On the sidelines of the UN Youth Forum, four climate leaders from across the continent and diaspora unite to call for stronger protection of Africa’s environment and vital resources.
 
Sibusiso Mazomba (far left), member of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; Eugenia Boateng (second from left), Founder and Executive Director of the African Diaspora Youth Hub, FABA Institute; Jabri Ibrahim, also of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; and Damon Hamman, Graduate Student, New York University, Centre for Global Affairs. Credit: UN Photo

By Alexandra del Castello
UNITED NATIONS, May 5 2026 (IPS)

Africa is on the frontlines of the climate crisis, warming faster than the global average and facing disproportionate climate impacts, despite contributing the least to global greenhouse gas emissions.

This is particularly evident in the growing pressures that climate change is placing on water resources and systems across the continent. As water underpins agriculture, livelihoods, ecosystems, and energy production, water-related climate impacts are deepening inequalities and threatening sustainable development across Africa.

At the forefront of this year’s ECOSOC Youth Forum – the largest annual UN gathering of young people – four African climate youth leaders led a dynamic discussion spotlighting the key role that African youth play in driving climate solutions across the continent, building community resilience, strengthening water security, and advancing locally led adaptation efforts.

Their insights highlighted how young people are not only responding to the climate crisis but reshaping the development agenda through innovation, advocacy, and community rooted action.

African youth are charting bold new pathways for climate leadership and proving that the future of climate action is being shaped by their vision and determination.

Learn more about the speakers:

Eugenia Boateng is an African diaspora strategist and founder of the African Diaspora Youth Hub (ADYH) and FABA, a production strategy lab building systems to make African economies more visible, structured, and investable.

Her work focuses on translating informal economies into institutional intelligence, connecting diaspora resources to African production, and designing systems that enable value retention on the continent.

Jabri Ibrahim is a climate and energy policy expert with an extensive network across Africa, connecting youth movements, policymakers, and private sector leaders. Jabri has played a central role in mobilizing African youth for climate action, particularly through the African Youth Initiative on Climate Change (AYICC).

Sibusiso Mazomba is a climate justice activist, advocate, and researcher. He leads youth advocacy at the African Climate Alliance, driving initiatives to ensure meaningful youth participation in decision-making.

A junior negotiator for South Africa’s UNFCCC delegation since COP26, he has contributed to negotiations on adaptation, oceans, and loss and damage, representing youth and national interests on the global stage.

Damon Hamman is a Master of Science candidate in Global Affairs at New York University, concentrating in transnational security, intelligence, and conflict analysis. His work centers on the intersection of human security, diplomacy, and data-driven policy research.

He has served with the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, where he built an AI-assisted thematic analysis pipeline for Voluntary National Reviews, contributed to policy briefs aligned with Agenda 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, and supported diplomatic engagement with African missions.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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Displaced mothers and children at a malnutrition treatment center in Chuil, Jonglei State, South Sudan. Credit: WFP/Gabriela Vivacqua

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, May 1 2026 (IPS)

In 2026, the humanitarian situation in South Sudan has taken a considerable turn for the worse, with widespread food shortages, ongoing disruptions to food production systems, and rising rates of malnutrition affecting over half of the population. Compounded by the vast scale of needs and an overwhelming lack of access to basic services, humanitarian experts warn that nationwide levels of hunger are projected to worsen to catastrophic levels if urgent intervention is not secured.

On April 28, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) published a joint statement underscoring the escalation of the hunger crisis in South Sudan, noting that approximately 56 percent of the population, or roughly 7.8 million people, are projected to face acute food insecurity by July. They stress that the main drivers of food insecurity are climate shocks, flooding, mass displacement, and protracted armed conflict, all of which hinder effective agricultural yields and reduce food availability for hundreds of thousands of families.

“Hunger in South Sudan is intensifying, not stabilizing,” said Ross Smith, WFP Director of Emergencies and Preparedness. “Between April and July of this year, more than half of the population is projected to face crisis levels of hunger or worse, including people already in catastrophic conditions, where starvation and a collapse of livelihoods are a daily reality. This is among the highest proportions of any country’s population facing crisis levels of hunger today.”

The latest figures from the Integrated Food Security Classification Phase (IPC) show that over 280,000 additional civilians have been pushed into acute food insecurity since late 2025, including 73,000 civilians who are facing catastrophic (IPC Phase 5) levels of hunger. This marks a 160 percent increase from last year’s figures. An additional 2.5 million people face emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of hunger, and 5.3 million have been reported to rely on unsustainable coping mechanisms to survive.

Children have been hit particularly hard, with UNICEF reporting that approximately 2.2 million children between the ages of six months and five years suffer from acute malnutrition, marking an increase of over 100,000 cases compared to last year. Over 700,000 children are projected to face the highest levels of hunger by July. Roughly 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, which has significantly dangerous, long-term implications for both mothers and children.

“Every day of delayed humanitarian access and supply delivery is a day a child’s life and future hangs in the balance,” said Lucia Elmi, UNICEF Director of Emergencies. “We are calling on all parties to grant timely, safe access to conflict-affected, including areas of displacement, and scale up nutrition interventions. We must act now if we are to save children’s lives.”

Widespread displacement continues to hinder South Sudan’s road to recovery, with rampant insecurity, overcrowding, and a shortage of critical supplies in displacement shelters complicating humanitarian relief efforts. The UN agencies note that nearly 300,000 people have been displaced this year in the Jonglei state alone, with many communities entirely cut off from humanitarian assistance. Numerous families report being unable to access food services due to rising prices, disrupted markets, and economic decline, which has significantly reduced household purchasing power.

Additionally, displaced communities face elevated risks of contracting infectious diseases due to persistent overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The agencies have recorded a sharp rise in cholera, malaria, and measles infections, particularly among “vulnerable and already acutely malnourished children”. Furthermore, treatment for malnutrition has been severely compromised over the past several months, with a substantial portion of the nation’s healthcare and nutritional support facilities having been damaged or closed entirely due to conflict. Life-saving medical interventions are largely unavailable due to continued shortages of medical supplies.

In April, IPC conducted a detailed Risk of Famine Analysis, assessing hunger conditions across seven counties to determine which regions were at a high risk of developing famine. The analysis identified four counties that are projected to contract famine in the coming months, a significant increase from just one county identified last year. The Upper Nile and Jonglei regions are particularly vulnerable, as the renewed escalation of armed hostilities has driven further displacement and reduced humanitarian reach to the most at-risk communities.

Risks are especially pronounced in Akobo, where IPC projects the return of over 100,000 South Sudanese civilians currently displaced in Gambela and Ethiopia. This large-scale return could further exacerbate hunger conditions, as humanitarian and healthcare personnel face severe shortages of supplies, funding, and staffing in assisting already strained communities.

IPC also warns that hunger conditions could escalate to catastrophic levels (IPC Phase 5) in the coming months across multiple areas, including Doma and Yomding in Ulang County; Pulturuk, Waat, and Thol Lankien in Nyirol County; and Kuerenge Ke and Mading in southern Nasir County. All of these regions remain largely inaccessible due to ongoing conflict, which has limited humanitarian reach.

In response, the UN has called for an end to the isolation of these communities in relief efforts, stressing the urgent need for closer monitoring and a strengthened humanitarian response.

“Now, more than ever, we cannot afford to lose the hard-won gains made in recent years, especially as South Sudan works to strengthen its agrifood systems and build on encouraging signs of local agricultural production,” said Rein Paulsen, FAO Director, Office of Emergencies and Resilience. “These gains remain highly vulnerable to conflict, insecurity, and climate shocks—the very forces driving today’s food crisis. We must act urgently and collectively to protect livelihoods, sustain food production, and prevent millions more people from falling deeper into hunger.”

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The UN report has highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources. Credit: UNU-INWEH

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 30 2026 (IPS)

A newly released United Nations report has raised urgent concerns that the world’s push toward clean energy and digital technologies is driving a hidden crisis in some of the planet’s most vulnerable regions, where mining for critical minerals is depleting water supplies, damaging health, and deepening inequality.

The report, Critical Minerals, Water Insecurity and Injustice, released by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH), warns that the race for minerals essential to electric vehicles, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence could replicate the injustices of the fossil fuel era.

Demand for these minerals is expected to surge dramatically in the coming decades. According to the report, global demand could quadruple by 2050, with lithium, cobalt, and graphite seeing increases of up to 500 percent. These materials are indispensable for batteries, solar panels, and digital infrastructure.

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, says the world lacks an enforceable governance model for critical minerals. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, told IPS News in an exclusive interview that the world is lacking an enforceable governance model for critical minerals.

He said that without binding international agreements, laws, and policies, environmental and health costs—especially water depletion and pollution—are pushed onto mining regions, leaving affected communities without effective accountability or recourse.

“The climate, energy, sustainability, and the so-called “green” policies are narrowly carbon-centric. Demand projections are driven by decarbonisation targets, but water security, health and WASH impacts are not hard constraints in transition planning. As a result, mineral extraction expands even in highly water-stressed regions,” Madani said.

He added that the trade and industrial policies reinforce structural asymmetries and that high-income economies retain control over refining, manufacturing, finance, and intellectual property, while mineral-rich countries are locked into raw extraction with weak benefit-sharing. “Together, these failures reproduce inequality rather than delivering a just transition,” Madani told IPS.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress. Credit: UNU-INWEH

The report has further highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources.

Producing just one tonne of lithium requires nearly 1.9 million litres of water. In 2024 alone, global lithium production consumed an estimated 456 billion litres, an amount equivalent to the annual domestic water needs of about 62 million people in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, one of the world’s richest lithium reserves, mining accounts for up to 65 percent of regional water use, intensifying shortages for local communities and farmers.

Across the so-called Lithium Triangle, spanning Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, groundwater levels are falling. The report cites evidence of declining water tables and disrupted ecosystems as brine extraction alters underground water systems.

“Everyone needs money. But everyone also needs the basics, like water,” a resident in Bolivia’s Uyuni region is quoted as saying in the report.

Cases of Birth Defects, Miscarriages, and Chronic Illnesses

Toxic chemicals and heavy metals released during extraction often seep into rivers, soil, and groundwater.

The report documents widespread pollution in mining regions such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where cobalt extraction is concentrated. In some areas, rivers have turned highly acidic, with pH levels below 4.5, rendering water unsafe for drinking and agriculture.

Health impacts are severe. In communities near mining sites, 72 percent of respondents reported skin diseases, while more than half of women reported gynaecological problems. Prolonged exposure to contaminated water has also been linked to cases of birth defects, miscarriages, and chronic illnesses.

Children are particularly vulnerable. Studies cited in the report show higher rates of congenital abnormalities in areas close to mining activity, along with increased risks of developmental disorders.

“These are not isolated cases. They reflect systemic health disparities driven by environmental exposure,” reads the report.

Who Benefits and Who Pays?

Beyond health, water scarcity and pollution are undermining traditional livelihoods. Farming, fishing, and livestock rearing are becoming increasingly difficult in mining regions.

In Bolivia, lithium extraction has reduced water availability for quinoa farming, a staple crop. In parts of Africa, declining fish populations have resulted from river contamination, which has cut off a key source of food and income.

In some cases, mining operations displace entire communities. Indigenous populations, whose lands often contain mineral reserves, are among the hardest hit.

The report estimates that more than half of critical mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous territories .

A main finding of the report is the imbalance between who benefits and who pays the price.

While extraction largely occurs in the Global South, the economic and technological gains are concentrated in wealthier nations. Countries rich in minerals often lack the infrastructure and capacity to process them, limiting their role to low-value extraction.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces over 60 percent of the world’s cobalt, more than 70 percent of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

Meanwhile, the profits flow to multinational corporations and industrial economies that dominate refining and manufacturing.

The report describes this dynamic as a “structural sustainability paradox,” where the environmental benefits enjoyed in developed countries are effectively subsidised by ecological and social harm in poorer regions.

Experts warn that the current trajectory could repeat patterns seen in the fossil fuel industry.

“The clean energy transition is not automatic. Without deliberate policy intervention, it can reproduce extractive colonialism under a new label,” the report states.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly being described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress.

The report has recommended stronger international regulations, mandatory environmental standards, and greater transparency in supply chains. It also urges investment in recycling and circular economy models to reduce reliance on new mining, as well as the adoption of technologies that use less water.

Crucially, it emphasises the need to include local communities in decision-making and ensure they benefit from resource extraction. “Achieving climate goals must not come at the expense of those least equipped to bear the costs,” the report reads.

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, says legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity is crucial. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Strategic Policy Needed

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, a UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, told Inter Press Service that a practical step to move up the value chain and keep more economic benefits is a strategic industrial policy: using export conditions, licensing, or joint-venture requirements to promote local refining, processing, and manufacturing.

“Second, benefit-sharing and reinvestment mandates: legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity. Third, regional value-chain cooperation: pooling resources across neighbouring countries to achieve economies of scale in processing and manufacturing that individual countries cannot reach alone,” Nunbogu said.

He added that the final step would be to address power imbalances by linking mineral access to ethical sourcing standards and technology transfer obligations in trade agreements.

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On 25 March 2026 in Somalia, Nasra and Muslimo, both in Grade 8, attend class at Kabasa Primary School in Dollow. The school serves children from displaced and host communities. Through education, safe spaces and life-skills programmes, UNICEF supports girls to stay in school, build confidence and pursue their aspirations despite the challenges of drought and displacement. Credit: UNICEF/Nahom Tesfaye

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

The escalating global climate crisis has led to an increase in the frequency of climate-induced natural disasters, affecting millions worldwide. As governments struggle to keep up due to persistent funding shortfalls and inadequate preparedness and response mechanisms, education systems in Eastern and Southern Africa continue to deteriorate, pushing millions of children into displacement and poverty, further deepening long-term inequalities.

These are detailed out in a April 20 policy brief from UNICEF and global consulting firm Dalberg, titled Protecting Children’s Learning Futures: Quantifying Climate-Related Loss and Damage in Eastern and Southern Africa. The report analyses data from Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia, examining how increasingly destructive climate shocks are destroying educational infrastructure and limiting growth opportunities for the most vulnerable populations, including girls, children with disabilities, and other marginalised communities.

Through this report, UNICEF and Dalberg stress the urgency of building climate-resilient educational systems that promote human development, economic growth, and long-term self-sufficiency. Without immediate humanitarian intervention, it is projected that hundreds of millions of children are at risk of falling behind in their education by 2050, resulting in billions of dollars lost in development and poorer life outcomes.

“Children are paying the highest price for a crisis they did not create. For the first time, this report shows the scale of climate-related loss and damage to education, yet the impact on children remains largely invisible in financing decisions,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa.

“Without stronger prioritization in climate finance, education will continue to bear the brunt of climate impacts, driving repeated disruption,” Kadilli continued. “We must design education systems that anticipate shocks, protect early and foundational learning, and keep schools open. Otherwise, the true cost of climate loss and damage will be measured in lost human potential.”

Eastern and Southern Africa are among the most climate-sensitive regions in the world, home to roughly one-third of the world’s most vulnerable countries. According to UNICEF, since 2005 the region has experienced over 700 extreme weather events, roughly 75 percent of which are attributed to climate change, affecting over 330 million people and causing over 40,000 deaths.

As of 2024, climate-induced natural disasters have caused approximately USD 1.3 billion in damages, largely driven by widespread damage to school infrastructure and expenses related to establishing temporary learning facilities. Since 2005, extreme weather patterns have disrupted the education of over 130 million children, resulting in a total estimated loss of USD 120–140 billion in future earnings.

Without urgent intervention, UNICEF projects that these losses could rise to between USD 3.3 and 3.8 billion by 2050, nearly tripling in the most vulnerable contexts. This is equivalent to approximately 440 to 520 million students being stripped of their education, with projected losses in future earnings reaching between USD 260 to 380 billion.

Additionally, persistent climate shocks in Eastern and Southern Africa have been linked to declining school performance, compromised safety, and reduced well-being among school-aged children. According to the report, widespread heatwaves are associated with reduced cognitive performance, lower test scores, and diminished teaching performances among educators.

UNICEF has also reported rising rates of absenteeism and increasing psychosocial challenges, driven by the destruction of schools and the loss of supportive social networks. Schools themselves have become increasingly dangerous for both students and teachers, as damaged infrastructure and heat stress further limit access to safe, equitable, and quality education.

“Many people in the climate movement assume that people who are impacted by climate change are more worried about it, but that is not the case, including in frontline communities,” said Jennifer Carman, Director of Survey Strategy at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) at the Yale School of Environment. “Instead, people in frontline communities are more worried about hazards that directly affect their day-to-day lives, like extreme heat and power outages — and these hazards are made worse by climate change.”

