A view of the rubble in Jabalia, northern Gaza, after heavy Israeli bombardment. Credit: UNICEF/Rawan Eleyan

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 17 2026 (IPS)

Roughly six months after the ceasefire in the Occupied Palestinian Territory went into effect, the humanitarian situation in Gaza remains precariously fragile, despite a relative decline in hostilities. The crisis, marked by ongoing Israeli airstrikes and shelling, continued blockades on humanitarian aid, and widespread displacement, has pushed the majority of Palestinians in Gaza to the brink. Amid the vast scale of needs, basic services are increasingly strained, and humanitarian experts warn that the situation could deteriorate further in the coming months unless sustained aid and funding are secured.

A new report from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinians in the Near East (UNRWA) on the current conditions in Gaza confirmed a continuation of airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire across multiple areas, including Beit Lahia, Jabalia, Deir al Balah, Khan Younis, Rafah, and Bureij. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that since the eruption of hostilities on October 7, 2023, approximately 72,315 Gazans have been killed and another 172,137 injured.

“The scale and pattern of these actions, occurring alongside mass displacement of Palestinians from their homes and land in Gaza shows once again the ongoing broader policy of ethnic cleansing across the occupied Palestinian territory,” said a group of United Nations (UN) experts on April 13. “This cycle of displacement, terror, and targeted attacks serves an ultimate purpose: to make life unbearable for Palestinians and permanently force them from their land…Targeting areas known to shelter displaced civilians is a grave breach of international humanitarian law and is a grim reminder of the urgent need for international action and accountability.”

According to Palestine’s Ministry of Health, at least 32 Gazans have been killed by Israeli forces in early April alone. Airstrikes, gunfire, and shelling are daily occurrences, with women, children, disabled persons, humanitarian workers, and journalists being routinely targeted. On April 9, a young girl was killed by Israeli gunfire in a crowded classroom-turned-makeshift encampment.

“For the past 10 days, Palestinians are still being killed and injured in what is left of their homes, shelters, and tents of displaced families, on the streets, in vehicles, at a medical facility and in a classroom,” said United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. “Movement itself has become a life-threatening activity. Incidents of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces while walking, driving, or standing outside are recorded nearly every day.”

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also confirmed that there have been increasing cases of Israeli forces killing Palestinians based on their proximity to the “yellow line”, a line of demarcation that divides the Palestinian-controlled areas of Gaza and the Israeli-controlled areas. “Targeting civilians not taking direct part in hostilities is a war crime, regardless of their proximity to deployment lines,” said Türk

On April 6, Israeli forces shot at vehicles from the World Health Organization (WHO), killing a driver. Two days later, Israeli drone strikes killed Al Jazeera journalist Mohamed Washah in Gaza City, marking the 294th Palestinian journalist to be killed by Israeli forces since October 7, 2023. Additionally, Israel has continued to ban international journalists from accessing Gaza, further compounding the regional decline of journalistic freedom.

“The number of journalists and humanitarian personnel killed in Gaza is unprecedented, and further compounds civilian harm as it makes reporting on the situation and responding to its humanitarian implications life-threatening,” added Türk.

Internal displacement is particularly rampant, with OCHA estimating that routine evacuation orders and bombardment have affected roughly 92 percent of all housing across the enclave, with the vast majority of affected communities having been displaced multiple times. Civilians residing in overcrowded, makeshift encampments are disproportionately affected by insecurity, freezing temperatures, building collapse, and a severe shortage of humanitarian aid and basic services.

Humanitarian movement remains severely constrained, with all UNRWA staff banned from accessing the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory since March 2025. The agency, which has long acted as a critical lifeline for Palestinians, has pre-positioned food parcels, flour, and shelter supplies at Gaza’s borders, which could help hundreds of thousands of Gazans.

Thousands of Palestinians across the enclave are in urgent need of medical care as Gaza’s health system nears the brink of collapse, facing severe shortages of supplies amid an influx of injured and ill patients. Medications are critically short in supply, and UNRWA has reported a sharp uptick in cases of ectoparasitic infections such as scabies and fleas, as well as chickenpox and other skin diseases, which have been linked to disrupted water and hygiene (WASH) services, overcrowding, and pests.

Despite these challenges, humanitarian experts have expressed optimism that the situation in Gaza could improve as access constraints begin to fade. Following nearly 40 days of closure, the critical Zikim crossing reopened in early April, allowing nutritional and health supplies to reach northern Gaza directly. UNRWA is currently supporting over 67,000 displaced individuals across 83 collective emergency shelters, with over 11,000 personnel providing lifesaving care.

UNRWA, in collaboration with WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Palestine’s Ministry of Health, reached almost 2,100 children under three years of age with vaccinations between April 5 and 9. WHO and its partners have also been facilitating dozens of medical evacuations through the Rafah border crossing and providing access to medical care, food, water, and psychosocial services to returning Gazans.

The UN experts stressed that a definitive end to hostilities, an expansion of protection services, and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid are crucial in coordinating an effective return to stability in Gaza. Additionally, the experts called on Israeli authorities to ensure a safe and dignified return to Gaza for displaced individuals, as well as the lifting of restrictions for UNRWA operations.

“We reiterate our call on States to bring Israel’s unlawful occupation to an end and ensure the immediate protection of civilians sheltering in displacement sites across the Gaza Strip, including by scaling up vital humanitarian assistance,” the experts said. “States must comply with their legal obligations. They must bring Israel’s unlawful occupation to an end, refrain from recognising it and withhold assistance to it, and take effective measures to ensure investigations and accountability for grave violations of international law in the occupied Palestinian Territory.”

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Credit: Kristian Tuxen Ladegaard Berg/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)

When Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen addressed her supporters on election night on 24 March, she chose her words carefully. Losing four percentage points after almost seven years in power, she suggested, wasn’t so bad given there’s been a pandemic, a war in Europe and a confrontation with Donald Trump over Greenland. The reality was the Social Democrats had recorded their worst general election result since 1903. Meanwhile, the far-right Danish People’s Party (DPP) tripled its seat count, despite years of the Social Democrats leading a systematic crackdown on immigration to try to prevent it gaining support.

A historic result

While the Social Democrats came first on 21.9 per cent of the vote, they dropped from 50 to 38 seats. Their centre-right coalition partner, Venstre, had its worst result in its 150-year history. These are the two parties that have led every government since mainstream politics began copying far-right narratives on immigration. The bargain has benefitted neither.

Vote-switching data from exit polls told the story. The Social Democrats retained only around two thirds of their 2022 support. Their largest group of defectors — 13 per cent of their previous voters — switched to the Green Left, which now holds 20 seats as parliament’s second-largest party. Right-leaning voters switched to the DPP rather than rewarding the Social Democrats for delivering the immigration restrictions the DPP has long demanded. Time and again, evidence suggests that voters who are highly motivated about an issue tend to prefer parties that have always prioritised it over parties that have adopted it more recently out of electoral calculation.

The overall picture leaves neither bloc with a majority. The left-wing grouping holds 84 seats and the right holds 77, both short of the 90 needed to govern. Frederiksen has submitted her resignation as prime minister but, as leader of the largest party, has been charged with forming a new government. This is a task made harder by the conditions attached by Moderates leader Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who’s unwilling to join a government that does not include both left and right.

Twenty-five years of accommodation

The Social Democrats’ turn on immigration began in the aftermath of their 2001 election defeat. The party believed it was losing working-class voters to the far right over immigration and concluded it needed to compete on that ground. It framed anti-immigration policies as a defence of the welfare state, trying to emphasise solidarity rather than xenophobia, and over the next decade moved steadily rightward on this issue.

The nine seats the DPP got in 2001 became invaluable to centre-right Venstre leader Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who formed a minority government with its support. His government subsequently launched a wave of amendments to the Aliens Act, which was changed 93 times between 2002 and 2016 with the explicit goal of making Denmark less appealing to asylum seekers.

Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, the DPP grew steadily, winning 20.6 per cent of votes in 2015 to become the biggest force on the right. Between 2015 and 2018, immigration law was amended over 70 times.

When Frederiksen became Social Democrat leader in 2015, she sought to outbid the DPP. By the 2019 election, the Social Democrats’ anti-immigration platform closely mirrored the DPP’s. And in the short term, it worked for them. They won the 2019 election while the DPP lost almost 12 percentage points. In losing, though, the DPP had won: its previously fringe positions on migration, belonging and identity had been absorbed into mainstream politics.

A rights-violating regime

On entering government in 2019, Frederiksen entrenched what the Social Democrats called a ‘paradigm shift’, moving from integration to deterrence, detention and return, with the stated goal of admitting ‘zero asylum seekers’. Denmark became the first European state to declare parts of Syria safe, enabling it to deport Syrian refugees to an active conflict zone. In 2021, parliament authorised the outsourcing of asylum processing to countries outside Europe. By 2024, Denmark was granting under 900 people asylum a year, the lowest figure in four decades, pandemic years excluded.

The human rights consequences have been documented by international civil society organisations and bodies such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture. Amnesty International has raised concerns about the forced return of asylum seekers to danger in violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Denmark’s three-year waiting period for family reunification for refugees with temporary protection status violates the right to family life. Policies targeting government-classified ‘ghetto’ areas — overwhelmingly low-income neighbourhoods with high concentrations of people from migrant backgrounds — have been challenged at the European Court of Justice on grounds of racial discrimination.

The harm has been intentional. A framework designed to make Denmark as unwelcoming as possible has placed tens of thousands of people in prolonged legal uncertainty, with documented effects on family stability and mental health. Under Denmark’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, Frederiksen pressed for similar policies across Europe and, alongside far-right Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, lobbied for a revised European Convention on Human Rights to enable easier deportation. Centre-left governments in Sweden and the UK have looked to Denmark as a model.

Normalisation, not neutralisation

The political calculation was that taking ownership of immigration would reduce its salience as an issue and deny the far right the fuel to grow. Instead, the move intensified demand, leaving opponents of migration taking ever more extreme positions while erasing the distinction between mainstream and far-right politics.

Denmark’s experience is a lesson other European centre-left parties appear determined not to learn. Twenty-five years of accommodation have produced a society in which far-right assumptions have become normalised, at enormous and ongoing cost to those whose rights are being stripped away. This is not a template; it is a warning.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Credit: UNHCR/Amanda Jufrian

By Mohammed Zonaid
COX’S BAZAR, Bangladesh, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)

While global attention right now is on escalating geopolitical tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, another crisis continues quietly in Bangladesh.

Beginning April 1, 2026, the World Food Programme (WFP) introduced a revised Targeting and Prioritisation Exercise (TPE) for Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char, according to a statement released by the United Nations in Bangladesh on April 2.

Under the new system, refugee households will receive food assistance of $12, $10, or $7 per person per month, depending on their assessed level of food insecurity. Previously, all refugees received $12 per person.

On paper, vulnerability-based targeting appears reasonable. In many humanitarian crises, such systems help ensure that limited resources reach those most in need. However, the Rohingya context is different.

Nearly nine years after fleeing genocide and persecution in Myanmar, more than one million Rohingya refugees remain confined to camps in Bangladesh, according to the latest data from UNHCR Bangladesh including 144,456 biometrically identified new arrivals and 1,040,408 Registered refugees 1990s & post-2017. 78% them are Women and children.

Unlike refugees in many other countries, Rohingya in Bangladesh have extremely limited freedom of movement and cannot legally work or run small businesses within the camps. Refugees are also not formally employed by humanitarian organizations—except as volunteers receiving small daily allowances. As a result, they remain almost entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Within this context, reducing aid raises serious concerns. When refugees are not permitted to engage in meaningful economic activity, food insecurity becomes less a household condition and more a structural outcome.

Humanitarian agencies have provided life-saving support for years, and their efforts should not be overlooked. But survival is not the same as stability. Instead of creating pathways toward self-reliance for Rohingya and local communities in Cox’s Bazar who are affected due to refugee statements, the current system has largely institutionalized dependency.

Many programs labeled as “livelihood initiatives” have not produced meaningful outcomes. Skills training programs—such as electrical repair or other technical courses—often fail to translate into real opportunities because refugees do not own motorbikes, electricity access is limited in many camp areas, refugees cannot legally move beyond the camps to seek work, and humanitarian organizations don’t employ trained refugees within their own operational structures.

This raises difficult questions: Why invest donor resources in skills that cannot realistically be applied? And what long-term strategy do these initiatives serve?

The new targeting model categorizes refugees as extremely food insecure, highly food insecure, or food insecure. Some vulnerable households—such as those led by elderly individuals, persons with disabilities, or children—will continue receiving the highest level of assistance.

Yet the broader reality remains unchanged: the entire Rohingya population in Bangladesh faces severe restrictions on economic participation.

Recent protests in the camps are often described as reactions to ration reductions. In reality, they reflect deeper concerns about uncertainty and the absence of long-term planning. Refugees are asking a simple question: What happens if funding declines further in the future? Where will we go? Well Bangladesh alone will be left dealing with the Rohingya crisis?

They want to send a message to the world: dependency on aid was designed around the Rohingya. It is time to think beyond relief and give them the tools to stand on their own feet.

Long-term strategic thinking is urgently needed. This includes serious discussions about ensuring safe and dignified lives in the camps until the Rohingya are able to return to Myanmar, expanding economic participation for refugees, and creating policies that allow them to contribute economically while remaining under appropriate regulation.

At the same time, Bangladesh itself is going through a transitional period after the election, and the new government and said it will work closely to make Rohingya repatriation possible and shared data on 8.29 lakh Rohingyas with Myanmar.

But the Rohingya crisis cannot be a lesser priority, the new government also needs to recognize that prolonged displacement cannot be managed indefinitely through restriction and relief alone—the same approach that largely characterized the policies of the previous government.

Carefully regulated work opportunities—such as camp-based enterprises, pilot employment schemes, or limited work authorization programs—could help reduce humanitarian dependency while preserving government oversight.

If even one or two members of each refugee household were allowed to work legally under controlled frameworks, humanitarian costs could gradually decline, camp economies could stabilize, and youth frustration could decrease.

Most importantly, dignity could begin to return.

After nearly nine years, international agencies have managed one of the world’s largest refugee operations with remarkable logistical capacity. Yet the central question remains: what durable systems have been created to help refugees stand on their own feet?

As global funding pressures increase and donor fatigue grows, humanitarian assistance is being recalibrated downward. Without structural reforms, this risks managing dependency more efficiently rather than reducing it.

The Rohingya did not choose dependency on aid. It was created by the restrictions surrounding them. Food assistance remains essential. But the future of an entire population cannot be defined solely by ration cards and vulnerability categories.

The Rohingya crisis requires more than improved targeting of aid. It requires policies that combine protection with participation and living with safety.

The world has learned how to feed the Rohingya.

The real test is whether it will allow them to stand—until the day they can safely return home to Myanmar with rights, safety, and dignity.

Otherwise, families quietly reduce meals. Young people seek unsafe informal labor. The risks of child labor, early marriage, unsafe migration. and involvement in illicit activities increase. When opportunity disappears, desperation fills the gap.

Mohammed Zonaid is a Rohingya SOPA 2025 honoree, freelance journalist, award-winning photographer, and fixer. He works with international agencies and has contributed to Myanmar Now, The Arakan Express News, The Diplomat Magazine, Frontier Myanmar, Inter Press Service, and the Myanmar Pressphoto Agency.

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres visiting a shelter hosting displaced people from areas affected by the ongoing conflict in the Dekwaneh area of Beirut during his visit to Lebanon in March 2026. Credit: UN Photo/Haider Fahs

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 9 2026 (IPS)

On April 8, Israeli military forces launched the deadliest series of airstrikes on Lebanon since hostilities escalated in early March, resulting in the deaths of at least 254 civilians. This latest incident threatens to further complicate humanitarian efforts in Lebanon that are already under immense pressure.

This latest escalation occurred just as a two-week ceasefire deal between the United States and Iran was announced the night prior on April 7, more than a month after the United States, Iran and Israel began engaging in military strikes against each other, which also led to Arab States in the Gulf getting caught in the crossfire. The parties targeted military bases and civilian infrastructure in Iran and Gulf states allied with the United States. Israeli and Lebanese armed forces exchanged fire across borders, which has resulted in a new wave of civilian casualties and mass displacement in a continuation of the conflict between the Israeli military and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. Israeli strikes on Lebanon have resulted in nearly 1,530 deaths since March 2, including more than 100 women and 130 children.

While the temporary ceasefire was welcomed, including by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, questions were raised about where it extended, even among major players in the negotiation process. Iran and Pakistan, a mediator in the peace negotiations, have stated that the deal includes Lebanon. Meanwhile, Israeli leadership initially claimed that the ceasefire did not include Lebanon and that the airstrikes specifically targeted Hezbollah-owned strongholds. Wednesday’s airstrikes targeted residential and commercial neighborhoods in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon.

Humanitarian actors expressed concern and alarm over the airstrikes and urged the parties involved to consider the safety and dignity of civilians in Lebanon.  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was “outraged” by the “devastating death and destruction” in Lebanon.

Displaced families at a makeshift shelter in a parking lot in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. Credit: WFP Arete/Ali Yunes

Oxfam International Executive Director Amitabh Behar welcomed the news of a ceasefire but said in a statement that until there was an end to the hostilities across the entire region, “no one will feel truly safe.”

“This pause must become a stepping stone for wider peace,” Behar said.

The war in Iran and the Middle East has put greater strain on humanitarian aid workers on the ground, including UN agencies.

Imran Riza, the UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Lebanon, explained that even before the latest escalation, the UN and its partners were aiming to support 1.5 million vulnerable people and that they have been forced to scale up their response with fewer resources than in previous years.

Less than a third of the emergency flash appeal for USD 308 million has been funded as of now. Yet despite these challenges, the UN and its partners have been able to provide more than four million meals and distribute more than 130,000 blankets and 105,000 mattresses to shelters. Multi-purpose cash assistance has also been provided to households as well.

Briefing reporters virtually from Beirut mere hours after the airstrikes, Riza commented on how civilians reacted to the news of a ceasefire.

“This morning, many people across Lebanon were cautiously optimistic about returning home—some even began to move. The events of the past hours, however, are likely to have triggered further displacement,” said Riza.

Also briefing from Lebanon was UNFPA Arab Regional Director Laila Baker, who described how the city of Beirut slowed to a standstill in the wake of the airstrikes. Cars are lining the streets while tents spread across the city as families seek shelter, she noted. She warned that the initial sense of unity that the Lebanese government and its partners had been working towards was now under threat due to the month-long “devastating aggression” from military forces.

“The risk is not only humanitarian collapse but also renewed fragmentation at a time when unity is most needed,” said Baker.

Displacement is already at an “unprecedented scale”, Riza said, as more than 1.1 million people—or one in five people in Lebanon—are internally displaced. More than 138,000 civilians, of which a third are children, are sheltering in 678 collective sites. The majority are dispersed across informal settings and host communities, which Riza noted leaves them with limited access to basic services. Overcrowding in shelters and limited sanitation services will likely lead to increased health risks.

The health system has also been overwhelmed and “under severe pressure.” Many facilities have been forced to close or have been damaged. Riza reported at least 106 attacks on healthcare, which have resulted in more than 50 deaths and 158 injuries among health workers.

Women and children are particularly vulnerable in this situation. Baker estimates that at least 620,000 women and girls have experienced displacement. Among them are at least 13,500 pregnant women who have been cut from essential maternal health services. At least 200 pregnant women will be delivering babies without essential support from midwives or nurses or with access to maternal and neonatal healthcare.

More than 52 primary healthcare facilities are no longer facilities and are forced to close. Among the six hospitals forced to close, five of them had maternity wards.

“These are not just statistics. They are grave violations of international humanitarian law – direct assaults on life, health, and dignity,” said Baker. “This is not only a humanitarian crisis – it is a crisis of humanity. It is a crisis of trust in the international system and in the principles meant to protect civilians.”

The UN and other humanitarian agencies urge for a permanent end to the fighting and call for international law to be upheld by all parties. Under the ceasefire agreement, all parties are urged to pursue diplomatic dialogue and work toward a long-term solution to the war.

