountability?

We document abuses, bring evidence to policymakers and international institutions and support Uyghur-led advocacy. Central to our work is equipping Uyghur women and young people in the diaspora with the knowledge and practical skills to lead advocacy efforts. We have run around 20 advocacy workshops worldwide, and we are proud to see a new generation of young Uyghur activists taking the lead.

We also work with civil society groups, interfaith organisations, think tanks and universities to turn evidence into tangible policy action. Our campaigns have contributed to US laws, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, and our coalition-building has helped put the Uyghur crisis on the political agenda.

With investigative partners, we exposed Volkswagen’s sham audit and its attempts to conceal links to state-imposed forced labour. We worked with The New York Times to reveal that cotton from the Uyghur region was used to make the viral Labubu dolls manufactured by Pop Mart. This work connects evidence from the ground with public scrutiny and action.

Why has there been so little international action since the UN’s landmark 2022 report?

China has enormous economic and political leverage. Many governments and companies are reluctant to jeopardise diplomatic, trade and investment ties, or have simply been pressured into silence. Such is China’s influence that the UN refused to debate human rights abuses in the Uyghur region.

There is also an often underestimated propaganda problem. China has spent years building a global media apparatus. It uses state broadcasters, partnerships with foreign media outlets, sponsored trips for journalists and influencers and coordinated messaging to drown out credible research and human rights reporting. China does not necessarily need the world to believe its propaganda. Creating doubt and making people hesitate to act can be enough.

Time is another obstacle. Every day without meaningful consequences normalises abuses, and a human rights crisis becomes the accepted status quo.

What should governments and the UN do?

Lawmakers should pass legislation to address transnational repression, ban products made with state-imposed forced labour and provide stronger protection for Uyghurs seeking refuge.

Governments should use existing sanctions tools, including the Global Magnitsky Act, which allows sanctions on individual human rights abusers, to hold officials responsible for the genocide accountable.

Governments should also refuse to extradite Uyghurs to China. No one should be sent back to a country where they may face genocide.

Governments and international institutions must keep individual cases and the broader human rights crisis on the agenda. They should keep existing official genocide determinations in place and secure the release of political prisoners such as my sister. Human rights should never be treated as secondary to broader relations with Beijing.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Transnational repression: a world without refuge CIVICUS Lens 03.Sep.2026
China: ‘The Ethnic Unity Law means there is one acceptable way to be Chinese’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Gulchehra Hoja 30.Jul.2026
Transnational repression: ‘China feels emboldened to globalise its political red lines’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Barbora Bukovská 19.May.2026

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021, Zahra Nader was pursuing a doctorate in Women and Gender studies at York University in Canada. Nader had planned to return to Afghanistan to continue her research, possibly teach at Kabul University, and continue exploring Afghan women’s role in political history.

Zahra Nader, Editor-in-Chief, Zan Times

Seeing the freedoms and opportunities that women had enjoyed being stripped away, Nader could not help but do something. A journalist with experience in Afghan newsrooms as well as with The New York Times in Kabul, she knew how dangerous life could be for women journalists under Taliban control.

“I knew who the Taliban are, what they will do if they took over. So I had no illusion about Taliban 2.0 and how the Taliban has changed. We knew they have not changed. And so we started Zan Times,” says Nader. Set up in 2022, Zan Times, is a news agency run by women who investigate human rights abuses under the Taliban government. Operating out of exile, the news agency works in collaboration with journalists operating within Afghanistan, most of them working under pseudonyms to remain anonymous.

“I was here in Canada, safe, my rights are protected, but the rights that I grew up with, the opportunities that I had in Afghanistan, going to school, going to university, are now being denied to millions of women,” Nader says.

According to this report by the United Nations, five years since the Taliban have seized power, women and girls in Afghanistan have been systematically stripped of their rights. De facto authorities have issued more than 100 decrees curbing “education, including one that’s left 2.4 milion girls excluded from secondary education, work and freedom of movement – restrictions now compounded by deep cuts to aid on the ground”. The report states that the unprecedented restrictions have triggered a mental health crisis.

“The results are devastating,” the agency added, stressing that shorter life expectancy, higher risks of maternal death, child marriage and gender-based violence alongside the loss of education, work and freedom of movement have also triggered a mental health crisis.”The systemic erasure of women from public life, including their exclusion from higher education and employment, also removes the visible role models that show what is possible and narrows what Afghan women and girls can imagine for their own futures, this report adds.

For Nader, these are examples of efforts to strip women of their presence in the world around them. Nader refutes the assumption that it is the Afghan culture itself that stops women from getting involved in public affairs and activities. She mentions her personal experience of how she was encouraged by her family to get educated and work as a journalist. “What I really want the world to know about us is that our culture does not prevent Afghan women from joining public life and social activities.” The marginalization of women is not an inevitable or predestined cultural process; it is something that is being imposed on them through specific policies.

One of the groups most visible to suffer from these measures has been women journalists. “Since taking over Afghanistan five years ago, the Taliban have made Afghanistan one of the world’s hardest places for journalists to report,” says this statement by the Committee to protect Journalists. “Women in the media face particularly severe and escalating discrimination. Taliban authorities have banned women’s voices from radio and TV in Helmand, prevented them from attending press conferences, and mandated that they cover their faces when appearing on TV.”

Limitations imposed on women’s dress code and activities have diminished the opportunities for women journalists to perform their duties even more. Taliban’s 2024 Law on the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice includes additional limitations regarding the voice of Afghan women in public space.

Women journalists also encounter limitations on freedom of movement by having to travel with a male guardian in most places. Investigating topics like the education of girls and the wellbeing of women exposes journalists to intimidation and questioning.

Insecurity of income is another problem that women journalists face. Nader argues that women journalists have claimed being offered unpaid jobs, exclusion from staff positions since their presence would make them vulnerable to questioning by Taliban officials, and sexual abuse in job hunting.

Journalists who opt to continue working under such conditions also expose themselves to danger. In the case of Zan Times, journalists working in Afghanistan do so clandestinely, using pseudonyms.

Despite all the restrictions, Afghan women keep finding ways of resisting their marginalization.

Women teachers turn their own homes, bedrooms, and even basements into informal schools, where girls could still get education. Other women organize online classes and educational programs, but the lack of Internet connection and funds is preventing many people from participating.

Women also create private literary clubs, exchange books, and attend meetings of poets. These places enable them to communicate, share knowledge, and stay in touch despite the prohibition of public gatherings.

Nader considers such actions to be strong examples of women’s resistance. The work of women journalists who document cases of violation belongs to this form of struggle since through their activity, Afghan women manage to keep their stories visible in public sphere.Their work is especially important because not only they observe the restrictions imposed on women, but they experience them too.

Nader appeals for increased efforts from the international community in protecting Afghan refugees from any kind of forced return.

Moreover, there should be support for Afghan women, particularly in matters such as education and resettlement. There should also be increased protection for journalists under threat. Accountability is equally significant. Through international legal proceedings, there is a possibility of those who perpetrate persecution being taken to book in the future.

At the end of the day, the situation in Afghanistan, along with that of women’s rights and of press freedom, is that of peace. In order to have peace, you need to have half the country educated and involved into public life. You need to have the other half able to earn money on its own without being afraid of demanding anything. Even if the Taliban managed to establish control over Afghanistan, this is not the same thing as peace.

Afghanistan has been unable to give its women peace because its system relies on their complete isolation from the process of development of the country, their participation, dignity and freedom. Without the establishment of justice and rights for all the citizens, there is no peace. The Afghan women who are still fighting and educating, organising and reporting under extremely tough conditions prove that peace should not be confused as absence of war.

To Nader, the crisis in Afghanistan is an indicator of the vulnerability of women’s rights throughout the world.

“Failure to hear from Afghanistan does not mean that all is well and peaceful. Failure to hear from Afghanistan means that we don’t know what is happening,” Nader says.

Sania Farooqui is an independent journalist and host of The Peace Brief, a platform dedicated to amplifying the voices of women in peacebuilding and human rights.

IPS UN Bureau

Kenia Inés Hernández Montalván. Credit: @CDHVitoria

By Clare Quirk
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Oct 15 2026 (IPS)

Kenia Hernández is an Indigenous Mexican lawyer and human rights defender dedicated to advancing women’s rights and social justice.