Such daily struggles faced by children as a result of climate-driven disruptions to schooling manifest in heightened protection risks. A significant portion of school-aged children in these regions have been forced to relocate multiple times, essentially eliminating their access to structures of supervision, stability, and peer support. Additionally, the climate crisis continues to erode livelihoods, intensifying economic instability across many communities, and elevating children’s vulnerability to exploitation, including rising rates of child marriage, child labour, gender-based violence, and recruitment by armed coalitions.

These risks disproportionately affect girls, children with disabilities, and displaced communities. Despite this, as of 2023 estimates, less than 2.4 percent of funding from critical multilateral funds was allocated toward “child-responsive interventions”, while support for education-specific programs has remained minimal. This is relatively low when compared to national spending for other sectors, such as healthcare. UNICEF estimates that if education programs received adequate support, it could close the USD 97 billion funding gap that is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 targets in low- and middle-income countries.

“Without systematically integrating education into climate finance and policy frameworks – including efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage – countries risk remaining trapped in repeated cycles of disaster recovery spending rather than sustained resilience building, allowing climate shocks to compound disruptions to learning and generate significant non-economic losses for children and their future opportunities,” the report states.

Figures from UNICEF show that investing in education can yield substantial returns, with every USD 1 invested generating $2 to $13 in avoided losses. With the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) Board meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, from April 22 to 24, humanitarian organizations and world leaders are aiming to broaden global conversations that are essential in shaping recovery and resilience efforts that could build a brighter future for children in these regions.

Through such dialogues, UNICEF urges governments, stakeholders, and donors to strengthen the integration of education within national climate frameworks, which can be done by explicitly referencing education in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to unlock access to “climate and loss-and-damage financing”.

UNICEF also advocates applying a climate-risk lens to domestic education financing, which could help ensure that budget allocations to education sectors are climate-informed and adequately support children’s foundational education and the continuation of their education in the long term.

Furthermore, UNICEF stresses the importance of scaling and better targeting international climate finance for education by encouraging major funding mechanisms to allocate resources for education. FRLD is one such example, financially supporting “unavoidable losses” when education systems are not adequately structured to withstand climate shocks.

“These frameworks should therefore clearly articulate how countries will protect education systems from climate-related loss and damage and strengthen learning continuity, enabling governments to align financing from multiple sources – including climate funds and private sector investment – toward sustained and risk-informed education investments that strengthen education systems and reduce future climate-related impacts,” the report states. “Such investments today can help break this cycle by safeguarding learning, reducing future fiscal pressures and protecting children’s development on which long-term human development depends.”

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Seychelles’ pioneering blue bond offers a compelling lesson in practical ocean finance. Credit: Michaela Rimakova/Unsplash

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Apr 29 2026 (IPS)

As the world prepares for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) meeting in Samarkand next month, Seychelles’ pioneering blue bond offers a compelling lesson in practical ocean finance.

For small island states, the ocean is not merely a natural resource; it is the foundation of national life, economic opportunity, and long-term resilience against climate threats.

As President of Seychelles, I introduced the blue economy as a national vision as early as 2008. I did so because I believed then—as I do now—that for an island nation spanning 1.4 million square kilometers of ocean, sustainable development must begin with responsible stewardship of our marine resources. Our future depended on learning how to protect biodiversity, manage fisheries sustainably, and build economic models that serve both present needs and future generations. This vision positioned Seychelles as an early advocate for integrating ocean health with national prosperity.

That vision was not developed in isolation. It was strengthened through deliberate steps and high-level conversations that bridged policy ambition with financial innovation. A key milestone came with the debt-for-nature swap, finalized with the Paris Club creditors and The Nature Conservancy in 2014. This landmark agreement restructured approximately US$21.6 million in debt, freeing resources for marine conservation and climate adaptation. It directly led to the creation of SeyCCAT, the Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust, which has since become a vital mechanism for channeling funds into ocean protection, sustainable fisheries, and resilience projects.

As President, I also discussed the blue bond concept directly with the then Prince of Wales, Prince Charles, during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sri Lanka in November 2013.

Meeting with the Prince of Wales in Sri Lanka in 2013 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Credit: James Alix Michel

His International Sustainability Unit was already promoting innovative ocean finance mechanisms, and our conversation highlighted the urgent need for small island states to access capital markets tailored to blue economy priorities.

This exchange, combined with early engagement from the World Bank and Commonwealth partners, helped refine the idea into a viable sovereign instrument. It underscored a growing global recognition that traditional financing was inadequate for the unique challenges of climate-vulnerable, ocean-dependent nations.

The blue bond represented the culmination of this journey. Structured with technical support from the World Bank, a US$5 million guarantee from the multilateral lender, and a US$5 million concessional grant from the GEF, it raised US$15 million from private investors including Calvert Impact Capital, Nuveen, and Prudential Financial.

On 29 October 2018, Seychelles launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond at the Our Ocean Conference in Bali — an event I had the privilege of attending. This was not just a financial milestone for Seychelles; it was a global proof of concept for ocean-positive investment.

Launch of the Seychelles Blue Bond in Bali at the Ocean Conference in 2018. Credit: James Alix Michel

The bond’s structure was as innovative as its purpose. Proceeds were allocated to expand marine protected areas to 30% of Seychelles’ exclusive economic zone, improve fisheries governance, and develop sustainable blue economy sectors like eco-tourism and seafood value chains. Managed through SeyCCAT and the Development Bank of Seychelles, the funds supported grants and loans for projects that delivered measurable environmental and economic returns. Investors benefited from blended finance that de-risked the instrument, while Seychelles gained long-term capital for priorities that traditional aid could not address.

For small island developing states (SIDS), this model holds profound significance. Nations like Seychelles grapple with high public debt (often exceeding 60% of GDP), acute climate exposure, a heavy reliance on marine resources for 20-30% of GDP, and limited fiscal space. Conventional loans and grants are frequently too rigid, too short-term, or misaligned with ocean realities.

The blue bond demonstrated that sovereign debt instruments can be repurposed for sustainability, attracting private capital while advancing public goods like biodiversity protection and community livelihoods.

Its broader impact extends beyond the US$15 million raised. The Seychelles blue bond lent credibility to the blue economy as a bankable asset class, inspiring subsequent issuances by Gabon (2022), Ecuador (2024), and others. It proved that nature-based solutions and financial innovation are complementary, not competitive. By linking debt restructuring, conservation trusts, and market-based finance, Seychelles created a replicable blueprint that has influenced global discussions at forums like the UN Ocean Conference and G20 sustainable finance tracks.

Yet this success should not be romanticized. Innovative finance alone cannot resolve systemic inequities in the international financial architecture. Blue bonds require robust institutions, transparent governance, technical capacity, and a pipeline of investable projects—foundations that not all SIDS possess. Seychelles benefited from strong political commitment, capable partners like the World Bank and GEF, and a pre-existing conservation framework. Without these, such instruments risk becoming symbolic rather than substantive.

This is precisely why the GEF assembly in Samarkand is so timely. Oceans face escalating crises: overfishing depletes 35% of stocks, plastic pollution chokes marine life, warming waters trigger coral bleaching, and habitat loss threatens 40% of global biodiversity. Yet ocean finance remains woefully inadequate—less than 1% of climate finance targets marine ecosystems, despite the ocean’s role in absorbing 25% of CO₂ emissions and producing 50% of planetary oxygen.

Samarkand offers a platform to scale solutions like Seychelles’ model.

The GEF, as a catalytic funder, should prioritize blue finance architecture for SIDS and coastal states. This means expanding blended finance facilities, providing first-loss guarantees, offering concessional capital, and building capacity for project pipelines. It also requires policy reforms to integrate blue bonds into debt sustainability frameworks, ensuring they complement—rather than compete with—multilateral debt relief initiatives.

Seychelles took a calculated risk in 2008 by centering the blue economy in national strategy. We persisted through debt swaps, presidential diplomacy, and patient institution-building. The blue bond was the reward: a tool that converted vulnerability into opportunity.

As delegates converge on Samarkand, let Seychelles’ story serve as both inspiration and imperative. The blue economy will not thrive on declarations or pilot projects. It demands instruments that harness private capital for public purposes, turning ocean ambition into enduring action. Seychelles opened the door.

The GEF and global community must now widen it—for islands, for coasts, and for the shared blue planet we all depend on.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

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Credit: Nikada/iStock by Getty Images. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

By Abebe Aemro Selassie
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies entered 2026 with significant momentum. The region had notched its fastest growth rate in 10 years—4.5 percent in 2025—buoyed by reduced macroeconomic imbalances, rising investment levels, and a generally supportive external environment.

Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Rwanda led the charge, with growth exceeding 6 percent. The median inflation rate fell to about 3.5 percent and public debt levels had started to decline. These gains were hard-won, the fruit of politically difficult but meaningful reforms such as exchange-rate realignments, better spending allocation, and tighter monetary policies.

Progress on the fiscal front has been particularly impressive. The region’s general government primary balance has been steadily improving and is now near balance. By contrast, primary deficits in both advanced economies and other emerging markets remained noticeably wider in 2025 than before the pandemic.

Sub-Saharan Africa achieved this consolidation while simultaneously sustaining reasonably decent growth and bringing down inflation, thanks to bold reforms and notwithstanding headwinds from elevated global uncertainty and much reduced concessional financing.

And just as the region has begun to secure these gains, the war in the Middle East has brought a significant new shock that threatens to stall, or even unwind, that progress. It has pushed up global prices for oil, gas, and fertilizer, disrupted trade routes, and tightened financial conditions. These developments are weighing on the region’s outlook.

We expect growth to slow to 4.3 percent this year, some 0.3 percentage points below pre-war forecasts, while inflation is projected to rise. That may sound benign by global standards, but for a region where rapid growth is imperative to create millions of new jobs for the rapidly expanding population, any hit to growth is problematic.

Oil importers, many of them low-income or fragile states, face worsening trade balances and rising living costs. Oil exporters may benefit from higher oil prices, but remain exposed to volatility and the temptation of procyclical spending.

And the risks are mounting.

A prolonged conflict could further inflate commodity prices, trigger a risk-off episode in global markets, and force abrupt fiscal adjustments in countries with large refinancing needs.

In a severe downside scenario, as detailed in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook, regional output this year could fall 0.6 percent below pre-war forecasts, with oil importers suffering the most, and inflation could surge by an additional 2.4 percentage points.

The human costs are equally stark. Food insecurity looms large: the region remains acutely vulnerable to food-price shocks, and the war has already driven up fertilizer and shipping costs. A 20 percent rise in international food prices could push more than 20 million people into food insecurity and leave 2 million children under age 5 acutely malnourished.

Climate shocks intensify the strain—the recent floods in Mozambique and Madagascar serve as a reminder of the region’s deep vulnerability to weather disruptions.

The unprecedented decline in foreign aid strips away a critical buffer. Unlike past contractions, 2025 marked a sharp structural break in aid flows, with cuts falling hardest on the most fragile states and threatening to unravel essential services—healthcare above all—in countries with no alternative source of finance.

Debt vulnerabilities are also rising. More than one-third of countries are at high risk of, or already in, debt distress. In 21 countries, fiscal deficits exceed the levels that are needed to stabilize debt. Rising interest bills and dwindling concessional finance are inflating debt-service burdens and crowding out essential development spending.

In some cases, growing reliance on domestic borrowing has deepened ties between government debt and bank balance sheets, raising the specter of financial instability.

In this fraught environment, policymakers must navigate competing pressures. In the short term, they should anchor inflation expectations, shield the most vulnerable from rising prices, and avoid procyclical fiscal policies.

Oil exporters should treat windfalls as fleeting, using them to rebuild buffers and strengthen social safety nets. Oil importers with fiscal space can offer targeted, time-bound support; those without must focus on increasing the efficiency of spending and boosting domestic revenues.

Even as policymakers grapple with the immediate shock, the medium-term reform agenda cannot wait. The premium on accelerating structural reforms—to boost growth and resilience—is now even higher. Improving the business climate, strengthening governance, and reforming state-owned enterprises, especially in energy, transport, and telecommunications, can help attract investment and lift productivity. Deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area could bolster supply-chain resilience and expand markets for local producers.

Digital transformation offers promise, but also highlights the region’s infrastructure gaps. Artificial intelligence is already helping farmers boost yields, doctors improve diagnoses, and students master difficult concepts faster.

But scaling such innovations will require investing in electricity, internet access, digital skills, and data governance. Today, just 53 percent of the region’s population has access to electricity, and only 38 percent to the internet.

International role

The international community has a role to play, especially when the economic troubles facing many countries stem largely from shocks beyond their control. Predictable financing, technical assistance, and capacity-building support can help countries weather current storms and sustain reform momentum.

Aid should be prioritized for low-income and fragile states, where alternative sources of finance are scarce. The IMF is already deeply engaged, with programs in 22 of the region’s 45 countries, and stands ready to scale up support for members facing acute balance-of-payments pressures linked to the war.

The optimism that greeted 2026 was not misplaced: it was earned, through years of difficult but necessary reform. The fallout from the war in the Middle East is now testing that progress, but it does not need to erase it. African policymakers have demonstrated they can deliver under pressure. The choices they make now—whether to hold the line on inflation, protect the vulnerable from the worst of the shock, and resist the temptation to unwind the reforms that got them here—will determine whether these hard-won gains endure.

The job of the international community is to support that effort. But the boldness and resolve that the moment demands must come from within the region itself.

This IMF blog is based on the April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, “Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure,” prepared by Cleary Haines, Michele Fornino, Saad Quayyum, Can Sever, Nikola Spatafora, and Felix Vardy.

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Beekeepers harvest honey from an ABL hive in the Tana Delta, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

By Chemtai Kirui
GOLBANTI, Kenya, Apr 23 2026 (IPS)

Lydia Hagodana stands next to a bee yard (apiary) in Golbanti, Tana Delta, where she lives. The air carries a low, steady hum as bees move in and out in a constant stream. She lifts the back of one hive slightly, gauging its weight.

“This hive is mine,” she says. “I have two.”

Hagodana is one of 25 members of the Golbanti women’s group, which manages about 50 hives shared between them. Each member keeps a pair, harvesting honey a few times a year. Some of the income is kept individually, while a portion is pooled into group savings to support a small communal vegetable farm.

The apiaries sit along the southern banks of the Tana River, where it begins to split into the channels that form the lower delta. In the rainy season, the land opens into floodplains, drawing migratory birds and supporting wildlife, including hippos, crocodiles and the rare Tana River topi.

Lydia Hagodana in the area where she keeps one of her beehives in the Tana Delta, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Patches of gallery forest along the riverbanks are home to two critically endangered primates – the Tana River red colobus and the crested mangabey.

In recent years, beekeeping has offered an alternative source of income in a place where livelihoods have long depended on farming, fishing and livestock. For women in particular, managing hives marks a shift from more physically demanding work and from roles traditionally dominated by men.

Before the bees, these same floodplains were at the centre of proposals for large-scale biofuel plantations – plans that raised concerns about converting wetlands into industrial agriculture.

“This was linked to the European Union policy to blend biofuels with fossil fuels,” said Dr Paul Matiku, executive director of Nature Kenya. “Africa was seen as a place with ‘idle’ land that could be converted to these crops, including jatropha and sugarcane.”

At the time, the Kenyan government framed the projects as part of vision 2030 – a way to bring development and jobs to what officials described as an “empty” region.

Land clearing had begun. In some places, fields were ploughed before indigenous families had gathered their belongings. A wildlife corridor used by elephants and other species was carved into plantation blocks.

Tensions Rose

By 2012, violent clashes had erupted, turning the delta into what investors began calling a “red zone”.

“We woke up to a challenge about where the Tana Delta was going,” said Matiku, who helped lead the legal fight to stop the expansion. “You cannot convert wildlife land and food-producing land into fuel for cars. We had to unleash every bit of machinery we had to stop it.”

A coalition of conservation groups and local communities took the government to court.

In February 2013, Lady Justice Mumbi Ngugi halted the proposed large-scale developments in the delta, ruling that the state had failed to account for the rights of local people.

“The court said no one could move forward without a land-use plan developed with the people,” Matiku said.

Over the next two years, communities, county officials and conservation groups worked together to map the delta – dividing the landscape into zones for grazing, farming and conservation under what became the Tana Delta Land Use Plan (LUP).

For the first time, the delta had a formal set of rules.

But another question followed: could conservation pay?