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On 27 October, Omer, a Community Development Committee member, supports health workers at the UNICEF-supported mobile clinic in Al Jadab village in Atbara, River Nile State. Through this initiative, UNICEF is restoring lifesaving healthcare services, such as nutrition, immunization, antenatal and postnatal services, medical consultations, and essential medicines, closer to vulnerable communities. Credit: UNICEF/Mohamed Dawod

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 2 2026 (IPS)

Global human migration is at record-high levels, as the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that roughly 1 in 8 people—about one billion individuals—are on the move. Many of these migrants and refugees face harsh living conditions and heightened challenges, such as poverty, insecurity, and limited access to basic services. With the number of international migrants having doubled since 1990, new findings from WHO call for expanding health systems to meet the growing scale of needs.

“Refugees and migrants are not just recipients of care, they are also health workers, caregivers and community leaders,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of WHO. “Health systems are only truly universal when they serve everyone. “Like anyone else, refugees and migrants need uninterrupted, affordable, and equitable access to health services wherever they are.”

WHO estimates that there are approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide, including 170 million migrant workers. Roughly 117 million of those are persons who have been forcibly displaced, 49 million are children, and 2.3 million have been born as refugees.

More than 71 percent of the world’s international migrants find refuge in low to middle-income countries, which often face the most severe resource constraints and protection challenges. Marginalized groups are disproportionately affected: women and girls are especially vulnerable to gender-based violence and often lack access to related services; unaccompanied children face heightened risks of exploitation, abuse, and neglect; and persons with disabilities face elevated barriers to accessibility and increased exposure to discrimination.

Refugees and migrants have been found to experience greater exposure to health risks, in part driven by conditions that restrict movement and access to care, as well as persistent discrimination and language and cultural barriers. These challenges are exacerbated by ongoing conflict and climate-related disasters, leaving millions around the world increasingly vulnerable to infectious and chronic diseases, mental health issues, and dangerous living and working conditions.

“We cannot talk about refugee and migrant health without also addressing emergencies,” said Dr Chikwe Ihekweazu, WHO’s executive director for health emergencies. “Whether it’s a conflict, a climate-related crisis, or an epidemic that forces movement, these crises expose the fragility of health systems and magnify the vulnerabilities of all those already at risk.”

On March 26, WHO launched its World Report on Promoting the Health of Refugees and Migrants: Monitoring Progress on the WHO Global Action Plan, establishing what it describes as the first global baseline for tracking progress toward inclusive, migrant-responsive health systems. Based on data from more than 93 Member States, the report highlights both a growing shift in national responses to migrant and refugee health needs and the persistent structural gaps that continue to hinder progress toward equitable access.

WHO found that out of the member states surveyed, only 42 percent reported having emergency preparedness and disaster reduction or response programs in place for migrant or refugee communities. Just 40 percent indicated that they provide training for health workers in culturally responsive care, while only 37 percent reported having systems to collect, monitor, and analyze migration-related health data—information that is rarely disseminated enough to support a more coordinated global response.

Discrimination remains widespread in low- and middle-income countries that host large numbers of refugees and migrants, with misinformation and disinformation continuing to fuel negative perceptions of these communities. Only 30 percent of surveyed countries reported having communication campaigns in place to counter these misconceptions and discriminatory language.

Anti-migrant sentiment remains particularly pronounced, with internally displaced persons, migrant workers, international students, and migrants under irregular circumstances being far less likely to access health services. Additionally, refugees and migrants are largely unrepresented in governance and decision-making processes that shape their access to health rights in most surveyed countries.

“The phenomena of displacement is unfortunately happening more frequently in countries with fragile systems, fragile economies and limited domestic resources,” said Dr Santino Severoni, head of WHO’s Special Initiative on Health and Migration and lead author of the report. “There is almost no mention of irregular migrants in those emergency plans and response or in disease risk reductions, there is no systematic approach in assessing the system to see how their system is really functioning, how efficient and effective it is. This is really a call for action to keep the promise of sharing a bit of responsibility in managing those emergencies.”

Over the past year, international support for refugee health has seen considerable declines. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that their 2025 response plan has secured only 23 percent of its USD 10.6 billion goal. The agency projects that this could cause over 12.8 million displaced persons to lose access to lifesaving health interventions this year.

Global responses have been polarizing. Some countries have adopted inclusive policies that support migrant communities—such as Chile— which has supplied municipal health councils for migrants and refugees with community representatives. Other countries, such as the United States and Canada, have cut health insurance coverage for undocumented migrants, forcing them to pay out of pocket for lifesaving care and increasing protection risks.

Through the report, WHO called for greater inclusion of refugee and migrant voices in decision-making processes, as well as improved coordination between governments. With a smoother flow of data between Member States, WHO will be able to more effectively shape health, employment, housing, and protection services.

WHO emphasized that responses should be specifically tailored to the needs of different migrant subgroups, while remaining committed to countering misinformation and discrimination through “evidence-based action.” Investment in refugee and migrant health systems has been found to deliver significant returns, fostering improved social and economic cohesion, revitalizing fragile health systems, and boosting global security, all while reducing long-term costs by promoting these communities to contribute back to society.

“The health of refugees and migrants is not a marginal concern: it is a defining issue of our time,” said Severoni. “By acting now, countries can ensure that refugees and migrants are not left behind, and that health systems are stronger, fairer and more prepared for the future.”

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CIVICUS discusses Italy’s restrictive immigration policies with Eleonora Celoria, a researcher at FIERI (Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione), a research centre on migration, and a member of the Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI), an Italian legal organisation that defends migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights through advocacy, public awareness and strategic litigation.

Eleonora Celoria

What are the main objectives of the new migration bill?

The bill introduces a 30-day naval blockade mechanism, extendable to six months, for ships deemed to pose a ‘serious threat to public order or national security’, including on the grounds of ‘exceptional migratory pressure’. It goes beyond European Union (EU) frameworks and is designed to restrict civil society organisations conducting search and rescue operations.

The blockade is really a prohibition on entering Italian waters, and ships that violate it would face fines of up to €50,000 (approx. US$ 57,000), with repeat offenders facing confiscation. Since civil society rescue vessels are the only ships making multiple trips in and out of Italian waters, they are the primary target. This is not simply a border management tool; it’s a deliberate escalation of state control over maritime arrivals.

More significantly, the bill would make the Italy-Albania protocol permanent: migrants intercepted at sea would be transported directly to Italian-run processing centres in Albania, bypassing Italian mainland ports entirely. Their asylum claims would be determined outside Italy’s jurisdiction. Because they never reach Italian soil, they wouldn’t access Italian legal protections or independent judicial review. The government is determined to use this mechanism. Albanian facilities held only 10 to 15 people due to adverse court rulings, but the government has recently ramped up transfers to take the number to around 80.

How does the bill change asylum and border management practices?

The bill focuses on criminalisation, deportations and removals rather than asylum procedures. It introduces stricter rules for immigration detention centres (Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri, CPRs), expands expulsion grounds to include minor criminal convictions and ramps up criminal penalties for people facing expulsion. This effectively criminalises irregular status itself.

Critically, the bill eliminates special protection, a form of national protection that Italian courts have frequently recognised for people who don’t meet narrow refugee criteria but face serious risks if they are returned. This has been one of the few remaining meaningful pathways to legal status. Stricter eligibility criteria would reduce judicial discretion, trapping more people in legal irregularity.

Finally, the bill implements the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of EU laws overhauling asylum and border procedures across the bloc, which member states must transpose by 12 June. It does so through legislative delegation, giving the government wide discretion to enact implementing measures by decree. Italy’s approach is the most restrictive possible. The Albania externalisation model is the primary mechanism, prioritising rapid removal over thorough examination. Changes to asylum procedures will be determined through executive action, with limited parliamentary scrutiny.

What is remigration, and why does it concern civil society?

Remigration is a white supremacist concept that calls for the forced removal of immigrants, refugees and their descendants, including legal residents and naturalised citizens, on grounds of ethnicity, race or perceived failure to ‘assimilate’. It targets people for who they are, not what they have done, violating the non-discrimination principle that underpins human rights law and the rule of law.

What makes this dangerous is that remigration has moved from marginal to mainstream political discourse. A far-right petition on remigration has recently gathered enough signatures to force a parliamentary debate. When such concepts gain mainstream legitimacy, they push other parties towards increasingly restrictive policies. Italy’s current bills move precisely in that direction.

From a legal perspective, remigration violates international human rights conventions and Italy’s constitution, which guarantees non-discrimination and solidarity. A policy based on ethnic or racial identity would also be incompatible with Italy’s international obligations.

Where do these measures conflict with international law?

The measures create serious tensions with several binding legal instruments: the 1951 Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and EU primary law including the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Expanded administrative detention in Italy and Albania risks being arbitrary where the legal basis is insufficiently precise or subject to inadequate judicial review. Documented conditions in Italian CPRs and foreseeable conditions in Albanian centres expose people to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The externalisation model creates a direct risk of violating the non-refoulement principle, the absolute prohibition on returning people to places where they face persecution.

The government will argue these measures align with the EU Pact. But alignment with the pact does not guarantee compatibility with the ECHR or the Geneva Convention. ASGI will respond with litigation, through individual cases and strategic cases targeting CPR detention and the Italy-Albania deal, and documentation of the human costs of these policies.

What risks do these policies pose for migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights?

Under the proposed legislation, Italy would intercept boats and transfer rescued migrants to extraterritorial centres without assessing their health status, protection needs or vulnerabilities. Victims of persecution, torture and trafficking may never get to present their claims or be identified as needing protection.

The bill criminalises irregular migrants by allowing both administrative detention in CPRs and criminal imprisonment in prisons, a dual-track approach that multiplies the risk of fundamental rights violations and exposure to degrading conditions. Detention in existing CPRs is already documented as dangerous. Conditions in the Albanian centres, with minimal oversight and no independent monitoring, would predictably be worse.

The result is a system designed to process people quickly rather than accurately. Trafficking victims, torture survivors and people with severe mental health conditions — people who most need careful assessment and legal support — are unlikely to be identified and protected. Compressed timelines and limited access to lawyers amount to a serious restriction on the right to effective judicial protection.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Migration: Cruelty as policy CIVICUS | 2026 State of Civil Society Report
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Italy: ‘No migration policy should be based on fear and punishment’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Valeria Carlini 17.Nov.2024

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Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Interim Head of MONUSCO, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

In the month following the reopening of the Burundi-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has deteriorated considerably, recently marked by an influx of Congolese refugees returning home, where they face overcrowded conditions and a severe shortage of essential services. This comes in the midst of escalating clashes between rebel groups AFC and M23, and forces affiliated with the Kinshasa government, with drone strikes causing widespread destruction and pushing violence closer to Burundi’s borders, where conditions are most dire.

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), described the current humanitarian situation as “extremely volatile”. During a press stakeout on March 26, she highlighted that the rapid spread of the conflict from North and South Kivu into Tshopo Province and toward Burundi’s borders is a major concern, warning that it increases the risk of a broader “regional conflagration.”

Van de Perre also warned that armed militants have been increasingly relying on the use of heavy weapons and drone strikes in densely populated urban areas, which have caused great damage to civilian infrastructure as well as serious risks to civilian safety, underscoring recent violent incidents at the Kisagani Bangoka International Airport and in Goma, the largest city in North Kivu. Additionally, she warned of M23’s growing presence in Goma, where the coalition has managed to gain influence, undermine state authority, and disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries.

Furthermore, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC (UNJHRO) has uncovered a considerable rise in human rights violations committed by armed groups. Since December 2025, approximately 173 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented, affecting at least 111 victims, the majority of whom were women and girls.

Van de Perre described these findings as “only the tip of the iceberg,” and highlighted growing rates of exploitation, particularly along artisanal mining sites, where child labour is especially pronounced. Armed groups have also been alleged to hamper monitoring, investigation, and justice mechanisms, and subject human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors to intimidation and arbitrary detention.

This follows a sharp escalation of hostilities between the armed groups in December 2025, which forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese to flee to Burundi, most coming from Uvira in South Kivu Province and the surrounding areas. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) show that after M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and a relative return of stability, more than 33,000 refugees began returning home since the border’s reopening on February 23, with most crossing through the Kavimira border point. Many of these returnees already received little humanitarian assistance in Burundi due to chronic underfunding.

“Conditions in many areas of return in the DRC remain fragile, with acute humanitarian needs,” said Ali Mahamat, UNHCR Head of Sub-Office in Goma, DRC, on March 24 at a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. “Initial UNHCR assessments in Uvira and Fizi show families arriving with few belongings, in urgent need of shelter, basic household items, health care, and access to water and sanitation. Many returned to find their homes destroyed and belongings looted, leaving them in deep despair and unable to resume normal life without substantial support.”

According to the latest updates from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), roughly 60 percent of returnees are living in damaged shelters and over 30 percent face challenges accessing their land. Returnees face heightened risks of gender-based violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, extortion, and exploitation, with female-headed households disproportionately affected due to limited livelihood opportunities for women, which leave these communities entrenched in poverty and especially vulnerable.

Figures from UNHCR show that approximately 30 percent of returnees had been taking refuge in Burundi’s Busama displacement camp, where they faced significant levels of overcrowding and limited access to clean water, sanitation services, healthcare, and shelter. Currently, roughly 4,500 Congolese refugees remain stuck at transit points as they await being relocated to Busama. Additionally, Burundi continues to host over 109,000 Congolese refugees, with 67,000 of them in Busuma alone.

Additionally, internal displacement remains widespread in the DRC, with more than 6.4 million people currently displaced. IFRC estimates that over 5.2 million internally displaced Congolese are concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, 96 percent as a result of ongoing armed violence. According to van de Perre, over 26.6 million people, roughly a quarter of DRC’s population, are projected to face food insecurity this year.

Currently, UNHCR’s response plan to assist returnees, refugees, and displaced Congolese civilians is only 34 percent funded, seeking a total of USD 145 million. MONUSCO is currently on the frontlines providing protection services for nearly 3,000 civilians in Djaiba village. Through the mission, the UN has been able to support over 18,000 farmers in harvesting and transporting crops and has conducted 204 patrols. Van de Perre stressed that stronger governance and security enforcement are crucial in protecting vulnerable civilians, and disarmament and repatriation efforts must be conducted to resolve broader regional tensions.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses Portugal’s presidential runoff election and the rise of the far-right Chega (Enough) party with Jonni Lopes, Executive Director of Academia Cidadã (Citizen Academy) and a Steering Committee member of the European Civic Forum, an organisation working on civic engagement, democratic participation and the protection of civic space at national, regional and international levels.

Jonni Lopes

Why did centre-right voters back a Socialist candidate?

Despite not agreeing with his politics, centre-right voters backed a Socialist candidate to build a firewall around the presidency, recognising that the office demands deliberation, predictability and respect for democratic rules, none of which Chega represents. Seguro’s campaign made this possible. He distanced himself from party politics, avoided turning the race into a debate about the Socialist Party and positioned himself as a stable figure capable of providing institutional continuity during a political crisis.

This was practical risk management, not ideology. The centre-right Social Democratic Party is pushing labour law changes that triggered a joint general strike in December, with over three million workers participating. With Chega already holding significant parliamentary power, voters feared that a far-right president would go further still, using veto powers not to check the government’s agenda, but to entrench it and block any legislation protecting workers’ rights.

This coalition shows that a clear boundary against the far right still exists, at least when it comes to leading the state. It’s a defensive pact: democrats can disagree on policy, but there’s a line when it comes to handing power to a reactionary force that threatens democratic institutions.

What does the result mean for Portugal and Europe?

For Portugal, this result is a temporary reprieve for democracy. Seguro won two-thirds of the second-round vote and over 3.5 million votes, the most ever cast for a presidential candidate in Portugal, despite storms that disrupted voting. This shows that, faced with a genuine far-right threat, Portuguese democracy can still mobilise broadly to defend itself.

But this wasn’t a clear victory against the far right. Ventura won one-third of the vote, strengthened his base and positioned himself as a serious contender for right-wing leadership. In just a few years, Chega has gone from a fringe party to parliament’s second largest.

This sends a mixed message to Europe: broad democratic coalitions can still prevent far-right candidates reaching the top office, but the far right is now mainstream, shapes political agendas and forces other parties to constantly define themselves in relation to it. This is the new normal. This matters particularly for the European Commission, as far-right movements are structural threats and the only response is to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Where does Chega go from here?

Ventura lost the presidential election, but Chega has emerged stronger. Winning a third of the vote against a candidate backed by the entire democratic spectrum cements its position. Ventura can now claim to speak for a significant portion of the right, and his loss only strengthens that claim, as he can frame the firewall as evidence that the political system is rigged against him, feeding narratives of elite persecution. He will also use his parliamentary strength to extract concessions by supporting or blocking the government’s budget and pushing on immigration and security, winning enough policy gains to show he delivers for his voters.

Ventura has already said that support for stability ‘has limits’. If the government hits serious problems, such as a budget crisis or a political deadlock, Chega will position itself as the only force willing to break the impasse and ‘fix things’. He’s not treating the presidential loss as the end of his political project but as a stepping stone to bigger gains in future elections. His calculation is that electoral legitimacy can eventually become governmental power.

What does this mean for civic space and civil society?

Portugal’s civic space is shrinking. Hate speech is becoming normalised, immigration rules are tightening, government administration is becoming more exclusionary, protest organisers face police intimidation and civil society organisations are struggling financially. These create real barriers to people exercising their rights. Chega’s rise and its racist and xenophobic rhetoric now heard in parliament raise the risk that discrimination and violence against migrants will become politically acceptable.

A president committed to rights protection can set limits: vetoing discriminatory laws, refusing to suppress information the public needs and protecting communities and organisations under attack. The presidency alone cannot reverse the shrinking of civic space, but it can prevent the government from fully institutionalising a far-right agenda.

Human rights organisations, labour movements and migrant groups see this moment as an opportunity to strengthen protections, not a final victory. Turnout held strong despite devastating storms and emergency conditions, evidence that people were genuinely mobilised by the threat, particularly urban voters connected to civil society, including unions, who had already fought the government over labour rights. The organisations that coordinated the strike now expect the president to use his powers to defend rights.

How should Seguro use his presidential powers?

Seguro has been clear he won’t be the reason parliament is dissolved, and has committed to working with the government while demanding ‘solutions and results’. This means dissolution of parliament will be a last resort in a genuine crisis, not a tactical move to tackle normal political disagreements. He will use his veto power to block laws he thinks violate the constitution and rights and mediate between the government and opposition to push them towards compromise.

The challenge will be to keep the democratic parties, both government and opposition, at the centre while Chega tries to dictate the agenda. If Seguro dissolves parliament too quickly or without a strong reason, he’ll just fuel Chega’s narrative that the system is broken. If he’s too passive and doesn’t use his veto when rights are threatened, he’ll look complicit in democratic erosion. Both scenarios would help Chega: either the system looks incapable of functioning, or it looks unwilling to defend people’s rights.

Seguro will have to walk a very fine line between doing too much and doing too little, while a far-right opposition waits to exploit whatever mistakes he makes. If he gets it wrong, his historic electoral victory will give way to deeper crisis rather than democratic renewal.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Portugal’s far-right surge CIVICUS Lens 30.May.2025
‘Civil society must engage to prevent discussions devolving into demagoguery’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jorge Máximo 28.May.2025
‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Ana Carmo 19.Feb.2024

Who benefits from a war of choice against Iran?

The immediate political winners may include President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But if the war continues for a longer period, the political consequences for both Trump and Netanyahu could be uncertain. However, the most consistent beneficiaries are defense contractors, defense manufacturers and military lobbyists, who profit regardless of the outcome.

A. K. Abdul Momen

Despite vast reserves of oil and gas, the very engines of global prosperity—many nations across the region continue to face instability, poverty, and insecurity. From Palestine to Yemen, and from Iraq to Afghanistan, millions lack basic necessities, including food, safety, and economic opportunity.

In fact, millions of people in Muslims countries like Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Oman, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, etc have been suffering from war and terror, from food deficiency and safety and security of life and liberty.

No wonder, their wealth often flows outward, with elites investing in more stable, non-Muslim countries rather than building productive industries, infrastructure, or research capacity at home. Their investment, if any, in their home countries or Muslim communities are mostly concentrated in building a mosque, a prayer house or a madrassa for poor students.

They are reluctant to build a hospital, a road, a manufacturing or industrial plant, a bridge, a technical school or a research center. This imbalance contributes to long-term structural weakness.

A critical question emerges: what ensures national security?