Arrested in October 2020, she has faced multiple criminal proceedings that human rights organisations, including CIVICUS, have denounced as politically motivated and linked to the criminalisation of her activism. This piece is the second in our series on the campaign that advocates for the immediate release of unjustly imprisoned or persecuted human rights defenders globally.

Additional reference: Five years of resistance: The case of Kenia Hernández and the battle against the fabrication of crimes 

Additional research and reporting: Cecilia Russell
Note: This feature is published with the support of CIVICUS: Stand As My Witness Campaign.
IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

IPS UN Bureau Report

UN Secretary-General António Guterres opens the general debate of the General Assembly’s 81st session on 22 September 2026. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Oct 14 2026 (IPS)

At this year’s highest-profile UN event, Donald Trump publicly mused over his ‘big decision’ about whether to ‘annihilate’ Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as dozens of delegates walked out, branded those who condemn genocide in Gaza ‘moral cowards’.

The UN was established in the devastating aftermath of the Second World War with the explicit aim to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. Its charter commits all UN members to settling disputes peacefully. Yet at the UN General Assembly’s annual high-level session, held in September, several national leaders used a podium meant for peace and international cooperation to justify and threaten violence.

The bellicose tone of many speeches signalled a broader crisis of multilateralism. Autocrats are throwing their weight around, determined to prove that might makes right, or, as Trump put it when boasting of US control of Venezuelan oil, ‘to the victor belong the spoils’. Such leaders care little for international laws, norms, institutions and processes.

Powerful states are withdrawing from institutions, defunding them, refusing to cooperate and forming rival, more selective and less formal groupings. Nakedly transactional deal-making is replacing collective action, fragmenting the multilateral system. As a rules-based order gives way to something more chaotic, civil society’s opportunities to engage are withering. All this is happening as huge transnational problems mount up, including the climate crisis, economic inequality, impunity for conflict atrocities and the repression of civic space.

The race to succeed Guterres

Against this backdrop, someone new will take the helm. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s second term expires at the end of the year, and states are now choosing his successor.

Civil society is calling for a feminist woman leader who puts human rights first. Yet human rights feature little in the debate. A former UN human rights chief, Michelle Bachelet, has pulled out because straw polls among the 15 Security Council members, a key stage of the process, showed she lacked support.

In each poll, states can ‘encourage’ or ‘discourage’ a candidacy, or express ‘no opinion’. So far, five rounds have proved inconclusive. Former Costa Rican Vice President Rebeca Grynspan has emerged as frontrunner, but the latest poll saw her receive six ‘discourage’ votes compared to three in the round before. No candidate commands overwhelming backing and it’s possible other candidates will come forward.

Civil society is trying to engage, but ultimately states don’t have to publicly justify their decisions. Because the Security Council is central to the process, the final say rests with its five permanent members, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA, any of which can veto a candidate they dislike. Opaque negotiations are therefore likely to produce a compromise candidate that China, Russia and the USA find sufficiently inoffensive.

As the race heats up, there are signs candidates are avoiding speaking about issues that may be seen as contentious for fear of losing support. States that back particular candidates may decide not to ask difficult questions that could cost them votes. As a result, important matters such as Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the rights of excluded groups are being sidelined. Anyone who sees themselves as a world leader should be taking these issues on, but candidates’ refusal to do so shows how firmly powerful states are calling the shots.

One candidate, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, has been the target of a Wall Street Journal hit piece over comments condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide, made in her role as Guyana’s ambassador to the UN. The intent is clearly to encourage the USA to block her.

Civil society expects a global voice of conscience, someone prepared to go further than serving states and willing to speak up on the issues candidates are now avoiding. History shows that, even in difficult times, the personality and leadership style of the secretary-general can make a difference. Whoever prevails will have to steer the UN through crisis and rebuild respect for the institution and the broader promise of multilateralism, and that means putting human rights first.

Access needed

When they next meet, national leaders will have the opportunity to shape the future of development. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the set of 17 interconnected goals agreed by every UN member state in 2015, expire in 2030. Next year’s SDG Summit will consider what should come next.

In these difficult times, civil society faces the challenge of asserting a progressive vision and pushing for goals that make a real difference. But civil society remains excluded. It was once again forced to the sidelines for this high-level session. The passes of organisations that have cleared accreditation hurdles and normally have access to UN headquarters are suspended at these annual meetings. This speaks of a broader exclusion. The UN has failed to advance even modest proposals to recognise civil society’s role, such as instituting a UN civil society day or appointing an envoy to coordinate civil society engagement.

Meanwhile, the UN’s funding crisis is further impacting on civil society’s participation. The USA is the chief culprit, owing around US$4.2 billion in contributions. The USA and other powerful states are defunding and sidelining the UN’s human rights functions, which civil society most engages with. The result is job cuts, curtailed mandates and fewer opportunities for civil society participation.

The arrival of a new secretary-general and the debate on new development goals bring not just challenges but also opportunities. To seize them, civil society will need to build stronger coalitions and collaborate more closely than ever. It must engage constructively with the next secretary-general while raising expectations, putting stronger access and partnerships on the table.

A state-centric UN will fail. A UN that hopes to make a difference on big problems, rebuild respect for human rights and win an increasingly contested argument for the value of multilateralism can’t keep excluding civil society. The next secretary-general must champion an open and accountable UN that recognises civil society as an essential partner.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Medicine is supposed to protect human life and dignity. Yet testimonies from Ukrainians released from Russian captivity reveal a disturbing reality: medical personnel in places of detention have not only denied prisoners necessary treatment but, in documented cases, participated in torture and ill-treatment.

Anna Trushova

The research draws on testimonies from 16 people released from Russian captivity, including former detainees and medical professionals. Their accounts describe the denial of medical assistance, the neglect of serious injuries and illnesses, degrading treatment, and the concealment of evidence of violence. Some testimonies describe medical personnel directly participating in acts of torture.

One of the most troubling findings is the consistency of these accounts. Previous reports have documented abuses by medical staff, but this research systematically examines testimonies alongside the legal and regulatory framework governing medical professionals in Russia. Its findings suggest that the violations cannot be dismissed as isolated misconduct.

Russian medical personnel are bound not only by international humanitarian law and professional medical ethics but also by domestic rules that require them to provide care and to refrain from causing harm. The documented abuses, therefore, raise questions about violations of both international obligations and Russia’s own legal standards.

The consequences extend far beyond the detention facilities. People returning from captivity often require prolonged medical treatment and rehabilitation. Their families, meanwhile, must cope with the lasting effects of imprisonment, serious illness, and loss.

Sofia Krokhmaliuk, whose father, Oleksandr Krokhmaliuk, headed the Azov brigade’s medical service and died in captivity, described the pain of receiving his body back in Ukraine. She said the condition of his remains indicated that he had not died of natural causes.

Another family has spoken about the consequences that can persist after release. Ukrainian serviceman Oleksandr Savov spent more than 1,000 days in Russian captivity and returned home on March 19, 2025. He died of heart failure on November 16 that year, aged 46. His daughter, Anastasiia Savova, has emphasized that release does not mean the end of a crime: its consequences can last for the rest of a person’s life.

These stories demonstrate why the right to medical care in captivity cannot be treated as a secondary humanitarian concern. For people held in conditions where they have little or no access to independent assistance, medical care may be essential to their survival. Its deliberate denial can itself become a form of cruel treatment.

The Center for Civil Liberties’ research adds another dimension by examining the role of medical personnel within this system. It also reinforces the need to document individual responsibility and preserve evidence for future investigations and prosecutions.

Accountability is possible, even when it takes years. Thorough documentation can help identify those responsible, establish patterns of abuse, and provide evidence for national and international legal proceedings. Impunity, by contrast, creates conditions in which violations can continue.

That is why more than 90 Ukrainian organizations and institutions have appealed to the World Health Organization (WHO), urging it to respond to the systematic denial of medical care and the documented involvement of medical personnel in torture and ill-treatment.

The appeal calls for stronger international monitoring of detention facilities, including through cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations mechanisms, and independent medical organizations. It also urges support for documenting abuses, identifying those responsible, and securing medical evacuation for severely wounded and seriously ill prisoners of war and unlawfully detained civilians.

