In 2025, 13.5 million ‘zero-dose’ children did not receive vaccinations in their first year. More than half of these children live in fragile, conflict-affected or vulnerable countries, where immunization may be disrupted due to a number of factors. Credit: UNICEF

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

Despite growing up and working in vastly different geographic regions and environments — one shaped by decades of armed conflict and political instability, and the other by remote, hard-to-reach areas — both Sagal and Johao encounter children daily who have never been vaccinated. Sagal and Johao are members of UNICEF’s Global Youth Health Advisory Group, where they advance children’s health by shaping UNICEF’s strategies, policies, and campaigns, while working directly in their own countries to connect community realities to global conversations about children’s health.

Sagal, 23, lives in the Darul-Salam district in Mogadishu, Somalia, where she works as a junior doctor in maternal and child health. Sagal’s passion lies in promoting vaccine confidence, addressing health misinformation, and empowering the youth to become advocates for healthier communities, she told Inter Press Service. While global vaccine coverage is improving, Sagal describes Somalia’s situation as “still very difficult.” Somalia has one of the lowest vaccination rates due to years of conflict, and while coverage is improving, “not all children are reached equally and a child’s chance to get vaccines depends on where they live, especially in unsafe or hard-to-reach places.”

Johao, 14, lives in Ecuador’s Amazon region, where he has seen firsthand the realities of why children in rural, remote, and isolated areas struggle to get vaccinated. Johao has hands-on volunteer experience in infectious disease research and community health projects and is also a part of U-Report, GeneraciónMÁS, and FixMyFood networks in Ecuador. The biggest challenges Johao encounters when it comes to childhood vaccination campaigns, he told Inter Press Service, are “reaching communities with limited infrastructure, overcoming transportation difficulties, and ensuring that accurate information reaches families before misinformation does.” Both conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas face their own challenges, but what is particularly difficult in remote communities is “isolation and limited access to essential services.”

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines “zero-dose” children as those who lack access to or are never reached by routine immunization services, which is measured as children who have never received their first dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP). According to the annual WHO-UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage (WUENIC), 90 percent of infants globally received at least one dose of a DTP vaccine and 85 percent completed the three-dose series in 2025. However, in 2025, an estimated 13.5 million zero-dose children did not receive a single vaccine in their first year of life, and an estimated 7.3 million infants received their first DTP vaccine but dropped out before receiving their first measles dose. Globally, more than half of all zero-dose children live in fragile, conflict-affected or vulnerable countries (FCV) where immunization programs are affected by political instability, insecurity, and underfunding.

The Immunization Agenda 2030 (IA2030) Mid-Term Review, identified FCVs as “one of the greatest challenges to achieving global immunization goals.” In Somalia, Sagal explained how “most zero dose and dropout children live in places that are unsafe, far away, or completely unreachable. These children face many problems at the same time, including, no vaccines, poor nutrition, very few health services, and almost no social support.”

Sagal, 23, a Somalian junior doctor and member of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group. Credit: UNICEF

The situation is similar in Ecuador, where Johao explained, “children who have never received vaccines often live in remote rural or Indigenous communities, where transportation is limited and access to health services can be difficult.”

UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell emphasized that while vaccination rates have bounced back since dropping during the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of children are still left vulnerable due to displacement, poverty and war.

“We must reach every child, and we must rebuild trust where it is fraying. No child should suffer from a disease that a simple vaccine can prevent,” said Russell.

WHO and UNICEF have identified the urgent need to counter the spread of misleading information and erosion of trust, which has led to a surge in vaccine hesitancy and anti-science sentiment. In particular, IA2030 called for tailored support in FCV settings to “promote nuanced and context-specific advocacy messaging and approaches, and foster trust through sustained community engagement.”

Aside from logistical access, there are other factors that determine people’s decisions to get vaccinations. Sagal shared that in Somalia people forgo vaccinations for a variety of reasons, including fear of vaccine side effects or rumors that vaccines cause infertility. In Ecuador, Johao detailed how some families lack clear information regarding vaccination schedules and have vaccine concerns influenced by misinformation, with these “barriers affecting their trust in and ability to access health services.”

As a member of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Johao, 14, speaks to the experiences of children in Amazon communities in Ecuador. Credit: UNICEF

In FCV and hard-to-reach settings, mistrust surrounding vaccines is driven by multiple complex and multifaceted aspects, including misinformation campaigns, conspiracy theories, religious opposition, low health literacy, sociodemographic factors, and the politicization of vaccines that undermines science.

Both Sagal and Johao’s work sits at the intersection of access and trust. As members of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Sagal and Johao are not only bringing vaccines to children who would otherwise be missed, but doing so in contexts where the social and political conditions that make vaccination difficult are the same conditions their communities live with every day.

When it comes to rebuilding trust and reaching children in FCV settings, youth advocates’ “presence and credibility help [them] enter spaces where formal systems cannot,” Sagal said. “Youth advocates speak the same language and come from the same communities, [so] families trust us more than big institutions.” In Somalia, she explained, youth advocates help to rebuild trust in fragile areas by “reaching other young people quickly, communicating in a natural and friendly way, fighting misinformation fast, and mobilizing communities faster than traditional actors.”

Across settings, culture, language, and traditions strongly influence health decisions. Johao noted how “vaccination messages are more effective when they are communicated respectfully and acknowledge local knowledge and beliefs.”

In order to reach the IA2030 goal and ensure vaccines reach everyone, everywhere, at every age, WHO and UNICEF have put forth four concrete actions. These actions include strengthening immunization programs in FCV settings, countering false and misleading health information to support vaccine uptake, increasing and sustaining global funding for immunization programs, and investing in stronger data and disease surveillance systems.

Sagal and Johao’s lived experiences highlight the dire need for these actions. From Sagal’s experiences, zero-dose children “need health and nutrition support delivered in ways that work in fragile and dangerous environments.” As members of the UNICEF Global Youth Health Advisory Group, Johao explained that to effectively help their communities, “we need access to reliable information, training, resources, and opportunities to work closely with health professionals and community leaders.”

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By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A proposal to restrict US visas to foreign journalists assigned to cover the US has triggered a strong protest from the New York-based Foreign Press Association (FPA).

The FPA says it is dismayed by the US administration’s proposals for restricting international press visas. The shortened duration of the press “I” visa would make it impossible for overseas press to maintain consistent coverage of the US, let alone staff a bureau.

The likely administrative backlogs and possible politically motivated visa denials fly in the face of the First Amendment in the US and challenge international media standards.

“The demand for frequent visa renewal obviates any chance that correspondents could maintain any kind of family life, let alone to develop the network of sources and resources essential for professional journalism.”

“The benefits of free press coverage stand in their own right. However, we should also point out that many essential US industries depend on international media coverage.”

Markets, education, entertainment, STEM, sports, and culture are just some examples of industries where companies and institutions could decide to relocate to more cosmopolitan and accessible countries, the FPA said.

The administration rule changes reducing the length of stay for foreign journalist (I) visas to 240 days and 90 days for Chinese journalists harm the international media’s ability to cover the United States. Journalists, who have spent years building relationships and developing a deep understanding of the U.S. economy, people, culture, and politics, would join the millions whose ability to travel to and work in the U.S. is challenged by the administration’s policies.

According to the US State Department, media (I) visas are for representatives of the foreign media, including members of the press, radio, film, and print industries. The media representative must be traveling temporarily to the United States to work in their profession. The individual may only participate in informational or educational activities, essential to the foreign media function.

Activities in the United States while on a media (I) visa must be for a media organization with a home office outside of the United States. Activities in the United States must be informational in nature and generally associated with the newsgathering process and reporting on current events.

Since at least the Second World War, the FPA pointed out, the State Department has set an example for other countries with its untrammelled welcome for the foreign press and its consistent defense of First Amendment rights. The flurry of reflexive xenophobia represented by these proposals reverses all those decades in a way that clearly does not take account of the needs of the press, nor indeed of the USA.

“Many of us can testify to the professional development of journalists from more restrictive countries like China when exposed to a more open press here, which makes it even more illogical that the proposals impose additional restrictions on Chinese media”.

“We recall that the Headquarters Treaty with the United Nations and other international bodies commits the host country, the US, to facilitate entry to press from member countries to cover the work, and cannot see any provisions to ensure that this international treaty obligation is fulfilled. Once again this suggests that these proposals were rushed through without consideration of the realities, and we can testify, with no consultation with the media affected”.

Ian Williams, President, Foreign Press Association of the USA, told Inter Press Service (IPS), “It’s worse than a crime; it’s a screw-up (mistake), as Napoleon’s general didn’t say… They have lumped journalists in with the overall category of foreigners and acted with reflexive xenophobia—perhaps exacerbated because if there’s any group they hate more than foreigners, it’s journalists.”

The proposals, he said, show no sign of intelligent appreciation of the role of journalism or journalists, and they have produced no statistics for journalists and the alleged threat to security or immigration. Their arguments and proposals are an exercise in knee-jerk prejudice, a reflex that operates without the intervention of the intellect.

“One also wonders whether they have given any thought to American interests. Whatever you think of their social utility, NYSE and NASDAQ depend on global media for international investors,” he said

Similarly, as one would expect from a bunch of Philistines with no professional experience, by bundling the media, along with educational visas, they may have muddied the waters. Higher education has a heavy dependence on foreign tuition income, and they will fight back politically and in the courts, maybe joined by the Murdoch Press, which has regularly imported reactionary talent from abroad.

“Ironically one thinks of the foreign press personalities who have come into the USA—people like Rupert Murdoch, Andrew Neill, Douglas Murray, Conrad Black, Andrew Sullivan, and Stuart Varney—and furthered the conservative cause here, but that is not who they are thinking about,” declared Williams, a former President of the UN Correspondents’ Association (UNCA).

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, President, Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution, told IPS that by conditioning a journalist’s ability to live and work in the United States on repeated, discretionary renewals, the administration is creating precisely the climate of self-censorship that the First Amendment was meant to prevent.

If a reporter knows that a critical story about the president or his allies might translate into a denied extension, the line between immigration policy and political reprisal evaporates, he said.

“This is not a hypothetical danger. The rule expressly allows the government to scrutinize the “content” a journalist is covering when deciding whether to grant an extension, opening the door to ideological filtering of who gets to report from the United States. That logic is indistinguishable from the methods long used by authoritarian regimes that the United States has historically condemned,” said Dr Ben-Meir

The proposal also creates a ready-made instrument for selective punishment of journalists from countries with which the Trump administration has tense or adversarial relations. The singling out of Chinese journalists for especially harsh 90-day limits is an explicit signal that Washington is prepared to wield visa policy as a geopolitical stick, not a neutral administrative tool, he pointed out.

Once this precedent is established, nothing prevents the administration from tightening the screw further on reporters from other states whose governments it wishes to pressure—or punish.

The result would be a two-tiered press landscape in which journalists from favored countries enjoy relative stability, while those from disfavored states face constant uncertainty and the implicit demand to “behave,” he declared.

Dr. Ben-Meir said foreign governments and international bodies, including the UN, should make it clear that undermining foreign press access in the United States will invite reciprocal restrictions on American journalists abroad—further isolating US audiences from the world.

And American citizens, who ultimately bear the cost of an information-starved public sphere, must insist that their government not abuse immigration law as a backdoor censorship tool.

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Credit: Luke Dray/Stringer via Getty Images. Source IMF

By Martin Schindler, Nikola Spatafora and Andrew Tiffin
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A farmer in Kenya gets weather and planting advice on a basic phone. A teacher in Nigeria uses a chatbot to help students catch up in math. South Africa’s revenue authority uses data analytics to better target tax audits. These are not futuristic examples from Silicon Valley. They are early signs of the broader transformation that artificial intelligence (AI) could bring to sub-Saharan Africa.

AI will reshape the global economy. The question for Africa is whether it rides the wave or gets left behind.

Transformative potential

Our research shows AI’s promise, but it also points to significant risks and challenges. At current levels of preparedness, we estimate that AI will add just 0.2 percent to the region’s GDP over the next decade—little more than a rounding error. However, if countries can put the right foundations in place to accelerate adoption and extend the impact of AI beyond today’s digitally connected firms, the gains could rise to about 4 percent over the decade—nearly half a percentage point of additional growth a year.

That extra growth is critical given Africa’s vast jobs challenge. By 2030, sub-Saharan Africa will account for roughly half of new entrants into the global labor force. But the issue is not only the number of jobs needed—it is also their quality. Most workers are still in informal microenterprises or smallholder agriculture, where productivity is far below that of formal firms.

For the region, AI’s main promise is not about replacing office workers, but boosting productivity across the economy—helping informal firms manage inventory, enabling farmers to increase yields, and supporting mid-sized firms to transition to formality and export readiness.

The risk is that the opposite happens. AI adoption in sub-Saharan Africa currently lags well behind every other region. If richer economies race ahead while African firms and governments lag, the productivity gap between the region and the rest of the world will only widen.

A different reality

Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.

The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.

The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.

Delivering on AI’s promise

Two priorities for AI adoption stand out.

First, countries must build the foundations for broad adoption.

AI depends on reliable electricity, affordable broadband and data infrastructure, and workers with digital skills. That means investing in power and connectivity, supporting regional data infrastructure where viable, and strengthening digital and AI literacy through education and training. Countries in Africa do not need to develop the world’s most powerful AI models. But they do need the capacity to adopt, adapt, and scale AI quickly.

Second, build trust—and scale.

AI can widen inequality if its benefits are concentrated among large firms, skilled workers, and urban hubs. It also creates risks around privacy, cybersecurity, misinformation, and dependence on foreign providers. Governments need clear and practical rules on data, competition, consumer protection, cybersecurity, and the public sector’s use of AI. Regional cooperation will also be essential. Many African economies are too small to build AI ecosystems alone. But together they can create the scale needed for infrastructure, data standards, regulation, and markets.

AI in Africa is not just a technology policy issue—it is central to the region’s growth strategy. Africa does not need to win the race to build cutting-edge AI models, but it must find ways to use AI widely, cheaply, and safely. The window is narrow. Over the next debate, Africa’s young and growing workforce will either find more productive jobs, or watch the global productivity gap widen further. The outcome will not be shaped in Silicon Valley, but in the choices made across governments, schools, farms, and firms from Dakar to Dar es Salaam.

Martin Schindler is an advisor, Nikola Spatafora is a senior economist, and Andrew Tiffin is a deputy division chief, all in the IMF’s African Department.

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Global Nobel Laureates at the Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War held last week in Rome. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan.

By Ariel F. Dumont
BORGO LAUDATO SI’, Italy, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

“I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that.” By bringing the supercomputer HAL 9000 to life in his 1968 film 2001: A Space Odyssey, American director Stanley Kubrick created one of the most powerful symbols of the fear of artificial intelligence (AI) escaping human control.

Fifty-eight years later, that question is more relevant than ever. It was precisely this issue that brought together more than 200 international figures for three days of discussions in the exceptional setting of Borgo Laudato Si’, located within the papal summer residence at Castel Gandolfo, where Pope Leo XIV is currently staying.

Organised by the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War, the conference set out to reflect on “the future of international security, the governance of emerging technologies, disarmament and the building of an economy of peace”.

Yoshiyuki Nagaoka, Executive Director of the Office of External Relations at Soka Gakkai and Executive Director of the Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan

The programme brought together a number of leading international figures, including former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi; Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Chief Advisor to Bangladesh Muhammad Yunus; Yoshiyuki Nagaoka, President of the Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue and Executive Director of the Office of External Relations at Soka Gakkai; Filipino journalist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa; Amnesty International Secretary General Agnès Callamard; and several scientists and nuclear experts.

The assembly was officially opened by Monsignor Fabio Baggio, under-secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development.

In his welcoming address, he immediately established the central thread of the discussions by stressing that “peace is not simply the absence of war but an order founded on justice, mutual trust, respect for the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of every human being.”

The central idea was clear: regulating artificial intelligence has become imperative if peace – and ultimately humanity’s very survival – is to be preserved. AI is now integrated into military systems, dramatically increasing the risks of proliferation, cyber warfare and high-intensity conflicts, with the potential to undermine global stability and respect for ethical principles.

Although the speakers sometimes differed in their analyses, reflecting their diverse backgrounds, they all converged on one essential conclusion. Artificial intelligence should not be feared, but that certainly does not mean it should be given free rein until it becomes another HAL 9000. On the contrary, most participants stressed the urgent need to establish safeguards before potential abuses become impossible to control.

Karen Hallberg, Argentine physicist and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan

This concern was voiced in particular by Karen Hallberg, the Argentine physicist specialising in condensed matter and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. AI, she argued, is a “dual-use” technology, much like nuclear energy itself. While nuclear fission has led to extraordinary advances in energy production and medicine, it has also made atomic weapons possible.

“Artificial intelligence has the same ambivalence. It can certainly contribute to scientific research, medicine and even the monitoring of international commitments. However, its integration into nuclear weapons systems could usher in a period of dangerous uncertainty,” she warned.

Hallberg also stressed that one of the greatest risks would be to allow algorithms to intervene in processes related to the command and control of nuclear weapons – for instance, analysing satellite imagery, interpreting military situations or contributing to decisions whose consequences could prove irreversible for the future of humanity.

“I am not afraid; I am concerned. And it is precisely this concern that should give us the determination to act before it is too late,” she said, calling on governments to apply the precautionary principle before technology outpaces political regulation and leads to an irreversible drift.

A concern that Nagaoka shares, albeit from a different perspective, is that artificial intelligence is not inherently dangerous. Everything, he argued, depends on how humanity chooses to use it.

“The question ultimately comes back to humanity itself, which has the choice of becoming either more selfish or more compassionate.”

Nagaoka placed particular emphasis on the responsibility of younger generations, who are growing up in an environment where digital tools occupy an ever greater place and where the risk of isolation continues to increase. Humanity’s greatest challenge, therefore, is not to reject AI but to learn how to use it without abandoning the uniquely human capacity for judgement.

“We must preserve our conscience and our wisdom when making decisions,” he said, reminding participants that education and critical thinking will remain the best safeguards against a technology capable of influencing both individual and collective choices.

“I recently heard on television the story of an 86-year-old Japanese woman faced with the painful decision of ending life support for her seriously ill husband. She chose to seek advice from ChatGPT rather than from her family.”

For Nagaoka, the issue is not to condemn such a choice but rather to reflect on these new forms of dialogue emerging in societies where machines may increasingly become trusted interlocutors at the most important moments of human existence.

This reflection on human responsibility echoed the concerns raised by Maria Ressa, winner of the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for her defence of freedom of expression and her fight against disinformation.

Peace is not simply the absence of war but an order founded on justice, mutual trust, respect for the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of every human being.
Throughout the discussions, she repeatedly highlighted the risks AI poses to the future of democracy, including the accelerating spread of false information, the large-scale manipulation of public opinion and the concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of technology companies.

“AI is not simply an issue of innovation. It concerns the very functioning of democratic societies,” Ressa insisted.

But it was undoubtedly Yunus who delivered the conference’s most far-reaching criticism by shifting the debate onto economic ground. The Bangladeshi economist, founder of the Grameen Bank and recipient of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize offered a profoundly humanist critique that challenged the very foundations of AI’s use within contemporary capitalism.

“The main problem is not simply the possible disappearance of certain jobs, but the growing concentration of wealth,” Yunus said.

Artificial intelligence, he warned, risks reinforcing a model in which a handful of companies control technologies, data and income, while an ever larger share of the population is excluded from economic participation.

“It could deprive people of their livelihoods, their dignity and their ability to remain independent,” he argued.

The future, he said, cannot be an economy in which artificial intelligence replaces human beings. Instead, it must be based on participation, entrepreneurship and the sharing of opportunities.

His message to political leaders around the world was unequivocal: AI must not become an instrument for concentrating power but rather a tool placed at the service of everyone.

And now what? At the end of these discussions, one certainty emerges: there can be no turning back. Artificial intelligence is now part of our world. Humanity should not fear it, nor should it regard it as tomorrow’s greatest enemy. But several fundamental questions remain unanswered: Who will control this technology, according to what rules, and in the service of what kind of society?

More than half a century after HAL 9000, the real threat may not be that a machine could become human. It may be that human beings gradually renounce what defines them most: their capacity to decide, to judge and to assume responsibility for their own choices.

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Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

Despite rising geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions and calls to bring production back to domestic shores, the global economy remains more interconnected than it may appear. Trade through global value chains (GVCs) reached historic levels in 2024, according to a new report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

GVCs, the cross-border production networks through which countries exchange materials, services and intermediate inputs used to produce goods and services, accounted for roughly 17 percent of global GDP in real terms between 2022 and 2024. This is up from approximately 16 percent before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

The findings stand to challenge expectations that the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions would have on the campaign of de-globalization. GVC trade expanded rapidly before the Global Financial Crisis and later stabilized at historically high levels. Nevertheless, in 2024 inflation-adjusted GVC trade remained close to its 2022 peak, even as total global trade declined slightly from its 2022 level.

The distinction between real and nominal figures is particularly important following years of elevated inflation and volatile commodity prices. Rising prices can inflate the apparent value of international trade without representing an actual increase in the volume of goods and services exchanged. The OECD’s inflation-adjusted figures indicate that cross-border production itself has remained historically high.

Beneath that overall stability, however, industries have moved in markedly different directions. Manufacturing and transportation remain among the sectors most dependent on internationally sourced inputs.

Coke – a carbon-rich fuel produced from coal and primarily used in steelmaking – refined petroleum products, water and air transport, information and communication technology, electronics, rubber, plastics, chemicals, basic metals and motor vehicles all recorded GVC trade exceeding 35 percent of their gross output in 2024, indicating their heavy reliance on cross-border production networks.

While gains were recorded in those sectors, the motor vehicle industry became less internationally integrated over the period examined, falling from the sixth-most internationalized sector in 2011 to tenth in 2024, being overtaken by chemicals, air transport and electronic equipment.

Pharmaceuticals moved in the opposite direction. Despite increased policy attention toward strengthening domestic medical supply chains following the COVID-19 pandemic, pharmaceutical production became more dependent on internationally sourced inputs between 2011 and 2024.

GVC participation also increased notably in air transport and warehousing, highlighting the continued importance of globally connected logistics networks in supporting production.

The differences illustrate the uneven nature of supply-chain reconfiguration: while some industries have reduced their reliance on foreign inputs, others have become increasingly integrated into cross-border production networks.

The same pattern is visible across national economies. Of the 80 economies examined by the OECD, 49 had a higher share of foreign value added embedded in their exports in 2024 than in 2011.

Across the economies examined, countries generally relied more heavily on foreign inputs to produce their exports than they contributed inputs to exports produced elsewhere. For example, a country importing foreign-made components to manufacture and export a car is participating backward in a GVC. A country supplying steel that is then used to manufacture and export that car elsewhere is participating forward.

These patterns vary depending on the structure of each economy. Large economies such as the United States, China and Brazil are generally less reliant on foreign inputs because more of their production can be sourced domestically. Major commodity exporters such as Norway and Kazakhstan, meanwhile, rank highly in forward participation because their domestically-produced energy and raw materials become inputs in production and exports elsewhere.