Increasingly, it appears that states possessing nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities enjoy greater deterrence and stability. The case of North Korea illustrates this paradox.

Despite isolation and adversaries, it maintains regime security through nuclear capability. This raises a troubling implication: does survival in today’s world require nuclear armament? Should their leadership acquire nuclear capability to safeguard their national security and stability?

The consequences of a U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran would extend far beyond the battlefield. Even after hostilities end, the region would likely face prolonged economic damage, weakened infrastructure, and fractured political trust.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Lebanon and Iran could suffer severe economic disruption and internal instability.

Moreover, the strategic dynamics of such a conflict risk deepening divisions within the Muslim world itself. Military actions and retaliations particularly involving foreign bases in regional states could lead to intra-regional damage, further destabilizing already fragile alliances.

Another question, should leadership allow foreign bases in its home turf to guarantee national security? Or will it welcome more insecurity and conflict? Should leadership deny foreign bases in its own territory? Can they avoid such bases?

In case of Bangladesh, the ousted popular Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina refused her territory to be used as a military base for a foreign government and it cost her job, her government was overthrown. Can they afford to deny a powerful foreign government?

From a geopolitical perspective, wars of this nature often reshape control over resources and influence. Economic motivations particularly access to energy and mineral resources cannot be overlooked in understanding strategic decision-making.

This leads to a deeper ethical question: do power and victory ultimately outweigh principles such as justice, human rights, and moral leadership? Ethics, human rights, fairness and morality are these the sermons of the weak and priests only? Does Machiavelli sounds right— survival of the fittest?

In fact, the logic often resembles the political realism associated with Niccolò Machiavelli—where success is measured by survival and dominance rather than ethical conduct. Machiavelli describes a sneaky, cunning, and manipulative personality that uses deceit, duplicity, and unethical methods to achieve goals often in politics and business as a success story.

And history tends to remember the victors only. Yet the long-term cost—human suffering, instability, and moral compromise—raises the question of whether victory alone defines true leadership.

Professor Dr. A. K. Abdul Momen is Former Foreign Minister of Bangladesh

IPS UN Bureau

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A Sudanese family in rural Wasat AL Gadaref, Gedaref State, near Khartoum, Sudan. Credit: UNICEF/Osman Saif

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

The past two weeks have marked a significantly violent escalation in the Sudanese Civil War, with drone strikes and artillery shelling between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) causing widespread destruction, casualties, and displacement. With humanitarian responses critically underfunded and the scale of needs, including the hunger crisis, continuing to grow, experts warn that millions in Sudan could be affected by famine, violence, or prolonged displacement.

Since March 4, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recorded more than 200 civilian deaths resulting from drone strikes in the Kordofan region and White Nile State. In West Kordofan, SAF drone strikes have killed at least 152 civilians, hitting densely populated areas including hospitals and markets. The conflict has also spread to White Nile State, where strikes have targeted the state capital, Kosti, as well as electrical facilities—causing widespread power outages—and a student dormitory.

“It is deeply troubling that despite multiple reminders, warnings, and appeals, parties to the conflict in Sudan continue to use increasingly powerful drones to deploy explosive weapons with wide-area impacts in populated areas,” said Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “It will soon be three full years since the senseless conflict in Sudan began, devastating millions of lives and livelihoods. Yet the violence, fueled by these new technologies of war, simply keeps spreading. It is high time it came to an end.”

South Darfur has also been heavily affected, with drone strikes on March 12 and 13 causing extensive damage across multiple neighborhoods. In West Darfur, strikes on a market in Akidong triggered a massive explosion that impacted the Adre border crossing—a critical lifeline for humanitarian aid deliveries and a key route in preventing widespread starvation. On March 16, a deadly drone strike hit the Sudan-Chad border in Chad’s Tine region, killing 17 people and injuring several others. Local eyewitnesses told reporters that the strikes hit mourners at a funeral, as well as children playing nearby.

UN Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that the attack reflects a growing pattern of violence affecting border communities, raising concerns about broader regional instability between neighboring countries. “The UN calls once again on all parties to comply with their clearly known obligations under international humanitarian law, which include protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and ensuring the rapid, safe, unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to whoever needs it, and wherever it is needed,” Haq said.

Following the attack, Chad bolstered its security forces along the Sudan-Chad border to prepare for defensive operations. On March 19, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby confirmed in a statement shared to social media that Chad’s army has been ordered to “retaliate, starting from tonight, to any attack coming from Sudan.”

“Despite various firm warnings addressed to the different belligerents in the Sudan conflict and the closure of the border, the town of Tine has again been the target of a drone attack,” said a spokesperson for the Chadian government. “This latest assault of extreme gravity has caused the death of 17 of our compatriots and left several others injured.”

As violence continues to escalate and spill across borders, its humanitarian consequences within Sudan are becoming increasingly pronounced. Figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that approximately 9 million people are currently internally displaced across Sudan, marking one of the largest displacement crises in the world. On March 17, several people were killed in the Bara locality, northeast of El Obeid City, the capital of North Kordofan, causing over 150 displacements from Sherim Mima Village in Bara to Um Dam Haj alone.

Displacement has gone down in recent days, with roughly 3.8 million civilians recorded to have begun returning home, particularly to Khartoum and eastern regions. Despite this, returnees face a host of challenges, including the loss of their livelihoods, infrastructure damage, and a lack of access to basic services. Roughly 55 percent of internally displaced civilians were children under 18 years old.

Additional reports from humanitarian agencies paint a grim picture of the conditions that civilians face. Doctors Without Borders, also known as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), reports that civilians are at great risk of being harmed by explosive remnants on the ground, recording 23 injuries, including four women and seven children, sustaining severe injuries.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that rampant and concurrent outbreaks of cholera, measles, dengue, and Hepatitis E. have overwhelmed national health systems, which were already weakened by the vast influx of injured persons.

The World Food Programme (WFP) states that approximately 21.2 million people are currently food insecure across Sudan, with women and children disproportionately affected. The majority of female-headed households are critically food insecure. According to UNICEF, “catastrophic” malnutrition rates were recorded in Um Baru and Kornoi in North Darfur. Numerous regions are at risk of developing famine-like conditions and face severe shortages of food, clean water, healthcare, and other basic services.

Despite immense access challenges, the UN and its partners have been working on the frontlines to restore access to basic services, managing to install eight 2,000-liter water tanks in displacement shelters and schools. UNICEF has reached struggling communities with food assistance and vaccination programs, providing 787,000 children with nutrition screenings, 25,100 children with malnutrition treatment, and over 540,000 children with vaccines for Measles and Rubella.

However, these efforts remain severely constrained by chronic underfunding, with the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan being only 16 percent funded, reaching only $454 million of its $2.9 billion goal, which would assist over 20 million crisis-affected civilians across the country. An additional $1.6 billion is required to reach refugees and host communities in neighboring countries.

IPS UN Bureau

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By Mohammad Rakibul Hasan
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

My Name is Dhaka is a one-minute experimental film portraying Dhaka as a living, breathing entity with a 400-year history. Through a reflective voice, the city recounts its transformations, crises, and resilience. It captures contrasts between pollution and celebration, hardship and hope, revealing a megacity shaped by climate change, migration, and human survival.

I am also one of the world’s climate hotspots. My rivers swell, my heat rises, and my air grows heavier each year. I often rank among the most polluted cities in the world.

I remember the silence of the coronavirus pandemic when my streets suddenly emptied. I remember the fear and chaos of bus bombings during the political unrest of 2013 – 14. And I remember the fall of a fascist regime in 2024.

But I am not only a city of crisis. I am a city of contrasts. I hold stories of child labor and deep social injustice, where many struggle just to survive. At the same time, I celebrate life my streets burst into color during Holi, and my people find joy even in hardship.

Credit: Mohammad Rakibul Hasan

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On 5 March, thousands of people, including many children, fled their homes in the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut, with many gathering in the streets or attempting to reach safer areas. Children are among the most affected as families face displacement, uncertainty and limited access to essential services. Credit: UNICEF Lebanon

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 13 2026 (IPS)

During a solidarity visit to Lebanon, the UN chief announced a flash appeal of USD 308.3 million to support humanitarian operations there in the wake of escalated fighting.

The humanitarian appeal is intended to reach the more than 816,000 people within Lebanon that have been displaced due to the most recent fighting in the Middle East region. Nearly two weeks since the United States, Israel and Iran engaged in a military offensive, this has brought about a new wave of displacement and civilian casualties impacting the entire region.

The appeal comes at a time of increased fighting between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that at least 634 people have been killed and more than 1500 have been injured since the start of the fighting on March 2. The number of displaced people is expected to rise as Israeli evacuation orders force people, including up to 300,000 children, to flee to safety. The fighting reached further escalation on Thursday, Israeli forces launched missiles parts of the southern suburbs and the Bashoura neighborhood in Beirut.

On Friday, UN Secretary-General António Guterres began a solidarity visit to Lebanon, coming straight from Ankara, Türkiye. He met with Lebanese leadership, including Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, to discuss the current situation. He has called for all parties to end the hostilities and for negotiations that would respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Guterres commended the work of UN agencies and humanitarian partners in delivering essential needs and to local communities supporting those impacted.

“These efforts are saving lives. But they need a big boost of support,” Guterres said on Friday. “The Flash Appeal we launch today will sustain and expand life‑saving assistance over the next three months – including food, clean water, health care, education, protection, and other vital services. Its success depends on swift, flexible funding – and on ensuring that humanitarian workers can safely reach those most in need.”

According to UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric, since March 12 the UN and its humanitarian partners have distributed 632,000 hot meals and 18,000 ready-to-eat meals, and have provided more than 2000 liters of bottled water and over 1700 cubic meters of clean water.

Additional funding from the UN system has also been mobilized to support Lebanon. Earlier this week, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher announced that USD 15 million would be mobilized from the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), along with a reserve allocation from the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund.

Fletcher warned the UN Security Council that humanitarian workers’ ability to reach people was “tightening by the day”, as they must navigate within active conflict zones and key transport routes are blocked due to debris, making it more difficult to reach affected communities.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses the situation in Venezuela following US intervention and the ousting of President Nicolás Maduro with Verónica Zubillaga, a Venezuelan sociologist who specialises in urban violence, state repression and community responses to armed violence.

Verónica Zubillaga

Is the recently announced amnesty a real opening or a strategic manoeuvre?

We are at an unprecedented crossroads. Venezuela and its Chavista regime, under US tutelage and despite two decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, are reconfiguring themselves in such a way that some opening could result. However, there is still a risk that an authoritarian model will be consolidated, with economic and humanitarian concessions, but without real democratisation.

The release of political prisoners — a constant demand in all negotiations with international support, and a low-cost form of early opening for the interim government that has taken over from Maduro — could function as a stepping stone towards democratisation. The restoration of civil, political and social rights will be a difficult and lengthy struggle in this context of such deprivation, in which our rights have been violated for so long.

In the first half of February, there were partial and gradual releases, but hundreds of people remained in detention. The enactment of the Amnesty Law on 19 February has accelerated the releases.

The announcement was presented as a political concession, not as a recognition of the extensive human rights violations committed by Maduro’s government. There has been no mention yet of initiating processes to seek the truth, hold those responsible accountable, provide reparations or dismantle the repressive apparatus, which are urgent.

We therefore need to react with caution. The release of people deprived of their liberty for political reasons is essential, but it cannot replace a broader agenda of justice, reparation and institutional transformation.

How has civil society worked to keep this issue at the centre of the debate?

The cause of political prisoners is cross-cutting. There are detained people of different ages, social classes and political backgrounds. In a society as polarised as ours, this is one of the few causes around which there is broad consensus.

After the results of the presidential election of 28 July 2024, which the opposition clearly won, were disregarded, it was mainly people from the working classes who took to the streets to protest. Many young people, including teenagers, were arrested and imprisoned. This situation significantly deepened the social dimension of the problem, highlighted the break between the ruling party and its traditional base and consolidated the brutally authoritarian nature and illegitimacy of Maduro’s government.

There is also an important gender dimension. While many young men are in prison, it is women – mothers, sisters and other relatives – who have organised committees, vigils and public actions demanding their release. Symbolically, the figure of the grieving mother demanding the release of her children is particularly powerful. It is a symbol that appeals to the Latin American imagination about women and their cries for democratisation, justice and reparation in the context of crumbling authoritarian regimes.

Recently, the demand for the release of political prisoners has also been raised by the student movement in its call for a rally at the Central University of Venezuela. After a year and a half of brutal repression following the 2024 election, which emptied the streets and created a climate of widespread fear, any public demonstration is a significant sign that could trigger a chain of progressive demands and the vindication of civil, political and social rights.

What has been the impact of the USA’s renewed interest in Venezuelan oil?

It is clear that the Trump administration is fixated on oil and investment opportunities and completely disregards democracy and human rights. The part of the opposition represented by María Corina Machado has been stunned by its exclusion from key decision-making despite its efforts to gain Donald Trump’s attention. This exclusion has altered the internal political balance.

Historically, there has been tension within the Venezuelan opposition between those who favour resorting to external pressure and those who prioritise internal negotiation strategies. Since 2014, two main strategies have coexisted: one that is more confrontational, demanding the immediate end of the government, and another favouring negotiation or elections. Civil society mirrors these same divisions. One of the difficulties of the Venezuelan process is this constant fragmentation and internal disagreements within the opposition. As the government has become more authoritarian, these divisions have prevented more powerful coordinated political action. It is important for the opposition to coordinate strategies and, instead of wearing itself down in these disagreements, coordinate efforts to move strategically between confrontation and negotiation.

Whenever the opposition has managed to coordinate, as in the 2015 legislative and 2024 presidential elections, it made significant gains. During the 2024 campaign led by Machado, the opposition achieved an unprecedented level of coordination, generating enormous collective hope, particularly with regard to the prospect of family reunification in a country with over eight million migrants. This situation affects people of all social classes and political ideologies. But in response, the government redoubled its repression and consolidated the dictatorship. This led to frustration, demobilisation and further fragmentation. The opposition lacked a long-term strategy to sustain its gains and withstand setbacks. This is still one of the biggest challenges today.

What should the international community do to contribute to real democratisation?

The international community, and Latin American states in particular, could have taken a firmer stance after the 2024 electoral fraud. Silence and a lukewarm approach weakened the defence of democracy. Now it should not repeat that mistake. Beyond Maduro’s profound delegitimisation, the US military operation in Venezuela is a sign of what could happen to any Latin American country under the US government’s new national security strategy.

With the USA as an imperial power primarily concerned with its geostrategic interests and oil resources, demands for democratisation may take a back seat. An authoritarian model that is economically stable but without real democratisation could become entrenched.

In this context, the USA’s prioritisation of energy interests is worrying. It is an unprecedented scenario in which external intervention and the permanence of the ruling party in power coexist. The situation is highly volatile, and this has only just begun. A period of instability and political violence could follow if the civil-military coalition in power breaks down, which may happen given the tradition of anti-imperialist discourse rooted in the armed forces during the two and a half decades of Chavista rule.

Ironically, the USA’s focus on energy interests could result in the defence of sovereignty becoming a new unifying cause for the Venezuelan opposition, potentially leading to basic agreements between the ruling party post-Maduro and the opposition to defend Venezuelan oil interests. What’s at stake is recovering politics as an exercise involving conflict and struggle, as well as recognition and exchange for democratic coexistence — something we have lost, particularly over the past decade.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent

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‘Although the repressive architecture remains intact, a small window of hope has opened’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Luz Mely Reyes 05.Feb.2026
Venezuela: democracy no closer CIVICUS Lens 29.Jan.2026
‘We are seeing an economic transition, but no democratic transition’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Guillermo Miguelena 26.Jan.2026

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On 3 March 2026, at a public school in Mount Lebanon, UNICEF team is on the ground providing emergency supplies including mattresses, blankets, water, hygiene, baby and dignity kits UNICEF and other UN humanitarian agencies have begun mobilizing aid and emergency supplies to families in Lebanon and across the Middle East region. Credit: UNICEF/Fouad Choufany

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 6 2026 (IPS)

As military fighting breaks out across the Middle East with increasing frequency and intensity, the United Nations promises to ramp up its humanitarian response on the ground.

Armed attacks have been ongoing since February 28 when the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran, who retaliated with their own airstrikes on Israel and Arab Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. Since then, military strikes have continued between these states, and the fighting has only exacerbated tensions in neighboring states. In Lebanon, military skirmishes have broken out between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Hezbollah, which has led to a spike in internal displacements.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 330,000 people have been forcibly displaced in the last few days, mostly within their own countries. In Lebanon, nearly 84,000 people are seeking shelter in 400 collective sites. Within Iran, more than 1.6 million refugees, most from Afghanistan, have been forcibly displaced. Fighting along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has led to the displacement of nearly 118,000 people in both countries.

These overlapping crises within one region marks what UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs called a “moment of great peril”, and an example of “increased linkages” between these humanitarian crises. Fletcher called for a de-escalation and an immediate end to the fighting, and for diplomatic dialogue and peaceful negotiation to resume, including between the parties involved.

Fletcher briefed reporters on Friday on the situation in the Middle East, announcing that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is “fully mobilized” across the region, preparing humanitarian teams and supplies into the affected areas. They have begun distributing food, aid and shelter to thousands of affected civilians across the region.

UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher briefs reporters in New York on the situation in the Middle East. Credit: UN Web TV

Fletcher warned that as this war within the Middle East continued, there would be far-reaching consequences. “War doesn’t stay neatly within borders or on desktop military plans,” he said., referring to the impact on the global market and supply chains as the war disrupts access to commercial goods and energy sources. Of note, the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime corridor that borders Iran and a strategic route for oil and natural gas exports, has seen a near-total halt of traffic due to strikes in and around the channel, causing the global prices of gas and oil to surge. Fletcher warned that this will put greater strain on public services, food prices and even constrain humanitarian operations.

As humanitarian resources and global attention is drawn to the Middle East, Fletcher also raised concerns that this will divert attention away from other humanitarian crises in areas like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan and Ukraine, among others.

Humanitarian actors are scaling their response to the countries affected by the conflicts, notably in Iran. Since February 28, there have been over 1000 reported instances of damage to civilian infrastructure, and close to 1600 people have been injured or killed in the airstrikes.

The military strikes already have reported children among the casualties thus far. In Iran, about 180 children have been killed in airstrikes while they were in school, according to UNICEF. In a statement issued on March 5, they warned that such casualties stand as a “stark reminder of the brutality of war and violence” on children that affects families and generations thereafter. In Lebanon, since the escalation of hostilities seven children have been killed and 38 have been injured.

The conflict has also complicated humanitarian operations and essential supply routes. Ongoing missile airstrikes in the region have disrupted airspace. As other sources have reported, this has forced many commercial flights to be postponed or canceled as some countries in the region have closed their airspace. For humanitarian operations, airspace closure and security restrictions have affected the movement of supplies and personnel. On this, Fletcher noted that OCHA has already pre-positioned supplies and identified alternate routes to send supplies through.

“Humanitarian action is always harder in times of war, but this is of course when it is most needed,” said Fletcher. “…The humanitarian movement will, once again, meet this moment. We’ll continue to serve those who need us.”

This most recent conflict already risks moving beyond the borders of the Middle East. Reports have emerged from Türkiye of an Iranian missile heading into Turkish airspace that was then destroyed by NATO forces, and Azerbaijan has accused Iranian drones of attacking an airport building in the exclave of Nakhchivan.

“It is critical that this conflict does not extend even further into new areas and into bringing new countries into this conflict,” UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said on Friday.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres posted on X (formerly Twitter) to warn the attacks in the Middle East are causing “tremendous suffering and harm to civilians throughout the region”, and that the situation “could spiral beyond anyone’s control”. “It is time to stop the fighting and get to serious diplomatic negotiations. The stakes could not be higher.”

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The ordinary sounds of Nahid Ali’s home in Khartoum were completely drowned out by the sound of war which began on April 15 2023. Her baby was just 21 days old. The morning started as any typical day for a mother who had just given birth to her baby and needed to nurse her newborn while she took care of her other children. The gunfire began to erupt. The fighting began when two groups started to battle each other in the streets. The fighting which began in her area developed into a destructive countrywide war in Sudan which spread to her street within moments.

