Evans Njewa, on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group, addresses the 71st GEF Council Meeting. Credit: IISD_ENB

By IPS Correspondent
SAMARKAND, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Niue, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sudan, and Togo will receive over USD 67 million in new funding to help strengthen resilience.
The funding for vulnerable countries aims to strengthen resilience through a package of projects approved by the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) Council, along with a new strategy to guide the funds through 2030.

Meeting in Samarkand ahead of the Eighth GEF Assembly, Council members approved the final LDCF/SCCF Work Program of the GEF-8 period, comprising seven projects under the Least Developed Countries Fund and one project under the Special Climate Change Fund. Along with the USD 67 million, the projects are expected to  mobilise nearly USD 218 million in co-financing.

The funding is expected to assist with mitigating flood and coastal risks, strengthen food and water security, protect ecosystems, improve disaster preparedness, and expand resilient economic opportunities for vulnerable communities.

Claude Gascon, Interim CEO and Chairperson, GEF. Credit: IISD/ENB | Danny Skilton

Claude Gascon, GEF Interim CEO, said the latest tranche of programming responded to evolving national needs, showing how targeted finance was essential in helping countries advance their adaptation priorities while leveraging wider partnerships.

“The work program reflects this demand and the continued relevance of these funds,” Gascon said. “It also shows the catalytic nature of the LDCF and SCCF – working with MDBs and other climate funds and increasingly supporting multi-trust fund projects that align resources across the GEF family of funds.”

The projects include:

• Inclusive and Resilient Agricultural and Rural Entrepreneurship in the DRC, which aims to build community resilience, reduce vulnerability, and strengthen adaptive capacities to climate hazards in the provinces of Congo Central, Kwilu, Kwango, and Haut Katanga. About 200,000 people should benefit. IFAD will implement the project.
• Safeguarding Guinea-Bissau’s Coastlines and Urban Areas from Climate Risks aims to strengthen the adaptive capacity of coastal and urban communities, critical infrastructure, and ecosystems. About 120,000 people are expected to benefit, and the UNDP will implement the project.
• An integrated project to Strengthen the Resilience of Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in a Changing Climate in Dakar, Senegal, aims to strengthen the resilience of agricultural communities and populations to floods in the Niayes area and the urban and peri-urban areas of Dakar. It’s expected to deliver direct adaptation benefits to 362,882 people.
• Strengthening Climate-smart Agribusiness and Natural Resource Management for Adaptation and Resilient Livelihoods in Sudan’s River Nile and Northern States aims to reduce vulnerability and enhance the adaptive capacity of agropastoral communities. About 27,000 people should benefit.
• The Sustainable Transport Solutions in Lomé project aims to reduce flood risk and improve the sustainability of urban mobility in Lomé, Togo. It is expected to provide direct adaptation benefits for 45,000 people and will be implemented by BOAD.
• Infrastructure, Ecosystems and Communities Integrated Project in Niue is aimed at climate change adaptation, mitigation, and biodiversity. It is expected to directly benefit 1,142 people, with UNDP as the implementing agency.
• Community Access and Urban Services Enhancement Project II will expand successful models for climate-resilient urban services in Honiara, Solomon Islands, by using integrated flood mitigation, nature-based solutions, and community-based interventions. Expected to benefit 153,285 residents. The World Bank is the implementing agency.
• Enhancing Coastal Adaptation and Resilience in Bangladesh will enhance coastal climate adaptation and resilience improving livelihoods and adaptive capacity for 43,050 people. The Implementing agency is CI.

The approval concludes a significant period of delivery for the two adaptation-focused funds. With this work program and pending medium-sized projects, the LDCF will have supported 90 projects and programs during GEF-8, reaching 44 Least Developed Countries and programming a total of more than USD 750 million. Over the same period, the SCCF is expected to support 40 projects, including 25 projects benefiting non-LDC Small Island Developing States through its dedicated SIDS window, as well as support for technology transfer, innovation, and private sector engagement.

Looking to the Future

Council members also endorsed the GEF-9 Programming Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change for the LDCF and SCCF, setting the direction for programming under the two funds from July 2026 to June 2030.

The strategy provides a framework to help vulnerable countries move from adaptation planning to implementation, with a stronger focus on integrated solutions, locally led action, innovation, private sector engagement, blended finance, and better collaboration across climate funds and development partners.

Evans Njewa, speaking on behalf of Ambassador Adao Soares Barbosa, Chair of the LDC Group, welcomed the work program and strategy while emphasising the continued importance of predictable support for Least Developed Countries in the face of intensifying climate impacts.

“These discussions are not merely procedural. They shape whether adaptation support reaches the countries and communities that need it most,” Njewa said. “Each approval, each endorsement, and each new strategy represents a step closer to a world where the most vulnerable are empowered, supported, and included in the transition toward a climate-resilient future.”

The GEF-9 LDCF/SCCF Programming Strategy sets out two financial scenarios for each fund: USD 1 billion to USD 1.3 billion for the LDCF and USD 200 million to USD 300 million for the SCCF, and it also introduces operational improvements to strengthen access, delivery, innovation, and finance mobilisation. Together, these measures will help the LDCF and SCCF provide more predictable, catalytic support for Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States.

The work program also reflects the growing role of the LDCF and SCCF in leveraging wider sources of finance. The LDCF projects are expected to mobilise USD 207.9 million in co-financing, while the SCCF project in Niue is expected to mobilise USD 9.8 million. Several projects involve multilateral development banks and international financial institutions, and they also use multi-trust fund approaches that align LDCF and SCCF financing with broader GEF investments.

Gascon said the decisions in Samarkand would help provide continuity and predictability for countries relying on LDCF and SCCF support.

“With just a few years remaining to deliver on global commitments to 2030, the role of these funds is even more central,” he said. “By endorsing the strategy, this Council has provided a clear framework for the years ahead. The momentum is there, the demand is clear, and the opportunity is in front of us.”

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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By External Source
Jun 2 2026 (IPS)

 
2025 was one of the three hottest years ever recorded.

The years from 2015 to 2025 were the hottest eleven years on record.

The planet is now about 1.43 degrees Celsius warmer than the pre-industrial average.

The oceans are absorbing heat at a staggering rate — about eighteen times humanity’s annual energy use each year over the last two decades.

Sea levels remain near record highs.

And for people, the risks are immediate.

The IPCC estimates that 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change.

The World Health Organization projects that, between 2030 and 2050, climate change could cause about 250,000 additional deaths each year from undernutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress alone.

Yet the gap between promise and action remains wide.

UNEP says current policies put the world on track for 2.8 degrees Celsius of warming this century.

Even full delivery of new national climate pledges would still leave warming at around 2.3 to 2.5 degrees.

This is why June 5th matters.

World Environment Day was established by the UN General Assembly in 1972 and is led by UNEP.

In 2026, World Environment Day is focused on climate action.

Azerbaijan will host the global commemoration in Baku, under the national campaign message:

“Inspired by Nature. For Climate. For Our Future.”

UNEP’s global call is simple:

Act #NowForClimate.

The message is not that the future is lost.

It is that choices still count.

Cleaner energy.

Stronger early warning systems.

Smarter cities.

Protected ecosystems.

Restored land.

Every action reduces risk.

Climate action is not only an environmental issue.

It is a health issue.

A development issue.

A justice issue.

And a survival issue.

This World Environment Day, June 5th, join the movement.

Act now.

Speak up.

Choose change.

For nature.

For climate.

For our future.

IPS UN Bureau

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Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, at the 71st GEF Council Meeting. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

By Stella Paul
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)

On day 2 of the Global Environment Facility’s 71st Council Meeting, which focused on process and procedure, a clear message emerged: global environmental governance cannot afford fragmentation.

With six major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) under its financial mechanism – the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), the Minamata Convention on Mercury, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the emerging Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction – the GEF sits at the centre of a complex reporting architecture.

For many convention secretariats, reporting requirements have become increasingly difficult for countries, constrained by limited staffing and multilayered requirements. Calls for greater synergies, including simpler processes across conventions, have taken on new urgency.

“This is the year of three COPs – a great opportunity for us to create synergies,” said Asad Naqvi, representing the CBD, setting the tone for discussions.

A System Under Strain

Across conventions, similar challenges surfaced: fragmented reporting, misaligned data requirements, and duplication, especially for smaller secretariats and developing countries.

Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, highlighted the gap between global commitments and local realities while acknowledging GEF’s progress in integrating Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). She pointed to artisanal and small-scale gold mining – one of the largest sources of mercury emissions – that often occurs in indigenous territories. Yet many affected communities remain unaware of how the issue is addressed under the convention. Without meaningful engagement, broader goals such as biodiversity conservation become difficult to achieve.

“If Indigenous Peoples are not adequately engaged in combating mercury pollution, even biodiversity goals will fall short,” she warned, calling for stronger integration across conventions.

Delegates at the 71st GEF Council Meeting debated how to remove fragmentation in the management of funding across six major multilateral environmental agreements. Stella Paul/IPS

The ‘Minefield’ of Reporting

The complexity of reporting was underscored by Dr Rolph Payet, Executive Secretary of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm (BRS) Conventions. Despite efforts to build synergies within the chemicals and waste cluster, reporting remains what he described as a “minefield”.

“We have one convention where reporting has started and others where reporting formats have changed; some stakeholders still prefer paper-based systems, while others want digital platforms – and they do not always share data,” Payet explained.

The result is a system that remains difficult for countries to navigate. Still, Payet struck a cautiously optimistic note, pointing to ongoing efforts to harmonise compliance mechanisms and streamline data collection.

“This is not something we should run away from,” he said. “We have a unique opportunity to bring our heads together and find ways to make reporting easier, more effective, and more useful for measuring impact.”

From Silos to Systems

For Naqvi and others, synergies go beyond administrative efficiency; they are essential for addressing interconnected global crises.

Synergies are not just about efficiency but addressing interconnected crises, says Naqvi. The Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) is often viewed as a conservation blueprint.

“All these challenges – climate, biodiversity, land degradation, pollution – are interconnected,” he said. “The global financial landscape does not allow us to continue with siloed projects.”

He urged the GEF to leverage its role as a financial mechanism for multiple conventions to deepen integration. Existing coordination platforms, such as the Joint Liaison Group among the three Rio Conventions, could be expanded to include chemicals, waste, and emerging issues.

Equally important, he added, is shifting the focus from outputs to systemic change – understanding and addressing the economic drivers behind environmental degradation.

“We must not only fight the flames but also turn off the tap that fuels the fire,” Naqvi said.

Financing the Transition

Across conventions, the scale of investment required far exceeds available grant resources, creating an urgent need for innovative financing.

Stankiewicz highlighted the funding gap for mercury pollution and hazardous chemicals, noting that grants alone are insufficient. She pointed to blended finance – combining public, private, and sovereign capital – as a key pathway.

“Grants can catalyse,” she said. “They can crowd in larger investments and unlock development opportunities while addressing environmental challenges.”

According to her, emerging examples reflect this approach. For example, the GEF-supported PCB animation project not only reports on the destruction of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) but also on co-benefits such as emissions reduced through energy efficiency.

“That will be integration in practice. And I hope the implementation agencies will also join us on this important job,” Stankiewicz said.

Land, Drought, and Resilience

From the UNCCD perspective, synergies closely link to scaling investment and building resilience, particularly in vulnerable regions.

Cathrine Mutambirwa, Programme Coordinator at the UNCCD’s Global Mechanism, stressed the need to mobilise private capital and expand blended finance models beyond pilot initiatives. This is especially critical in drylands and drought-prone regions where financing remains limited.

She welcomed the proposed integrated programmes on drought and land restoration under GEF-9 as a timely response to country needs.

“These are precisely the kinds of cross-sectoral approaches that affected countries are asking for,” she said.

Mutambirwa also highlighted partnerships with multilateral development banks and regional institutions, showing how coordinated financing can bring together resources – including GEF, climate funds, and development banks – into cohesive programmes.

Speakers also stressed that integration must be inclusive, placing Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, and vulnerable communities at the centre and supported by accessible information and simplified systems.

“There has been too much fragmentation,” Naqvi of UNCBD acknowledged. “We need to ensure that our processes work for those who are custodians of biodiversity and natural resources.”

A Pivotal Moment

The Eighth GEF Assembly comes at a critical time. With multiple COPs scheduled in the same year and the GEF entering its ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), there is a rare alignment of political attention, financing, and institutional momentum.

Speakers were clear: this moment must not be missed.

Greater synergies in reporting, financing, and programme design are essential to reduce burdens and improve their impact.

If implemented effectively, such integration could transform global environmental governance from parallel efforts into a coherent system capable of addressing the world’s most pressing challenges.

As Naqvi put it, the opportunity is clear: to move beyond fragmentation and build a system where sustainability is not just a goal but a pathway to inclusive and resilient development.

The speakers revealed that UN agencies and conventions were cutting operational costs – through reduced travel and the use of technologies like AI. At such a time, they are expected to push for simpler reporting systems that align with tighter budgets, smaller teams, and growing workloads. It will be telling to see how the GEF-9 cycle reflects these constraints in both design and implementation.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Noemi Hernandez Rodriguez Borjas at the first of the 71st GEF Council Meeting. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton

By Kizito Makoye
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)

While the Global Environment Facility (GEF) said its eighth replenishment cycle (GEF-8) was about to exceed environmental targets for biodiversity protection, marine conservation, ecosystem restoration, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, governments and civil society groups called for stronger safeguards to ensure that local communities, Indigenous Peoples, and smaller implementing agencies are not left behind as funding mechanisms become more complex.

The 71st GEF Council Meeting is taking place at the Congress Center in the ancient city of Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

Amid the optimism, delegates cautioned that billions of dollars flowing into efforts to restore forests, protect oceans and combat climate change must also deliver accountability and earn the trust of the communities whose livelihoods are affected.

The delegates endorsed the final work programme under GEF-8, which is expected to bring overall programming to 97 percent of available resources before the four-year cycle ends.

Officials described the programme as politically significant, marking it as the final package of projects before negotiations on the ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), which will guide billions of dollars in environmental financing over the coming years.

“We see good progress, and we know that programming is anticipated to be 97 percent by the end of the GEF-8 cycle,” Dr Dawda Badgie, a council member from The Gambia, said, noting that several environmental indicators had surpassed their targets.

Fred Boltz, the GEF’s Head of Programming, said resources across most funding windows would be fully committed by the end of the current four-year cycle.

“In all focal areas, integrated programmes, blended finance, the small grants programme and efforts by indigenous peoples and local communities will yield extraordinary results from GEF-8 investment, achieving or greatly surpassing six of ten GEF-8 outcome targets,” Boltz told delegates.

According to GEF officials, investments under GEF-8 are expected to place well over hundreds of millions of hectares of land and sea under improved biodiversity management, restore more than 10 million hectares of ecosystems, improve management of 59 transboundary water systems and benefit more than 32 million people worldwide.

Boltz said climate investments alone are expected to deliver more than 2.2 billion metric tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, while marine conservation efforts will contribute to the creation or improved management of more than 1.9 billion hectares of marine protected areas – equivalent to more than five percent of the world’s oceans.

He said targets related to marine protected areas, ecosystem restoration, emissions reductions, shared water ecosystems and sustainable fisheries management are expected to be significantly exceeded by the end of the cycle.

Among the highlighted initiatives was a conservation financing mechanism in Madagascar that combines blended finance resources with climate adaptation funding to support an outcome-payment bond for biodiversity conservation, including the protection of the island’s iconic lemurs.

Boltz said land degradation funding would also be fully utilised, helping restore more than 10 million hectares of land and ecosystems worldwide.

Key projects include support for the Great Green Wall initiative across the Sahel and a water-land management programme in Central Asia covering two river basins that support about 80 percent of the population in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The chemicals and waste portfolio, expected to reach 95 percent utilisation, is projected to eliminate more than 260,000 metric tonnes of hazardous chemicals and waste through programmes reducing pollution and promoting cleaner industrial production.

One initiative seeks to eliminate mercury use in the non-ferrous metals sector, including copper and aluminium production, industries experiencing growth due to increasing demand from electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies.

The international waters portfolio is expected to be 99 percent committed by the end of GEF-8.

The fund is supporting implementation of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) agreement in more than 60 countries and has helped improve management of 59 shared water systems globally.

Blended finance resources under GEF-8 are expected to be fully deployed, supporting initiatives such as debt-for-nature swaps in Latin America and the Caribbean and renewable energy investments in small island states.

“The Latin America and Caribbean Debt for Nature Conversion Facility helps countries address debt burdens and support biodiversity conservation at the same time,” he said.

The GEF’s Small Grants Programme, which supports conservation efforts at the community level, is also expected to fully use its allocation.

Boltz said local civil society organisations would help place nearly seven million hectares of landscapes and 300,000 hectares of marine habitats under improved management practices, benefiting around 870,000 people, half of whom are women.

“He added that support for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) would expand under GEF-9.”
It is expected that the GEF will announce support for 10 Indigenous-led initiatives, including 5 Indigenous-led funds, by the end of 2026.

The fund has invested in youth leadership through the 10-million-dollar Fonseca Leadership Programme, which has supported 250 fellows from 52 countries, 42 percent of whom are young women.

Mohamed Bakarr, who oversees the GEF’s integrated programmes, said that all 11 integrated initiatives approved under GEF-8 were fully programmed.

Together, they deploy USD 1.65 billion in GEF resources and mobilise an additional USD 11.2 billion in co-financing across 98 countries.

“The integrated programmes mobilise 45 percent more co-financing per project on average,” Bakarr said, adding that governments were contributing significantly higher shares of funding than in previous replenishment cycles.

The June 2026 work programme includes 16 projects requiring USD 129.5 million in GEF financing and US$11.9 million in agency fees, for a total allocation of USD 141.3 million.

The projects are expected to leverage USD 828 million in co-financing, resulting in a co-financing ratio of 6.4 to one.

The work programme will support environmental initiatives in more than 19 countries, including seven least-developed countries and four small island developing states.

Delegates hailed a renewable energy initiative in Uzbekistan, which they expect will mobilise more than USD 1 billion in private investment.

Japan’s representative, Yoko Yamoto, described the project as an icon for GEF presence in Central Asia.

“We welcome the development of the NGI project in Uzbekistan, the host country for this session, and especially raising the GEF’s presence in Central Asia,” Yamoto said.

However, the same project attracted criticism.

Representing the GEF Civil Society Organisation Network, Sagar Aryal argued that civil society organisations and affected communities had not been consulted during the project’s design phase.

The criticism reflected broader concerns that GEF’s financial instruments may advance faster than mechanisms designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and community participation.

“The Stakeholder Engagement Plan is promised only before CEO endorsement, not before this Council takes a decision today,” Aryal said. “As GEF scales up blended finance, this question matters more, not less. We ask that community engagement and consultations be required before Council approval and not deferred after it.”

Civil society groups also praised greater support for community-led conservation.

Aryal highlighted continued support for the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund and a new Global Flyways Grant Mechanism focused on the East Asian-Australasian Flyway.

“Together, these two projects represent close to 20% of this work programme going to or directly through civil society,” he said. “This is the highest share we have seen… it shows what is possible.”

“As GEF-9 begins, we ask, can this be the floor and not the ceiling?” he added.

Delegates also criticised the concentration of projects among implementing agencies, noting that almost two-thirds of projects were submitted by just Conservation International and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In response to the criticism, Boltz affirmed that, despite the concerns, overall allocations stayed within limits.

“UNDP share presently is at 29.8 percent for GEF-8 overall,” he said, noting that medium-sized projects and enabling activities involving other agencies would help improve diversification.

The Secretariat also defended the programme’s performance, stating that GEF8 was on track to meet or exceed several core environmental targets.

Boltz said six of ten core indicators were on track and that terrestrial and marine conservation areas supported under GEF-8 had surpassed 2 billion hectares, up from 1.5 billion hectares in GEF-7.

As the meeting moved toward endorsing the final work programme, consensus emerged that GEF-8 is ending as one of the institution’s most successful replenishment cycles in environmental results, programming and co-financing. But delegates said success alone would not shield the institution from growing demands for greater inclusion, transparency and institutional diversity.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Credit: Adobe stock. Source Africa Renewal, United Nations

By Cristina Duarte
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)

Africa holds 9 per cent of global renewable freshwater, over 600 gigawatts of untapped hydropower potential, and between 60 and 65 per cent of the world’s uncultivated arable land.

Its workforce is the youngest on the planet. Its consumer market will reach 2.5 billion people by 2050. Together, these constitute every production factor that global water, energy and food systems will need in the coming decades.

This is not a continent of scarcity. It is a continent of strategic abundance, and the African Union’s decision to anchor its 2026 theme in water and sanitation signals that the continent’s leadership is ready to govern it as such.

Consider what governed abundance looks like. The Grand Inga Dam alone could generate twice the output of the Three Gorges and electrify industries across Central, Southern and West Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project already proves that African-engineered, transboundary water infrastructure can operate at scale and supply major urban economies.

Expanding managed irrigation from 3.7 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s arable land (the lowest figure in the developing world) to even 10 per cent within a decade would transform food security, generate millions of jobs across agricultural value chains, and cut the continent’s exposure to rainfall variability.