Yet, increased GVC participation does not necessarily mean companies are simply buying more supplies from abroad.

Between 2019 and 2024, China, Japan, the United States and the European Union all became more reliant on foreign value in their exports. However, the OECD found that this was not primarily because companies shifted toward foreign suppliers. Instead, these economies increasingly produced and exported goods and services that themselves relied more heavily on international supply chains.

For example, an economy could begin sourcing more car parts domestically but simultaneously increase its exports of cars, which depend heavily on globally connected production networks. Its individual supply chains may become more domestic, while its overall economy becomes more integrated into global production.

The findings suggest that efforts to bring parts of production closer to home can therefore occur alongside deeper global economic integration.

Trade flows – the movement of goods and services across borders – only captures part of that interconnectedness. Multinational companies (MNCs) also operate and produce directly in foreign markets through foreign affiliates — companies they own or control outside their home country.

If a German MNC owns a factory in the United States, that American operation is a foreign affiliate. Products it manufactures and sells within the United States would not count as international trade, as they never crossed a border, yet the factory remains part of the German company’s global production network.

In 2023, foreign affiliates generated approximately USD 25.6 trillion in output, equivalent to one-quarter of global GDP and only slightly below the USD 26.6 trillion value of total world trade in goods and cross-border services.Together, MNCs and their foreign affiliates accounted for roughly 35 percent of world gross output in 2023 but only 60 percent of world exports, demonstrating their outsized role in international trade.

The geography of MNC production is also gradually broadening. While companies headquartered in OECD economies still controlled nearly 85 percent of foreign-affiliate output in 2023, the share of production involving non-OECD companies operating in non-OECD markets, nearly doubled from 4.9 percent in 2011 to 9.3 percent.

The report’s findings suggest that globalization is not simply retreating in the face of geopolitical fragmentation, rather global production is being reorganized across industries, companies and countries. Supply chains may be shifting, diversifying and adapting to new risks, but the networks connecting the global economy remain deeply entrenched and central to the production of goods and services.

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United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres addresses the opening session of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, Geneva, Switzerland. Credit: UN Photo/Irina Popa

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

Throughout July 2026, various United Nations (UN) bodies and global experts have underscored the need for increased comprehensive artificial intelligence (AI) governance. Although AI yields significant potential gains for global development, persistent structural barriers continue to impede equitable access and deepen the digital divide.

From July 6 to 7, the UN convened the first session of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, featuring a presentation of the inaugural report of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI. The conference included testimonies from global experts and leaders who emphasized the rapidly accelerating nature of AI, warning that without adequate guardrails and transparency measures, entire communities risk falling behind.

“Artificial intelligence is advancing at runaway speed. A technology that can reshape economies, transform the world of work, sway elections and tilt the balance of security is being deployed faster than anyone— including the people building it— can keep up,” said UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres at the Opening Session of the dialogue on July 6th.

“The technologies we trust most— in aviation, in medicine, in nuclear energy and beyond— earned that trust because we acted to hold their makers to account. If AI is to be powerful, it must be governed. If AI is to be trusted, those who build it must be accountable. If AI is to be global, it must be fair. And if AI is to serve the future, it must not consume the future,” he added.

According to Guterres, AI holds immense potential to accelerate medical advancements, revolutionize educational systems, strengthen food production, and revitalize local economies, all of which would drive progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Despite this, widening gaps in development have been recorded across communities in lower-income countries, particularly in the Global South.

On July 17, Guterres spoke at the World AI Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, urging governments and stakeholders to invest in international cooperation and monitoring efforts to ensure equitable access to AI’s benefits. Guterres noted that an alarming “one-third of humanity” remains offline, with the vast majority of technical expertise and investment disproportionately concentrated in only a few countries and companies

“Hundreds of billions of dollars of private investment flood into artificial intelligence – while many developing countries receive just a trickle,” said Guterres. “AI risks pushing the world towards even greater inequalities … greater divides in income, in opportunity, in security … greater gaps between North and South.”

At WAIC, Guterres outlined three main priorities that are to be taken in advancing global AI governance: making AI more environmentally sustainable, establishing critical safety guardrails, and expanding capacity across developing countries. Underscoring the need for AI testing and risk management to be firmly based in the principles of international law, he confirmed that over 20 countries, including China, have agreed to contribute to a UN-supported Global Network for Exchange and Cooperation on AI Capacity Building to assist developing countries navigate this transition.

Throughout the conference, many UN experts emphasized that human rights must remain the cornerstone of all AI decision-making processes, ensuring that final judgments are always made by human beings. Guterres also called for major AI companies to disclose their environmental footprints and commit to a full transition to renewable energy by 2030.

AI has the potential to accelerate the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy by optimizing power efficiency and significantly reducing waste. Several nations, including China, are already leveraging these technologies to increase their annual reliance on renewable energy.

Several developing countries in the Pacific have taken steps to reclaim agency over AI, implementing frameworks that prioritize sustainability and ensure that they remain in control regarding the technology’s development and use. For example, the Kingdom of Tonga has expanded commercial 5G access and conducted a Digital Readiness Assessment to examine risks and potential gains when coordinating governance strategies. Similar assessments have been undertaken across Samoa, Vanuatu, and Fiji.

The Kingdom of Tonga is reshaping its government services around a digital-first model by implementing AI tools that will assist citizens in interacting with the state in their own language. In Kiribati, AI monitoring technologies in fisheries have helped in recovering approximately US$2 million in illegal fishing fines.

“These are real wins, but they are wins within a system the Pacific did not design. The region already knows what it means to be on the wrong side of a divergence, in climate, in trade, in debt vulnerability,” said Kanni Wignaraja, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UNDP Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific.

“AI follows the same logic at greater speed. The difference is that the rules of AI are still being written, which means the divergence is not yet locked in. That window will not stay open for long. The time for the Pacific to shape the outcome is now, not once the frameworks are agreed, and the tools are already being deployed.”

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Population ageing, including the point at which older adults outnumber younger people, is a global demographic phenomenon. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

In many countries, older adults (aged 65 and above) now outnumber younger individuals (under the age of 18), reflecting a significant demographic transformation known as demographic ageing.

The shift in a population’s age structure is becoming increasingly common around the world and is primarily driven by declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy. As populations age, societies face a range of economic, political, and social challenges.

Economically, an ageing population can lead to labor shortages, slower economic growth, and a shrinking tax base. These changes can make it more difficult for governments to finance pensions, healthcare systems, and other public services.

At the same time, the growing number of older adults increases demand for specialized healthcare services, including geriatric care, assisted living, and the treatment of chronic illnesses, placing additional strain on healthcare systems.

To promote sustainable growth and social equity, governments should seek to balance the needs of older adults with those of younger generations, ensuring that public resources support both present well-being and future development

Politically, as people live longer and represent a larger share of the electorate, older adults may gain greater political influence. Their increased voting power can shape government spending priorities, potentially leading to a larger share of public funding being allocated to pensions, healthcare, and retirement benefits, while comparatively less is invested in education, childcare, and programs that support younger generations.

Overall, demographic ageing is reshaping societies worldwide, creating both opportunities and challenges. These developments require governments to adopt balanced policies to ensure economic sustainability and intergenerational equity.

In the middle of the 20th century, older adults accounted for 5% of the world’s population of approximately 2.5 billion, while young people comprised 41%. At that time, the median age of the global population was 22 years. By the end of the 20th century, the world’s population had grown to 6.2 billion, although the age distribution changed only modestly.

In 2000, older adults represented 7% of the global population, while young people represented 36%. Meanwhile, the median age increased to 25 years, indicating a gradual ageing of the global population.

Despite the rapid growth of the world’s population during the second half of the 20th century, the proportion of older adults increased at a much slower pace. These changes mark the early stages of global demographic ageing, characterized by a gradual increase in the share of older adults and a corresponding decline in the proportion of younger people (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

By 2026, the world’s population had reached approximately 8.3 billion. At the same time, young people accounted for an estimated 29% of the global population, while older adults represented about 11%, and the median age had risen to 31 years. By 2078, these two age groups are projected to account for equal shares of the global population, which is expected to reach 10.3 billion, with each group accounting for approximately 22% of the total population (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

In 2026, approximately 50 countries and territories have a higher proportion of older adults (aged 65 and above) than young people (under the age of 18). This demographic pattern is most common in the more developed countries, which tend to have lower fertility rates and longer life expectancies.

In Italy and Japan, for example, the proportion of older adults (aged 65 and above) is roughly twice that of young people (under the age of 18). Similarly, European countries such as France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland also have substantially larger shares of older adults than young people (Figure 2).

Source: United Nations.

Demographic ageing, together with the changing proportions of older and younger populations, has significant economic, social, and political consequences.

Among the most important effects of demographic ageing are shrinking workforces, a growing proportion of retirees, rising dependency ratios, increasing pension expenditures, mounting healthcare costs, shifting political and budgetary priorities, and adapting institutions to the needs of ageing populations.

As populations age, more retirees receive pension benefits for longer periods, while a relatively smaller workforce contributes to the pension systems. Consequently, fewer workers are required to support a much larger non-working population, placing substantial pressure on public finances and social security systems. In response to labor shortages associated with shrinking workforces, many governments have introduced policies that encourage older adults to remain in the labor market for longer.

Healthcare expenditures also rise as populations age. Older adults typically require more medical care than younger people because they are more likely to experience chronic diseases, multiple health conditions, and complex healthcare needs.

As a result, demand for healthcare services such as rehabilitation, dialysis, dementia care, and long-term care continues to increase. In many countries experiencing rapid demographic ageing, governments and families face growing financial and caregiving responsibilities to support an expanding older population.

Meeting the care needs of an ageing population often creates tension over responsibility between governments and families. Governments may expect family members to assume primary responsibility for caring for older adults, while families frequently believe that governments should provide greater support and resources to meet the needs of their ageing relatives.

Some conservative and authoritarian governments argue that extensive public spending on elder care generates limited economic returns because older adults are viewed primarily as recipients of care rather than contributors to economic productivity. As a result, these governments often contend that rising healthcare and long-term care expenditures for older adults may constrain economic growth and advocate limiting public investment in these services.

Similarly, many conservatives and some policymakers often believe that caring for older adults should be the responsibility of individuals and their families, with the private sector playing a greater role rather than government in delivering care and support.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), common health conditions associated with older age include hearing loss, cataracts, back and neck pain, osteoarthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes, depression, loneliness, dementia, and mobility limitations. Many older adults experience several of these health conditions at the same time, making their healthcare needs more complex and requiring coordinated, long-term management.

Older adults who require long-term care are disproportionately women aged 80 years and older who live alone. This group is particularly vulnerable to social isolation which is associated with poorer mental and physical health outcomes, including increased risks of depression, cognitive decline, chronic illness, and reduced quality of life.

In contrast, young people are more likely to face health issues such as injuries from road traffic accidents, falls, drowning, violence, self-harm, depression, anxiety, substance use disorders, asthma, and maternal health conditions.

Population ageing, particularly the increasing prevalence of chronic health conditions and the growing demand for long-term care, has significant implications for government policies and public programs that affect people of all ages. As these trends intensify, they place growing pressures on public resources and influence electoral priorities, shaping decisions about healthcare, social services, education, and public spending.

As older adults make up a larger share of the voting population, governments often place greater emphasis on policies that address the needs of these older adults, particularly pensions and healthcare. As policy priorities shift, investment in areas that primarily benefit younger generations – such as education, infrastructure, and long-term economic development – may decline.

To promote sustainable growth and social equity, governments should seek to balance the needs of older adults with those of younger generations, ensuring that public resources support both present well-being and future development.

Demographic ageing also presents difficult fiscal and political challenges. Governments may need to consider measures such as raising taxes, reducing pension benefits, increasing the retirement age, or implementing other fiscal reforms to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances.

However, governments often delay implementing these reforms because they are politically unpopular. As a result, financial pressures on pension and healthcare systems continue to grow, increasing the risk of substantial funding shortfalls, or, in some cases, insolvency if reforms are postponed for too long.

Population ageing, including the point at which older adults outnumber younger people, is a global demographic phenomenon. As this demographic transformation continues across countries, governments face the ongoing challenge of adapting their economic, political, and social institutions to meet the needs of different age groups – particularly younger and older generations – while maintaining fiscal sustainability and promoting intergenerational equity.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of numerous publications on population issues.

Delegates at the 11th Annual Global Conference on Energy Efficiency, organised by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Credit: Umar Manzoor Shah/IPS

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

As geopolitical tensions, rising electricity demand and climate pressures reshape the global energy landscape, more than 600 energy ministers, chief executives, financial leaders and policy experts gathered in Montreal, deliberating upon how to deliver at an unprecedented scale.

The 11th Annual Global Conference on Energy Efficiency, organised by the International Energy Agency (IEA) on July 7, focused on transforming a global commitment into practical action. Delegates sought ways to meet an ambitious international target of doubling the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, a goal widely viewed as essential for strengthening energy security while cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Speaking during the conference, IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol described energy efficiency as the world’s “first fuel”, calling it the fastest, cheapest and cleanest resource available to countries seeking greater resilience amid growing uncertainty.

Birol reminded delegates that the global energy system has experienced only three major disruptions in recent decades. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 fundamentally reshaped global energy policy. More recently, the supply chain disruptions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of international energy markets.

Against that backdrop, he argued, improving efficiency is no longer simply an environmental objective but a matter of national security and economic stability. Growing geopolitical risks around strategic shipping routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, reinforce the urgency of reducing dependence on volatile energy supplies.

“We are in an age of rapid technological change,” Birol said, urging governments and industries to move beyond declarations and begin implementing large-scale solutions.

Throughout the two-day conference, participants repeatedly emphasised that technology alone will not deliver the transformation. Success, they said, depends on closer cooperation between governments, investors and private industry.

One of the conference’s central outcomes was the launch of the Montreal Collaboration Framework, an initiative designed to strengthen coordination between policymakers, financial institutions and businesses. The framework aims to overcome one of the biggest barriers facing energy efficiency projects, fragmented decision-making that often prevents otherwise viable investments from moving forward.

Executives participating in CEO roundtables acknowledged that many companies continue to pursue isolated efficiency upgrades that deliver only modest savings. Such projects frequently fail to attract significant investment because their financial returns appear too limited when evaluated individually.

Industry leaders instead advocated bundling multiple efficiency improvements into larger investment packages.

Rather than replacing a single motor or upgrading one heating system, companies can combine electricity savings, industrial heat recovery, cooling improvements and digital monitoring into integrated projects that generate stronger financial returns and attract institutional financing.

Another recurring theme was the growing importance of data.

Representatives from major industrial technology companies including Schneider Electric and Danfoss argued that many businesses still rely on broad estimates of their energy consumption instead of detailed operational information.

Without precise data, they warned, companies struggle to identify where the greatest efficiency gains can be achieved.

Delegates highlighted artificial intelligence, predictive analytics and digital monitoring systems as increasingly important tools for optimising industrial operations, reducing waste and lowering operating costs.

Representatives from Deutsche Bank argued that traditional investment decisions remain too heavily focused on initial capital expenditure. Instead, investors should assess projects through the lens of total cost of ownership, accounting for decades of lower energy bills, maintenance savings and reduced operational risks.

Such an approach, participants said, makes many efficiency investments substantially more attractive than they initially appear.

The conference also examined one of the energy transition’s newest challenges.

Rapid growth in artificial intelligence and digital services is driving an unprecedented expansion of data centres, creating soaring electricity demand worldwide.

Rather than viewing AI solely as a source of higher consumption, delegates argued that technological innovation can help solve its own energy challenge.

Companies showcased advanced cooling technologies, including liquid cooling and evaporative systems, capable of dramatically reducing the electricity needed to maintain modern data centres.

These innovations, participants said, demonstrate that rising digital demand does not necessarily have to translate into proportionally higher energy consumption.

Beyond technology and finance, speakers repeatedly stressed that energy efficiency must also serve broader social goals.

Yasmin Abraham, representing the Kambo Energy Group, reminded delegates that low-income communities often experience the highest energy costs while having the fewest resources to improve efficiency.

“Communities know the challenge,” she said. “Communities are closest to that challenge but furthest from the resources.”

Governments, she argued, must ensure that efficiency programmes reach vulnerable households rather than benefiting only wealthier consumers and large corporations.

Canada used the conference to announce an expansion of its Canada Greener Homes Affordability Program, which will provide energy efficiency retrofits to approximately 35,000 low- and middle-income households without upfront costs.

Officials described the initiative as an example of how public policy can reduce emissions while improving affordability and living conditions for ordinary families.

Despite widespread optimism, delegates acknowledged that achieving the 2030 efficiency target remains a formidable challenge.

Global energy demand continues to grow as economies expand, industries electrify and artificial intelligence accelerates electricity consumption. Meeting climate commitments while ensuring affordable and reliable energy will require unprecedented coordination across governments, financial institutions and private industry.

Still, the prevailing mood in Montreal remained pragmatic rather than pessimistic.

Participants agreed that the technical solutions largely exist. What has often been missing is coordinated implementation, sufficient investment and political determination.

By the conference’s conclusion, delegates appeared united around a common conviction that energy efficiency should no longer be treated as a secondary climate policy but as the foundation of future energy systems.

“With the launch of the Montreal Collaboration Framework and renewed commitments from governments, industry and financial institutions, the conference sought to transform efficiency from an often overlooked policy objective into the central pillar of global energy security, economic competitiveness and climate action,” Abraham said.

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People collect signatures against the construction of a massive Mitsui Fudosan datacentre in Hino City, Tokyo, 19 April 2026. Credit: Yasushi Wada/The Yomiuri Shimbun via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

Few things unite Donald Trump’s most ardent supporters with the Democratic Party’s progressive wing, but datacentres are one of them. Across the USA, communities are joining forces across the political divide to oppose developments few want but governments seem determined to impose.

Michigan residents are among those who’ve come together across party lines to oppose plans for over a dozen datacentres. Polling shows just 28 per cent of the state’s population support the proposals. Local communities are fighting back, and similar struggles are unfolding across the world.

Datacentre impacts

Datacentre construction is booming, driven by AI use, demanding increasing computing power that requires huge amounts of electricity and water for cooling.

A single question to an AI chatbot can use 10 times more energy than a conventional search. Generating an AI image takes around a thousand times more energy than generating text. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that datacentre electricity demand will double by 2030.

In Utah, despite thousands of objections, authorities recently approved one of the world’s largest datacentres. It will need more power than the entire state currently uses. The development will construct a gas-fired plant.

AI growth is driving the construction of such gas-powered plants, meaning that more datacentres cause more greenhouse gas emissions. According to the IEA, coal is currently the top energy source for datacentres and over half of all current datacentre power comes from fossil fuels. The agency expects renewables to eventually provide a bigger share of growing needs, but warns that datacentre demand is driving growth for fossil fuel-generated electricity.

Tech companies once pledged to be climate leaders, but that no longer rings true. Google promised to become net zero by 2030, but its greenhouse gas emissions leapt 48 per cent from 2019 to 2023 as it embraced gas-fired electricity for datacentres. In Mumbai, India, two coal plants due to close in 2024 have had their operational life extended to meet demand from Amazon datacentres. Last December, Irish authorities decided that datacentres can keep using fossil fuel electricity for six more years. The UK intends to burn gas to power over 100 planned new datacentres.

Fossil fuel corporations lobby for datacentres almost as hard as tech companies, because they help perpetuate a destructive business model otherwise threatened by the shift to renewables. Fossil fuel corporations were among Donald Trump’s top campaign backers, and they’re benefiting from his administration’s rollback of regulations and ambition to achieve ‘unchallenged global technological dominance’.

Water supplies are coming under greater strain. One large datacentre can use as much daily water as a town of 50,000 people, yet datacentres are being built in some of the world’s driest regions. Amazon plans to open new datacentres in Aragon, Spain, even as the regional government seeks European Union help for drought. Similar concerns surround plans for one of the world’s biggest datacentres in the United Arab Emirates.

Civil society resistance

The struggle against tech companies and their lobbying riches is an unequal one, but civil society is mounting an increasingly credible response.

Climate litigation is an established civil society tactic, and recent research indicates that lawsuits are an emerging response to datacentre developments, with recent examples in Ireland, the UK and the USA. Civil society groups are also filing objections in planning processes, including one recently lodged against a huge proposed datacentre in Cape Town, South Africa.

Legal action by two UK organisations forced the developer of a huge new datacentre in Buckinghamshire to commit to binding environmental impact mitigation measures. Lawsuits are also exposing how datacentre impacts are often understated and inadequately measured. A 2022 case forced Google to publish accurate water consumption figures for an Oregon datacentre.

Protests and campaigning are bringing successes. In 2023, protests driven by a recent drought forced Google to change plans for a datacentre to reduce water use in Uruguay. Similar protests in Chile caused Google to pause its plans. As of last year, public pressure had led to over US$42 billion worth of datacentre projects being changed, delayed or cancelled in Europe, and US$77 billion worth in the USA.

In the USA, civil society groups have forged alliances with sub-national administrations to develop stronger local environmental and accountability standards. While established politicians aren’t listening, there are signs that US local politics are shifting. Some candidates opposed to datacentres have won, and several local administrations have introduced bans or moratoriums.

Campaign successes are bringing new threats. US industry lobbyists have smeared activists as agents of foreign influence determined to sabotage the country’s technological supremacy. US government documents show a growing focus on what they call ‘anti-technological extremism’, suggesting that security forces may be gathering intelligence on campaigners, and peaceful protesters could be targeted for surveillance on national security grounds.

Tech companies that are driving datacentre development often present themselves as free speech champions. They should prove it by ensuring that wherever they develop, people are able to protest, and hold them to environmental standards. There’s widespread public opposition and no shortage of people bearing the climate and environmental costs of the datacentre boom. Their voices must be heard.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Elders meet with Danny Seidemann, founder of Terrestrial Jerusalem, to discuss the E1 settlement plan and Jerusalem’s holy sites. Credit: Maya Levin / the Elders

By the Elders
LONDON, Jul 20 2026 (IPS)

We have just concluded a visit to the West Bank, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. From all that we have witnessed and heard, our inescapable conclusion is that the government of Prime Minister Netanyahu, and in particular Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, aim to make Palestine disappear physically, economically, culturally and politically. Yet other governments either are choosing not to see this or lack the will to take meaningful concerted action.

While the population in Gaza is forcibly pushed into an ever-smaller pocket of land amid destruction and deplorable humanitarian conditions, annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem is occurring in plain sight. The Government of Israel’s systematic attacks on UNRWA are intended to de-legitimise the rights of Palestinian refugees. Hate speech and incitement to violence by ministers are dehumanising Palestinians and creating a dangerous enabling environment for ethnic cleansing to take root.

We have spoken to mothers, fathers and children who are living under occupation and whose lives and dignity are oppressed in every sense. This is a collective denial of humanity.

We refuse to abandon the vision of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples living alongside each other in mutual peace and security.

Self-determination is the right of Palestinians, but the current Government of Israel aims to deprive them of it permanently. Ultimately, occupation, annexation, and forced displacement leading to ethnic cleansing will also destroy the long-term prospects for Israel’s own peace and security.