The WHO cannot replace international investigators or courts. But its professional authority and international reach can help bring these violations to the attention of the global medical community and strengthen calls for independent access, accountability, and protection.

The immediate priority must be to help those still held in captivity receive the medical care they need. At the same time, the international community must ensure that allegations of medical personnel participating in torture are investigated rather than ignored.

Medicine must never become an instrument of repression. When those entrusted with protecting life become involved in abuse, the response must extend beyond professional condemnation. It must include independent monitoring, effective pressure, evidence preservation, and accountability.

For Ukrainians who remain in Russian captivity, these measures are not abstract questions of ethics or international law. They may determine whether they receive treatment, whether their suffering is documented, and whether they live to return home.

Anna Trushova is human rights defender and communications manager at the Center for Civil Liberties

IPS UN Bureau

The awarding of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize to distinguished South African jurist and international judge Navanethem “Navi” Pillay is about more than just the recognition of an exceptional individual in the global fight for justice.

Navi Pillay-Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

Pillay’s recognition affirms the conviction that international law, however imperfectly applied, remains indispensable to a peaceful world.

Making history

It is a proud moment for South Africa. She becomes the fifth South African to receive this honour, following resistance leader Chief Albert Luthuli in 1960, religious leader and activist Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1984, and former presidents Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk in 1993.

She is the first South African woman to receive the peace award. Her prize is a further break with its historical tendency to mostly honour “highly educated white men from Europe and the US”.

Similar to her South African predecessors, the struggle against apartheid and white minority rule features as a crucial element of her contribution. However, there is an important difference. While Mandela became a global symbol of reconciliation, Pillay took the lessons of South Africa’s struggle into the international arena. There she became leader and institution builder in her own right.

She had the daunting task of being one of the very first international judges responsible for forging into being international institutions intended to ensure that those responsible for the gravest human rights violations are held accountable.

She was on the first bench of judges of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by the United Nations (UN) following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) from 2003 to 2008.

Her personality and drive endowed these fledgling institutions with gravitas and legitimacy. Through her pioneering contributions, she has come to personify the global quest for accountability.

The Navi Pillay I know

As a scholar of international human rights law, I first met Pillay when she was president of the Rwanda tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. She struck me then, and over time continued to impress me, as someone remarkably approachable. Humble, unassuming and generous with her time, she is also often described as courageous, principled, and unwavering.

I smiled when, in her characteristically down-to-earth reply to the Nobel committee praising her courage, she insisted she was merely applying her independent legal mind to the stark principles of justice.

When I first met her, I was with a group of human rights students from the University of Pretoria visiting Tanzania to observe proceedings. Judge Pillay’s demanding schedule prevented her from spending much time with us during the day. Yet she offered to meet us at her hotel that evening. To our surprise, she arrived driving herself, without a chauffeur or an entourage. She spent many hours answering questions and discussing the work of the tribunal.

Similar encounters continued over subsequent years. To me, these moments revealed her understanding of human rights institutions not as remote structures, but as belonging to people. This included young Africans who she hoped would one day help shape their future.

From apartheid to global justice

Pillay’s story is held together by a central belief, whether in response to apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda or the occupation of Palestinian territory: that law can restrain abusive power, protect victims and hold the powerful to account. She simply applied it on a bigger stage each time.

Born in 1941 in Durban, to a family of Indian Tamil origin, Pillay experienced racial and gender discrimination first-hand. Despite this, she built a legal career. In 1967 she became the first woman of colour to establish a legal practice in her province.

Like many lawyers opposed to apartheid, she sought to use the very legal system that sustained injustice to challenge its abuses. She represented political activists, exposed torture and challenged the treatment of political prisoners.

She was also involved in the Women’s National Coalition, which helped shape the equality provisions of South Africa’s democratic constitution. These prohibit discrimination on grounds including race, sex and sexual orientation. After apartheid ended, Mandela in 1995 appointed her as a High Court judge.

Rape as a crime against humanity

Later that year she took up office in Tanzania, where one of her most enduring global contributions came in the Rwanda tribunal’s landmark 1998 judgement.

During the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, accused of the slaughter of thousands, Pillay and another judge questioned witnesses about sexual violence. They helped bring these experiences into the open and contributed to the amendment of the indictment to include rape.

The result was a judgment that recognised rape as a crime against humanity. It established that rape and sexual violence could also constitute acts of genocide.

The decision constituted the first conviction for genocide by an international criminal tribunal and the first conviction of an individual for rape as a crime against humanity by such a tribunal. This opened the way for greater accountability for crimes committed disproportionately against women and girls.

As Pillay put it:

From time immemorial, rape has been regarded as spoils of war. Now it will be considered a war crime.

Human rights within the UN

From 2008 to 2014, Pillay served as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the first woman from the global south to hold this position.

It required a different form of leadership. Rather than deciding cases as a judge, she had to engage governments, confront violations and persuade states to honour their international obligations. During her tenure, she managed to steer the UN’s human rights work through turbulent times, including the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, and civil war in Syria. Her voice was a steadfast pillar of clarity: human rights could not be sacrificed to economic expediency, national sovereignty or political convenience.

Her tenure coincided with significant advances within the UN. She was a consistent advocate for the rights of equality based on sexual orientation and gender identity, anti-discrimination laws, and proper recording of hate crimes.

In 2001, her home city, Durban, hosted the UN’s World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. The Durban Declaration set an international agenda against racism and xenophobia. It also acknowledged slavery as a crime against humanity.

Although she had no official role in the 2001 conference, as UN high commissioner she was closely involved in the subsequent review process. She defended the declaration against misrepresentation. She emphasised its condemnation of antisemitism, remembrance of the Holocaust and recognition of Israel’s right to security.

Despite boycotts by several western states, including the US, she helped steer the 2009 Durban Review Conference towards a consensus reaffirming the declaration, supported by 182 states. Her role exemplified her determination to overcome division and backlash without compromising fundamental human rights principles.

Pillay’s term was also characterised by a distinctive contribution to women’s rights by championing the recognition of preventable maternal deaths as a human rights issue, rather than merely a public health concern. Under her leadership, the UN Human Rights Office developed groundbreaking guidance in 2012 requiring governments to address discrimination, maternal healthcare and accountability for avoidable deaths.

Palestine and genocide

More recently, she took up her last official UN duty as chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel. The commission’s investigations and findings, including on the war in Gaza, have generated considerable controversy and strong criticism, particularly from Israel and the US.

Her dedication to this task illustrates an essential feature of her work: the application of legal principles becomes most difficult, and most necessary, when politically powerful actors reject scrutiny.

A time when hope is needed

The timing of this award is therefore particularly telling. It comes as, only days earlier, US president Donald Trump had called the ICC “evil” and urged all its members to resign. Responding to the prize, the US imposed sanctions on the ICC.

By honouring a former ICC judge, the Nobel committee chose to defend the very institutions that are now “under attack”, with their judges “sanctioned”.

The award also comes amid Israel’s growing international isolation. Pillay and her team concluded in 2025 that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.

The commission’s findings do not constitute a binding judicial determination. But they do represent a significant contribution to documenting alleged atrocities and advancing the pursuit of accountability, despite intense political opposition.

Even as Pillay recently celebrated her 85th birthday, she may soon have another word on genocide. Since 2019, she has been sitting as an ad hoc judge at the International Court of Justice in the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar concerning alleged genocide against the Rohingya. Following a public hearing in January 2026, a judgment in this case is expected later this year, or in early 2027.

Her Nobel Prize does not suggest that international justice has triumphed. But it reminds us that the structures built to advance it remain worth defending. Recognising Pillay is an affirmation of what has been achieved, but also about what must not be lost.

Frans Viljoen – Professor of International Human Rights Law, SARChI Chair in International Constitutional Law, University of Pretoria

This story was originally published by The Conversation.

IPS UN Bureau

Credit: Tosin Olowoleni

By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko
YOLA, Nigeria, Oct 7 2026 (IPS)

Following the mass abduction of 46 pupils and teachers in Oyo State, south-west Nigeria in 2026, the authorities attributed the attack to the Ansaru terrorist group. Key suspects were prosecuted and handed prison terms. But this was not the first time terrorist groups had engaged in mass abduction of school pupils in Nigeria. Peace and security researcher Saheed Babajide Owonikoko explains what factors could have motivated the Ansaru terror group to stage that attack and what lessons Nigeria should take away from the incident, which lasted 56 days.