Credit: Nahid Ali, Communications Manager, Plan International

As a mother, she could not protect her children from the sound of airstrikes or the fear of hunger. As a humanitarian, she felt the crisis in her bones. “I became one of the people I used to help,” she says. Now, when mothers describe fleeing under fire or struggling to feed their children, she does not simply empathize. She understands. The war which forced Nahid to leave her house has developed into one of worlds worst humanitarian crisis. The World Health Organization estimates that more than 30.4 million people which represents two-thirds of the global population now require humanitarian assistance, including 7 million internally displaced people. Cities have been shattered, communities have emptied, front lines shift, but civilians remain trapped in the wreakage created by this war.

Sudan’s health infrastructure has come crumbling down under the pressure of the conflict. Over 70 percent of the health facilities are not functioning. Hospitals have been bombed, looted, or occupied. Healthcare staff have either fled, not been paid, or have been killed. Disease is rampant in the crowded camps, and lack of medication is the new normal. What was once curable is now fatal.

The situation is being made worse by the effects of the climate change and the economic collapse. The purchasing power has been eroded by the high rates of inflation. The prices of food have skyrocketed. Water is now a luxury. People are not eating for days. The situation is affecting the women, children, elderly, and the displaced the most.

The situation has now spread beyond the borders of Sudan. The conflict has displaced over 2.9 million people into Chad, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan. These nations are already dealing with health challenges of their own.

The conflict started in April 2023, as tension between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces transformed into an armed conflict in Khartoum. The conflict has since spread across the Darfur region. What started as a political power struggle has now resulted in the displacement of populations, starvation, and genocide.

In a report released by the United Nations, an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan established that the “evidence establishes the existence of at least three underlying acts of genocide in Darfur. These are the killing of members of the protected ethnic group, the causing of serious bodily and mental harm, and the deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part.”

The report is based on the situation in El Fasher, the capital of the state of North Darfur, a town besieged for 18 months before the main attack. The report established the “scale, coordination, and public endorsement of the operation by senior RSF leadership demonstrate that the crimes committed in and around El Fasher were not random excesses of war,” said Mohamed Chande Othman, chair of the mission. “They formed part of a planned and organized operation that bears the defining characteristics of genocide.”

Children are at the eye of this storm.

According to UNICEF, there are an estimated 1.3 million children in areas where famine is already taking place. Over 770,000 children are expected to face severe acute malnutrition this year. Many of them will not survive. In the final six months of 2024 alone, there were over 900 grave violations against children reported, eighty percent of them were killings, mainly in Darfur, Khartoum, and Gezira Province. These are just a few of the reported cases, which humanitarian agencies say is just a small fraction of the true extent of the crisis.

The Integrated Food Security Phase classification (IPC) said the thresholds for acute malnutrition were surpassed in two new areas of North Darfur, Um Baru and Kernoi, following the fall of the regional capital, El Fasher, in October 2025 and a massive exodus. December assessments found acute malnutrition levels among children of 52.9 per cent in Um Baru, nearly twice the famine threshold and about 34 per cent in Kernoi.

It is a challenging job to deliver aid to the war-torn areas. The roads are either unsafe or impassable, bureaucratic delays are common too and the armed groups attack aid convoys as well. “Sometimes the assistance cannot even arrive,” Nahid says.

In these places of displacement, Nahid witnesses the toll taken on the human body by the numbers.

“Sexual violence is a tool of war. Many of the women we meet were attacked as they fled their homes. Some were forced to watch as their friends were attacked in front of family members. Some are pregnant, waiting for services that might never materialize.” The trauma these women face is compounded by shame and a total lack of services.

In some communities, the shame of rape leads to the forced marriage of the raped women to the rapist. This provides a context for the child born of rape, it’s a way to give the family a sense of honour. But the damage done by this violence cannot be overstated. The girls who were raped have yet to open up about the violence they experienced, psychosocial services for these women are scarce, safe havens are hard to find and their needs are overwhelming. Children come to the camps alone, separated, orphaned, lost. Some saw their families die. Some crossed through combat zones to escape.

Nahid recalls a six-year-old girl who is always scared, she describes how in Sudan, women wear a traditional attire called the tobe. Whenever the girl sees a woman wearing a tobe, she runs towards her crying, “My mother, my mother.” She hopes against all hopes that this woman is her real mom, Nahid says.

“We need the world not to forget Sudan.” She says this is what she hopes for: more solidarity from the world community, more funding, more pressure on governments.

What keeps her going is the strength she sees all around her. She sees women organizing community kitchens from scratch. She sees families sharing the little food they have. She sees women organizing their own support groups. Sudanese women inspire her most. Many have lost homes, livelihoods, and loved ones, and yet, they still care for children, advocate for services, and hold communities together.

“They have lost so much,” Nahid says. “But they are still standing.”

Sania Farooqui is an independent journalist, host of The Peace Brief, a platform dedicated to amplifying women’s voices in peacebuilding and human rights. Sania has previously worked with CNN, Al Jazeera and TIME.

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Credit: Georgios Kostomitsopoulos/NurPhoto via Getty Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 24 2026 (IPS)

The Islamic Republic of Iran has put down another uprising, with a ferocity that makes previous crackdowns seem restrained. The theocratic regime has survived, but it has done so by substituting violence for the economic security it cannot provide and the political legitimacy it no longer has. Its show of force is also an admission of weakness.

The protests that began on 28 December were triggered by a specific event — the collapse of the rial to a record low — but rooted in years of accumulated grievances. The second half of 2025 alone saw at least 471 labour protests across 69 Iranian cities. Inflation stood at 49.4 per cent. The 12-day war with Israel in June sent the Tehran Stock Exchange down around 40 per cent and cost many people their jobs. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions in September. The government cut fuel subsidies in November and slashed exchange-rate subsidies in December. Over 40 per cent of Iranian households now live below the poverty line and around half the population consume fewer than the recommended 2,100 calories per day.

It was this collapse that brought typically conservative bazaar merchants onto the streets. Within two weeks, the protests had spread to all of Iran’s 31 provinces, drawing in the urban middle class, working-class communities and people from rural provinces who had historically been among the regime’s most reliable supporters. What began as an economic stoppage rapidly became political defiance. For the millions who joined the striking merchants, the plummeting currency and rising cost of food were not market failures; they were proof of the regime’s corruption and ineptitude. Generation Z played a central role, demanding not reform but profound change. Lethal repression provided further confirmation the system was beyond reform.

The state’s response evolved. Initially it offered token economic concessions alongside its usual crowd control violence such as batons and teargas. When it became clear that a widespread movement with political demands had taken hold, it shifted to total attrition. On 8 January, authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown and authorised security forces to use military-grade weapons against crowds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a parallel military structure, major political force and economic empire with a direct stake in the regime’s survival – spearheaded the crackdown, with its affiliated Basij paramilitary networks playing a central role in street-level violence.

The casualty figures were deliberately obscured by the internet blackout, but all evidence points in the same direction. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that at least 3,000 civilians — including 44 children — were killed in the first 17 days. Iran Human Rights, citing Ministry of Health sources, documented a minimum of 3,379 deaths across 15 provinces. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported around 7,000 verified fatalities by mid-February, with 12,000 further cases under review. Time magazine cited hospital records suggesting the toll may have reached 30,000. Even the lowest of these figures vastly eclipses the 537 deaths recorded during the 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s concession that ‘several thousand’ had been killed confirmed the order of magnitude.

By 16 January the streets had been cleared, but a quieter repressive campaign continued, with nighttime raids, enforced disappearances and mass detentions in unofficial holding sites outside the legal system, targeting not only protesters but also doctors who treated the wounded, lawyers who provided legal assistance, bystanders who helped and people who posted supportive statements online. Authorities have detained over 50,000 people. Revolutionary Courts have fast-tracked mass indictments through summary trials, often conducted online and lasting mere minutes, with defendants denied independent legal counsel and confessions extracted under torture. Eighteen-year-old Saleh Mohammadi, whose retracted confession was obtained after interrogators broke bones in his hand, has been sentenced to be publicly hanged at the site of his alleged crime. Dozens more face imminent execution.

The regime has, for now, held: its security forces have not fractured, there have been no significant elite defections, and the IRGC has maintained its capacity for suppression. But it rules over a country with a wrecked economy, a battered nuclear programme, weakened regional proxies and a population that has run out of reasons to comply. Each protest cycle has required a higher threshold of state violence to suppress, a sign the regime has no other tool left.

What prevents weakness from becoming collapse is the absence of any alternative. The international response briefly suggested external pressure might tell – but did not. Donald Trump told Iranian protesters that ‘help is on its way’. The European Union listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The UK imposed fresh sanctions. The Iranian diaspora held at least 168 protests across 30 countries. But the international noise simply enabled the regime to spread the narrative that the uprising was foreign-directed.

The exiled opposition is fragmented along ethnic, ideological and generational lines, seemingly more consumed by internal rivalries than the task of converting widespread discontent into sustained political pressure. Inside Iran, the most credible opposition voices — Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh and veteran leader Mir Hossein Mousavi — are imprisoned or cut off from public life.

A weakened regime facing a leaderless opposition can endure, but what it cannot do is reverse its decay. Violence may clear the streets, but it cannot rebuild the economy, restore trust or give Iran’s young people a reason to stay. The regime has bought time, at an ever-rising price, but the crisis it’s suppressed isn’t going away.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Taher M. El-Sonni, Permanent Representative of the State of Libya to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in Libya. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 20 2026 (IPS)

A new UN report warns of the “brutal and normalized reality” for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Libya as they face exploitation and human rights violations.

On February 18, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) released a joint report documenting a sharp rise in human rights violations in the country. The agencies warned that coordinated action by Libyan communities, national authorities, and the international community is urgently needed to end impunity and ensure meaningful protection.

Covering the period from January 2024 to December 2025, the report draws on interviews with nearly 100 migrants from 16 countries across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. It outlines what the agencies call an “exploitative model preying” on vulnerable populations, where abuses have become “business as usual”.

According to the findings, migrants and refugees face abduction, arbitrary detention, human trafficking, forced labor, enforced disappearances, and severe forms of abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and torture. Conditions are especially dire near Libya’s borders, where traffickers, smugglers, armed groups, and even state actors subject individuals to systematic violence and exploitation.

“After their disembarkation in Libya, they are routinely held in detention centres that are breeding grounds for human rights violations and abuses,” said Suki Nagra, the UN Human Rights Representative to Libya. “We’re seeing waves of racist and xenophobic hate speech and attacks against migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, as well as interceptions at sea where people are brought back to Libya — which we do not consider a safe place for disembarkation and return.”

The report notes that migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees are often caught in the crossfires of violent clashes between smugglers, traffickers, and armed groups, with many abandoned in the desert to fend for themselves. Those intercepted at Libya’s borders are frequently transferred to formal and informal detention centers before being forcibly expelled without due process, violating the protections against collective expulsions and the right to seek asylum.

According to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), between June 2023 and December 2025, approximately 13,783 migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees were intercepted at the Libya-Tunisia border by Libyan authorities. Many individuals face heightened risks of refoulement and are left without access to water, food, or medical care, further compounding the harsh conditions faced at border crossings. Even after entering Libya, migrants face restrictions on movement between cities, where checkpoints often become sites of extortion and intimidation.

Between July 2024 and June 2025, migrants and asylum-seekers in Libya faced repeated waves of forced expulsions and abandonment in the Sahara Desert. At least 463 individuals were deported to Niger in July 2024, followed by more than 1,400 additional deportations between January and June 2025. The majority of those expelled were Nigerian nationals, including women and children, many of whom were in poor health.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported finding 16 people in the Sahara—including a mother and her daughter who had died of thirst—while nine others were reported missing in the desert. Survivors also reported instances of arbitrary arrests across Tripoli, Misrata and Sabha, where many experienced extortion, torture, and confiscation of belongings before being transported in overcrowded trucks to be left behind in the Sahara without food or water.

2025 saw a sharp increase in violence and expulsions. In February, clashes between brigades affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA) led to the destruction of migrant shelters and the arrest of hundreds, many of whom were detained or forcibly deported to Niger. In June, Libyan authorities announced the “rescue” of 1,300 Sudanese migrants stranded near the tri-border region, though reports revealed that some had been previously forcibly expelled. They were eventually returned to al-Kufra, Libya, after spending several days in harsh desert conditions with limited access to food and water.

Migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees that are detained face heightened risks. Reports of the detention centers describe severe overcrowding, enforced disappearances, malnutrition, lack of medical care, extortion, and deaths linked to untreated illnesses. Women, children, pregnant individuals, and people with chronic health conditions are disproportionately affected, often enduring severe psychological trauma alongside physical abuse. Additionally, detainees are often subjected to forced labour under coercive and degrading conditions, including garbage collection, mechanical work, agricultural labour, and even serving as cell guards. Many are also recruited to discipline other detainees, while others are forcibly recruited to guard traffickers’ compounds, detention centers, and farms.

In May 2024, approximately 1,500 migrants from several Sub-Saharan African countries were transferred to Tamanhint following LNA raids, with dozens reportedly dying along the way due to malnutrition, dehydration, and illness. Many had already endured sexual violence and forced labour before being moved.

OHCHR and UNSMIL interviewed 50 men from countries including Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and the occupied Palestinian territory, in which 45 reported being tortured or beaten as a means of extortion while detained. Their families were forced to pay ransom amounts ranging from 500 to 10,000 USD to secure their release.

“I was held in al-Kufra. The situation there is so pathetic,” said George, a Kenyan national whose family was forced to pay USD 10,000 for his release. “They rent houses — that is the business there. It is trafficking. If you try to escape, others will capture you again for ransom. I am pleading for help because al-Kufra is unreasonable. They are manhandling people and killing people.”

According to George, captors repeatedly called families from different phone numbers to demand payment. Those who resisted faced brutal consequences.

“There was a boy who rebelled — he was beaten and killed. We were told we would be beaten until our people paid the ransom. If they didn’t, they would kill us, abandon us, or throw us into the desert,” he added.

By early 2025, UNSMIL and OHCHR received reports of a sharp increase in rates of human trafficking and sexual and gender-based violence, particularly in the migrants’ branch of al-Daman juvenile prison, where migrant children are held. Five girls, aged between 14 and 17, were raped several times in 2024 and 2025, in al-Kufra trafficking hubs and in Tripoli. Four additional girls from Sudan, aged 12 to 17, also reported attempted rapes in Tripoli and Bir al-Ghanam.

Between June 2024 and November 2025, ten women detained in trafficking hubs reported being sexually abused, trafficked, and witnessing other women and girls being raped.

“I wish I died. It was a journey of hell,” said one Eritrean woman who was detained at a trafficking hub in Tobruk, in eastern Libya, for over six weeks. “Different men raped me many times. Girls as young as 14 were raped daily.”

A different Eritrean woman, who had been previously subjected to genital mutilation, told OHCHR that she and her friend were forcibly cut open by traffickers and subsequently raped, with her friend later dying from bleeding.

Another survivor, who was detained in a hangar, said that armed men would take women at night and subject them to physical and sexual violence, oftentimes in front of others. “I was raped twice in that hangar before my daughters and other migrants. A Sudanese man tried to help me and stop them, but they beat him severely. My daughter was traumatised and is still asking me about that night,” she said.

The joint report urges Libyan authorities to immediately release all individuals who are arbitrarily detained, stop violent and degrading interception practices, and put an end to forced labour and human trafficking. It also calls for effective and transparent mechanisms to ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses.

Furthermore, the report calls on the international community, including governments and institutions, to carefully review any funding, training, equipment, or cooperation involving Libyan entities accused of human rights violations, to ensure that all support is strictly conditioned to comply with international human rights standards.

“We recommend legal and policy changes to end the entrenched, exploitative business model driving these violations and abuses,” Nagra said. “A key area is accountability — holding security actors, traffickers, and complicit State-affiliated actors responsible. Accountability provides justice to victims and serves as a deterrent to further violations and abuses.”

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CIVICUS discusses the recent protests in Iran with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists, a Netherlands-based diaspora organisation empowering Iranian civil society.

Sohrab Razaghi

What sparked the protests, and in what ways were they different from previous ones?

Rising prices and the collapse of the national currency initially sparked the protests, but these quickly expanded beyond economic grievances. At least in part, this is because the economy is no longer seen as a purely technical issue but as a measure of the state’s ability to govern. A central question among social groups now is whether the government can manage crises and provide sustainable solutions.

Anger has built up, reflecting broken promises and lost futures. Over the past three decades, four major protest waves – in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022 – were met with repression, denial or superficial reforms. This pattern has produced a strong sense of humiliation and political voicelessness.

But perhaps the most decisive factor in the latest wave of protests has been the role of Generation Z, a generation that did not experience the 1979 revolution or the war with Iraq and does not have the ideological attachments of earlier generations. The dividing line is not just age but also expectations, lifestyles and values. While previous generations used to hope for gradual reform within the system, now many young people see no viable future within the current framework. For them, the most rational responses to what they perceive as a structural dead end are disengagement, migration or radical protest.

Recent protests, particularly those of 8 and 9 January, also reflected shifts in protest dynamics, with higher levels of violence visible in both rhetoric and practice. This escalation likely reflects accumulated frustration and political deadlock, but doesn’t necessarily indicate that the state has weakened. Security forces so far appear cohesive and operationally effective, and there are no clear signs of fragmentation inside the coercive apparatus.

But the rise in violence is troubling for democratic forces and civil society. When violent tactics become prominent, organised civic initiatives are marginalised and security-driven narratives prevail, weakening sustained civic action.

Additionally, Israeli and US statements expressing support for protesters and threatening military action had contradictory and largely negative effects.

While such rhetoric initially generated hope among some protesters, the lack of follow-up produced disillusionment and scepticism. Most importantly, statements by foreign governments, including Israel and the USA, strengthened the regime’s narrative. They enabled the authorities to frame protests as the products of foreign interference and protesters as instruments of external powers, including claims of involvement by Mossad agents. This narrative was very useful to justify securitisation and repression.

How have civil society and the media documented human rights violations amid internet shutdowns?

During near-total internet blackouts, local and community-based groups played crucial roles. They recorded the time and location of incidents, collected testimonies from multiple sources and preserved legal, medical and visual documentation while observing basic digital security principles.

When limited internet access became available, information was shared securely with international partners and diaspora networks. These networks helped archive data, liaise with human rights organisations and media and reduce pressure on activists operating inside Iran. International human rights organisations then cross-checked and verified reports before incorporating them into official documentation. Because communication shutdowns, security risks and restricted access to evidence prevented full documentation, they typically presented casualty figures and details of repression conservatively. At the same time, fake news and baseless casualty figures are also prevalent in diaspora and international media reports. It is essential to interrogate such reporting to preserve the credibility of fact-checked, evidence-based reports.

Under severe restrictions, independent and evidence-based documentation has been essential to preserve truth, counter denial and lay the groundwork for future accountability.

What’s limiting sustained pressure for change?

Recent protests have not expanded into broader forms of social organisation. Participation by labour unions, local networks and professional associations has been limited, restricting the potential for sustained institutionalised pressure. Without stronger organisational structures, documentation of abuses won’t necessarily translate into coordinated civic action. Social media-based coordination and mobilisation are effective for the start and first phase of protests, but on-the-ground leadership, networks and organising capacity are instrumental for sustaining protests and increasing pressure for change.

At the discursive level, significant attention has focused on appeals for foreign pressure rather than on building internal coalitions among social groups. In some cases, rhetoric has centred on state collapse rather than democratic transition, a framework that risks instability and further social fragmentation. The use of profanity and violent language – both inside Iran and among the diaspora community – has also alienated families and moderate groups, narrowing rather than broadening support.

Ultimately, for protests to evolve into movements capable of exerting sustained pressure for change, what’s needed is inclusive organisation, coalition-building and a unifying narrative.

What should the international community do to strengthen Iranian civil society?

Sustainable change will depend on domestic organisational capacity, leadership and representation, not external force. So international leaders should avoid war rhetoric and avoid engaging in any form of military intervention. Historical experience suggests that even limited foreign military intervention is unlikely to weaken domestic repression. Instead, it may well increase regime cohesion, at least in the short term, intensify nationalist sentiment and raise the costs faced by civil society activists, who can be easily portrayed as collaborators and traitors.