We recognise that Israel has long-standing and legitimate security concerns. These have been heightened since the Hamas terror attacks of 7 October 2023 which we have unequivocally condemned.

Those concerns cannot be addressed through occupation and aggression, but only through inclusive political solutions and a genuine path to Palestinian self-determination. Many Israeli security experts share this view.

We are alarmed by the growing settler violence and the severe pressure on services provided by the Palestinian Authority – caused mainly by the Government of Israel’s unjustified withholding of Palestinian tax revenues. These are inflicting ever greater hardship on Palestinians.

Only two states living side by side in peace, with clearly negotiated borders and mutual recognition, can give security to Israelis and Palestinians alike. Peace depends on two-state security.

This will be possible only by stopping Israel’s actions and the impunity that facilitates them from the horrors of the genocide which has unfolded in Gaza and the ongoing annexation of the West Bank to the illegal US-Israeli war on Iran. The same applies to the IDF’s continuing military incursions into, and occupation of parts of Southern Lebanon: innocent civilians are being killed and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have been uprooted from their land.

International handwringing and regret will be of no value to Palestinian men, women, and children if the E1 settlement proceeds to cut through the West Bank and seals off East Jerusalem, or when the sustained deprivation and shrinking of Gaza – already one of the most densely populated areas of the world – renders normal life impossible.

We applaud the Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations which are shining a light on state-sanctioned abuses against Palestinian detainees. We welcome the growing criticism of settler terror attacks – often with the complicity of the IDF – against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.

When Israeli society at large recognises both the fundamental injustice of Israel’s nearly 60-year-long occupation of Palestinian territory and the Palestinians’ right to dignity and self-determination there can be a just and lasting peace.

The same message applies to Israel’s traditional partners and allies, particularly the European Union. We support the efforts of those EU Member States which are already proposing robust actions on trade and sanctions against Israel, including suspension of the trade pillar of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Most immediately, the EU must ban all trade with the West Bank settlements which it has long agreed are illegal. The EU has a responsibility to uphold international law; without taking decisive action it is complicit in these injustices.

The UN Security Council must act to ensure that the path forward is firmly grounded in international law.

Palestine must not disappear. Leaders must accept responsibility and act now.

Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and co-chair of the Taskforce on Justice

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Excerpt:

Credit: liujunrong/iStock by Getty Images - Source: IMF

By Jean-Marc Natal and Azim Sadikov
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 17 2026 (IPS)

The largest disruption to the global oil market in decades should have sent prices soaring. But after spiking at the start of the war in the Middle East, crude prices soon settled in a range of $90 to $100 per barrel, much lower than many had feared. Why didn’t prices climb higher? The answer is that a combination of factors helped cushion the initial blow. But much of that room has now been used up.

There are plenty of reasons why oil should have become cripplingly expensive. The war effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off some 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and refined products, a fifth of global consumption. Gulf producers redirected what they could. Saudi Arabia sent oil through its pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The United Arab Emirates pushed its Fujairah port, outside the strait, close to capacity. Even so, these workarounds offset only a fraction of lost Hormuz volumes.

Beyond crude, refined product output in the gulf region dropped significantly, hitting diesel and jet fuel hardest—products in which the region accounts for about 10 percent of global supply.

By the end of May, more than 1.1 billion barrels of crude—equivalent to about 10 days of typical global consumption—had not reached the market. At the same stage of the disruption, the shortfall exceeded those of the 1973 oil shock, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Gulf War.

Three shock absorbers

How did the global system absorb a disruption of this scale? In the days before the war, supply was running about 2 million barrels a day above demand, providing a head start. In the March-May period, three factors helped close the gap:

• Demand compression did the heavy lifting, especially in Asia, as higher prices reduced consumption and economies turned to alternatives such as coal and renewables. Transportation demand proved stickier though, in part because of fuel price caps, subsidies, and tax rebates that contained the impact—but at a fiscal cost.
• Production outside the Gulf rose more than expected, by nearly 2 million barrels a day above 2025 levels. The United States led the way, with Venezuela, Guyana, and Russia also raising production.
• Inventories did the rest. The estimated market deficit of about 4.0 million barrels a day in March–May was met almost entirely by drawing down global stocks, including commercial inventories in China and strategic reserves.

Recovery won’t be instant

Before the most recent escalation of tensions, the US-Iran framework agreement to reopen the strait sent prices sharply lower, in large part because stranded oil on tankers in the Gulf could rapidly return to the market. Still, much remains uncertain—including when freedom of navigation through the world’s most critical oil chokepoint will be effectively restored, and how quickly shipping, insurance, and operator confidence will follow.

Industry estimates suggest it will take two to three months before a significant share of oil flows can resume following a full reopening of the waterway. A longer-term concern is that prolonged production halts could cause permanent output losses, especially where financing to restart wells is scarce.

Whenever supply begins to recover, the oil deficit will close only gradually, drawing inventories closer to operational minimums—the level below which the physical system itself begins to bind.

Lessons for policymakers

Energy shocks still bite. What cushioned the initial blow this time is that energy markets had room to maneuver and absorb it. As tensions flare again in the Strait of Hormuz, that room is now smaller and shrinking further as spare capacity has been deployed, demand has compressed, and inventories have been drawn down. Unless inventories are replenished, the world will start from a weaker position when the next shock comes.

For policymakers, three lessons stand out:

• Inventories matter. Rebuilding them is essential to prepare for future shocks.
• A single chokepoint leaves the global economy heavily exposed. Diversifying energy sources—including renewables—is as important as diversifying routes.
• Support to consumers should be targeted to the most vulnerable and temporary to protect government budgets and the price signals that encourage energy saving and efficiency.

Energy markets’ flexibility and prompt policy actions bought the global economy time. An enduring US-Iran agreement would create an opening to restore supply. But significant efforts are still critically needed to increase the resilience and diversification of energy supply and prevent oil shocks from destabilizing the global economy.

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An Indigenous community leader, Jackeline Mendoza Díaz, addresses participants during the webinar “Gold’s Dark Web: The Hidden Price of a Booming Market” on June 25, speaking about the devastating impacts of illegal and poorly regulated gold mining on Indigenous lands, forests and local communities. The webinar brought together community leaders, investigators, civil society organisations, financial experts and policymakers to discuss how soaring gold prices are accelerating environmental destruction, organised crime and human rights abuses. Credit: FERN

By Kizito Makoye
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Jul 17 2026 (IPS)

The sweltering heat inside a London conference hall did not deter Indigenous leader Jackeline Mendoza Díaz from condemning the sheer destruction of the Peruvian Amazon. Her voice occasionally trembled with emotion but delivered a strong message — painting a picture far removed from the glittering gold bars traded in the world’s financial capitals.

Behind the rising price of gold, she said, lie poisoned rivers, razed forests and Indigenous communities jostling to defend their ancestral lands from the rising wave of illegal mining.

In her Asháninka community, she said, rivers that once sustained life no longer provide edible fish. Women trek for hours searching for clean water, while community leaders who speak out against encroachment increasingly do so at personal risk.

“Our rivers are being contaminated with mercury. When the rivers are contaminated, the fish become contaminated as well, and we indigenous people depend on these rivers for our survival,” Díaz told participants during a webinar that brought together Indigenous leaders, environmental advocates, investigators, bankers and policymakers to discuss the growing crisis of illicit gold.

Her testimony offered a glimpse into a global phenomenon that experts say is accelerating, as gold prices fuel environmental destruction, organized crime and corruption across continents

Behind the soaring value of gold lies a darker reality, visible in remote forests, fragile river systems and marginalised communities globally.

A recent report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) warns that illicit gold has become one of the world’s most consequential criminal markets, functioning as an “accelerant economy” that fuels conflict, corruption, environmental crime and organised criminal networks worldwide.

The report says rising gold prices have enabled criminals to control entire supply chains.

For nearby communities, the consequences are dire.

“We are defenders of the forests and defenders of life. Yet because of this, Indigenous defenders are often attacked, and many of us are even killed for protecting our people, our territories and our way of life,” said Diaz.

Forests Falling, Rivers Dying

In Ghana, where illegal mining has become a national crisis, environmental campaigner Daryl Bosu described a country caught up in a moral dilemma to balance the worth of the precious metal with environmental woes.

“Ghana is Africa’s largest gold producer, and gold remains one of the most important pillars of our economy,” Bosu said. “However, alongside these economic benefits, we have witnessed an alarming increase in illegal and poorly regulated mining activities.”

The environmental consequences, he warned, have been severe.

“Many of our forest reserves have suffered extensive degradation. Rivers and water bodies that serve millions of people have become heavily polluted.”

Across gold-producing regions, forests are rapidly being cleared to dig mining pits, roads and processing kilns. Once mining begins, toxic substances often contaminate rivers and groundwater aquifers.

According to the GI-TOC report, illicit gold mining frequently paves the way for illegal logging, wildlife trafficking and land grabbing. Dirty money is increasingly being invested in cattle ranching that destroys critical forest ecosystems.

Mercury’s Silent Toll

While deforestation often captures public attention, experts say mercury pollution remains one of the most devastating but least visible consequences of artisanal and small-scale gold mining.

Speaking exclusively to IPS during the recent Global Environment Facility (GEF) Assembly in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, warned that mercury contamination continues to threaten millions of people living in mining communities.

“Mercury contamination does not stop at the mining site,” Stankiewicz told IPS.

“It enters rivers and ecosystems, affecting fish, soil and water sources locally.”

For families dependent on fishing and farming, the consequences can be profound.

“Reduced food safety and food security, loss of income from contaminated natural resources, and long-term degradation of ecosystems they depend on,” she explained.

Mercury exposure can trigger neurological damage, memory loss, tremors, respiratory illnesses and reproductive health complications. Children are particularly vulnerable.

The impacts extend far beyond mining sites themselves.

Mercury released into the environment can travel vast distances through atmospheric circulation. Indigenous communities in the Arctic, for example, are experiencing mercury contamination despite having no mercury-intensive mining activities in their territories.

Following the Money

Yet environmental damage represents only one side of the illicit gold equation.

Several participants stressed that illicit gold is fundamentally a financial crime issue.

Julia Yansura, programme director, Environmental Crime & Illicit Finance, FACT Coalition, said billions of dollars earned through environmentally damaging mining activities continue to enter legitimate financial systems without scrutiny.

“What we are discussing today is not merely an environmental issue,” she said. “It is also a financial crime issue.”

Traditional responses have focused heavily on police raids and military operations targeting miners.

But according to Yansura, such interventions often fail because they focus on low-level actors while leaving intact the financial networks that sustain illegal mining.

“A more effective approach would focus on following the money,” she said.

The GI-TOC report supports that assessment, warning that criminals increasingly control entire gold supply chains.

The report also identifies growing use of cryptocurrencies and gold-backed stablecoins as emerging mechanisms for laundering illicit proceeds outside traditional anti-money laundering frameworks.

London’s Hidden Role

Much of the webinar focused on the responsibilities of major financial centres.

A coalition of 35 civil society organisations has urged governments gathering at the UK Illicit Finance Summit to recognise that gold has evolved beyond a commodity into what they describe as a strategic vehicle for organised crime, sanctions evasion and corruption.

The coalition notes that London remains the world’s largest over-the-counter gold trading hub, handling approximately 70 percent of global OTC gold trading volumes.

Because illicit gold frequently passes through multiple countries and refineries before reaching financial markets, campaigners argue that financial centres can no longer treat illegal mining as a problem confined to producer countries.

“The solution cannot come only from mining countries,” Yansura said. “It must also come from the financial centres where profits are ultimately laundered and legitimated.”

The coalition is calling for mandatory due diligence requirements, stronger beneficial ownership transparency, enhanced scrutiny of gold traders and robust anti-money laundering obligations across the entire gold supply chain.

A Crisis Outpacing Regulation

Sophia Pickles of the GI-TOC warned that existing international frameworks have failed to contain the evolving nature of illicit gold markets.

“There has undoubtedly been progress,” she acknowledged. “However, our recent research shows that criminal activity linked to gold mining is expanding.”

According to the GI-TOC report, voluntary responsible sourcing standards are insufficient against increasingly sophisticated criminal networks. Information gaps, weak customs oversight and opaque financial transactions continue to provide opportunities for illicit gold to enter legitimate markets.

Researchers argue that current approaches remain too narrowly focused on artisanal mining and conflict zones while overlooking broader vulnerabilities embedded throughout global supply chains.

Among the report’s key recommendations are legally binding due diligence requirements, stronger oversight of international bullion centres, mandatory transparency measures and enhanced scrutiny of financial institutions.

Searching for Solutions

Despite the scale of the challenge, Stankiewicz believes progress is possible.

Under the Minamata Convention, countries with significant artisanal and small-scale gold mining sectors are required to develop national action plans aimed at reducing mercury use and protecting communities.

The results, she says, are encouraging.

Countries are increasingly adopting mercury-free technologies, strengthening regulations and formalising parts of the mining sector.

Beyond the Gold Rush

As the webinar drew to an end, panellists emphasised that illicit gold is not just a mining issue but an environmental, health, governance, human rights and financial crime crisis.

For Mendoza Díaz and communities living on the edge of gold extraction, the message was crystal clear.

“We are not just defending our land and our territories; we are defending life itself and our ecosystem.”

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the launch of the preliminary report from the UN Independent Panel on AI. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 16 2026 (IPS)

As the international community continues to weigh the good, the bad and the deadly in artificial intelligence (AI), which is spreading far and wide with apparently no guardrails, the United Nations is taking a closer look at the impact, both positive and negative, of AI.

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said last week that “the technology is heightening the danger, with sophisticated and increasingly autonomous new weaponry, including drones, able to inflict massive harm on populations.”

The new weapons, particularly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as drones, seem to be a new wave of killing machines in recent conflicts, including the US vs. Iran, Israel vs. Palestine and Lebanon, and Russia vs. Israel, plus scores of civil wars in Africa and Asia.

Simon Adams, Professor of Human Rights at Murdoch University in Australia and former President and CEO of the Center for Victims of Torture—a leading international human rights and humanitarian NGO—told Inter Press Service no country in the world has openly admitted to deploying a weapon that is completely autonomous in the sense of killing humans without a person also being involved in the decision-making process.

“But there are already a number of powerful states—including several that sit around the table at the UN Security Council—who are increasingly dependent on drones, robots and AI systems to fight wars for them. Algorithms are choosing bombing targets and are already responsible for killing civilians in some major conflict zones.”

AI has the potential to improve the lives of billions of people on this planet. It would be a moral failing of epic proportions and a global tragedy if AI were harnessed to innovate new ways for humans to outsource the dirty work of waging war to robots, he said.

“Killer robots are a horror that belongs in science fiction. There is nothing more sinister than outsourcing killing and warfighting to emotionless, faceless machines that will select which humans get to live or die. Lethal autonomous weapons systems are ethically indefensible and should be illegal. We need a global ban before it is too late.”

Guterres has also reiterated his call to have them banned by international law, adding that some decisions must remain forever human, none more than taking a human life.

David Swanson, campaign coordinator for RootsAction, told IPS dozens of national governments have already stated their support for banning autonomous weapons, and dozens of others expressed their inclination to support such a ban.

So, a treaty could be established among those nations, on the model of the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and then work could be done to add more nations to it. The initial signers and ratifiers would be the small and medium nations with the most willingness to defy the will of the U.S. government.

This banning of a particular type of weapon would ignore, as does the TPNW, the existence of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which requires disarmament of all weapons. It would also fail to address the morally repugnant act of ordering a young person, on pain of severe punishment, to press a button that sends a missile into people thousands of miles away—an act of dubious moral superiority to setting loose fully autonomous killer robots, he declared.

“But the biggest denier of reality in all of this is the U.S. government, which pioneered drone wars, was widely warned that it would not like the results when other nations followed suit, went on to suffer huge damage from foreign drones in places like the Persian Gulf during the current war on Iran, and altered its agenda not one iota. As guns sometimes appear to have more rights within the United States than children do, all forms of weaponry seem to be treated as deserving first consideration in U.S. foreign policy’,” he said

According to the New York Times of July 13, for decades Western governments have ordered supplies like tanks, fighter jets and submarines from contractors such as Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman—items that take years to deliver and are dizzyingly expensive: an F-35 jet can run to over $100 million.

“But the current trend is clear: defense technology is becoming cheaper and nimbler, with breakthroughs developed by privately funded companies rather than governments,” says an article authored by Vivienne Walt.

Of the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion budget request by the current US administration for next year, about $55 billion is earmarked for the creation of a new unmanned, AI-powered arsenal.

Singling out a more positive non-military use of drones, the Times said last month that Sri Lanka, faced with one of the worst outbreaks of dengue fever in years, is using military drones to scan rooftops and find mosquito breeding grounds to eliminate them. The country’s air force has been routinely flying drones over high-rise buildings to identify breeding sites.

Nick Mottern, co-coordinator of the Weaponized Drone Ban Treaty Campaign, told IPS: “We are calling for a treaty to remove all weapons from drones, rather than to ban drones controlled autonomously by AI.

This is because all militaries will claim that there will always be a human in ultimate control of AI-augmented drones in spite of the fact that the drone will identify targets using AI, select weapons using AI, and present a human with all elements of the decision to kill using AI.

A treaty banning weapons on drones is the only way to stop the drone tsunami, he declared

Speaking at the First Global Dialogue on AI Governance in early July, Guterres said the world faced more than 120 conflicts in 2025.

Conflicts are becoming more protracted, more complex, and more interconnected, he pointed out. “We see widespread violations of international law and a growing sense of impunity. Technology is heightening the danger, with sophisticated — and increasingly autonomous — new weaponry, including drones, able to inflict massive harm on populations.”

“And online hate speech, misinformation and disinformation are spread and amplified in an instant. Too often, early warning signs are ignored. And responses are often a little too late.”

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The WHO-led Women’s Integrated Cancer Services Program; the pilot programs were first implemented in Kenya in the Bungoma and Nyandarua counties. Credit: WHO/Yasin Abdullahi

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 15 2026 (IPS)

One in five people will be diagnosed with cancer in their lifetime, and when the emotional and physical toll on close family members is factored in, an estimated 92 percent of people globally will be affected by cancer at least once in their lifetime. This staggering statistic is the centerpiece of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s latest global report on cancer.

The Global Status Report on Cancer 2026, published in July 8 in conjunction with the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), is the most comprehensive cancer assessment to date and provides an in-depth analysis of the current global status of cancer care and prevention. The report also paints an alarming picture of persistent and widening inequities in prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and care.

WHO estimates that cancer claimed nearly 10 million lives in 2024 (over 26,000 lives every day), along with 20.6 million new diagnoses globally. Without urgent and accelerated action, annual cancer cases are projected to rise to 35 million by 2050, said Stephane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General on July 8. Furthermore, the steepest increases in cancer cases are projected to disproportionately burden low-and-middle-income countries (LMICS), with a 133 percent increase in cancer incidence rates in low-income countries and an 86.5 percent increase in lower-middle-income countries by 2050.

The report highlighted the deep global inequities in cancer survival rates. In high-income countries, the five-year net survival rate for breast cancer exceeds 85 percent, while, in low-income countries it drops below 45 percent. For childhood leukemia, only 54 percent of countries have reached the 60 percent five-year survival rate that WHO’s Global Institute for Childhood Cancer set as the minimum target. Furthermore, there are stark regional differences, with some African and Eastern Mediterranean countries falling at only 19 percent, and some South-East Asian countries at 26 percent.

The regional disparities are highlighted by the report’s statement that “our experience of [cancer] and chances of surviving now depend less on the stage or biology of our disease than on where we live and our economic circumstances.” A primary driver of these inequities is limited treatment capabilities and infrastructure in LMICs. For example, 23 LMICs lack any active radiation facilities, resulting in over 197 million people without local access to any critical radiation treatment. Furthermore, even when facilities exist in LMICs, they are chronically unreliable and subject to downtime, high operating costs, limited local maintenance expertise, and delays in importing parts.

While the physical and emotional health effects of cancer are astronomical, the financial consequences for families are just as devastating. Approximately 45–60 percent of people diagnosed with cancer experience catastrophic health expenditure, leading to impoverishment, food insecurity, and disrupted education for the children and siblings of cancer patients. Even in countries that have universal health coverage, the indirect costs of cancer are detrimental, and female caregivers experience greater consequences for their employment and productivity than men.

Throughout the report, prevention is highlighted as the most important yet underused tool for reducing cancer incidence rates. In 2022, 38 percent of cancer cases were attributed to 30 modifiable risk factors, with tobacco use, infections, alcohol consumption, and excess body weight as the primary factors. However, only 30 percent of national cancer control plans incorporate evidence-based cancer prevention interventions.

The WHO outlined three strategic shifts to help shape the future of cancer control: better capabilities, better protections, and better value. These shifts are anchored in a person-centered cancer agenda that is shaped by lived experience. Cancer care needs stronger governance and financing that is centered around investing in human resources. Globally, there needs to be a primary focus on prevention through early detection and equitable access to diagnosis and treatment. Outcomes must be focused not just on survival but also on function and quality of life.

The report concluded, “the primary gap is no longer a gap in knowledge, but a gap between what we know and what we do, between what we plan and what we implement.” WHO Director-General, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, emphasized that the path forward for cancer care “must be shaped by more than data and scientific research; they must also reflect the voices and lived experiences of people impacted by the disease.”

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Pride Parade participants march on the Elisabeth bridge in Budapest, Hungary on 27 June 2026. Credit: Attila Kisbenedek/AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 15 2026 (IPS)

On the morning of 28 June, riot police sealed off Taksim Square with iron barriers and enforced bans on all weekend gatherings in Istanbul. Marchers pressed ahead anyway, re-emerging from side streets each time police dispersed them. By the end of the day police had detained at least 50 people, including a journalist. It was Istanbul Pride’s 24th edition, and the 12th year running that the authorities banned it outright.

Homosexuality is not illegal in Turkey, so the state cannot prosecute people for who they are. Instead, it punishes them for making themselves visible. Authorities ban marches on ‘public morality’ grounds, block access to the social media accounts of LGBTQI+ organisations and put activists on trial for ‘obscenity’.

The pattern repeats in country after country. For a movement that spent decades making progress in winning recognition of rights, this Pride season tells a story of regression. A concerted backlash is clawing back territory once claimed, and Pride has again become a protest.

Much of the current wave of regression is a direct response to the gains LGBTQI+ movements made over previous decades. Anti-discrimination laws, recognition of equal marriage rights and growing public visibility have given opponents a clear target to mobilise against, and governments under economic or political pressure have found a convenient scapegoat in the LGBTQI+ community.

Authoritarian and populist leaders, facing discontent over corruption, inflation and unemployment, redirect public anger towards a minority that can be attacked without political cost, while conservative religious institutions find in opposition to LGBTQI+ rights, and particularly trans rights, a rallying cause that restores their claim to define society’s moral order. The result is a mutually reinforcing alliance between political power and religious conservatism, dressed up as the defence of children, the family and national identity.