What can Nigeria learn from the mass kidnap of school children in Oyo State?

The lessons can be deduced from the differences between the incident and others that have taken place in Nigeria.

The first striking difference is that northern Nigeria was previously the centre of kidnapping incidents in Nigeria. As of 1 June 2026, there had been 31 mass school kidnapping incidents involving over 2,530 people in Nigeria since the 2014 Chibok incidents.

Terrorists had struck before in south-western Nigeria. Also, criminal kidnappings on the highway had taken place, but not a mass school kidnapping. The Oyo State school kidnapping is the first in the southern parts of Nigeria. The lesson is that terrorism is expanding beyond the traditional areas known for activities of terrorist groups.

Another difference is that the victims included children as young as two years. Most previous Nigerian mass school abductions targeted older students.

The third is that it involved multiple schools. My contact in Ogbomosho said three schools were attacked.

This suggests the vulnerability of civilian populations and institutions in areas previously regarded as less exposed to terrorist kidnapping. The targeting of particular groups, especially schoolchildren and other populations whose abduction is likely to generate public pressure, also provides terrorists with a strategic advantage. Such attacks will be easy to execute by the group and can trigger public outrage, protests and demands for government action. They could put pressure on authorities to negotiate or make concessions.

Victims have now been “released” or “rescued”, most probably without concession to any of their demands, and some people linked to the incidents have been put on trial. But the ease with which the group carried out the attack exposes the vulnerability of the south-west and other non-traditional theatres of terrorist kidnapping to sudden attacks, particularly where security presence and response capacity remain limited.

Concentrating security in volatile areas may not be the solution, as terrorist groups will always take advantage of vulnerable areas.

What factors motivated this kidnap?

Criminal bandits and terrorists are responsible for most of the high-profile kidnapping incidents in Nigeria. However, while bandits kidnap mostly for money, terrorists mostly kidnap for more strategic reasons.

The 15 May 2026 armed attack against schools in Oriire Local Government of Oyo State, leading to the abduction of over 40 people, most of whom were pupils and teachers, was carried out by The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, popularly known as Ansaru. Since its breakaway from Boko Haram in 2013, Ansaru has acquired the trademark of being involved in high-profile kidnapping and hostage-taking, sometimes with the support of bandits.

Ansaru’s involvement in the Oyo State kidnapping was confirmed by the group’s demands. The group listed its demands as follows:

• • 1 billion naira to be paid to one account in the Benin Republic

• • the Oyo state government should release their members from prison

• • Toyota Hiluxes

• concession of some Oyo state laws in favour of the bandits (land and sharia law).

The second item is particularly informative. In August 2025, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s national security adviser, announced the arrest of two key Ansaru leaders – Mahmud Muhammad Usman, the amir (leader) and Mahmud al-Nigeri, the deputy and chief of staff.

They are currently standing trial on terrorism charges. For a long time, Ansaru remained silent due to the leadership vacuum left as a result. Their strategic importance made the group stage the Oyo kidnapping incidents.

In one of my previous articles, I warned that, given the importance of these two leaders, they might attempt to secure their release through a prison break or resort to a high-profile kidnapping or hostage-taking operation, either in retaliation for their detention or as leverage to demand their release.

What makes the south-west vulnerable to these kinds of attacks?

The choice of Oyo State and the kidnapping of pupils are also strategic. Oyo State is vulnerable because of its proximity to the North Central and North East through savannah woodlands, wildlife reserves and riparian vegetation.

Movement from North Central and North West to the south may also be caused by low security expectations and reduced military pressure there.

A reduction in expertise due to the arrest of Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri also affected Ansaru’s operational effectiveness in high-intensity security terrain, making the south more attractive.

Ansaru usually targets high-value civilians, including expatriates, well-to-do individuals and humanitarian workers. They kidnapped schoolchildren because of their vulnerability and also because it can spark public outrage that may force the government to give concessions.

Does this incident have any implications for the ongoing debate on state policing in Nigeria?

According to the government account, the rescue of the schoolchildren and their teachers was achieved through a prolonged, intelligence-led, multi-agency operation. Although the outcome shows state security institutions can mount a coordinated response, it raises questions about whether such resource-intensive operations can be sustained and replicated in similar incidents.

More fundamentally, the operation illustrates the reactive character of the response. Security agencies mobilised resources after the abduction rather than preventing the attack or detecting the threat earlier. This is where the debate over the state police is very important. One of the major problems with Nigeria’s security landscape is the centralisation of the security apparatus, leaving the federating units at the mercy of the federal government to deploy security forces.

To reduce the vulnerability of civilians everywhere in Nigeria, the police institution should be federalised. This will ensure that a minimum level of protection exists for everyone, wherever they live in Nigeria.

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko is Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

This story was originally published by The Conversation.

IPS UN Bureau

Social Democratic Party leader Magdalena Andersson speaks at the Social Democrats’ election night party in Stockholm on 13 September 2026. Credit: Jonas Ekstromer/TT News Agency/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Oct 5 2026 (IPS)

Four years ago, Sweden’s far right became the power behind a right-wing government. This time, it expected further gains and cabinet seats. But voters turned against it. In the 13 September general election, support for the far-right Sweden Democrats fell for the for the first time in the party’s history. Four days later, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson resigned, leaving the way clear for the centre-left Social Democrats to negotiate a coalition. But the Sweden Democrats’ defeat will prove hollow if the next government maintains the hostility towards migrants that has come to characterise Sweden’s politics.

The Sweden Democrats originated in the country’s violent neo-Nazi movement. Established parties long refused to cooperate, but the centre-right Moderate Party broke the firewall in 2019, when it announced it was willing to work with it. In the 2022 election, the Sweden Democrats came second with 20.5 per cent of the vote. The Moderate Party came third but was able to form a minority government. The Sweden Democrats didn’t receive cabinet seats, but entered into a formal agreement with the governing parties, which relied on its votes.

Having brought the Sweden Democrats into the political mainstream, Kristersson went further in April, when he said his aim was to form a majority government with the Sweden Democrats and promised them cabinet posts, potentially giving them control of immigration policies. The announcement made clear how central to Swedish politics the Sweden Democrats had become.

Hostility written into law

The Sweden Democrats framed its hostility towards migrants as a defence of the country’s envied living standards, underpinned by its extensive social welfare system. This time it promised to ‘make Sweden Sweden again’, in a campaign marked by instances of blatant Islamophobia.

Sweden saw a sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers and migrants in 2010, particularly from war-torn Syria. Political parties and media have repeatedly blamed migrants for crime and economic and social problems.

As the Sweden Democrats picked up electoral support, established parties adopted increasingly anti-migrant policies to try to see off the political threat. The same thing has happened in other European countries, with the same effect. Mainstream parties legitimised the anti-migrant agenda and brought the far-right challenger into the political mainstream, while voters tended to prefer the original to the copy. In Sweden, conditions for migrants have worsened under successive governments.

Restrictive policies preceded the 2022 government, but intensified under it. Ahead of the election, the government passed a new set of anti-migrant laws. These removed any route to permanent residency for people with asylum status, offering only temporary residency permits. They introduced a broadly defined ‘good behaviour’ clause that allows authorities to refuse residency permits for non-criminal offences and revoke permits already granted.

On top of this, what’s commonly called the ‘snitch law’ obliges some categories of public employees to report people they suspect of being undocumented migrants. This may deter migrants from using essential public services, such as healthcare, for fear of being reported. Because the law is broad and vague, it will also encourage self-censorship, as migrants may feel less able to take part in protests or speak out online. This effectively creates a two-tier system for civic freedoms and risks introducing a default racial profiling system. Troublingly, other EU countries are reportedly watching how Sweden’s hostile new laws play out, with a view to copying them.

A fragmented result

Crime and migration were campaign issues, but didn’t dominate the debate, as voters also focused heavily on the economy, education and healthcare. After many years at the top of the agenda, migration may be receding as a political issue, revealing the Sweden Democrats as having little else to offer. The party’s four four years of sustaining a government also made it harder to run an anti-establishment campaign, while a scandal linking a party official to Russia may also have cost it.