A group of community members gather outside an African Beekeepers Limited facility in Kenya’s Tana Delta to discuss the business of beekeeping. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

From Idle Land to Natural Economy

With support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), researchers began calculating the economic value of the delta’s ecosystems – reframing them from “idle land” into a functioning natural economy.

The partners approached the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world’s largest multilateral fund for the environment. In 2018, after a technical review process, the fund approved a USD 3.3m grant for restoration in the Tana Delta under the Restoration Initiative.

The funding aimed to stabilise a landscape long marked by land disputes and failed biofuel schemes. Working with UNEP and Nature Kenya, the program supported consultations, legal drafting, and the work needed to turn the land-use plan into law.

Between 2019 and 2024, the county enacted 29 policies and legislative instruments aimed at regulating land use, conservation and climate action.

“We have moved from loosely coordinated conservation projects to a law-driven governance framework that integrates land use, climate change and community engagement,” said Mathew Babwoya Buya, Tana River county’s environment executive.

Tana River county has set aside at least 2% of its development budget for climate resilience and ecosystem restoration.

For the 2024/25 fiscal year, the county’s total budget is about KSh 8.87 billion (USD 68.76 million). Of that, roughly KSh 3 billion (USD 23 million) is development spending, implying annual allocations of about KSh 60 million (USD 460,000) for restoration programmes.

The commitment helped secure new funding from the GEF, which approved a grant of about USD 3.35 million for the Tana Delta under its Restoration Initiative.

Project documents show the program mobilised roughly USD 36.8 million in co-financing, about eleven dollars for every dollar of GEF funding, a commonly cited measure of leverage in conservation finance.

“The Tana Delta project shows what is possible when country ownership is strong and priorities are clearly aligned. This level of leverage reflects deep national commitment, strong engagement from a wide range of stakeholders, and clear links to value chains and local business opportunities. The project’s integrated, landscape-based approach allows it to address multiple challenges at once, making it an attractive platform for partners to invest alongside GEF,” said Ulrich Apel, a senior environmental specialist at the GEF.

The composition of that financing shows that the bulk originates from public agencies and development partners, including multilateral programmes and philanthropic funding. Only about USD 341,000 – less than 1 per cent of the total – is attributable to direct private-sector investment.

Apel explained the figures do not necessarily capture the full extent of commercial activity.

“It is important to understand how co-finance is defined and recorded,” Apel said. “Only capital explicitly committed to a project through formal letters is captured. There can be private sector flows into these value chains that do not show up in the co-financing numbers.”

UNEP officials say the structure is intended to use public funding to reduce land-use risk and attract investment over time.

“The GEF grant was designed to play a catalytic role,” said Nancy Soi, a UNEP official involved in the project.

By funding land-use planning, cooperative structures, and governance systems, she said, the program has helped “derisk” the delta for commercial activity in sectors such as honey, chilli, and aquaculture.

In parallel, other partners are beginning to test that approach in specific value chains.

In aquaculture, the Mastercard Foundation, working with TechnoServe, is supporting a program aimed at about 650 young entrepreneurs in Tana River County.

How that model translates into sustained commercial investment is still being tested on the ground.

In Golbanti, where Hagodana’s hives sit along the riverbanks, one of the emerging value chains is honey production. The work is being developed through a partnership with African Beekeepers Limited (ABL).

Under the model, the company supplies modern hives and technical expertise, manages production, and buys the honey at a fixed price – removing one of the biggest risks in rural markets: price volatility.

Nature Kenya says it has deliberately avoided locking farmers into long-term contracts at this stage, allowing time to assess whether production volumes and pricing can prove viable.

“We managed to pay 76 farmers about KSh700,000 (USD 5,400) from honey harvested in the delta,” said Ernest Simeoni, director of ABL, referring to the project’s first production cycle.

Numbered beehives in a conservation area of Kenya’s Tana Delta. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Not Just Beekeeping, It’s the Business of Beekeeping

Simeoni said the approach differs from many donor-led initiatives, which typically focus on training farmers to manage hives independently.

“There are hundreds of modern hives across Kenya, but they don’t produce honey,” he said. “The missing link is expertise.”

Instead, ABL keeps production under the company’s control, deploying its teams to monitor colonies, harvest honey, and oversee processing.

“We’re not training farmers how to do beekeeping,” he said. “What we’re doing is business – showing how to make money from honey.”

Community groups provide land and security for the hives, while the company manages harvesting and processing. Simeoni said that structure helps maintain consistent production volumes.

Even so, he cautioned that the model remains fragile. Access to affordable finance is limited, and much of the sector still depends on donor-backed projects to absorb early risk.

“If donor funding disappears tomorrow, most of these projects stop,” he said.

Looking beyond small-scale value chains, the county is also trying to attract larger investments through a proposed development plan known as the “Green Heart”.

A 60-hectare site in Minjila has been earmarked for an industrial hub intended to support agroprocessing, logistics and green manufacturing, according to Mwanajuma Hiribae, the Tana River county secretary.

“We are working to establish an investment unit to coordinate engagement with private firms,” she said. Funds have also been allocated to develop a masterplan for the site.

But the project remains at an early stage. The land has yet to be formally transferred to the county’s investment authority, and proposals from potential investors are still under review.

Officials say any future development will need to align with the delta’s land-use plan and environmental safeguards.

For now, however, the flow of private capital to the delta remains limited.

Experiences elsewhere in Kenya suggest the model, while technically replicable, depends heavily on political will, security conditions and sustained public financing – factors that vary widely between regions.

In western Kenya, a similar land-use planning approach has been introduced in Yala Swamp, with mixed results. While Busia county has formally adopted the framework, neighbouring Siaya has yet to approve it, with local officials citing competing political and commercial interests around large-scale agriculture.

“The science is replicable,” said Matiku. “But political interests can slow or block implementation.”

In Golbanti, the idea of a restoration economy is beginning to take shape in small ways.

Beekeepers at the African Beekeepers Limited facility in Kenya’s Tana Delta. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Welcome Income

Income from honey, though modest and still irregular, is starting to filter into daily life.

For Hagodana, it helps pay school fees for her six children, supports a small farm, and contributes to a shared fund used to grow vegetables. Some of the money is spent, some saved, and some reinvested.

She has been keeping bees for two years. Before that, she says, life was harder. Now there is at least something to rely on.

She does not plan to stop. Whether or not outside support continues, she says she will keep the hives and hopes eventually to learn how to process honey into other products.

Back in the apiary, the bees move in and out of the hives in a steady rhythm.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Clean drinking water runs from a tap in Senegal. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider
 
The African Union has pronounced their theme for 2026 to be: ‘Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems to Achieve the Goals of Agenda 2063’. In an opinion piece, AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf explores the continent's renewed commitment to protecting and managing its vital water resources.

By Mahmoud Ali Youssouf
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Apr 22 2026 (IPS)

When Africa’s Heads of State and Government gathered in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2026 for the African Union’s 39th Ordinary Session, they did more than adopt another resolution. They made a choice: to place at the centre of the agenda the most fundamental, life-sustaining and strategic resource our continent possesses: water.

The theme adopted by our leaders, “Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems to Achieve the Goals of Agenda 2063,” is not a bureaucratic formality. It is a declaration of intent. It reflects a simple but profound truth: without water security, there can be no food security, no industrialization, no public health, and no lasting peace or prosperity.

The scale of the challenge we face remains stark. Across Africa, water scarcity and inadequate sanitation continue to undermine economic growth and human dignity. Waterborne diseases remain among the leading causes of death in many parts of the continent. Millions of Africans, disproportionately women and girls in rural communities, still walk long distances each day to collect water instead of attending school, pursuing livelihoods, or participating fully in the life of their communities.

This is not merely an inconvenience. It is an injustice. It is also a brake on the ambitions we have set for ourselves in Agenda 2063, Africa’s collective blueprint for inclusive growth, sustainable development and shared prosperity.

The year 2026 must therefore mark a turning point: the moment we move decisively from diagnosis to delivery.

The African Union Commission’s Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment has been entrusted with advancing this agenda. Yet responsibility cannot rest with one department or with the Commission alone.

Achieving water security will require sustained collaboration among member states, regional organizations, civil society, the private sector and, critically, African communities themselves.

The urgency of this task is heightened by the accelerating climate crisis. Africa is already experiencing more frequent droughts and devastating floods. Changing rainfall patterns are shrinking rivers, lakes and reservoirs in some regions while unleashing destructive flooding in others.

These disruptions threaten the livelihoods of millions of Africans who depend on agriculture and pastoralism. Sustainable water management is therefore not only a development priority; it is a resilience imperative.

Water also reminds us that cooperation is not optional. Nearly 60 percent of Africa’s freshwater resources are shared across national borders. Rivers such as the Nile, the Niger, Congo, the Zambezi and the Volta link countries and communities in complex hydrological systems that transcend political boundaries.

These shared waters can become either sources of cooperation or sources of tension. The choice is ours. Strengthening collaborative frameworks for the equitable and sustainable management of transboundary water resources must be a priority for our continent. Water, after all, recognizes no borders.

Sanitation demands equal urgency. Safe sanitation is not a luxury; it is fundamental to human dignity, public health and economic productivity. Yet millions of Africans, particularly in rural communities and rapidly expanding urban settlements still lack access to even basic sanitation facilities. In the twenty-first century, this reality is unacceptable.

Addressing these challenges will require investment, innovation and political will. It will also require a shift in how we design and implement solutions. Sustainable progress cannot be imposed from above. Communities must be involved in planning, building and maintaining water and sanitation systems. Local ownership is essential if infrastructure is to endure and deliver real benefits.

The African Union is therefore developing a comprehensive implementation strategy to support the theme of the year. This strategy will promote innovative technologies for water purification and efficient resource management.

It will encourage stronger water governance and expand access to sanitation infrastructure. It will also prioritize the participation of youth, women and marginalized communities while facilitating the sharing of best practices across our continent.

Innovation, inclusion and cooperation must guide our collective efforts.

As I travel across Africa in my capacity as Chairperson of the African Union Commission, I am reminded repeatedly that water is not merely a matter of infrastructure or policy. It is about people.

It is about a mother who no longer fears losing her child to a preventable disease caused by contaminated water. It is about a girl who can remain in school because clean water flows in her village. It is about a farmer who can irrigate crops through dry seasons. It is about an entrepreneur whose business can grow because reliable water supply supports production.

These everyday transformations form the true foundation of Africa’s development.

The African Union’s theme for 2026 is therefore a clarion call for governments to prioritize water and sanitation in national development agendas. Because water touches every sector; agriculture, health, energy, industry and education — our response must be equally integrated.

African countries must strengthen cooperation, share expertise and mobilize resources to address common challenges. Regional economic communities and river basin organizations have a crucial role to play in supporting collaborative water governance. The African Union will continue to facilitate dialogue and partnerships that promote sustainable and equitable management of shared water resources.

But governments cannot act alone. Civil society organisations, the private sector, research institutions and development partners must also contribute their expertise and resources. Investments in water infrastructure, sanitation systems and climate-resilient water management are investments in Africa’s stability, prosperity and future.

The stakes could not be higher. By 2050, Africa’s population is projected to double, placing increasing pressure on water resources and infrastructure. Ensuring sustainable water access today will determine whether our growing cities thrive, whether our agriculture can feed our people, and whether our economies can realize their full potential.

This is why the African Union’s theme of the year is not simply a slogan. It is a continental commitment.

Together, we can ensure that every African has access to safe water and dignified sanitation. In doing so, we will not only protect lives and livelihoods; we will unlock the immense potential of sustainable development across our continent.

Ultimately, our success will not be measured by the eloquence of our declarations. It will be measured by the taps that flow, the sanitation systems that function and the millions of lives transformed.

Mahmoud Ali Youssouf is Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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Credit: Zohra Bensemra/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Nwabueze Chibuzor and Mighulo Masaka
ABUJA, Nigeria / NAIROBI, Kenya, Apr 22 2026 (IPS)

In many countries across Africa, people have recently lined up to vote. But in country after country, there has been no real choice on offer. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report documents, what has frequently been on display is a procedural ceremony of democracy, orderly enough to satisfy observers, but hollow enough to leave those who hold the reins of power untroubled. Laws and structures that were supposed to promote democratic decisions have been manipulated into compliance checks, ticking all procedural requirements while lacking democratic substance. In too many cases, the ballot box has become a public relations exercise.

Tanzania offered a stark illustration. Once seen as one of the continent’s rising democratic hopes, it held one of the most deeply flawed recent elections. Ahead of the October 2025 vote, President Samia Suluhu Hassan disqualified and detained most opposition figures and imposed a nationwide internet blackout. When people protested, they were severely repressed. Security forces fired live ammunition, killing over 700 protesters, and arrested thousands. Around 240 people, including children, have since been charged with criminal conspiracy and treason.

Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, followed the same script: the 2026 presidential election as marked by widespread rigging, suppression of the opposition, internet outages and a lethal crackdown on protests. These shows of force were also an admission of weakness: governments with genuine popular support do not need them to stay in office.

In Kenya, election outcomes have increasingly shifted from the ballot box to the courtroom and the streets. While legal challenges and judicial oversight can be signs of a healthy democracy, there’s been growing normalisation of post-election uncertainty about whether results will be respected, with the state framing any challenge to outcomes as a threat to national security and stability, and responding to post-election protests with violence.

Further north, Tunisia exemplifies the slow-motion dismantling of a once-promising democracy. Its 2024 presidential election saw the incumbent face only token opposition. President Kais Saied has systematically removed democratic checks and balances, jailed opponents and vilified critics as agents of foreign powers. The country that once kept the democratic promise alive in North Africa has become a cautionary example of how quickly gains can be reversed.

In West Africa, military rule is being normalised. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are now led by military juntas, while in Guinea a carefully stage-managed December 2025 election enabled the military leader to retain power with a varnish of legitimacy. Elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 2025 and Togo in 2024 fell far short of competitive standards.

Senegal offered a rare exception: when President Macky Sall attempted to postpone the 2024 presidential election just days before voting, widespread protests and sustained international pressure forced the polls to proceed. Opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye, released from jail only days before the vote, won a shock victory — proof that electoral integrity remains worth fighting for.

In Central Africa, military rulers have simply changed into civilian clothes. General Oligui Nguema, who ended the 56-year Bongo family dynasty in a 2023 coup, retained power in an April 2025 election marked by the absence of a credible opposition and the abuse of state resources, making the outcome a foregone conclusion. Chad’s Mahamat Déby followed the same path, transitioning from military council head to elected president through a vote held under severe civic space restrictions and minimal competition.

In October 2025, Cameroon’s Paul Biya, at 92 the world’s oldest head of state, extended his 42-year rule through a highly performative election. In both the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, recent elections have been undermined by the state’s inability to control its territory amid ongoing conflicts, disenfranchising vast majorities and producing winners whose legitimacy is in permanent doubt.

Southern Africa offers a more encouraging picture. South Africa’s 2024 election ended almost three decades of unchallenged African National Congress dominance, with new political parties reshaping the landscape and forcing the formation of a coalition government. Elections in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia were competitive, with power changing hands for the first time since independence in Botswana. These results are a reminder that elections can still serve their democratic purpose.

The pattern across most of the continent is unmistakable. As civic space comes under intensifying attack, Africa’s citizens, institutions and international partners must resist the temptation to confuse orderly processes with democratic substance. Elections must offer genuine opportunities for accountability and be allowed to produce results that disrupt established power, if that is what voters want. Anything less risks normalising the appearance of democracy while hollowing out its content.

Chibuzor Nwabueze is the Programme and Network Coordinator of the Digital Democracy Initiative at CIVICUS.

Mighulo Masaka is the Project Officer, Host Liaison of the Digital Democracy Initiative, working closely with civil society in the global south for election-related activities.

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A group of young people. Photo by Iwaria Inc. on Unsplash. Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations.
 
The choice is clear; the window is narrow; and the time to prepare Africa’s workforce for the frontier economy is now. Africa’s growth story over the past two decades is real, but it is not yet transformative.

By Claver Gatete
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Apr 17 2026 (IPS)

Across the continent, GDP has risen on the back of more workers, more capital and a commodity super-cycle, rather than through genuine gains in productivity and innovation. Too little labour has moved out of subsistence agriculture into higher-productivity manufacturing and modern services.

As the recent Africa Business Forum in Addis Ababa drew to a close, a clear message emerged: if Africa is to create the tens of millions of quality jobs its young people need in the coming decade, it must shift decisively from input driven growth and embrace an innovation-led growth powered by data and frontier technologies.

Our 2026 Economic Report on Africa comes at a time when governments are realising that this pivot is no longer optional. It is the only credible route to resilient, inclusive and sustainable development amidst climate shocks, tightening financing conditions, geopolitical challenges and rapid technological change.