Every one of these investments is within Africa’s technical reach. The engineering is known. The water is there. The land is there. The workforce is there.

The question is governance. On this, Africa must be frank with itself: the prevailing approach does not match the scale of the opportunity. Governments and donors have treated water as a social service delivery challenge, a matter of boreholes and latrines managed project by project, rather than as productive infrastructure on the same footing as roads, ports and energy grids.

A hand pump installed without a maintenance budget is not development. A pit latrine built without connection to a sanitation system is not development. These interventions may register as progress on a results framework, but they do not transform economies. They are consumables, not assets.

The evidence of this mismatch is plain. Less than half of Africa’s population, or 41 per cent, has access to safely managed drinking water. Twenty-three million primary school-age children attend class hungry. Some 429 million Africans live in extreme poverty, a number projected to remain above 400 million in 2030.

These figures do not describe a resource-poor continent. They describe a governance model that treats water as charity rather than strategy, and a “build, neglect, rebuild” cycle that consumes scarce capital without producing lasting systems.

Africa can break this cycle, and I propose three shifts that would change the trajectory.

First, adopt Strategic Asset Management as a continental doctrine.

Dams, irrigation networks, urban treatment plants and transboundary systems are assets with 50- to 100-year lifespans. They demand sustained institutional stewardship, not five-year project horizons. Govern them across the full lifecycle, from planning through maintenance and renewal, with climate adaptation at every stage.

The build, neglect, rebuild pattern ends when African governments treat water systems as national infrastructure: as permanent assets to maintain, not temporary projects to hand over.

Credit: Adobe Stock

Second, launch a continental irrigation expansion.

South Asia irrigates 41 per cent of its arable land. Sub-Saharan Africa irrigates 3.7 per cent. Closing even a fraction of that gap within a decade would generate employment, build agricultural value chains, strengthen food sovereignty and reduce dependence on imported food. Water without irrigation grows nothing. Land without water feeds no one. Managed irrigation is the fastest route from endowment to economic value.

Third, build enforceable cooperative governance for shared basins.

Ninety per cent of Africa’s surface water crosses at least one national boundary. The Nile, the Niger, the Congo, the Zambezi: these are regional systems that demand regional governance. Africa already has models that work. The Senegal River Basin Development Organisation, has managed a four-country transboundary system for half a century. The task is to make cooperative governance the norm, not as diplomatic courtesy but as a strategic requirement for regional stability and integration.

Financing these shifts requires Africa to lead with its own resources. Closing the water security gap demands between $50 billion and $64 billion annually, according to the AU High-Level Panel and the African Development Bank respectively. The primary financing base must be domestic: reform tariffs progressively, protect maintenance budgets, stop the leakages, and treat water investment with the seriousness that roads and energy grids receive.

Africa must also mobilise international climate finance, which the continent has chronically underutilized, for integrated water investments. And African Governments should not consider the approval of foreign land deals without mandatory water-impact assessments. African Governments need to address land management and governance in an integrated fashion with water governance. Every crop grown on a foreign-leased African field and exported is a transfer of virtual water off the continent, water that was never priced, never accounted for, never governed. Land and water are inseparable. To alienate one is to alienate the other.

The world will develop Africa’s water and land in the coming decades. That process is already under way. Wealthier nations, facing their own water and food constraints, understand the arithmetic of African abundance and are positioning accordingly. The only question is whether this development happens on African terms or someone else’s.

Let me end on a somber note. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will not be achieved in Africa by 2030. Honesty demands we say so. But the generation after 2030 can inherit something different, if Africa’s leadership chooses now to govern water as what it already is: a driver of economic transformation, a foundation of peace, and the most important asset the continent holds in trust for its children.

Africa’s water is its future. The question is, will Africa govern it, or will it be governed by others?

Cristina Duarte is the Under Secretary-General for the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa.

Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations

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The Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is currently taking place at the Congress Center of Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Nearly 150 country representatives are participating in the week-long assembly and associated meetings. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton

By Stella Paul
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, May 31 2026 (IPS)

The 71st Council meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) opened today amid a sharp divide, with donor nations urging broader and increased funding commitments, while developing countries called for more equitable and accessible pathways to environmental finance.

In April, donor countries pledged an initial USD 3.9 billion to the GEF Trust Fund’s ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), which will support environmental projects worldwide from 2026 to 2030.

Today, government officials, development banks, philanthropies, and civil society groups welcomed the pledges and highlighted GEF’s “whole of the societies” approach, which aims to involve governments, communities, businesses, and civil society. However, discussions at the meeting preceding the Assembly also reflected a growing challenge: environmental problems are becoming more urgent just as international aid budgets are shrinking.

Developing countries repeatedly raised concerns about whether funding is reaching those who need it most and whether access to it is fair.

Aziz Abdukhakimov, Advisor to the President of Uzbekistan on Environment and Chairman of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, addresses the opening day of the 71st GEF Council meeting. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton

Opening the Assembly, GEF Interim Chief Executive Officer Claude Gascon said GEF-9 is designed to “unlock great investments” through stronger cooperation across government agencies while continuing support for least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).

“The resources must reach countries more efficiently, where the impacts are greatest,” Gascon said. He pointed to reforms agreed during replenishment talks that aim to simplify procedures and improve accountability.

According to the GEF Secretariat, its current projects are already delivering large-scale environmental benefits. GEF’s blended finance operations have achieved an average co-financing ratio of 18 to 1, meaning every dollar invested by GEF has helped attract many more dollars from public and private sources for biodiversity, climate, land restoration, and pollution projects.

Aziz Abdukhakimov, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Environment and Chairman of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, highlighted the importance of this forum.

“We meet in Samarkand at a moment when the triple planetary crisis is becoming increasingly visible across all regions of the world. At the same time, the window for achieving our global environmental commitments is rapidly decreasing. This is why the role of the GEF is important more than ever,” Abdukhakimov said.

The Opening Council of the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is in Progress at the Congress Center of Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

A More Inclusive GEF

A key feature of GEF-9 will be integrated programming, based on the idea that environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and land degradation are interconnected and should be tackled together.

Ninety-eight countries, including 31 least developed countries and 26 small island states, are expected to participate in these programs from 2026 to 2030.

More than 100 country-level workshops and consultations have already been held to help countries strengthen their capacity, align GEF funding with national priorities, and increase participation by women, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and the private sector.

Donor countries highlighted what they see as progress. Norway welcomed larger allocations for LDCs and SIDS, as well as funding targets aimed at directing more resources to countries with the greatest needs. Norwegian representatives said they have high expectations for the results GEF-9 will achieve.

Representatives of Indigenous Peoples also described the replenishment process as a major step forward.

Speaking on behalf of the GEF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group (IPAG), Giovanni B. Reyes said Indigenous communities had a stronger voice in shaping the new funding cycle.

“For the first time, we were at the table of the replenishment. For the first time, our work will be visible in the way it deserves,” Reyes told the Assembly.

“The inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and our territories in the corporate scorecard means our contributions will be counted, our lands recognised, and our results disaggregated alongside women and youth. We have always been there — this is our way of life. Now the data will tell our story and amplify our voices.”

The representative said that commitments to create a dedicated GEF Indigenous Peoples policy, establish procedures for Indigenous-led projects, and allow Indigenous organisations to become accredited implementing agencies represent lasting institutional changes – rather than one-time promises. The representative also warned that failing to protect Indigenous and traditional territories would lead to biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse.

New Partnerships Announced

Several new partnerships were announced during the opening ceremony.

Gascon revealed a partnership with a U.S.-based philanthropy to support biodiversity conservation in Africa through the Africa Protected Areas Initiative.

A video presentation highlighted protected areas such as Kafue National Park and North Luangwa in Zambia, showing how relatively small protected areas can help secure water supplies, support local livelihoods, and conserve globally important wildlife.

Rob Walton of the Blue Nature Alliance described GEF as a key institution in global environmental finance. He highlighted its support for international environmental agreements, including preparations for the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty, which he called an important milestone for ocean protection.

The World Bank, which serves as trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, announced that USD 3.3 billion has already been confirmed for GEF-9.

Speaking at the Assembly, Maitreyi Das, World Bank Vice Director of Trust Funds and Partner Relations, said additional contributions are expected as donor approval processes continue. For the first time, countries can make pledges throughout the replenishment period rather than only at the beginning.

“This replenishment reflects a shared resolve to advance an ambitious environmental agenda at a very difficult moment for overseas development assistance,” she said. She credited cooperation among donors, recipient countries, civil society, businesses, and international environmental conventions.

Developing Countries Seek Fairer Access

Despite the positive announcements, delegates from developing countries said access to finance remains a major problem.

African representatives described GEF-9 as an important opportunity to address drought, food insecurity, land degradation, and biodiversity loss. However, they warned that available funding remains far below what Africa needs to meet global climate and biodiversity goals by 2030.

While they welcomed increased attention to least developed countries, drylands, and integrated programmes, several African countries cautioned that blended finance and private-sector investment require financial systems and risk-sharing mechanisms that many countries still lack.

“The region therefore calls for stronger grant-based financing, simplified access procedures, and capacity support to ensure equitable participation,” said Baixo Eduardo of Mozambique, who is representing southern African countries at the assembly.

Small island states voiced similar concerns.

Speaking for Caribbean countries, one representative said predictable, adequate, and accessible funding remains essential if SIDS are to achieve environmental and sustainable development goals.

“The ambition of GEF 9 is encouraging,” she said, particularly in biodiversity conservation, climate resilience, and pollution reduction. “But implementation mechanisms must reflect the unique vulnerabilities and capacities of small island developing states.”

Brazilian delegate Simone Carolina Bauch, speaking on behalf of its constituency, welcomed commitments to dedicate 35 percent of GEF-9 funding to biodiversity and 20 percent to Indigenous Peoples and local communities. However, she said that countries should remain in control of how projects are designed and implemented.

Bauch also called for greater clarity on the rules for participating in integrated programmes and warned that co-financing requirements should not become barriers to accessing funds.

Yicheng Yao, representative of China and Hrisheekesh Arvind Modak, representative of India, strongly supported these concerns raised by Bauch and called for simpler and fairer access to green finance.

Responding to these issues, Gascon said resources have been set aside for a country engagement strategy that will help national focal points better understand funding opportunities and make informed decisions.

He added that further guidance on participation in integrated programmes will be presented to the GEF Council later this year, with formal expressions of interest expected in early 2027.

As discussions continue in Samarkand, the GEF said the window for new contributions to the GEF-9 replenishment will remain open throughout the Assembly, allowing countries to make additional pledges for the 2026–2030 funding cycle. Delegates also thanked the government of Uzbekistan for hosting the assembly.

Notes: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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‘As record heat sweeps the world, the climate crisis is no longer a warning for the future, but a reality of the present.’

James Alix Michel

Across the globe, records are not just being challenged; they are being shattered.

In the United Kingdom and Ireland, London has reached an unprecedented 35.1°C, breaking all-time May records. Wales has climbed to 32.9°C, while Ireland recorded a remarkable 28.6°C in County Clare. Continental Europe is faring no better. France has seen temperatures rise to 36°C in the southwest, Austria’s Alpine regions—once symbols of climatic stability—have surged to 32.7°C, and Milan is enduring 35.5°C, nearly 9°C above average. Spain now braces for a potentially dangerous 40°C weekend.

Beyond Europe, the pattern intensifies. Northern India has been locked in a prolonged heatwave exceeding 45°C, while Pakistan is experiencing temperatures up to 6°C above seasonal norms. In parts of the Middle East, forecasts warn of temperatures approaching 52°C.

These are not isolated events. Nor are they seasonal aberrations. They are interconnected manifestations of a destabilizing climate system.

For decades, scientists have warned of precisely this trajectory. Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in particular, have consistently sounded the alarm, emphasizing that climate change is not merely an environmental issue, but an existential one.

I do not write about this from a distance. During my time as President of Seychelles, I carried this message across continents—from Copenhagen to Abu Dhabi, from Samoa to Addis Ababa, and in engagements spanning the United Nations to Washington. Alongside many others, I urged the international community to recognize both the acute vulnerability of SIDS and the broader systemic dangers posed by global warming. Too often, these warnings were acknowledged, but not matched by action at the scale or urgency required.

What is changing now is not the science—but the scale and visibility of impact.

The climate crisis is no longer confined to distant geographies or vulnerable coastlines. It is disrupting major economies, straining infrastructure in developed nations, and reshaping the daily lives of populations once considered insulated. Heatwaves are affecting transport systems, reducing agricultural productivity, and increasing risks to public health, particularly among the most vulnerable.

From melting asphalt in London to strained power grids in Milan, from intensifying wildfires and prolonged droughts to sudden floods and violent storms, the signals are converging into a single, unmistakable message: climate change is no longer a future threat. It is a present and accelerating reality.

This moment demands a fundamental reframing.

Climate change is not only about sea-level rise. It is not only an “island issue.” It is a systemic global crisis affecting every nation, every economy, and every community. The notion that some regions may remain insulated has been decisively disproven.

And yet, despite the mounting evidence, global responses remain insufficient.

International commitments, while important, continue to fall short of the scale and urgency required. Current emissions trajectories are not aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Adaptation financing remains limited and unevenly distributed. Mechanisms addressing loss and damage, though increasingly recognized, are still evolving relative to the magnitude of need.

This gap between ambition and implementation is no longer sustainable.

To today’s global leaders, look out your windows – the message is clear: the evidence is no longer abstract, nor confined to scientific reports. It is unfolding in real time—in ecosystems under strain, in extreme heat, in disrupted food systems, and in growing human insecurity.

The climate crisis recognizes no borders. No country is insulated. No society is immune.

This shared exposure must now translate into shared responsibility and accelerated action.

Mitigation efforts must intensify through rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Adaptation must be elevated as a global priority, with investments in resilient infrastructure, early warning systems, and climate-smart development. Climate finance must be significantly scaled up and delivered equitably, reflecting both historical responsibility and present need. Above all, multilateral cooperation must be strengthened, as fragmented approaches will not meet a challenge of this magnitude.

We are no longer in an era of warning. We are in an era of consequence.

The decisions taken today will shape not only the trajectory of global warming, but also the resilience of our societies, the stability of our economies, and the future habitability of our planet.

Earth is our only home. The window for meaningful action is narrowing.

This must become the defining global call to action of our generation.

The time for hesitation is over.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

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Voting by secret ballot. Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 29 2026 (IPS)

The year 2026 seems to be an eventful year at the United Nations –a new President of the General Assembly (PGA), who will officially preside over the 81st session in mid-September, plus the election and appointment of a new Secretary-General (SG) who will takeover in January 2027 after the conclusion of a 10-year tenure by the outgoing SG Antonio Guterres.

When UN member states competed in elections– or sought votes for membership in the Security Council or in various UN bodies– the voting in the 1960s and 70s was largely tainted by cheque-book diplomacy — while promises of increased aid to the world’s poorer nations came mostly with heavy strings attached.

In the 1950s and 60s, voting was by a show of hands, particularly in committee rooms. But in later years, a more sophisticated electronic board, high up in the General Assembly Hall, tallied the votes or in the case of elections to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice, the voting was by secret ballot.

In one of the hard-fought elections many moons ago, there were rumors that an oil-soaked Middle Eastern country was doling out high-end, Swiss-made wrist watches and also stocks in the former Arabian-American Oil Company, then one of the world’s largest oil companies, to UN diplomats as a trade-off for their votes.

So, when hands, both from right-handed and left-handed delegates, went up at voting time in the Committee room, the largest number of hands raised in favor of the oil-blessed candidate sported Swiss watches.

As anecdotes go, it symbolized the corruption that once prevailed in voting in inter-governmental organizations, including the United Nations — perhaps much like most national elections the world over.

Just ahead of a crucial election, one Western European country offered free Mediterranean luxury cruises in return for votes while another country dished out — openly in the General Assembly hall— boxes of gift-wrapped expensive Swiss chocolates.

Fathulla Jameel, a former UN Ambassador and later Foreign Minister of the Maldives told Inter Press Service of how his resource-poor island nation, categorized by the UN as a Small Island Developing State (SID), would appeal to richer nations to help fund some of country’s infrastructure projects.

At least one rich Asian country, a traditional donor, was the first to respond – and magnanimously too, he said. The project would be fully funded —free, gratis and for nothing. But there was a catch: “If there is a vote at the UN, and it is not of any national interest to your country”, said the donor country’s foreign ministry, “we would like to get your vote.”

Perhaps for life – the life of the island nation itself which was threatened with sea-level rise and in danger of being wiped off the face of the earth. The offer was a clever political payback. Development aid with no visible strings attached.

There was at least one instance when the president of the General Assembly, the highest policy making body at the United Nations, was elected, on the luck of a draw -– following a dead heat.

With the Asian group failing to field a single candidate, the politically-memorable battle took place ahead of the 36th session of the General Assembly back in 1981 when three Asian candidates contested the presidency: Ismat Kittani of Iraq, Tommy Koh of Singapore and Kwaja Mohammed Kaiser of Bangladesh (described as the “battle of three Ks”—Kittani, Koh and Kaiser).

On the first ballot, Kittani got 64 votes; Kaiser, 46; and Koh, 40. Still, Kittani was short of a required majority — of the total number of members voting. On a second ballot, Kittani and Kaiser tied with 73 votes each (with 146 members present, and voting).

In order to break the tie, the outgoing General Assembly President drew lots, as specified in Article 21 relating to the procedures in the election of the president (and as recorded in the Repertory of Practice of the General Assembly).

And the luck of the draw, based purely on chance, favored Kittani, in that unprecedented General Assembly election. But according to a joke circulating at that time, it was rumored that the winner was decided by the flip of a coin — but the tossed coin apparently had two heads and no tail.

In more recent years, however, the regional groups, including the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean and the Western and Other Groups (WEOG) have called for a virtual ceasefire as they took turns according to geographical rotation. The Groups would name their candidates who get elected without any opposition.

But the seriousness of the UN’s far-reaching mandate has been tempered by occasional moments of levity which have rocked the Glass House by the East River— with laughter. The UN is a rich source of anecdotes—both real and apocryphal– in which the General Assembly (UNGA), takes center stage, along with the Security Council (UNSC) as a political sidekick.

When UN ambassadors and delegates congregate in the cavernous General Assembly hall at voting time, they have one of three options: either vote for, against, or abstain.

The most intriguing, however, is a fourth option: to be suddenly struck with an urge to rush to the toilet. The frantic attempt to leave your seat vacant — and consequently be counted as “absent”– takes place whenever the issue is politically-sensitive.

When delegates are unable to vote with their conscience– don’t want to incur the wrath of mostly Western aid donors or are taken unawares with no specific instructions from their capitals– they flee their seats and head for the toilet

At a lunch for reporters in his town house bordering Park Avenue in Manhattan, (“this was once owned by Gucci, now it is Fulci”), Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, an Italian envoy with a sharp sense of humor, described the fourth option as the “toilet factor” in UN voting.

And he jokingly suggested that the only way to resolve the problem is to install portable toilets in the back of the General Assembly hall so that delegates can still cast their votes while contemplating on their toilet seats. But for obvious reasons, there were no takers.

In most instances, the various regional groups and coalitions—including the Group of 77, the Latin American and Caribbean States, the African Union (AU) and the Western European and Others (WEOG)— take decisions behind closed doors ahead of voting and voted by consensus,

In the 1970s and 80s, the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961, was one of the largest and most powerful political coalitions at the UN led by countries such as Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Zambia, Cuba and Sri Lanka.

As a general rule, all 116 countries vote in unison on General Assembly resolutions rarely breaking ranks. A Sri Lankan ambassador once recounted a message transmitted from his Foreign Ministry in Colombo – primarily directed at newly-arrived delegates which read— “If you are faced with an unscheduled surprise vote, and do not have any instructions from the Foreign Ministry, look to the right to see how Yugoslavia is voting and look to the left to see how India is voting. If both ambassadors are seen bolting from their seats, just follow them to the toilet”.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment – and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/

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Credit: United Nations
 
At a time of accelerating global crises and transformation, the question is no longer whether young people should be at the table, but how power is being shared with them. With more than 2.6 billion people aged 15–35 worldwide, this generation is not only the largest in history, but a decisive force in shaping a more sustainable and inclusive future, according to the United Nations
 
Youth participation must move beyond visibility toward real influence and shared responsibility-UN Secretary-General António Guterres
 
Dr. Felipe Paullier of Uruguay assumed his mandate as the first-ever Assistant Secretary-General for Youth Affairs in December 2023 at the age of 32. He is the youngest senior appointment in the history of the United Nations, and the youngest serving member of the Secretary-General’s senior management group.

By Bisma Qamar
UNITED NATIONS, May 28 2026 (IPS)

In this exclusive interview, Dr. Felipe Paullier, UN Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) and Head of the United Nations Youth Office shares his leadership approach, insights on youth engagement, and his vision for driving institutional change from the grassroot level — redefining what is possible and proving that age is just a number.

Bisma Qamar: As the youngest and first ASG of the United Nations Youth Office, what drives and shapes your leadership style?