Existence criminalised

A growing number of states are going further, criminalising not only LGBTQI+ people’s visibility but their very existence. Four West African states have criminalised consensual same-sex relations in the past two years, framing their move as a defence of national sovereignty against western influence. Mali’s military government criminalised homosexuality in December 2024 and Burkina Faso’s junta followed in September 2025. Niger’s new penal code, adopted last month, imposes punishment of up to 20 years in prison. Within weeks, media reported at least 40 arrests, the suspension of HIV prevention services and people fleeing the country.

Electoral democracies aren’t immune. In Senegal, parliament doubled the maximum sentence for ‘unnatural acts’ to 10 years in March, and over 300 ‘suspected homosexuals’ have reportedly been arrested in the past few months. Ghana’s parliament passed a bill imposing jail sentences on anyone who identifies as LGBTQI+ and requiring people to report prohibited activities to the authorities. President John Mahama has yet to sign it into law, but the debate about the bill has already fuelled a rise in blackmail, evictions and workplace discrimination.

The model is Uganda’s 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, which includes the death penalty for ‘aggravated homosexuality’ and punishes the vaguely defined crime of ‘promoting’ homosexuality with up to 20 years in prison.

All these laws, marketed as a rejection of foreign interference and imported values, have been promoted with foreign money. US-based conservative groups such as the American Center for Law and Justice and Family Watch International have played a key role in funding anti-rights advocacy. Days after passing its bill, Ghana’s parliament hosted the African Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Family Values and Sovereignty, a platform with documented ties to those groups that has promoted Uganda’s law as a template for the continent.

Consensus in retreat

US anti-rights groups have their president’s ear. Since returning to office, Donald Trump has signed a series of executive orders rolling back federal protections, particularly targeting transgender people. Private companies heard the message. Major events including NYC Pride and San Francisco Pride lost sponsors in 2025, and Tampa Pride had to cancel its 2026 parade.

For years, activist groups such as New York’s Reclaim Pride Coalition accused corporations of pinkwashing, that is, turning Pride into a corporate vehicle without advancing demands for rights. Many sponsors are now gone, but for the wrong reasons. Whatever its motives, sponsorship functioned as a seal of approval from mainstream institutions. Money withdrawn out of political fear takes with it more than event budgets; it erodes a social consensus that took decades to build.

Marching for those who can’t

In this context, the year’s biggest marches have become acts of political defiance. A million people marched in São Paulo under the theme ‘The street summons, the ballot box confirms’, ahead of Brazil’s October general election. In Bangkok, an all-time record half a million people marched a year after Thailand’s marriage equality law took effect, a testament to what legal recognition can do for a community’s visibility.

On 27 June, tens of thousands joined the 31st Budapest Pride, the first held since voters removed the right-wing populist government that repeatedly banned it. Organisers are treating this as a starting point, pressing the new government with a list of 14 demands that begins with repealing a 2021 ‘anti-LGBT propaganda’ law the European Union’s top court has ruled incompatible with equality and human dignity. Hungary shows that change is possible after all.

In places like Indonesia, Iraq, Niger and Uganda, among many more, there’s no Pride march to ban, because holding one is unthinkable. Even private organising now risks prosecution. In those places, people are looking outward, hoping that a crowd marching freely somewhere else will march for them too. That’s the duty of Pride season for those still free to gather: to mobilise both for themselves and for the many being forced to hide who they are.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Trump insists the West must unite on his terms against the Rest, particularly China and Iran. Europe, however, wants greater Trump support for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime to replace Putin’s leadership of Russia.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

After Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich appeal for Western unity based on shared race, culture and imperial history, this appears to have been a European effort to strengthen its alliance with the US.

The unsubstantiated charge of Chinese military support to Russia against Ukraine, a claim never corroborated by Kyiv, is expected to worsen relations between Europe and China.

Portraying China as a strategic threat to Europe justifies greater belligerence against Beijing. It no longer seems to matter that China has never endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, China retains strong ties with Kyiv, calling for a ceasefire and political settlement, while repeatedly offering to mediate between the warring neighbours.

The G7summit of the seven largest rich economies in late June followed the EU in trying to consolidate Western strategic solidarity against Russia, China and Iran.

With financial crises from 1997 threatening G7 legitimacy, then US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers initiated the G20. But the recently expanded G7 role marginalises the more inclusive but less amenable G20.

Nurina Malek

More Chinese goods have entered European markets, with prices and quality that most others cannot match. For years, Western leaders happily enabled this by liberalising trade, appreciating cheap Chinese imports, for keeping inflation low.

After decades of state-encouraged investment, China’s still growing industrial capacity now supplies the world, enabled by Western-drafted WTO rules.

Before Trump 2.0, Washington had imposed investment restrictions, Section 301 measures, sanctions, tariffs and more following Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. Facing less US market access, more Chinese exports have gone elsewhere.

European industry can no longer compete, even where it once led. Instead of neoliberal WTO trade liberalisation, EU protectionism supposedly ‘levels the playing field’.

US advisers increasingly warn European officials that China’s industrial ‘overcapacity’ will soon scale up the ‘China shock’ in most industrially significant supply chains.

China now refines and processes most of the world’s ‘rare earth’ minerals, exercising near-monopsonistic leverage over suppliers by processing at scale at much lower cost.

With China successfully countering Trump’s trade policies, Western leaders worry Beijing will abuse its near-monopolistic control of rare earth elements, which downstream industries need.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that New York and London rare earth market reactions indicate major institutional investors view recent developments as significant.

G7 vs China
Protecting European industry, labour and economic sovereignty is now constrained by the rules Western leaders put in place over decades, often coordinated by the OECD.

Splits inside the EU soon extended beyond commercial faultlines to ostensible strategic interests defined by the fluid geopolitics after the first Cold War.

German car exports to China have been superseded by Chancellor Metz’s military Keynesianism, in line with Trump’s demand for NATO allies to spend much more on the military to greatly strengthen Western military power and global dominance.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier push for unaligned European ‘strategic autonomy’ has given way to a NATO+ strategic view embracing Western imperialism.

Meanwhile, smaller EU member states remain cautious, fearing the collateral effects of new Western ambitions, such as Chinese restrictions on imports that Europe depends on.

Great power rivalry
With the Iran war refusing to fade from daily headlines despite Trump’s on-off-on ceasefire, other myths are also evaporating. Few still believe Israel will accept a ‘two-state solution’ or that peace will prevail between trading partners.

NATO, OECD, G7, EU and other such arrangements have become variable links in the hegemonic US-led bloc. Such coalitions – including Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan – were never seamless together or fully fit-for-purpose.

Trump expects unilateral US aggression against Washington’s chosen enemies must be fully supported and subsidised by NATO allies, with reluctance deemed disloyal, even antagonistic.

Countries not aligned with the major poles may be alternatively courted and coerced by rival poles, especially by the affluent West. Cooperation among others may be seen and portrayed as proof of the existence of an antagonistic bloc.

Multiple poles are likely to coalesce into the West versus the Rest, competing for support and influence, as those courted try to gain from their suitors.

With reduced government engagement and less sustained inter-state cooperation and order, disruptions in an increasingly anarchic world economy have required governments to prioritise resilience as businesses, consumers and labour face rising costs.

As the US and its allies weaponise economic rules and arrangements to discipline both friends and foes, the world economy is slowing unevenly as prices rise sporadically.

The US-Israel war on Iran underscores how current conflicts can develop in unpredictable ways as states and other significant non-state ‘actors’ innovate strategically in unexpected conditions.

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A conceptual illustration of the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly at Castel Gandolfo, where Nobel laureates, AI experts, religious leaders and civil society representatives will confront the intertwined risks of artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons and war while seeking a new architecture for peace. Credit: INPS Japan

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
VATICAN CITY, Jul 13 2026 (IPS)

More than eight decades after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered humanity into the nuclear age, the world is confronting another technological revolution whose consequences extend far beyond science and industry.

Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on AI and Nuclear War

Against this backdrop, more than 200 participants — including around 30 Nobel laureates and representatives of Nobel Prize-winning organizations, former heads of state and government, leading artificial intelligence researchers, scientists, Catholic figures and civil society representatives — are set to gather from July 14 to 16 at Borgo Laudato Si’ in the Pontifical Gardens of Castel Gandolfo.

The Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War will bring together some of the world’s most prominent voices in science, technology, peacebuilding and ethics to consider one of the defining questions of the twenty-first century:

Can artificial intelligence become a force for peace, or will it deepen the dangers of war in an already unstable nuclear age?

The three-day gathering will conclude in Rome on July 16 with the presentation of the Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace, intended to set out principles and recommendations for addressing artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons, digital governance and emerging models of technological development.

Source: Progressive Hub

The timing of the Assembly is no coincidence.

The international security environment has become increasingly fragile. Russia’s war in Ukraine has shaken Europe’s post-Cold War security order. Conflicts in the Middle East have heightened fears of wider regional escalation. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated, while nuclear rhetoric has returned to international politics with an intensity not seen for decades.

At the same time, all nine nuclear-armed states are modernizing or expanding their arsenals. Many of the arms-control arrangements that once helped manage strategic rivalry have weakened, expired or become politically paralyzed. Channels of communication among adversaries have narrowed, increasing the danger of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

Artificial intelligence is entering this volatile environment at extraordinary speed.

AI systems can already process vast quantities of intelligence, identify patterns, assist military planning, strengthen cyber capabilities and accelerate decisions that once required hours or days of human deliberation. They may eventually provide new tools for crisis prevention, verification and early warning.

But those same capabilities could also make crises more dangerous.

Artificial intelligence may shorten the time available to political and military leaders during emergencies. It may generate unreliable or misleading assessments, magnify disinformation, increase the vulnerability of command systems to cyberattacks and encourage states to delegate more authority to automated technologies.

A conceptual illustration of world leaders confronting the growing influence of artificial intelligence on military power and nuclear decision-making, as technological advances threaten to outpace political judgment and international governance. Credit: INPS Japan

The central concern is not necessarily that a machine will independently decide to launch a nuclear weapon. The more immediate danger is that AI-generated information, predictions or recommendations could influence human decision-makers during moments of extreme pressure, when information is incomplete and the consequences of error are irreversible.

Humanity is therefore confronting a challenge unlike any it has faced before.

The question is no longer simply how nuclear weapons should be controlled. It is also how the relationship between artificial intelligence, military power and nuclear decision-making should be governed before technological developments outpace political judgment.

Pope Leo XIV, photographed in October 2025 during an audience with President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the Vatican Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The choice of the Vatican as host is deeply symbolic.

The Holy See commands no nuclear arsenal and exercises little conventional military power. Yet it maintains diplomatic relations with most of the world’s states and has long sought to place human dignity, moral responsibility and the protection of civilians at the center of debates about war and peace.

The Assembly is being held at Borgo Laudato Si’, an educational and ecological center established in the gardens of the papal residence at Castel Gandolfo. According to the organizers, the meeting is inspired by Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica humanitas, devoted to the protection of the human person in the age of artificial intelligence.

Its guiding vision — an “Unarmed and Disarming Peace” — suggests a concept of peace that goes beyond the absence of war.

An unarmed peace rejects the assumption that security can be permanently sustained through ever-greater military force. A disarming peace seeks not only the reduction of weapons but also the transformation of the political fears, rivalries and economic structures that perpetuate militarization.

This approach broadens the discussion beyond questions of technological safety.

It asks what kind of society humanity wishes to build as increasingly powerful systems reshape politics, economics, communication and warfare. It also raises a deeper ethical question: whether innovation will remain subordinate to human dignity, or whether human beings will gradually be subordinated to the technologies they create.

Beyond Governments

Perhaps the Assembly’s most significant feature is its recognition that governments alone can no longer govern all the technologies shaping the future.

During the Cold War, nuclear diplomacy belonged primarily to states. Agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were negotiated among governments because states controlled nuclear arsenals, delivery systems and the materials needed to build them.

Artificial intelligence presents a fundamentally different reality.

Many of the world’s most advanced AI systems are being developed by private companies, universities and research laboratories. Technology firms possess computing resources, data and specialized expertise that rival or exceed the capacities of many governments. Decisions made inside corporate research divisions can have global political, social and security consequences.

Effective governance will therefore require more than traditional diplomacy.

It will require sustained cooperation among states, technology companies, scientists, universities, international institutions, religious communities and civil society.

That is precisely why the Assembly will bring together Nobel laureates, AI companies, leading universities and research institutions, nuclear disarmament organizations, Catholic figures centered around the Vatican, and civil society organizations, including Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist-based movement engaged in peacebuilding, dialogue and nuclear abolition.

Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War

Participants and supporting institutions include representatives associated with OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Anthropic and AARU, as well as the Nobel Women’s Initiative, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the Yunus Center and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Universities and research institutions from Europe, Asia, North America and Australia are also expected to take part.

The significance of this gathering lies not simply in the prominence of those attending, but in the diversity of the communities represented.

Instead of relying exclusively on governments, the Assembly reflects an emerging model of global governance in which science, technology, ethics, religion and civil society seek common ground in addressing shared existential risks.

From Warheads to Algorithms

For much of the nuclear age, arms-control negotiations focused on physical objects: warheads, missiles, bombers, submarines, nuclear materials and testing facilities.

The AI age introduces a different set of challenges.

Algorithms are less visible than missiles. Software can be modified rapidly. Data can cross national borders almost instantaneously. Commercial systems developed for peaceful purposes can also have military applications. Verification, accountability and transparency become far more difficult when the relevant technologies are embedded in code, networks and privately controlled computing infrastructure.

This means that future arms-control and security frameworks may need to govern not only weapons but also the digital systems that inform, guide or accelerate their use.

Questions that once appeared theoretical are becoming increasingly urgent.

Should artificial intelligence ever be integrated into nuclear command-and-control systems? What level of human oversight must be maintained over autonomous weapons? How should states respond when AI systems produce conflicting warnings during a crisis? Can private technology companies be held accountable when their products are adapted for military purposes? And what international institutions are capable of establishing credible safeguards?

The Assembly cannot resolve all these questions in three days.

But by placing nuclear experts, Nobel laureates, AI developers, scholars, religious figures and peace advocates in the same forum, it may help establish a common vocabulary for debates that have until now often taken place in isolation from one another.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, signed 20 September 2017 by 50 United Nations member states. Credit: UN Photo / Paulo Filgueiras

History suggests that humanity has repeatedly responded to existential threats by creating new ideas, institutions and norms.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 warned that nuclear weapons had placed the survival of the human species in jeopardy. The first Pugwash Conference in 1957 opened channels of communication among scientists divided by the Cold War. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty later became the central framework of the international nuclear order.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017, further strengthened the humanitarian and moral challenge to nuclear deterrence by declaring nuclear weapons incompatible with international humanitarian principles.

Whether the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly will eventually be regarded as part of that historical lineage remains uncertain.

Declarations issued at international conferences rarely transform policy overnight. They may lack legal force, enforcement mechanisms or immediate political support. Their language can be aspirational, and their influence may not become visible for years.

Yet declarations can also change the terms of international debate.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto did not eliminate nuclear weapons, but it helped inspire a movement. The first Pugwash meeting did not end the Cold War, but it established relationships that later contributed to arms-control diplomacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not initially binding, yet it became a foundational reference for international law and political legitimacy.

The importance of the Rome Declaration may therefore depend less on whether it produces immediate agreements than on whether it begins a sustained process involving governments, technology companies, universities, international organizations and civil society.

The larger question is whether it can help create norms before dangerous practices become entrenched.

Looking Toward the Rome Declaration

Palazzo Senatorio　Credit: Di Tournasol7 – Opera propria, CC BY-SA 4.0

The document is intended to address the age of artificial intelligence, nuclear and autonomous weapons, new digital protocols and emerging models of digital development. According to the organizers, it will seek to promote international security based on cooperation, human dignity, integral development and peace among peoples.

The critical test will be whether the Declaration moves beyond broad ethical appeals.

Will it call for meaningful human control over nuclear and autonomous weapons systems? Will it propose restrictions on the role of AI in nuclear decision-making? Will it outline responsibilities for private AI companies? Will it recommend new international monitoring, dialogue or verification mechanisms? And will it establish a continuing process capable of translating principles into policy?

The answers will determine whether the meeting remains primarily symbolic or becomes the starting point of a broader “Rome Process” on artificial intelligence, nuclear risk and human security.

More than eight decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humanity once again faces technologies capable of reshaping the future of civilization.

Nuclear weapons remain the most immediate means by which human beings could destroy their own societies. Artificial intelligence, meanwhile, is beginning to influence the speed, complexity and character of the decisions that could determine whether those weapons are ever used.

The defining challenge is therefore no longer simply whether humanity can control nuclear arms.

It is whether humanity can build institutions capable of ensuring that artificial intelligence strengthens human judgment rather than displacing it, reduces the danger of catastrophic error rather than magnifying it, and serves peace rather than war.

The answer will not emerge from three days of deliberation at Castel Gandolfo.

But the conversation beginning there may help shape international debates over technology, security and human responsibility for years to come.

Credit: UN photo

INPS Japan will report from Castel Gandolfo and Rome during the Assembly and will publish follow-up analysis after the Rome Declaration is presented on July 16. This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

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Security Council. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Shihana Mohamed
NEW YORK, Jul 13 2026 (IPS)

As the United Nations (UN) Security Council prepares for its first round of closed-door straw polls this month to select the tenth Secretary-General, the organization stands at a critical crossroads. Multilateralism is fracturing under geopolitical gridlock, and the UN is battling a severe budgetary deficit driven by funding cuts.

Yet the gravest threat to the institution is not financial; it is cultural. To regain the trust of the global public, the UN urgently needs a radical transformation of its organizational culture, beginning with the selection of candidates for its highest office—the post of UN Secretary-General. This requires dismantling entrenched nepotism, cronyism, patronage, and quid pro quo practices in recruitment, promotion and appointment, and replacing them with a culture grounded in merit, integrity, transparency, and gender equity.

Patronage Becomes Institutional Norm

The history of the Secretary-Generalship and senior leadership is marked by allegations and documented cases of favouritism that have undermined the UN’s professed values of merit and equity. During the tenure of former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, concerns were raised about the employment of his son-in-law within the UN system, prompting debate over perceived favouritism, though the appointment was defended on merit grounds. Under Kofi Annan, the Oil-for-Food Programme scandal exposed widespread corruption, bribery, and serious administrative failures.

Such controversies are not confined to the highest levels of leadership. Allegations of politicized staffing and patronage have periodically surfaced across the UN system, highlighting a persistent gap between the organization’s principles and internal realities.

What begins as an exception at the executive level can become embedded practice throughout UN agencies and departments. Mid-level managers often replicate these patterns by shaping job descriptions, tailoring interview panels, sharing interview materials, and influencing or “fixing” vacancies for preferred candidates. In such an environment, backdoor recruitment risks becoming normalized rather than exceptional.

The result is a damaging paradox: while the UN publicly champions fairness, equal opportunity, and transparency, its internal systems often operate through favoritism, personal connections, and exclusion. Talented staff without access to influential networks face limited advancement, while better-connected but less qualified individuals may benefit from patronage, eroding institutional credibility, staff morale, and public trust.

The 2026 Secretary-General Race Under Scrutiny

Even in the current selection process for the next Secretary-General, concerns about institutional fairness persist. Accountability investigations by independent watchdog groups have raised questions about the presence of family members of candidate Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, across Vienna- and Rome-based UN agencies. By contrast, candidates such as Michelle Bachelet, Rebeca Grynspan, and María Fernanda Espinosa bring extensive records in multilateral governance and international leadership, with no publicly substantiated findings of comparable family-based appointments during their UN service.

Concerns have also emerged regarding unequal institutional advantages during the selection process. Rebeca Grynspan stepped aside from her role as Secretary-General of UNCTAD in line with General Assembly Resolution 79/327, which encourages candidates holding UN positions to suspend their duties during campaigns to avoid conflicts of interest and undue advantage. Rafael Grossi has remained in office as Director General of the IAEA while pursuing his candidacy.

Critics argue that continued access to institutional visibility and resources may create an incumbency advantage. Whether or not this violates formal rules, it raises broader concerns about fairness and structural imbalance in leadership selection.

The UN’s Persistent Gender Gap

Beyond nepotism and back-door recruitment, the most glaring failure of this selection cycle is the UN’s inability to break its own highest glass ceiling. In over 80 years and nine Secretary-Generals, the organization has never been led by a woman. This persists despite years of relentless, highly coordinated global campaigns by civil society groups, advocates, and the 1 for 8 Billion coalition calling for gender-balanced leadership.

Despite decades of calls for historical justice and General Assembly Resolution 79/327—which notes with regret that no woman has ever held the position of Secretary-General and urges Member States to strongly consider nominating women, two men—Rafael Grossi and Macky Sall—were still nominated to such a narrow and exclusive candidate pool. At a time when women are leading nations and global institutions through major crises, this outcome highlights a gap between the commitments of Member States and their practice. It risks reinforcing the very inequalities the United Nations has pledged to address.

Reform in the UN Cannot Wait

The next Secretary-General must treat institutional integrity as a priority long before taking office—indeed, even before announcing a candidacy. Member States must translate long-standing reform commitments into enforceable mandates. These reforms can no longer remain aspirational; they must become immediate requirements shaping how the UN governs, recruits, and leads.

• Prioritizing a Female Leader to Break the Status Quo: Member States—and especially the five permanent Security Council members with veto power—must recognize that meaningful reform requires breaking entrenched networks of power and patronage. Electing the first female Secretary General in 2026 would signal a decisive shift toward aligning leadership with the principles of equality the UN promotes globally.

• Mandatory Campaign Step-Aside Rules: Any active UN official seeking the post of Secretary General should be required to suspend all institutional duties upon declaring candidacy. This would eliminate even the perception of using institutional platforms, influence, or resources for campaigning.

• Ban on Family Appointments: The UN system should adopt a strict policy prohibiting the hiring, consulting, or internship of immediate family members of any Assistant Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General, agency chief, and Secretary-General candidate. The international civil service must never be treated as a family business.

• Preventing Post-Fixing and Backdoor Recruitment: The Secretary-General’s Office should be empowered to independently review recruitment and selection decisions across the UN system and investigate credible evidence of favoritism, cronyism, or reciprocal patronage. All appointments must follow transparent, merit-based procedures that withstand internal and public scrutiny.

Restoring Institutional Credibility

The world does not need a Secretary-General who merely manages bureaucracy; it needs one who restores moral authority to a fractured international order.

If the next Secretary-General is selected through informal bargaining, backroom deals, entrenched patronage, or continued exclusion of women, the UN risks deepening its legitimacy crisis and accelerating its decline in global relevance.

The UN must first reform itself: break the highest glass ceiling in its history, dismantle entrenched systems of patronage, open its selection process to genuine transparency and scrutiny, and ensure that its leadership reflects the principles and values enshrined in the UN Charter.

The transformation must begin now, starting with this month’s straw polls in the UN Security Council for the Secretary-General selection.

Shihana Mohamed, a Sri Lankan national, is the President of Asia Global Network (www.AsiaGlobalForum.org) and a US Public Voices Fellow on advancing the rights of women and girls. She is the founder of the UN Asia Network for Diversity & Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org) and is a strong advocate for gender equality and the advancement of women. She served at the UN for over 25 years.