Frontier technologies, from artificial intelligence and advanced data analytics to the Internet-of-Things, robotics and clean energy solutions, are already reshaping value chains in agriculture, manufacturing, services and public administration.

Claver Gatete

Jobs of the future

Preparing for the jobs of the future starts with an honest diagnosis of the skills challenge. Today, only a small share of African children achieve minimum reading proficiency by age 10; enrolment in technical and vocational education remains low; and tertiary enrolment lags far behind global averages. This is a recipe for exclusion from a technology intensive global economy.

Countries need comprehensive national skills compacts that place foundational learning, STEM education and digital literacy at the centre of economic strategy, not as an add on.

That means curriculum reforms that prioritize problem solving, coding, data literacy and creativity; large scale teacher upgrading; and robust partnerships between universities, TVET colleges and industry to ensure training aligns with real labour market demand.

Encouragingly, some countries are already moving in this direction.

For example, Kenya’s digital innovation ecosystem – from mobile money to platform-based logistics and e commerce – is creating new occupations in fintech, digital marketing, data services and platform management that barely existed a decade ago.

Rwanda has positioned itself as an African testbed for emerging technologies, investing heavily in broadband, digital public services and coding academies to build a workforce ready for data driven and AI enabled jobs.

In Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, automotive and renewable energy value chains are spawning new roles in advanced manufacturing, battery technology and solar and wind engineering.

Tangier, the city that hosted the ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance and Economic Development last month, has a world-class frontier technologies port that rivals many in developed countries.

These examples show that when countries align education, industrial policy, and digital strategy, they can start to bend their labour markets towards the industries of the future.

More is required

But skills alone will not deliver the jobs dividend. Workers need productive firms to hire them, and firms need an enabling ecosystem to innovate.

That is why the report stresses the importance of industrial and innovation policy that deliberately integrates frontier technologies in Africa’s productive sectors.

In agriculture, for instance, the jobs of the future will be in climate smart farming, Agri data services, precision input distribution and digital extension.

Realizing that potential requires investment in irrigation, rural broadband, data platforms, and support for agritech start ups that can tailor frontier tools, from sensors to satellite imagery and AI based advisory services, to local realities.

In manufacturing, governments can use industrial parks and special economic zones to attract firms deploying automation, smart logistics and advanced materials, while negotiating technology transfer and local supplier development that expand skilled employment.

At the same time, Africa must treat data as a strategic economic asset, not an afterthought. Data underpins frontier technologies across all sectors – yet much of the continent’s data is stored and processed offshore, with limited value captured locally.

Building a data economy that creates jobs means investing in data centres, cloud infrastructure, high performance computing and secure connectivity, while developing clear rules on data governance, privacy, cross border flows and competition.

It also means supporting local firms that work along the data value chain – from collection and labelling to analytics and AI services – and equipping young people with the skills to work as data engineers, analysts, ethicists and product managers.

If Africa continues to export raw data while importing high value digital services, it will simply reproduce its traditional commodity trap in digital form.

The financing model for innovation and jobs must also change. Traditional banking systems, focused on collateralized lending, are poorly suited to high risk, intangible asset driven technology ventures. African countries can begin to close this gap by creating blended finance facilities, innovation bonds, public venture funds, and regional credit lines that crowd in private capital for high productivity sectors.

Public procurement can be a powerful lever here: by designing innovation friendly tenders and reserving space for local digital and tech providers, governments can create predictable demand that helps start ups and SMEs grow and hire.

Some countries are already experimenting with sandboxes and innovation challenges in fintech, e health and govtech, signalling how policy can catalyse new job creating ecosystems.

None of this is without risk.

The risks

Frontier technologies are already automating routine tasks and reshaping value chains in ways that can displace workers, widen social and gender inequalities and deepen digital divides. Jobs will not disappear overall, but they will change – and some will vanish.

Preparing for that disruption demands robust social protection systems, active labour market policies and targeted support for women and youth to access training, finance and technology.

It also requires serious attention to cybersecurity, data protection and platform regulation to prevent predatory practices, safeguard rights and maintain trust in digital systems.

If governance lags too far behind innovation, the labour market will absorb the adjustment costs through informality, underemployment, and social tension.

Africa starts this journey with significant advantages.

It is home to the world’s youngest population, vast critical mineral reserves essential for clean energy and technology manufacturing, and some of the best solar resources on the planet.

These assets can underpin new waves of green industrialization – in batteries, electric mobility, green hydrogen, clean power, and digital infrastructure – creating diverse, future oriented jobs in engineering, construction, maintenance, data and services.

But to convert potential into reality, countries must abandon the comfort of input driven growth and embrace a more demanding agenda: one that puts skills, innovation ecosystems, data, and frontier technologies at the heart of economic strategy.

With the AfCFTA as our Marshall Plan, we have the rules and platform for continental scaling, leading to shared prosperity in jobs, created from harnessing data and frontier technologies.

The jobs of the future are being designed today, in how Africa educates its children, regulates its data, finances its innovators and plans its infrastructure.

If African countries act with urgency and purpose, they can shape a labour market that is more productive, more inclusive, and more resilient than the one they inherited.

If they hesitate, the continent risks remaining a consumer of other people’s technologies and a supplier of low value labour and raw materials.

In the end, the real question is simple: will Africa harness frontier technologies to accelerate economic growth and structural transformation, or remain on the margins of the industries shaping the 21st century?

The choice is clear; the window is narrow; and the time to prepare Africa’s workforce for the frontier economy is now. This is how we can ensure sustainable economic growth on the continent.

Claver Gatete is Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Source: Africa Renewal

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CIVICUS discusses the spread of AI-powered surveillance in Africa with Wairagala Wakabi, executive director of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) and co-editor of Smart City Surveillance in Africa: Mapping Chinese AI Surveillance Across 11 Countries, the latest report by the African Digital Rights Network (ADRN) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

Wairagala Wakabi

How widespread is AI-powered surveillance in Africa?

Under the guise of reducing crime and fighting terrorism, at least 11 governments have invested over US$2 billion in AI-powered ‘smart city’ surveillance infrastructure: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Governments are installing thousands of CCTV cameras linked to central command centres, paired with tools such as automatic number-plate recognition, biometric ID systems and facial recognition to track people and vehicles. The largest known investments are in Nigeria (over US$470 million), Mauritius (US$456 million) and Kenya (US$219 million), though the real total is likely much higher, since surveillance spending is often secret and the report covers only 11 of Africa’s 55 countries.

Despite being presented as tools for crime prevention, counter-terrorism, modernisation and urban management, these are not targeted security measures. They represent a broader shift toward continuous, population-level monitoring of public spaces, rolled out over the past five to ten years almost always without clear legal limits or public debate.

Are these systems achieving their stated purpose?

No, there is no compelling evidence that they have in any of the countries studied. Instead, the data points to a pattern of use that raises serious human rights concerns.

In Uganda and Zimbabwe, AI-powered surveillance including facial recognition is being used to suppress dissent rather than ensure public safety. Activists, critics of the government, opposition leaders and protesters are identified and monitored through this system, even after protests have ended. In Mozambique, smart CCTV systems have reportedly been installed in areas of strong political opposition, suggesting targeted rather than neutral surveillance.

In Senegal and Zambia, countries with relatively low terrorism threats, governments have still invested heavily, which calls into question the stated security rationale.

Across the countries studied, the scale of surveillance far exceeds any actual or perceived security threat, and the infrastructure is consistently being used to monitor dissent and consolidate state control rather than address genuine public safety needs.

Who’s supplying this technology?

While firms from Israel, South Korea and the USA supply surveillance technologies, Chinese companies are the primary suppliers and financiers. They typically offer end-to-end ‘smart city’ packages that include cameras, software platforms, data analytics systems, training and ongoing technical support. Many projects are backed by loans from Chinese state-linked banks, which makes them financially accessible in the short term but creates long-term dependencies on external vendors for maintenance, system management and upgrades.

This model undermines transparency. Procurement processes are opaque and civil society, the public and oversight institutions including parliaments rarely have information about how these systems operate, how data is stored or who has access to it. That lack of accountability is what makes abuse not just possible, but hard to detect or challenge.

What impact is this having on civic space?

This large-scale surveillance of public spaces is not legal, necessary or proportionate to the legitimate aim of providing security. Recording, analysing and retaining facial images of people in public without their consent interferes with their right to privacy and, over time, their willingness to move, assemble and speak freely.

The most immediate consequence is a chilling effect, particularly where civic space is already restricted. Knowing they can be identified and tracked, activists and journalists are less willing to attend protests for fear of later arrest or reprisals, and end up self-censoring. Civil society organisations also report heightened anxiety about the risks for their members and partners.

What should governments and civil society do?

None of the 11 countries studied have a legal framework capable of balancing the state’s security needs with its commitments to protect fundamental human rights. That must change. Governments must adopt clear regulations on surveillance, including restrictions on facial recognition and other AI tools, require independent human rights impact assessments before introducing new systems, make procurement and deployment processes transparent and establish strong oversight mechanisms, including judicial and parliamentary scrutiny, to prevent abuse.

Civil society should continue documenting abuses, raising public awareness and advocating for accountability, while also supporting affected people and communities through digital security support and legal assistance.

Technology-exporting states and donors must enforce stricter controls and safeguards on the export and financing of these tools, support rights-based approaches to digital governance and help fund independent monitoring and advocacy across Africa.

Without urgent action, these systems will continue to expand, and the rights of people across Africa will continue to shrink.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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A crew member with The Greater Cape Town Water Fund looks out over the landscape where the team is working to remove invasive alien plants for improved water security. Credit: Roshni Lodhia/ The Nature Conservancy

By Louise Stafford
CAPE TOWN, South Africa, Apr 16 2026 (IPS)

In 2018, Cape Town came perilously close to becoming the first major city in the world to run out of water. Known as “Day Zero”, it was more than just a crisis, it marked a pivotal moment. It made clear that water insecurity is not a distant threat, but an immediate reality.

It also revealed something equally important, water security depends not only on built infrastructure, such as dams, desalination plants and groundwater extraction, but on the health of the natural systems that sustain them. Ecological infrastructure – our catchments, rivers and wetlands – is as essential as the roads we travel and the grids that power our homes.

South Africa is in a period of structural water scarcity. According to the National Water and Sanitation Master Plan, the country could face a water deficit of up to 17% by 2030. Much of the focus has rightly been on failing built infrastructure, such as non-revenue water, ageing infrastructure, and wastewater discharge into rivers. But an equally critical, and often overlooked, part of the problem lies upstream.

Degraded catchments, driven by poor land management, erosion, invasive alien plants, river diversion, and the loss of wetlands and riparian areas, are undermining the very systems that produce and regulate water.

The Hidden Drain on South Africa’s Water

The impact of alien tree invasions on our water resources is not unknown in South Africa. Multiple scientific studies emphasized the scale of the problem. The invasion of catchment areas by alien tree species, such as pine and Australian acacias, has a significant effect on streamflow. They reduce South Africa’s water availability by an estimated 1.4 billion cubic metres every year, enough to irrigate between 140,000 and 280,000 hectares of farmland according to WWF-SA, drawing on research by the CSIR and partners.

That is water that could otherwise sustain crops, support rural economies, households and strengthen national food security. In the greater Cape Town region, these species consume around 55 million cubic metres annually, roughly equivalent to two months of the City of Cape Town’s water supply.

South Africa has taken important steps to address alien plant invasions through programmes like Working for Water and through the efforts of landowners. However, these initiatives face persistent challenges such as limited funding, uneven prioritisation, and interruptions in implementation that reduce long-term effectiveness.

Restoring catchments requires continuity and scale. Traditional public budgets cannot keep up. Short-term grants and project‑based funding cycles are mismatched with the long‑term reality of managing and restoring South Africa’s catchments. Catchments do not operate on three-year budget cycles. They require decades of commitment. To secure our water future, we must rethink how we value and finance the ecological infrastructure that underpins our economy.

Science Meets Implementation: A Proven Model

The Water Fund model has added a valuable new option to address catchment restoration. South Africa’s first, the Greater Cape Town Water Fund (GCTWF), provides compelling proof that investing in ecological infrastructure and prioritizing headwaters deliver measurable results. Over the past seven years, with support of the private sector and City of Cape Town, over 40,000 hectares have been cleared of invasive alien plants priority catchments. Importantly, the cleared areas have been followed up multiple times to prevent regrowth.

This work increases water flows into dams of the Western Cape Water Supply System by 36 million cubic meters per year. The benefits extend far beyond water. The programme creates job opportunities, reduces wildfire risk, and supports the recovery of native fynbos and freshwater ecosystems — while building resilience to climate change.

The Greater Cape Town Water Fund demonstrates that ecological infrastructure can deliver reliable, measurable returns. Yet scaling this model has been constrained by one persistent challenge namely predictable funding to plan and reach the set target of clearing 54,300 hectares to replenish the water losses.

Rethinking How We Fund Water Security

What about a new funding approach? One that can crowd in private capital while ensuring accountability for results and bridging the gap between short term and sustainable funding. This is the foundation of the FRB Cape water performance-based bond, developed through a partnership between Rand Merchant Bank and The Nature Conservancy.

The Cape Water Performance-based Bond, a first of its kind financial instrument designed to unlock non‑traditional funding sources and secure a consistent five‑year funding stream to accelerate invasive plant control in priority catchments of the Greater Cape Town region. This marks an important milestone not only for Cape Town but for South Africa as a whole, a shift toward mobilizing capital markets to invest in nature at scale.

Accountability is built in. Rigorous monitoring and data collection tracks delivery and ensures a positive return on investment. “Clearly demonstrating what an investment has achieved is the backbone of impact finance. Investment returns in the FRB Cape water performance-based bond rely on performance and so we require systems to independently verify results. This independence and transparency are critical to ensure trust in these results, and to scale nature-based impact finance products.” Chris Barichievy, Director of Science, Conservation Alpha

Taking Impact To Scale

Water security underpins economic stability. From farms to factories, every sector depends on a reliable flow of water. When systems fail, the costs are staggering. When they succeed, they quietly power equity and prosperity.

The Cape Water Performance-based Bond matters because it can be replicated. Cities across Africa face similar challenges, degraded landscapes, limited public funds, rising demand. This model offers a science-based, practical path forward that can be adapted to different contexts.

From Vision to Delivery

This is where vision meets action. Governments and other roleplayers need to recognize that healthy catchments are as essential as pipes, treatment plants and pumps. Healthy catchments enable water to reach our dams, which is the first step in securing our water supply.

The capital markets are the world’s largest funding pools. Yet the opportunity for capital markets to play a role in the water supply system has been limited – until now. Martin Potgieter from RMB said: “This Cape Water Performance-based Bond gives financial institutions and investors the opportunity to participate in the security of the water supply system. It gives investors a low-risk entry to the funding of a water catchment, while at the same time enabling a project that delivers lasting, systemic impact.”

Large and critical interventions need long-term planning and commitment, with the Cape Water Performance-based Bond providing five years of predictable funding.

Without this change, the risks to our water security will only grow. In 2018, Cape Town has shown the world what it means to be pushed to the edge. Now, it is showing the world what it means to lead. By building financing systems that match the scale of the challenge, we can secure a future where both nature and people thrive.

Louise Stafford is the South Africa Country Director at The Nature Conservancy

The GEF actively supports climate resilience and sustainable livelihoods in Zanzibar, with a specific focus on the seaweed farming sector, which is crucial for over 20,000 farmers—mostly women—in the region. Here a woman identified as Jazaa is pictured working as a seaweed farmer. She carefully attaches little seaweed seedlings to the rope that she will harvest after two months. Credit: Natalija Gormalova/Climate Visuals Countdown

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 16 2026 (IPS)

The Global Environment Facility, widely known as the GEF, plays a central role in financing environmental protection across the world. It supports developing countries in tackling climate change, biodiversity loss, land degradation, pollution, and threats to ecosystems.

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the GEF has grown as a multilateral environmental fund, supporting projects in more than 170 countries.

Over time, the GEF has evolved into what it calls a “family of funds”, each targeting a specific global environmental challenge while operating under a shared strategic framework.

This explainer looks at how the GEF funding works, the origins of its financing model, and the role of six major funds that channel resources toward global environmental goals.

While the GEF predates the 1992 Rio ‘Earth’ Summit, its importance as a financial mechanism grew after the summit. Here UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali opens the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which aimed to develop a global blueprint for balancing economic development with environmental protection. Credit: Michos Tzavaras/UN Photo

Origins of the GEF Funding Model

The GEF was created in 1991, before the Rio ‘Earth’ Summit in 1992, which aimed to develop a global blueprint for balancing economic development with environmental protection; however, its importance grew after the summit.