Dr. Paullier: I focus on perspective. Young leaders naturally bring fresh ideas and question why processes exist, fostering creativity and improvement. My approach is human-centered. Issues like mental health and wellbeing indicate societal shifts and must be taken into consideration. Leadership should be accessible and empathetic while understanding one’s potential and well-being. Today’s teams value approachable, realistic leaders rather than authoritative leaders.

“Leadership must blend insight with empathy; people want leaders who understand and support individuals”

From Potential to Performance :

Qamar: As member states become informed and establish programs like the youth delegate program, which strategic aspects are key to truly empowering young voices and ensuring meaningful participation beyond symbolism?

Dr. Paullier: The main challenge is converting narratives into actionable participation. Institutions need inclusivity, structured funding, and support mechanisms. Multilateral collaboration is essential, and power must be genuinely shared with youth. Meaningful participation involves more than representation—it requires influence over decision-making.

UN Youth Forums: Advancing Inclusion and Participation

Qamar: How do forums such as ECOSOC and HLPF contribute to advancing inclusion and promoting equitable opportunities?

Dr. Paullier: ECOSOC and similar platforms provide a structured environment where youth voices can be heard and actively contribute to institutional change. They allow spaces to be created where meaningful dialogue across generations and individuals from diverse backgrounds are possible. These forums emphasize translating strategic narratives into tangible actions at both institutional and grassroots levels, encouraging participants to understand their potential impact as well as the limitations of the processes involved and the power of collaboration to create impact.

Insights from Youth Participation at ECOSOC 2026 :

Qamar: Reflecting on 2026, what are your insights on the impact and engagement such as the ECOSOC for instance?

Dr. Paullier: Geopolitical tensions made participation more difficult for some regions. Nonetheless, enthusiasm remained high. This demonstrates the resilience and determination of young participants who continue to assert their presence and contribute meaningfully, even amid complex global situations.

“Despite such challenges which may occur, youth engagement continues to be a powerful message of hope and influence.”

Conclusion

This conversation highlights the transformative power of human-centered leadership, grounded in trust, collaboration, and vision. Dr. Paullier embodies a model where young leaders not only challenge norms and drive innovation but also inspire inclusion and collective action. His message is clear and compelling: meaningful change is achievable because leaders who step forward, embrace responsibility, and demonstrate possibility.

Through platforms like the United Nations Youth Office, these principles translate into tangible impact, proving that when vision is coupled with courage and collaboration, nothing is impossible — change happens because leaders like him are present to make it so.

As he states “It’s possible, because I am here”

Bisma Qamar is Focal Person for UN and Global Youth Affairs, PMYP.

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Credit: Derek Hudson/Getty Images. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

By Mario Mansour and Fayçal Sawadogo
WASHINGTON DC, May 26 2026 (IPS)

Developing countries face major difficulties as income from natural resource extraction industries decreases and wealthier nations reduce their aid.

Nontax revenue from natural resources extraction and foreign aid grants for general spending have fallen by a combined 3.8 percent of gross domestic product since 2000, according to the latest annual update of the IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Database.

Gains from tax collection since then amounted to just 2.6 percent, offsetting only two-thirds of the decline, our unique tally of detailed public revenue data shows.

The Chart of the Week shows that the decrease in proceeds from nontax extractive revenue was the biggest driver of the drop for both low-income developing countries and emerging market economies.

These revenues are generally what governments earn from industries like oil, gas, and mining—such as royalties, profit sharing, and dividends from state-owned enterprises. Declining foreign aid grants for general spending also contributed to lower revenues.

Closing the gap often requires collecting more tax revenue, and affected countries won’t be able to deliver on their economic development goals without doing so. To succeed, they need sustained investment in domestic tax policy and tax administration, supported by effective institutions to underpin them.

The IMF supports member countries through its capacity development efforts—customized technical assistance and training services, often delivered through collaboration with donor countries and other international organizations.

Capacity development helps developing countries build expertise and policy frameworks to improve tax systems and institutions. It also reduces dependence on volatile and declining revenues, such as from extractive industries and foreign support.

Helping developing countries with this work, known as domestic revenue mobilization, contributes to fiscal resilience, which ultimately benefits global economic growth.

Evaluating how governments raise more reliable, sustainable revenue from within the economy requires high-quality granular data. Our database tracks decades of tax and nontax revenue consistently across 195 economies using data provided by our members.

The database is also a unique resource for researchers, policymakers, and development practitioners seeking to analyze revenue trends, benchmark performance, and identify reform priorities.

Mario Mansour & Fayçal Sawadogo, International Monetary Fund

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The headquarters of the United Nations with Trump World Tower looming in the foreground, in Manhattan, NY, on April 28, 2026. (SEBASTIAN CHRISTOPH GOLLNOW/PICTURE ALLIANCE VIA GETTY IMAGES) Source: Wahington Reports

By Ian Williams
NEW YORK, May 25 2026 (IPS)

AS THE WORLD HURTLES TO HELL (albeit in a SpaceX rather than a hand basket), it might seem of only academic interest which cipher vegetates on the 38th floor of the U.N. Headquarters. However, the choice is due by the end of the year, unless, as has happened in the past, the Security Council is veto-bound and asks António Guterres to stay on as interim Secretary General.

Guterres certainly has experience for a seat-warming position, since he has performed like an interim Secretary General ever since he was first appointed. At times when his voice could and should have made a difference, he has followed the guidance of the three wise monkeys (see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil). The Secretary General’s ability to put items on the council agenda and raise them publicly are his few effective powers in the face of the permanent members’ traditional lackadaisical stance.

His studied withdrawal from influence has infected other levels of the Secretariat and allowed the Security Council to reach new lows of subservience to power. So, if and when the council picks his successor, it’s unlikely that crowds will gather on U.N. Plaza to watch the white smoke rising to announce the anointment.

That is not only because Trump World Tower looms over the plaza like an escaped prop from “2001: A Space Odyssey,” but also because its eponymous owner has done so much to devalue the U.N. One could almost suspect that it is only allowed to hang on in New York because property values would plummet in the neighborhood if all the insouciant and complaisant diplomats who work in the U.N. complex had to leave.

The U.N.’s geopolitical absence certainly diminishes potential public interest in the race and is compounded by the increasing ineffectuality of the Security Council in the face of the erasure of the U.N. Charter. The guiding principle of the Secretariat often seems to be plucked from Arthur Hugh Clough’s old poem, “Thou shalt not kill/ But needs’t not strive, officiously to keep alive.”

However, the general membership is almost as complicit. Faced with the latest U.S. demand to reshape the organization before Washington even considers paying a part of its legally obligated payments, their response is to dicker about the depth of evisceration, not to challenge the assumptions. Of course, the U.N. needs reform—but not necessarily in the way the U.S. has been demanding for half a century.

Western signatories of the Rome Convention for the International Criminal Court have left their nationals, like Francesca Albanese and Karim Khan, to swing in the wind in the face of an entirely illegal U.S.–Israeli war on International Criminal Court staff. Even their home states’ declaration that they will provide government backed credit to the victims of U.S. sanctions would send a signal and some succor to the judges. A robust denunciation by the outgoing Secretary General (a lame duck and hence beyond significant U.S. payback) would have helped, but it was not forthcoming.

As the only figure who could coordinate (and heaven help us, lead) the defense, the forlorn position of the Secretary General is still essential despite the lackluster field. So, the choice is important—as well as boring.

So far, there is a growing consensus that the next leader needs to be a woman, which China has been very firm on, and should be from the Latin American and Caribbean region. So far, it’s a very uninspiring and, dare one say, “mature” field. Maybe there should be as much pressure for “youth’s” turn as there is for a woman, not least since both declared female candidates are of a certain age. The “most difficult job in the world” is not one for the elderly.

The April candidate forums at the U.N. featured four announced aspirants, but as the Book of Proverbs says, “Where there is no vision, the people perish: but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.” None of the candidates offered a vision: their presentations were more like an AI-generated resume for corporate human resources.

Even the candidates who showed some signs of integrity, like the “keeping the law” bit, seem to be missing the vision thing and, frankly, professed over-adherence to the law is a stretch for candidates who want to avoid a veto from the P5. Which is, of course, why there was conspicuous silence on the hustings about Israel and Iran. It also so far guaranteed candidates who will not rock the boat for Washington.

So in a field of lame horses, the three-legged one might limp home, and that could be former President of Senegal Macky Sall, who is not a woman, not Latin American and does not have the support of his own country or the African Union. His best qualification is the traditional U.N. promotion criterion: not being remembered for anything in particular. He could fall in the East River and not cause a ripple. But he is unlikely to be willing to undergo the gender transition necessary. China says it wants a woman and has historically been prepared to stand its ground with repeated vetoes.

Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet has the required diplomatic and political credentials, and she has clearly been playing the long game. As U.N. Human Rights Commissioner she sat upon a report about the People’s Republic of China’s abuse of the Uighurs, which might fend off a Chinese veto but raises questions about her integrity and independence.

It does suggest that she had acute political antennae since at that time pandering to China could have cost her support with the U.S. and Europeans—but now, perhaps not so much. Under the MAGA Trump Republicans, human rights are a now and then thing. More important perhaps to Washington, Chile’s new right-wing government pulled its endorsement of her which could burnish her credentials with what’s left of the progressive world. And her gender and Latin American origins tick other boxes.

In contrast, right-wing Argentinian President Javier Milei backs Rafael Grossi’s candidacy, which detracts from Grossi’s globalist credentials to head the U.N. However, as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), his equivocation about Iranian nuclear activities might well be negotiable into active U.S. support. He has been a deft tightrope walker, trying not to give Iran a clean bill of health, but avoiding complicity in an over-explicit casus belli to Washington, which would upset Moscow and Beijing (and may yet). But he has defied best practice for candidates by staying active in his U.N. role, which suggests he knows his IAEA position gives him cards to play.

Costa Rica’s Rebeca Grynspan is an uninspiring apparatchik who has presided over the effectual dismantlement of U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, the development agency that had been in the sights of Washington for decades. While one cannot hold family connections against her, many countries might also worry about the optics of a secretary general whose sister is an Israeli settler in the West Bank. However, she is backed by her government, unlike some other candidates, and is a Latina, so ticks two of the boxes, and is likely to get support from the U.S. (and Israel, which does not have a direct seat on the Security Council, but nevertheless is reputedly a presence).

Looking at the heavily handicapped slate so far, it’s good that there are nominations waiting in the wings. Barbadian PM Mia Amor Mottley would be an ideal candidate, ticking both the vision and law boxes. A woman from the Latin American and Caribbean region whose otherwise disqualifying integrity might pass the Trump test by speaking English and being previously accoladed by no less than the American Enterprise Institute! However, she has just won re-election in Barbados and would probably prefer to stay where she is now.

Another person who announced her candidacy is Ecuador’s María Fernanda Espinosa, former General Assembly President, who is also missing support from her own government, but she has shown both vision and integrity and has other backers. And she is not of pensionable age.

In the end, sadly, the odds are against anyone who meets the needs of the world and organization. Their very qualifications would be unlikely to survive the whims and prejudices of this U.S. administration, let alone survive scrutiny by Moscow or Beijing. Even if Russia and China pay lip service to the international order and sacrifice their immediate prejudices for the greater good, Washington is unlikely to be so forbearing.

Overall, the question is whether the U.N. is redeemable while some countries have veto power. At one time the U.S. realized the advantages of maintaining the U.N. as a thin blue fig leaf for its actual hegemony, but it no longer sees the need to cover its rampant MAGA-hood.

U.N. correspondent Ian Williams is president of the Foreign Press Association of the U.S. He is the author of U.N.told: The Real Story of the United Nations in Peace and War (available from Middle East Books and More).

Source: Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs
https://www.wrmea.org/north-america/the-search-is-on-for-the-next-u.n.-secretary-general-in-a-turbulent-world.html

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Budget shortfalls could force the organization to move closer to the communities that it's meant to serve.

By JB Bae
FORT COLLINS, Colorado USA, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The $1.2 billion renovation of the Palais des Nations was intended to reaffirm Geneva’s centrality to the multilateral system. Instead, the city’s international quarter is emptying.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has cut hundreds of positions. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is relocating core administrative roles to Rome and Budapest. Other agencies are scaling back or relocating operations. The United States, which funds roughly a quarter of the U.N.’s regular budget, now owes approximately $2.2 billion, about 95% of all unpaid contributions to the organization.

Many will read this as a harbinger of the decline, or perhaps even the demise, of the U.N. system. Yet the crisis in Geneva may be creating the conditions for a more resilient multilateralism.

Critics claim that American taxpayers subsidized a U.N. bureaucracy hostile to their interests, one lacking accountability and captured by priorities divorced from its founding purposes. There is some truth to this. However, these arguments have marginalized those who wish to refound the U.N. system, rather than dismantling multilateralism wholesale.

The erosion of U.S. funding may be doing what decades of reform efforts could not: forcing a realignment of the U.N.’s structure with its mission. Numerous proposals, secretary-general initiatives, and expert panels have failed to produce meaningful change.

The U.N.’s own 2021 Integration Review, drawing on input from over 200 staff members across the organization, found that institutional insulation undermined impact, calling for more decentralized decision-making and reforms responsive to field realities. Member states had pressed for the same for decades.

Meanwhile, Geneva came to embody the distance between those running the institution and the constituencies they were meant to serve. The compensation structure tells part of the story. Bureaucrats enjoyed tax-free salaries, exceptionally generous pension arrangements, housing allowances pegged to one of the world’s most expensive cities, business-class travel, and education grants that cover most of the cost of elite international-school tuition in Geneva, where annual fees often reach $45,000 per child per year.

One study of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operations found spending of roughly $600 per refugee annually (around $800-850 in today’s dollars). U.N. reimbursements for a single child’s school fees in Geneva, in other words, could support dozens of refugees for a year. These arrangements are not reserved for senior leadership. They define the terms of employment for the typical international civil servant.

These terms apply to a substantial workforce. Switzerland hosts roughly forty international organizations that employ more than 25,000 people, most concentrated in the Lake Geneva region. The World Health Organization, the largest, employs roughly 2,400 people at its Geneva headquarters and operated on a biennial budget of $5.3 billion for 2026-27 before recent cuts. The International Labour Organization (ILO), UNHCR, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and others maintain significant presences in Geneva.

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When the U.N. Secretary-General’s office issued a memo in April 2025 directing Geneva and New York to identify posts for relocation to lower-cost duty stations, the Geneva staff union’s response was telling: its official statement declared the union “alarmed,” hundreds of staff demonstrated on International Workers’ Day to protect their Geneva postings, and unions defended housing subsidies, education grants, and tax exemptions as essential. These numbers and reactions reflect the insulation of much of Geneva from the realities the institution nominally exists to address.

Yet the crisis is strengthening the position of those within the system who have long called for change. The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF)’s consolidation of regional functions to Bangkok, the expansion of U.N. agency operations in Nairobi, and shifting administrative functions to lower-cost duty stations all reflect a shift toward where the work actually is. Technology and the remote collaboration it enables make justifying the Geneva-centric model even more difficult. What once required flights to Geneva can now happen across multiple continents simultaneously.

Simply relocating institutions to less costly settings, however, risks reproducing Geneva’s pathologies — insulated professional communities, compensation structures detached from local conditions, and organizational cultures oriented more toward one another than toward the populations they serve. More than simply moving offices, structural reform requires confronting how these institutions are staffed, incentivized, and embedded in the political contexts in which they operate.

A more promising direction is aligning institutions with the political support and capacity of host nations. This goes beyond decentralization and proximity to need, toward placing authority where capacity and political will already exist. Former aid recipients that have become donors and regional powers in their own right — Poland, Chile, and South Korea among them — are natural candidates for anchoring this kind of multilateralism. Having navigated conflict, development, refugee flows, and political transition themselves, they bring the political legitimacy and operational credibility that Geneva-centered bureaucracies cannot replicate.

The substance of the changes also matters for the legitimacy of the international order. A multilateral system whose centers of decision-making remain in Geneva, New York, and a handful of donor capitals is vulnerable to the accusation that it represents a historical moment that has long passed. Institutions whose operational weight sits closer to the communities they serve, staffed by professionals embedded in supportive settings, are harder to displace. What survives will be better able to compete for relevance in a more contested world order.

Geneva will survive this crisis as a conference center for highest-stakes diplomacy and backroom dialogues that only physical proximity can enable. But what emerges beyond Geneva, in the field offices of agencies closer to the populations they serve and potentially in the hands of actors with the legitimacy and experience to carry multilateralism forward, may prove closer to what the system was always intended to be.

Many of the structural problems that have long plagued the U.N. will remain. The shifts now under way will not solve them. But they change where influence accumulates, and who shapes the decisions that matter. This new multilateralism may prove more resilient, more legitimate, and harder to hold captive to the politics of any single donor.

JB Bae is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University. His research addresses issues in international security and foreign policy, with a focus on East Asia. He received his PhD from UCLA.

The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.

Source: Responsible Statecraft

IPS UN Bureau

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UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Credit: UN Photo/Sourav Sarker

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The United Nations has had a longstanding tradition, described by some as a “privilege”, where most senior staffers are entitled to highly-expensive First Class or Business Class seats on trips worldwide.

But with the world body facing a severe cash crisis –and demands by the Trump administration calling for drastic cost-cutting—another privilege is likely to end up on the chopping block.

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/senior-management-group

Speaking off-the-record, a former UN official told Inter Press Service: “On the rare occasion I travelled with the UN for work, I was always shocked by the enormous amounts paid for air tickets. I find it interesting to see that it took the UN a deep financial crisis to invite the staff to a ”voluntary” downgrade”

Setting the record straight, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told IPS: “To be clear, a Secretary-General is the only person in the UN cleared for first class travel, and since about the start of the year, this Secretary-General no longer sits in the first class cabin.”

As part of the Organization’s ongoing efforts to reduce travel costs, and in response to the General Assembly’s call to strengthen measures to promote voluntary downgrades from business or first-class travel entitlements, the UN’s Human Resources Services Division (HRSD), in collaboration with the Travel and Transportation Section (TTS), in the Department of Operational Support (DOS), has launched the Voluntary Downgrade Pilot which introduced a set of new incentives to encourage voluntary downgrade for official air travels by United Nations travelers.

“The initiative is designed to encourage United Nations travelers to voluntarily downgrade from business class to premium economy, or equivalent cabins, by offering eligible travelers, a series of additional incentives aimed at maintaining comfort and convenience, while generating cost savings for the Organization,” says a circular released 18 May.

Meanwhile, in the latest figures released in one published report, the UN spent approximately $319 million on staff travel in one recent reporting year, covering roughly 98,000 trips.

Of those trips:

• About 12,000 flights were business class
• Only 51 flights were first class

The report also noted that the Secretary-General has recommended curbing first-class travel for senior officials.

Current UN travel rules state that:

• Most staff up to D-2 level normally travel economy, though some long-haul exceptions permit a higher class.
• Under-Secretaries-General (USGs) and Assistant Secretaries-General (ASGs) are entitled to “the class immediately below first class,” which in practice is generally business class on most airlines.

So, while the UN’s total annual travel spending has been in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars, the portion specifically attributable to senior officials flying business or first class is likely only a fraction of that total — probably in the tens of millions rather than hundreds of millions annually, based on the relatively small number of first-class tickets reported. The UN has steadily tightened rules on premium travel over the years, according to the report.

In addition to the existing entitlements for travelers, such as reimbursement for advance seat selection, in-flight meals and beverages, and one additional checked bag, the new incentives, according to the staff circular include:

Rest Periods (subject to supervisory approval)

• One additional day of rest upon arrival at the duty station, with up to one day of additional Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA), if arriving early.
• The option to remain at the official business location for one extra day prior to return, with DSA, if this reduces overall ticket cost.
• One additional calendar day of rest upon return to duty station (no DSA).

Reimbursement of costs for

• Lounge access at departure and connection points for both outbound and inbound travel (where applicable).
• Purchase of “extra space seating” including “couch style” in economy class, if offered by the airline.

The circular appeals to staffers to consider the above incentives when planning official travel, ”and should you opt for voluntary downgrade, you may select any combination, provided that the total cost is less than the entitled business class fare, keeping in mind, any additional rest periods selected under the pilot will remain subject to the approval of your first reporting officer.”

How to get started

• Explore details on iSeek: New incentives for travelers: Voluntary downgrade pilot launches | iSeek
• Check out how-to guides on how to opt in;
• Contact your local HR, Travel, or Admin Office for further information and support.

“We encourage all staff to take advantage of these options and contribute to more cost-effective travel practices across the Organization”.

HRSD in the Office of Support Operations (OSO) and TTS in the Facilities and Commercial Acitivites Service (FCAS) within the Division of Administration (DOA), are part of the Department of Operationsl Support (DOS).

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Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN, speaks at the General Assembly. Credit : UN WEB TV

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, May 21 2026 (IPS)

Member states this week (May 20) deliberated over a draft resolution on states’ obligations in respect of climate change following the advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The General Assembly agreed to take measures to uphold the ICJ’s advisory opinion for member states to meet their existing obligations to climate justice under international law and multilateral frameworks.