Results point to a further political fragmentation. The Social Democrats also lost seats, recording its lowest vote share in over a century, while smaller parties gained support, with the Green and Left parties particularly attracting young voters.

The two major political blocs are holding coalition negotiations. Neither faces an easy task. A four-party coalition led by the Social Democrats would command 176 seats, just above the 175 needed for a majority, while a four-party coalition on the right would claim only 173. But significant policy differences mean agreement can’t be taken for granted. Determination to keep the Sweden Democrats out may galvanise the four into an agreement but may not be enough to sustain it in the long term.

Even if the Social Democrats prevail, a significant change of direction on migrants’ rights is unlikely. The party has expressed support for many recent anti-migrant policies. The political rhetoric may soften, but the situation could mirror that of neighbouring Denmark, where the Social Democrats, having long adopted anti-migrant policies, retained power in the March election despite having its worst result in over 120 years.

A chance to change course

Progressive voices urgently need to start making a more positive case that tells human stories and asserts the human rights of migrants, and that builds understanding of the causes of migration and appreciation of the benefits migrants can bring, from the public service jobs Sweden’s social welfare service relies on to the economic contributions migrants make.

Sweden’s civil society must be heard. Civil society organisations are providing practical help to migrants and going to the courts and European bodies to challenge the worst impacts of regressive laws. They know what’s needed to curb the hostility, make Swedish society fairer and restore the country’s hard-earned global reputation as a human rights champion.

The Sweden Democrats’ loss of support shows there’s nothing inevitable or unstoppable about the rise of the far right. If Sweden’s next government listens to civil society instead of continuing to imitate the far right, it has a chance to show Europe that it’s possible to roll back the far right’s agenda.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 
CIVICUS discusses life as a refugee with an exiled Sudanese civil society activist who has asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.

Over three years into Sudan’s war, millions of people have been displaced, both within the country and beyond its borders, and the numbers keep rising. Fighting continues to force civilians from their homes, while those who reach neighbouring countries struggle to find safety and stability. Civil society warns that, despite the scale of the suffering, Sudan’s crisis isn’t receiving the international attention it deserves. Exiles document violations and advocate for democracy and peace.

What drew you to human rights activism, and how has exile changed it?

The gender-based injustice women face in our societies drew me to human rights work. From childhood, I objected to the unequal treatment of girls and boys and the stereotypes that painted women as less capable. I rebelled against this system, seeking out books, stories and real-life experiences that showed women’s capabilities and potential.

Activism in exile, particularly during wartime, brings unending and unexpected risks and challenges. At times, it feels like you are fighting to survive. You carry the trauma of war and the guilt of being safe while your family and community remain in danger. Many human rights defenders lack the basic resources to survive.

In exile, I have moved from a radical stance to one focused on reform, having learned that dogmatism, hostility and refusal to listen can lead to violence and grave human rights violations. I have become more deliberate in my judgements, with a stronger desire to understand the other side.

How has Sudanese civil society adapted since the war began?

Sudanese civil society has shown remarkable resilience. People mobilised to confront the war and the collapse of state institutions. Within hours, young people and volunteers were helping the wounded, homes became field clinics and communities shared their resources.

As the war continued, many civil society organisations relocated abroad. One of the most remarkable aspects of the Sudanese experience has been the emergence of numerous additional human rights, humanitarian, women’s and youth organisations in host countries. They have maintained links with activists inside Sudan, monitored human rights and documented violations, provided humanitarian assistance, advocated for peace, promoted dialogue and countered hate speech.

Civil society’s work, inside Sudan and abroad, is one of the few sources of hope for peace in the country.

What barriers do Sudanese civil society activists and organisations face in exile?

Refugees face insecurity and a rising wave of xenophobia in host countries, and many feel unwelcome, or even blamed for seeking safety in a country where they are made to feel they don’t belong. Many also face movement restrictions, difficulties renewing residency documents and the constant risk of deportation.

On top of this, activists carry the added burden of propaganda that portrays them as fugitives or foreign agents. We must confront the abuses we document while also countering division, hatred, intolerance and racism.

Civil society organisations abroad also face economic, legal and security restrictions. Many struggle to register legally, open bank accounts, access funding or obtain permits.

Compounding all this are the limited international support and the sense that global decision-makers, and even international human rights organisations, don’t prioritise our concerns. This can leave you feeling that you simply don’t matter.

What needs to change to stop displacement silencing activists and refugees in general?

The global system often seems designed to protect the strong while weakening the vulnerable. In Africa and across the global south, we seek to change this, yet we remain constrained by the structures and assumptions of the system. We need to see difference as a source of diversity rather than division, share responsibility for resources and security, and protect everyone’s rights to life, development, dignity and freedom.

As a Sudanese refugee and human rights defender, I strongly support the Borderless Africa campaign, led by the pan-African civil society movement Africans Rising, which calls for visa-free travel and a single continental passport across Africa. It reflects the need to move beyond borders and put humanity and fundamental rights first.

It’s shocking to be forced into silence about crimes you have witnessed simply because you are a refugee. Governments, civil society and activists must dismantle the legal and logistical barriers that leave refugees unable to access basic rights.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

SEE ALSO
Sudan: ‘Crossing a border doesn’t automatically mean you’re safe’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Rawia Saad 09.Sep.2026
Sudan: blood on the hands of foreign powers CIVICUS Lens 04.Sep.2026
Sudan in crisis: mass killings continue while the world looks away CIVICUS Lens 23.Dec.2025

Mariam Daher preparing for her Tawjihi examinations in the temporary learning spaces in Gaza. Credit: Education Above All Foundation

By Hani Shehada
DOHA, Qatar, Oct 2 2026 (IPS)

In the 21st century, getting a pencil into Gaza became international news. In January, after more than two years of restrictions, UNICEF finally brought in learning kits with pencils and exercise books. Textbooks stayed out. By then, the UN had recorded damage to 97.5 per cent of Gaza’s schools.

If a pencil makes headlines, consider what a national examination demands: question papers printed for thousands of students, answer sheets scanned, halls furnished and staffed. In Gaza, education officials started by pulling damaged photocopiers from beneath the rubble, stripping their usable parts and rebuilding enough machines to keep the exam alive. It worked. More than 95,000 students have sat the Tawjihi, the national secondary school examination that decides who can compete for a university place.

This week, world leaders gathered at the UN General Assembly under the banner of “a United Nations that delivers for all“. The effort behind Gaza’s examination poses an uncomfortable question to that promise: when does celebrating a solution make it easier to tolerate the problem? Scholars writing from Gaza have warned that praising Palestinian resilience reassures outside observers and releases them from the duty to act.

At a school damaged by the war near Mashrou’ Amer in southwestern Gaza City, Education Above All Foundation and UNDP have established 10 temporary learning spaces. Credit: Education Above All Foundation

Israel classifies thousands of items as “dual-use“, spare parts among them, and bars or limits their entry. Technicians harvested parts from other machines. Repairing the printers and scanners took more than 90 days. The printers ran on old ink stocks, because new ink faced restrictions too. Until recently, paper itself could not enter Gaza.” and drop the fallback plan after it.

Exam halls also needed seats and desks. Little wood reaches Gaza. Carpenters build tables from scrap and shipping pallets, and families burn whatever they find to cook and keep warm. Staff repaired chairs and desks with timber from the pallets that carry aid. Every liter of fuel for an examination center required coordination. All of it happened under strikes that never fully stopped, which have killed more than 1,300 Palestinians in Gaza since the ceasefire took effect.

An examination also needs people. Every center needed invigilators while many education staff receive only a fraction of their salary. Before assigning anyone, the ministry first had to establish who was still alive. The war has killed more than 21,000 students and educational staff since October 2023.

A school teacher leads a lesson inside one of Gaza’s temporary learning spaces established by Education Above All Foundation and UNDP.
Credit: Education Above All Foundation

This year, Gaza’s candidates took the Tawjihi online, many on phones in tents and cafés, while the ministry worked to bring the exam back into halls. With support from the State of Qatar, Education Above All Foundation, UNDP and the ministry have set up 110 learning spaces, partly for that purpose. Planners intended these spaces, a mix of prefabricated units and tents, as a transition. Gaza’s students are using them for years, while sun, heat, humidity and cold wear them down.