When supporting Iranian civil society, international allies should prioritise independent, nonviolent civil society organisations rather than opposition groups advocating violence. Narratives of ‘collapse at any cost’ marginalise civic initiatives and undermine the prospects of democratisation.

Long-term investment in capacity strengthening is essential. This includes supporting civic organising skills, digital security, democratic advocacy, nonviolent action and secure communication tools. Over recent decades, resources and repertoires for change within civil society have been weakened. Sustained engagement is required to rebuild these capacities, with up-to-date resources, techniques and tools.

Monitoring, documentation and evidence-based reporting grounded in credible local sources are among the most effective forms of support. Accurate reporting strengthens prospects for accountability and limits the space for propaganda.

Ultimately, sustainable democratic change in Iran will depend on civil society acting independently, rooted in domestic capacities and supported by context-aware, non-interventionist international engagement.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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13-year-old Ojulu Omod comes to the gold mine site before the day gets too hot. He is out of school and supports his family by mining gold the traditional way. Credit: UNICEF/Demissew Bizuwerk

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 13 2026 (IPS)

Although global rates of child labour have declined since 2020, the practice remains a serious and persistent violation of children’s rights, undermining their safety, social development, and long-term economic stability. These risks are intensified by structural pressures— poverty, climate shocks, protracted conflict, and unsafe migration— that continue to push vulnerable children into crisis, and in some cases, trafficking and exploitation. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warns that African countries remain among the most affected regions, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated policy action, cross-border cooperation, and sustained investment to protect children on the move and those at risk of labour exploitation.

Roughly 137.6 million children across the world are engaged in child labour, representing 7.8 percent of all children globally. Of this number, approximately 54 million children are engaged in particularly hazardous work—such as mining and construction, or work performed for over 43 hours per week.

In a newly-released data brief analyzing child labour trends across Eastern and Southern Africa, UNICEF found approximately 41 million children—nearly one third of the global total—are engaged in child labour as of 2024, accounting for roughly one in five children in the region. While this represents progress from the 49 million children recorded in 2020, UNICEF warns that these gains remain fragile and could be reversed without strengthened policies and adequate financing.

“Children belong in classrooms, not workplaces,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa. She emphasized that ending child labour requires an inclusive approach that aims to revitalize education systems and strengthen protection measures for children worldwide.

“Supporting parents with decent work is essential so children can go to school, learn, play, and build a brighter future,” Kadilli added, urging governments, the private sector, civil society, and communities to work together to build a coordinated response aligned with “national and continental commitments” to put a definitive end to child labour.

The report highlights the severity of the crisis: 13.4 million children in Eastern and Southern Africa are engaged in hazardous work. It is only second to West and Central Africa when it comes to the prevalence of child labour globally. Education disparities are particularly pronounced, with six in ten adolescents engaged in child labour out of school, compared with just two in ten of their non-working peers.

According to the report, Eastern and Southern Africa has a disproportionately high share of young children engaged in child labour compared to other regions. Roughly 65 percent of children in child labour in the region are between the ages of 5 and 11, which greatly contrasts with other parts of the world where older adolescents make up a larger share. Although notable progress has been made in reducing child labour across all age groups, the decline has been slowest among the youngest children.

UNICEF notes that child labour in Eastern and Southern Africa is heavily concentrated in agriculture, which accounts for approximately 78 percent of all cases among children aged 5 to 17. This is even more pronounced among younger children, with more than 80 percent of those aged 5 to 11 working in agricultural fields. However, hazardous work is disproportionately concentrated in other sectors, with 55 percent of child labor in industry and 56 percent in services being classified as hazardous, compared to the 26 percent found in agriculture.

On February 11, during the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour in Marrakesh, Morocco, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) called on governments to strengthen protection measures, enhance international cooperation, and improve monitoring systems to ensure that migration and trafficking are central to efforts to end child labour. The agency emphasized that unsafe migration is a key driver of child labour, as displaced communities often resort to it in the absence of access to basic services, stable livelihoods, and social protection.

“If we are serious about ending child labour, we must face a reality that is still too often overlooked: migration,” said Amy Pope, IOM Director-General. “Today, millions of children are on the move, they’re forced by conflict, they’re pulled by poverty, they’re displaced by the impact of climate shocks. And they’re searching for opportunity and for safety. Evidence shows that migrant children are often the most exposed to child labour. They work longer hours, they earn less, they are less likely to attend school, and they face higher risks of injury, exploitation, and death.”

According to the latest figures from IOM, approximately 30,000 child victims of trafficking have been identified globally, though the true number is likely far higher due to widespread underreporting and gaps in detection. Children account for nearly one in four detected trafficking victims worldwide, with roughly 20 percent aged between 9 and 17 years of age.

Among all identified victims, 61 percent face sexual exploitation, with girls being disproportionately affected. Recruitment into armed groups is common among boys. Traffickers commonly exert control through psychological, physical, and sexual abuse, as well as threats against victims or their families and restrictions on finances, medical care, essential services, and freedom of movement.

Pope underscored the urgency of closing systemic gaps in labour governance and protection systems that leave migrant children vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. “These children are often missing from child labour policies, overlooked in protection systems, and invisible in the data that guides decisions,” she said. “Along migration routes, children are exploited in agriculture, domestic work, hospitality, and construction — and these abuses follow them across borders wherever protection fails. Protection must move with the child: prevention must reflect real labour and mobility realities, and systems must work together across sectors and borders.”

UNICEF is calling on the international community to address both the root causes and consequences of child labour. The plan includes expanding social protection programs for vulnerable families, promoting universal access to quality education, strengthening monitoring efforts to identify at-risk children, ensuring decent work opportunities for youth and adults, and enforcing stronger labour laws to enhance corporate accountability and eliminate exploitation across supply chains. Together, these efforts aim to ensure that families are not forced to rely on their children for survival—and that children are free to learn, grow, and simply be children.

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Credit: Port Vila Market, Vanuatu – Kevin Hellon / shutterstock.com

By Tobias Ide
Feb 9 2026 (IPS)

 
The Pacific Island countries are at the frontline of climate change. Their territories mostly consist of small, low-lying islands, with long coastlines and vast ocean spaces between them. Many livelihoods are based on agriculture or fishing, and importing water or food is often infeasible or expensive. This makes those large ocean nations highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as storms, droughts, and rising sea levels. Analysts have expressed concerns that this can result in various forms of socio-political conflict.

However, the Pacific Island countries have received scarce attention in research on climate change and conflict. This is surprising given the Pacific Island countries’ high climate vulnerability and increasing geopolitical relevance. A few years back, a Nature article did not find a single peer-reviewed study on the climate-conflict nexus in the Pacific. And while recent work added important insights on potential pathways between climate and conflict in the Pacific Island countries, the region remains understudied.

A new study tackles this knowledge gap by systematically collecting data on conflict events (such as protests, riots, and communal violence) in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. It then determines statistical associations between the occurrence of such conflicts—protests, riots, communal violence etc.—and climate extremes like storms, heatwaves, and floods. The results are surprising.

Climate extremes do not drive conflict risks

The researchers found that climate disasters are not a significant predictor of conflict events. This is true for both cities and rural areas. In cities, high values of (and competition for) land, immigration after disasters, and opportunities for political mobilisation have long been considered to make climate-related conflicts more likely, yet no such statistical signal was detected. Even when looking only at conflicts around natural resources like water or forests, climate extremes are not a good predictor.

These findings could nuance common wisdom about climate change and conflict. Experts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have concluded that climate change increases conflict risks, even though other conflict drivers are more important. Such a linkage is particularly likely in climate vulnerable regions with a history of political instability, and it is also more applicable to low-intensity conflicts like protests (as compared to large-scale violence like civil wars). Yet, the study focuses on such smaller-scale conflict. Fiji, Solomon Island, and Vanuatu are also highly vulnerable to climate change and suffered through political instability (coups, civil war, and unrest) in the past.

How to make sense of the absence of conflict

As a starting point, it is important to clarify three things. First, the absence of conflict does not necessarily imply peace, particularly if those least responsible for climate change suffer most from its consequences. Second, the study focuses on visible and collective forms of conflict. Disasters, but also competition for disaster-related support schemes, might well result in lower-level, less visible forms of conflict, such as household and intimate partner violence or lower social cohesion within communities. Studying these forms of conflict is certainly a key task for future work. Third, evidence is not perfect. The new study, for instance, covers only the period 2012 to 2020, studies just three Pacific Island countries, and could not include rainfall anomalies due to a lack of data.

That said, the absence of a correlation between climate extremes and socio-political conflict events is still noteworthy. It indicates the Pacific Islands have significant levels of agency and resilience. This is not to romanticise local communities and national governments—as everywhere in the world, they have their share of tensions and shortcomings. But the Pacific Island countries possess well-established traditional institutions and, at least in some areas, strong community and civil society networks. Given their remote location, tropical climate, and oceanic geography, they have plenty of knowledge and experience in dealing with climate extremes like droughts, floods, and storms as well. These are important assets for coping peacefully with the impacts of climate change.

Consider the example of Vanuatu after cyclone Pam in 2015. Despite being one of the most intense storms to ever hit the South Pacific, the death toll was relatively low, and the country recovered rather quickly from its impacts. This was the case because local community structures and NGO-led Community Climate Change Committees coordinated well, and they thus played a key role in preparing for the storm and in delivering disaster relief and recovery. These activities did not just utilise but also strengthened traditional social networks. Furthermore, state institutions effectively utilised the inflow of international aid to deal with the cyclone’s impacts, thereby increasing trust in the government. Consequentially, no major conflicts erupted in the aftermath of Pam.

Avoid doomsday thinking – and provide tailored support

Which insights can decision makers draw from these findings?

It is important to avoid doomsday scenarios when thinking about climate change in the Pacific. For sure, the respective countries are highly exposed to and quite vulnerable to climate change. But if policy makers and media portray the Pacific Island countries as helpless victims of climate change and prone to conflict, the consequences are problematic: a lack of economic investment, external support mostly focussed on relocation, and an ignorance of local capacities.

By contrast, emphasising how Pacific communities successfully deal with and maintain peace in the context of climate change provides different perspectives. It highlights how local communities and state institutions (despite not being perfect) have significant capacities for climate change adaptation and bottom-up peacebuilding. National governments and international donors should utilise those capacities by providing tailored support, responding to the needs and priorities of those on the frontline of climate change. Rather than preliminary resignation or relocation, this can support the building of climate-resilient peace.

Related articles:
There Is No Security Without Development, Anything Else Is a Distraction
Do We Need a Pacific Peace Index?
The Trump Presidency and Climate Security in the Indo-Pacific Region

Tobias Ide is Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at Murdoch University Perth. Until recently, he was also Adjunct Associate Professor of International Relations at the Brunswick University of Technology. He has published widely on the intersections of the environment, climate change, peace, conflict and security, including in Global Environmental Change, International Affairs, Journal of Peace Research, Nature Climate Change, and World Development. He is also a director of the Environmental Peacebuilding Association.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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CIVICUS discusses the genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with Mohammed Nowkhim of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace & Human Rights (ARSPHR), a civil society organisation led by Rohingya people born out of refugee camps in Bangladesh to document atrocities, preserve survivor testimony and advocate for accountability and justice.

Mohammed Nowkhim

What atrocities were committed against Rohingya people and what is being examined in court?

During what were called ‘clearance operations’ in 2017, Myanmar security forces burned entire villages, raped women, killed children and threw them into fires and wells. According to documented reports, over 10,000 people were killed and around 700,000, including me, were forced to flee Myanmar. These were not random acts of violence; they were systematic and targeted attacks aimed at erasing our community.

In 2019, The Gambia, supported by 11 other states, filed a case against Myanmar at the ICJ, accusing it of genocide. Judges are now examining evidence of mass killings, sexual violence, village destruction and forced displacement. They are also reviewing official policies and actions that show intent to destroy Rohingya people as a group, including patterns of violence, coordination by state forces and the systematic denial of basic rights.

This case shows that genocide claims can be examined through law rather than dismissed for political convenience. But for the Rohingya, this is not just a legal process. It represents acknowledgment and a source of hope for present and future generations. After decades of denial and silence, our suffering is being heard at the world’s highest court and recognised in a legal space where truth matters. The hearings can’t erase our wounds, but they can offer some solace and a path towards justice.

What evidence supports the case against Myanmar?

The case was built on years of evidence-gathering. The Gambia relied on extensive material from the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and United Nations (UN) fact-finding missions, as well as documentation collected over many years by human rights organisations, including Fortify Rights, Human Rights Watch and Rohingya-led groups.

Civil society played a key role when states failed to act. Even when the world looked away, organisations continued to document the truth and refused to let these crimes be erased or rewritten. Long before any court agreed to listen, groups including the ARSPHR were collecting survivor testimonies, documenting violations and carefully preserving evidence, knowing it might one day be used in court. Without that work, much of what happened would have been lost and perpetrators couldn’t have been challenged.

In a way, civil society became the memory of the Rohingya people. Today, this evidence forms part of the case before the ICJ.

Why is accountability so difficult?

Politics often protects perpetrators. Those with power choose stability over justice and shield those responsible for crimes. Myanmar’s authorities continue to deny wrongdoing and refuse to cooperate, which delays justice.

International law also has its limits. Justice moves slowly because ICJ rulings do not automatically lead to consequences. International courts can establish the truth, but they can’t force states to act. Enforcement depends on political will, often through the UN Security Council, where countries such as China and Russia can block action, even when crimes are clear and well documented.

What must happen to ensure justice?

There must be real action. Perpetrators must be held accountable, Rohingya citizenship must be restored and discriminatory laws that enabled genocide must be removed. Any return of refugees must be voluntary, safe and dignified. It can’t happen without international monitoring and guarantees of protection. People can’t be sent back to the same conditions that forced them to flee.

Ultimately, justice is not only about the past, but also about ensuring that future generations of Rohingya can live with rights, safety and dignity. This case is only the beginning. What happens after the judgment will decide whether justice is real or only symbolic.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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The 158th session of the Executive Board took place on 2-7 February 2026 at WHO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Pictured is Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. Credit: WHO / Christopher Black

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 6 2026 (IPS)

On February 3, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched its 2026 global appeal to help millions of people living in protracted conflicts and humanitarian crises access lifesaving healthcare. Following a trend of sharply declining international funding, the agency warns that it is becoming increasingly difficult to respond to emerging health threats, including pandemics and drug-resistant infections.

According to figures from the United Nations (UN), roughly a quarter of a billion people are currently living through humanitarian crises that threaten their access to healthcare and shelter, even as global defense spending has surpassed USD 2.5 trillion annually. Meanwhile, WHO estimates that approximately 4.6 billion people lack access to essential health services and 2.1 billion face significant financial strain from rising health costs.

These disparities are expected to worsen in the coming years, as the world is projected to face a shortage of 11 million healthcare workers by 2030—more than half of whom are nurses. Seeking nearly USD 1 billion to support civilians across 36 emergency settings—14 of which are classified as extremely severe—WHO aims to protect and support millions of people living in the world’s most fragile crisis settings.

“This appeal is a call to stand with people living through conflict, displacement and disaster – to give them not just services, but the confidence that the world has not turned its back on them,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. “It is not charity. It is a strategic investment in health and security. In fact, access to health care restores dignity, stabilizes communities and offers a pathway toward recovery.”

Since its founding in 1948, WHO has served as a critical lifeline for crisis-affected populations—promoting universal health coverage, coordinating international responses to health emergencies, and tracking emerging health threats and progress worldwide. In 2025 alone, WHO and its partners provided emergency health services to approximately 30 million people, delivering vaccinations to 5.3 million children, facilitating 53 million health consultations, supporting more than 8,000 health facilities, and deploying 1,370 mobile clinics.

“In today’s most complex emergencies, WHO remains indispensable – protecting health, upholding international humanitarian law, and ensuring life-saving care reaches people in places where few others can operate,” said Marita Sørheim-Rensvik, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN Office at Geneva. “From safeguarding access to sexual and reproductive health and rights to supporting frontline health workers under immense strain, WHO’s role is vital.”

The 2026 appeal follows a year in which humanitarian financing fell below 2016 levels, forcing WHO and its partners to reach only one-third of the 81 million people originally targeted for health assistance. Additionally, this comes after the United States exit from WHO on January 22, which is estimated to reduce the agency’s budget for 2026 and 2027 from USD 5.3 billion to USD 4.2 billion.

Ghebreyesus addressed WHO’s Executive Board in Geneva on February 2, warning of the far-reaching consequences expected after last year’s steep funding cuts, describing 2025 as one of the organization’s “most difficult years” in its history. “Sudden and severe cuts to bilateral aid have also caused huge disruptions to health systems and services in many countries,” he said.

Ghebreyesus also noted that the agency narrowly avoided a far more severe financial collapse due to a host of member states agreeing to raise mandatory assessed contributions. This would reduce WHO’s dependence on voluntary designated funding. These reforms have enabled WHO to mobilize roughly 85 percent of its core budget for 2026-2027, though Ghebreyesus warned that the remaining gap will be “hard to mobilize” in today’s strained financial environment. He cautioned that “pockets of poverty” remain across critically underfunded areas, including emergency preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and climate resilience.

Ghebreyesus also warned noted that the funding crisis has exposed deeper challenges for global health governance, especially among low and middle-income countries that struggle to maintain access to essential services. He stressed that the crisis presents a crucial opportunity for transformation, noting that a “leaner” WHO can become more focused on its core mission and mandate within the broader UN80 reform initiative. “This means sharpening our focus on our core mandate and comparative advantage, doing what we do best – supporting countries through our normative and technical work – and leaving to others what they do best,” he added.

As a result of shrinking global funding, WHO says that it and its partners have been “forced to make difficult choices” about which operations to sustain going forward. The agency stated its intentions to concentrate solely on the most critical, high-impact interventions–such as keeping essential health facilities running, delivering emergency medical supplies and trauma care, restoring immunization efforts, ensuring access to reproductive, maternal, and child health services, and preventing and responding to disease outbreaks.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is working with health authorities in South Sudan and partners to scale up cholera prevention efforts, including a vaccination campaign. Credit:WHO/South Sudan

“In 2026, WHO is adapting its emergency response again. We are applying the discipline of emergency medicine: focusing first on actions that save lives,” said Ghebreyesus. “We are placing greater emphasis on country leadership and local partnerships. We are concentrating on areas where WHO adds the greatest value and reducing duplication so that every dollar has maximum impact.”

In 2026, WHO will prioritize its emergency health response in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Afghanistan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Ukraine, and Myanmar, while also addressing ongoing outbreaks of cholera and mpox. As the lead agency for health coordination in humanitarian crises, WHO works with more than 1,500 partners across 24 emergency settings worldwide to ensure that national authorities and local organizations remain at the center of emergency response efforts.

Additionally, WHO’s strategy going forward places strong emphasis on helping countries reduce reliance on external aid and build long-term financial self-sufficiency. A key element of this approach is domestic resource mobilization, including the introduction of higher health taxes on harmful products such as tobacco, sugary beverages, and alcohol.

In recent months, WHO has made important progress in strengthening global responses to emerging health threats, even as antimicrobial resistance continues to escalate—with one in six bacterial infections worldwide now resistant to antibiotics. The agency has also expanded its disease surveillance capabilities, relying on AI-powered epidemic intelligence tools to help countries detect and contain hundreds of outbreaks before they evolve into major crises. WHO’s work has also been reinforced by last year’s adoption of the Pandemic Agreement and amended International Health Regulations (IHR), which aim to bolster global preparedness in the post-COVID-19 era.

“The pandemic taught all of us many lessons – especially that global threats demand a global response,” said Ghebreyesus. “Solidarity is the best immunity.” He emphasized that the future effectiveness of WHO hinges on predictable, sustained funding:“This is your WHO. Its strength is your unity. Its future is your choice.”

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Most major destination countries are shifting from a policy of expanding migrant labor to one of selectivity and restriction in order to manage immigration within their borders, especially unauthorized immigration. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

The delicate balance of international migration relies on the high demand for labor and the enforcement of stricter immigration controls. This equilibrium is especially crucial when considering the international migration of students and skilled workers.

International students and skilled migrant workers play essential roles in economic development and addressing labor shortages in many countries. However, these individuals are facing increasing obstacles in entering and integrating into destination countries.

Essentially, most major destination countries are shifting from a policy of expanding migrant labor to one of selectivity and restriction in order to manage immigration within their borders, especially unauthorized immigration.