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Karen Hallberg

By Karen Hallberg
TOKYO, Japan, Jul 10 2026 (IPS)

Eighty years since the dawn of the nuclear age, which began with the first nuclear test in New Mexico, USA, and with the tragic atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humanity faces a deep existential crisis. This crisis is much more unstable and unpredictable than the gravest Cold War confrontations. In 1955, when there were only three states with nuclear weapons and the first thermonuclear weapon was being developed, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto posed a profound question: “Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?” Today, with 9 states possessing nuclear weapons and several thousand thermonuclear devices, this question becomes an ultimate choice.

The Pugwash Conferences is deeply concerned about the deterioration of the international system, in which the threat and use of force has become preferable to diplomacy. Current military confrontations involving nuclear-weapon states pose an existential risk to civilization, a risk that can be drastically increased by a new wave of nuclear proliferation.

With the expiration of the New START between the United States and the Russian Federation, the international community has officially entered an era without a binding, verifiable agreement to constrain the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. For the first time in more than fifty years, dating back to the era of the 1972 SALT I, the two preeminent nuclear powers are operating without the essential guardrails that provided control, stability, predictability and transparency to the global order and were instrumental in reducing the total number of nuclear warheads from around 70,000 in the mid-eighties to current ~12,200 (or a yield larger than 146,000 Hiroshima-bombs equivalent!). However, despite historic progress in reducing 9 global nuclear stockpiles, the current trajectory suggests a troubling reversal of those hard-won security gains in times of a resurgent nuclear arms race, heightened global tensions and military confrontations involving nuclear-armed states.

The ongoing expansion and modernization of the nuclear arsenals of most nuclear-armed states is adding new pressures to global strategic stability, particularly in the absence of any arms control dialogue. These developments reflect the growing salience of nuclear weapons in international security, undermining global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, in particular, Art. VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has definitely constrained the spread of nuclear weapons for more than half a century and is now under severe strain.

At the same time, the growing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reflects the determination of many states and civil society actors to advance the goal of the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. While differences remain regarding pathways to disarmament, the Treaty has reinforced the humanitarian imperative of eliminating nuclear weapons and has helped keep the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world firmly on the international agenda.

Recent discussions about extending nuclear deterrence arrangements within Europe to additional non-nuclear-weapon states, together with emerging political voices advocating in favor of nuclear weapons in East Asia and other regions, risk igniting a new, uncontrollable wave of proliferation to safeguard their own survival.

Equally troubling are irresponsible threats by some nuclear-weapon states to resume nuclear testing. Such rhetoric contributes to a potentially dangerous escalation and threatens the continuation of the longstanding moratorium on nuclear explosive testing established in anticipation of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which still awaits ratification by key states.

The current situation poses great challenges ahead, which can and should be addressed immediately, without delay:

– Nuclear-weapon states should reconfirm their Joint Statement issued on January 2022 on preventing nuclear war and avoiding a nuclear arms race sending a clear signal on the political will to the diminish the role played by nuclear weapons in international security. In doing so, they would also reaffirm their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which commits all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith toward ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. 10

– Nuclear-armed states must recognize their responsibility to identify areas of common interest and engage in serious diplomatic efforts aimed at revitalizing multilateral arms control negotiations.

– All nuclear-armed states should reiterate their voluntary commitment to a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and take the necessary steps to secure the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Any resumption of nuclear testing would represent a dangerous step toward renewed arms racing and strategic instability.

– Nuclear-armed states should strengthen negative security assurances by reaffirming that they will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed states, adopt no-first-use commitments, and work toward making these assurances legally binding.

– Strengthening the verification and monitoring role of the International Atomic Energy Agency will remain essential for ensuring compliance transparency, and confidence within the global non-proliferation regime, including non-nuclear-weapon states.

– Consolidate nuclear weapons free zones, in particular establish one in the Middle East, as agreed at the 1995 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences.

These measures could serve as practical confidence-building and risk-reduction steps, helping to increase global stability and preventing a spiraling “nuclear breakout”. They could also serve as a diplomatic bridge towards a more cooperative, comprehensive and modernized future security architecture capable of addressing modern challenges including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonic weapons, missile defense systems, space-based military capabilities and autonomous weapons.

Raising public and political awareness of the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons is of utmost importance, as stated in the recent Declaration of the Nobel Laureate Assembly , “we call on scientists, academics, civil society, and communities of faith to help create the necessary pressure on global leaders to implement nuclear risk reduction measures.“ The responsibility lies with us all. Let us be inspired and guided by the closing words of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto: “We appeal as human beings to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest.”

This text was contributed as the foreword to the Annual Report of a media project “Toward the World without Nuclear Weapons” promoted by INPS Japan in partnership with Soka Gakkai International. The report compiles project articles published between April 2025 and March 2026.

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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Artificial intelligence is reshaping trade processes across Asia and the Pacific. However, despite growing interest, most economies have yet to deploy the technology at scale, according to a new study by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Credit: ESCAP

By ESCAP
BANGKOK, Thailand, Jul 10 2026 (IPS)

Artificial intelligence is reshaping trade processes across Asia and the Pacific. However, despite growing interest, most economies have yet to deploy the technology at scale, according to a new study by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Report 2026: Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Trade Facilitation finds that AI implementation in trade facilitation stands below 15% among economies surveyed, with levels ranging from 1% to 40% across subregions.

AI is increasingly being used in customs and logistics systems across the region, including automated verification of shipping documents, machine learning tools to identify high-risk cargo and image analysis technologies used in border inspections. These applications can help reduce delays, improve compliance and strengthen supply chain resilience as economies face growing trade pressures and more complex regulations.

“The rapid development of AI and machine learning now signals yet another transformation, offering new opportunities to enhance efficiency, compliance, supply chain resilience and digital connectivity,” said Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP.

She added that this transformation is particularly significant as the current global trade landscape faces growing challenges, including geopolitical tensions, increasing regulatory and compliance requirements related to climate risks and sustainability, as well as a persistent digital divide across economies.

Shortages in AI-related skills remain the biggest barrier to wider adoption, followed by high infrastructure costs, fragmented data systems and regulatory uncertainty. While many economies have expanded digital trade systems, gaps remain in data integration, interoperability and operational readiness.

“It is critical to support developing economies in strengthening digital infrastructure, cross-border connectivity, interoperable systems and digital skills to harness the benefits of AI-enabled trade facilitation,” said Fatima Yasmin, Vice-President for Sectors and Themes, Asian Development Bank.

East Asia leads the region in AI readiness across operational deployment, governance frameworks and data quality, while Pacific economies continue to face the largest implementation challenges.

Launched at the Asia-Pacific Trade Facilitation Forum, the report calls for stronger investment in AI-related skills, integrated digital infrastructure and governance frameworks to support secure and efficient digital trade. It also highlights the importance of regional cooperation and cross-border interoperability as trade systems become increasingly data-driven.

For more information: https://www.unescap.org/kp/2026/asia-pacific-trade-facilitation-report-2026-harnessing-artificial-intelligence-trade

IPS UN Bureau

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Woman farmers harvest tea leaves at a tea plantation in Nyaruguru, Kibeho District, Rwanda. Tea is one of Rwanda’s major agricultural export commodities.Credit: FAO / Jean Baptiste Nkurunziza

By Zipporah Musau
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 9 2026 (IPS)

As FAO coordinates the implementation of the International Year of the Woman Farmer 2026, gender team leader Tacko Ndiaye discusses why investing in Africa’s women farmers is essential for food security, economic growth and creating more resilient agrifood systems

Africa Renewal: What role do women farmers play in ensuring food security in Africa?

Ms. Ndiaye: We know that women are at the heart of Africa’s agrifood systems. Across the continent, women play a central role in agrifood systems through their labour, expertise and care, supporting households, communities and local markets.

Women make up almost half of the agrifood workforce—49 per cent—and contribute at every stage of the value chain, from production and processing to distribution and trade, according to FAO’s recent report, The Status of Women in Agrifood Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Also, women are custodians of culture and keepers of traditional knowledge passed down through generations about seed preservation and protecting biodiversity, as well as maintaining the social bonds that underpin the agrifood sector.

At the same time, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to face multiple food insecurity challenges. To give you an example, in 2024, about 64 per cent of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, according to FAO data. We also know that more than 30% of women aged 15 to 49 years are experiencing anemia in the region.

If Africa is to address its food security challenges, empowering women farmers must be a priority.

What are the most pressing challenges women farmers in Africa face today?

In Africa, as you know, women till the land. Every time you see a publication on agriculture and food systems in Africa, you are more likely to see a photo of a woman farmer on the front page.

Yet despite their central role, women continue to face structural inequalities that limit their productivity, resilience and economic opportunities.

• One of the most significant barriers women face is unequal access to and control over land. In 28 of the 32 Sub-Saharan African countries we studied, men are more likely than women to own or control agricultural land. In more than 40 per cent of those countries, the gender gap in ownership or secure rights over agricultural land is particularly pronounced.

• We also know that even where there is law to protect land rights, such legal protections are either weak or insufficient. In half of the countries we studied, legislation does not adequately protect women’s land rights.

• Land ownership is also closely linked to access to finance because land is often used as collateral. Yet only 49 per cent of women in the region have a financial account, compared with 61 per cent of men.

• Women also face barriers in accessing agricultural inputs, extension services, markets and technology.

• Digital exclusion is another challenge. Digital platforms have become essential for marketing products, accessing information and acquiring new skills. Yet women are 29 per cent less likely than men to use mobile internet. An estimated 205 million women in Sub-Saharan Africa still lack access to digital tools.

• In addition, despite their substantial contributions to agrifood systems, women often work under poorer conditions than men. They are disproportionately represented in precarious, informal, labour-intensive, lower-skilled and underpaid jobs. This is reflected in the fact that nearly 90% of women in the region work in the informal sector.

• Discriminatory social norms, gender-based violence, restrictions on women’s leadership and participation, and the heavy burden of unpaid care work further limit their opportunities.

There are many challenges that need to be addressed if we are to build agrifood systems that are more inclusive, resilient and efficient.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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A 12-year-old girl from northern Togo, orphaned and displaced to northern Benin with her siblings, is now attending school and benefiting from a cash programme, which supports vulnerable girls’ education and wellbeing. Credit: UNICEF/UNI970733/Njiokiktjien

By Ana Patricia Muñoz and George Laryea-Adjei
WASHINGTON DC / NEW YORK, Jul 8 2026 (IPS)

Almost half of the world’s population now lives in countries that spend more money paying interest on their debts than on education or health. New data shows the cost of borrowing for African countries in particular rose 91% since 2020. Rising debt payments have reduced governments’ capacity to invest in children and build their human capital.

This week UN officials and government leaders gather in New York for the High-level Political Forum, where the Sustainable Development Goal on financing and global partnership (SDG 17) comes up for its in-depth review. They must go beyond short-term fixes and drive sustainable solutions to the debt crisis and its impact on children’s futures. Too many countries are struggling to keep pace with debt payments and facing a stark and painful choice: spend less on children or default. This fiscal crunch has a disproportionate impact on girls, especially in marginalized and remote communities, as efforts to narrow the gender gap in educational attainment are undercut by debt servicing. In 2024, the 10 countries facing the worst barriers to girls’ education spent, on average, four times more on debt servicing than on education.

Debt choices today are also silently eroding children’s prospects and future economic growth. UNICEF analysis shows that African countries spend, on average, just 6.5 per cent of their child-related budgets on the critical first five years of life, while G20 countries invest roughly four times as much. As debt servicing consumes an increasing share of public resources in many countries, governments face difficult fiscal trade-offs that can further reduce investments in children. The result is not only a loss for this generation, but also lower productivity, diminished human capital and weaker long-term growth. The World Bank estimates that today’s children could lose up to half of their future lifetime earnings because of deficits in learning and human capital development.

Work by the International Budget Partnership shows that the global debt crisis is also an accountability crisis. The Open Budget Survey 2025 finds that 50% of surveyed countries do not provide information on the composition of debt in their budget proposals, and just 18% publish any information on the sustainability of government finances over the next ten years. In a recent assessment of 11 African countries, only one country published a borrowing plan that was connected to the annual budget cycle and linked borrowing to specific sectors or projects. In all 11 countries, parliaments approve borrowing without access to comprehensive information on how those funds will be used or what development outcomes they are expected to deliver. Debt crises will continue to recur if governments continue to borrow without telling oversight bodies or the public how they’re borrowing, why or on what terms.

Debt transparency alone will not solve the debt crisis unless it is matched by accountability and smarter financing choices.

Domestic constituencies who live with the consequences of debt decisions should be at the heart of accountability efforts – this includes children. Legal frameworks should mandate governments to release information about who is responsible for debt decisions, what is counted as debt, what it is being used for and what tradeoffs were considered. Governments should embed debt and fiscal sustainability information into the budget process so that there can be regular scrutiny by oversight bodies. Legislators, national auditors and independent legislative bodies need technical support and mandates to deliver informed and accessible analysis of the long-term fiscal implications and risks of these decisions. That analysis must also be accessible to the public. Equipping civil society groups so that they are better able to engage with debt information and better understand how these seemingly esoteric decisions ultimately impact their health centers, schools and children, must be part of any debt accountability agenda. These accountability levers are critical to ensure debt fuels development instead of holding it back, and that public spending choices reflect the rights and needs of children.

We also need financing solutions to address the current emergency and these efforts should support rather than displace domestic accountability. The SDG bond of the Government of Benin has shown that debt instruments linked to social outcomes and public reporting are already working. Debt is not inherently the enemy of development, but must be borrowed transparently, invested productively and subject to public scrutiny. Debt relief frameworks must catch up with reality: as sovereign debt shifts toward private, foreign-currency creditors existing restructuring mechanisms leave too many countries without meaningful relief. Reforming the legal frameworks that govern sovereign debt contracts is long overdue.

The Sevilla Commitment, adopted by leaders at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, underscored the value of pursuing these options and the importance of prioritizing investments in children. The High-level Political Forum should address how new financing options can avoid opacity by requiring governments to report to legislatures and the public how funds are used and by supporting civil society to track whether resources deliver tangible results.

When decisions with lifelong consequences are made behind closed doors, children inevitably lose first, and longest. We must use all the tools at our disposal to address the debt crisis and demand accountability to ensure public money works for all, especially for children and future generations.

Ana Patricia Muñoz is Executive Director, International Budget Partnership; George Laryea-Adjei is Director of Global Programme Division, UNICEF

IPS UN Bureau

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A child's painting of a fawn at the Conference Centre of Samarkand, where the Eighth GEF Assembly was held last month. The Bukhara deer, a species once pushed to the edge of survival by habitat loss and poaching, are now protected and introduced to the Zarafshan National Nature Park. Credit: ISD/ENB | Danny Skilton

By Kizito Makoye
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jul 7 2026 (IPS)

For most of the Eighth Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Assembly last month, the atmosphere inside Samarkand’s sprawling Congress Centre echoed a growing confidence of global environmental policymakers.

Delegates darted between plenary halls and side events discussing biodiversity targets, climate adaptation and ecosystem restoration. PowerPoint charts displayed shrinking forests. Investment bankers touted new financing tools. Smartly dressed bartenders served coffee in perfect air-conditioned comfort.

Yet despite this spectre of environmental diplomacy, a hard question lingered: How to mobilise private money when public coffers can no longer provide?

To many, the answer was blended finance.

The question became even more tangible on a humid Saturday morning when a group of delegates boarded low-emission coaches to Zarafshan National Nature Park on the outskirts of the ancient Silk Road city.

The excursion, many delegates later affirmed, offered a glimpse of a successful conservation model.

Walking through one of Central Asia’s surviving tugai forests – a riverside ecosystem that once stretched across much of the region – delegates witnessed the recovery of the Bukhara deer, a species once pushed to the edge of survival by habitat loss and poaching.

Wide-eyed delegates watched as rangers briskly hurled bundles of fresh forage, while several deer emerged from the reeds with the ease of animals that had learned to trust their caretakers.

A ranger works in an enclosure at the Zarafshan National Natural Park, one of Uzbekistan’s newest protected areas established to conserve the fragile riparian forests of the Zarafshan River and recover threatened wildlife, including the iconic Bukhara deer. The park illustrates the type of landscape where blended finance could help bridge funding gaps for ecosystem restoration, sustainable tourism and community livelihoods, provided investments deliver measurable conservation outcomes. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

For conservationists, the scene was a tangible sign of ecological recovery in a parched Uzbek steppe. For financiers, it carried a different meaning—evidence that restoration requires sustained investment long after donor attention has shifted elsewhere.

That tension – between ecological reality and financial logic – ran through nearly every conversation in Samarkand, where the GEF’s Eighth Assembly signalled a deeper shift toward blended finance as a core conservation funding model.

The GEF’s new replenishment cycle, dubbed GEF-9, will secure at least $3.9 billion in donor commitments through 2030. But the more consequential shift lies in its architecture, with a target of using roughly a quarter of the resources to crowd in private capital alongside public and concessional finance.

GEF officials explain that the institution’s approach differs from other blended finance initiatives by targeting only investments where markets have clearly failed.

“It is worth stating clearly at the outset that GEF’s own approach to blended finance has been deliberately targeted and highly catalytic,” Avril Benchimol, Senior Blended Finance Specialist at the GEF, told IPS. “By design, GEF’s concessional resources have been directed at transactions where market failure is demonstrable – frontier areas such as circular economy, nature-based solutions, conservation finance, and sustainable agriculture in challenging markets where private capital does not flow without a catalytic push.”

Samuel Wangwe, senior researcher at the Economic and Social Research Foundation, said this shift towards more blended finance initiatives reflects a broader transformation in development thinking.

“Blended finance is essentially an attempt to stretch scarce public resources further by bringing in private capital. That logic is understandable in today’s fiscal environment, but it does not remove the underlying development constraints that many countries face,” he said.

The logic is rooted in a fiscal reality widely acknowledged across development finance institutions: public budgets are insufficient to meet global environmental needs, with annual financing gaps for biodiversity and climate resilience running into hundreds of billions of dollars.

Blended finance is intended to bridge that gap by using public capital to absorb early-stage risk, improving the risk-return profile of projects that would not be viable for commercial investors.

A park ranger guides delegates through one of Uzbekistan’s protected landscapes, explaining ongoing conservation and restoration efforts. The visit highlighted how long-term biodiversity protection depends not only on strong environmental policies but also on innovative financing mechanisms capable of attracting private capital while safeguarding public conservation objectives. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

But Wangwe warned that the effectiveness of this model depends heavily on institutional strength.

“You cannot financialise ecosystems without strong governance systems. Where land rights are unclear or enforcement is weak, the risk does not disappear—it is simply priced differently, often at a higher cost to the country.”

The timing reflects broader strain in global public finance. Many donor governments face rising debt burdens, domestic political pressures and competing priorities from defence to healthcare. Development assistance budgets, once expected to expand alongside climate commitments, are instead substantially shrinking.

In that constrained environment, multilateral institutions are under pressure to demonstrate leverage – how much private capital can be mobilised per unit of public spending. As a result, blended finance has shifted from a niche development tool to a central pillar of environmental action, offering policymakers a politically palatable narrative: scarce public funds are not being reduced, but multiplied.

Wangwe, however, cautioned against over-reliance on this narrative.

“There is a tendency now to focus on how much money can be leveraged, rather than how effectively institutions can absorb and manage that investment. But without institutional depth, leverage becomes a hollow metric.”

GEF argues that its own experience suggests carefully structured concessional finance can mobilise substantially larger private investment than broader market averages.

“The concern about additionality is legitimate at the system level, and GEF takes it seriously as part of the broader conversation,” Benchimol said.

“GEF’s own mobilisation ratios have consistently outperformed the [market] average, in part because of the deliberate application of a minimum concessionality principle—using only as much concessional support as is necessary to make a transaction viable, and no more.”

Yet the promise of scale masks a more selective reality. Institutional investors – pension funds, insurers and asset managers – do not allocate capital based on environmental urgency. They respond to predictable revenue streams and manageable risk.

That distinction matters. Renewable energy projects increasingly fit that profile, offering long-term contracts and stable cash flows. Many conservation activities do not.

Ecosystem restoration, biodiversity protection and watershed management often generate public goods that are difficult to monetise. A restored forest may reduce carbon emissions and stabilise rainfall patterns, but it does not always produce direct financial returns.

As a result, blended finance works best where environmental projects can be partially ‘financialised’ – through carbon credits, ecotourism revenues or infrastructure-linked returns. Pure conservation projects remain harder to structure in bankable form.

Nowhere is this mismatch more visible than in Africa. The continent holds some of the world’s most critical biodiversity assets, from the Congo Basin to East Africa’s savannahs, yet continues to attract a relatively small share of global private environmental finance.

Contrary to common assumptions, the binding constraint is not global liquidity. Trillions of dollars sit in institutional portfolios seeking yield.

As Wangwe put it, “Africa is not short of opportunities. It is short of bankable structures that meet investor expectations. That gap is not technical alone—it is institutional and political.”

The result is a structural imbalance: countries with stronger institutions attract disproportionate flows of blended finance, while those facing the most severe environmental degradation remain dependent on grants and concessional funding.

GEF acknowledges that imbalance remains a genuine weakness of blended finance globally.

“The GEF fully shares the concern that blended finance instruments have not always reached the countries and communities with the greatest need,” Benchimol said.

“The concentration of blended finance flows in middle-income and relatively more bankable markets is a documented challenge, and addressing it is a priority as GEF shapes its future programming.”

This dynamic brings governance to the centre of the debate. Blended finance does not eliminate institutional risk; it re-prices it.

Guarantees, first-loss capital and concessional tranches can improve project economics, but they cannot substitute for credible legal systems or stable regulatory frameworks.

In practice, blended finance tends to cluster in environments where governance already functions relatively well. Where institutions are weaker, transaction costs rise and investor appetite declines.

That creates an uncomfortable implication: the places most in need of environmental investment are often the least able to attract it.

Wangwe added that this dynamic risks deepening inequality in conservation finance.

“If local communities are only seen as beneficiaries rather than stakeholders in financial structures, then blended finance risks repeating the same extractive patterns we have seen in other sectors, just under a greener label.”

GEF says future financing models must become far more country-led.

“Equity in blended finance requires genuine country ownership and voice—ensuring that recipient governments are partners in the design of financial structures rather than passive recipients of externally defined solutions,” Benchimol said.

Beyond technical design lies a more political question: who ultimately controls environmental assets as they become financialised?

Blended finance structures distribute risk and returns among governments, investors and local communities. But those distributions are not neutral.

Critics warn that conservation could increasingly resemble an investment class, where financial returns flow outward while ecological and social costs remain local.

“There is a risk that conservation becomes an asset class without community ownership,” Wangwe said. “That would replicate extractive dynamics under a green label.”

Despite its market-orientated framing, blended finance does not reduce the role of public institutions. It reconfigures it.

Governments and development agencies continue to provide first-loss capital, guarantees, project preparation funding and regulatory support. Without these interventions, most blended-finance transactions would not be viable.