The draft resolution (A/80/L.65) passed with 141 votes in favor, 8 votes against, and 28 abstentions. It was brought forward by the Republic of Vanuatu, along with the Core Group of States leading the UN General Assembly resolution responding to the ICJ advisory opinion. The resolution was introduced after a long period of consultations between member states. It outlines member states’ obligations to ensure the protection of the climate system by calling for multilateral cooperation to address what the ICJ has called an “existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet.”

“This day will be remembered. It will be remembered as the moment the United Nations received the considered judgment of its highest court of its defining challenge of our time and decided what to do with it. Vanuatu and the Core Group believe this Assembly should meet that moment with unity, with seriousness, and with respect for the law and one another,” said Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN.

Voting Record of Resolution A-80-L.65. Credit: UN TV

When introducing the draft resolution to the Assembly, Tevi remarked that the ICJ opinion “confirms that the protection of the climate system is a matter of legal obligation, not political discretion.” It would not replace or challenge existing agreements such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement, but rather reinforce them as the primary legislations and forums for the world’s response to climate change.

Amendments to the resolution were brought forward by a small group of member states, which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. Those that argued for the amendments posited that the current resolution required further legal clarity, particularly as it related to the measures required to support developing countries in mitigation and adaptation. At the same time, there were concerns that the amendments weakened the language around the actions and responsibilities of member states, and tabling them so late into the provision would risk undermining the careful negotiations. Ultimately though, the amendments did not pass and the resolution was adopted without them.

In their remarks following the vote, member states welcomed the adoption of the resolution in light of recognizing climate change as a defining existential issue of the modern age, commending Vanuatu for its leadership in pushing for the resolution.

Speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small-Island Developing States (SIDS), Filipo Tarakinikini, Permanent Representative of Fiji to the UN, welcomed the resolution, remarking that it was an “affirmation of survival” for island nations that have been uniquely threatened by climate change, experiencing lasting damages to their homes and their connection to heritage.

“We do not come to this hall asking for mercy. We come demanding justice. Justice that is today grounded in the authoritative voice of the world’s highest court. The Pacific will not disappear, and neither will our resolve,” said Tarakinikini.

Jérôme Bonnafont, Permanent Representative of France, said that this General Assembly decision was welcome in light of an “international context marred by many crises.”

“[France] will continue to defend ambitious climate action, multilateralism, respect for international law, and a science-based approach for sustainable development and for future generations,” Bonnafont said.

James Larsen, Permanent Representative of Australia, hoped that this resolution would “galvanize practical efforts” to protect the climate system and that the case for multilateralism has “never been stronger.” With Australia set to host COP31 later this year, Larsen remarked his country would continue working together with member states to accelerate climate action.

Among those that abstained from voting or were against the resolution are states accused of being major carbon emitters, including G77 members like India and Saudi Arabia. Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation voted against the resolution.

Prior to the vote, the United States expressed that their opposition was based on their “serious legal and policy concerns” about the resolution. The U.S. delegate noted that the resolution called for states to fulfill alleged obligations based on a non-binding ruling from the ICJ, and opposed the resolution’s “inappropriate political demands” to address climate issues.

The Russian Federation’s delegate argued after that member states’ climate obligations, such as the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold, were more of a political obligation rather than normative and that the resolution was an effort to circumvent existing climate agreements.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the adoption of the resolution, commending the leadership of Pacific Island countries, SIDs and the students and activists whose “moral clarity helped bring the world to this moment.”

“The world’s highest court has spoken. Today, the General Assembly has answered,” said Guterres. “This is a powerful affirmation of international law, climate justice, science, and the responsibility of states to protect people from the escalating climate crisis… Those least responsible for climate change are paying the highest price. That injustice must end.”

Reacting to the debate, Yamide Dagnet, NRDC’s Senior Vice President, International, said, “Climate justice prevails! The world sent a loud signal that multilateralism and science matter and can deliver for the people and the planet.”

While congratulating the Small Island States, the youths and frontline communities who refused to stand down for their energy, tenacity and leadership, she noted,  “There will be a lot of noise about the difficulty in enforcing this resolution, but the reality is that it represents a watershed moment for polluter accountability. Moving forward, regulators and courts have an additional tool in their arsenal to force nations and companies to look at how they can put people over pollution and better protect the world’s most impacted communities and countries with dignity.”

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Jotham Napat, said the country expressed profound gratitude to 141 Member States that voted in favor of the UNGA resolution welcoming the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on climate change and to the 90 States that stood together as co-sponsors of this historic initiative.

“This outcome is a powerful affirmation that the international community remains committed to the rule of law, multilateral cooperation, and climate justice at a time when these principles are being tested,” Napat said while acknowledging that the resolution was the first step in a new journey.

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CIVICUS discusses the cancellation of RightsCon 2026 with Barbora Bukovská, Senior Director for Law and Policy at ARTICLE 19, a human rights organisation that works on freedom of expression and information around the world.

Barbora Bukovská

Why does the cancellation of RightsCon matter?

This cancellation is significant on three levels. First, it means the loss of community. The human rights movement depends on relationships built across borders and over time. RightsCon was one of the few global spaces where civil society organisations, funders, governments, journalists, researchers and technology professionals could meet without political interference. Losing it means losing opportunities to build solidarity and strengthen the networks the movement runs on.

Second, it was a symbolic blow. RightsCon represented the idea that at least one global space existed where civil society could convene freely, protected from political pressure. That illusion is now shattered. The space proved vulnerable. It is yet more evidence of shrinking civic space globally, and the message it sends is chilling: no space is truly protected from state interference any more.

Third, it caused financial damage. Following funding cuts from the USA in early 2025 and reduced funding from other major donor governments, civil society is struggling to secure resources. Organisations had invested precious funding to attend RightsCon, covering travel, organising side events and preparing advocacy materials. These are resources vulnerable civil society organisations cannot afford to waste.

What does this episode reveal about transnational repression?

The cancellation lays bare how emboldened China feels to globalise its political red lines and exercise transnational repression. For years, it has applied pressure on governments to sideline Taiwanese participation in multilateral forums. Taiwan’s leading role in digital rights and technology has long irritated China. What’s new is other governments’ willingness to yield.

China’s tactics have grown more sophisticated. Rather than open confrontation, it leverages threats of diplomatic fallout or lost investment. The pressure now extends into spaces once thought beyond its reach, such as cultural institutions, rights conferences and universities. China has shown it can coerce governments across sectors and at multiple levels.

The wider context matters too. The USA, once a leading global supporter of internet freedom, has retreated from diplomatic and financial backing for digital rights. China’s influence on the African continent has expanded in the absence of rights-based alternatives. When democratic states withdraw support for civil society, authoritarian influence fills the void.

How do China’s leverage and Zambia’s democratic decline combine?

China’s leverage across Africa has grown substantially in recent years. Chinese funding has built major infrastructure in Zambia, including Mulungushi International Conference Centre, the venue where RightsCon was due to take place. Only days before the cancellation, China signed a new agreement to fund further development projects. Zambia carries roughly US$5 billion in debt to China, and that dependency comes with strings attached.

Domestically, the picture is similarly bleak. Despite President Hakainde Hichilema being elected in 2021 on a promise of democratic renewal, civic space has shrunk steadily since. In 2025, parliament passed cybersecurity laws now used to curtail freedom of expression online and detain political opponents. Ahead of the August 2026 general election, the government is enacting further laws designed to entrench its power. Political control is winning out over democratic commitments.

Yielding to Chinese pressure while restricting civic space at home calls Zambia’s commitment to the rule of law and human rights into serious doubt. The debt creates a channel through which China can extract political cooperation. Together, these dynamics create a dangerous precedent for other global south nations facing similar pressure.

What does this mean globally?

The danger extends well beyond Zambia. If a government can cancel a major international civil society gathering without serious diplomatic or institutional consequences, it sends the wrong signals. States must show that interference carries costs. Democratic states, multilateral organisations and regional institutions must impose costs through sustained pressure and exclusion from future convenings.

International human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, have already condemned Zambia’s decision. But statements alone are not enough. Zambia shouldn’t be considered a reliable host for rights-based global dialogue in future.

If governments can yield to authoritarian pressure at the expense of civil society protections without paying a price, the pattern will spread.

What steps should be taken to protect global civil society forums?

Civil society can adapt but cannot insulate its gatherings from state pressure on its own. Real responsibility lies with states that claim to support human rights. They must send a diplomatic and political signal that interference in global forums is costly and prevent other governments from following Zambia’s example. They must reaffirm their commitment to multi-stakeholder forums and invest in civil society’s ability to convene and participate.

That includes member states of international coalitions such as the Freedom Online Coalition and the Media Freedom Coalition. They must act against restrictions on civic space and freedom of expression, using these platforms to impose costs on governments that interfere with civil society. The behaviour Zambia has just normalised must be made costly.

The UN, other intergovernmental organisations and states must work to guarantee the safety and openness of global gatherings. As democratic states withdraw support and authoritarian states expand their reach, the spaces where global civil society can gather, build relationships and advance human rights will continue to shrink. What’s at stake is the infrastructure of global civil society coordination and solidarity.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Democracy: an enduring aspiration CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Zambia: ‘Constitutional changes in an election period tend to be driven by political expediency rather than the public interest’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Gideon Musonda 24.Dec.2025
Zambia: ‘The NGO Bill strengthens legal mechanisms designed to discredit or silence critical civil society voices’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Josiah Kalala 03.Jun.2025

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A tea picker in the Bearwell tea estate of Sri Lanka. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

By Boubaker Ben Belhassen
ROME, May 20 2026 (IPS)

The tea in your cup this morning began its journey in someone else’s hands. Hands whose work most of us never think about. Almost certainly, those hands belonged to a smallholder farmer tending a small plot of land, plucking leaves by hand beneath long mornings of mist and rain.

Two leaves and a bud. Two leaves and a bud. Thousands of times. Smallholders account for about 60 percent of global tea supply. The industry built on their labor is worth US$19.5 billion a year and supports the economies of some of the world’s poorest countries. Yet the conditions that sustain that work – ecological, economic and climatic – are under growing pressure.

Smallholders account for about 60 percent of global tea supply. The industry built on their labor is worth US$19.5 billion a year and supports the economies of some of the world's poorest countries. Yet the conditions that sustain that work – ecological, economic and climatic – are under growing pressure

Tea is the most popular drink on earth after water. Global production reached 7.3 million tonnes last year, and per capita consumption continues to rise steadily. From the outside, the sector appears healthy.

Yet the millions of smallholder farming families driving that growth in China, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Malawi, Rwanda and beyond need stronger support if the sector’s momentum is to endure.

The geography of tea production is also a geography of economic necessity, linked to patterns of economic dependence and rural livelihoods. Kenya is the world’s largest tea exporter.

Sri Lanka, Uganda, Malawi and Rwanda rank among the global top ten. In these economies, revenues from tea exports help finance food imports and sustain rural livelihoods across entire regions. The sector remains a major source of employment and income for millions of poor families worldwide.

That income is more fragile than the industry’s headline numbers suggest. International tea prices, adjusted for inflation, have been declining for four decades.

The sector’s nominal value has expanded, while the real purchasing power of many producers has stagnated. FAO has documented what this means at the household level: when farmgate prices fall, smallholder families reduce spending on food, education and health care.

Smallholder producers also face limited market access, inadequate extension services, weak access to credit and technology, and persistent asymmetries in how value is distributed across the supply chain.

As production costs rise and price increases transmit unevenly through markets, many farming families struggle to generate sufficient returns to reinvest in farm renewal, climate adaptation or productivity improvements. These pressures heighten income volatility and make long-term planning increasingly difficult.

Tea production and processing are major sources of employment and income for women across East Africa and South Asia. When smallholder tea farming families prosper, women’s economic participation will determine whether that prosperity and stability hold.

Programmes that support women directly through training, market access and financial resources consistently produce stronger outcomes for both households and communities. In many tea-growing regions, women sustain not only household economies, but also the continuity of the knowledge and labor on which the crop depends.

Tea cultivation relies on highly specific agro-ecological conditions: altitude, rainfall patterns and temperatures shaped gradually over centuries in the regions where production became concentrated.

These conditions are becoming harder to predict and increasingly difficult to sustain. More erratic rainfall, fluctuating temperatures, and extreme weather events are already impacting both yields and quality.

For a smallholder farmer without savings or insurance, a lost harvest is not a temporary setback. It immediately affects household spending on food, medicine and schooling.

The unevenness of that burden is a central challenge. Larger operations often possess greater capacity to adapt through irrigation, diversification, upgrading and financial reserves.

Smaller producers, by contrast, frequently get trapped between increasing climate risks and limited investment capacity. Investment needs to be calibrated to the realities of smallholder tea farming rather than assumptions drawn from larger commercial operations.

What is at stake extends beyond a commodity market. Several tea-growing landscapes have been formally recognized by FAO as Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems. These landscapes were shaped over generations through accumulated farming knowledge and long relationships between land, crop and community.

Tea cultivation depends on delicate balances of shade, slope, rainfall, soil health, and inherited knowledge built gradually over generations. Climate-related stress threatens these landscapes alongside the livelihoods and agricultural continuity they sustain.

More efficient, inclusive and sustainable value chains, including greater local value addition and stronger producer participation in markets, are essential if the benefits of the growing tea economy are to reach both the people and the environments that sustain it. Per capita tea consumption in many producing countries remains relatively low, meaning the sector’s growth potential is still substantial.

Ensuring the sector’s viability, however, requires more than rising consumption levels. Smallholder producers need better access to finance, markets, technology, and climate adaptation support calibrated to their realities.

More transparent and balanced value chains, targeted investment that reaches women directly, and stronger incentives for reinvestment at farm level will determine whether the industry’s future growth will remain economically and socially sustainable.

The farmer who grew your tea will get up again tomorrow morning before sunrise. The future of the sector depends on ensuring this remains a viable livelihood option.

You want to see a bright tea future? Join us in celebrating International Tea Day on 21 May!

Boubaker Ben-Belhassen is Director of the Markets and Trade Division at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Aquidneck (WPB-1309) in the Strait of Hormuz, with a large container ship visible in the background as it transits the critical global trade route (Dec. 2, 2020). Credit: MC2 Indra Beaufort

By Lulseged Desta and Jonathan Mockshell
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Sharp surges in energy, fertilizer, and food prices triggered by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf strikingly illustrate the deep interconnections between geopolitical conflict, food insecurity, and the fragility of fossil fuel–dependent food systems.

Besides carrying roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day (about 27 percent of global oil exports), the Strait of Hormuz also handles 20–30 percent of internationally traded inorganic fertilizers, which uses natural gas as a key ingredient in its production. Its closure has immediately disrupted the flow of these essential commodities, triggering sharp price spikes in fuel and key agricultural inputs.

This situation demonstrates how geopolitical instability can rapidly disrupt essential agricultural functions under current input-dependent, industrial production systems that rely heavily on external energy and supply chains. This crisis highlights, more clearly than ever, a critical reality: food systems tied to fossil fuels are inherently unsustainable, continually undermine food sovereignty, and disproportionately affect farmers, particularly smallholders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). World Food Programme estimates warn that, if the conflict continues, the soaring oil, shipping and food costs will push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, driving the global total beyond its record 319 million¹.

Reducing food systems’ reliance on fossil fuels and external inputs is essential to strengthen our collective resilience to future shocks. The truth is that fossil fuels courses through every stage of the food system – from fertilizers and pesticides to processing, preservation, transportation, packaging, food waste disposal, and even food preparation. Moreover, entrenched economic and political structures lock in this fossil-fuel dependence through massive subsidies and price protections – estimated at over $1 trillion in recent years².

Food systems account for at least 15 percent of total fossil fuel use – mostly through synthetic fertilizers ⁴ – but also to power machinery and vehicles, and generate electricity and heat for key processes like irrigation, grain drying, livestock housing, and food storage.

Agroecological approaches to food production offer an alternative to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels while still meeting the needs of a growing global population. This supports a transition from energy-sink systems to regenerative ones, radically enhancing food systems’ resilience in the face of escalating geopolitical instability and environmental vulnerability.

Agroecology is based on natural processes and local resources for sustainable soil fertility. Crucially, many of these practices draw directly from indigenous knowledge systems, where local communities have long maintained soil health through time. Practical steps include the use of organic fertilization (often blended with minimal synthetic inputs), efficient soil microorganisms, nitrogen-fixing plants, and soil health practices like crop rotation, cover cropping, intercropping, reduced tillage, and crop-livestock integration.

Research consistently shows that agroecological approaches – such as farm diversification and tree integrated systems – outperform conventional systems in climate resilience, nutrient cycling, and soil health^5,6, often while boosting yields^7-9. Agroforestry also provides a source of wood fuel, making it a valuable alternative during fossil fuel shortages and price spikes.

Examples can be found worldwide. Peruvian cocoa farmers are using bokashi and bio-oil amendments to restore soil organic matter, regenerate microbial activity, and enhance nutrient cycling¹⁰. In Vietnam, rice-fish coculture systems optimize nutrient cycling, curb pests, and diversify outputs – lowering costs while stabilizing farmer incomes¹¹. Ethiopian farmers practicing wheat-fava bean rotations are cutting fertilizer needs while improving soil structure and building long-term fertility11. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF)’, delivers biodiversity benefits while more than doubling farmers’ economic profits and maintaining comparable crop yields, than chemical-based farming ^12,13.

Other farm-level steps to curb fossil fuel dependence include integrating renewable energy sources for on-site generation and operations – like solar panels, biogas digesters, and wind turbines; solar water pumps, adopting fuel-efficient engines and draft animals; and embracing practices such as minimum tillage, precision irrigation, integrated pest management, and low-input crop-livestock systems.

More fundamentally, shifting from global, industrial commodity chains toward territorial, agroecological food networks can relocalize production, processing, and consumption – shortening supply chains and reducing energy-intensive operations. Shorter, localized supply chains reduce reliance on long-distance transport, lower packaging demand, and promote reusable packaging systems, thereby decreasing fossil fuel consumption.

These efforts can be reinforced by complementary practices that strengthen food sovereignty, such as home gardens and urban agriculture. Crucially, agroecology also aligns with reduced production of ultra-processed foods – among the most energy-intensive products – helping to curb fossil fuel use while potentially improving public health.

In the short term, it is crucial that the allocation of emergency funds are earmarked to procure or purchase organic alternatives to synthetic fertilizers, particularly in the most affected regions. Longer-term, it is necessary to reduce structural barriers to farmers’ adoption of these agroecological approaches including reforms to agricultural subsidies and strengthening support for technical assistance and local governance.

References
1. Farge, E. Iran war may push 45 million people into acute hunger by June, WFP says. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-war-may-push-45-million-people-into-acute-hunger-by-june-wfp-says-2026-03-17/ (2026).

2. IPES-Food. Fuel to Fork: What Will It Take to Get Fossil Fuels out of Our Food Systems? https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FuelToFork.pdf (2025).

3. FAO, UNDP, and UNEP. A Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity – Repurposing Agricultural Support to Transform Food Systems. (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP, 2021). doi:10.4060/cb6562en.

4. Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Power Shift: Why We Need to Wean Industrial Food Systems off Fossil Fuels. https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ga_food-energy-nexus_report.pdf (2023).

5. Niether, W., Jacobi, J., Blaser, W. J., Andres, C. & Armengot, L. Cocoa agroforestry systems versus monocultures: a multi-dimensional meta-analysis. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104085 (2020).

6. Beillouin, D., Ben‐Ari, T., Malézieux, E., Seufert, V. & Makowski, D. Positive but variable effects of crop diversification on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Glob. Change Biol. 27, 4697–4710 (2021).

7. Dittmer, K. M. et al. Agroecology Can Promote Climate Change Adaptation Outcomes Without Compromising Yield In Smallholder Systems. Environ. Manage. 72, 333–342 (2023).

8. Rodenburg, J., Mollee, E., Coe, R. & Sinclair, F. Global analysis of yield benefits and risks from integrating trees with rice and implications for agroforestry research in Africa. Field Crops Res. 281, 108504 (2022).

9. Jones, S. K. et al. Achieving win-win outcomes for biodiversity and yield through diversified farming. Basic Appl. Ecol. 67, 14–31 (2023).

10. Altieri, M. A. & Nicholls, C. I. Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture. J. Peasant Stud. 47, 881–898 (2020).

11. FAO. The State of Food and Agriculture 2022. (FAO, 2022). doi:10.4060/cb9479en.

12. Berger, I. et al. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming’, delivers biodiversity and economic benefits without lowering yields. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 2057–2068 (2025).

13. O’Garra, T. Agroecology benefits people and planet. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 1973–1974 (2025).

14. IPES-Food. Food from Somewhere: Building Food Security and Resilience through Territorial Markets. https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FoodFromSomewhere.pdf (2024).

15. Einarsson, R. Nitrogen in the Food System. https://tabledebates.org/building-blocks/nitrogen-food-system (2024) doi:10.56661/2fa45626.

Lulseged Desta, CGIAR Multifunctional Landscapes Science Program; Jonathan Mockshell, Alliance Biodiversity International – CIAT

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Credit: Bibbi Abruzzini/Forus - Rabat, Morocco

By Silla Ristimäki, Miguel Santibañez, Emeline Siale Ilolahia and Aoi Horiuchi
HELSINKI, Finland / SANTIAGO, Chile / SUVA, Fiji / TOKYO, Japan, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Just four years of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development remain. What comes after 2030 is already a political battleground.