A notable exception to this global trend is Spain, which is granting legal status to half a million undocumented migrants. This policy aims to reduce labor exploitation in Spain’s underground economy and meet the need for around 300,000 migrant workers annually to sustain its economy.

The stricter immigration controls in many destination countries are primarily driven by political shifts to the right, national security concerns, public pressure, unauthorized migration, unlawful border crossings, visa overstays, and anxieties about changing population composition and social integration. These controls are also limiting asylum seekers and low skilled migrants while favoring highly skilled migrants.

Major destination countries have also implemented stricter immigration controls in terms of international student migration.

These controls include stricter visa rules and entry requirements, fixed-term visas, limited years of study, work permit restrictions, higher financial costs, and restrictions on bringing dependents. These measures are driven by high net migration, efforts to curb visa misuse, university enrollment caps, housing pressures, higher financial requirements, and restrictions on bringing family dependents.

In 2024, there were approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide, representing about 3.7% of the world’s population of 8.2 billion. This figure is nearly double the number of international migrants in 1990, which was approximately 154 million, representing 2.9% of the world’s population of 5.3 billion at that time (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

The top five migration destination countries and their percentage of all migrants are the United States (17%), Germany (6%), Saudi Arabia (5%), the United Kingdom (4%), and France (3%) (Figure 2).

Source: United Nations.

In contrast, the top five emigration countries and their percentage of all emigrants are India (6%), China (4%), Mexico (4%), Ukraine (3%), and Russia (3%) (Figure 3).

Source United Nations.

As of 2024–2025, there were approximately 7 million internationally mobile students globally. The key destinations for these international students were the United States (17%), Canada (12%), the United Kingdom (11%), France (7%), and Australia (6%). Other major destination countries were Germany, Russia, South Korea, China, and Spain (Figure 4).

Source: United Nations.

In addition to internationally mobile students, there were approximately 168 million migrant workers in 2022, accounting for about 5 percent of the global labor force. About two-thirds of all migrants of working age are in the labor force, with 60% of them being men.

In many of the more developed countries, the percentage of migrant workers in the labor force is significantly higher. For example, in the United States, approximately 20% of the labor force, totaling over 30 million people, consists of immigrants and foreign-born workers who are concentrated in the construction, farming, and service sectors. Canada has an even higher proportion of 30%, with many migrant workers represented in the tech sector, manufacturing, and healthcare.

Migrant workers can be found across all skill levels. Despite many possessing higher qualifications, they are often concentrated in lower-skilled industries such as services, agriculture, construction, and tourism. However, sectors and occupations related to high-skilled information technology and professional work often rely on skilled migrant labor to address labor shortages.

Migrant workers can be found across all skill levels. Despite many possessing higher qualifications, they are often concentrated in lower-skilled industries such as services, agriculture, construction, and tourism. However, sectors and occupations related to high-skilled information technology and professional work often rely on skilled migrant labor to address labor shortages

The populations of most developed countries and many developing countries are experiencing declining, ageing, and diversifying trends in the 21st century. These three profound demographic changes present significant social, economic, political, and ethical challenges.

As populations rapidly evolve during the 21st century, changes in fertility, mortality, and migration are shaping the demographics of many regions. These changes are based on past trends, current data, and projected future patterns over the next eighty years.

Projections suggest that population decline will persist because of low fertility rates remaining below the replacement levels of about two births per woman. Many countries have experienced low fertility rates for an extended period. The population of the more developed countries is expected to decrease by 14 million by 2050, while the least developed countries are projected to grow by 733 million during the same period.

Regarding mortality rates, life expectancies are anticipated to continue rising throughout the century. For instance, the current life expectancy at birth of 80 years in more developed countries is projected to reach approximately 84 years by 2050 and 90 years by the end of the 21st century.

In addition to declining populations and increasing life expectancy, many countries have experienced a “historic reversal” in their age structures. By 2025, 55 countries and areas had experienced this reversal, with more countries expected to undergo the same soon.

This significant demographic milestone occurs when the percentage of individuals aged 65 and older exceeds the percentage of those aged 17 and younger. In simpler terms, it is when older adults outnumber children in a population.

Population ageing is expected to continue throughout the remainder of the 21st century. The median age for more developed countries currently at 42 years is projected to increase to 45 years by 2050 and 48 years by 2100.

Additionally, the proportion of elderly individuals is projected to continue rising. For example, Europe’s elderly population is expected to increase to approximately 30 percent by mid-century.

Major destination countries are also becoming more ethnically diverse due to increasing levels of international migration. For instance, the estimated number of foreign-born individuals in Europe, which was around 57 million at the beginning of the 21st century, has risen to approximately 87 million by 2020.

The population compositions of many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, are becoming significantly more ethnically diverse. Population projections suggest that the US and the UK populations will become “minority white” around 2045 and 2065, respectively.

In addition to high levels of legal migration, increasing levels of unauthorized migration pose mounting challenges for many destination countries and for international students and skilled migrant labor.

Notable among these challenges are the negative attitudes and hostilities towards immigrants and their families, as well as the increasing political influence of far-right nationalist parties advocating anti-immigrant policies. These parties are concerned that the growing numbers of immigrants will have a negative impact on their traditional culture, shared values, and national identity. They believe that immigration, especially unauthorized migration, undermines their way of life, national security, ethnic heritage, and social cohesion.

A significant factor fueling the unprecedented high levels of unauthorized migration to many destination countries is the rapid demographic growth of sending countries. Many of these countries, which are struggling with poverty, political instability, civil strife, and climate change, are in the less developed regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The number of people desiring to emigrate permanently is approximately 1.3 billion. This number significantly exceeds the number of immigrants countries are willing to admit, leading many individuals to migrate without authorization.

Of particular note is Africa’s population, which currently includes 33 of the 46 least developed countries in the world. Africa’s population is expected to more than triple during the 21st century, increasing from approximately 800 million to nearly 4 billion.

In summary, the major demographic features of traditional destination countries for the 21st century are declining, ageing, and diversifying. In contrast, the populations of most sending countries are increasing and remain relatively young, with many of them wishing to emigrate to a developed country.

These potent, pervasive, and differing demographic trends are creating a delicate balance of high demand for labor and the implementation of stricter immigration controls. This balance is especially relevant for international students and skilled migrant labor as it impacts their entry and integration into destination countries.

Joseph Chamie is an independent consulting demographer and former director of the United Nations Population Division.

Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, briefs reporters at UN Headquarters. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

As Haiti’s Transitional President Council (TPC) approaches its February 7 expiration date and the country remains without a newly elected president, humanitarian experts warn the nation risks further sliding into insecurity, raising fears of broader collapse.

The United Nations (UN) notes that escalating violence by entrenched armed coalitions, persisting impunity for human rights abuses, political instability, and mass civilian displacement are straining aid operations to their breaking point, leaving millions with dwindling access to essential services and pushing hopes for stability and national self-sufficiency further out of reach.

“Violence has intensified and expanded geographically, exacerbating food insecurity and instability, as transitional governance arrangements near expiry and overdue elections remain urgent,” said UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres in his latest report on the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). “Gang violence affects communities nationwide, with particularly devastating consequences for women, children and youth, undermining the country’s social fabric over the long term.”

Currently, it is estimated that armed gangs now exert near-total control over approximately 90 percent of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, as well as large parts of the surrounding provinces, severely undermining government authority and humanitarian operations. Presidential elections have not been held in a decade, and ongoing political instability, coupled with the continual adaptive reshaping of gang networks, has made establishing security increasingly difficult.

Gangs continue to launch coordinated attacks, seize control of critical economic corridors and agricultural areas, and drive mass displacement—exhausting both law enforcement and humanitarian systems. In 2025, Haiti’s murder rate rose by roughly 20 percent compared with the previous year, with Guterres informing reporters that more than 8,100 killings were recorded across Haiti between January and November 2025.

Child trafficking and recruitment have surged, with children and youth now making up roughly 50 percent of all gang members. They are being forced into a range of roles and to participate in violent attacks. Sexual violence – particularly against women and girls- has also escalated sharply, leaving deep and lasting trauma for survivors with limited access to psychosocial support, while perpetrators face widespread impunity.

Approximately 6.4 million people—more than half of Haiti’s population—are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Programme (WFP) warns that a record 5.7 million people are currently facing acute hunger, which is expected to rise to 5.9 million by March without prompt intervention. This hunger crisis is largely driven by rampant insecurity across key transport routes and agricultural regions, which has severely disrupted crop production and movement to markets. Food prices remain extremely high and increasingly beyond reach for many households.

Civilians continue to live in overcrowded, unsanitary shelters marked by widespread malnutrition, disease outbreaks, limited access to clean water, and escalating insecurity, with women and children being disproportionately impacted. Additionally, internal displacement has reached record highs, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimating that roughly 1.4 million Haitians are internally displaced, including over 741,000 children.

At Jean Marie César School, now serving as a displacement site in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, UNICEF continues to provide psychosocial activities to help children cope with trauma. Credit: UNICEF/Herold Joseph

Humanitarian experts remain deeply concerned about the continued adaptive reorganizing and restructuring of gangs to bypass national security measures and expand their influence. John Brandolino, Acting Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has said that gangs have transformed into more structured criminal networks with defined leadership, territorial ambitions, and diversified streams of revenue.

The Viv Ansanm coalition has carried out large-scale attacks on police forces, prisons, and critical economic infrastructure, enabling gangs to tighten their grip over the capital and key corridors into Artibonite and Plateau Central. Extortion, as well as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and ammunition, have become major sources of revenue, further entrenching gang control and undermining state authority.

Despite this, notable progress has been made in recent months through police operations supported by the UN Security Council-authorized Gang Suppression Force, which was deployed in October 2025. These efforts have yielded significant early results, including the reopening of key roads in parts of Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department, as well as the restoration of government presence around the capital’s Champ de Mars. These gains demonstrate that sustained, coordinated pressure on armed groups can weaken gang control and yield meaningful improvements in security.

However, Carlos Ruiz-Massieu, UN Special Representative and Head of BINUH, warned that these gains remain extremely fragile and it is imperative to address the root cause of insecurity—political instability. Haiti currently stands at a precarious crossroads as it nears the end of its TPC, with a newly issued electoral decree and calendar calling for the inauguration of an elected president by early 2027. Despite this, humanitarian experts and civilians have raised concerns on whether such elections are realistically feasible amid the country’s entrenched insecurity.

“Haiti has entered a critical juncture in its process of restoring democratic institutions,” Ruiz Massieu told the Security Council on January 21. “Let us be clear: the country has no time to lose to prolonged internal conflict,” he warned, emphasizing that it is imperative for national stakeholders to set aside differences and uphold their political responsibilities, and maintain momentum on security efforts.

The following day during a press briefing, Ruiz-Massieu emphasized to reporters in New York that improving security conditions is essential for Haitians to have freedom of movement and the ability to participate in society, which paves the way for eventual, credible elections. He stressed that Haiti’s recovery will depend on close cooperation between national authorities and the international community.

“What we need is an authority that can work with the international community and manage the public forces in a way that can really increase security in different areas,” said Ruiz-Massieu. “How you measure success is by improving security in certain areas of Port-au-Prince that can enable Haitians to walk freely, to work freely, and the country to be able to organize elections in a meaningful way. We expect authorities to continue after February 7 and work with the international community to improve security.”

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Andrii Melnyk, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, briefs the United Nations Security Council meeting on the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 23 2026 (IPS)

Nearly four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine faces another winter marked by widespread humanitarian suffering and continued indiscriminate attacks. The final months of 2025 were particularly volatile, characterized by routine bombardment of densely populated areas and repeated strikes on residential neighborhoods, critical civilian infrastructure, and humanitarian facilities. As hostilities expanded into new territories over the past year, humanitarian needs grew sharply, with many war-torn communities residing in uninhabitable areas.

According to figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), at least 55,600 civilians have been killed or injured since the wake of the full-scale invasion, with 157 civilians killed and 888 injured across Ukraine and Russian Federation-occupied areas in the final months of 2025 alone. Additionally, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that over 3.7 million people have been internally displaced since the invasion.

Additional figures from OHCHR indicate that 2025 marked the deadliest year for civilians since the start of the full-scale invasion, with the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reporting that 2,514 civilians were killed and 12,142 were injured as a direct result of conflict-related violence. This marks a 31 percent increase from 2024.

“The 31 per cent increase in civilian casualties compared with 2024 represents a marked deterioration in the protection of civilians,” said Danielle Bell, head of HRMMU. “Our monitoring shows that this rise was driven not only by intensified hostilities along the frontline, but also by the expanded use of long-range weapons, which exposed civilians across the country to heightened risk.”

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that roughly 10.8 million people across Ukraine are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, with 3.6 million identified as particularly vulnerable and prioritized in relief operations. OCHA underscores the exacerbation of humanitarian conditions over the past few months, noting that front-line areas and northern border regions face higher rates of military shelling, destruction of civilian infrastructure, mass civilian displacement, and repeated disruptions to essential services.

Civilians residing in Russian Federation-occupied zones remain largely cut off from essential services and protection measures, facing heightened risks of serious human rights violations.

According to Matthias Schmale, The UN Human Coordinator for Ukraine, the nation is currently in the midst of a severe protection crisis, marked by rapid shrinking of humanitarian resources, consistent escalations of insecurity, and no signs that 2026 will be safer for civilians or humanitarian aid personnel. “The nature of warfare is evolving: more drone attacks and long-range strikes increase risks for civilians and humanitarians, while causing systematic damage to energy, water and other essential services,” said Schmale.

The first few weeks of 2026 saw a sharp escalation in targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, particularly water and energy systems. According to figures from the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, between January 8 and 9, Russian authorities launched 242 drones and 36 missiles toward Ukraine. These attacks struck the port city of Odesa, disrupting electricity and water supplies there and in the cities of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. The strikes also crippled mobile communications and public transport, prompting the mayor of Dnipro to declare a state of emergency.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia had launched roughly 1,300 drones between January 11 and 18 alone. For the following two days, more than 300 drones struck the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Dnipro, Odesa, and Khmelnytskyi regions, killing two civilians and injuring dozens.

On January 19, the Russian Federation launched a series of attacks on energy facilities in Ukraine, shutting down heating and electricity in numerous major urban areas, including Odesa and Kyiv. The mayor of Kyiv informed reporters that approximately 5,635 multi-story residential buildings were left without heating the following morning, 80 percent of which had only gained back access to heating after prolonged outages caused by a similar attack on January 9.

“Civilians are bearing the brunt of these attacks. They can only be described as cruel. They must stop. Targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure is a clear breach of the rules of warfare,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. According to figures from OHCHR, hundreds of thousands of families across Ukraine lack access to heating—an especially dire development as freezing temperatures persist. Numerous communities in Kyiv also lack access to water, which has disastrous consequences for the most vulnerable, including children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.

“For people in Druzhkivka and in many communities along the front line, daily life is overshadowed by violence and attempts to survive. A strict curfew means they can only go outside for a few hours a day, timing their lives around shelling patterns and the increased risk of drone attacks. They face hard choices: to flee for safety, leaving their homes and lives behind, or remain under constant shelling,” Schmale added.

The UN’s Ukraine office underscored that the consequences for civilians will be long-lasting, even when they reach a definitive end to hostilities. They noted that the war’s impact will “long outlive the current emergency and humanitarian phase.” Psycho-social harm is widespread, with severe mental health needs reported among adults, children, former combatants, and their families- many of whom have endured displacement, the damaging or destruction of their homes, and repeated exposure to explosions and shelling.

The strain on Ukraine’s health and education systems compounds these effects, with UN Ukraine warning that “fractures in social cohesion” will shape the country for years to come.

In response, the UN and its partners launched the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan to provide life-saving support to affected communities, aiming to reach 4.1 million people in 2026. The plan includes operations to deliver food, healthcare, protection services, cash assistance, and other essential needs to besieged communities, calling for USD $2.3 billion.

“I urge all humanitarian, development and governmental partners to work together around our shared values and key identified strategic priorities, respecting the distinct role of principled humanitarian action and recognizing where others must lead,” said Schmale.

He added: “We ask our donors to sustain flexible, predictable funding so that we can respond rapidly to new shocks while maintaining essential services for those who cannot yet stand on their own feet. Only together we can ensure that the most vulnerable, like the family I met in Druzhkivka, receive timely assistance.”

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Collecting water in Ethiopia. A new report, ‘Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond Our Hydrological Means in the Post Crisis Era’ warns that many of the earth’s water resources have been pushed to a point of permanent failure. Credit: EU/ECHO/Anouk Delafortrie/IPS

By Umar Manzoor Shah
UNITED NATIONS & SRINAGAR, India, Jan 20 2026 (IPS)

The world has entered what United Nations researchers now describe as an era of Global Water Bankruptcy, a condition where humanity has irreversibly overspent the planet’s water resources, leaving ecosystems, economies, and communities unable to recover to previous levels.

The new report, released by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, titled Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond Our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era. The report argues that decades of overextraction, pollution, land degradation, and climate stress have pushed large parts of the global water system into a permanent state of failure.

“The world has entered the era of Global Water Bankruptcy,” the report reads, adding that “in many regions, human water systems are already in a post-crisis state of failure.”

According to the report, the language of “water crisis” is no longer sufficient to explain what is happening. A crisis implies a shock followed by recovery. Water bankruptcy, by contrast, describes a condition where recovery is no longer realistically possible because natural water capital has been permanently damaged.

In an exclusive interview with Inter Press Service, former Deputy Head of Iran’s Department of Environment  Prof. Kaveh Madani, who currently is the Director at United Nations University, Institute for Water, Environment and Health, said that declaring that the planet has entered the era of water bankruptcy must not be interpreted as universal water bankruptcy, as not all basins, aquifers, and systems are water bankrupt.

Prof. Kaveh Madani, Director at the United Nations University, Institute for Water, Environment and Health, addresses the UN midday press briefing. Credit: IPS

“But we now have enough critical basins and aquifers in chronic decline and showing clear signs of irreversibility that the global risk landscape is already being reshaped. Scientifically, we know recovery is no longer realistic in many systems when we see persistent overshoot (using more than renewable supply) combined with clear markers of irreversibility—for example aquifer compaction and land subsidence that permanently reduce storage, wetland and lake loss, salinization and pollution that shrink usable water, and glacier retreat that removes a long-term seasonal buffer. When these signals persist over time, the old “bounce back” assumption stops being credible,” Madani said.

According to the report, over decades, societies have drawn down the renewable flow of rivers and rainfall besides long-term reserves stored in aquifers, glaciers, wetlands, and soils. At the same time, pollution and salinization have reduced the share of water that is safe or economically usable.

“Over decades, societies have withdrawn more water than climate and hydrology can reliably provide, drawing down not only the annual income of renewable flows but also the savings stored in aquifers, glaciers, soils, wetlands, and river ecosystems,” the report says.

The scale of the problem, as per the report, is global. Nearly three-quarters of the world’s population now lives in countries classified as water insecure or critically water insecure.

Around 2.2 billion people still lack safely managed drinking water, while 3.5 billion lack safely managed sanitation. About 4 billion people, as per the report findings, experience severe water scarcity for at least one month every year.

Madani said, adding that water bankruptcy is best assessed basin by basin and aquifer by aquifer, not by country.

“Please note that, based on the water security definition used by the UN system, water insecurity and water bankruptcy are not equivalent. Water bankruptcy can drive water insecurity, but water insecurity can also stem from limited financial and institutional capacity to build and operate infrastructure for safe water supply and sanitation, even where physical water is available,” he explained.

Madani added that the regions most consistently closest to irreversible decline cluster in the Middle East and North Africa, Central and South Asia, parts of northern China, the Mediterranean and southern Europe, the southwestern United States and northern Mexico (including the Colorado River system), parts of southern Africa, and parts of Australia.

The Aral Sea, which lies between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, shows dramatic water loss between 1989 and 2025. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Surface Water Systems Are Shrinking Rapidly

The report shows how more than half of the world’s large lakes have lost water since the early 1990s, affecting nearly one quarter of the global population that depends directly on them. Many major rivers now fail to reach the sea for parts of the year or fall below environmental flow needs.