Gaza’s people now crowd into less than 40 per cent of the Strip. Crews must clear rubble and check for unexploded ordnance before they can build. When they clear land for a learning space, displaced families can move onto it and stay. Others shelter in partly destroyed buildings. A school site now competes with the most basic need of all: somewhere to live.

Picture one of those 95,000 candidates. She has studied for this exam for years, first at a desk at home, then by phone light in a tent. The war has taken her father, perhaps her mother too, and most of the family who would have waited for her results. She may walk on crutches where a leg used to be. Strikes still fall at night, and she revises anyway. All she wants is the chance to sit the exam. Behind that chance stand a salvaged photocopier, a rebuilt desk and a negotiated liter of fuel, each one liable to fail. The UN reports that shortages once managed through reuse have become unmanageable, and critical systems are failing. Judged against a cancelled examination, against a school able to order a replacement part, it reveals an avoidable burden.

I am from Gaza, and I work for one of the foundations that funds this response. That makes the question personal: have we become so used to celebrating what Palestinians can salvage that we no longer ask why they must salvage it? An examination held amid continuing strikes is an achievement. It is also evidence of a world that has allowed the conditions for education to be dismantled.

As the speeches in New York wind down, leaders can measure their words against practical tests. Let paper, printer parts, school furniture and textbooks into Gaza without months of negotiation. Fund classrooms built to last years, not seasons. Pay the teachers who keep the system running. Gaza’s educators have shown what they will do to keep education alive. The question before the world is what it would take for Gaza’s schools to stop needing miracles.

Hani Shehada, Palestinian from the Gaza Strip, and is Regional Manager at Education Above All Foundation’s Al Fakhoora programme.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

Media personnel watch a digital screen showing leaders of member states gather for a family photograph during the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 13 September 2026. Credit: Arun Sankar/AFP

By Samuel King and Inés M. Pousadela
BRUSSELS, Belgium / MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 30 2026 (IPS)

At the 18th BRICS Summit, held on 12 and 13 September in New Delhi, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi brought together presidents Xi Jinping of China, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran, along with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince, Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed, representing the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Around the table sat longstanding rivals such as India and China and, in the case of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, states on opposite sides of an ongoing war. That the summit produced a joint declaration every member could sign was a modest multilateralist success.

The summit took place against a fast-changing backdrop. With the USA under Donald Trump an unreliable partner and often a hostile power bent on bullying others into submission, numerous states are seeking new alliances as a counterweight. BRICS, whose 11 members account for 49 per cent of the world’s population and 28 per cent of the global economy, could become a more significant forum as a result. But what is on offer is a profoundly old-fashioned, state-centric form of multilateralism, in which the people in whose name states claim to act have little say.

A hollow declaration

At the summit, Xi called for international rules to be ‘written by all countries’, even though he leads a one-party state where increasingly only he writes the rules. Putin urges greater representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America at the UN Security Council, while routinely wielding his veto to stop the council acting on his war in Ukraine.

The New Delhi Declaration’s silences speak loudest. It is explicit on Palestine, calling on Israel to end its war on Gaza and backing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. But on the war in Iran, it only urges ‘maximum restraint’ without naming the warring parties, reflecting the fact that Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sat around the same table. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not mentioned at all, a regression from past declarations and a troubling sign that Putin has no interest in ending the fighting. The text condemns ‘indiscriminate rising tariffs’ and ‘unilateral sanctions’ without naming the USA, sparing the blushes of members such as India, which is reportedly finalising a trade deal with Washington. The declaration preserves consensus at the expense of resolve.

Closed civic space, open defiance

Most BRICS governments have no fear of being held domestically accountable for the compromises they have made. Civic space is closed in seven of BRICS’ 11 states and obstructed or repressed in the rest. Russia jails and exiles opposition voices and has made protest almost impossible. China subjects its people to mass surveillance and crushes any expression that departs from ruling-party lines. Iran violently suppresses protest movements, including through the death penalty. Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognise no legitimate role for independent civil society. Host and self-styled mediator India has seen Modi’s government erode press freedom, restrict civil society funding and stoke hostility towards religious minorities.

Domestic repression translates directly into a closed international forum. After 18 summits, BRICS still has no treaty, no published membership criteria, no permanent secretariat, no budget and no mechanism for civil society to hold its members to account. This is no accident. It leaves powerful leaders free to pursue their interests, and it means civil society has less influence in BRICS than in comparable blocs such as the G20, and much less than in UN processes.

Civil society mobilised regardless. Three weeks before the summit, over 200 delegates from farmers’ organisations, people’s movements, trade unions, women’s organisations and other civil society groups gathered in New Delhi for the People’s BRICS Summit. Its resolution denounced BRICS states for reproducing extractivist, inequitable development models, and insisted that cooperation between global south states be judged by the dignity and rights it delivers to people and communities, not by the freedom it grants states and capital. It called for debt restructuring, a publicly accountable energy transition, food sovereignty, universal social security, women’s political representation and an end to the persecution of civil society activists, and for BRICS to take a clear stand against military intervention, occupation and genocide. BRICS governments chose not to listen.

Ambition without accountability

BRICS’ biggest ambition, on display in the New Delhi Declaration, is to reshape international finance. Development of payment systems independent of the US dollar would chip away at the USA’s unique ability to sustain its power by printing more dollars, despite mountainous debt, to meet unceasing demand. But it would also let repressive states such as Iran and Russia sell oil and gas more easily, funding their repression while blunting international sanctions.

This ambition comes with no commitment to accountability. The bloc has no channel through which the people most affected by its decisions can make their voices heard, and no human rights conditions are attached to its initiatives.

None of the emerging responses to the rapidly changing international order promises to be more democratic than the current system. So far, neither BRICS nor any of the other alternatives now taking shape has matched its growing ambition with greater accountability.

Samuel King is a researcher at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, working on ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition, a Horizon Europe-funded project. Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

A Rohingya refugee carries Myanmar's national flag during a Genocide Remembrance Day rally marking the anniversary of their mass exodus at a refugee camp in Bangladesh on 25 August 2026. Credit: Abdul Goni/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Sep 25 2026 (IPS)

On 15 September, Norwegian police and security services raided the headquarters of Telenor in Oslo. Authorities accuse the multinational telecoms company, majority owned by the Norwegian state, of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity in Myanmar and breaching sanctions.

Telenor sold its Myanmar subsidiary in March 2022, in the wake of the military coup that ousted the country’s democratically elected government in February 2021. An August 2025 Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation investigation reported that ahead of its exit, Telenor had complied with military requests to hand over customer data. It’s alleged that call log and location data may have helped the military track, capture and kill democracy activists, including campaigner Ko Jimmy, executed in July 2022.

Civil society warned of the dangers when Telenor prepared to sell its subsidiary to a joint venture between a Lebanese group and Thein Win Zaw, a Burmese entrepreneur accused of having close military ties. It has kept up the struggle for accountability. Justice for Myanmar, a covert activist group, worked with the International Commission of Jurists to collect documentary evidence on Telenor’s role and filed police complaints in December 2024 and October 2025.

Telenor is also subject to a lawsuit brought by a group of civil society organisations last October, alleging the company passed on data of over 1,200 people. In addition, the company has been found in breach of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct.

International complicity

The Telenor case focuses attention on the wider networks of companies and states that are propping up the regime and keeping Myanmar’s civil war going.

Following the coup, almost all states refused to recognise Myanmar’s military rulers and continued to regard the exiled National Unity Government as the country’s legitimate representative. But several authoritarian states have since swung behind the junta. Russia leads the pack, with Vladimir Putin hosting junta leader Min Aung Hlaing for repeat visits in Moscow. China, India, Singapore and Thailand have joined Russia in supplying weapons.

Many Chinese companies collaborate with the regime, among them Geedge Networks, a tech company with close links to the Chinese state that specialises in online surveillance. The company is helping the military install a version of China’s ‘great firewall’ so it can systematically restrict internet use, access users’ data and identify and track down dissenters.