The next global development framework is being shaped now: through quiet agenda-setting, shifting alliances, financing choices, contested norms, and decisions about who gets to participate and who is pushed to the margins. That matters because the world that will shape what comes next is not the world that adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.

The context is harsher, more fractured and less generous. Geopolitical fragmentation is deepening. Armed conflicts are distorting priorities. Climate impacts are accelerating. Development finance is under growing strain. Civic space is shrinking. Public trust in multilateralism is weaker. And too often, the rights, equality and accountability commitments that gave the SDGs their normative force are treated as negotiable.

“We step into the next decade against the background of climate chaos, growing inequality and increasing poverty. The scaffolding for positive change shall be to infuse democratic values in the blood stream of all our governments from the Right to the Left,” says Dr. Moses Isooba, executive director of the Uganda National NGO Forum and Vice-Chair of Forus.

The post-2030 debate must confront the political and structural weaknesses that limited implementation the first time around.

As a civil society network, we have been here from the very beginning. We have secured the adoption of the SDGs with the Beyond 2015 campaign, pushed for innovation and ambition, challenged power, brought forward the voices of communities, and held systems accountable. That role evolves and as we now look “beyond 2030”, we remain present, engaged, and determined to influence what comes next.

One message comes through clearly: the next agenda will only be credible if we are clear about three things — what must be defended, what must be demanded, and what must be declined.

What must be defended

Some foundations of the current framework remain essential and must not be traded away for the sake of political convenience.

The first is universality. One of the most important achievements of the SDGs was to establish that sustainable development is not only a concern for lower income countries, but a universal responsibility. Policies, consumption patterns and economic models that drive inequality, exclusion and ecological harm must be addressed in all regions. High-income countries must not only finance development but also reform their own adverse policies. If the next framework weakens the recognition that sustainable development must integrate social justice, equality, environmental sustainability, peace and human rights, it will not move us forward. It will mark a retreat.

The second is civic space. Civil society participation is one of the conditions that makes accountability, inclusion and implementation possible yet it is increasingly constrained by financial pressures, exclusion from global decision-making processes and erosion of fundamental rights. A future agenda which prioritises resources and protection for civil society supports the building of stable, sustainable societies.

The third is local leadership. Communities and local civil society actors remain closest to the realities that global frameworks claim to address, yet they are still structurally under-resourced and under-represented. Localisation beyond the “buzzword” can bring essential resources for problem diagnosis and planning, increasing effectiveness and legitimacy for sustainable development and peacebuilding.

And finally, what must be defended is multilateralism itself, not as an abstract ideal, but as the shared political space where common commitments can still be built.

“Safeguarding the structures created to advance peace, cooperation and rights sustains global hope and possibilities to address common global challenges. This is in the interests of us all, future generations and the planet.” Silla Ristimäki, Adviser at Fingo. “This is why ambitious reform of the UN cannot be separated from the post-Agenda 2030 discussion.”

What must be demanded

Defending core principles is not enough. Negotiations about the future must also correct what the Agenda 2030 left unresolved.

At the centre of this is financing. A credible post-2030 framework cannot rest on the same unequal financial architecture that has constrained implementation for years. Debt burdens, unequal fiscal space, volatile aid flows and weak commitments have all narrowed the room for governments and communities to act. Financing reforms must include debt restructuring and relief, fairer lending terms, increased concessional finance, stronger domestic resource mobilisation, tax justice, policy coherence and predictable support for civil society.

“Many countries are spending more on debt than education or health. We need to reform the current unjust international financial architecture,” says Aoi Horiuchi, Senior Advocacy Officer at JANIC, the civil society network for international cooperation in Japan.

Accountability must also be stronger. Voluntary reporting and soft review mechanisms have not been enough. A future agenda must be backed by mandatory, transparent and regular review, with independent oversight and a formal role for civil society and local actors in tracking progress and exposing implementation gaps.

And participation must mean more than consultation after decisions are already taking shape. Civil society needs a formalised, meaningful and safe role in both negotiating and implementing the future framework, especially for local actors and groups continuing to face structural or political exclusion.

“Meaningful change comes from meaningful participation. That’s why we need to defend civic space,” says Horiuchi.

What must be declined

Some directions already visible in early discussions must be rejected outright.

A thinner agenda that lowers ambition in the name of consensus must be declined. So must any attempt to weaken universality, rights, gender equality, civic freedoms or climate ambition for political expediency.

The continuation of a financial status quo that deepens inequality while speaking the language of partnership must also be declined. So must accountability arrangements that remain symbolic, selective or performative.

And tokenistic participation must be named for what it is. A process that brings civil society into the room for appearance’s sake while excluding it from agenda-setting, decision-making and follow-through is managed exclusion.

Finally, as development governance evolves, the expanding role of private and philanthropic actors must not come without public-interest safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. Public goals cannot be left to unaccountable power.

We must get out of silos, create spaces of dialogue, of co-responsibility and raise the question of whether the post-2030 framework will be more honest about power, more serious about accountability, more capable of confronting structural inequality, and more open to those whose lives and rights are most at stake.

Our answer is here:
Defend what must not be lost.
Demand what must be corrected.
Decline what would weaken the future.

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Credit: Osugi / shutterstock.com

By Jordan Ryan
May 19 2026 (IPS)

 
Where does real power reside in the UN development system? A new policy brief from Cepei, a Colombian development policy institute, and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), presented earlier in May, poses this deceptively simple question. The answer matters because institutions that cannot govern fairly or transparently struggle to sustain legitimacy, and legitimacy is essential for peace.

The Cepei-IDOS diagnosis identifies a “triple disconnect” that structures contemporary development governance. Formal oversight bodies (the Executive Boards, ECOSOC, the General Assembly) set policy directions but control only a fraction of financing. Real resources flow through bilateral arrangements between major donors and agency leadership, operating largely beyond collective scrutiny. The ten largest donors shape system priorities through informal channels of influence. Meanwhile, the programme countries that host the vast majority of UN development operations report significantly weaker upstream influence than traditional donor states. This misalignment between authority, resources and voice is no longer incidental. It has become embedded in the way the system operates.

What transforms this observation from an efficiency problem into a peace imperative is the reality that ungovernable systems cannot respond to prevention and peacebuilding needs. A development architecture shaped disproportionately by donor priorities and limited programme-country voice lacks the legitimacy, flexibility and democratic accountability required to address the structural drivers of conflict. When host countries experience UN operations as imposed rather than negotiated, and when funding priorities reflect donor interests rather than local prevention priorities, the development system becomes an actor in grievance production, not prevention.

The governance–legitimacy nexus works in both directions. Ungovernable institutions erode the multilateral system’s credibility in the Global South. Successive rounds of ineffective UN reform, driven by incremental adjustments within existing power structures, signal to programme countries that the system is designed to resist their inclusion. This perception is strengthened when donors can navigate around formal governance bodies through bilateral arrangements. Over time, institutional opacity breeds delegitimation. The UN is then weakened as a platform for both development cooperation and conflict prevention, because confidence in its democratic character has fractured.

The Cepei-IDOS brief positions the first 1000 days of the next Secretary-General’s term as a narrow window for visible structural change. The argument is neither revolutionary nor naive. It does not propose wholesale redesign of the UN system. Rather, it suggests that an incoming Secretary-General with political capital and an informed strategic agenda can make power visible, realign financial flows with governance decisions, strengthen coordination across fragmented programme delivery, and treat programme country inclusion not as charitable consultation but as an operational requirement. Small shifts in how decisions are made, where resources are allocated and whose voice is heard can accumulate into meaningful redistributions of power.

For those committed to multilateral peace and development, the brief is important precisely because it refuses the false choice between institutional realism and structural ambition. It recognises that the current system is durable and resistant to change. It also demonstrates that durability does not mean immutability. The Secretary-General occupies a unique position to convene, name problems and propose sequenced shifts in practice. Whether that role is exercised for incremental adjustment or for visible realignment of power depends on the strategic choices made in the first 1000 days, when institutional attention is high and political mandates are fresh.

The launch event captured something essential about the moment. Participants acknowledged that the system is ungovernable as presently designed while recognising that accepting that reality is not the same as accepting its inevitability. The brief itself can serve as an anchor for what peace advocates and policymakers need to argue in the months ahead: that the next Secretary-General should treat governance reform not as a technical fix but as a peace imperative. When multilateral institutions are trusted by the countries they purport to serve, they become more effective instruments of prevention and cooperation. When they are experienced as vehicles for donor capture, they become part of the problem they claim to address.

If the next Secretary-General treats governance reform as a peace imperative rather than a technical exercise, the UN development system can begin to rebuild the legitimacy it is steadily losing among the countries and communities it exists to serve.

Related articles from this author:
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Sustainable beekeeping is increasingly recognized as a key asset for not only farming communities but for sustainable agrifood systems, the environment and the global community as a whole. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS

By Thanawat Tiensin
ROME, May 19 2026 (IPS)

For thousands of years, humans have kept bees. Beekeeping is a key agricultural activity, yet its full potential remains largely unrealized. Beekeeping produces far more than honey and generates far more income than many have chosen to acknowledge.

The contribution of bees to global agrifood systems runs to hundreds of billions of dollars annually, a figure that should anchor national policy and investment decisions, not appear as a footnote in environmental reports.

The case for investing more substantially in sustainable beekeeping and pollinator conservation can be and has been made at the farm level. When farming practices actively support pollinator health through crop diversification, reduced agrochemical use, and biodiversity-friendly habitat management, the results are measurable and can be significant.

As an example, in cashew cultivation in South India, agroecological farming practices increased the abundance of insect pollinators visiting flowers by nearly 400 percent, with yields trending substantially higher as a result.

Beekeeping generally requires relatively low capital investment, generates income across multiple product streams, and is well-suited to the resource constraints of small-scale producers

Cashew, like many high-value crops, suffers acute yield losses in the absence of pollinators, losses that better conservation of bees and other pollinators can directly address.

Beekeeping generally requires relatively low capital investment, generates income across multiple product streams, and is well-suited to the resource constraints of small-scale producers. In increasingly fragile and climate-stressed environments where other agricultural activities face growing uncertainty, beekeeping has shown unusual resilience.

Of the roughly 25,000 bee species on Earth, only 8 to 11 are honeybees. Around those species, humanity has built very advanced management systems, refined over millennia and now increasingly integrated with modern science. Many countries across the world have made beekeeping a pillar of rural livelihoods, and in 2017 World Bee Day officially entered the United Nations calendar.

Celebrated each year on 20 May, it marks the birthday of Slovenian Anton Janša, a founding figure of modern apiculture. We have made great strides in raising awareness of the importance of bees and other pollinators and the role they play in our lives and now we need to step up our efforts.

One important action that can promote sustainable beekeeping and realize its true economic and food security potential is to recognize bees as a valuable natural asset. When governments include beekeeping in national agriculture investments and support its potential to generate income, they can promote fair and just development of domestic value chains for a range of hive products.

This enables beekeepers to earn higher prices in international markets by producing honey that is sustainable and traceable. FAO’s “Good Beekeeping Practices for Sustainable Apiculture” provide guidelines for sustainable colony management, integrated pest and disease control, habitat stewardship, and the value chain development that allows beekeepers to generate returns beyond raw honey.

These practices, which have been tested across developing country contexts can raise both hive productivity and beekeeper income.

Another key action is to promote sustainable beekeeping through improving extension services, input subsidies, and training programs; these should be designed to help small-scale producers to integrate beekeeping into their production systems, capturing both the pollination benefits and the income from hive products that conventional farm support systems often overlook.

A further and equally important action is to ensure that benefits from beekeeping are accessible and reach those who need them most. Women and young people represent a growing segment of the global beekeeping community and have a lot to gain from having diversified income sources. When they can access training, equipment, and markets on equal terms, productivity and hive health have shown to improve.

The partnership between humans and bees has lasted for thousands of years and continues to evolve.

From the forests of Ethiopia to the pine slopes of Turkey, from the clover fields of Argentina to the manuka hillsides of New Zealand; farmers and beekeepers have long understood what agricultural policy is only beginning to recognize: that sustainable beekeeping and pollinator conservation can be a key asset for not only farming communities but for sustainable agrifood systems, the environment and the global community as a whole.

Thanawat Tiensin is the Assistant Director-General, Director, Animal Production and Health Division, FAO

Non-communicable diseases such as heart disease and cancer account for nearly three-quarters of all deaths worldwide. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, May 19 2026 (IPS)

With death being an inevitable outcome, a fundamental question that crosses the minds of practically everyone is: “How am I going to die?”

A simple response is that you will likely die from one of the top causes of mortality. A more precise answer is that “it depends” to a large extent on your personal circumstances.

For example, if you are under the age of 45, the most likely cause of death statistically in many countries is unintentional injuries or accidents. If you are a young adult aged 18 to 29, in addition to motor vehicle accidents, other major causes of death include suicide and homicide. If you are an older adult over the age of 65, you are most likely going to die from the major causes of death for that age group, which are heart disease and cancer.

Various important personal circumstances contribute to your eventual demise, including age, sex, genetics, country of residence, medical condition, family status, occupation, income, healthcare access, and lifestyle choices. These lifestyle choices may involve smoking, alcohol consumption, drug use, diet, and exercise.

Before delving into personal circumstances and the leading causes of death globally and in various countries that ultimately end human lives, it is important to recognize the positive news regarding survival rates and the increase in human life expectancy.

In recent years, the average length of human lives has significantly increased. More people across the globe are surviving to older ages than ever before.

Marked increases in human survival rates have occurred at virtually every age, resulting in more people living longer lives. Additionally, a wide range of diseases, ailments, and conditions have either been eliminated or significantly reduced.

Life expectancies at various ages have shown significant increases worldwide. For example, the global life expectancy at birth has risen from 46 years in 1950 to 74 years today and at age 65, life expectancy has increased from 11 years in 1950 to 18 years today (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

Additionally, infant and childhood death rates have significantly decreased with more children surviving to adulthood. For instance, the world’s infant mortality rate has dropped from 138 deaths per 1,000 births in 1950 to today’s 26 deaths per 1,000 births.

Moreover, remarkable medical advancements have been made in extending the lives of older men and women since 1950. For example, the number of centenarians worldwide has increased from nearly 15,000 in 1950 to about 672,000 in 2026.

Returning to the question posed at the beginning, “How am I going to die?”, the major causes of death for the world’s population of 8 billion provide some general background.

Globally, the main causes of death are non-communicable diseases (NCDs), which are illnesses that are not contagious. These NCDs account for about three-quarters of all deaths worldwide.

However, infectious diseases, such as pneumonia, influenza, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, COVID, and malaria, still exist and are responsible for approximately 14% of all deaths.

According to recent trends by the World Health Organization (WHO) the leading cause of death globally is ischemic heart disease. It is followed by stroke, cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), lower respiratory, and neonatal conditions (Table 2).

Source: World Health Organization (WHO).

In 2021, COVID-19 was a leading cause of death, ranking after ischemic heart disease and preceding stroke. By 2025, COVID-19 had dropped significantly in ranking, yet it still remains a significant contributor to respiratory mortality.

Analyzing the major causes of death among various age groups in different countries provides additional valuable insights. These data offer a glimpse into potential answers to the question of how I am going to die, based on specific age groups within different countries.

For individuals aged 15 to 34, the primary causes of death in many countries, especially more developed ones, are suicide, accidents, and cancer.

A particularly troubling global trend development in mortality is the fact that suicide ranks as the third leading cause of death among individuals aged 15 to 29. More than 720,000 people die by suicide every year

In Japan, for example, suicide is the leading cause of death for individuals aged 15 to 34, followed by accidents and cancer. Among older adults, cancer and heart disease are the main causes of death. Recent data also show that mortality from senility (or “old age”) has rapidly increased to become the third leading cause of death among elderly adults.

Similarly in the United States, the causes of death vary significantly by age. For young adults (ages 15 to 24), the main causes of death are unintentional injuries such as motor vehicle crashes and drug overdoses, followed by suicide and homicide. Among the elderly, the primary causes of death are heart disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lower respiratory diseases.

In many more developed countries, such as Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and South Korea, the leading causes of death for those aged 15 to 34 are suicide, road accidents, and cancer. Among adults aged 65 and older, like in the United States, heart disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lower respiratory diseases are the main causes of death.

Turning to less developed countries, the leading cause of death in China is cardiovascular disease, accounting for over 44% of deaths in 2024. Among children and adolescents, the leading causes of death are suicide, road traffic accidents, and drowning while among older persons aged 60 and above, cancer and cardiovascular diseases are major factors. Unintentional falls are also a significant and growing cause of injury related deaths in this older age group.

Similarly, ischemic heart disease is the leading cause of death in India, accounting for nearly one-third of all deaths. Among those aged 15 to 24, suicide is the leading cause of death, followed by road traffic injuries. For children, infectious diseases such as diarrheal diseases and intestinal infections are major factors contributing to death.

In contrast to China and India, the leading causes of death in Africa are dominated by communicable diseases. The major causes of death, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, include lower respiratory infections, malaria, diarrheal diseases, and HIV/AIDS. Neonatal conditions and maternal mortality also significantly contribute to premature death.

In Nigeria, for example, the leading causes of death are dominated by malaria, lower respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and tuberculosis. Heart disease, stroke, and HIV/AIDS are also among the important causes of death. However similar to China, India, and many other countries worldwide, road traffic accidents are among the top causes of death among young adults.

Among the countries of South America, cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death, followed by cancer and respiratory diseases. Together these three account for over two-thirds of deaths in this major region.

Suicide is the leading cause of death among young people in several South American countries, including Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, and Suriname. Additionally, in many countries in South America, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, homicide and road traffic accidents are the major causes of death among individuals aged 15 to 24.

A particularly troubling global trend development in mortality is the fact that suicide ranks as the third leading cause of death among individuals aged 15 to 29. More than 720,000 people die by suicide every year. This number, coupled with the alarming increasing trend, has elevated suicide to a major public health concern in many countries.

In conclusion, while virtually everyone acknowledges the inevitability of death, many occasionally wonder “How am I going to die?” Providing a precise answer to this question is challenging and depends on various personal circumstances, including age, sex, genetics, income, medical conditions, country of residence, and lifestyle choices.

Some of these circumstances, such as age and genetics, are unchangeable. However, lifestyle choices that impact the cause of death, such as smoking, alcohol and drug consumption, diet, and exercise, can be modified or improved. Making positive changes in these areas can often lead to a longer and healthier life.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.

Claude Gascon, Interim CEO and Director of Strategy and Operations at the Global Environment Facility. Credit: The GEF

By Stella Paul
WASHINGTON D.C. & HYDERABAD, India, May 19 2026 (IPS)

As governments prepare for the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – scheduled to be held from May 30 to June 6 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan – the stakes are unusually high.

Climate change, biodiversity collapse, pollution, debt distress and geopolitical fragmentation are converging at a moment when environmental finance is under growing scrutiny. For many countries in the Global South, the challenge is no longer only about ambition but also about whether global systems can deliver fast enough and fairly enough.

For Claude Gascon – Interim CEO and Director of Strategy and Operations at the GEF – the question facing the organisation is how to turn urgency into action while operating in an increasingly volatile world.

“A meaningful outcome is turning urgency into action,” Gascon says in an exclusive interview with IPS, describing what success at the upcoming Assembly would look like. That includes public confirmation of country pledges to the GEF and final approval of a strong GEF9 package that will guide investments for the next four years. He also points to endorsement of several priorities that the institution sees as central to its future direction: integrated programming, blended finance, whole-of-government approaches, and stronger support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs).

“All this signals that multilateralism is delivering and positions us to accelerate impact in the final sprint toward the 2030 global environmental goals,” he says.

Gascon stepped into the role of Interim CEO during a period of overlapping crises and mounting pressure on international institutions. While many governments continue to demand bigger environmental outcomes, donor fatigue, economic instability and competing geopolitical priorities are tightening the availability of public finance.

“We need to do more with less, and to accomplish that, we chose disciplined ambition,” he says.

The full interview follows:

IPS: The Eighth GEF Assembly comes at a time of overlapping crises – climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. What, in your view, would define a meaningful outcome from this Assembly?

Claude Gascon: A meaningful outcome is turning urgency into action. This includes public confirmation of country pledges to the GEF and final approval of a strong GEF-9 package that will guide our investments for the next four years. The Assembly is also an opportunity for clear endorsement of the ambitious priorities we’ve agreed on: a focus on integration and integrated programs, mainstreaming blended finance to mobilise private capital, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, and strengthened support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Indigenous People and local communities (IPCLs). All this signals that multilateralism is delivering and positions us to accelerate impact in the final sprint toward the 2030 global environmental goals.

IPS: As the Interim CEO, you are navigating a volatile global context. What difficult trade-offs have you had to make between ambition and feasibility?