The Rio Summit produced three major environmental conventions. These were the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and, later in 1994, the Convention to Combat Desertification. The GEF became the financial mechanism for these agreements, meaning it mobilises and distributes funds to help countries implement them.

Over the past 35 years, the GEF has expanded its mandate. Today it supports multiple conventions and environmental initiatives through a structured set of trust funds. This architecture allows the facility to coordinate funding across different environmental priorities while maintaining specialised programs for each global commitment.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is now focusing on solving environmental problems together instead of separately. It looks at climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution as connected issues and works with governments, international groups, civil society, and businesses to address them.

The GEF Trust Fund was initially created to support multiple environmental agreements simultaneously. Over time, countries preferred more specific funding for their particular needs.

Because of these changes, the GEF now has different funds, each designed for different purposes and methods of giving money.

Some funds – like the Trust Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and part of the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) – use a system that helps countries know in advance how much funding they can expect.

The GEF Trust Fund

The Global Environment Facility Trust Fund is the main source of funds for the GEF. It provides grants to support environmental projects in developing countries.

The Trust Fund finances activities across several environmental areas.

These include

• Biodiversity conservation,
• Climate change mitigation,
• Land degradation control,
• International waters management, and
• Chemicals and waste reduction.

Countries receive funding through a system known as the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources, or STAR, which distributes funds based on their environmental needs and eligibility.

Projects funded by the Trust Fund often focus on creating global environmental benefits. These may include:

• Protecting endangered species,
• Restoring ecosystems,
• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and
• Improving pollution management systems.

The Trust Fund operates through periodic “replenishment” cycles. Donor countries pledge new contributions every four years, which allows the GEF to finance programs during the next funding period. For example, the GEF-9 cycle will cover the period from July 2026 to June 2030 and focus on scaling up environmental investments while mobilising private capital and strengthening country ownership of environmental policies.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has created Integrated Programs. These are special programs designed to address multiple environmental goals at the same time in a more coordinated and efficient way.

For example, the Food Systems Integrated Program does not fund separate projects for climate change, biodiversity, and land degradation. Instead, it combines them into one unified project, which helps achieve stronger and longer-lasting results while making better use of funding.

The GEF helps fund biodiversity across the globe, helping to create conditions to prevent the further endangerment of species like the Sumatran Orangutan (Pongo abelii). Credit: Thomas Gabernig/Unsplash

Global Biodiversity Framework Fund

The Global Biodiversity Framework Fund is a relatively new component of the GEF family of funds. It was created to help countries implement the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which was adopted in 2022 under the Convention on Biological Diversity.

The biodiversity framework sets ambitious targets for protecting nature by 2030. Its most prominent targets include the “30 by 30” target, which calls for protecting at least 30 percent of the world’s land and ocean areas by the end of the decade.  The Framework also sets a 30 percent target for the restoration of ecosystems and a target of mobilising 30 billion dollars in international financial flows to developing countries for biodiversity action.

The Global Biodiversity Framework Fund supports actions that help countries meet these targets.

Actions that are supported include the following:

• Expanding protected areas,
• Restoring degraded ecosystems,
• Protecting endangered species, and
• Strengthening biodiversity monitoring.

Another important focus is the integration of biodiversity into economic planning. Many projects supported by this fund work with governments and businesses to match financial flows with biodiversity goals. This means reducing financial support for activities that damage the environment and encouraging more sustainable farming, forestry, and fishing practices.

By providing targeted financing for biodiversity commitments, the fund helps translate global agreements into practical actions at the national and local levels.

It is also important to highlight that the fund sets a target of providing at least 20% of its resources to support actions by Indigenous Peoples and local communities. This form of direct financing is unique for a multilateral environmental fund.  To date, this target has been exceeded and mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility are considering replicating this approach.

GEF-9 biodiversity investments will bring together four interconnected pathways:

• Scaling up financial flows to close the nature financing gap,
• Embedding environmental priorities in national development strategies,
• Mobilising private capital through blended finance, and
• Empowering Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and civil society as active conservation partners.

“A renewed emphasis on the Forest Biomes Integrated Program will continue directing investment into the landscapes most critical for achieving 30×30 – ensuring that GEF financing remains focused where the stakes are highest,” said Chizuru Aoki, the head of the GEF Conventions and Funds Division.

Medicinal and aromatic plant species, such as the baobab, are often exploited; however, the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing aims to ensure fair use of the planet’s genetic resources and secure benefits for Indigenous knowledge holders. Credit Noah Grossenbacher/Unsplash

Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund

The Nagoya Protocol Implementation Fund supports countries in implementing the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. This international agreement, part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, aims to make sure that the genetic resources of the planet are used fairly and equitably, with benefits shared with those who provide them.

Genetic resources include plants, animals, and microorganisms that are used in research and commercial products such as medicines, cosmetics, and agricultural technologies. Historically, many developing countries have expressed concerns that companies and researchers benefit from these resources without sharing profits or knowledge.

The Nagoya Protocol fixes these issues by requiring users to do the following:

• Get permission from the country providing the resources, and
• Agree on how benefits (like money or knowledge) will be shared.

The fund supports countries by helping them:

• Create laws and rules for using genetic resources,
• Improve monitoring systems, and
• Build skills among researchers and policymakers.

Projects funded also support Indigenous peoples and local communities, who often hold traditional knowledge associated with biological resources. Protecting this knowledge and ensuring fair compensation is a key objective of the Nagoya framework.

Least Developed Countries Fund

The Least Developed Countries Fund focuses on supporting climate adaptation in the world’s most vulnerable nations. These countries often face severe environmental risks but lack the finances and systems to respond efficiently.

The fund supports the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action and National Adaptation Plans. These are country-specific strategies that identify the most urgent climate risks facing each country and outline measures to reduce vulnerability.

Typical projects include the following:

• Strengthening climate-resilient agriculture,
• Improving water management systems,
• Protecting coastal zones, and
• Building early warning systems for extreme weather events.

Because many least developed countries face multiple environmental issues at once, the fund often supports integrated projects that address climate change alongside biodiversity conservation and land management.

This funding system makes sure that the poorest and most vulnerable countries get the help they need to deal with climate change, even though they did very little to cause it.

Villagers in Nyamisati, Rufiji District, wade through muddy tidal flats to plant mangrove seedlings—part of a grassroots effort to curb saline intrusion that has begun to poison nearby rice paddies as saltwater seeps underground. The initiative reflects growing local responses to environmental degradation driven by human activity along Tanzania’s coast. The GEF supports projects like these that help mitigate the impacts of climate change. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

Special Climate Change Fund

The Special Climate Change Fund supports climate action in developing countries and works alongside the Least Developed Countries Fund.

While the Least Developed Countries Fund focuses on the poorest nations, this fund helps other developing countries that are also affected by climate change.

It supports projects that:

• Help countries prepare for climate impacts,
• Include climate planning in development and infrastructure,
• Improve water management and agriculture.
• Reduce disaster risks, and
• Promote environmentally friendly technologies.

The SCCF also, in some cases, supports mitigation efforts, particularly when they involve innovative technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By financing both adaptation and mitigation initiatives, the fund contributes to global efforts to stabilise the climate system.

Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency Trust Fund

The Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency Trust Fund supports countries in implementing transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement.

Under this agreement, countries must regularly report their greenhouse gas emissions and track their progress on climate goals. However, many developing countries do not have the tools or skills to do this properly.

This fund helps by supporting:

• Training for government officials,
• Creation of national emissions data systems, and
• Better monitoring and reporting methods.

Strong reporting systems are important because they:

• Help track climate progress,
• Build trust between countries, and
• Ensure countries meet their commitments.

The fund helps developing countries improve their climate reporting so they can fully take part in global climate efforts.

How the “family of funds” works together

One of the defining features of the GEF funding model is that each part speaks to the others.

Think of it like a team of funds working together, rather than separate, isolated programs.

These funds are coordinated so they can:

• Support the same project from different angles,
• Avoid duplication (no overlapping funding for the same purpose), and
• Align with global environmental agreements.

For example:

• A biodiversity project might use:
  • The main GEF Trust Fund
  • Plus the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund
• A climate adaptation project could combine:
  • Least Developed Countries Fund
  • Special Climate Change Fund

This ‘family’ structure improves:

• Coordination, so different funds work in sync,
• Efficiency, so funds work with less waste and duplication, and
• Flexibility, so projects can tap into multiple funding sources.

Environmental problems are interconnected. A single project (like forest conservation) can:

• Reduce carbon emissions,
• Protect biodiversity,
• Improve water systems, and
• Avoid land degradation.

Because of the integrated funding system, the GEF can support all these goals at once, rather than funding them separately.

The “family of funds” is a coordinated funding system that allows the GEF to:

• Combine resources;
• Support complex, multi-sector projects; and
• Maximise environmental impact

The Future of GEF Financing

As global environmental crises grow, so does the demand for money and resources to meet climate and biodiversity needs. International assessments suggest that hundreds of billions of dollars are needed each year.

The GEF aims to play a “catalytic” role in closing this gap – in short, the GEF acts as a “catalyst” or tool for using limited public funds to unlock much larger investments.

Its funding model mobilises additional resources from

• Governments,
• Development banks, and
• Private investors.

“In practical terms, the mechanisms being supported in GEF-9 include debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps, green bonds, pooled investment vehicles, and outcome-based financing structures. Each of these can serve a different purpose depending on the context – but the common thread is that they allow the GEF to use its resources strategically to unlock much larger pools of capital from the private sector, multiplying the environmental impact that public funding alone could achieve,” Aoki said.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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From the left, Rev. Tolbert Thomas Jallah Jn with Mariann Bassey Olsson during the launch of the campaign in Cartagena, Colombia. Credit: AFSA.

By Isaiah Esipisu
NAIROBI, Apr 14 2026 (IPS)

Over 800 households in Ikolomani Constituency in Kakamega County, Western Kenya, fear eviction to pave the way for a British firm, Shanta Gold Limited, to begin extracting gold valued at Sh683 billion ($5.29 billion) on an estimated 337 acres of residential and agricultural land.

Efforts by residents to protest against the looming displacement during an attempt for a public participation session on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) by the government on 4 December 2025 were met with police brutality, leading to four deaths due to bullet wounds, arbitrary arrests and scores of injuries.

According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the incident is part of a disturbing and escalating pattern in Kenya’s extractive sector, where communities seeking accountability are met with brutal force, political threats, and procedural manipulation.

“Mining zones are increasingly becoming death traps rather than engines of community development,” reads part of a statement issued by the commission following the incident.

This trend mirrors what is happening in many other countries across Africa, where communities living in mineral-rich areas face forceful displacements, abuse of basic human rights, and environmental degradation linked to industrial mineral extraction, often perpetrated by foreign firms with full support of the political class.

According to Appolinaire Zagabe, a Congolese human rights activist and the Director for the DRC Climate Change Network (Reseau Sur le Changement Climatique RDC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), often, people he terms ‘greedy government officials’ sign contracts with extractive firms to legalise their activities, then use police machinery to forcefully and brutally evict communities without informed consent and proper compensation.

It is based on such injustices that civil society organisations, social movements, faith-based actors, Indigenous Peoples, pastoralist and peasant organisations from Africa under the umbrella of the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) launched a campaign calling for land policies that protect African smallholder farmers and communities against punitive extractive practices and land grabbing, which are currently a threat to human rights, livelihoods and sustainable food systems.

“Land is more than a resource; it is our heritage, our identity, and our future,” said Rev. Tolbert Thomas Jallah Jr, the Executive Director at the Faith and Justice Network, during the launch of the campaign on the sidelines of the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD+20) in Cartagena, Colombia.

“Across Africa, our soils feed our families, sustain our economies, and connect generations, yet today, land degradation, industrial extractive practices by foreign enterprises, climate change, and land grabbing threaten the very foundation of our food systems,” he added.

In a joint declaration at the conference, the organisations observed that rural communities across the world continue to face dispossession, land concentration, and ecological destruction.

“Despite global commitments to end hunger and poverty, land and food systems are increasingly controlled by corporate and financial interests, while communities that produce food remain marginalised and insecure,” reads part of the declaration statement.

It was further observed that carbon offset projects, extractive industries, agribusiness expansions, and speculative land markets are accelerating dispossession, soil degradation, and social inequality, often excluding communities from territories they have governed collectively for generations.

The campaign, dubbed “Protect Our Land, Restore Our Soil”, is now calling on governments to strengthen land rights and protect smallholder farmers; communities to embrace sustainable farming practices that rebuild soil fertility; and youthful farmers to view agriculture not as a last resort but as a powerful pathway to innovation and resilience.

“When soil is degraded, food becomes scarce, and when land is taken or misused, communities lose dignity and security,” said Rev. Tolbert, who is also the sitting Chairperson at the AFSA’s Board of Directors.

Just like the looming evictions of residents of Ikolomani in Kenya, Amnesty International has also observed that people of the DRC also pay a high price to supply the world with copper and cobalt: forced evictions, illegal destruction of their homes, and physical violence – sometimes leading to deaths.

The DRC supplies 70 to 74 percent of the copper and cobalt used in lithium-ion batteries. These batteries power our smartphones, laptops, electric cars, and bicycles, and they play a major role in the energy transition away from fossil fuels. This transition is urgent and necessary.

However, according to Amnesty International, mineral-rich regions of the DRC are sacrificed to mining development, leading to a shocking series of abuses in the region. Thousands of people have lost their homes, schools, hospitals, and communities due to the expansion of copper and cobalt mines in the country, especially in Kolwezi, which sits above rich copper and cobalt deposits.

The AFSA-led campaign calls on governments and corporate organisations to guarantee meaningful participation of affected communities and free prior and informed consent of Indigenous Peoples in land, agriculture and climate decision-making to avoid conflicts and abuse of basic human rights.

“The future lies not in further commodifying land and food systems, but in restoring community control over territories, securing pastoralist mobility and commons, and supporting agroecological transitions rooted in justice and ecological integrity,” observed Mariann Bassey Olsson, a Lawyer, and Director at Action (Friends of the Earth Nigeria).

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Landlords at the training program in Kibera, Nairobi. Credit: Steven Ashuma
 
When landlords are empowered, they can become a grassroots answer to the intractable problem of sexual violence in slums.

By Meg Warren
BELLINGHAM, Washington USA, Apr 10 2026 (IPS)

Trigger warning: This article discusses child rape.

Their quiet latent power comes from being ever-present eyes and ears on the ground. As they move around their compounds, collecting rent and checking on anywhere from 10 to 20 houses occupied by as many as 200 people, they see and hear things.

They say not everyone knows their neighbours these days. But landlords play a unique role in Kibera, one of the world’s largest informal slums, situated on the outskirts of Nairobi, Kenya. Here, rape and gender-based violence are widespread, and a 2022 study found that Kenya is third in the world for teen pregnancies. In 2024, thousands marched across the country against femicide, after a rise in murders. Last month, Kenya announced it was rolling out new protections for female athletes after they were targeted.

A harmful mix of cultural norms, limited government services, and persistent economic struggles has made gender-based violence rampant in slums like Kibera. One might assume the people who can address such a systemic problem are those who hold power, authority, and indeed, the responsibility to deal with it, such as legal authorities, government officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

But landlords know when violence breaks out behind closed doors; they have a sense when things are turning ugly. Though typically, they don’t want to interfere in what residents have long considered “private domestic matters.”

Siama Yusuf, senior program officer at CFK Africa, addressing the community at Kiandutu informal settlement, Nairobi. Credit: Meg Warren

When parents learn of their young girls’ pregnancy, they throw them out of the house. Not only because of the cultural norms that shame the victims, but also because, given their conditions of extreme poverty, they don’t want to have one more mouth to feed.

Ultimately, rape and the consequent teen pregnancies become an economic problem, burdening landlords with unpaid tenants – a clear draw for property owners to become engaged in preventing this kind of violence.

When CFK Africa, an NGO focused on empowering youth in Kibera, launched a program to train landlords on how to spot and respond to domestic violence and sexual assault, the participating property owners learned that they could be valuable allies at very little cost to themselves and teach others to do the same. They could earn respect as community leaders and help keep tenants at their properties—a win-win.

In one incident, a landlord was at home in his compound in the afternoon when he heard cries emerging from a house. In the past, he would have put it out of his mind, deciding that he shouldn’t get involved in a “private domestic matter.”