Massive losses have occurred in wetlands, which serve as natural buffers against floods and droughts. Over the past five decades, the report claims that the world has lost roughly 410 million hectares of natural wetlands, almost the size of the European Union. The economic value of lost ecosystem services from these wetlands exceeds 5.1 trillion US dollars.

Groundwater depletion is one of the clearest signs of water bankruptcy. Groundwater, says the report, now supplies about 50 percent of global domestic water use and over 40 percent of irrigation water. Yet around 70 percent of the world’s major aquifers show long-term declining trends.

“Excessive groundwater extraction has already contributed to significant land subsidence over more than 6 million square kilometers,” the report says, warning that in some locations land is sinking by up to 25 centimeters per year, permanently reducing storage capacity and increasing flood risk.

In coastal areas, overpumping has allowed seawater to intrude into aquifers, rendering groundwater unusable for generations. In inland agricultural regions, falling water tables have triggered sinkholes, soil collapse, and the loss of fertile land.

These satellite images show a dramatic impact of the Aru glacier collapses in western Tibet. First image was taken in 2017 and the second in 2025. Credit: UNU-INWEH

The cryosphere, glaciers and snowpacks that act as natural water storage systems are also being rapidly liquidated. The world has already lost more than 30 percent of its glacier mass since 1970. Several low- and mid-latitude mountain ranges could lose functional glaciers within decades.

“The liquidation of this frozen savings account interacts with groundwater depletion and surface water over-allocation to lock many basins into a permanent worsening water deficit state,” says the report.

This loss, as per the report, threatens the long-term water security of hundreds of millions of people who depend on glacier- and snowmelt-fed rivers for drinking water, irrigation, and hydropower, particularly in Asia and the Andes.

Madani said the biggest failure was treating groundwater as an unlimited safety net instead of a strategic reserve.

He says that when surface water tightened, many systems defaulted to “drill deeper” without enforceable caps.

“Authorities often recognize the consequences when it is already late, and meaningful action then faces major political barriers. For example, reducing groundwater use in farming can trigger unemployment, food insecurity, and even instability unless farmers are supported through short-term compensation and a longer-term transition to alternative livelihoods,” he added.

According to Madani, that kind of transition cannot be implemented overnight.

“So, business as usual continues. The result is predictable: groundwater gets “liquidated” to postpone hard choices, and by the time the damage is obvious, recovery is no longer realistic,” he told IPS news.

Agriculture Lies at the Heart of the Crisis

According to the report, farming accounts for approximately 70 percent of global freshwater withdrawals. About 3 billion people and more than half of the world’s food production are located in regions where total water storage is already declining or unstable.

The report states that more than 170 million hectares of irrigated cropland are under high or very high water stress. Land and soil degradation are making matters worse by reducing the ability of soils to retain moisture. The degradation of more than half of the global agricultural land is now moderate or severe.

Drought, once considered a natural hazard, is increasingly driven by human activity. Overallocation, groundwater depletion, deforestation, land degradation, and climate change have turned drought into a chronic condition in many regions.

“Drought-related damages, intensified by land degradation, groundwater depletion and climate change rather than rainfall deficits alone, already amount to about 307 billion US dollars per year worldwide,” the report states.

Water quality degradation further shrinks the usable resource base. Pollution from untreated wastewater, agricultural runoff, industrial effluents, and salinization means that even where water volumes appear stable, much of that water is unsafe or too costly to treat.

The report adds that the planetary freshwater boundary has already been crossed. Both blue water, surface and groundwater, and green water, soil moisture, have been pushed beyond a safe operating space.

Current governance systems, the authors argue, are not fit for this reality. Many legal water rights and development promises far exceed degraded hydrological capacity. Existing global agendas, focused largely on drinking water access, sanitation, and incremental efficiency gains, are inadequate for managing irreversible loss.

“Water bankruptcy must be recognized as a distinct post-crisis state, where accumulated damage and overshoot have undermined the system’s capacity to recover,” the report says.

Water bankruptcy could result in a further increase in conflicts. Credit: UNU-INWEH

It warns that the implications of water bankruptcy are dire.

UN Under-Secretary-General Tshilidzi Marwala, Rector of UNU explains,  “Water bankruptcy is becoming a driver of fragility, displacement, and conflict. Managing it fairly—ensuring that vulnerable communities are protected and that unavoidable losses are shared equitably—is now central to maintaining peace, stability, and social cohesion.”

Policy Implications

Instead of crisis management aimed at restoring the past, the report actually pitches for bankruptcy management. That means acknowledging insolvency, accepting irreversibility, and restructuring water use, rights, and institutions to prevent further damage.

The authors lay stress on the fact that water bankruptcy is also a justice and security issue. The costs of overshoot fall disproportionately on small farmers, rural communities, women, Indigenous peoples, and downstream users, while benefits have often accrued to more powerful actors.

“How societies manage water bankruptcy will shape social cohesion, political stability, and peace,” the report warns.

Furthermore, it urges governments and international institutions to use upcoming UN Water Conferences in 2026 and 2028 as milestones to reset the global water agenda, calling for water to be treated as an upstream sector central to climate action, biodiversity protection, food security, and peace.

“This is about a crisis that might arrive in the future. The world is already living beyond its hydrological means,” reads the report.

When asked why the report frames water bankruptcy as a justice and security issue and how governments can implement painful demand reductions without triggering social unrest or conflict, Madani said the demand reduction becomes dangerous when it is treated as a technical exercise instead of a political economy reform. In many water-bankrupt regions, according to him, water is effectively a jobs policy: it keeps low-productivity farming and local economies afloat.

“If you cut water without an economic transition, you create unemployment, food insecurity, and unrest. So the practical pathway is to decouple livelihoods and growth from water consumption. In many economies, water and other natural resources are used to keep low-efficiency systems alive. In most places, it is possible to produce more strategic food with less water and less land, and with fewer farmers—provided that farmers are supported through a transition and offered alternative livelihoods.”

According to Madani, governments should protect basic needs but target the big reductions where most water is used, especially agriculture and besides that, pair caps with a just transition package for farmers—compensation, insurance, buy-down or retirement of water entitlements where relevant, and real income alternatives.

He further suggests that the governments should invest in diversification, including services, industry, value-added agri-processing, and urban jobs, so communities can earn a living without expanding water withdrawals.

“In short, you avoid conflict by making demand reduction part of a broader economic transition, not a standalone water policy.”

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The International Court of Justice holds public hearings on the merits of the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening) at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Credit: UN Web TV

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 15 2026 (IPS)

On January 12, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), opened landmark hearings in a case brought by the Republic of The Gambia, alleging that Myanmar’s military committed acts of brutal genocide against the Rohingya minority during its 2017 crackdown. Described by the United Nations (UN) as a case “years in the making,” the ICJ will spend the next three weeks reviewing evidence and testimony from both sides to determine whether the Myanmar military violated the Genocide Convention.

This case marks the first genocide case fully undertaken by the ICJ in over a decade, filed by The Gambia in 2019, two years after the Myanmar military’s 2017 crackdown —which resulted in thousands of deaths and mass displacement. UN experts note that the outcome of this case could have implications far beyond Myanmar, potentially shaping other international legal proceedings such as South Africa’s petition accusing Israel of genocide in the Gaza Strip, and helping to define standards of evidence for genocide in contexts like Darfur in Sudan and Tigray in Ethiopia.

“The case is likely to set critical precedents for how genocide is defined and how it can be proven, and how violations can be remedied,” Nicholas Koumjian, head of the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, told reporters.

Since 2017, Rohingya survivors have described the brutality of the Myanmar military’s attacks and their enduring impacts, recounting widespread instances of rape, arson, and mass killings. The violence displaced more than 750,000 people to neighboring Bangladesh, where resources are scarce and refugees continue to face discrimination and long-term psychological trauma.

Shortly after the 2017 crackdown, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, described the Myanmar military’s operations as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. A 2018 UN fact-finding mission concluded that the military’s operations included “genocidal acts”. Myanmar authorities rejected these characterizations, claiming the crackdown was a response to Rohingya armed groups.

On January 12, The Gambia’s Justice Minister Dawda Jallow told the ICJ that after reviewing “credible reports of the most brutal and vicious violations imaginably inflicted upon a vulnerable group”, Gambia officials concluded that the Myanmar military deliberately targeted the Rohingya minority in an attempt to “destroy the community”.

“It is not about esoteric issues of international law. It is about real people, real stories, and a real group of human beings—the Rohingya of Myanmar,” Jallow told ICJ judges. He added that the Rohingya have endured decades of “appalling persecution and years of dehumanizing propaganda,” aimed at effectively erasing their existence in Myanmar.

On January 14, Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting The Gambia’s allegations of genocide as “flawed and unfounded in fact and law,” claiming they rely on biased reports and “unreliable evidence.” The statement notably avoided the term Rohingya, referring instead to the community as “persons from Rakhine State.” It also asserted that Myanmar is cooperating with the ICJ proceedings in “good faith”, framing this as a demonstration of its respect for international law.

Lawyers for Myanmar are expected to begin presenting their arguments to the ICJ on January 16. UN officials note that after three weeks of testimony, a final ICJ ruling could take months or even years, and would be legally binding. If Myanmar were to be found guilty of genocide, such a ruling would place state responsibility on Myanmar, designating it as a “pariah state” and severely damaging its international standing.

Such a ruling could compel the UN Security Council to take more forceful peacekeeping measures and could trigger obligations under the Genocide Convention (of which Myanmar is a state party), to prevent further atrocities, punish perpetrators, and provide reparations to victims, which may include enabling conditions for a safe, dignified, and voluntary return. Even as the case proceeds, the ICJ’s existing provisional measures already require Myanmar to protect the Rohingya community and preserve evidence, though enforcement depends on Myanmar’s compliance.

“Seeing Gambia’s landmark case against Myanmar finally enter the merits phase delivers renewed hope to Rohingya that our decades-long suffering may finally end,” said Wai Wai Nu, founder and executive director of the Women’s Peace Network, a human rights group advocating for marginalized communities in Myanmar. “Amid ongoing violations against the Rohingya, the world must stand firm in the pursuit of justice and a path toward ending impunity in Myanmar and restoring our rights.”

As legal proceedings continue, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and displaced communities in Myanmar’s Rakhine State are confronting an escalating humanitarian crisis in 2026, marked by severe shortages of essential services and heightened protection risks. According to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over one million Rohingya refugees who fled violence in Myanmar are now living in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar settlement, one of the largest refugee camps in the world.

Recent humanitarian updates from UNHCR show that Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh continue to live in severely overcrowded shelters with limited access to food, healthcare, education, clean water, and sanitation. Livelihood opportunities remain sharply restricted, as Rohingya refugees are considered stateless. Shelter for newly arrived refugees is increasingly scarce and conditions continue to deteriorate as funding cuts hinder UNHCR’s ability to adequately support affected communities.

Meanwhile, Rohingya civilians who remain in Myanmar’s Rakhine State continue to endure entrenched discrimination, severe movement restrictions, persistent insecurity, and shrinking humanitarian access as clashes between armed groups and the military intensify. Humanitarian experts and civil society leaders underscored the significance of the ICJ case, noting that a ruling in favor of The Gambia could mark a critical step toward justice and long-term recovery for the Rohingya community.

“I hope the ICJ will bring some solace to the deep wounds we are still carrying,” said Mohammad Sayed Ullah, a member of the United Council of Rohingya (UCR), a civil society organization formed in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, that advocates for the rights of Rohingya refugees. “The perpetrators must be held accountable and punished. The sooner and fairer the trial is, the better the outcome will be. Only then can the repatriation process truly begin.”

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Refugees by Honoré Daumier (1808-1879)

By Jan Lundius
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jan 13 2026 (IPS)

At the moment, ICE’s advancement in the U.S. is apparently dividing the nation’s population into desired and undesirable elements. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was born after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers and intended to be a response to terrorism. However, with Donald Trump’s return to the White House, federal immigration agents have become the president’s praetorian guard, implementing his immigration politics.

ICE has currently 22,000 employees, a number destined to grow thanks to new recruits. Its budget is USD 30 billion a year. During 2025, the agency’s spending on fire arms has grown 600 percent. Its agents generally act with their faces covered, and move around heavily armed, in unmarked vehicles.

ICE agent, photo from Huffington Post

This while it has been indicated that between 900,000 and 1.6 million Ukrainians on Russian-occupied territories have been deported to Russia, including 260,000 children. Outside of Europe similar activities are taking place in several other areas. For example, in Gaza where from the beginning of the Gaza war on 13 October 2023, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) forced the evacuation of 1.1 million people from Northen Gaza, while the land strip has been bombed and destroyed.

We have to admit that after reaching catastrophic dimensions during the last century the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing is still with us. As the herd animals that we are, we humans have become afflicted with the unfortunate trait of dividing individuals into groups, which we judge and treat according to broad generalizations based on people’s group affiliation, regardless of their unique personality.

Given the xenophobic storms now raging in both in the U.S. and Europe, it may be appropriate to recall the human disasters that such behaviour has caused on their continents. The genocide that the indigenous people of the U.S. were subjected to is well known, and also when during World War II U.S. forcibly relocated and incarcerated about 120,000 U.S, citizens of Japanese descent in various concentration camps. Lesser known is probably the forced deportation of between 300,000 and 2 million Mexicans and Mexican-Americans during the Great Depression between 1929 and 1939, forty to sixty percent of them were U.S, citizens and overwhelmingly children.

The European 20th century history of mass deportations and human slaughter is even darker. It began at the outskirts of the continent when Russian forces between 1863 and 1878 invaded Circassia by the Black Sea, systematically killing and deporting 95 to 97 percent of its population, resulting in the deaths of between 1 and 1.5 million. This was followed by the pogroms, i.e. mass killings of Jews, in for example Odessa (1881), Kishinev (1903), Kiev (1905), and Bialystok (1906), leaving more than 2,000 dead and resulting in a mass migration of Jews from the affected areas, worsened during the following civil war when 35,000 to 250,000 Jews were massacred between 1918 and 1920. At the same time the Bolshevik regime killed and/or deported an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Don Cossacks.

After World War I between 90,000 and 300,000 Albanians were deported from Yugoslavia and up to 80,000 were killed during this new nation’s colonization of Kosovo. The expulsion and genocide of Armenians and Greeks which occurred in Turkish Anatolia both during and after World War I resulted in mass migrations and between 2 and 3 million Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians were killed. Over 1.2 million ethnic Greeks were expelled from Turkey in 1922-1924, while the Greeks expelled 400,000 Muslims.

Even worse was to come. Between 1935 and 1945, Nazi Germany systematically killed an estimated 130,500 Roma and Sinti people and between 1938 and 1945 more than 6 million Jews. During the same period Nazi German forces killed 3 million Ukrainians, 1,6 million Poles, 1,6 million Russians, 1,4 million Byelorussians. The German allies in Croatia massacred between 200,000 and 500,000 Serbs, as well as approximately 25,000 Roma/Sinti and 30,000 Jews. Their adversaries, the Serbs, killed 32,000 Croats and 33.000 Bosniaks.

The overwhelming part of all these victims were civilians, not combatants, and the estimations above are only some examples of massacres and deportations that occurred all over Europe during World War II.

In the Soviet Union (USSR), Stalin ordered the resettlement of more than 3,5 million ethnic minorities – Ukrainians, Volga Germans, Chechens, Balts, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Karachays, Turks, and Ingush. Many of them never returned to their homelands and up to 400,000 deaths due to these expulsions were archived by Soviet authorities.

Before that the Holodomor, a massive man-made famine from 1932 to 1933 had killed 3.5 to 5 million in Ukraine, as well as 62,000 in the Kuban area, while over 300,000 Ukrainians were deported to Kazakhstan, where many died.

All these numbers are just estimations and they might be higher or lower. However, we have to keep in mind that behind every single number we find cruelty and unimaginable suffering.

At the conclusion of World War I, it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place, but during and after World War II what happened was rather the opposite – boundaries remained broadly intact (though USSR significantly expanded its territory) and people were moved instead … millions of them.

For example, 1.6 to 2 million Poles were by the invading Germans expelled from their lands, not counting millions of slave workers deported from Poland to the German Reich. At the same time the USSR transferred 380,000 Poles from their home territories, while 410 000 Finns had to leave Karelia, ceded to the USSR.

On top of that, losses on the battle fields were enormous – Soviet Union lost 6 million soldiers, Germany 4 million, Italy 400,000, and Romania 300,000. If combining military and civilian losses Poland lost one person in 5 of her pre-war population, Yugoslavia one in 8 and Greece one in 14, compared with one in 15 in Germany and 1one in 77 in France.

Nazi Germany captured 5.5 million Soviet soldiers and out of them 3.3 million died in the camps, of the 750,000 German soldiers captured by USSR 20,000 survived.

All this cruelty continued after the war and it was now members of ethnic groups connected with loosing nations who were lumped together into one unit, where individuals came to suffer, both the guilty and the innocent ones.

At the Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945 the heads of the leading Allies – the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. – agreed upon “orderly and humane” expulsions of the “German populations” from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but not Yugoslavia and Romania. As a result, between 13,5 and 16.5 million “ethnic Germans” were expulsed from Central and Eastern European countries.

Estimates of the number of those who died during this process are being debated and range from a half to 3 million. As an example, investigations by a joint German and Czech commission of historians did in 1995 established that 2.1 million ethnic Germans were deported from Czechoslovakia to Germany. The death toll was at least 15,000 persons, but it could range up to a maximum of 30,000 dead, if one assumes that many deaths were not reported.

Yugoslavia was a particularly horrifying example of ethnic cleansing both during and after World War II. As mentioned above Croats and Serbs constantly massacred each other. During the so called foibe massacres (foibes are sink holes common in the region and many victims were thrown into them) ethnic Italians were killed by Communist partisans. During and after the war these crimes caused an exodus amounting to between 230,000 and 350,000 “ethnic Italians”, estimates of massacred victims range from 3,000 to 11,000.

These are just a few examples of expulsions and massacres of some Europeans, without mentioning the horrible fate of many Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Turks, and many others who happened to be minorities in countries where they had lived for centuries. While considering this often forgotten, or at least unmentioned, history of millions of unwelcomed victims and refugees criss-crossing a bombed out and miserable Europe it is difficult to comprehend that so many descendants of these suffering people are now gathering around xenophobic parties which make refugeeism, whether for one’s life, or due to general misery, a crime.

Contemplating the heavily armed ICE agents in the U.S. “liberating” their nation from “foreign elements” you might easily evoke images of equally armed SS troopers, Soviet NKVD agents, Romanian Iron Guards, Croatian Ustaše and many similar units who expelled, and often killed, ethnic groups all over Europe.

Main sources: Judt, Tony (2005) Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. London: Vintage. Lieberman, Benjamin (2013) Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Totten, Samuel et al., eds. (1997) Century of Genocide; Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views. New York: Garland Publishing.

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Two malnourished children receive food supplements at a health centre in Tawila, North Darfur, Sudan. Credit: UNICEF/Mohammed Jamal

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 8 2026 (IPS)

As Sudan approaches 1,000 days of civil war, late December and early January saw a brutal escalation of violence, with drone strikes hitting areas at the center of the country’s deepening hunger crisis.

While the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) advance across western and southern Sudan, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) tighten control over the east and the capital, civilians are at a high risk of being caught in the crossfire. Thousands have been displaced as a direct result of violence, humanitarian access remains severely strained, and most civilians are unable to access basic, essential services.

In late December, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) released its annual Emergency Watchlist report, outlining the humanitarian crises in 20 countries and identifying those at the greatest risk of deteriorating conditions in 2026. For the third year in a row, Sudan ranked at the top of the list, with the IRC describing the nation’s crisis as the “largest humanitarian crisis ever recorded”, as well as the largest and fastest growing displacement crisis in the world.

“This crisis is entirely man-made,” said IRC country director for Sudan, Eatizaz Yousif. “The ongoing conflict has decimated livelihoods, displaced millions, and blocked life-saving aid from reaching those in desperate need.” According to IRC estimates, roughly 150,000 Sudanese civilians were killed in 2025—a number expected to rise in the new year as the conflict intensifies and collapsing emergency services struggle to meet rapidly growing needs.

The first week of 2026 have been particularly turbulent for besieged civilians in Sudan. Between January 1 and 3, multiple drone strikes occurred in Dilling, South Kordofan, causing numerous civilian deaths and injuries and generating considerable panic among residents.