Gascon: We need to do more with less, and to accomplish that, we chose disciplined ambition. For example, we are channelling resources through integrated programs in nature, food, urban, energy, and health systems and setting a target of programming 25 percent of our resources to mobilise private capital and stretch scarce public funds. We are also simplifying access and speeding decisions, so countries see real progress sooner. And finally, we are working to expand our partnerships with new stakeholders such as private philanthropies to collaborate on joining our public investments with the private investments of foundations so that together we can scale up the outcomes that are critical to achieving the 2030 goals.

IPS: Countries facing debt and instability say targets feel out of reach. Should expectations be recalibrated or should financing mechanisms evolve?

Claude Gascon: We need to acknowledge these difficulties, but our response must be by evolving financing and delivery instead of lowering the goals. The GEF-9 opens more space for innovation and expands tracking of socio-economic co-benefits and transformational outcomes. There will also be a full review of the resource allocation model during the GEF-9 investment cycle to inform comprehensive changes in the GEF-10 cycle (from 2030 to 2034). The aim is faster, more flexible access that mobilises private and domestic finance alongside official development assistance (ODA). We must also work to support countries in their efforts to align national policies and eliminate perverse subsidies that could help in achieving global environmental goals.

IPS: With climate finance increasingly tied to geopolitical priorities, is there a risk of weakening multilateral funds like the GEF?

Claude Gascon: The opposite signal is coming through this replenishment. Even amid competing priorities, contributors have pledged an initial US$3.9 billion, with final approval due at the end of May from the GEF Council and public country announcements at the Assembly. The GEF’s family of funds and role across six international environmental conventions uniquely positions us to align diverse finance streams with agreed-upon global goals. That provides coherence and stability countries can count on.

IPS: Several Global South governments argue the GEF cycles are still too slow. What concrete changes can countries expect in speed and flexibility?

Gascon: I can give you three examples of practical shifts. First, the GEF is expanding the successful model of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund’s one-step project approval process where appropriate. Second, we are increasing multi-trust-fund programming so countries can access multiple windows through a single operation. And finally, we have a cap on allocation of resources per GEF Implementing Agency that increases competition and a target to increase disbursements through Multilateral Development Banks. All these measures are designed to move from pledge to project to results faster.

IPS: The GEF is a connector across CBD, UNFCCC, and UNCCD. How can it strengthen this role without overstretching?

Gascon: By doing what only the GEF can: translate multiple international environmental conventions’ mandates into integrated programs while fostering policy coherence. We operate a family of funds under a shared architecture, coordinating smarter, sharing what works, and aligning with 2030 milestones. This means that one GEF dollar invested can deliver multiple benefits across several of the Conventions.

IPS: Private finance is key to closing gaps, but investors avoid fragile contexts. How realistic is this approach – and what lessons has the GEF learned so far about both its potential and its risks?

Claude Gascon: It’s realistic when structured well. From GEF-6 to GEF-8, US$369.5 million in GEF blended finance mobilised US$6.4 billion in co-financing. That is 17 dollars for each GEF dollar, with more than US$3.5 billion coming from private sources. The GEF also has deep experience with fragile contexts: over the last 35 years, 45 percent of our investments have included at least one conflict-affected country and 88 percent of country-level projects were in fragile situations. The main lesson we learned is to pair risk-sharing instruments and strong local partners around projects that fit local realities.

IPS: How is the GEF improving tracking and communication of real-world impact, especially at the community level?

Claude Gascon: The GEF-9’s results framework strengthens environmental outcome tracking and explicitly expands measurement of socio-economic co-benefits and contributions to transformational change. A Council-approved Knowledge Management & Learning strategy aligns data, learning, and communications, and we will continue spotlighting community-level results through platforms like the Small Grants Program and the Inclusive Conservation Initiative, with expanded inclusion under the whole-of-society approach.

IPS: Critics say global environmental finance reflects donor priorities more than recipient needs. How is the GEF addressing equity, voice, and decision-making for the Global South?

Claude Gascon: Equity is built into GEF-9. We have a goal of allocating 35% of total programming to benefit LDCs and SIDS; and an aspirational target of 20% of GEF-9 financing directed to support IPLCs. These targets are supported by updated guidance and a policy to strengthen IPLC engagement. It is also important to note that all funding decisions are made by recipient countries as to the use of GEF resources. This means that recipient country priorities are well supported in the GEF model.

IPS: How will the GEF remain relevant in an increasingly crowded and complex landscape?

The GEF will stay relevant by being more catalytic, coherent, and faster to impact. We will deepen systems-focused integrated programs; mainstream blended finance, maintain a high but disciplined innovation risk appetite, and streamline access and delivery so countries can deliver once and meet several global goals at the same time.

Note: This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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The World Bank Group is consulting publicly on whether to merge its three independent complaint mechanisms. This note explains what is being proposed and how civil society organizations can participate in the consultation.

By Danny Bradlow and David Hunter
PRETORIA, South Africa / WASHINGTON DC, USA , May 19 2026 (IPS)

The World Bank made history in 1994 by creating the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism, at any international organisation. Its function is to investigate complaints from communities who allege they were harmed because the bank failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.

By establishing the three-member Inspection Panel, the World Bank showed support for a democrati Soth Arica/c vision of international governance based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals to take part in development decisions that affect their lives.

To date, the panel has received 186 complaints. Fifty-two have been from Africa. They involved projects in 56 countries, including 26 African countries. The complaints have raised issues such as the World Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies regarding public consultations, environmental and social impact assessments and involuntary resettlement in the projects that it funds.

The board has expanded the bank’s accountability process to include both compliance reviews and dispute resolution processes. Today, the World Bank Group has three independent accountability mechanisms:

• the Inspection Panel, which focuses on compliance reviews in public sector projects
• a separate dispute resolution mechanism for public sector projects
• the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, which offers both compliance reviews and dispute resolution services for private sector projects, primarily funded by the International Finance Corporation.

These accountability mechanisms have operated with mixed success. There have been some wins, for example in a case in Uganda involving risks for women and children associated with the building of a road. And some failures. An example is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman finding against the International Finance Corporation for noncompliance in a coal fired power plant in India that was ignored.

We were involved, as legal academics and working with civil society organisations, in the establishment of the Inspection Panel. We have been following the activities of these independent accountability mechanisms for over 30 years. We are concerned about their future.

The World Bank Group is seeking to become a “bigger and better” bank. This involves promoting more collaboration between the five entities that make up the group. It is doing so under the banner of “One WBG”. This is an important development because the World Bank is the only global multilateral development bank. It offers developing countries both financial and advisory services. For example, it is the biggest funder of development projects in Africa.

The increasing collaboration between the different institutions in the bank raises concerns about which of their policies are applicable to a particular project. It also raises the issue of whether the bank should integrate the group’s independent accountability mechanisms so that there is no question about which mechanism is applicable to the project.

We believe that resolving this issue offers the bank’s board an opportunity to improve the structure of its independent accountability mechanisms and their contribution to the bank’s operations.

The dangers

The board appointed a two-person task force in September 2025 to advise it on the feasibility of integrating the three organisations in a way that does not reduce their independence, accessibility and effectiveness. The task force prepared a thorough and well-reasoned draft report.

The report was finalised after public consultations and is being considered by the board. It shows that integration of the mechanisms is a feasible, but complex exercise. The existing mechanisms have different operating cultures, policies and practices and human resource needs. The report describes various models for integrating the existing mechanisms.

The report also demonstrates that if mishandled, the exercise could result in a less independent and less effective accountability mechanism. To avoid this risk, we propose that the board adopt a model consisting of two separate independent accountability mechanisms. One to cover compliance reviews across the entire group. The other to cover dispute resolution across the group. This will enable both functions to operate independently and efficiently.

Our proposal raises four issues.

First, it is important that each mechanism is independent of the bank’s management. Each mechanism must have sufficient resources to undertake effective compliance reviews or dispute resolutions. Their processes must also be robust enough to result in meaningful outcomes for the complainants.

Second, the new compliance mechanism must retain a three-member panel appointed by and reporting to the bank’s board. The panel should have a permanent chair serving a six-year term. The chair must have the authority to decide which cases need the panel’s attention. The other two panel members should also serve staggered six-year terms.

A three-person panel allows for some geographic, technical and experiential diversity. Gaining a consensus among the panel members improves the quality and increases the credibility of the panel reports. A three-member panel is better able to withstand pressure from the bank’s management and other stakeholders than is a mechanism headed by one person.

Third, the dispute resolution mechanism should be headed by an experienced dispute resolution professional at the vice-president level. This official should report to the president of the bank. Our view is that this arrangement could encourage the institution to play a more proactive role in resolving disputes.

To ensure that the unit has some independence it should also have regularly scheduled meetings with the board. The head of the unit should also be able to request a meeting with the board whenever they deem it necessary and without requiring the prior approval of the bank’s president.

Fourth, the process of consolidating accountability mechanisms will be complex. Consequently, the board should first decide on the basic structure: a compliance review unit headed by a three-member panel and a separate dispute resolution unit headed by a senior professional.

It should delay any decisions on the policies, principles and practices of the mechanisms until it receives advice from a multi-stakeholder working group that includes external stakeholders and management and is co-chaired by one person from each of the units being merged.

An opportunity to fix things

The bank has the opportunity to strengthen its development mission. The changes it makes should be designed to:

• help make the bank a better institution that supports higher quality projects
• make the bank a learning institution that openly accepts criticism and looks to implement solutions
• ensure it becomes an institution that recognises that people affected by bank-funded projects are stakeholders in its operations who may be forced to risk their well-being for the greater good.

Source: The Conversation Africa May 17, 2026

Daniel Bradlow is Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria; David Hunter is Professor Emeritus, The American University Washington College of Law, American University.

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Emmanuel Herman/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Hannah Wheatley, Joanna Makhlouf and Taís Siqueira
BAGAMOYO, Tanzania / BEIRUT, Lebanon / WASHINGTON D.C., May 18 2026 (IPS)

In an era when civil society funding is in decline, it’s time to rebel against a broken system.

Today, too much is being asked from the people already doing the most. In a time of multiple and connected global crises – of climate, conflict, democracy, disinformation, global governance, human rights and inclusion – and in a context of intensifying civic space restrictions and collapsing funding, funders and the intermediary organisations that distribute resources somehow expect frontline organisations to transform systemic injustices that have built up over centuries. At the same time, these groups are expected to keep meeting inflexible targets, writing flawless reports and keeping their teams emotionally and physically afloat.

As governments, international organisations, investors, philanthropists, civil society and business leaders meet at the Global Partnerships Conference on the future of international development, it’s time to do things differently.

Let’s stop asking local leaders to transform their communities before they’ve had space to heal. Let’s stop training grassroots organisations to become international clones. Let’s stop intermediaries replicating burnout culture.

No single organisation can undo the long legacy of colonialism or the systemic problems of global capitalism. And they shouldn’t have to. The role of the civil society ecosystem must be to build and protect space, redistribute power and resources and, most of all, stop transferring institutional pressure downwards. If we truly trust local civil society, we must also trust its limits. That means intermediaries must stand their ground with funders, set realistic expectations and champion the right to do less when circumstances demand it.

At CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Labs – an initiative to tackle the barriers that get in the way of local leadership of development – partners often report feeling compelled to deliver ambitious workplans that involve them reaching every district, leading multiple initiatives and facilitating extensive community engagements, even as civic space is closing around them. Driven by passion and the need to prove their worth in a competitive ecosystem, many have overextended without realising the toll on their wellbeing and sustainability.

Burnout is not just about long hours. It stems from impossible expectations in unsafe, high-pressure contexts. Civil society is striving to stretch every grant dollar, prove its worth at every reporting cycle and ensure the survival of communities. In restrictive civic space conditions, these pressures are compounded by harassment, intimidation, surveillance and violence.

The result is a constant feeling of not doing enough, even when the demands are structurally impossible. Over time, this erodes morale, health and leadership sustainability.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, funders proved that another way was possible. They provided unrestricted funding and offered flexibility and simplified reporting. Trust was extended. Partnerships were strengthened. But that willingness to experiment has not lasted.

What must change

It must be recognised that in these conditions, scaling back is not failure. It is how movements endure.

We have seen that investing in healing and reflection is not a luxury. It is what sustains movements. At Local Leadership Labs, partners working with survivors of state violence realised they could not move forward without first addressing exhaustion and trauma. Their care-centred approach showed that the process itself can be the outcome. Taking time for healing and thoughtful collaboration produces more sustainable, transformational results.

This is what the civil society ecosystem should support: not chasing impossible targets, but creating conditions for dignity, reflection and resilience.

Addressing burnout requires more than acknowledgement. It calls for rethinking about how support is structured and how expectations are set. Funders and intermediaries can help break the cycle by:

1. Budgeting time and priority for healing
Leaders are often asked to deliver systemic change while carrying unaddressed trauma. Without space for healing, burnout is inevitable. Intermediaries can normalise pacing, integrate healing into workplans and advocate with funders for timelines that reflect reality.

2. Showing funders the way
Funders need guidance on becoming more adaptable to intensifying civic space conditions and contexts of high volatility. Intermediaries can convene learning spaces where funders reflect on how flexibility and responsiveness protect communities and sustain movements. They can also challenge extractive, funder-driven processes and advocate for spaces where local civil society can lead and influence on its own terms.

3. Bridging, connecting and humanising
Behind funders, intermediaries and frontline civil society are people, all under institutional pressure. Intermediaries can help in both directions, by shielding local partners from unrealistic demands while working with funders to develop an understanding of what’s achievable. By cultivating empathy, they can replace transactional directives with reciprocal accountability, unlocking collaborations that go beyond the extractive.

In many contexts, civil society is holding the line in the face of authoritarianism, even worse attacks on human rights and still stronger repression. The enemies of democracy and human rights thrive when those defending freedoms and demanding social justice burn out. When forced to compete for scarce resources, organisations try to over-deliver to prove their worth, further deepening stress and accelerating exhaustion.

In this context, supporting the wellbeing of local civil society is not optional. It is central to protecting the energy that drives activism. Funders and intermediaries must pause, reflect and reset expectations. If we create space for healing, rest and resilience, movements will survive the current storm, and emerge equipped to resist, transform and win.

Taís Siqueira is Local Leadership Labs Coordinator at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Hannah Wheatley is CIVICUS’s former Data Analyst and Joanna Makhlouf is a former member of the Local Leadership Labs implementation team.

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Credit: Africa Center for Strategic Studies

By Kester Kenn Klomegah
MOSCOW, May 18 2026 (IPS)

Under the auspices of the Faculty of Journalism of Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Russian-African Club, in late April, held its IV International Forum of Journalists from Russia and Africa, which marked another historical milestone. According to an established annual tradition, discussions were focused on aspects of the media, its structure, current performance, information contents, and challenges as well as future perspectives.

The shared common purpose was also to critically review whether the media, both in Africa and in the Russian Federation, have played its role in strengthening bilateral relations, and promoted the important goals set out during the first and second Russia-Africa summits. Why Media?

As largely expected, there were in-depth discussions. There were also controversies over the dynamics of media performance, with prominent participating experts raising narratives and criticisms, in the context of the forum’s theme: “Mass Media of Russia and Africa: The Role in Strengthening Friendship and Solidarity among the Peoples of the World.”

Elena Vartanova, dean of the Faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University, pointed to the fact that the media has to build diverse partnerships between Russia and Africa, further emphasized the importance of intercultural dialogue in creating a unified information space amid the complex global transformations of the modern world.

Yaroslav Skvortsov, dean of the Faculty of International Journalism at MGIMO, spoke about his recent unique trip to South Africa, noting that South Africa and the continent as a whole remain a “media blind spot” for Russian media, just as Russia receives very little coverage for African audiences.

The expert emphasized the need for serious, thoughtful, and in-depth reporting work in this area. The necessity to explore more opportunities in building strong ties, deepening the understanding of geopolitical developments, while fostering dialogue among the continent’s public.

Underlining Reasons

The media performance gap between Russia and Africa stems from overwhelming dominance of Western media outlets, a little of direct African reporting in Russia (including a lack of accredited African journalists), and limited institutional investment. These are some of the reasons highlighted during the discussions by an African studies journalist and columnist for the ITAR-TASS Analytical Center, Oleg Osipov, Timur Shafir, Secretary of the Union of Journalists of Russia and Head of the International Department of the Union of Journalists of Russia, and Louis Gowend, chairman of the Commission for Relations with African Diaspora and the Media of the Russian-African Club of Moscow State University, and president of the African Business Club.

Oleg Osipov, unreservedly, expressed concern about information deficit in Russian and African journalism, emphasized the urgent need to expand the network of Russian correspondent offices across the African continent, as well as getting a few experienced African media practitioners to Russia. This is especially important in today’s reality, as geopolitics heightens in the world.

Assessing current global trends, Russia needs to expand its presence in all spheres, and the media space is a crucial component of this process, the Russian expert believes. But for Timur Shafir, the thoughts were on the fact that it was especially important now to find common grounds in the mutual perceptions of the peoples and cultures of Russia and Africa through media communication.

In addition, he further emphasized that the media landscape is currently undergoing significant transformations, with technologies, audiences, and means of communication changing. Therefore, journalism is currently an area of particular responsibility and professional integrity, and direct dialogue between journalists in Russia and Africa has become crucial now.

Search for New Approach

The IV International Forum of Journalists from Russia and Africa, was considered as the new dawn, turning a new chapter with suggestion and paving the path for improving media performance in both regions. The participants offered a deafening applause to this position. The speakers expressed confidence that the Forum will serve as a starting point for many new joint initiatives.

According to Louis Gowend, the RusAfroMedia media platform—an information resource, which was created by the Moscow State University RA Club in 2022, for instance has to undergo serious facelifting, by strengthening cooperation and to improve the image of Russia-Africa cooperation.

This platform provides all the conditions for a free and frank exchange of opinions, relevant useful information, and the promotion of initiatives in all areas of cooperation between Russia and Africa. The speaker expressed concern over the fact that Russian journalists are much less active on the RusAfroMedia platform than their African counterparts and urged those present to make greater use of this resource.

In his contribution, Alexander Berdnikov, executive secretary of the Russian-African Club, distinctively noted that, at a time when new development trends are unfolding in the world, journalism and the entire media sphere are literally becoming a battlefield for information wars and special operations.

The speaker reminded that the Forum, being held ahead of the Third Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for October 2026, indicates how crucial for participants to develop solutions and initiatives for cooperation in journalism between Russia and Africa, and which will form the basis for practical recommendations in preparation for the forthcoming African leaders’ Summit.

Preserving Traditional Practice

Lyubov Sakhno, head of the Protocol and African Section of the TASS International Relations Department, represented Russia’s oldest news agency and spoke about ITAR-TASS’s consistent efforts to provide African media with foreign-language news feeds. But then, Russian media expansion faces limited budget constraints.

According to her, over 400 media outlets in Africa use these resources. She also discussed the organization’s media forum, which traditionally takes place on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit.

Sergey Grachev, deputy director of the Media Research and Analysis Directorate at Rossiya Segodnya International News Agency, agreed with his colleagues that today we are facing unprecedented pressure from Western media. African media, most often, depends on Western sources, which Russian officials argue creates a “vacuum” filled by biased or hostile information.

Despite this, Russian media projects in Africa continue to develop, presenting analytical models of Sputnik’s presence on social media, where it broadcasts in 33 foreign languages.

Editor-in-chief of the African Initiative news agency, Buinta Bembeeva, noted in her discussions that Africa has become noticeably, and more prominent in Russian news in recent years. The speaker discussed the African Initiative’s experience in Africa. The agency is noticeably represented in many African countries through cooperation agreements with local media outlets.

The agency also collaborates with bloggers and organizes a journalism school for young African journalists. This close, on-the-ground, direct collaboration with African media outlets is key to achieving full-scale journalistic activity.

Contributions from Nigerian Academics

Professor Babatunde Joseph, Kaduna State University, spoke about using strengthened strategic communications to strengthen partnerships and unite the cultures of African countries. He agreed with his Russian colleagues on the need to expand the presence of Russian news agencies in Africa and African media in Russia. The expert cited the example of a well-known British radio station that broadcasts in five languages in Nigeria alone: Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin English (called “Najin” there), and plain English. “This is a successful strategy,” the professor was forced to note.

Professor Mohammad Bashir Ali, Kaduna State University (Nigeria), leading the Nigerian delegation to the Forum, discussed at length, the traditional role of media in promoting economic and entrepreneurial cooperation between Russia and Africa. Despite the multiple challenges posed by the complex international environment in both Africa and Russia, there is enormous potential for opportunity in this area. He concluded that greater consolidation in the media sphere is essential.

Professors Yushau Ibrahim Ango and Ayodele Babatunde, both from Kaduna State University, presented a working paper entitled “African Creative Industries and Media Systems in the Context of Digitalization,” analyzing the impact of digital media on entrepreneurship in the Nigerian economy.

The paper, however, concluded that reliance on digital platforms introduces new vulnerabilities, including algorithmic unpredictability, into the economy. This paper contributed to entrepreneurship and media research by theorizing digital platforms as entrepreneurial infrastructure, which has implications for policy, platform governance, and understanding how media shapes economic life in the African context.

Concluding Remarks

Hafiz Basi, chairman of the Youth Projects Commission of the Russian-African Club, seriously echoed the opinion in closing remarks, stating that it is time to change outdated stereotypes that portray Russia and Africa through Soviet political clichés. “We need journalism that brings people together, not further distances,” Hafiz Basi emphasized. He also noted that the lack of accredited African journalists in Russia remains a pressing issue.