Instead, he went to the house, where he found a father brutally raping his four-year-old daughter. He immediately intervened to stop it and called the program’s special number for an emergency ambulance service, which he had learned about during the training the previous day. It directs callers to a private ambulance or other services, including a recently installed “gender desk.”

Typically, the police were reluctant to enter the slums. This meant that people could perpetrate violence without facing consequences. The landlord knew how to get help, so he did.

He found the girl’s mother, who had been at work, and reassured her that he would support her if she wanted to file a police report against her husband. He told her that there’s no fee to file the report — a community myth perpetuated to deter people from reporting violence.

In 2025, landlords made 92 referrals to the authorities, helping survivors of violence with life-saving support services. The program has since expanded to other slums in Kenya, like Mathare and Mukuru kwa Ruben, and in Kajiado County.

CFK’s model has potential for global scale. My team’s 2024 study conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) suggested that the most powerful allies aren’t outsiders, but respected local leaders such as the church pastors and the wives of the imams, using their community’s own values and traditions to stand up for others.

When they decided to turn their knowledge and power into a strength, they used their influence to teach an estimated 30,000 congregants about healthy relationships characterized by respect, gender equity, nonviolence, and empowerment. Four years later, gender-based violence had dropped dramatically by 50 to 85%.

It’s time for governments and aid agencies to recognize and empower non-traditional allies as an invaluable resource in the fight against gender-based violence. Target 5.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls to eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking, sexual exploitation, and other types of exploitation.

The day after the landlord in Kibera contacted the emergency line, he called back to deliver hopeful news. The little girl had suffered serious injuries from the attack and was taken to the hospital, but doctors said she would survive because of the timely intervention. Her life was saved thanks to an unexpected ally: the landlord.

Meg Warren, Ph.D. is Professor of Management, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington.

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An artisan puts final touches to the monument of Magawa, a Tanzanian-born bomb-sniffing rat. Credit: APOPO

By Kizito Makoye
MOROGORO, Tanzania , Apr 7 2026 (IPS)

At Mazimbu village, not far from Tanzania’s Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), Stephano Jaka still remembers the night he trapped and killed a rat that had been feasting on his maize cobs – stored in a meticulously woven basket designed to protect grains from rodents.
“I felt a big sense of relief when I finally killed it. It had been causing huge losses to my family,” he tells IPS.

Thousands of kilometres away in Siem Reap, Cambodia, farmers were among the dignitaries invited on Saturday to honour a Tanzanian-born rat for detecting hundreds of landmines, helping to clear swathes of land for farming.

Where farmers in Tanzania’s Morogoro region still perceive rats as destructive creatures threatening their livelihoods, communities in Cambodia embrace one of the species as a life-saving hero – underscoring how a despised animal has come to embody entirely different meanings across continents.

Cambodia remains one of the world’s most landmine-infested countries, with millions of explosives still buried underground, making large areas unsafe for farming, settlement and development.

On the eve of the International Day for Mine Awareness, a 2.2-metre statue – the world’s first public monument dedicated to a life-saving rat – was unveiled. The monument honours Magawa, whose bomb-sniffing career began after a yearlong stint at Sokoine University. He was hailed not as a crop-raiding pest but as an unlikely hero whose extraordinary sense of smell helped uncover hidden dangers.

For years, Magawa worked across some of Cambodia’s most dangerous terrain, detecting more than 100 landmines and helping to make large areas safe before his death in 2022. He remains the only rat ever awarded the PDSA Gold Medal for bravery.

Carved from local stone by Cambodian artisans, the statue shows Magawa wearing his medal and operational harness. Its base incorporates fragments of decommissioned explosives, symbolising the threat he helped eliminate. Erected in central Siem Reap, the monument also directs visitors to APOPO’s centre, where they can learn about the rats’ work and the ongoing impact of landmines.

“Magawa became a global symbol of hope for Cambodia’s mine-affected communities. This statue honours his extraordinary service and the work of all APOPO HeroRATs who continue to save lives in Cambodia and around the world — step by step, life by life,” said Christophe Cox, founder of APOPO.

The tribute also serves as a reminder that millions of landmines remain buried, and efforts to clear them continue despite limited resources.

Magawa was trained by APOPO, a non-governmental organisation that deploys African giant pouched rats to detect explosives. Because they are too light to trigger landmines, the animals can safely search contaminated areas far more quickly than conventional methods.

Born at Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro, Magawa showed early promise before being deployed to Cambodia in 2016, where he became one of the most successful detection animals in the programme.

In heavily affected regions such as Battambang, land once considered too dangerous has been cleared and returned to productive use, allowing communities to rebuild livelihoods and restore a sense of normalcy.

Magawa’s work also highlights a broader story of African innovation contributing to global solutions, with a programme developed in Tanzania now supporting mine clearance efforts in several countries.

Although Magawa died in 2022, other trained rats continue the work, helping to reduce the threat posed by unexploded landmines.

Residents of Morogoro spoke with a mix of pride, curiosity and quiet awe when reflecting on the global recognition of Magawa, the giant African pouched rat whose work in Cambodia has saved countless lives.

“Who would have thought a rat from our region could become a global hero?” said Jaka. “Here, rats are something we chase away. But Magawa has changed that story completely. He has shown us that even the smallest creatures can carry the biggest responsibilities.”

At the Morogoro main market, trader Rehema Msuya said Magawa’s story had sparked new conversations among residents about science and innovation.

“People now talk about rats differently,” she said. “We used to see them only as destructive. But this one saved lives and detected danger where machines sometimes fail. It makes you proud, knowing such intelligence can come from a rat.”

For some, Magawa’s legacy goes beyond admiration, emphasising the possibilities often overlooked.

“Magawa represents Africa in a very powerful way,” said Dar es Salaam-based secondary school teacher Godfrey Lwambano. “We often underestimate what we have – our environment, our knowledge, even our animals. Yet here is a creature trained with patience and care, going on to clear deadly landmines and protect communities far away.”

Young people in Morogoro, too, say the story touched them.

“When I first heard about him, I thought it was a joke,” said 22-year-old university student Neema Kibwana. “But when I learnt he worked for years detecting mines and even received awards, I was inspired. It shows that impact doesn’t depend on size or status.”

As the story of Magawa circulates in Tanzania and beyond, it continues to challenge long-held perceptions – transforming an animal once seen only as a pest into a symbol of ingenuity, resilience and hope.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Public Domain. Smoke rises above Tehran, Iran. Source: UN News

By Daniel D. Bradlow
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Apr 3 2026 (IPS)

By Easter 2026 it was still not clear when – or how – the war initiated by Israel and the US against Iran would end. But what was already clear was that it would harm Africa in a number of ways.

Firstly, it would adversely affect the global supply and prices of oil and gas, fertilisers and food. Secondly, local currencies would be affected. More than a month after the war had started a number of African currencies had begun to lose value against the US dollar.

Thirdly, interest rates stopped falling and further rate increases were highly likely. Fourth, there will be a decline in access to affordable foreign financing.

How should Africa respond?

African countries cannot avoid being harmed by the current Gulf war. Nevertheless, based on my work in international economic law and global economic governance, I think there are two lessons that, if followed, can help the continent emerge from the crisis in a better place.

First, governments and societies need to be pragmatic. Their first priority must be to do whatever they can to mitigate the impact of the war, particularly on their most vulnerable citizens. This will require governments to make trade-offs.

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They will have to reallocate budgets to at least maintain the level of imports necessary to meet the society’s basic needs. They will need to convince their creditors to help finance their necessary imports. They will also need to persuade them to be flexible enough that they leave governments with at least some policy space.

Second, states and societies need to identify opportunities within the crisis for actions that over the medium term can help them meet their financing, economic, environmental and social challenges. This requires collaboration between the state and its non-state stakeholders. Business, labour, religious groups, civil society organisations and international organisations all have something to contribute.

Oil price surge is hurting African economies: scholars in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa take stock

Action in the short run

The focus of Africa’s efforts in the short term must be on minimising the negative effects of the war and on managing the state’s external debts in the most sustainable and effective way.

This is easy to state, but hard to implement. This is particularly the case in the current international environment, in which it is not realistic to expect donor countries and other international sources of finance to be particularly generous.

African countries will need to convince their creditors to acknowledge that this crisis is beyond Africa’s control and that they should not compound the pain that’s being experienced. This will require, at a minimum, that the creditors agree to suspend debt payments for the next year.

Creditors have already accepted the principle that debt payments can be suspended when debt challenges arise from sources beyond the debtor’s control. Many of them have accepted clauses requiring such action under specific conditions in their most recent debt contracts. They also did this during COVID.

Second, African countries, which are already heavily indebted, should challenge their multilateral creditors to accept the consequences of being among the biggest creditors for the continent. This includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. By custom these institutions are treated as preferred creditors.

This means that they get paid before all other creditors. Instead of participating in any debt restructurings, they also make new loans to the debtor in crisis. This shifts the debt restructuring burden onto the debtor’s other creditors. It also increases the total amount owed to the multilaterals.

This cannot continue. These institutions need to be more creative in providing Africa to financing. This should include:

• Using their financial resources to guarantee the financial transactions of African countries so that they can reduce their borrowing costs and attract new equity investments.
• More generously supporting innovative debt for development swaps. These involve creditors agreeing with African sovereign debtors to convert a portion of the existing debts into financing for specific local projects, for example in health or education.
• Helping African governments convert their foreign exchange denominated debts into local currency debts at affordable interest rates.

Third, governments should work with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions to use these institutions more effectively to finance African development. For example:

• They should require the institutions to only undertake transactions that are consistent with their development mandates. This means no more opaque transactions like the recent one that the African Finance Corporation concluded with Senegal.
• African governments should take the necessary action to activate the African Financial Stability Mechanism that they agreed to establish last year. This would create a useful financial safety net for the continent.

Fourth, African governments must build on the efforts they began last year to become a more effective advocate for African development financing interests at the international level. Among these efforts was the initiative by African ministers of finance to develop common African positions on sovereign debt restructurings. Another was South Africa’s launch of the African Expert Panel that proposed a number of initiatives on African debt and development financing.

In the medium term

African countries should advocate for the IMF to review its governance arrangements so that it becomes more accountable and responsive to developing countries, including African states and societies.

They should also advocate for the IMF to more use its existing resources, including its gold reserves, more creatively to support Africa.

Second, Africa should call for a debate on the preferred creditor status of multilateral financial institutions. This has become particularly relevant because the members of the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions are claiming that, like all other multilateral financial institutions, they are entitled to this status.

It is not clear that there are good arguments for excluding these institutions from preferred creditor status while protecting the position of the legacy institutions. This suggests that there is a need for some general principles that help determine which institutions should be treated as preferred creditors. These should be acceptable to all multilateral financial institutions and other market participants.

Third, African societies must make every effort to demonstrate that they are taking control of their own development. They should demand that their governments and all other actors in African development finance behave responsibly in regard to the financial, economic, environmental and social aspects of these transactions.

Another medium-term objective should be to limit the illicit financial flows that are so often associated with international trade and investment. This goal would be advanced by the successful conclusion of the current efforts to agree on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

Prof Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, was Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law

Source: Conversation Africa

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Artisanal miners work at a mercury-free processing site in Bushiangala, Ikolomani, Kakamega County, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

By Chemtai Kirui
KAKAMEGA, Kenya, Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

They call this land Bushiangala. Gold has been mined here for nearly a century. In 1931, colonial prospectors arrived after traces were found in the nearby Yala River, setting off a rush that changed this quiet corner of western Kenya.

Colonial authorities quickly took control of the boom, introducing mining laws that restricted access, while companies like Rosterman Gold Mines dominated production, employing local labour even as profits flowed out of the region. When industrial operations collapsed in the 1950s, they left behind something more enduring: an informal mining economy that never disappeared.

For more than 70 years, artisanal miners, known locally as ‘wachimba migodi’, have worked these deposits by hand, digging, crushing and washing ore using techniques passed down through generations. Mercury came much later.

Josephine Liabule Mkhobi grew up around the pits. She remembers watching older miners process gold with water and pans.

“Our parents never used mercury,” Mkhobi says. “This method started around 2008.”

Introduced as a faster alternative, mercury quickly took hold, speeding up gold extraction – but leaving behind contamination that has not disappeared.

Over time, water sources across the Lake Victoria region became increasingly unsafe, with mercury in some wells reaching up to ten times the World Health Organization’s guidelines.

The contamination now stretches across a gold-rich belt that includes Kakamega — home to Bushiangala — as well as Vihiga, Siaya, Busia, and Kisumu, reaching toward Migori near the Tanzanian border.

A 2026 study published in Environmental Health found that the water and slurry used in these mining pits contain concentrations of arsenic, chromium, and mercury up to 100 times higher than local surface waters. The researchers warned that miners – and children living nearby – are in direct, frequent contact with these toxic mixtures, which eventually drain into the broader Lake Victoria ecosystem.

Mercury’s Slow Poison

Gladys Akitsa, an artisanal gold miner, mixes mercury with gold-bearing concentrate at the Bushiangala mining site in Ikolomani, Kakamega County, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

For the miners on the ground, these toxins are no longer a matter of abstract data.

Timothy Mukoshi, a miner, remembers a colleague who slowly began to lose his memory. The man would withdraw money from the bank and later forget where he had put it.

Like many miners here, he often burnt mercury-gold amalgam to separate the metal – a process that releases toxic vapours. After he died, Mukoshi says the cause was clear: a post-mortem found traces of mercury in his brain.

“Mercury is what you call a slow poison,” Mukoshi says.

For years, the risks associated with using mercury in mining went largely unrecognised. Now, Bushiangala is trying something different.

In the same processing sites where women crush ore and wash gold by hand, miners are forming cooperatives and introducing methods that can recover gold without the toxic metal.

Miners say the shift gathered momentum after training initiatives reached the area through the planetGOLD programme — a global initiative backed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), with country-level implementation in Kenya by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to reduce mercury use in artisanal and small-scale gold mining.

“The planetGOLD programme stands as our leading initiative to tackle mercury use in artisanal and small-scale gold mining. By helping countries identify, test, and scale up mining and processing techniques, we not only support improved gold recovery but also empower miners to transition away from mercury use,” says Anil Bruce Sookdeo, Chemicals and Waste Coordinator and Senior Environmental Specialist at the GEF.

“Our approach is comprehensive – we facilitate sector formalisation, broaden access to financing for technology upgrades, and connect miners to formal and more reliable gold supply chains. When cleaner technologies are economically viable, financing is accessible, and there’s a dependable market for their gold, miners are much more likely to adopt mercury-free methods,” Sookdeo added.

Bringing Artisanal Miners Out of the Shadows

Women miners gather at a gold processing site in Bushiangala, Ikolomani, Kakamega County, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

The planetGOLD Kenya project, locally known as IMKA, is partnering with the Ministry of Mining and the Ministry of Environment to tackle the root cause of the mercury crisis: informality. By bringing miners out of the shadows and into legal cooperatives, the project aims to replace toxic shortcuts with formal, mercury-free systems.

“At first, many miners were afraid of joining cooperatives,” says Mkhobi, the chairlady of the Bushiangala Women’s Mining Cooperative. “They thought it meant losing their money or being forced into something they didn’t understand. But after they understood the benefits, more people started joining.”

Kakamega currently has 24 registered mining cooperatives spread across several gold-producing sub-counties. Small welfare groups were brought together into registered cooperatives, creating a structure through which miners could access training, equipment, and formal recognition under the Mining Act of 2016.

A Capful of Mercury Replaced by Mechanical Processing

Miners stand at the entrance of a shaft at the Bushiangala mining site in Ikolomani, Kakamega County, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

An artisanal miner uses a sluice box to separate gold from crushed ore at the Bushiangala mining site in Ikolomani, Kakamega County, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Women process crushed gold ore at the Bushiangala mining site in Ikolomani, Kakamega county, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Mechanical processing systems are replacing mercury inside the cooperatives. Miners who once relied on a capful of mercury are now learning to master gravity concentrators and shaking tables – mechanical systems that use physical force, rather than toxic chemicals, to pull gold from the dust.

At Bushiangala, a mercury-free demonstration plant now serves as a training ground for miners to practise using the new system under supervision. Technical manuals that once existed only as engineering documents are being translated into practical steps that can be applied directly in the pits.

Training sessions are conducted by technical staff from the planetGOLD programme alongside regional mining officers and cooperative leaders, combining engineering guidance with the practical knowledge miners already bring from the pits.

Oversight of the site is handled through a Joint Implementation Committee that brings together national regulators, county governments and representatives from mining communities.

By providing land and routine supervision, county governments are gradually assuming greater responsibility for the sector — an arrangement designed to ensure the effort continues even after international partners step back.