On January 3, drone strikes targeted a market and a medical clinic in the Al Zurg and Ghurair villages in North Darfur, which has been described as the “epicenter of Sudan’s hunger crisis” by the United Nations (UN), causing extensive damage. The same day, two drone attacks occurred in the Kulbus locality in West Darfur, leading to the displacement of over 600 civilians.

According to figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), between December 31 and January 4, over 1,000 civilians were driven from their homes and fled to South Kordofan as a result of violence. On January 6, brutal clashes between warring parties caused over 2,000 civilians to flee from North Kordofan in a single day.

Conditions for displaced civilians in North Darfur are extremely dire, with the IRC underscoring a widespread lack of access to basic services. Approximately 400,000 families fleeing violence in neighboring El Fasher have arrived in Tawila, overwhelming the region’s already strained humanitarian capacity. Many are living in makeshift shelters without adequate food, clean water, or healthcare. IRC teams have also reported more than 170 young children in Tawila separated from their families, highlighting the severe protection risks facing displaced communities.

“The sight of these small children arriving alone, without the whereabouts or the fate of the rest of their family, is harrowing,” said Arjan Hehenkamp, IRC’s Darfur crisis lead. “Extremely disturbing reports and satellite imagery confirm that people are not able to flee El Fasher to safe places like Tawila, which means they are trapped, detained, or worse.”

On December 29, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) conducted a nutritional assessment in North Darfur’s Um Baru locality—one of the regions most affected by conflict and food insecurity—and found that 53 percent of nearly 500 children screened showed signs of acute malnutrition, many of them being under five years old. Eighteen percent of the screened children were found to suffer from severe acute malnutrition, which can be fatal in weeks if left untreated.

“When severe acute malnutrition reaches this level, time becomes the most critical factor,” said UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell. “Children in Um Baru are fighting for their lives and need immediate help. Every day without safe and unhindered access increases the risk of children growing weaker and more death and suffering from causes that are entirely preventable.”

According to estimates from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), roughly 21.2 million people across Sudan—nearly half of the population—are experiencing high levels of food insecurity, with over 3.7 million children under five, as well as pregnant and lactating women, urgently requiring treatment for acute malnutrition. Furthermore, famine was officially declared in El Fasher and Kadugli in November, with humanitarian experts projecting that it could spread to 20 additional localities across Darfur and Kordofan.

In late December, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced a large-scale seed distribution campaign to assist in winterization efforts and combat Sudan’s deepening nutrition and hunger crisis for the new year. Launched in Khartoum in November, the campaign aims to strengthen and rehabilitate Sudan’s local food production. FAO seeks to reach over 134,000 households, or 670,000 people, across ten states, including Al Jazirah, Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern State, Red Sea, River Nile, Sennar, and the White Nile states.

Targeted households will receive a variety of vegetable seeds including eggplant, green pepper, jute mallow, okra, onion, pumpkin, rocket, snake cucumber, tomato, and zucchini. This campaign aims to restore dietary diversity, improve household nutrition, and revitalize livelihood opportunities. This is crucial for a country like Sudan, in which roughly 80 percent of the population relies on agriculture as a lifeline for food and income.

Additionally, the UN and its partners are working on the ground in Khartoum to strengthen protection services for vulnerable civilians. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is currently in the process of removing debris, distributing medications, creating short-term employment opportunities, and providing psychosocial support.

In late December, UNDP and the UN Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) launched a campaign titled Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Social Cohesion in Kassala and Red Sea States, in cooperation with UNICEF, to promote gender equality, social cohesion, youth engagement, equitable governance, and successful livelihoods.

“During the war, many of us felt hopeless, but being part of this group gave me purpose,” said Khawla, a youth ambassador from Kadugli trained by the program. “When I see young people listening, asking questions, and starting to believe that peace is possible, I know our work matters. It’s not just about awareness—it’s about restoring trust and rebuilding our communities from the ground up.”

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Credit: Isabel Infantes/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Dec 30 2025 (IPS)

Satellite images show corpses piled high in El Fasher, North Darfur, awaiting mass burial or cremation as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia tries to cover up the scale of its crimes. Up to 150,000 El Fasher residents remain missing from the city, seized by the RSF in November. The lowest estimate is that 60,000 are dead. The Arab militia has ethnically cleansed the city of its non-Arab residents. The slaughter is the latest horrific episode in the war between the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces, sparked by a power battle between military leaders in April 2023.

Both sides have committed atrocities, including executions, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. It’s hard to gather accurate figures, but at least 150,000 people are estimated to have been killed. Around nine million people have been internally displaced, and close to four million more have fled across the border. Some 25 million now face famine.

Civil society and humanitarian workers are responding as best they can, but they’re in the firing line. They face death, violence, abduction and detention. Emergency orders impose bureaucratic restrictions on civil society organisations and limit aid operations and freedoms of assembly, expression and movement, while troops also block aid delivery.

Reporting on the conflict is difficult and dangerous. Almost all media infrastructure has been destroyed, many newspapers have stopped publishing and both sides are targeting journalists, with many forced into exile. Extensive disinformation campaigns obscure what’s happening on the ground. Mohamed Khamis Douda, spokesperson for the Zamzam displacement camp, exemplified the dangers for those who tell the truth. He stayed on in El Fasher to provide vital updates to international media. When the RSF invaded, they sought him out and killed him.

The world looks away

Sudan is sometimes called a forgotten war, but it’s more accurate to say the world is choosing to ignore it – and this suits several powerful states. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the RSF’s biggest backer. It continues to deny this, even though weapons manufactured by the UAE or supplied to it by its allies have been found at sites recovered from RSF control. Without its support, the RSF would likely have lost the war by now.

In recent years, the UAE has worked to cultivate influence among several African states. It has developed a series of ports around Africa, with one planned on Sudan’s stretch of the Red Sea. It has big agricultural investments in Sudan and receives most of the gold mined there. The UAE has evidently concluded that RSF control is the best way of securing its influence and protecting its interests, regardless of the cost in human lives. In response, Sudan’s government has moved to improve links with Russia. It’s been reported it may allow Russia to develop a permanent Red Sea naval base.

The UAE faces little international pressure because western states that are strongly aligned with it, including the UK and USA, downplay its role. The UK government continues to supply the UAE with arms in the knowledge these are being transferred to the RSF, while a whistleblower has accused it of removing warnings about possible genocide in Sudan from a risk assessment analysis to protect the UAE. The European Union and UK reacted to the El Fasher atrocities by placing sanctions on four RSF leaders and the USA is said to be considering further sanctions, but these measures never reach as far as figures in the UAE government.

The UN Security Council, where the UK is the permanent member that leads on Sudan, has also been predictably ineffective. Russia has said it will veto any resolution the UK brings. Yet in June, the UK refused an offer from African states, serving on the Council on a rotating basis, to take over responsibility, something that could have created more space for negotiation.

Among other countries with regional influence, Egypt strongly favours the Sudan government, and Saudi Arabia is somewhat supportive too. They come together with the UAE and USA in a forum called the quad. Despite competing interests, in September there appeared grounds for hope when the quad brokered what was supposed to be a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a nine-month transition to civilian rule. Both sides accepted the plan, only for the RSF to keep fighting, causing the Sudanese government to reject the proposal.

Pressure and accountability

Whether fighting halts may depend on the USA’s diplomatic whims. Trump has recently appeared to take more interest in the conflict, likely prompted by Saudi Arabia’s ruler Mohammed bin Salman, who visited the White House in November.

Trump may want to claim to have ended another conflict in his evident quest for the Nobel Peace Prize, but it’s hard to see progress unless the US government proves willing to pressure the UAE, including through tariffs, a blunt instrument Trump has used to force deals on other states. The fact the Trump administration currently applies tariffs at its lowest rate, 10 per cent, shows its continuing warmth towards the UAE.

Campaigners are trying to focus more attention on the UAE’s central role in the conflict. One highly visible focus is basketball: the NBA has an extensive and growing sponsorship agreement with the UAE, part of the regime’s efforts to sportswash its international reputation. Civil society campaigners are calling on the NBA to end its partnership, and their advocacy may help move Sudan up the US agenda.

The international community has the power to stop the killing, but first it must acknowledge the role of the UAE and its western allies in enabling it. All involved in the conflict, within and beyond Sudan, must put aside their calculations of narrow self-interest. The UAE, their allies and the other quad states should face greater pressure to broker a genuine ceasefire as a first step towards peace, and use their leverage with the warring parties to ensure they stick to it.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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CIVICUS discusses migrants’ rights in Libya with Sarra Zidi, political scientist and researcher for HuMENA, an international civil society organisation (CSO) that advances democracy, human rights and social justice across the Middle East and North Africa.

Sarra Zidi

Libya has fragmented into rival power centres, with large areas controlled by armed groups. As state institutions have collapsed, there’s no functioning system to protect the rights and safety of migrants and refugees. Instead, state-linked bodies such as the Directorate for Combating Illegal Immigration (DCIM) and the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) often work with militias, smugglers and traffickers, with near-total impunity. In this lawless environment, Sub-Saharan migrants face systematic abuses that the International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations bodies warn may amount to crimes against humanity. Despite this, the European Union (EU) continues to classify Libya as a ‘safe country of return’ and work with it to externalise its migration control.

What risks do migrants face in Libya?

Libya has no asylum system, which leaves migrants and refugees without legal protection and highly vulnerable to abuse. From the moment people enter the country, they face the risk of arbitrary arrest, torture and, in some cases, ending up in mass graves or being killed extrajudicially.

Detention is the default approach to migration management. While the DCIM formally oversees detention centres, many are effectively run by militias that hold people indefinitely without registration, legal processes or access to lawyers. Centres are severely overcrowded, with hardly any food, healthcare, sanitation or water, and disease outbreaks are common. Sexual and gender-based violence are systematic. Militias and guards subject detained women to forced prostitution, rape and sexual slavery.

Extortion is widespread. Officials torture detainees to force ransom payments from relatives, and their release often depends on intermediaries paying bribes. Those who manage to get out typically have no documents or resources, leaving them exposed to being arrested again.

Smuggling networks shape much of the movement across Libya. Traffickers routinely subject migrants to economic exploitation, physical violence and racial discrimination. Some CSOs have documented slave auctions where Black migrants are sold as farm workers. Officials and traffickers treat migrants as commodities in an economy built on forced labour across agriculture, construction and domestic work.

Accountability is almost non-existent. Libya lacks laws criminalising key offences under the ICC’s Rome Statute, including sexual and gender-based violence and torture. In this context, many migrants try to flee through the Central Mediterranean Route – the world’s deadliest migration route – as the only escape they can see.

What’s the EU’s role?

Although Libyan authorities are the ones who commit these human rights violations, they operate within a wider EU policy designed to externalise migration control. By relying on Libya to contain migration along the Central Mediterranean Route, the EU prioritise containment over protection.

Since the 2017 Malta Declaration between Italy and Libya, the EU has funded and trained the LCG. This support enables Libya to maintain a vast search and rescue zone and intercept people attempting to cross the sea. This approach draws inspiration from other offshore detention models, such as Australia’s, and focuses on preventing people from reaching European territory. This has strengthened Libya’s capacity to intercept migrants while doing little to address the systematic violations occurring in detention centres and at the hands of militias.

What are CSOs doing to help, and what challenges do they face?

CSOs play a crucial role in documenting violations, gathering survivor testimonies and building evidence archives that can support future accountability efforts. They are also a vital source of information and protection for migrants. Many work closely with international partners such as Doctors Without Borders and the World Organisation Against Torture, and often intervene directly in individual cases to save lives.

But because security risks remain extremely high, activists, human rights defenders and journalists must carry out much of their work discreetly. They face constant surveillance, threats and pressure from authorities and militias, and some have been arbitrarily detained, tortured and forcibly disappeared.

Their work is becoming increasingly difficult as authorities further restrict Libya’s civic space. The government uses draconian laws to silence organisations that expose abuses, call for reforms or maintain ties with international partners. The 2022 Cybercrime Law is routinely applied to target activists and bloggers under vague charges such as ‘threatening public security’. In March 2023, a new measure invalidated all CSOs registered after 2011 unless they were founded under a specific law from the era of Muammar Gaddafi.

On 2 April, the Internal Security Agency ordered the closure of 10 international CSOs, accusing them of ‘hostile activities’ and of trying to alter Libya’s demographics by assisting African migrants. This move has cut off essential services for asylum seekers, migrants and refugees, leaving them even more vulnerable.

What actions should the international community take?

The international community must urgently refocus its attention on Libya. When donors de-prioritise the crisis or divert funds elsewhere, Sub-Saharan migrants are left even more exposed to exploitation and violence.

International bodies also need to strengthen their support for Libyan civil society and ensure activists can participate safely in global forums in Brussels, Geneva and New York. Policymakers need their testimonies to shape informed, rights-based decisions.

Protection systems need major improvements too. The International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations Refugee Agency struggle with long bureaucratic processes that result in many people never receiving the help they need. Migrants need places where they can report abuse safely and receive proper legal advice and psychosocial support.

Only with adequate resources, renewed political will and a rights-based approach that brings local voices to the table can we address the ongoing crisis in Libya and protect migrants trapped in a system of abuse.

This interview was conducted during International Civil Society Week 2025, a five-day gathering in Bangkok that brought together activists, movements and organisations defending civic freedoms and democracy around the world. International Civil Society Week was co-hosted by CIVICUS and the Asia Democracy Network.

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Libya: Women, HRDs, migrant support NGOs, journalists and online critics face systematic violations CIVICUS Monitor 26.Oct.2025
Outsourcing cruelty: the offshoring of migration management CIVICUS Lens 15.Sep.2025
Migrants’ rights: humanity versus hostility CIVICUS | 2025 State of Civil Society Report

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Our traditional “year-ender” usually kicks off with a grim litany of world disasters and crises over the past 12 months, highlights IPS partners and contributors and culminates in a more positive-sounding finale. This time I’d like to begin on a more personal note intended also as a metaphor.

Farhana Haque Rahman

As thousands looked for the nearest exit, a young Bangladeshi diplomat saw me and instead of joining the mass scramble, he gallantly led me through the crowds to safety. Thank you Aminul Islam Zisan for demonstrating when in crisis people can come together in unique ways.

Thankfully no one was killed in the fire; talks resumed and the Conference of Parties process survived in the form of a concluding document that could be interpreted as a small step forward in the global battle to stem the climate crisis, even while making only an oblique reference to the fossil fuels that are largely creating it.

COP’s survival was not assured given the US boycott ordered by President Donald Trump who dismissed climate change as “the greatest con job” in addressing the UN General Assembly in September.

The US absence from Belem in fact inflicted more damage to the US in terms of its global standing, just as Trump’s decision to shun the G20 talks running parallel in Johannesburg only deepened its reputational harm. Salt was diplomatically rubbed into its self-inflicted wounds by the dignity of G20 host President Cyril Ramaphosa who ignored US opposition from afar and steered adoption of a declaration addressing global challenges, notably the climate crisis.

Looking back, perhaps this was the week that quietly brought the curtain down on the Age of America. Unpredictability, chaos, violence and institutionalised cruelty are the early symptoms of the dramatic shift in 2025 towards unilateralism and protectionism.

Hundreds of Palestinians, including scores of children, have been killed since the US-brokered “truce” between Israel and Hamas began on October 11. Russian air strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets have also regularly punctuated Trump’s flip-flopping efforts to end a war he said he could finish on day one of his presidency.

Sharp cuts in US aid ordered by Trump in January have “fuelled a global humanitarian catastrophe”, according to a statement by the UN Human Rights Council on July 31. Citing two independent experts on poverty, food and human rights, the Council said: “More than 350,000 deaths stemming from the aid cuts have already been estimated, including more than 200,000 children.”

Famine is spreading with the conflict in western Sudan, and lack of finance has also led to cuts in vital UN aid to South Sudan. Over one million people caught in Myanmar’s largely forgotten civil war had their lifesaving support cut by the UN World Food Programme because of funding shortfalls.

Civicus, a global alliance of civil society organizations and activists working to strengthen citizen action, says these multiple and connected crises – conflict, climate breakdown and democratic regression – are overwhelming the international institutions designed to address the problems that states can’t or won’t resolve. US withdrawal from global bodies threatens to worsen this crisis in international cooperation.

But as CIVICUS’s 2025 State of Civil Society Report outlines, civil society has ideas about how to save the UN by putting people at its heart: a theme embraced at COP30 by Open Society Foundations President Binaifer Nowrojee who endorsed Brazil’s democratic leadership for elevating Indigenous and Afro-descendant voices and bringing human rights back to the centre of climate action.

In this rapidly shifting world order, Nowrojee sees the Global South stepping forward with new ideas and a new vision rooted in dignity, fairness, and protection of the planet.

Arguably the most important agreement emerging from COP30 was the Just Transition Mechanism which aims to ensure fair development of a global green economy, protecting the rights of all people, including workers, women and Indigenous people.

Coral Pasisi, Director of Climate Change and Sustainability for the Pacific Community (SPC), highlighted at COP30 how critical the situation has become for island nations experiencing accelerating climate impacts and hoping for meaningful breakthroughs in Belem. She raised the need for stronger support from developed countries for Loss and Damage.

The Gen Z demonstrators who have rocked regimes in South Asia and Africa are certainly stepping up with their visions for fairer futures for all, their protests aimed against nepotism and corruption among entrenched elites. They have been met with bullets in Bangladesh last year, and in Nepal – where the government was forced to resign in September – as well as Tanzania where hundreds were reported killed. Gen Z protests this year also rocked Indonesia, the Philippines and Morocco.

As Jan Lundius, a Swedish researcher, wrote in IPS: “Even though specific incidents triggered these upheavals, they were all due to long-term, shared grievances evolving from stark wealth gaps, rampant nepotism, and unlimited corruption. Above all, youngsters protested against members of powerful dynasties, favouring a wealthy and discredited political elite.”

A combination of conflict and climate disasters can have disastrous long-term consequences, particularly for children’s education. Initiatives supported by IPS like Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and the Safe Schools Declaration focus on providing quality, inclusive education to crisis-affected children to prevent long-term cycles of poverty and instability.

Hurricane Melissa which swept through the Caribbean in October served as a harsh reminder that 5.9 million children and adolescents in Latin America and the Caribbean could be pushed into poverty by 2030 due to loss of education as a result of climate change if governments do not intervene soon, according to UNICEF.

The World Bank estimated the physical damage inflicted by Hurricane Melissa on Jamaica at some $8.8 billion, or 41% of the country’s 2024 GDP.

However the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has also warned governments that they are underestimating or ignoring the inextricable links between climate change, nature loss and food security. Its latest assessment, approved by nearly 150 countries meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, warned that biodiversity is declining everywhere, largely as a result of human actions.

CGIAR, a global research partnership focused on food security, is facing a very different world from when it was founded nearly 50 years ago in terms of having to address climate change, biodiversity loss, and new conflicts, according to CGIAR Chief Scientist Dr Sandra Milach. A major focus is on equipping 500 million small-scale producers for climate resilience to protect their livelihoods and increase stable incomes.

A year-ender wouldn’t be complete in the run-up to festive celebrations without at least a mention of the major religious figures to dominate the news.

Pope Francis, one of the most outspoken pontiffs in modern times, died on Easter Monday. Chicago-born Robert Francis Prevost, 69, became his successor, the first North American elected to the role. Choosing to be known as Pope Leo XIV he called for an end to the ‘barbarity’ of the war in Gaza. He also took aim at climate sceptics and appealed for urgent actions to be taken by world leaders at COP30.

The Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, turned 90 in exile in India, and also made a call for peace in the world. To the delight of his followers, he made clear that he would be reincarnated and that only his trusted inner circle of monks would have the “sole authority” to locate his successor. China swiftly rebuffed his declaration, saying his successor must be approved by Beijing.

In 2025 the world marked 80 years since the end of the Second World War. Minoru Harada, a Buddhist monk and head of Soka Gakkai, recalled his childhood experience of the fire-bombing of Tokyo and pledged his organisation’s determination that no one should have to endure the horrors of war.

Farhana Haque Rahman is Senior Vice President of IPS Inter Press Service and Executive Director IPS Noram; she served as the elected Director General of IPS from 2015-2019. A journalist and communications expert, she is a former senior official of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

IPS UN Bureau

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