The junta made a concerted effort to gain international legitimacy with a sham election in December 2025 and January 2026. It extensively prepared the ground by replacing the civilian electoral commission with a military-controlled body, banning pro-democracy parties and prohibiting political rallies, ensuring a military puppet party faced only token opposition. A new election law enabled it to criminalise over 300 people for criticising the election. Authorities jailed some merely for liking social media posts and handed 37-year sentences to eight activists for taking part in a protest calling for a boycott. There were also reports of threats to withhold aid from displacement camps unless people voted.

After the military’s party duly won, Min Aung Hlaing transitioned from general to civilian and became president in April. That same month, a group of civil society organisations filed a complaint against him in Indonesia over his role in the 2017 genocide of Rohingya people. Despite this legal action and the election’s evident lack of credibility, an array of non-democratic states including Belarus, China and Russia were happy to endorse the result.

While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) didn’t recognise the election, its most authoritarian members, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, backed it anyway, and the bloc has consistently stuck with its failed Five Point Consensus, a plan agreed with the junta in April 2021 that the military has never respected.

The US government has also shifted its position. In 2025, the Trump administration cut funding to independent Burmese media, lifted sanctions against junta-controlled businesses and arms dealers supplying the regime and removed protections from Burmese refugees living in the USA, citing governance improvements. It treated the junta as a legitimate counterpart by sending it a letter about tariffs. In May, it was revealed the junta gives Roger Stone, a long-time Donald Trump ally, US$50,000 a month to rebuild relations with the USA. Mineral deposits are likely in the Trump administration’s sights.

Civil war continues

The Telenor raid has momentarily brought Myanmar back into the headlines. Its civil war has otherwise gone on for almost five and a half years with little global attention. Sparked by the army’s violent suppression of democracy protests, it pits the military against armed pro-democracy forces, both backed by a variety of ethnic militia. The army controls the main population centres and has recently regained some territory, but there’s no end in sight.

The army has committed numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes. A September 2025 UN report painted a harrowing picture of airstrikes on schools and the destruction of villages. This year, the conflict has escalated across the Magway Region, with the army and associated militia mounting armed assaults on villages, burning homes and using drones to kill civilians, including children.

Recent escalations of conflict have driven further displacement. At the same time, monsoon rains across several regions in July and August caused floods that left villages isolated and increased disease risks. As needs have grown, the healthcare system is collapsing due to military attacks on facilities and workers, while humanitarian aid and vital health supplies are further constrained by military checkpoints, road closures and movement restrictions.

The Telenor case has the potential to challenge impunity. It should refocus the minds of democratic states and companies headquartered in them, offering a warning that they can be exposed for complicity in the junta’s atrocities. It should give fresh impetus to civil society’s efforts to hold states and companies to account. By standing with civil society, in Myanmar and around the world, democratic states can put themselves on the side of human rights and justice.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

Credit: Amanda Cotton / Ocean Image Bank

By Gareth Johnstone and Jan Thomas Odegard
OSLO, Norway, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

As Norway undertakes Vendepunkt, or “Turning Point,” its reflection on the future of Norwegian development policy, it is critical that oceans remain a priority. Donors around the world are running similar audits, deciding which long-term partnerships to keep, and why. Norway has decades of expertise to offer, but also something significant at stake: healthy and well-governed oceans underpin food, livelihoods and economic activity in partner countries while supporting global seafood supply chains in which Norway itself participates.

West Africa demonstrates what sustained investment in oceans can achieve. More than a decade of cooperation on illegal fishing has helped countries strengthen their own capacity to monitor and protect their waters. But the ocean cannot be managed country by country. Fish stocks are shared, vessels move across borders, and climate change is shifting marine resources into new waters. Strong national capacity must therefore be matched by the ability of countries to cooperate.

That cooperation depends on the relationships between countries that allow information to be shared, trust to develop and authorities to act together. These relationships are not simply a by-product of capacity building. They are essential development infrastructures particularly when the resources being protected cross borders.

Gareth Johnstone

The connection between West Africa and Norway makes this tangible. Fish caught off West Africa enters international supply chains as fishmeal and fish oil, including feed used in aquaculture thousands of kilometres away. A fish caught off Guinea-Bissau can ultimately help feed a salmon in a Norwegian fjord. In one investigation supported by TMT, authorities took action against the factory vessel TIAN YI HE 6 after it received fish from a Turkish-flagged vessel, with the resulting fishmeal transported onwards to international markets. The case resulted in fines for unauthorized fishing operations, illegal transshipment and obstruction of inspectors.

Jan Thomas Odegard

Technology has transformed what fisheries authorities can do. An inspector can now examine a vessel’s movements and history before deciding whether it should enter port. Recorded use of the Vessel Tracking Tool, developed by fisheries intelligence organisaiton, TMT, more than doubled between 2024 and 2025.

Despite this, turning information into action requires trained officials, functioning institutions and trust between agencies and countries. In the West African region where TMT, and its partners have focused support, the relationships resulted in the deterrence of illegal fishing took more than a decade to build. An independent assessment by Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management of this work, supported by Norway, found that some of the strongest results came when governments shared information regionally.

One case began with a concern raised by a fisheries inspector in Ghana about the vessel NOVA ZEELANDIA. Officials in Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and South Africa checked their records and shared information. Angola subsequently fined associated trawlers for unauthorized transshipment and barred NOVA ZEELANDIA from its waters, while Cameroon separately fined the vessel owners US$2.1 million for breaches of inspection rules.

The vessel later changed its name and flag and remains in operation. It is a reminder that effective ocean governance requires sustained cooperation across jurisdictions.

Relationships are development infrastructure

Development programmes routinely count the numbers of people trained, systems established and institutions strengthened. The value of the relationships built alongside them is harder to measure. Yet a fisheries officer knowing who to contact in a neighbouring country can be as important as the technology on their desk.

These relationships take years to build and can be fragile. One or two funding cycles may establish a system or deliver training, yet they are less likely to embed the institutional memory, expertise and relationships that allow it to survive and adapt.

Long-running development partnerships and support should therefore not automatically be viewed as evidence that localisation has failed to materialise. A better test is whether they are evolving toward stronger national institutions, greater regional leadership and with less dependence on external technical expertise, while preserving cooperation where challenges remain shared.

Oceans belong in Norway’s Turning Point

Norway brings decades of experience in fisheries management, marine research and ocean governance. Norway is itself a fishing and aquaculture nation, connected through the same ocean systems and global seafood supply chains.

Norway’s investment in oceans can therefore combine locally led capacity with international cooperation because illegal vessels do not respect borders.

The evidence from West Africa shows why sustained investment matters. National enforcement capability and regional networks have been built over more than a decade. Withdrawing support before those systems are sufficiently resilient risks losing hard-won gains, continuing to invest allows national leadership to deepen and relationships to mature.

Norway’s challenge is not unique. Development partners are increasingly being asked to make harder choices and reduce dependency without dismantling the relationships and cooperation needed to address problems that are inherently international. As Turning Point asks where Norway has particular strengths and where its development cooperation can have greatest impact, oceans deserve a prominent place in the answer.

The question should not simply be which partnerships Norway can eventually leave. It should also be which are worth sustaining and deepening because the same fish stocks, vessels and networks are what is at stake. Strong national capacity and international relationships are not competing goals. One makes the other possible. And in an ocean that connects Guinea-Bissau’s fishing communities with Norway’s fjords, Norway has both the expertise and the interest to keep investing in both.

Gareth Johnstone is the Executive Director of Norwegian based fisheries intelligence organization, Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT). He has over 30 years’ experience as an environmental scientist, researcher and policy expert. He is also the former Director General of WorldFish.

Jan Thomas Odegard is a Norwegian environmental and development expert with 30 years’ experience spanning the UN, NGOs, private sector and research. He is co-founder and Chair of the Trygg Mat Tracking Board and former Secretary General of Friends of the Earth Norway.

IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:

Credit: IAEA
 
IAEA’s 70th General Conference highlights growing strains on safeguards and nuclear security as attention shifts to the first review of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
VIENNA, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

The international nuclear order is facing another test as governments move from an inconclusive review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York to renewed disputes over safeguards and nuclear security in Vienna—and toward the first Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) later this year.