Convine Omondi, the project’s chief technical adviser, said in a 2025 planetGOLD report that involving local authorities directly helps turn what began as a donor-supported initiative into something managed and sustained at the local level.

The training materials and tools being tested here are part of a wider effort under the planetGOLD programme to share lessons between countries. Experiences from Kenya are being documented and adapted for use in other artisanal mining regions, rather than copied wholesale.

As of early 2026, Kenya had identified six demonstration sites across Kakamega, Vihiga, Migori and Narok. Fencing and sheds have already been completed, and the sites are now entering the commissioning phase. Delivery of heavy equipment and full operation are expected later this year.

Even so, progress is gradual. A site is only considered fully operational once the machinery is installed, utilities such as water and electricity are reliable, and certified cooperatives are actively using the facilities.

“First we were sensitised about how hazardous mercury is,” says Mukoshi, who has worked the Kakamega gold fields since the late 1990s and now chairs the Kakamega Miners Cooperative Union. “People realised it is dangerous. Now many sites keep registers, and miners are also learning that when you mine, you must rehabilitate the land.”

Healing the Land, Working Together

This focus on healing the land has spread beyond Kakamega. In neighbouring Vihiga County, the shift toward environmental restoration is being led by women who see the forest’s health as inseparable from their own.

“The training also introduced environmental rehabilitation, encouraging miners to restore excavated land once extraction ends,” says Shebby Kendi, chair of the Elwunza Women Cooperative Society.

But for Mkhobi, the change is not only about soil or chemicals. It is also about bargaining power. By moving from scattered pits to organised cooperatives, miners are beginning to act collectively in a trade where individuals have little influence.

“Now through the training we are learning how to organise ourselves, keep records and work as cooperatives,” Mkhobi says. “When we come together, we have more strength in the market.”

In a region where gold prices are often dictated by middlemen, that collective strength is beginning to shift how miners negotiate.

Giving Women Voice

A woman at the Bushiangala artisanal gold mine in western Kenya, where mercury is commonly used in gold processing, raises health concerns among workers. March 23, 2026. Photograph: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

“When you are one woman with a gram of gold, you have no voice,” she says. “When there are a hundred of you with a kilo, the buyers have to listen.”

For Anthony Munanga, Kakamega’s county director for environment, natural resources and climate change, that “kilo” also represents something else: control. At a recent media engagement, he said that without organised cooperatives, the gold economy remains largely invisible to regulators.

“Without organisation, there is no way to ensure compliance,” Munanga says. His department is now mapping mining areas across the county, an effort aimed at moving miners out of scattered pits and into designated zones where licensing and environmental oversight become possible.

“This process allows miners to operate safely and legally,” he says.

Changing Face of Financial Support

But legal recognition requires more than a map. It requires financing — and the local banking system is still reluctant to lend to a sector long defined by risk.

Changing how gold is produced also means rethinking how the trade is financed. In Bushiangala, this is where the constraints begin to show.

The planetGOLD programme in Kenya was launched with relatively modest public funding, despite ambitions that stretch far beyond its initial budget. At its core is a USD 4.24 million grant from the Global Environment Facility, much of which has already been allocated.

The grant has largely supported technical assistance — including miner training, policy development and institutional systems designed to formalise the sector — rather than directly financing mining equipment.

Project documents estimate the programme could mobilise up to USD 26 million in additional financing from commercial lenders and private investors to support new processing plants and upgraded mining infrastructure.

In practice, that funding has been slow to materialise.

Although the project was backed by USD 16.6 million in co-financing from government and local partners, a 2023 mid-term review found that much of this support existed on paper as in-kind contributions rather than cash available for day-to-day operations. It also pointed to delays within government financial systems and the lack of a risk-sharing mechanism to draw in private lenders, factors that have slowed implementation on the ground.

A final evaluation due in 2026 is expected to assess how far the programme has managed to address these gaps and whether it can sustain its operations over the long term.

Several structural constraints help explain the shortfall.

A government moratorium on new mining licences between 2019 and 2023 froze formalisation during a critical phase of the project. Without licences, miners could not meet standard lending requirements, and commercial banks have been reluctant to lend to what remains a largely informal sector.

Even where discussions with lenders progress, approval processes within banks can take more than a year, often outlasting key phases of the programme.

The absence of a dedicated risk-sharing mechanism has also limited participation. Without a first-loss guarantee to absorb potential defaults, lenders had little incentive to finance investments in artisanal mining.

The COVID-19 pandemic slowed procurement and field operations, but programme assessments suggest that the deeper barriers were structural — particularly the shortage of licensed miners eligible for credit and the lack of financial instruments tailored to the sector.

As a result, the programme has made measurable progress in training miners and organising them into cooperatives, but access to capital remains constrained.

Harry Kimtai, principal secretary at Kenya’s Ministry of Mining, describes the sequencing as deliberate, arguing that formalisation must come first before significant private investment can enter the sector.

Lag Between Training and Implementation

Sharon Ambale, an artisanal gold miner, holds a gold-mercury amalgam at the Bushiangala mining site in Ikolomani, Kakamega county, Kenya. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

For those on the front lines, that “deliberate sequencing” feels like a race against their own health. Merab Khamonya, a 28-year-old mother who joined the Bushiangala cooperative in 2024, is one of those caught in the lag between training and implementation.

Though she has attended planetGOLD sessions and understands the neurotoxicity of the metal she handles, her reality remains unchanged. To support her family, she still submerges her bare hands in basins of ore and mercury—a necessity for survival.

“I feel things moving inside my eyes,” she says, describing a persistent, painful irritation. “I know it harms me. I even see traces of it on my clothes when I go home to cook for my children.”

For Khamonya, the promise of a mercury-free mechanical system is a lifeline that has yet to arrive. “We are ready for the shift,” she says, “but for now, we have no other way to clean the gold. We are just waiting for the machines.”

Benefits of Mercury-Free Mechanical Systems

The economics behind the shift are straightforward. Kenya’s 2022 National Action Plan on artisanal and small-scale gold mining estimates that traditional manual methods recover only about 20 per cent of the gold in the ore. By comparison, data from planetGOLD Kenya shows that mercury-free mechanical systems can recover up to 90 per cent—potentially increasing the amount of gold recovered from each load of ore.

Miners involved in the programme say they are cautiously optimistic. They understand the problems and the solutions needed and feel best placed to judge what works on the ground.

“We have seen the difference and learned about mercury-free alternatives,” Mukoshi says. “We are ready to make the shift.”

But the obstacles, he adds, are basic.

“For these sites to work, you need water and electricity. Many of them don’t have either.”

For Mukoshi, Mkhobi, Kendi, Khamonya and their colleagues, the work has shifted to practicalities – securing water and electricity, preparing sites, and waiting on machines. The early experiments are over; what remains is making the system function.

On most days, that means clearing land, assembling equipment and negotiating with miners who are still uncertain about abandoning the mercury methods they have relied on for years.

The change taking shape in Bushiangala is small for now — one processing site, one cooperative, a handful of machines. But the model is already drawing attention beyond Kakamega.

planetGOLD’s Global Reach

In various places in Africa, governments and development agencies are searching for ways to formalise artisanal gold mining without destroying the environments where it takes place. In the Congo Basin’s Cuvette Centrale, UNEP and the planetGOLD programme are supporting a USD 10.5 million initiative aimed at protecting one of the world’s largest tropical peatland systems from mining damage.

The region spans about 167,600 square kilometres of peatlands and stores an estimated 29 billion tonnes of carbon — roughly three years of global emissions. GEF project data suggests the effort is designed to keep gold production from driving damage in a peat swamp that is crucial to climate stability.

In Zimbabwe, a parallel programme has begun introducing mercury-free processing technologies across dozens of mining sites. The effort here is more centralised, tied to the state-run Fidelity Gold Refinery and legislative reforms under the Mines and Minerals Bill.

Kenya’s system, by contrast, relies on cooperative structures at mine sites with county-level oversight through Joint Implementation Committees (JICs) and national regulation under the Mining Act — a model the African Development Bank is using as a reference point, particularly its JIC structure, for scaling mercury-free artisanal mining across the continent.

Kenya’s Experience Now a Guideline For Africa, World Expansion

According to Ludovic Bernaudat, head of the chemicals and green chemistry unit at UNEP, Kenya’s experience is now being used to guide the next phase of the programme as it expands across Africa.

He describes the country as one of the original eight members now completing its first implementation cycle – a milestone for the global initiative.

“New countries in Africa have recently joined the programme, and through the global project, UNEP will make sure that connection is made with Kenya,” Bernaudat said.

He added that the Kenyan model will be featured at the 2026 planetGOLD Global Forum in Panama, where nations share technical expertise and compare approaches to ending mercury use.

Since its launch, planetGOLD has expanded from nine to 27 countries across Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

“This growth demonstrates both the scale of the challenge and the value of a programme that integrates environmental action with support for livelihoods, inclusion, and market transformation,” says Anil Bruce Sookdeo, from the GEF.

But the final proof will depend less on policy design than on whether miners themselves decide it works.

Chasing Thin Seams of Gold Safely

Back in Bushiangala, that test is only beginning.

Miners still arrive at the pits each morning as they always have, chasing thin seams of gold buried in the red earth. What is changing — slowly — is what happens after the ore reaches the surface.

If the new system holds, the mercury that once flowed through these streams may eventually disappear. And the miners here, in this corner of western Kenya, will find a way to keep working the land without the risks that have defined it for years.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

Inter Press Service (IPS) UN Bureau Report

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ECA Deputy Executive Secretary for Programme Support, Mama Keita.

By Busani Bafana
TANGIER, Morocco, Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

Africa must move swiftly to harness data and frontier technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) to drive its economic growth and make the continent globally competitive in the digital economy, a senior official at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has told policymakers.

Opening the Committee of Experts segment of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development meeting in Tangier, ECA Deputy Executive Secretary for Programme Support Mama Keita emphasised that technological innovation is the key to unlocking Africa’s development potential. Africa has been slow to harness technological innovation to drive industrialisation and economic growth.

“Frontier technologies and innovation are not only useful to unlock Africa’s growth potential and enhance the competitiveness of African economies through productivity growth and diversification,” Keita said. She emphasised that technological innovations can be used to accelerate structural transformation, allowing the much-needed reallocation of resources from low- to high-productivity sectors.

Frontier technologies, including AI, the Internet of Things, and biotechnology, are boosting productivity, enhancing competitiveness, and enabling global economic diversification, but Africa is taking its time to join the party.

Keita, in remarks on behalf of ECA Executive Secretary Claver Gatete, questioned why Africa was not harnessing frontier technologies to utilise its natural resources and tap its youthful population and sizeable markets to boost productivity.

The conference, themed ‘Growth through innovation: harnessing data and frontier technologies for the economic transformation of Africa’, is being held at a critical moment for Africa, which is fast gaining global attention as the next frontier for investment, human capital, and mineral resource development. Despite trade uncertainty, Africa’s economic growth is on the rise.

Keita noted that the conference was an opportunity for policymakers to examine how technology-driven solutions can accelerate structural transformation and deliver more sustainable economic growth in Africa.

Despite averaging 3.5 percent GDP growth between 2000 and 2023, Africa has struggled to convert this expansion into productivity gains. Keita observed that growth has largely been driven by capital and labour accumulation, with little contribution from productivity improvements—an imbalance that innovation and advanced technologies could help correct.

Effective Regulation, Financing and Data Systems Needed

Frontier technologies and data can enable Africa to shift resources from low-productivity sectors to higher-value activities while also improving living standards with effective regulation and financing robust data systems  in place.

Africa suffers from poor data, which constrains effective planning and decision-making for development projects. The ECA’s flagship Economic Report on Africa 2026, to be launched during the conference, argues that harnessing data and technologies like AI, machine learning and robotics is now an imperative for Africa.

Technology Delivers

“There is no doubt that digital platforms, underpinned by frontier technologies such as AI, the Internet of Things, and blockchain, hold significant potential to reduce poverty, generate employment opportunities, promote economic integration, and drive economic growth,” Keita said.

Across the continent, signs are there of how technology innovation is driving development. Digital payment systems and mobile-money platforms are transforming Africa’s economies by lowering transaction costs, boosting efficiency, enhancing access to finance and markets, and advancing financial inclusion.

Nearly 30 per cent of the world’s critical minerals that are essential for clean-energy technologies are in Africa, which gives  the continent a comparative advantage over other continents.

Strategic industries such as digital technologies and telecommunications also depend on the critical minerals, making Africa an indispensable actor in this vital and fast-growing space, she said.

Frontier technologies have boosted crop productivity, enhanced water and land-use efficiency, and promoted climate resilience and adaptation in agriculture.

But Not all is Rosy

Keita said Africa risks falling behind global peers in harnessing the benefits of frontier technologies. AI, for example, is projected to contribute about 5.6 percent to GDP across Africa, Oceania and parts of developing Asia by 2030—lagging behind contributions expected in more advanced economies.

“The adoption of frontier technologies is not all roses, as this is associated with several risks that cannot be ignored,”  Keita warned. “The storage of most of Africa’s data in data centres outside the continent is a big problem, particularly for sensitive data such as medical, financial, and security data, given the sensitivity of such data. It is also costly and results in delays in data transmission.”

Africa currently accounts for less than one percent of global data centre capacity, limiting the deployment of data-intensive technologies like AI, according to the ECA.

“The disruptive effects of new technologies on the African labour market cannot be ignored,” Keita stated, adding that technology tends to cause job losses quickly, while job creation often occurs slowly.

But Africa’s demographic profile of having more young people presents a competitive advantage if it is aligned with the demands of a digital economy.

Globally, AI and automation are expected to create 170 million jobs while displacing 92 million jobs by 2030, resulting in a net gain of 78 million jobs.  Africa can only benefit from these new jobs if it prioritises providing enhanced digital skills training to its population.

&IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses the presidential election in the Republic of the Congo with Ivan Kibangou Ngoy, executive director of Global Participe, a civil society action-research organisation focused on democratic governance based in Pointe-Noire.

Ivan Kibangou Ngoy

How can the 94.8 per cent result be explained?

The outcome of this election was predictable from the outset, and for one fundamental reason: the legal framework gives free rein to electoral fraud. The electoral law lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent manipulation. The ruling party has systematically rigged the electoral process, excluding its opponents and independent civil society from any meaningful participation.

Accreditation for observers was refused to independent civil society organisations (CSOs), evidence of a total lack of transparency. Without independent observers, there’s no external oversight of the conduct of the vote or the counting of votes.

The result was not the outcome of electoral competition; it was the logical result of a system designed to guarantee precisely this outcome. When the legal framework allows for fraud, the opposition cannot campaign, observers are excluded and the government controls all administrative mechanisms, including the electoral administration, the result becomes inevitable. This is not an anomaly but the product of a system designed to produce it and to give it the appearance of democratic legitimacy. So the result was already decided even before polling stations opened.

How was competition restricted?

Opposition parties and independent CSOs were not allowed to organise public meetings or campaign openly among voters. They were denied access to public media, preventing them communicating with people.

The country still operates under a prior authorisation regime: the government must approve all public political activity. This system creates a fundamental imbalance: the ruling party can organise its rallies freely, while the opposition is blocked at every turn. There is an urgent need to move to a simple notification system, in which CSOs and parties would inform the authorities of their activities without needing their consent. Without this change, the opposition has no legal mechanism to participate fairly in an election.

The imprisonment and exile of major opposition figures send a clear message: challenging Sassou Nguesso’s regime is criminalised. Two of the country’s best-known opposition figures have been in prison for nearly a decade. When opponents cannot stand for election, campaign or move about freely, the result is predetermined both by fraud and the physical elimination of alternatives. The election is merely an administrative charade designed to legitimise the retention of power. It’s not a genuine choice but a demonstration of state power over a population reduced to silence.

Why is the internet cut off during elections?

Since the advent of social media, every election has been accompanied by an internet blackout, a deliberate measure the authorities take to control the information circulating during the vote. Internet shutdowns directly reinforce the system of electoral fraud by preventing the spread of information on fraud, irregularities or violations of voters’ rights. Without the internet, people cannot share photos or videos from polling stations, observers cannot report anomalies in real time and citizen movements cannot coordinate monitoring efforts.

The internet blackout effectively transforms the country into an information-controlled zone where only government messages can circulate. This reveals that the regime understands the power of social media as a tool for accountability and mobilisation. It’s an implicit acknowledgement that, without control over information, the regime could not maintain its official narrative. This systematic practice ultimately reveals the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy.

How has civil society mobilised despite restrictions?