Public finance, in other words, is not replaced – it is embedded deeper in deal structures, even as its presence becomes less visible in headline figures.

Wangwe stressed that this reality is often overlooked.

“The idea that private capital will replace public finance is misleading. In reality, public money is doing more of the heavy lifting than the rhetoric suggests – it is just now embedded deeper in the transaction structure.”

That raises a critical risk: if public spending is cut on the assumption that private capital will fill the gap, the entire model could weaken.

Closing the assembly, GEF interim CEO Claude Gascon noted that the model relies on cooperation and shared purpose.

He stressed the GEF was built on the understanding that no one can meet global environmental challenges alone and that it brings together countries, conventions, IPLCs, civil society, the private sector, and other stakeholders to deliver global environmental benefits.

“We need banks, institutional investors, corporations, and innovators to engage at a fundamentally different level. We need them not only to finance transition but also to shape it responsibly. We need business models that reward stewardship, not short-term extraction; disclosure and accountability systems that value long-term resilience; and governance frameworks that make environmental performance central to business success. The private sector has extraordinary reach, influence, and ingenuity. But with that influence comes responsibility.”

Back in Zarafshan National Nature Park, the Bukhara deer eventually retreated into the reeds as the delegation prepared to leave. The moment was brief, almost incidental, yet it underscored a central contradiction in global environmental finance.

Capital can accelerate conservation outcomes. It can reduce risk, improve coordination and expand funding. But it cannot substitute for the institutional and ecological conditions that determine whether recovery endures.

As delegates returned to Samarkand, optimism about blended finance remained intact. So did its central uncertainty.

For Africa, Wangwe argued, the challenge is not simply attracting investment but building the systems that can sustain it.

“The real test is not the volume of private investment mobilised, but whether ecosystems are restored, livelihoods are protected, and institutions are strengthened enough to sustain those gains beyond donor cycles.”

Despite the uncertainties, GEF says it intends to deepen – not scale back – its use of blended finance.

“GEF-9 is targeting 25% of GEF Trust Fund resources for blended finance, signalling a deliberate scaling of this approach – grounded in the conviction that blended finance, when properly structured and targeted, is not a subsidy for investments that markets would have made anyway, but a catalytic lever for investments that would not have happened at all,” Benchimol said.

The success of GEF-9 will therefore not be measured by how much private capital is mobilised but by where it flows – and whether it translates into lasting ecological recovery.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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By Gabriele Koehler and Catherine Mbengue
MUNICH / BRUSSELS , Jul 7 2026 (IPS)

The 2030 agenda cum SDGs are due to be completed in 2030, with negotiations towards a follow-up agenda to begin formally at the UN General Assembly in autumn 2027. Many direct or indirect discussions have, however, already begun, e.g. pluri-laterally at BRICS and G20 meetings and the EU; as well as at the UN in connection with the Summit of the Future, the Doha World Summit for Social Development, the Beyond GDP report; or in fora such as the Hamburg Sustainability Conference. Think tanks and academics, too, are brainstorming on how best to re-ignite a genuine commitment to the SDGs and at the same time reflect on the future.

Therefore, it appears as the right moment to inject some thoughts contributing to chart a better course for the “beyond 2030” development agenda.

Gabriele Koehler

The international community first conceptualized a development agenda– the development decade – in 1960, and this approach has continued in various formats ever since, with poverty eradication decades, the MDGs and the SDGs. Towards the end of each such effort, the tragic verdict is that the aspirations are at best partially met.

Many observers are dismayed at the poor performance of the SDGs, with delivery on many targets underperforming or even regressing. Hence the need to analyse where and why the 2030 Agenda has not met its commitments. One argument is that they lacked analysis and skirted the sensitive issue of the structural causes of poverty and inequities. Political and economic power hierarchies are not addressed.

Another possible conclusion is that, like the preceding development agenda, the SDGs offer a global commitment, but this is not binding. SDG reporting is voluntary and anecdotal, and governments can easily “pretend” to be keen, but in reality, circumvent the required actions. The international community can duck away from its obligations to restructure global economic structures that play out against lower-income countries and socially excluded communities.

Catherine Mbengue

Anchoring a post-2030 agenda in internationally recognised human rights obligations would help ensure that commitments to present and future generations are subject to regular review and accountability. The near-universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a particularly strong foundation for such an approach.

A proposal

We therefore propose considering a new tack: attaching the next development agenda to the Human Rights Council (HRC). The conceptualisation, the negotiations, as well as the subsequent reporting and monitoring could make use of the well-established mechanisms of the Universal Periodic Reviews and the human rights conventions.

In HRC processes, governments report on those of the 9 core human rights conventions which they have ratified. The process includes a report by the country itself, findings from independent research by the Office of Human Rights, and where existent, by civil society. Each country must report periodically on those conventions they have adopted. Some of the human rights conventions, notably the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), enjoy near-universal ratification, providing one of the strongest globally agreed foundations for a rights-based development agenda beyond 2030.

Since 2008, the Human Rights Council moreover prepares integrated reviews of human rights-related outcomes of its member states’ decisions and policies in the format of Universal Periodic Reviews (UPRs). The review process examines how a country under review adheres to the UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the conventions it has ratified, as well as national human rights policies and/or programmes, and applicable international humanitarian law. Three peer governments supplement and assess the report of the country under review, and independent human rights experts and civil society contribute their own assessment. All 193 member states of the United Nations participated in the first 3 rounds of UPRs. This shows their traction

The experience of the CRC reporting process also demonstrates how periodic reviews, independent expertise and civil-society engagement can strengthen implementation and accountability over time.

In our proposed adjusted approach to preparing a development agenda beyond 2030, the set of eleven ILO fundamental labour standards could supplement the human rights conventions, so as to incorporate decent work, living wages, the rights to social protection and to collective organising and bargaining. This would be in the same logic of making use of governments’ binding commitments.

And thirdly, to address the triple planetary crises, one would want to include the UN General Assembly resolution on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, or the Nationally Determined Contributions under the Climate Conference of the Parties, and other mandatory processes to tackle climate change and ecological challenges. While less codified, these agreements too are binding on UN member states.

Prospects of a shifted development agenda logic

The idea of incorporating human rights into a development agenda is not new. It faced some opposition when the SDGs were negotiated in the run-up to 2015. Nevertheless, at the operational level, a human rights monitoring tool, developed by the Danish Human Rights Institute, has been available since 2015, linking most SDG targets to human rights conventions. So, there would be accumulated experience to draw on.

Our hope is that shifting the ‘beyond 2030’ discourse and negotiations from the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, convened under the ECOSOC, to the Human Rights Council (HRC), in combination with the ILO for example, could help create a new dynamic:

• It could be more efficient, because governments could conflate the reviews of their voluntary SDG reports with the mandatory reporting processes.

• It could be more effective, because the HRC and the ILO oblige governments to react to and report on recommendations made at the respective reviews.

• It could be more honest and transparent because of the multiple viewpoints considered – governmental, academic, civil society, and UN.

• It could be more scientific, because part of the reporting on UN conventions is undertaken by specialists familiar with rigorous and independent academic standards.

Granted, it would be more painful, too, for those countries violating their human rights commitments. It would therefore not be easy to even launch this proposal. There may also be resistance from vested interests or established processes against moving “the SDGs” from New York to Geneva – and if climate is included – to Nairobi. And, of course, it could only function if the Human Rights Council, and human rights bodies and labour standards monitoring in each country, are properly and reliably funded.

Despite expected resistance to this idea, we observe a “magic moment”. We see so many vibrant processes on social and economic justice converging just now. Intellectual examples include the comprehensive compendium on Eradicating Poverty Beyond Growth: A Global Roadmap for a New Economy, the radical Global Justice Report, the multifaceted volume on policies for an Eco-Social Contract for Sustainable and Just Futures. Politically, the International Panel on Inequality and the Global Coalition for Social Justice, as well as the movement for tax justice carried by Brazil and South Africa, point to a hunger for fundamental change. In UN inter-governmental contexts, we have the Doha Declaration of the World Social Summit committing to a more just, inclusive, equitable and sustainable world. Shifting the development agenda to human rights arenas could therefor fit nicely into a long overdue momentum for global social justice within planetary boundaries.

Gabriele Koehler is a former UN staff member (ESCAP, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNICEF) and currently a senior research fellow with UNRISD and a member of various NGOs and NGO coalitions (Women Engage for a Common Future, Global Social Justice, Alliance for a Treaty on Business & Human Rights). She follows the UN80 and other UN processes, and has been writing, advocating and giving talks and academic lectures on the SDGs since long before their inception.
gabrielekoehler@posteo.de
www.gabrielekoehler.net

Catherine Mbengue is an independent international consultant with more than four decades of experience in development cooperation, humanitarian action and human rights. A former UN Senior Official (UNICEF Representative and Senior Advisor), she currently advises governments, multilateral organisations and civil society and serves on several international boards working on child rights, social justice and institutional reform.
mbenguec@gmail.com

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Technician repairing control panel. Mickael Ange Konan/pexels.comù Credit: United Nations
 
The United Nations General Assembly’s proclamation of the Fourth Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA IV) is far more than a symbolic milestone.

By Fatou Haidara and Francisca Tatchouop Belobe
VIENNA / ADDIS ABABA, Jul 6 2026 (IPS)

Amid shifting geopolitical, economic, and technological landscapes, it reflects growing international recognition that Africa’s sustainable industrial transformation is vital – not only for the continent’s future, but also for global prosperity.

Backed by more than 140 co-sponsors and endorsed by 176 Member States, as well as the African Union Executive Council, IDDA IV is the most politically anchored Decade yet. This is especially significant at a time when international development cooperation and multilateralism are under strain.

The proclamation underscores that industrialization is crucial to Africa’s productive transformation, economic diversification, decent job creation, poverty reduction, and long-term growth. It also calls on the international community to support Africa’s industrialization efforts as a contribution to the realization of Agenda 2063.

Building on its predecessor, IDDA IV sets an integrated transformation agenda, which aligns Africa’s structural realities to the opportunities and challenges of a rapidly evolving global economy.

The Third Industrial Development Decade elevated Africa’s industrialization on the global political agenda, mobilized over 700 joint initiatives with development partners and financial institutions, and strengthened industrial policy support across African Member States.

These achievements are a strong foundation to build on. Yet significant structural barriers – infrastructure and energy deficits, limited productive capacity, low technology absorption, and insufficient access to finance – still need to be addressed.

Africa enters the Fourth Industrial Development Decade against a backdrop of volatility and change, but also unprecedented opportunities.

Opportunities

Despite recurring global and regional shocks, the continent has remained resilient. The African Development Bank’s 2026 Economic Outlook notes that real GDP growth reached 4.4 per cent in 2025, making Africa among the fastest growing regions of the world.

With nearly 12 million young people entering the labour force each year, Africa’s youthful population is a major driver of its future prosperity.

At the same time, global supply chains are being reconfigured, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is creating the world’s largest emerging integrated market, opening the door to regional trade integration, value chains and economies of scale.

Digital technologies are reshaping manufacturing systems worldwide, providing Africa with an opportunity to leapfrog traditional industrial pathways. The digital transition is driving innovation in agro-processing and climate-smart agricultural technologies. It is also fueling global demand for critical minerals, which resource-endowed African countries can leverage by building local value addition.

In parallel, Africa’s growing middle class, urbanization and shifting consumer preferences are expanding markets, from processed foods to pharmaceuticals. Continuing regional integration under the AfCFTA is further adding momentum.

The convergence of these trends creates a historic window of opportunity for Africa, which may not return in the same form.

With IDDA IV proclaimed, the mandate is set; the urgent task now is delivery.

The African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) are committed to steering this process together as the two institutions entrusted by the UN General Assembly to lead the Decade’s implementation.

The immediate priority for the next 18 months is to develop a collaborative Programme of Action. This framework will translate the Decade’s mandate into targeted investments, secure financing platforms, and measurable results across national and regional corridors.

IDDA IV is not standalone. It aligns with major continental frameworks and initiatives, including the AfCFTA, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the New African Financial Architecture for Development (NAFAD), while convening the different actors needed to advance Africa’s industrialization.

UNIDO, as the UN’s specialized agency for industrial development, brings technical and policy expertise, field presence, and proven operational models to implement IDDA IV on the ground, including through its Programmes for Country Partnership.

The AUC, with its continent wide political mandate and strong coordination capacity, can align trade, infrastructure, finance, and industry to drive delivery.

This effort will be coordinated with the African Union Development Agency – Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA -NEPAD), the Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank Group, Afreximbank, regional economic communities, development partners, and private sector stakeholders.

However, to succeed, IDDA IV needs adequate and sustained financing. It requires building an industrial investment ecosystem and making private sector engagement a core pillar of delivery.

Governments and international organizations can create an enabling environment, coordinate partnerships and support policy reforms. But it is the private sector that builds factories, creates jobs, and links economies to regional and global value chains.

The next phase will therefore focus on mobilizing public and private capital, structuring bankable projects capable of attracting institutional investors, and using blended finance mechanisms to de-risk investments in emerging markets.

IDDA IV is not merely another international decade. It is the opportunity to redefine Africa’s role in the global economy, shifting from raw material exporter to a producer of value-added goods, and a driver of industrial innovation and sustainable growth.

Ms. Fatou Haidara is UNIDO’s Deputy to the Director General and Managing Director of the Directorate of Global Partnerships and External Relations, while Ms. Francisca Tatchouop Belobe is the AUC’s Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry, and Minerals.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Demographic realities are well documented, and governments have long been aware of the profound demographic changes now underway. Nevertheless, many policymakers continue to discount or ignore these demographic trends.

This reluctance often reflects the tension between short-term political priorities and long-term demographic realities. As a result, governments are frequently unwilling to acknowledge the full scale of the major demographic transformations reshaping their societies.

In some cases, demographic denialism serves to protect entrenched political or economic interests. More often, however, it reflects an unwillingness to confront politically difficult policy choices, such as raising taxes, expanding immigration, increasing retirement ages, or committing additional resources to pensions, healthcare, and other social welfare programs.

Many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline

Because demographic change typically unfolds gradually, politicians often prioritize policies that deliver immediate political or economic benefits over reforms designed to address long-term challenges such as population decline and demographic ageing. Electoral incentives and short-term political considerations often outweigh the need to adapt to evolving demographic realities.

Governments may also downplay demographic trends because doing so enables them to pursue short-term political priorities and ideological objectives while postponing the more difficult fiscal and policy adjustments required by demographic change.

Moreover, some policymakers continue to pursue measures intended to restore the demographic patterns of the recent past, despite the limited likelihood that such efforts will succeed.

The demographic conditions of the 20th century were historically exceptional. Population growth, fertility rates, age structures, declining mortality, and gains in life expectancy all reached unprecedented levels, particularly during the second half of the century. These conditions were the product of a unique combination of historical, economic, technological, and public health factors and are unlikely to be repeated. Rather than attempting to recreate the demographic environment of the past, governments should focus on adapting institutions, policies, and public finances to contemporary demographic realities.

The world’s population nearly quadrupled during the 20th century, rising from 1.6 billion in 1900, to 2.5 billion in 1950, and then to 6.2 billion by 2000.

Today, the global population is approximately 8.3 billion, more than five times its size in 1900. Although the world’s population is expected to continue growing, the rate of growth has slowed dramatically. According to current projections, the global population is expected to peak at approximately 10.3 in the mid-2080s before declining slightly to around 10.2 billion by the end of the century (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

The world’s population growth rate, which was 1.7% in 1950, rose to a peak of about 2.3% in the early 1960s. By the end of the 20th century, it had declined to about 1.4%. In 2026, the global growth rate is estimated at approximately 0.8% and is projected to continue decreasing, reaching about -0.1% by the end of the century.

Moreover, many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline.

Fertility levels have also fallen dramatically from the relatively high levels of the mid-20th century. The global fertility rate, which averaged more than five births per woman in the late 1950s, had declined to about half that level by the beginning of the 21st century. By 2026, the world’s fertility rate is estimated at approximately 2.2 births per woman. Furthermore, more than half of all countries now have fertility rates below the replacement level of approximately 2.1 births per woman.

Population ageing is another defining demographic trend. In 1950, only about 5% of the world’s population was aged 65 or older. By 2026, that proportion had more than doubled to nearly 11%. The proportion of the population aged 85 and older has increased even more rapidly, rising from just 0.2% in 1950 to about 1% in 2026.

As populations age, people are also living longer than ever before. Global life expectancy at birth has increased substantially, from about 46 years in 1950 to approximately 74 years in 2026.

Life expectancy at age 65 has also risen substantially. Globally, it increased from about 11 additional years in 1950 to approximately 18 additional years by the mid-2020s. In many countries, however, the gains have been greater, with life expectancy at age 65 exceeding 20 years. In Japan and France, for example, a 65-year-old can expect to live approximately 23 additional years (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century.

In many low-fertility countries, governments have devoted substantial public resources to pro-natalist measures such as cash transfers, tax incentives, subsidized childcare, and housing assistance. While these policies may ease short-term financial constraints for families, they have generally produced only modest and often temporary increases in fertility rates.

At the same time, despite rising old-age dependency ratios and persistent labor shortages, immigration policy remains politically contentious, and, in some countries, highly restrictive. This has occurred alongside growing fiscal strain on pay-as-you-go pension systems and increasing demand for healthcare and long-term care services.

Although life expectancy continues to increase, especially at older ages, reforms such as gradually raising retirement ages, broadening the tax base, restructuring pension systems, and adapting healthcare financing have often advanced slowly because of political resistance. As a result, fiscal adjustments frequently lag behind demographic change, contributing to mounting budgetary pressures and, in some cases, greater intergenerational tension.

In some countries, political leaders have responded to inconvenient demographic trends by weakening the independence of statistical agencies, reducing funding for demographic research and data collection, firing statisticians, sidelining professional expertise, or publicly questioning well-established demographic evidence. Such actions can make it more difficult for policymakers and the public to assess demographic change accurately, evaluate policy options, and develop effective long-term responses.

Similarly, rather than modernizing public safety nets, diversifying revenue sources, or implementing gradual reforms to retirement and pension systems, many governments postpone difficult policy decisions to minimize electoral backlash. Prolonged delays, however, can undermine the long-term financial sustainability of public programs and increase the likelihood that pension and social insurance trust funds will become insolvent or require abrupt corrective measures.

Another form of political avoidance is the maintenance of restrictive immigration policies despite persistent labor shortages. In many countries, immigration has historically helped offset population decline driven primarily by sustained below-replacement fertility. Without sufficient immigration, population decline and demographic ageing are likely to accelerate in these societies.

The major demographic shifts of the 21st century – including population decline, demographic ageing, sustained below replacement fertility, increasing longevity, migration, refugee movements, and asylum pressures – are well documented and widely recognized. Nevertheless, many governments continue to prioritize efforts to reverse these trends while devoting comparatively less attention to adapting institutions and public policies to long-term demographic realities.

Rather than focusing primarily on restoring the demographic conditions of the recent past, policymakers may benefit from placing greater emphasis on adapting economic, fiscal, and social institutions to the demographic realities of the present and the decades ahead. Such an approach recognizes demographic change not as a temporary departure from historical norms, but as a defining structural feature of the 21st century that requires sustained institutional adaptation rather than attempts at demographic restoration.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of numerous publications on population issues.

Farmers planting paddy in Helambu, Sindhupalchowk. Their farming is dependent on precipitation and snow-fed rivers in the region. Credit: Bhagirathi Pandit

By Tanka Dhakal
KATHMANDU, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Monsoon season in South Asia, including Nepal, is a period of frequent rainfall, extreme heat, and a busy time of the year for farmers. Most farmers in Nepal depend on monsoon rain to plant paddey, the main source of food.

Puspa Subedi, a farmer from Pokhara‑31, Talbesi, Kaski, in Gandaki Province, is ready for the rice‑planting season.

“In our area, we primarily grow raithane (a local breed of rice), which is more resistant to drought than hybrid species, so we are less concerned about the forecasted dry monsoon,” he said. “Drought does impact our production, but the effect on farmers who are planting hybrid seeds would be more dire.”

Subedi, the coordinator of Sundaridanda Community Seed Bank in Kaski, where they conserve 53 local species of rice seeds, mentioned that monsoon drought is a major concern for most farmers in Nepal.

According to the regional seasonal weather forecast, the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region, also known as the ”Third Pole’, is heading toward a dry monsoon, which will impact agricultural activities in the region, including Nepal. The recently published HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026 projects lower‑than‑normal rainfall and above‑normal temperatures in countries across the region, including Nepal, India, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Scientists warn that intense rainfall in short bursts, rising temperatures, and increasing water stress could make this monsoon particularly dangerous.

“The outlook points to a drier monsoon overall, but that does not mean lower risk,” said Manish Shrestha, a hydrologist at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). “Short, intense rainfall events can still trigger serious hazards.”

The map shows the seasonal mean anomaly for the 2026 monsoon in the HKH region. Source: HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026.

This week the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said that El Niño conditions are developing and are set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns, increasing the risk of extreme weather over the coming months. This weather phenomenon generally brings a dry monsoon to Nepal. Unusually warm ocean waters in the tropical Pacific were fuelling the development of El Niño, which was set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns and increase the risk of extreme weather over the coming months.

“The science is clear: El Niño is arriving on our doorstep in the coming months with 90% certainty.  The world must treat it as the urgent climate warning it is. El Niño conditions will pour fuel on the fire of a warming world.  Impacts will hit even harder, travel even farther, and cross borders with devastating speed.  The only effective response is climate action equal to the crisis – ending the addiction to fossil fuels, accelerating the shift to renewables, protecting the most vulnerable, and delivering early warning systems for all,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

Impacts on agricultural 

The regional forecast expects the combination of erratic rainfall and rising temperatures to increase both drought and flood risks during the season. Long dry spells may be followed by sudden heavy downpours, creating conditions for flash floods and landslides, particularly in mountain areas. Monsoon drought directly impacts farmers, while rainfall‑induced floods may also affect frontline communities, including farmers.

The outlook warns that higher temperatures and lower water availability can lead to heat stress in crops and livestock, “reduce yields, and shorten growing seasons, particularly in the already marginal mountain farming system.” High temperatures can also cause the loss of soil moisture by intensifying evaporation.

In Nepal, and in most places in the HKH region, farmers depend on rain‑fed and snow‑fed water sources for agriculture. Last winter, snow persistence across the region was observed to be below the long‑term average – and with rising temperatures, “river flows, groundwater levels, and spring water availability may decline substantially during or after the monsoon season”, the regional weather outlook notes.

Lower snow persistence further weakens the region’s natural water buffer, making river systems and groundwater recharge more sensitive to rainfall variability. “Lower snow persistence means the region is entering the monsoon with a reduced seasonal water buffer,” said Sarthak Shrestha, co‑author of the outlook.

Farmers are already experiencing water stress, which is affecting their farming calendar. Farmers in Helambu‑7, Sindhupalchowk, are struggling to get water from a local community‑based informal irrigation system that is river‑fed. Tilak Bahadur Pandit, a local farmer, says he and his neighbours are already late in planting paddy due to water scarcity.