The 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), held in Vienna from September 14 to 18, came less than four months after the 11th NPT Review Conference ended without consensus on a substantive outcome.

It was the third consecutive NPT Review Conference, following those in 2015 and 2022, to conclude without agreement on substantive conclusions and recommendations—underscoring the growing difficulty of reaching consensus amid heightened nuclear risks and geopolitical tensions.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed disappointment at the outcome while reaffirming the NPT as a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA does not negotiate nuclear disarmament. Its responsibilities include promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and applying safeguards to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Yet the issues confronting the Agency—from Iran and North Korea to Ukraine and naval nuclear propulsion—show how safeguards, nuclear security and armed conflict are increasingly intertwined with wider questions about the future of the international nuclear order.

Map of Iran

Iran remains one of the most difficult issues facing the Agency.

For the IAEA, the central question is not simply the political dispute surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, but whether it can maintain the continuity and credibility of independent verification.

Restrictions on access and uncertainty surrounding nuclear material, including highly enriched uranium, have intensified concerns about the effectiveness of safeguards.

The issue has taken on an additional dimension following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Beyond competing political and military claims lies a wider question for the international community: how can nuclear facilities—and the verification system surrounding them—be protected during armed conflict?

Ukraine Tests Nuclear Safety in Wartime

Ukraine presents another challenge.

The war has placed major nuclear facilities in or near areas of military operations, with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remaining at the centre of international concern.

The IAEA has maintained experts at the site as part of efforts to reduce risks to nuclear safety and security.

Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly accused each other of actions threatening nuclear installations. While those claims remain contested, the underlying issue extends beyond this war: international nuclear governance mechanisms must now operate in circumstances where a major nuclear facility can be exposed to prolonged armed conflict.

Water is used to cool processes at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Credit: IAEA/Fredrik Dahl

North Korea and the Limits of Verification

Credit: journal-neo.org

The IAEA continues to monitor developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from outside the country and maintains its readiness to resume verification activities should political circumstances permit.

The case illustrates a fundamental limitation of international verification: even sophisticated monitoring institutions ultimately depend on access and cooperation.

More broadly, the Vienna conference reflected the growing difficulty of achieving consensus. Political divisions are increasingly affecting debates even within an institution whose work is largely technical, encompassing safeguards, nuclear safety and security, and peaceful nuclear applications.

At the same time, progress in other safeguards cases shows that multilateral verification can produce results when governments provide access, transparency and sustained cooperation.

Civil Society Bridges the NPT and TPNW

Hideto Matsuura, head of Nihon Hidankyo, addresses an event hosted at the sidelines of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Credit Naureen Hossain/IPS

At the 2026 NPT Review Conference, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) was among civil society organizations advocating nuclear disarmament education, nuclear risk reduction and greater attention to the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons.

On April 30, SGI and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation co-organized a side event examining extended nuclear deterrence through the lens of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Hideto Matsuura, an atomic bomb survivor representing Nihon Hidankyo, described how radiation-related illnesses continue to affect Hibakusha more than eight decades after the atomic bombings.

The discussion raised a question that lies at the heart of the continuing debate over nuclear deterrence: whether security should be viewed primarily from the standpoint of states or also through the lens of human security.

Such civil society engagement provides a link between the NPT process and the humanitarian approach that contributed to the emergence of the TPNW.

From Vienna to New York

The next major stage of the 2026 nuclear diplomacy cycle now moves back to New York.

From November 30 to December 4, states parties to the TPNW will hold the treaty’s first Review Conference at United Nations Headquarters.

United Nations Headquarters. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

The TPNW does not replace either the NPT or the IAEA.

The NPT combines three pillars—nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—while the IAEA provides much of the safeguards and verification machinery supporting the non-proliferation regime.

Credit: IAEA

The three frameworks therefore address distinct but interconnected dimensions of the nuclear order.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference demonstrated the difficulty of reaching political agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation. Vienna, meanwhile, highlighted the practical challenges confronting verification and nuclear security amid armed conflict, regional proliferation disputes and geopolitical divisions.

The first TPNW Review Conference will now examine what the prohibition treaty can contribute under these conditions.

Nuclear-armed states remain outside the TPNW, placing clear limits on what the treaty can achieve on its own. At the same time, its states parties and supporting civil society organizations have placed the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and their elimination at the centre of international debate.

When delegates gather in New York on November 30, the discussion will therefore extend beyond the implementation of a single treaty.

After another NPT Review Conference ended without substantive consensus, a broader question remains: how can established and newer multilateral frameworks work alongside one another to reduce nuclear risks, strengthen verification and advance nuclear disarmament?

From Vienna to New York, that question is set to remain at the centre of nuclear diplomacy in 2026.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

IPS UN Bureau

Dr. Agnes Kalibata, speaking at the opening ceremony of the Africa Food Systems Forum in 2019. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

By Agnes Kalibata
NAIROBI, Kenya, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

I was born in Rwanda, but my family soon became refugees in Uganda during the conflict and unrest on the cusp of independence. My father was a teacher and went to great lengths to make sure I was well educated. My parents were also smallholder farmers, and I saw firsthand the challenges my parents and other refugee families faced.

After I received my doctoral degree from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, I returned to a new Rwanda in 2005, managing a World Bank agriculture project with the government. In 2008, I became Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources, and over the next six years, I oversaw the country’s transition from food deficit to food security, as Rwanda cut its global hunger index by more than 50 percent. We implemented what we understood to be true: effective deliberate agricultural investment drives poverty down.

Agricultural growth is up to four times more effective at reducing poverty than growth in other sectors, and it underpins food security besides. Yet despite that evidence, Africa’s agriculture sector faces an estimated $200 billion annual financing gap.

Less than a year ago, I joined the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) as Co-Chair of the Steering Committee because I have seen firsthand how GAFSP is a collaborative platform that connects governments, farmers, civil society and leverages the private sector and multiple partners to tackle food insecurity. Among its inaugural investments was a 60 million dollar investment in Rwanda’s Land Husbandry and terracing program which allowed farmers to reclaim degraded land by mobilizing more than 10 times this initial capital, reached hundreds of farmers and contributed to land restoration, food security and poverty reduction all at the same time.

GAFSP’s Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT) has made its second allocation (its first allocation was to the African Development Bank). Announced at the Africa Food Systems Forum “Investing in Africa’s Agri-Food Systems: Nourishing Nations, Growing Jobs, Building Resilience,” Rwanda’s BIFT allocation is a concrete step toward the GAFSP vision that sharing risk deliberately, and cooperatively, rather than leaving it with farmers alone, moves capital that reduces food insecurity. This $6 million allocation has already unlocked $15 million more from IFAD, the Bank of Kigali and Aceli Africa – 2.5 times GAFSP’s own contribution – reaching an expected 215 farmers’ organizations and 35,000 smallholders.

What is most encouraging about this funding is the paradigm shift it represents against the challenging context of reduced Overseas Development Assistance. Capital structured to absorb risk can shift lender considerations to bring private finance into a domain the private sector has avoided, catalyzing transformational change for smallholder borrowers.

The central obstacle isn’t capital or conviction – it’s risk. Agricultural lending is constrained by the risk of accelerating climate shocks and by the practical cost of financing smaller loans. Roughly 90 percent of staple food production in Sub-Saharan Africa depends on rain-fed agriculture, leaving households with no buffer when a season fails. Farmers in low-income countries bear the highest burden of worsening weather conditions, while African countries lose the most GDP to escalating natural disasters, from drought to surging storms. Finally, the loans these farmers need are relatively small, and small loans cost lenders more to appraise and administer.

As Rwanda’s Agriculture Minister, coordinating across ministries to run programs like the Land husbandry program mentioned above alongside the One Cow per Poor Family – a critical source of nutrition for poor families taught me that risk-sharing across government agencies, communities and financiers is what makes ambitious programs work.

It is now a question of scale. What worked for smallholders in Rwanda can work for millions more, if development finance institutions and private lenders treat risk-sharing as standard practice. I have spent my career watching farmers do more with less. Give them the finance they’ve earned, and there is no question they will transform the food system to be more efficient, resilient and a stronger driver of prosperity at scale.

IPS UN Bureau