Despite systematic restrictions, civil society organised itself by holding press conferences and workshops in private spaces, where the authorities could not intervene directly. These meetings enabled civil society to coordinate strategies and strengthen cohesion between organisations, even with a limited number of participants. Press conferences enabled direct engagement with the media despite restrictions on access to public media. Civil society also used social media to document rights violations, mobilise people and maintain a public conversation on electoral issues.

However, these strategies reveal the limits of resistance in a heavily controlled environment. Meetings in private spaces reach only a limited audience and social media can be shut down at any moment, as happened on election day. We must continue mapping independent CSOs to identify and connect all those working outside the regime’s control. We must also train CSO leaders in techniques for raising awareness and mobilising people.

People must understand the nature of the regime governing Congo-Brazzaville. The current regime is embodied by the Congolese Labour Party, a former Soviet-style party-state ousted from power at the ballot box in 1992, in the only truly free and transparent election the country has ever held. The party returned to power by force of arms after overthrowing the democratically elected government. Understanding this history is crucial: it proves that democratic change is possible. When people understand the mechanisms of power seizure and refuse to accept them, the regime loses its legitimacy even if it retains formal control of the state.

What’s the future for democracy in Congo after 42 years of rule?

Four decades under the same regime amount to the systematic denial of democratic change, of citizens’ fundamental right to choose a different government through the ballot box. Sassou Nguesso’s fifth term consolidates an institutional framework designed to ensure no one else ever comes to power through democratic means.

This framework operates through the systematic contradiction between constitutional promises and practice. The constitution proclaims a multi-party system, but a law recognises only those parties that pledge allegiance to the ruling power. The constitution creates the post of leader of the opposition, but this leader is the head of a party affiliated with the ruling power. The constitution establishes an advisory council of associations, but this institution is attached to the office of the head of state to muzzle civil society. The country is run like a barracks.

We must expose and discredit this regime internationally, by publicly denouncing its supporters, notably the French government and oil multinationals. Independent civil society must step up awareness-raising campaigns, both in person and online. The international community must exert sustained pressure, including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and support for organisations in exile. Without this combination of internal action and international pressure, democratic change will remain impossible. But it is possible. It happened in 1992, and it can happen again.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Interim Head of MONUSCO, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

In the month following the reopening of the Burundi-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has deteriorated considerably, recently marked by an influx of Congolese refugees returning home, where they face overcrowded conditions and a severe shortage of essential services. This comes in the midst of escalating clashes between rebel groups AFC and M23, and forces affiliated with the Kinshasa government, with drone strikes causing widespread destruction and pushing violence closer to Burundi’s borders, where conditions are most dire.

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), described the current humanitarian situation as “extremely volatile”. During a press stakeout on March 26, she highlighted that the rapid spread of the conflict from North and South Kivu into Tshopo Province and toward Burundi’s borders is a major concern, warning that it increases the risk of a broader “regional conflagration.”

Van de Perre also warned that armed militants have been increasingly relying on the use of heavy weapons and drone strikes in densely populated urban areas, which have caused great damage to civilian infrastructure as well as serious risks to civilian safety, underscoring recent violent incidents at the Kisagani Bangoka International Airport and in Goma, the largest city in North Kivu. Additionally, she warned of M23’s growing presence in Goma, where the coalition has managed to gain influence, undermine state authority, and disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries.

Furthermore, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC (UNJHRO) has uncovered a considerable rise in human rights violations committed by armed groups. Since December 2025, approximately 173 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented, affecting at least 111 victims, the majority of whom were women and girls.

Van de Perre described these findings as “only the tip of the iceberg,” and highlighted growing rates of exploitation, particularly along artisanal mining sites, where child labour is especially pronounced. Armed groups have also been alleged to hamper monitoring, investigation, and justice mechanisms, and subject human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors to intimidation and arbitrary detention.

This follows a sharp escalation of hostilities between the armed groups in December 2025, which forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese to flee to Burundi, most coming from Uvira in South Kivu Province and the surrounding areas. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) show that after M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and a relative return of stability, more than 33,000 refugees began returning home since the border’s reopening on February 23, with most crossing through the Kavimira border point. Many of these returnees already received little humanitarian assistance in Burundi due to chronic underfunding.

“Conditions in many areas of return in the DRC remain fragile, with acute humanitarian needs,” said Ali Mahamat, UNHCR Head of Sub-Office in Goma, DRC, on March 24 at a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. “Initial UNHCR assessments in Uvira and Fizi show families arriving with few belongings, in urgent need of shelter, basic household items, health care, and access to water and sanitation. Many returned to find their homes destroyed and belongings looted, leaving them in deep despair and unable to resume normal life without substantial support.”

According to the latest updates from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), roughly 60 percent of returnees are living in damaged shelters and over 30 percent face challenges accessing their land. Returnees face heightened risks of gender-based violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, extortion, and exploitation, with female-headed households disproportionately affected due to limited livelihood opportunities for women, which leave these communities entrenched in poverty and especially vulnerable.

Figures from UNHCR show that approximately 30 percent of returnees had been taking refuge in Burundi’s Busama displacement camp, where they faced significant levels of overcrowding and limited access to clean water, sanitation services, healthcare, and shelter. Currently, roughly 4,500 Congolese refugees remain stuck at transit points as they await being relocated to Busama. Additionally, Burundi continues to host over 109,000 Congolese refugees, with 67,000 of them in Busuma alone.

Additionally, internal displacement remains widespread in the DRC, with more than 6.4 million people currently displaced. IFRC estimates that over 5.2 million internally displaced Congolese are concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, 96 percent as a result of ongoing armed violence. According to van de Perre, over 26.6 million people, roughly a quarter of DRC’s population, are projected to face food insecurity this year.

Currently, UNHCR’s response plan to assist returnees, refugees, and displaced Congolese civilians is only 34 percent funded, seeking a total of USD 145 million. MONUSCO is currently on the frontlines providing protection services for nearly 3,000 civilians in Djaiba village. Through the mission, the UN has been able to support over 18,000 farmers in harvesting and transporting crops and has conducted 204 patrols. Van de Perre stressed that stronger governance and security enforcement are crucial in protecting vulnerable civilians, and disarmament and repatriation efforts must be conducted to resolve broader regional tensions.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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When the 11th Our Ocean Conference opens in Mombasa and Kilifi, Kenya, from June 16-18, 2026, it will mark the first time this influential meeting has been held on African soil. For coastal and island nations across the continent and the wider Indian Ocean – and for the Global South more broadly – the stakes could not be higher: the promises and commitments made there will help decide whether the ocean becomes a source of justice and resilience, or deepens existing inequalities.

James Alix Michel

Since its launch in 2014, the Our Ocean Conference has generated a steady stream of commitments on marine conservation, sustainable fisheries, climate action and pollution control. Billions of dollars have been pledged for marine protected areas, surveillance, research and community projects. Yet, for many communities in the Global South, the reality at sea has often changed far less than the rhetoric on land. Overfishing, climate-driven ecosystem shifts and pollution continue to undermine food security and livelihoods, while benefits from the “blue economy” still tend to flow upwards to those with capital and technology.

I know this process intimately. In 2018, at the Our Ocean Conference in Bali, Indonesia (October 29–30), I was honoured to be invited by renown Philanthropist, Dona Bertarelli, and named one of the founding Pew-Bertarelli Ocean Legacy Ambassadors, alongside John Kerry, former US Secretary of State, and David Cameron, former UK Prime Minister, Heraldo Munoz former Chilean minister of Foreign Affairs and Carlotta Leon.

Our central mission was to champion large-scale marine protected areas (MPAs).

Under my presidency of Seychelles (2004–2016), we set a global example for the Global South. At Rio+20 in 2012, we announced our bold commitment to protect 30% of our 1.35 million km² Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 2020 – a full decade ahead of today’s global 30×30 targets. We launched the Seychelles Marine Spatial Plan (SMSP) process in 2014, involving 265 stakeholder consultations and over 100 GIS data layers, culminating in 410,000 km² (30% of our EEZ, an area larger than Germany) designated as Marine Protected Areas in March 2020, with the full SMSP becoming legally binding across our entire EEZ on March 31, 2025. We also pioneered the world’s first sovereign blue bond in October 2018 – a US$15 million issuance (with $21.6 million debt-for-nature swap via The Nature Conservancy) that reduced our borrowing costs from 6.5% to 2.8% while funding fisheries governance, marine protection and blue economy projects through SeyCCAT and the Development Bank of Seychelles.

Mombasa’s significance lies not only in geography but in timing. The High Seas Treaty – formally the BBNJ Agreement entered into force on the 17th January this year having reached 60 ratifications in 2025.

The Treaty offers, for the first time, a framework to create marine protected areas and regulate potentially harmful activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction, which cover nearly half the planet and play critical roles in climate regulation and biodiversity. For African and other developing countries, the way this agreement is implemented will test whether “common heritage of humankind” can move from slogan to reality.

Seychelles was among the first African nations to ratify BBNJ, advocating for high seas MPAs like the Saya de Malha Bank.

The treaty’s provisions on environmental impact assessments, area-based management tools, capacity-building and benefit-sharing will shape who gets to decide what happens on the high seas, and who gains or loses from emerging ocean industries. Without strong institutions, adequate financing and meaningful participation from the Global South, there is a risk that powerful states and corporations will dominate decision-making, reproducing on the ocean the same patterns of inequality seen on land.

The debate over deep-sea mining makes these concerns concrete. Proponents argue that mining polymetallic nodules and other deep-sea deposits could supply minerals needed for the energy transition.

But scientific assessments warn that such operations may cause long-lasting damage to seafloor habitats, disrupt carbon cycles and threaten species we have barely begun to study. Small-scale fishers, coastal communities and Indigenous peoples worry that the costs will be borne by those least responsible for climate change and least able to adapt.

In recent years, a broad coalition of states, scientists, civil society groups and youth movements has called for a precautionary pause or moratorium on commercial deep-sea mining in the Area. This demand is rooted in the precautionary principle and in a vision of the ocean as a living system, not just a stockpile of raw materials. For many in the Global South, it is also a justice issue: the world cannot repeat, in the deep sea, an extractive model that has left communities polluted and marginalised on land.

In Africa’s Indian Ocean, these debates are particularly urgent. Recently, I joined ocean Renown philanthropist and a strong advocate of Ocean Conservation , Dona Bertarelli in calling for a moratorium on deep-sea mining in Africa’s ocean, especially in the Indian Ocean. Our message to governments is that precaution and long-term stewardship must come before short-term profit – a principle Seychelles has applied through our SMSP and blue bonds.

Kenya has framed the 2026 conference under the theme “Our Ocean, Our Heritage, Our Future”, with a focus on jobs, equity and healthy oceans. This framing resonates across the Global South, where coastal and inland communities face converging crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and economic insecurity.

For the conference to be a turning point, African and other developing countries could push for three outcomes :

First, insist that BBNJ implementation be guided by equity: robust funding for capacity-building and technology transfer, transparent environmental assessments, and benefit-sharing that reaches frontline communities.

Second, unite behind a precautionary moratorium on deep-sea mining until independent science shows it can proceed without irreversible harm and robust global rules exist.

Third, demand commitments that improve lives: secure markets for small-scale fishers, nature-based solutions like mangrove restoration, climate-resilient infrastructure, and support for youth, women and Indigenous leadership. Seychelles proves this works – 30%+ EEZ protection with sustainable financing balancing ecology and equity.

Mombasa sits at the intersection of vulnerability and possibility, like coastal cities across the Global South. Hosting Africa’s first Our Ocean Conference offers a chance to centre perspectives of those who live with the ocean daily.

The test of Our Ocean 2026 will be whether it shifts power towards those most affected and committed to stewardship. For Africa, SIDS and the Global South, Mombasa is a moment to say: the ocean is not a frontier to be mined, but a living foundation for our survival and dignity.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

IPS UN Bureau

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A Sudanese family in rural Wasat AL Gadaref, Gedaref State, near Khartoum, Sudan. Credit: UNICEF/Osman Saif

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

The past two weeks have marked a significantly violent escalation in the Sudanese Civil War, with drone strikes and artillery shelling between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) causing widespread destruction, casualties, and displacement. With humanitarian responses critically underfunded and the scale of needs, including the hunger crisis, continuing to grow, experts warn that millions in Sudan could be affected by famine, violence, or prolonged displacement.

Since March 4, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recorded more than 200 civilian deaths resulting from drone strikes in the Kordofan region and White Nile State. In West Kordofan, SAF drone strikes have killed at least 152 civilians, hitting densely populated areas including hospitals and markets. The conflict has also spread to White Nile State, where strikes have targeted the state capital, Kosti, as well as electrical facilities—causing widespread power outages—and a student dormitory.

“It is deeply troubling that despite multiple reminders, warnings, and appeals, parties to the conflict in Sudan continue to use increasingly powerful drones to deploy explosive weapons with wide-area impacts in populated areas,” said Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “It will soon be three full years since the senseless conflict in Sudan began, devastating millions of lives and livelihoods. Yet the violence, fueled by these new technologies of war, simply keeps spreading. It is high time it came to an end.”

South Darfur has also been heavily affected, with drone strikes on March 12 and 13 causing extensive damage across multiple neighborhoods. In West Darfur, strikes on a market in Akidong triggered a massive explosion that impacted the Adre border crossing—a critical lifeline for humanitarian aid deliveries and a key route in preventing widespread starvation. On March 16, a deadly drone strike hit the Sudan-Chad border in Chad’s Tine region, killing 17 people and injuring several others. Local eyewitnesses told reporters that the strikes hit mourners at a funeral, as well as children playing nearby.

UN Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that the attack reflects a growing pattern of violence affecting border communities, raising concerns about broader regional instability between neighboring countries. “The UN calls once again on all parties to comply with their clearly known obligations under international humanitarian law, which include protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and ensuring the rapid, safe, unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to whoever needs it, and wherever it is needed,” Haq said.

Following the attack, Chad bolstered its security forces along the Sudan-Chad border to prepare for defensive operations. On March 19, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby confirmed in a statement shared to social media that Chad’s army has been ordered to “retaliate, starting from tonight, to any attack coming from Sudan.”

“Despite various firm warnings addressed to the different belligerents in the Sudan conflict and the closure of the border, the town of Tine has again been the target of a drone attack,” said a spokesperson for the Chadian government. “This latest assault of extreme gravity has caused the death of 17 of our compatriots and left several others injured.”

As violence continues to escalate and spill across borders, its humanitarian consequences within Sudan are becoming increasingly pronounced. Figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that approximately 9 million people are currently internally displaced across Sudan, marking one of the largest displacement crises in the world. On March 17, several people were killed in the Bara locality, northeast of El Obeid City, the capital of North Kordofan, causing over 150 displacements from Sherim Mima Village in Bara to Um Dam Haj alone.

Displacement has gone down in recent days, with roughly 3.8 million civilians recorded to have begun returning home, particularly to Khartoum and eastern regions. Despite this, returnees face a host of challenges, including the loss of their livelihoods, infrastructure damage, and a lack of access to basic services. Roughly 55 percent of internally displaced civilians were children under 18 years old.

Additional reports from humanitarian agencies paint a grim picture of the conditions that civilians face. Doctors Without Borders, also known as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), reports that civilians are at great risk of being harmed by explosive remnants on the ground, recording 23 injuries, including four women and seven children, sustaining severe injuries.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that rampant and concurrent outbreaks of cholera, measles, dengue, and Hepatitis E. have overwhelmed national health systems, which were already weakened by the vast influx of injured persons.

The World Food Programme (WFP) states that approximately 21.2 million people are currently food insecure across Sudan, with women and children disproportionately affected. The majority of female-headed households are critically food insecure. According to UNICEF, “catastrophic” malnutrition rates were recorded in Um Baru and Kornoi in North Darfur. Numerous regions are at risk of developing famine-like conditions and face severe shortages of food, clean water, healthcare, and other basic services.

Despite immense access challenges, the UN and its partners have been working on the frontlines to restore access to basic services, managing to install eight 2,000-liter water tanks in displacement shelters and schools. UNICEF has reached struggling communities with food assistance and vaccination programs, providing 787,000 children with nutrition screenings, 25,100 children with malnutrition treatment, and over 540,000 children with vaccines for Measles and Rubella.

However, these efforts remain severely constrained by chronic underfunding, with the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan being only 16 percent funded, reaching only $454 million of its $2.9 billion goal, which would assist over 20 million crisis-affected civilians across the country. An additional $1.6 billion is required to reach refugees and host communities in neighboring countries.

IPS UN Bureau

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