Source: Lenssen, N. J. L., L. Goddard, and S. Mason, 2020: Seasonal Forecast Skill of ENSO Teleconnection Maps. Credit: WMO

Dry monsoon doesn’t mean no disaster

As below‑normal precipitation is forecast, it is not expected to reduce disaster risks. Scientists warn that short bursts of intense rainfall, rising temperatures, and growing water stress could make the season increasingly dangerous.

“Even in a weaker monsoon, short periods of intense rainfall remain a major concern,” said Shrestha, a hydrologist at ICIMOD. “Communities and authorities need to closely follow short‑term forecasts and advisories.”

Experts say that drought and flood risks are interconnected and can no longer be managed in isolation. The latest State of the Climate in Asia report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also notes that across Asia and the Pacific, rising heat is increasing multi‑hazard risks, intersecting with food systems and public health while placing new pressures on livelihoods.

Arun Bhakta Shrestha, Senior Adviser at ICIMOD, says, “Early warning systems, short‑term forecasts, and locally driven preparedness need to work together to address increasingly complex hazards.”

The WMO on Wednesday (June 2)

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres (left) and Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (right). They have called for the universal abolition of the death penalty. Credit: UN Photo/Violaine Martin

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

While the movement for the universal abolition of the death penalty advances, this progress “cannot be taken for granted,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres as he greeted the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty.

In his video message, Mr. Guterres said, “the death penalty does not deliver justice. It is an inhumane form of punishment. It puts innocent lives at risk. And it has no place in the 21st century.” Worldwide, the push for abolition has gained momentum, with the Secretary-General reaffirming the UN’s full commitment to universal abolition “firmly and without exception.”

The 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty, taking place in Paris between June 30th and July 2, 2026, convenes governments, UN officials, legal professionals, journalists, and activists to discuss concrete steps to reform and ultimately abolish the death penalty. The Congress is organised by ECPM (Together Against the Death Penalty), a leading French NGO that began campaigning for universal abolition in 2000 and has organised all 9 World Congresses Against the Death Penalty. The Congress is sponsored by France, and the European Union and Switzerland are co-sponsors.

At the opening of the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, Volker Türk, further underscored the UN’s staunch position on universal abolition. In his opening remarks, Volker Türk urged “all States, everywhere, to join the overwhelming, and principled, global consensus that use of the death penalty must end, everywhere, for all offenses.”

France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, mirrored Mr. Türk’s remarks, speaking at the Congress to the fact that “the death penalty has never made a society safer.”

“Never, because it does not act as a deterrent. It’s crazy. It has been demonstrated, observed and measured. The death penalty has never had the deterrent effect that certain, often authoritarian, authorities who defend it would like to attribute to it,” said Macron.

Prior to the start of the Congress, the European Union (EU) put forth a statement to the UN Human Rights Council on June 18, highlighting how capital punishment is a discriminatory practice that violates the inalienable right to life. The statement stressed how the death penalty is incompatible with human dignity and called for a moratorium by states as the first step towards abolition.

The EU Statement reiterates the key points from a May 21st statement from 41 Members of the Inter-Regional Task Force on the Moratorium on the use of the Death Penalty. While more than two-thirds of UN member states have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice, there has been a recent and significant increase in executions among the few retentionist states. The signatories of the statement emphasized how the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty represents an immense opportunity to reaffirm the global commitment to universal abolition.

Within the retentionist states, recent data from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) highlights an alarming spike in capital punishment. These increases were due to executions for drug-related violations for crimes that people committed as children and offences that did not meet the ‘most serious crimes’ criteria. Examples of actions by retentionist states include Iran, with over 1,500 individuals executed in 2025, 47 percent of which related to drug offences. Israel, which has set forth a series of legislative proposals introducing mandatory capital punishment provisions that would apply only to Palestinians. Other countries, including the United States, Somalia and Singapore, have also seen increases in executions.

While these numbers are startling, there has been immense progress towards abolition. 170 countries have either abolished or introduced a moratorium on the death penalty in law and/or in practice. Some states that have not yet fully abolished the death penalty but have taken encouraging steps to limit capital punishment include Vietnam, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Malaysia, and Kyrgyzstan.

These trends confirm that abolition is a core testament of the international community’s commitment to human rights and upholding international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by 175 states, guarantees the “inherent right to life” and that the death penalty may “be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law” for the countries that have not yet abolished it. The 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty presents an opportunity to take concrete steps towards the path of abolition, with the full support of the UN and Secretary-General António Guterres behind the Congress.

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Reef fish and corals. Credit: UNDP

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

In just the first half of this year, Abu Dhabi’s Environment Agency has cultivated 302,415 new coral colonies, bringing the total under the Abu Dhabi Coral Gardens Project to around 1.8 million – a scale of restoration that demands global attention.

Abu Dhabi’s coral project is more than a good news story – it is a glimpse of the future we urgently need.

For decades, I have argued that ocean protection, climate stability and human prosperity are inseparable. I have seen what happens when we ignore this truth: coral reefs bleaching, fisheries collapsing, coastlines exposed, communities losing both livelihoods and hope. That is why what Abu Dhabi is doing today with its coral restoration work speaks directly to my convictions about ocean health, climate resilience and the regenerative blue economy.

This is not a symbolic gesture. Through the Abu Dhabi Coral Gardens Project, the Environment Agency – Abu Dhabi (EAD) is building one of the largest coral reef restoration initiatives in the Middle East. Scientists cultivate fragments of heat resilient corals in nurseries, then carefully transplant them onto degraded reefs and artificial structures across the emirate’s coastal and offshore waters. Colony by colony, reef by reef, damaged seabeds are being transformed into living “coral gardens” capable of supporting fish, restoring biodiversity and strengthening coastal protection.

Coral as an investment, not a charity case

When a government decides to cultivate millions of coral colonies and restore vast areas of degraded reef, it is making a strategic economic choice, not simply ticking an environmental box. Coral reefs are infrastructure – natural infrastructure. They protect coasts from storms and erosion, underpin tourism and recreation, support fisheries, and safeguard cultures that have lived with and from the sea for generations.

President James Michel with His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Abu Dhabi’s decision to expand coral restoration at scale shows a clear understanding: it is cheaper and wiser to invest in living systems now than to pay later for disaster response, coastal damage and social instability.

This is the kind of thinking I have long argued for – treating the ocean not as a dumping ground, but as the foundation of long term resilience and prosperity.

A city of the future

What impresses me most is that coral restoration in Abu Dhabi is not happening in isolation. It sits alongside major investments in renewable energy, digital infrastructure and urban greening. Abu Dhabi is using its fossil fuel wealth to prepare for a post oil future – and that is no small shift.

Across the emirate, we see large scale solar projects harnessing the desert sun, new low carbon infrastructure, and modern digital networks designed for a smarter, cleaner economy. We see mangrove forests being expanded along the coast, seagrass meadows protected, and the city itself being “greened” to make it more liveable as temperatures rise. Abu Dhabi is becoming a prototype of the “city of the future”: one that understands that climate resilience, nature restoration and clean technology are central to development, not optional add ons.

Too many wealthy states still pour money into wars, arms and short term political games, even as their people face heatwaves, floods and collapsing ecosystems. Abu Dhabi may have its shortcomings – all countries have – but it has a vision and is putting serious capital into the pillars of a different future: clean energy, climate resilience, nature based solutions and large scale coral and mangrove restoration. For a resource rich economy, this is a profound shift in mindset.

This is what I mean by a regenerative blue economy: one that restores nature as it develops, rather than consuming it to exhaustion.

Corals on the frontline of climate change

Let us be clear: coral reefs are on the frontline of climate breakdown. In my own region, the Indian Ocean, we have watched reefs bleach and die as waters warm. The Gulf has suffered the same fate. When a place like Abu Dhabi deliberately farms corals that can better withstand heat, it is not clinging to the past – it is trying to give the future a fighting chance.

Instead of simply lamenting the loss of reefs, Abu Dhabi is experimenting, innovating and acting. It is accepting that the climate is already changing, and that we must adapt with intelligence rather than despair.

By focusing on more heat tolerant coral colonies, the project is quietly advancing a new frontier of climate adaptation: learning how to work with nature’s own resilience, rather than against it. If successful, lessons from the Abu Dhabi Coral Gardens could inform restoration efforts in many other warming seas.

Mangroves, greening and clean infrastructure

Coral nurseries alone are not enough, and Abu Dhabi knows this. The drive to expand mangrove forests, protect seagrass and green the city is part of the same story: recognising that nature is our strongest ally in storing carbon, calming storms and cooling our cities.

Alongside nature based solutions, the emirate is directing significant investment into clean infrastructure: solar farms, energy efficient grids, and other low carbon projects that will gradually reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Importantly, some of this effort is outward looking, supporting clean energy initiatives in vulnerable countries, including small island states such as Seychelles. When a wealthy state backs solar panels, wind turbines and resilient infrastructure in nations on the frontlines of climate change, it does more than tick a development box – it helps anchor a fairer, more stable world.

I have long argued that a healthy ocean is our first line of defence against climate change.

When you connect coral restoration, mangrove expansion and renewable energy under one vision, you start to see what real climate leadership looks like. It is not just about speeches at summits; it is about decisions on land use, budgets, technology and national priorities. It is about accepting that the only truly secure societies in the twenty first century will be those that learn to live within planetary boundaries.

A message to wealthy nations

This is where my opinion becomes blunt.

If you are a wealthy country today and you are not using your resources to restore ecosystems, decarbonise your economy and support those most vulnerable to climate impacts, then you are failing your citizens and the world. It is that simple.

Abu Dhabi shows that another path is possible. You can be an energy producer and still invest heavily in renewables. You can be a global city and still prioritise mangroves and coral reefs. You can be rich and choose to fund regeneration rather than destruction.

So when I look at this coral project, I see more than a local environmental initiative. I see a challenge to the complacency of other rich nations that prefer to invest in weapons and fossil infrastructure rather than in the living systems that sustain us all. It exposes a stark moral choice: spend on the machinery of war and planetary destabilisation, or spend on the stability and dignity that come from a thriving natural world.

Why this matters to me

As someone who has spent much of his life fighting for ocean protection, I cannot simply observe this from a distance. I feel a deep sense of responsibility – and, frankly, urgency. We are fast approaching the limits of what the ocean can absorb. We are already seeing climate impacts that once belonged to scientific warnings, not daily news.

Yet Abu Dhabi’s coral work gives me a measure of hope. It confirms that when visionary leadership, political will, financial capacity and scientific knowledge align, we can still repair, restore and reimagine our relationship with the ocean. It shows that a city built on hydrocarbons can choose to become a champion of coral, mangroves and clean energy instead of doubling down on the old model.

My vision has always been that countries, especially those with resources, should use their wealth to heal rather than harm: to farm corals instead of conflict, to grow mangroves instead of militaries, to build renewable capacity instead of new fossil dependencies.

Abu Dhabi is working towards the embodiment of that vision and it deserves recognition.

If more wealthy states chose this path, the global story on climate and ocean health would look very different – and future generations might say that, when it truly mattered, some leaders chose to use their power and their wealth to restore the ocean that makes life on Earth possible.

James Alix Michel, former President of Seychelles and Founder, James Michel Foundation

IPS UN Bureau

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By Shihana Mohamed
NEW YORK, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

At the Annual General Meeting of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org) on 21 May 2026, I was invited to share my reflections on both the pre and post separation phases of my UN journey. This provided me with a valuable opportunity to critically examine my decision to leave the UN service after many years at the ICSC.

I recently closed one of the most defining chapters of my professional life, after more than 25 years serving the United Nations (UN) —including two decades at the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). Importantly, my decision was made entirely on personal and professional grounds, independent of any budgetary or post-related considerations. As a jointly funded UN body, the ICSC is not affected by budget cuts or post reductions.

Why I Decided to Leave Early
My decision to leave under the UN’s Early Separation Programme was guided by reflection, self-respect, and a desire to preserve the enthusiasm and integrity that have always defined my work.

Leaving before the normal retirement age was not an impulsive choice—it was a deliberate act of self-preservation. Over time, I found that the institutional culture I had once admired had begun to erode the very principles it was meant to uphold. The UN’s mission remains noble, but its internal systems often fail to reflect that nobility.

My decision was shaped by several factors:

• Health and wellbeing: The relentless pace and stress of bureaucratic politics and petty backbiting were taking a toll. I wanted to reclaim balance and joy.
• Self-respect and dignity: When merit is overshadowed by favoritism, and integrity is compromised by internal politics, staying becomes a form of silent complicity.
• Desire to serve differently: I wanted to continue contributing to global governance—but from a space of independence, integrity, authenticity, and creativity.

Lessons Learned Before Leaving the UN
Before separation, I faced the same fears many colleagues quietly harbor: visa uncertainty, financial stability, and the daunting question of identity beyond the UN badge. The organization offers structure and prestige, but it can also create dependency. I learned that preparation—both practical and emotional—is essential.

• Plan early and thoroughly: Understand your entitlements, pension, and visa implications.
• Prioritize health and dignity: No professional title is worth sacrificing well-being.
• Seek clarity, not comfort: Reflect deeply on what you want to preserve and what you need to change.
• Build bridges before you leave: Relationships grounded in respect and trust endure beyond institutions.

Lessons After Leaving the UN
The months following my departure were both disorienting and illuminating. Freed from the constraints of bureaucracy, I rediscovered creativity, autonomy, and a renewed sense of purpose. I learned to shape my own rhythm, engage with global issues from a more independent perspective, and reawakened the joy of contributing without the shadow of ineffective bureaucracy.

• Structure your days: Routine restores stability and purpose.
• Embrace uncertainty: It is the space where reinvention begins.
• Stay connected: Continue engaging with colleagues and networks that share your values.
• Reclaim your voice: Independence allows you to speak truth without institutional filters.

Transforming the UN’s Culture
Overall, my time with the UN was a meaningful chapter in my life, offering a firsthand view of the power and potential of global governance and multilateralism in action. I continue to believe deeply in the ideals of the UN Charter—principles that remain both necessary and inspirational in an increasingly interconnected world.

At the same time, honest reflection requires acknowledging the institution’s shortcomings. While the mission of the UN is noble, the work itself is not inherently complex; too often, it is made unnecessarily difficult by people, entrenched cultures, bureaucratic practices, and systems that prioritize connections over competence. Environments that tolerate inequity and erode dignity rather than uphold it continue to undermine the organization’s credibility and effectiveness.

Ideals alone cannot sustain trust. When recruitment and promotion are shaped by back channels rather than merit, when accountability is applied selectively, and when organizational culture enables toxicity instead of transparency, the institution risks losing its moral authority. These are systemic challenges that demand introspection, accountability, and meaningful reform.

This was one reality of my journey, and I know I am not alone in recognizing it. These challenges tested me, but they also strengthened me—sharpening my sense of purpose, reinforcing the importance of competence, fairness, and integrity, and reminding me that institutions are judged not only by their ideals, but by the values they practice every day.

If the UN is to remain credible and effective in the decades ahead, it must confront its internal contradictions with honesty and urgency. Reform must go beyond structures and policies—it must also transform culture. Its strength lies in its people, and its future depends on creating an environment where they can thrive.

Key priorities include:

• Reinforce meritocracy: Recruitment and promotion must be based on competence and educational credentials, not connections. Transparent criteria and external oversight can help restore fairness.
• Empower accountability: Managers should be evaluated not only on outputs but also on conduct, how they treat staff, foster inclusion, and uphold dignity, as well as on the ethical stewardship of public funds and resources.
• Diversify leadership: Representation from all regions must be substantive, not symbolic. Talented and committed staff from developing countries deserve equal access to leadership pathways.
• Model integrity from the top: Ethical leadership must be visible, consistent, and enforced. Leaders should also meet clear minimum standards, including relevant educational credentials and demonstrated competence.
• Cultivate psychological safety: Encourage open dialogue, dissent, and innovation without fear of retaliation.

Practical Tips for Others Considering Separation
For those contemplating a similar transition, my advice is simple but vital:

• Prepare practically and emotionally: Plan your finances, entitlements, and visa matters early, while also preparing for the emotional shift of leaving a structured system. Practical readiness and emotional resilience go hand in hand.
• Develop skills beyond the UN system: The UN ecosystem is unique, and its experience does not always translate directly elsewhere. Build adaptability through new learning, volunteering, or personal pursuits that foster creativity, patience, and perspective.
• Expand your external network: Engage with academia, civil society, philanthropy, the private sector, and local community. Relationships beyond the UN can open doors to new opportunities and collaborations.
• Define your next purpose early: Clarify what motivates you and how you want to contribute next. A clear sense of direction brings meaning and stability during transition.
• Protect your integrity: Leave with professionalism, gratitude, grace, and honesty. How you exit shapes your legacy just as much as how you served the UN. Carry your professionalism and values into your next chapter.
• Transform experience into impact: Use what you learned to create something meaningful. Reinvention is not an ending—it is evolution.

Global service beyond the United Nations
Leaving the UN was both an ending and a beginning. It gave me the opportunity to step outside the system and rethink what global service could be—more inclusive, representative, and accountable. That vision led to the founding of Asia Global Forum, a nonprofit organization committed to addressing imbalances in global governance and ensuring that Asia’s diversity and perspectives are recognized as central to global progress—from governance and economic development to cultural dialogue—while strengthening collaboration with other regional communities.

I leave the UN with appreciation for what was good, respect for those who serve with integrity, and lessons from more difficult moments. At the same time, I leave with the conviction that meaningful transformation often begins outside established systems. Asia Global Forum is my way of continuing that service—building a movement that places representation, merit, and accountability at the center of a fairer global order.

Purpose does not end with an institution—it evolves beyond it.

Shihana Mohamed, a Sri Lankan national, is President of Asia Global Network (www.AsiaGlobalForum.org) and a US Public Voices Fellow with The OpEd Project and Equality Now on advancing the rights of women and girls. She is also a founding member and Coordinator of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org). A dedicated human rights activist, she is a strong advocate for gender equality and the advancement of women. She served the United Nations for over 25 years.

IPS UN Bureau

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U.S. and Israeli army officers talk in front a US Patriot missile defense system. Credit: Jack Guez/Getty Images Source: Council on Foreign Relations

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

For a generation, no foreign leader bet more heavily on a single American president than Benjamin Netanyahu bet on Donald Trump. Trump moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, tore up the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and in February 2026 joined Israel in the opening strikes of a war against Iran that Netanyahu had spent three decades urging Washington to wage.

The partnership looked unbreakable. It was, in fact, conditional—and the condition was that their interests never diverge. In June 2026 they diverged completely, and the rupture has exposed a truth Netanyahu has spent his career denying: when Israeli security and the prime minister’s political survival point in opposite directions, he chooses himself.

The break came over a single document. On June 17, Trump signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran—the Islamabad Memorandum, brokered by Pakistan—formally ending the war he had pushed to start. The 14-point framework in the memorandum declares a permanent halt to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and waives sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. It also commits the United States and regional partners to assemble a $300 billion reconstruction fund and to negotiate the gradual release of Iran’s frozen assets worldwide.

What it does not do is what Israel went to war to achieve. The framework deferred the negotiation over Iran’s nuclear program to a later date, and it says nothing about Iran’s ballistic missiles or its regional proxies. Essentially, Trump wanted a short war that would compel Iran to come to the negotiating table. Netanyahu, on the other hand, wanted Iran permanently broken as a regional power. Those two visions could coexist while the fighting continued, but could not survive peace.

Thus, Netanyahu set out to wreck it. Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich branded the agreement bad for Israel and for the free world. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that Trump’s deal “does not bind us” and that Israel “is not subject to the United States.” And Israeli jets kept hitting Lebanon. On June 14, with the signing supposedly hours away, Israel struck Beirut. Trump erupted publicly, then telephoned Netanyahu.

The call was not diplomatic. In a telephone call by Trump to Netanyahu, he said, ”Bibi, you better be careful, or you will be on your own very soon.” In a subsequent call with Netanyahu, there was an even angrier exchange: Trump called the Israeli leader “crazy,” accused him of ingratitude, and—according to US officials briefed on the call—reminded him bluntly: “You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me.”

That last line is the key to everything. Netanyahu has one political lifeline left: the war. As long as Israel is fighting, there will be no elections; as long as there are no elections, he stays in office, and as long as he stays in office, he can postpone the corruption trials, waiting for the moment he loses power. For Netanyahu, peace is not merely inconvenient—it is politically existential.

The US intelligence community reportedly warned the White House that Netanyahu was actively working to blow up Trump’s Iran deal, and analysts said plainly that Trump would have to play the middle man against his own ally. The man who lobbied for the war had become the chief obstacle to the peace.

Then came the moment the world was meant to absorb. On June 18, Vice President JD Vance stood at a White House podium and delivered a rebuke unlike any an American administration has aimed at Israel in living memory. “Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time,” he said. “If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally I have left.”

Then the reminder that doubled as a threat: “Over the last three months, two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected your homeland have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.” Anyone in Israel who thinks their problem is Trump, Vance added, needs to “wake up and smell the reality.” He was basically warning Israel and reminding it who arms its skies to protect the peace deal with Iran.

The warning has not been heeded, and the cost is mounting. The first round of US-Iran technical talks was set for Switzerland’s Birkenstock resort on June 19. The night before, Israeli airstrikes across southern Lebanon killed 47 people, by the Lebanese health ministry’s count, and wounded scores more. Iran demanded a guarantee that the fighting would stop before it would sit down. Vance canceled his trip; the talks collapsed.

On June 20, Iran announced it was closing the Strait of Hormuz again, citing Israel’s strikes as a violation of the agreement. Vance worked to salvage the deal; Smotrich went public: Israel will stay in southern Lebanon “for as many years as necessary,” until Hezbollah disarms, and will not withdraw—adding that the prime minister agrees. It was a statement engineered to sabotage a peace Israel’s closest patron was risking its credibility to build.

This is the heart of the matter, and it is the part Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben Gvir refuse to grasp: Israel is almost wholly dependent on the United States—financially, militarily, and diplomatically. Washington is the shield that absorbs global outrage, vetoes resolutions, and replenishes arsenals. Openly defying a deal Trump personally signed is not bold statecraft. It is a slap in the face of the one ally Israel cannot afford to lose, delivered by a government that has confused its own survival with the nation’s.

The damage will outlast this episode. America’s interest now is a stable region, open shipping lanes, and a managed diplomacy with Iran rather than perpetual war. Netanyahu’s interest is the war itself. Those are not tactical differences to be smoothed over; they are structurally opposed, and they will keep colliding for as long as Netanyahu is in power.

The relationship that defined Israeli security for decades has been quietly inverted—the enemy has become the deal partner, and the indispensable ally has become the liability. It will not be repaired by reassurances or photo opportunities. It will be repaired only when Israel has a leader whose political life does not depend on keeping the country at war.

Until then, the rupture is not a crisis to be weathered. It is the new baseline. Netanyahu’s arrogance (chutzpah) will finally come back to haunt him.