Meanwhile, African media outlets write about Russia primarily in political terms, failing to reveal the true depth of Russian culture and the soul of the Russian people. In his opinion, the Russia-Africa Journalists Forum, once more, demonstrated its importance, which discusses the most pressing issues, prospects, and strategies for strengthening media cooperation between Russia and Africa.

This is in reality, important during the time of rapid geopolitical changes, in response to the aggressive rhetoric of Western countries and their satellites, public diplomacy, soft power, and peacekeeping journalism which are becoming increasingly relevant careful analysis and take effective measures in building a solid foundation for Russian-African dialogue.

Kester Kenn Klomegah focuses on current geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development-related questions in Africa with external countries. Most of his well-resourced articles are reprinted in several reputable foreign media.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses the rising trend of social media bans for children with Marie-Ève Nadeau, Head of International Affairs of the 5Rights Foundation, an organisation that promotes children’s rights in the digital environment.

Marie-Ève Nadeau

Are social media bans an effective way of protecting children?

Today, one in three internet users is a child, and digital technologies increasingly mediate all aspects of their lives, from the classroom to the playground, from their first friendships to how they see themselves. As evidence of harms and risks mounts, lawmakers around the world are racing to impose age limits on children’s access to social media. The instinct to act is right, but the current direction risks missing the point.

The real issue is the conditions children face when online. Children are growing up in a digital environment designed without their distinct rights, needs and vulnerabilities in mind. This is a deliberate choice. Tech companies’ business models prioritise commercial gain over children’s safety and wellbeing, deliberately embedding persuasive design, relentless engagement loops and extractive data practices by default. Fixing this requires more than blocking children’s access.

Age restrictions are not new, yet their effectiveness remains inconclusive. Banning children from specific services while leaving the underlying system untouched lets tech companies off the hook for recommender systems that push harmful content, persuasive design that keeps children compulsively engaged and data practices that exploit their attention for profit. Used in isolation, bans create an illusion of protection while the same harmful design practices continue unchallenged. Children are pushed towards other unregulated environments, such as AI chatbots, gaming platforms and educational technology services, where they face equivalent risks with even less scrutiny.

What do these bans mean for children’s rights to expression and information?

Children’s rights are interdependent and indivisible, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 25 makes clear that all children’s rights apply fully in the digital environment. This includes the right to protection from harm, but also to the rights of access to information, expression and participation. In practice, tech companies have made these rights conditional on the commercial surveillance, exploitation and manipulation of children, eroding their privacy, safety, critical thinking and agency.

Age-based bans that restrict access without addressing underlying design practices create a false choice between freedom and safety. Children need both protection from harm and meaningful access to expression, information and participation. Restricting access without reforming the systems that embed risk fails to uphold the full range of children’s rights.

Who is most harmed by these bans, and what gaps do they create?

Children’s rights apply until the age of 18, yet proposed restrictions often only cover children under 16 and a narrow set of high-risk services. This creates gaps. Children above the age threshold, and those who circumvent poorly implemented restrictions, end up in unregulated spaces outside the scope of bans.

Bans can also entrench inequality. Children are not a homogeneous group, and those facing intersecting vulnerabilities linked to disability, gender, political opinion, race, religion or ethnic, national or social origin may heavily rely on digital spaces for expression, identity safety and support.

At the same time, engagement-based platform design often rewards and amplifies divisive and harmful content, for example on gender-based violence, heightening risks for excluded communities. Blanket bans do not create safer spaces, nor eliminate these harms. Instead, they displace them to less visible, less regulated and even less accountable spaces. Effective protection must ensure children can exercise their rights and have safe spaces of support and community.

How does age verification work, and what does it mean for children’s privacy?

Tech companies routinely invest heavily in targeting advertising and personalising content yet fail to apply the same rigour to protecting children. Age assurance, an umbrella term for both age estimation and age verification solutions, allows companies to recognise the presence of children and act accordingly. It must be lawful, rights-respecting and proportionate to risk. Data collection should be limited to what’s strictly necessary to establish age, and used only for that purpose.

Global privacy regulators found that 24 per cent of services lack any age assurance mechanism and 90 per cent of those relying on self-declaration are easily bypassed. Yet robust solutions exist. Australia’s age assurance technology trial demonstrates that privacy-preserving age verification can confirm age without exposing identity. Technical standards, such as the 2089.1-2024 Standard for Online Age Verification published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, show that independently audited frameworks, like those used in product safety or pharmaceuticals, are both feasible and necessary to ensure age assurance systems are secure, proportionate and compliant.

For low-risk services appropriate for all users, there should be no requirement to establish age. Where services or functionalities present risk to children, companies should address or mitigate specific high-risk features rather than gatekeeping entire services.

What should governments demand from platforms to protect children?

Age restrictions have become part of a global playbook, notably in data protection regimes like the US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which sets 13 as the threshold for consent to data collection. Poor implementation and enforcement of COPPA and similar laws have allowed tech companies to hide behind obscure disclaimers while failing to meaningfully restrict access and profiting from embedding risk into children’s digital experiences.

There’s another way forward. The priority should be holding tech companies accountable, not banning children from the digital world. That means banning exploitative practices, regulating risky features such as addictive design, manipulative recommender systems and extractive data practices, and requiring privacy, safety and age-appropriate design as the baseline.

It also means shifting to systemic risk management: companies should be legally required to anticipate, assess and mitigate how their products expose children to risk. This baseline already exists in other high-risk sectors such as aviation, food safety and medicine, where products must demonstrate safety before reaching the market.

A growing global consensus points to a clear path forward: embedding age-appropriate design, requiring child rights impact assessments, mandating privacy and safety by design and default, establishing effective enforcement mechanisms and ensuring independent auditing. Over 55 leading organisations and experts from all continents have endorsed the 10 best-practice principles developed by the 5Rights Foundation.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Child social media bans: a growing global problem CIVICUS Lens 05.May.2026
Technology: Innovation without accountability CIVICUS | State Of Civil Society Report 2026
North Macedonia: ‘The solution cannot be to cut children off social media, but to make it safer’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Goran Rizaov 23.Apr.2026

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Farmers in Bangladesh. Credit: Heifer International
 
As conflict in the Middle East disrupts critical fuel and fertilizer supply routes, smallholder farmers across Asia are once again caught in the crossfire of global shocks. This piece argues that repeated crises are exposing a deeper structural flaw in agri-food systems—Overdependence on External Inputs. It presents a compelling case for regenerative agriculture as a pathway to resilient food systems in Asia.

By Neena Joshi
UTTAR PRADESH, India, May 15 2026 (IPS)

The latest shock to global food systems, triggered by conflict in the Middle East and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, has once again exposed a fragile truth: the world’s food systems remain highly vulnerable to external shocks.

For Asia, especially South Asia, where agriculture underpins millions of livelihoods, the consequences are immediate and severe. Rising fuel prices, supply chain disruptions, and limited access to fertilizers are pushing already fragile systems to the brink.

The Strait of Hormuz is not just a geopolitical chokepoint; it is a lifeline for fuel and agricultural inputs across Asia. A significant share of fertilizers and their raw materials, including natural gas, transit through or originate from this route.

For countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, where agriculture employs between 38 and over 60 percent of the workforce, this dependency creates systemic risk. When supply chains falter, the effects cascade quickly: input costs rise, planting cycles are disrupted, and farmer incomes shrink.

Solar panels installed in a farm in Bangladesh. Credit: Heifer International

Even if shipping routes reopen, recovery will be slow

Damage to energy infrastructure and continued geopolitical uncertainty mean price volatility and supply constraints can persist for months. For smallholder farmers, this creates a dual crisis. Exporting produce becomes difficult due to logistical bottlenecks, while fuel shortages hamper domestic distribution. At the same time, the next cropping cycle looms, with essential fertilizers either unavailable or unaffordable.

This is not an isolated disruption. From the COVID-19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine, global shocks are becoming more frequent and interconnected. Each crisis compounds the last, pushing smallholder farmers, the backbone of global food production, into deeper uncertainty. The question is no longer whether disruptions will occur, but how prepared our systems are to withstand them.

At the heart of the problem is overdependence on external, input-intensive systems, chemical fertilizers, fossil fuels, and long, fragile supply chains. Reducing this dependence is central to building resilience.

Regenerative Agriculture and Renewable Energy Offer a Compelling Pathway Forward.

At its core, regenerative agriculture restores soil health, enhances biodiversity, improves water retention, and reduces reliance on synthetic inputs. Practices such as crop diversification, organic soil enrichment, reduced tillage, and integrated pest management shift farming from an extractive to a restorative model.

By rebuilding natural soil fertility, these approaches reduce dependence on external inputs. Instead of relying heavily on urea in rice cultivation, regenerative systems promote nutrient cycling and biological nitrogen fixation through legumes, alongside the use of compost and manure to strengthen soil organic matter and ensure a steady, natural nutrient supply.

Integrating renewable energy further strengthens resilience. Solar-powered irrigation replaces fuel-based inputs with clean, reliable energy, lowering operational costs and improving water-use efficiency—especially critical during periods of disruption.

The evidence base for these approaches is both growing and compelling. In Bangladesh, multiple studies show that solar irrigation consistently outperforms diesel systems, delivering higher returns, improving food security, and reducing irrigation costs by 20–50 percent, while significantly boosting profitability (Rana, 2021; Buisson, 2024; Sunny, 2023; Sarker, 2025).

Research also shows that bio-based inputs like compost, biochar, and green manure can partially replace synthetic fertilizers, often without yield loss, while improving soil health (Naher, 2021; Ferdous, 2023; Behera, 2025).

Regenerative Agriculture is Not Just an Environmental Solution—It is an Economic One

By reducing dependence on volatile external inputs such as chemical fertilizers and fossil fuels, regenerative agriculture shields farmers from global price shocks while improving long-term productivity and profits.

Emerging evidence from Nepal and India reinforces this trend: while yields generally remain stable, reduced input costs significantly increase farm profitability (Magar, 2022; Dhakal, 2022; Berger, 2025).

A broader analysis by the Observer Research Foundation (2025) finds that although yields may dip slightly during transition, most cases report higher yields over time, alongside improved income stability driven by lower input dependence.

Similar trends are being observed globally, reinforcing that regenerative approaches can deliver both resilience and profitability across diverse farming systems (link).

Importantly, these outcomes are already visible on the ground in South Asia. Through programs led by Heifer International, smallholder farmers are adopting regenerative and climate-smart practices that reduce costs, improve yields, and strengthen resilience.

In Bangladesh’s Jashore district, for instance, women farmers organized into cooperatives have reduced irrigation costs, improved productivity, and strengthened market access through solar irrigation, organic soil management, and collective action.

As one farmer, Shirin Akter, shares: “Adopting climate-smart practices and pooling resources through my cooperative allowed me to grow diverse crops. When drought hit, I still had harvests to sell, and my cooperative helped me recover quickly.”

For farmers like Shirin, these shifts are transformative, turning vulnerability into resilience through diversified systems, lower input dependence, and stronger collective support. Similar models in Nepal show how regenerative, community-based approaches can reduce resource pressure while improving incomes.

Scaling this Transition Requires Action Beyond the Farm

To transition to a resilient and sustainable food system, a multi-stakeholder approach is essential. Policymakers should realign incentives to support sustainable practices and reduce dependence on imported inputs. Financial institutions and insurers should recognize the lower risk profiles of regenerative systems.

Businesses must embed sustainability into core decisions, prioritizing sourcing from farmers adopting regenerative practices and building longer-term, stable supply relationships. At the same time, marketing teams can shape consumer demand by communicating the value of sustainably produced food. Together, these shifts can align supply chains and markets in support of more resilient food systems.

The stakes are high. The World Food Programme warns that roughly 45 million more people could be pushed into hunger if current disruptions persist, adding to the 318 million people already food insecure.

We cannot continue rebuilding fragile food systems after every shock. We must redesign them. Regenerative agriculture offers a pathway to reduce dependence on volatile external inputs, restore ecological balance, and build resilience where it matters most—at the farm level.

To replenish what has been used up is not just an environmental necessity—it is the foundation of more secure, equitable, and resilient food systems across Asia.

Neena Joshi is the Senior Vice President for Asia Programs at Heifer International. With over 20 years of experience, she leads initiatives to build inclusive, sustainable agrifood systems and empower smallholder farmers, especially women and youth, across Asia.

IPS UN Bureau

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One of the biggest hidden threats to ocean health comes from biofouling — the accumulation of algae, barnacles and microorganisms on ships’ hulls that can transport invasive species across oceans. Credit: Aaron Smulktis/Unsplash

By Kizito Makoye
MAFIA ISLAND, Tanzania , May 14 2026 (IPS)

Under the warm waters off Tanzania’s Mafia Island, marine scientist Asha Mgeni hovers above a coral reef she has studied for years. Small fish dart through the currents. To most divers, the reef appears pristine. But Mgeni notices something unusual.

Tucked between coral branches are invasive organisms disrupting the reef’s natural growth and species, which were not there before, she says.

“We know these reefs,” she tells IPS. “When something new appears, it stands out immediately.”

For communities along Tanzania’s coastline, coral reefs are ecological treasures. They cradle fish stocks, soften the blow of crashing waves and support coastal economies increasingly threatened by climate change and environmental degradation.

Scientists say one of the biggest hidden threats comes from biofouling — the accumulation of algae, barnacles and microorganisms on ships’ hulls that can transport invasive species across oceans. For decades, ballast water was considered shipping’s main pathway for spreading invasive aquatic species. But maritime experts now say biofouling can no longer be ignored.

“Ballast water has certainly, historically at least, been considered the primary vector for IAS introductions,” says Will Griffiths, Project Technical Analyst at the International Maritime Organization. “However, the role played by biofouling in this regard has become more recognised in recent years, with some studies suggesting that in some locations, such as parts of Hawaii and New Zealand, it may have been the primary vector.”

Fish vendors wait for the arrival of the day’s catch along the shoreline in coastal Tanzania, where fishing sustains thousands of livelihoods. Marine scientists say invasive aquatic species linked to international shipping could disrupt fisheries and threaten food security for vulnerable coastal communities. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

As global shipping expands, marine experts warn that invasive species are spreading through trade routes, disrupting ecosystems and threatening biodiversity. Scientists and regulators say biofouling can transport  marine organisms and pathogens across ecosystems, threatening fisheries and coastal economies.

“It is also worth noting that biofouling can represent a great species richness in terms of species transported by ships and also, therefore, potential pathogens,” Griffiths tells IPS.

Mwanahija Shalli, a professor of Marine and Coastal Resources Management at the University of Dar es Salaam, says marine biodiversity underpins livelihoods for millions of coastal residents through fisheries and tourism.

“Invasive aquatic species threaten ecosystems and fisheries by displacing native species,” she says. “If we fail to manage biofouling, we undermine important conservation efforts.”

A broad alliance led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is stepping up efforts to confront a major environmental threat from shipping: the spread of invasive aquatic species through biofouling.

Port and maritime officials inspect a vessel at the Port of Dar es Salaam as part of efforts to monitor the environmental risks posed by invasive marine species spread through global shipping routes. Experts say biofouling on ship hulls has become a growing threat to marine biodiversity and coastal economies. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

Known as the GloFouling Partnerships Project, the initiative aims to help countries strengthen regulations, improve monitoring systems and build technical capacity to reduce the transfer of invasive species through international shipping. The project supports  efforts to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals — particularly the target to conserve and sustainably use oceans, seas and marine resources — while delivering climate benefits through improved vessel efficiency and lower emissions.

Scientists say organisms nestled on ship hulls increase drag, forcing vessels to burn more fuel and produce more emissions.

“Biofouling changes the affected ships’ hydrodynamics and increases drag, meaning there is increased fuel consumption and thus increased greenhouse gas emissions,” Griffiths says. “This can also be a major issue when fouling is on the ship’s propellers, which, due to shape, require specialist cleaning.”

He says biofouling can also interfere with vessel operations.

“There is also some anecdotal evidence to suggest fouling can cause blockages in seawater intakes, affect engine performance and even firefighting systems in extreme cases, which further increases fuel consumption,” he says.

Andrew Hume, Senior Environmental Specialist at the Global Environment Facility, says the initiative builds on earlier international efforts to control invasive species transported through ballast water.

“The GloFouling project builds on a long-standing partnership between the GEF UNDP and the IMO to address shipping impacts on the marine environment,” he says.

According to Hume, the project closes a major gap by targeting hull biofouling, another key pathway for invasive species transfer.

“Keeping ships’ hulls free from just a thin layer of slime could reduce a ship’s greenhouse gas emissions by up to 25 per cent,” Hume says.

A cargo ship enters the Port of Dar es Salaam, one of East Africa’s busiest maritime gateways. As shipping traffic increases, scientists and regulators are raising concerns about biofouling — the buildup of marine organisms on ship hulls that can transport invasive species across oceans. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

Marine scientists warn that invasive aquatic species can dramatically alter ecosystems, outsmart native organisms and damage fisheries that support coastal livelihoods. The issue is  raising international concern as governments struggle to balance burgeoning maritime trade with the protection of ocean ecosystems. Griffiths says the international community has made substantial progress regulating ballast water through the Ballast Water Management Convention, but biofouling controls still lag behind.

“An important aspect to consider is that there is a robust international legal framework for managing ballast water, whereas at the international level biofouling provisions are, for the moment, recommendatory and only a few countries have biofouling regulations,” he explains.

Across East Africa, rising cargo traffic has increased concern about shipping’s ecological footprint. Similar efforts are underway globally. Indonesia estimates improved biofouling management could generate up to USD 7 million annually through healthier reefs, lower fuel consumption and reduced port maintenance costs.

In Peru, authorities are building a national aquatic biodiversity database to help scientists detect invasive species before they spread along the coastline.

“Collaboration in the project enabled the authorities to develop a national aquatic biodiversity catalogue providing the baseline knowledge to detect invasive species early and undertake rapid response,” Griffiths says.

In Fiji, the results are impressive.

“Fiji reported that as a result of the GloFouling dry dock training, they had improved the technical capacity of local personnel and gained access to resources to upgrade local facilities,” Griffiths says, adding that the programme had strengthened confidence among local maritime operators and enhanced Fiji’s position in the regional maritime services market

Meanwhile, Mauritius is encouraging private-sector investment in technologies designed to protect fragile marine ecosystems. Over the past six years, countries participating in the GloFouling initiative have moved toward stricter regulation and greater regional cooperation.

Australia and New Zealand have already introduced fully enforceable national regimes requiring clean hulls, biofouling management plans, record books and inspections consistent with the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines. Griffiths says Brazil has emerged as a leader among developing nations.

“Brazil is the newest and most explicit adopter, directly embedding the 2023 guidelines into mandatory port state law,” he says. “Unlike the IMO’s voluntary approach, however, Brazil sets an explicit enforceable standard: vessels must arrive with no more than microfouling.”

The project has also expanded into maritime training and private-sector cooperation. Through the Global Industry Alliance, companies are testing hull coatings and cleaning technologies to limit the spread of invasive species.

“One of the project’s most transformative impacts has been creating a collaborative platform where technology innovators, regulators and industry leaders jointly develop and implement solutions for biofouling,” Griffiths says.

The alliance, initially created to support the project, has since evolved into a permanent collaboration. Griffiths says the group is expanding research into hull inspection technologies and the environmental impacts of antifouling coatings.

“The continuation of the GIA and its ongoing studies offers exceptional value as a driving force for industry innovation, standard-setting and knowledge dissemination,” he says.

Hume says the initiative builds on earlier GEF-supported efforts that led to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments in 2004. He says the programme has since helped develop the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines and supported pilot projects in 12 countries.

Hume says the GEF is preparing a second phase of investment aimed at helping more countries implement the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines and strengthen international cooperation.

“The objective is to strengthen national and institutional capacity of developing countries to implement the guidelines in order to reduce invasive species and lower greenhouse gas emissions,” he says.

A second phase of investment expected before June  aims to strengthen national capacity, expand implementation and advance discussions toward a legally binding global framework on biofouling management. Although the GloFouling project officially concluded in May 2025, Griffiths says efforts are continuing through training programmes, technical studies and industry partnerships designed to maintain momentum ahead of anticipated binding international regulations by 2030.

Experts say cleaner hulls not only reduce the spread of invasive species but also lower fuel consumption and carbon emissions. However, scientists caution that poorly managed hull-cleaning practices can release chemicals and microplastics into marine environments.

Back on Mafia Island, Mgeni says the changes beneath the water are often subtle before they become irreversible.

“Once invasive species establish themselves, it becomes much harder to restore the balance,” she says.

For communities that depend on reefs for food, tourism and protection from storms, the battle against biofouling is becoming a fight to protect the ecosystems and livelihoods that depend on the ocean.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Opening plenary session, INC 5.2 of the global plastics negotiations, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 5 August 2025. Credit: Craig Boljkovac

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, May 14 2026 (IPS)

Norway’s reported decision to review and place on hold aspects of its funding to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) should be understood as more than a budgetary matter. It is a political signal. It is also a warning that the global plastics treaty negotiations may now be approaching the point at which governments must decide whether the present UNEP process can still deliver the treaty they promised, or whether a different pathway is required.