Dr Alon Ben-Meir is President of the Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution

IPS UN Bureau

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UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the launch of the preliminary report from the UN Independent Panel on AI. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

The acceleration of artificial intelligence (AI) and its capabilities is far outpacing governments’ capacities to effectively regulate it. Without scientific evidence to inform their policies, countries will be left at a greater disadvantage, according to the UN’s independent panel on AI.

The UN Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence officially released its Preliminary Report on July 1. This is the Panel’s first global, independent scientific assessment on the opportunities, risks and impacts presented by AI. This early report work from the Panel is expected to provide a foundational evidence base to inform global policy ahead of its first comprehensive report in 2027.

The collaborative effort to build a shared understanding of AI has reached a crucial stage. Governments are making consequential decisions about AI under great uncertainty with rapidly changing, often conflicting sources of evidence and perspectives that do not necessarily reflect local realities. As AI capabilities continue to grow, the stakes for decisions made around the world are also increasing.

The preliminary report was produced by a panel composed of 40 leading experts from across multiple disciplines and every region of the world. Its members, which include the likes of computer scientists, economists, academics and human rights experts, serve in their personal capacity, independent of any government, company or institution. The report’s findings will be presented to governments at the inaugural UN Global Dialogue on AI Governance, convening in Geneva, Switzerland on 6 and 7 July.

The timing of the Panel’s report and the upcoming AI conference represents a turning point for where AI is at, according to Yoshua Bengio, one of the co-chairs of the Panel.

“It’s about the growing intelligence of machines,“ said Bengio, the renowned computer scientist who is the co-president of LawZero and founder of Mila. “You have to realise that intelligence gives power. As that power grows, it can unlock great benefits if we act wisely. But it can also lead to many perils.”

On July 1, Bengio and fellow co-chair of the panel Maria Ressa, journalist and Nobel Peace Prize winner, briefed reporters virtually on the report and the Panel’s work since it convened earlier this year. The co-chairs emphasised that the report does not give policy recommendations on the best practices for AI governance. Instead, Bengio said the policies should meet the “highest standards of scientific integrity.”

When asked about why the Panel could not make policy recommendations, Bengio remarked that their work would become very politicised and would “pollute” the Panel’s ability to “provide scientific evidence”.

Ressa added that while the differences were evident between the panel members, they found a shared language in pursuing the science behind AI. It was also where they could align in their work. “The tech has torn us apart in different realities. What the report will hopefully do for member countries of the UN is to come and bring us together to the same reality,” said Ressa.

Among the key takeaways from the report, what is clear is that in recent years, AI capabilities have accelerated, as has its adoption across multiple sectors and in societies. Currently, its advancements far outpace governments’ capacities to understand it, let alone regulate it. The decision-makers need scientific evidence to effectively govern AI, which should rise. Without this evidence, policy is weakened

The report states that AI holds “significant potential” to advance development across multiple sectors such as health, education and food production. To take advantage of that potential requires tailoring it to local contexts, institutions and user needs. The integration of AI in the health and agriculture sectors makes a case for its positive contributions, especially in the context of the Global South, where evidence has emerged of its use in these spaces. They are more effective when adapted to local contexts and when human workers are trained to use them.

With that said, countries vary in their adoption and usage of AI. The use and access of AI across the Global South lags behind the Global North, according to the report. 118 countries, predominantly in the Global South, are not engaged in major AI governance discussions, and less than one-third of developing countries have developed national AI strategies. The report warns that the Global South is disproportionately exposed to the misuse of AI due to limited capacity for mitigation and limited frameworks for influencing AI development and capacity building. The inputs and outcomes of AI also show linguistic unevenness. Existing AI model infrastructures train on only a fraction of the over 7,000 languages spoken around the world.

A select few countries concentrate AI development and computing capacity. The report shows that of the 500 largest-known public and private AI compute clusters, 75 percent were located in the United States, 15 percent in China, and 10 percent for the rest of the world. Much of the development of AI models is further concentrated in a handful of companies; 91 percent of notable AI models originated from the private sector. U.S. institutions produced 59 known AI models, compared to China’s 35 and an additional 13 from the rest of the world.

This is indicative of existing disparities when it comes to technological developments and may reinforce inequalities between developed and developing countries. This raises the risk for power to be concentrated to a select few individuals and states to shape the standards around AI. This concentration of power may then further affect economic power, military power and the power to influence public opinion.

“A handful of companies and a handful of countries are making the most consequential decisions about humanity’s future,” said Ressa.

On top of that, AI usage can challenge our shared reality. With the ease of generating and disseminating AI-generated textual and visual content, this blurs the line between what was manually created and what has been created with AI tools. This also presents complications when AI is used to create and spread deceptive, manipulated information intended to undermine institutions of information, which can have adverse effects on civic participation and democratic institutions. There is also demonstrable evidence that suggests that AI harms disproportionately affect minority communities due to limited frameworks around the training and application of AI systems.

Bengio noted that the report recognises multiple possibilities for where AI development could be headed due to the rapid acceleration and integration, although it is hard to predict where it will go. It may continue to grow exponentially, at which point it will exacerbate the gaps in AI’s capabilities and the societal risks without sufficient oversight or governance. Alternatively, AI capabilities could reach a plateau, according to Bengio, which would make AI less powerful and would give other countries more time to catch up with their expansions.

It is with these factors in mind, within the current AI landscape that begs urgent action, that governments will convene in Geneva next week for the Global Dialogue on AI Governance. There are steps that member states can take to close the gaps identified by the independent panel and other experts, not to mention a sense of urgency and duty to enact policies that will protect the human rights of their citizens. But it will require sustained commitments from member states.

“The more AI advances without shared rules, the less say governments and people will have in the outcome. So my message to governments is simple: Do not wait,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “The Summit of the Future asked whether international cooperation could keep pace with the speed of technology. Today offers one answer. The science is here. We can no longer say we did not know. What we do with it is now up to all of us.”

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Anyone whose life has been touched by cancer knows that care is highly complex.

From first symptoms through diagnosis and treatment, patients may need multiple diagnostic tests, combinations of surgery, systemic therapy and radiotherapy, and input from several specialists, alongside support services such as financial counselling, psychological support and palliative care.

Such a complex chain is inherently vulnerable, with one weak link meaning that a vital referral is missed, test results not delivered, or a patient is lost in the system while awaiting follow-up.

As a chronic disease, cancer tests the full breadth of health systems like few other illnesses, exposing system-wide gaps that affect us all.

In low- and-middle income countries (LMICs), where more people are experiencing and dying from cancer, and resources are limited, the infrastructure that connects the elements of cancer care is often missing.

Health systems in cities offer a unique entry-point for building this connective tissue – for people with cancer and, ultimately, all others. Cities are close enough to patients to reveal the failures in care, and large enough to bring together the institutions, workforce, data and governance needed to fix it.

Cities are ground zero for closing the gap between cancer care policy and delivery in LMICs, which are projected to see cancer incidence rise 142 per cent by 2040 and represent more than half of new cancer cases and two-thirds of deaths by 2050.

Cities can offer the full range of health services that a patient needs: from primary care appointments to discuss initial symptoms to laboratory tests, imaging, surgery, chemotherapy and radiotherapy. These services are connected by a city governance architecture ensuring patients are referred from one institution to another, treatment is uninterrupted and services are financially accessible.

Cities also serve as referral and treatment hubs for surrounding areas, and even for neighbouring countries, meaning that developing stronger urban systems will undoubtedly create stronger national pathways of care, provided equity is designed in from the start.

This makes the city the most strategic starting point for closing the gap between cancer policy and delivery.

National cancer plans are essential, but they do not deliver care. Patient outcomes will only improve when these are actually implemented. And this requires policies being translated into time-bound, costed, funded programmes, and health authorities being given the governance structure, funding and authority to act earlier and more seamlessly to support better treatment and survival rates.

To transform this and turn policy into practice, governments and funders need to make at least two fundamental shifts.

First, they must move beyond externally designed interventions and invest in locally owned systems that can diagnose their own gaps, set priorities and sustain improvements over time.

Second, governments and funders need to stop treating national policy as proof of delivery and invest in the implementation mechanisms that make delivery possible and strengthen the systems at large.This means sustained investment in robust governance systems, defined referral pathways, sustainable financing and a trained and empowered health workforce.

At City Cancer Challenge (C/Can), we know this approach can work. We have seen how locally-led healthcare reform can ensure the fundamental processes and networks are in place to deliver long-lasting sustainable cancer care.

In Asunción, Paraguay, this approach showed what strengthening health systems means in practice. Improved diagnostic processes meant that women with suspected cancer were diagnosed earlier, started treatment sooner, and ultimately had better survival chances. It also meant that fewer women got lost along the pathway.

Asunción’s success came from coordinated action, not a single intervention. Laboratory quality improved, workforces were trained and empowered, protocols upgraded to international standards, and sample traceability strengthened across hospital services. Because these changes were locally owned and co-developed, they hold. This is what distinguishes real health system improvement from equipment that sits in a locked room, or protocols that disappear the moment external support does.

The value of this locally-owned model lies in its sustainability and scalability. Learnings from Asuncion can be used by other cities to identify bottlenecks in their own healthcare delivery, align institutions and build the local systems needed for better cancer care.

Cities have always been where health systems evolve, integrate and scale. And the impetus for strengthening LMIC health systems, starting in cities, is even greater to address the growing cancer crisis.

Where you live and who you are should not determine the quality of care you receive. Governments and funders should stop looking only at national cancer plans, protocols or new equipment. Instead, they should also ask whether local health systems can deliver timely, coordinated and equitable care, and invest accordingly.

Isabel Mestres, CEO, City Cancer Challenge (C/Can)

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The demand for critical energy transition materials such as copper, lithium and cobalt is on the rise due to the expansion of clean energy technologies. Credit: Unsplash/Lj. Filipović

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

Demand for critical energy transition minerals (CETMs) is expected to surge over the coming decades as countries expand clean technology capacity, develop electric vehicles, create battery storage, implement renewable energy systems, and introduce digital infrastructure according to UNCTADs latest report, The Shifting Dynamics of Critical Minerals Trade.

CETMs include lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, making them vital to producing low carbon clean energy alternatives and renewable technologies used for electricity production and battery storage. These elements are also commonly found within datacenters, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and any field requiring digitalization.

According to the report, demand for lithium is projected to increase by 353 percent by 2040, followed by graphite (131 percent), nickel (69 percent), magnet rare earths (65 percent), cobalt (49 percent), and copper (28 percent).

Naturally this surge in CETM demand also has changed the composition of where CETMs are being used, with clean technologies absorbing a growing share in the industry of CETMs.

Share of Critical Mineral Demand for Clean Technologies. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Although these CETMs are experiencing a surge in demand, from mining to processing or refining, the entire value chain is geographically concentrated between a few countries, dominating the entire global output. This same pattern also follows for reserves of key minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements which are unevenly distributed among a few states.

According to UNCTAD, China accounts for 69 percent of rare earth element production, and produces 78 percent of natural graphite capacity. Indonesia accounts for 67 percent of global nickel production, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for 50 percent of global cobalt reserves and 47 percent of global cobalt mine production.

“Reserves” refer to mineral deposits which can be economically extracted using available technology, differing from total geological resources, which include deposits not yet commercially viable or known. Due to the situation of current reserves and mining output, only a few nations produce the majority of the capacity of critical minerals. The concentration of production and reserves leaves global supply chains highly vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions, and trade restrictions, among other shocks.

Represented is how much of the global reserves/mining output of CETMs is within just the top three countries. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Notably, mining output is slightly more concentrated than reserves for every mineral shown, indicating that mining production is controlled by an even smaller group of countries than the resource base itself.

This means that an overwhelming amount of these materials needed for some of the most critical functions for today and for our future rely on three countries for the entire global trade to function.

UNCTAD states: “Mining is capital-intensive and characterized by long lead times, limiting short-term supply responsiveness and leaving concentrated supply chains exposed to geopolitical risks, governance challenges, and environmental and social pressures.”

While the mining process receives much of the attention, UNCTAD argues in their report that refining represents an even larger vulnerability due to processing capacity being concentrated within a even smaller number of countries.

Refining and other downstream stages are even more concentrated” than that of mining, “creating critical bottlenecks in CETM supply chains,” An UNCTAD spokesperson told Inter Press Service. “A country may possess abundant mineral reserves yet remain dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers for refining, separation, precursor materials or advanced components.” They added explaining how there are “technical know-how, industrial capabilities, infrastructure and market power”, which means that “access to mineral resources alone does not necessarily translate into secure access to supply.”

UNCTAD also highlights that the concentration is also within only a few firms, in “several critical mineral markets” where a relatively small number of companies control “significant shares of mining, processing, trading, refining and technology.”

The issue as UNCTAD points out is that refining requires substantial long-term capital investment, access to advanced technologies, significant energy inputs, and specialized infrastructure, along with being an economy of scale to be cost competitive, which creates massive barriers to entry for new players.

Because global supply is concentrated, naturally international trade is the primary mechanism through which these minerals move between countries. The UNCTAD spokesperson remarked that “Cross-border trade in ores, concentrates, refined materials, and downstream components enables access to geographically dispersed stages of production across complex global value chains, particularly in high-technology sectors.”

What this means is that most countries depend on imports of CETMs at some point of their value chain for their manufacturing or developmental needs.

While diversification of processes would be necessary to alleviate risk associated with CETMs, since 2020 restrictive export measures on CETMs have been on the rise.

Mineral-rich economies like China, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are seeking to capture higher value stages of production, rather than just exporting raw materials alone. Restrictive export measures are increasingly being introduced to capture more of the downstream value, encouraging domestic refining, industrial development, and manufacturing, rather than solely relying on commodity exports.

Of these measures, licensing requirements, export taxes, and exports bans make the most common measures.

Since 2020, 37 licensing requirements, 31 export tax measures, 29 export bans, and 1 export quota have been recorded. 18 of these export measures were implemented by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with China introducing 16 followed by Indonesia at 12. Other countries such as Burundi and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have introduced 8 measures each, while Zimbabwe has 7.

While at the moment supply chains are extremely concentrated and are becoming even further concentrated creating higher risk for importers, UNCTAD notes that major CETM importers such as the European Union, Japan, and the United States are adopting strategies to alleviate risk by diversifying import sources, increasing domestic capacity development, recycling, and developing strategic partnerships. In a three-year period, since 2022 such agreements in developmental stages have grown from just 15, to an addition of 58 new agreements targeting a diversification across value chains, and securing mineral access and production in a safe and future proof manner through policy.

As demand for CETMs accelerates, governments are increasingly looking at supply chains with scrutiny, seeing them as a strategic asset. While producing CETM high-capacity nations are seeking to control more value through domestic production of other stages and create more industry, major importers are moving aggressively to diversify supply sources to build more resilient supply chains. The outcome could not only decide the speed at which the global energy transition occurs, but also shape which countries will emerge as the key trading hubs and industrial powerhouses of the clean-energy economy.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed with Resident Coordinators from the Latin America and Caribbean region. Credit: United Nations

By Mohammed Chiraz Baly
GENEVA, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

A letter to staff unions from economists working in the resident coordinator system, blows the whistle on a restructuring that could damage the development pillar and downgrade support to middle income countries.

For memory, UN resident coordinators are tasked with aligning the work of different UN agencies in 162 countries with respective government priorities.

Resident coordinators don’t have funds to get agencies to work together. They rely on their powers of persuasion and importantly, their office’s analytical and data handling capacity.

They therefore have a country economist, who provides evidence-based advice to the UN country team on improving development impact and helps mobilise financing from international financial institutions. These economists also represent non-resident agencies such as mine, UNCTAD, in discussions with the government. As agencies shut their country offices, this becomes more important.

The current system has existed since 2019 and the General Assembly has asked the Deputy Secretary-General, who oversees the system, for a review.

According to the letter (there is no other source of information as the process is a tightly-guarded secret), the proposal is a restructuring that, surprisingly, reduces analytical capacity resident coordinator offices in the over 100 middle income developing countries through a blanket downgrading of economist posts, undermining resident coordinators in the process.

There doesn’t seem to be an assessment in the rushed process of different countries’ circumstances nor the situations they’re going through.

It is not clear why middle-income countries, which constitute most UN member states, are being targeted and this appears to run counter to UN policy.

DESA has warned against abandoning support for middle income countries (https://lnkd.in/edKWFJgM) noting they “are a large and heterogenous group. They differ widely in their development needs and challenges, and in their capacity to mobilise domestic and external resources.”

Rebeca Grynspan has called out the middle-income country trap.

Last month the Secretary-General warned not to judge the challenges facing countries by GDP alone (https://lnkd.in/eaB85QFg).

Although, member states have already voiced concerns with the restructuring; it is being imposed regardless, and being rushed through before they can have a further say.

A large number of staff, originating from all regions, some recruited only last year, will therefore be removed from their posts, while UN support to and ability to mobilise financing for middle income countries will be reduced.

As the restructuring is cost-neutral, the savings from cutting staff in the field would appear to then provide more posts to regional offices and at senior level, and upgrade management posts.

The letter alleges an absence of meaningful consultation with unions and resident coordinators. In some countries, the entire cadre of international and national professional staff in a country could be replaced.

There is consensus that the resident coordinator system should be improved and we know resources are limited. It’s not clear though if downgrading substantive and analytical capacity is the right solution. Perhaps a more comprehensive assessment is needed, without the ticking clock of the end of mandate, so that the fragile development pillar isn’t damaged further.

Extracts from the letter are published below :

We write as economists serving in UN Resident Coordinator’s Offices across Standard, Complex, and Multi-Country settings. We come from different regions, work in countries spanning very different development contexts and income categories, and some of us started our careers as national officers. We raise these concerns in good faith and ask for a structured dialogue before the proposals are finalised.

1. The case for economic expertise in the RC system

The RCO economist provides analytical support independent of government preference and agency programming logic — on fiscal space, debt dynamics, structural transformation, SDG financing, and trade shocks. It draws on experience across multiple country contexts and IFI networks. The seniority of the posts matters: it enables credible engagement with finance ministers, private sector counterparts, and development finance institutions — the partnerships needed to mobilise SDG financing. Abolishing those posts removes that standing. At the ECOSOC OAS in June 2026, delegations spanning the G77, the African Group, AOSIS, India, Germany, Indonesia, Pakistan, Canada, the United States, and the Republic of Korea called explicitly for “strengthening capacities in strategic planning, economic analysis, SDG financing, data, digitalization, communications, climate and resilience.” The recalibration moves in the opposite direction, weeks after that mandate was given.

• The current moment is the wrong time to reduce analytical capacity. Countries face compounding pressures: COVID-19 structural aftereffects, Russia-Ukraine trade and energy disruptions, US-Iran escalation, and a fragmenting multilateral trading system. At the ECOSOC OAS, USG Li Junhua (DESA) noted ODA fell a record 23% in 2025 and the SDG financing gap stands above USD 4 trillion. Agency analytical capacity is simultaneously contracting: UNDP has abolished its economist programme for Africa and budgets and staffing have been cut across multiple entities. As agency footprints shrink, the RCO economist is often the only independent macroeconomic analyst the RC and host government can draw on.

• The Standard RCO category is a coordination label, not an economic complexity assessment. Across the 101 Standard RCO countries, analytical complexity does not track income category. DESA, UNCTAD, and the regional commissions have all cautioned against using GDP per capita as a proxy for development support needs. Applying that filter to determine where independent economic analysis is necessary is inconsistent with the UN’s own guidance.

• Adding senior headquarters posts while cutting country capacity contradicts a direct General Assembly mandate. The recalibration creates new D2 posts at headquarters and increases regional staffing. In December 2025, paragraph 16 of GA resolution A/C.5/80/L.4 requested the Secretary-General to include proposals “with the aim to reduce or reclassify the overall number of USG, ASG, D-2 and D-1 posts markedly” under UN80. Adding D2 posts at headquarters while abolishing and nationalising field posts moves in the opposite direction. Norway at the ECOSOC OAS stated this is “not the time to weaken” the RC system. Member States including AOSIS, Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, Canada, and Switzerland also questioned “whether expertise-on-demand can substitute for sustained presence.” It cannot. Cross-country policy and financing work requires continuity, institutional memory, and relationships — not episodic inputs from a regional hub.

• The recalibration contradicts UN 2.0 priorities and discards a recent investment in talent. Under UN 2.0, the Secretary-General prioritised data-driven decision-making — a competency assessed in recruiting these positions — and called for international staff mobility across headquarters, regional bodies, and the field. The RCO economist role was one of the few routes enabling that rotation. Converting posts to national roles closes it off. Several colleagues joined within the past 12 to 18 months on the basis of a clear signal that country-level analytical capacity was being strengthened. Reversing course without explanation wastes the investment and will deter future talent.

2. The analytical basis for this decision does not hold

The recalibration of 130 RCOs has been summarised on a single slide with four columns — no within-category differentiation, no country-specific analysis, no assessment of capacity lost in any specific setting. The UN80 Staff Support Policy Framework (OHR/PG/2025/4, June 2025) requires that “decision-makers must provide reasons for any administrative decisions, supported by facts.” No such reasons have been provided. Income-based categories — which the UN’s own analytical bodies warn against using as a proxy for development complexity — are the primary basis for determining where independent economic analysis is needed.

3. Process concerns

• RCs were not meaningfully consulted. Engagement happened shortly before public rollout, not during the design phase. Earlier discussions reportedly included giving RCs discretion over the economist profile in their office. That option was dropped without explanation, in direct tension with the principle that country team configurations should reflect RC judgment.

• No written rationale has been provided. The town hall did not explain why economist positions are being nationalised or downgraded, why income categories are the organising variable, or how any of this improves efficiency or advances UN 2.0. Without a written rationale, staff and Member States are being asked to accept a significant structural change on trust.

• The process does not meet the Organisation’s own standards for staff consultation. Staff Regulation 8.1(a) requires “effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work.” OHR/PG/2025/4 commits management to engage through the Staff Management Committee “on a regular and timely basis regarding proposals that will impact staff.” Staff learned of this recalibration at a town hall after the configuration was designed. Whatever engagement occurred with staff representatives fell short of these requirements — and staff at large had no involvement at all.

• The pace of implementation risks bypassing Member State oversight. ACABQ and the Fifth Committee will consider RC system funding in autumn 2026. DCO’s extrabudgetary discretion means restructuring can proceed before that review. Rushing this through before a new Secretary-General is named makes the situation harder to revisit.

4. What we are asking for

• A written rationale — including the evidence base, efficiency gains claimed, and an honest account of what analytical capacity is lost.

• Genuine RC consultation before any finalisation on the economist profile appropriate for each country context. RC discretion should be the default, not the exception.

• Structured Staff Council engagement before the configuration is operationalised, consistent with Staff Regulation 8.1 and Staff Rule 8.1(h).

• Reconsideration of the blanket approach, with scope for RCs to retain or request an international economist where conditions warrant — an option reportedly still under discussion before this proposal was finalised.

• An assessment of the HR costs — relocations, repatriations, terminations — given the RC system’s current financial constraints.

Mohammed Chiraz Baly is a staff representative and former General Secretary of the CCISUA staff union federation. He is also a data analyst at UNCTAD focusing on investment financing in developing countries.

IPS UN Bureau

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