There should be no misunderstanding. Norway has been one of the strongest supporters of an ambitious global plastics treaty. It co-leads, with Rwanda, the High Ambition Coalition. It has also been the largest listed contributor to the INC process, with UNEP’s donor table showing more than USD 7.2 million in contributions received from Norway as of 25 March 2026.

Its apparent decision to pause or review funding therefore cannot be dismissed as marginal. It comes from a country that has invested politically and financially in the process and that has consistently positioned itself on the side of ambition.

That is precisely why the signal matters.

If Norway is now forcing a moment of reflection, it may be doing the negotiations a service. A process that cannot conclude, cannot decide, and cannot distinguish between genuine compromise and procedural obstruction needs more than another round of careful facilitation. It needs political clarity.

The original mandate was not ambiguous. In March 2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly agreed to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, addressing the full lifecycle of plastics, with the aim of completing the work by the end of 2024. That deadline has passed.

The fifth session in Busan did not produce a treaty. The resumed fifth session in Geneva did not produce a treaty. INC-5.3 in February 2026 was essentially an organizational session, including the election of a new Chair. We are now looking toward INC-5.4, possibly at the end of 2026 or in early 2027.

At some point, the numbering itself approaches the point of absurdity. INC-5.4 is not a normal negotiating milestone. It is the fourth attempt to complete the fifth session of a process that was supposed to conclude in 2024. This is not multilateral patience. It is clearly a form of procedural dysfunction.

None of this is intended as disrespect toward Ambassador Julio Cordano of Chile, the newly elected Chair of the INC. On the contrary, he has taken on one of the most difficult environmental negotiations in recent memory.

He inherited a fractured process, an absurdly complicated text, deeply polarized delegations, and an increasingly visible divide between countries seeking a full-lifecycle treaty and those seeking a narrower waste-management instrument. This is despite his stated and admirable determination to get the treaty “over the line.”

The difficulty, however, is that all indications suggest that the Chair is pursuing a highly neutral, process-oriented path. That is understandable. A Chair in this setting is expected to maintain confidence across the room, including among delegations whose positions are far apart. But neutrality is not the same as progress.

At a certain point, a too-neutral process can become a shield for those who prefer no outcome, or only the weakest possible outcome. And his treatment of observers, despite recent indications that he will take their views more fully into consideration, still leaves much to be desired in a UN system that contends to be as broadly inclusive as possible.

The gap between the Like-Minded countries and the High Ambition Coalition is not a drafting problem. It is a political problem. One group of countries wants an agreement that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics, including production, design, hazardous chemicals, products, trade, waste, finance and implementation.

Another group seeks to confine the treaty largely to downstream waste management, recycling and national discretion. These are not merely different textual preferences. They are different theories of the treaty. The mandate for the negotiations clearly states that the former, not the latter, is what should be pursued.

If the process continues to treat these positions as equally bridgeable, it will continue to reward delay. Consensus can be a tool for legitimacy. But in this process, it is increasingly at risk of becoming a veto mechanism for the least ambitious actors.

The result is predictable: more informal consultations, more revised texts, more late-night sessions, more statements of disappointment, and still no treaty.

This is why Norway’s move deserves, at minimum, a measure of credit. It has introduced a hard political question into a process that has become too comfortable with postponement. If countries are serious about concluding a meaningful treaty within UNEP, they should do so now. Not after another “informal” round. Not after another partial session. Not after INC-5.5 or INC-5.6. Now.

But if they are not prepared to do so, then high-ambition countries should begin preparing an alternative. The obvious precedent is the Ottawa Process on anti-personnel landmines. When the established disarmament machinery could not deliver a comprehensive ban, a coalition of like-minded governments, supported by civil society and international organizations, moved outside the blocked forum and negotiated a treaty among those prepared to act.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in Ottawa in December 1997 and was later (after agreement was reached) brought back into the broader UN treaty system.

That example is important because it shows that moving outside a blocked UN process is not necessarily anti-UN. It can be pro-multilateralism. The Ottawa Process did not reject international law; it created it. It did not wait for the least ambitious actors to become ready. It allowed the most ambitious actors to move first and then invited others to join.

A plastics “Ottawa Process” would not need to start from zero. The UNEP negotiations have already generated years of technical work, draft text, legal options, coalition positions, scientific input and stakeholder engagement. A like-minded process could take the strongest elements from that work and use them as the basis for an agreed treaty text.

Participation could be open to all states, but on the basis of a minimum level of ambition: full lifecycle coverage; legally binding obligations; controls on problematic products and chemicals of concern; a necessary focus on supply chains; credible implementation financing; and reporting and review mechanisms.

The next stage should therefore be framed as a final test. INC-5.4 should be treated as the last credible opportunity for the UNEP process to produce a treaty that reflects the mandate adopted in 2022.

If that session produces only another procedural continuation, or a weak agreement stripped of lifecycle measures, production-related provisions, and meaningful controls on chemicals and products, then high-ambition countries should move immediately toward an Ottawa-style diplomatic track.

The plastics crisis is not waiting for the INC process to resolve its internal contradictions. Plastic production continues to grow, in accordance with targets set by like-minded countries. Waste continues to leak into rivers, oceans, soils and food systems. Communities continue to bear the health and environmental costs. The purpose of the negotiations was to respond to that reality, not to create an indefinite process for describing it.

Norway’s funding decision may therefore prove useful if it forces governments to confront the obvious. Either the UNEP negotiations now become serious, political and outcome-oriented, or the countries that are serious about ending plastic pollution should create a pathway of their own.

That would not be a failure of multilateralism. It may be the only way left to save it.

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

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Transnational agribusinesses increasingly shape food policies worldwide. Claiming to best address recent food security concerns, they seek to profit more from innovations in food production, processing, and distribution.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The early post-WWII and post-colonial eras saw new emphases on food security, especially following severe food shortages before, during, and after the war.

Many starved as millions experienced acute malnutrition. The wartime Bengal famine in India claimed over three million lives as Churchill prioritised British imperial interests and military priorities.

After WWII, colonial powers weaponised food supplies for counterinsurgency and population control purposes, especially to overcome popular anti-imperialist resistance.

Many who died were not military casualties but victims of deliberate counter-insurgency food deprivation. Unsurprisingly, food security efforts became a popular policy priority after WWII.

Western-controlled research organisations, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), became highly influential, shaping and even developing post-colonial food security policies.

Felice Noelle Rodriguez

The Green Revolution initially focused on increasing yields of wheat, maize, and rice. These efforts increased cereal production unevenly during the 1960s and 1970s.

Malthusian logic held that rising life expectancies meant population growth outstripped the increase in food supply, constrained by limited agricultural land.

As government funding from wealthy nations declined, powerful corporate interests and philanthropies became even more influential. They often promoted their own interests at the expense of farmers, consumers, and the environment.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was established in the 1970s, channelling a small share of windfall petroleum incomes into food and agricultural development.

Soon after, the US transformed its Public Law (PL) 480 program into the World Food Programme (WFP). Thus, some FAO functions were ceded to donor-controlled UN funds and programmes also set up in Rome.

Embarrassingly, an FAO report found WFP food supplies were withheld from Somalia to avoid being taken by the ‘Islamist’ As-Shabaab militia. Chatham House also estimated two to three hundred thousand deaths as a consequence.

Neoliberalism
The counter-revolution against national development efforts in the 1980s undermined government fiscal capacities, import-substituting industrialisation, and food security efforts.

Neoliberal structural adjustment policies involving economic liberalisation were imposed on heavily indebted developing countries, mainly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Global North promoted trade liberalisation, undermining earlier protection of and support for food and industrial production.

Powerful food conglomerates sponsored and promoted import-friendly food security indicators, undermining FAO and other civil society research and advocacy efforts.

Countries hardly producing any food were highly ranked, as civil society organisations tried to counter with their own indicators, mainly focused on food sovereignty.

Trump 2.0
A new phase has begun with Donald Trump’s re-election as US president.

Trump 2.0’s weaponisation of economic policies and agreements, including food supplies, has ominous implications for countries trying to assert some independence.

Economic and military threats have been used for diverse ends, including economic, political, and other ‘strategic’ goals. Tariffs and sanctions are now part of a diverse arsenal of such weapons deployed for various purposes.

Governments have even been threatened with tariffs and sanctions for personal reasons. Trump has demanded Brazilian ex-President Jair Bolsonaro’s freedom following his failed coup after losing the last presidential election.

Deploying such economic weapons has worsened the deepening worldwide economic stagflation, as various Trump economic and military policy threats exacerbate contractionary and inflationary pressures.

The US-controlled WFP was long used to provide food aid selectively. But there is little sympathy left in Washington for other nations’ food security concerns.

To cut federal government spending, Trump has ended official development and humanitarian assistance, including food aid, while the US remains the world’s leading food exporter.

Nevertheless, Trump may take unexpected new steps to boost farmers’ earnings to recover electoral support before the November mid-term election.

Weaponisation of food aid took an ominous turn during the Israeli siege of Gaza, by calibrating food access to enable selective ethnic cleansing.

The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation attracted hungry residents to its food centres, causing hungry families desperately seeking food to be shot while seeking food.

Poverty is primarily defined by inadequate access to food, while the FAO considers income the main determinant of food insecurity.

Although World Bank poverty measures have generally continued to decline, FAO indicators suggest a reversal of earlier progress in food security over the last decade.

These contradictory trends not only reflect problems in estimating and understanding poverty and food security but also suggest that resulting policies are poorly informed, if not worse.

Professor Felice Noelle Rodriguez is Director of the Centre for Local History and Culture, Universidad de Zamboanga, Philippines.

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LDC Future Forum Banner. Credit: OHRLLS

By Rabab Fatima
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The future of the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) will be shaped by a critical choice they make today- strategic investment in their youth. Rich in human potential, the young people in LDCs embody ingenuity, resilience and ambition. With the right opportunities, they can transform challenges into opportunities and put their countries strongly on track to sustainable development.

In the 44 LDCs, more than 60 per cent of the population is under 25. That is more than 315 million young people – innovators, entrepreneurs and problem-solvers – in a world being reshaped by technology, climate pressures and shifting economic realities. Their energy, creativity and ambition represent an extraordinary opportunity not only for national development, but for global prosperity and stability.

The question is simple: will we act with the urgency this moment demands? In May 2026, governments, development partners, private sector leaders, researchers and young changemakers will convene in Helsinki for the Fourth LDC Future Forum, under the theme “Transforming LDCs by Empowering the Youth Population through Education, Innovation, and Inclusive Growth.”

Rabab Fatima, USG and High Representative, OHRLLS. Credit: OHRLLS

Opportunity is expanding—but unevenly

The global economy is evolving at speed. Artificial intelligence, digital platforms, green technologies and geopolitical shifts are reshaping how we live and work. By 2030, an estimated 170 million new jobs will be created worldwide, even as 40 per cent of core workplace skills are transformed.

Youth in LDCs are ready to be part of this future. Already, they demonstrate remarkable entrepreneurial initiative: nearly 70 per cent are engaged in self employment, compared to about 50 per cent in other developing countries.

Yet opportunity remains deeply uneven. Tertiary enrolment in LDCs stands at just 11 per cent. Fewer than a quarter of graduates specialize in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.

Millions of young people—especially girls and rural youth—remain excluded from quality education, digital connectivity and formal employment. Without urgent and targeted investment, demographic strength risks becoming a demographic strain.

The DPOA: Investing in youth as a development imperative

The Doha Programme of Action (DPoA) is unequivocal: investing in people – especially youth – is central to sustainable development and smooth graduation from the LDC category.

It places strong emphasis on education, skills and science, technology and innovation (STI) as engines of structural transformation. Critically, it advances concrete deliverables, including the establishment of an Online University for LDCs, designed to expand access to quality, affordable higher education – particularly in STEM fields. It also promotes digital learning, innovation ecosystems, and stronger linkages between education systems and labour market needs.

The Fourth LDC Future Forum will focus squarely on these priorities. It will advance practical solutions to close skills gaps, expand digital learning, strengthen innovation hubs and promote inclusive growth models that leave no young person behind.

Inclusion must be intentional

True transformation cannot happen if opportunity is accessible only to a few.

Gender gaps in education, skills acquisition and labour force participation continue to hold back progress. The digital divide—between countries, communities and genders—threatens to widen existing inequalities unless deliberately addressed. Inclusive growth requires inclusive design: policies and investments that actively reach girls, marginalized youth and those in rural and underserved areas.

By placing equity at the centre of youth empowerment, LDCs can ensure that growth is not only faster, but fairer—and therefore more sustainable.

A shared responsibility

No country can undertake this transformation alone. Governments must lead by prioritizing youth in national development strategies and aligning education with future economic needs. Development partners must scale up predictable, high quality financing for education, skills and digital infrastructure. Academia must help generate evidence based solutions. And the private sector must play a central role—by investing, mentoring, innovating and creating decent jobs.

The LDC Future Forum exists to forge these partnerships. Through rigorous research, policy dialogue and multi stakeholder collaboration, it aims to deliver actionable recommendations that will inform both national action and the 2027 Midterm Review of the Doha Programme of Action.

The choice before us

History will judge this generation not by the challenges we faced, but by the choices we made. We can allow structural barriers and underinvestment to hold back millions of young people—or we can unlock the dynamism that resides within them.

Empowering youth is not a long term aspiration. It is the fastest, most reliable path to sustainable growth, resilience and global stability.

The message from Helsinki must be clear: invest in young people now – and they will transform their countries, and our shared future.

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Excerpt:

Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 8 2026 (IPS)

The 10-month-old Middle East conflict—which has triggered a rise in the cost of living worldwide, and an increase in the prices of food, groceries and gasoline—is likely to impose burdens on hundreds of UN staffers, delegates, journalists and civil society representatives– and thousands more, during the General Assembly sessions beginning September.

The proposed increases are mostly due to the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the battle between the US and Iran, specifically targeting ships entering or departing– and halting oil exports and trade.

The UN’s Department of Operational Support (DOS) has decided “as mitigating cost savings measure to increase café prices by approximately 5% in general, any up to 20% for items, including sodas, cakes, oatmeal, pastries and soups”.

“This cost savings measure is meant to reduce the organization subsidy amount from $2.1M to $1M. The measures also include reduction in the hours of café operations to lower labor cost”.

The UN Staff Union (UNSU), responding to the price hike, said early this week, it “strongly objected to the proposed cafeteria price increases, which places an undue financial burden on staff already facing rising living costs and limited on-site alternatives”.

This concern is amplified by the fact that the cafeteria (run by an outside contractor) “benefits from substantial organizational subsidized support, and bears no overhead cost such as rent, utilities, and maintenance expenses”, says a message from UNSU released early this week.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations. Taken together, these facts point to “disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases”, says Narda Cupidore, President of the UNSU Staff Council.

In this context, shifting additional costs to staff is neither transparent nor justified, particularly in the absence of meaningful prior consultation as required under the Terms of Reference of the Headquarters Catering Advisory Committee.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, one UN staffer told Inter Press Service: “At a time when there are reports of proposed salary cuts, as part of UN reforms, this hits us where it hurts us most –in our stomachs”.

Moreover, says UNSU, current economic data does not support increases of this magnitude. With year-over-year inflation between January 2025 and January 2026 at approximately 2.3–2.4%, even accounting for higher food and labor costs, there is no credible basis for price hikes in the range of 5–20%.

Fluctuations in oil prices further fail to justify such increases, given their limited impact on overall cafeteria operations.

Taken together, these facts point to disproportionate and unjustified measures passed on the staff, who have not received comparable salary increases.

The Staff Union calls for a suspension of the proposed price hikes at the Café and encourages the DOS to evaluate alternative financial strategies that could avoid passing on such a significant cost burden to staff.

“We remain committed to constructive engagement and continue to seek opportunities for open dialogue and clear answers from management. UNSU believes it is essential to be a partner in both the discussion and the solution, working collaboratively we can reach an outcome that is fair and minimizes the impact on staff. We will keep you informed of any developments.

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Students at GH Rusheshe School in Kucikiro District, Rwanda, identified through the monitoring system through the ZERO Out of School initiative.

By Noor Muhammad Ansari
DOHA, Qatar, May 7 2026 (IPS)

In 2024, 273 million children, adolescents, and youth were out of school globally as per the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. While that is a staggering number, the figure is incomplete. The 2026 Global Education Monitoring report warns that the global out of school population may be undercounted by at least 13 million once humanitarian sources are used to correct data gaps in conflict-affected contexts.

When education data fails, the children most likely to be excluded are not just the ones out of school. There are also those who are completely missing from the systems meant to find them.

This is why data gaps are not simply a technical issue, they are a structural driver of exclusion. If a child is not in the dataset, they are less likely to appear in school planning processes, teacher-allocation formula, textbook procurements systems, transport route, or targeted social protection programmes that could have kept them enrolled.

The 2026 GEM Report highlights the depth of the challenge. In primary and secondary education, one in three countries does not report disparities by urban–rural location and one in two does not report disparities by wealth. When such information is missing, education policies that rely on national averages mask the children who are furthest behind.

Why Children Disappear from Education Data

An Education Above All Foundation Occasional Paper on counting out-of-school children explains how administrative enrolment figures can diverge from reality in predictable ways. Systems may undercount children who attend but are not registered; undercount late registrants when data are captured only once at the start of the year; or overstate participation by counting registered children who never attend.

And, these are not minor measurement errors. They are precisely how children slip through institutional cracks, especially those affected by poverty, displacement, disability, language barriers, and gender discrimination.

Finding the Children who are Missing

Consider what happens when programmes treat identification as seriously as instruction.

In our joint project with Educate Girls in rural Rajasthan in India we found that official child-tracking data often missed children in remote hamlets. To address this, community volunteers conducted door-to-door surveys at scale, across more than three million households in over 9,000 villages to identify out of school girls.

The effort enabled the programme to identify, enrol, and retain tens of thousands of girls who had previously been absent from official records. The lesson from this exercise was straightforward: it is hard to serve children you cannot see. But when systems invest deliberately in identification and verification, those learners can be found.

The same challenge applies to children with disabilities, who are too often hidden by stigma and undercounted by systems that do not measure disability consistently. In our ten-country inclusive education programme implemented with Humanity & Inclusion across Africa, we sought to “bring children out of the shadows”, through community outreach, disability-sensitive identification tools, and sustained tracking of participation, the programme successfully enrolled more than 32,000 out of school children with disabilities and supported strong retention outcomes.

These experiences show that exclusion is not only about access to education. It is also about whether systems can identify and track children who face multiple barriers to participation.

What Stronger Education Data Systems Can Do

Across many countries, governments and partners are beginning to recognise that stronger education data systems are essential to identifying and supporting the most excluded learners. For instance, in Rwanda, the Zero Out of School Children initiative uses the Waliku application, a digital monitoring tool developed with partners including Save the Children and the Ministry of Education.

Teachers use the mobile platform to register out of school children, record attendance, and track patterns of absence. When repeated absences occur, the system generates follow-up alerts so schools or community workers can contact families and support re-enrolment.

In partnership with UNICEF and Government of The Gambia, efforts are underway to integrate education data with health and civil registration systems through DHIS2 for Education, helping authorities identify children who are missing from school records and coordinate responses across sectors.

Other partnerships illustrate how digital tools can strengthen identification and monitoring in different contexts.

In Nigeria, a partnership project with UNICEF developed the Tracking Re-entry of Children to Education (TRACE) system that combines community mapping and school records to track children from identification through enrolment and progression.

In Kenya, under EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership, a Digital Attendance Application enables near real-time monitoring of school attendance, allowing schools to detect patterns of absenteeism and intervene early.

Digital systems are also proving valuable in fragile contexts. In Syria, the EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership project developed a Self-Learning Programme Child Monitoring System to track children participating in alternative learning pathways when formal schooling has been disrupted.

In Zanzibar, the EAA Foundation-UNICEF partnership project developed a mobile-based monitoring tool that supports community-level identification and follow-up of out-of-school children, while the EAA Foundation-World Bank partnership project in Djibouti developed digital tools that help track participation in alternative education programmes and support transitions into formal schooling.

In Zanzibar, a mobile-based monitoring tool that supports community-level identification and follow-up of out-of-school children.

Taken together, these initiatives illustrate an important shift: Education systems are moving from periodic aggregate reporting toward child-level identification, real-time monitoring, and early-warning systems.

As these systems evolve, particularly with advances in analytics and artificial intelligence, they offer the potential to predict dropout risks and guide targeted interventions, helping ensure that every child remains visible within the education system.

Rwanda’s school attendance register and tracking system, Waliku Application. Teachers use the mobile platform to register out of school children, record attendance, and track patterns of absence.

So, what should change?

Governments must treat education data as an inclusion tool, not only a reporting obligation. This means investing in learner-level education information systems that can uniquely identify learners, track attendance and progression, and safely link education data with civil registration, health, and social protection systems where appropriate.

Governments should also routinely combine and integrate data from various sources to correct blind spots in national statistics.

Secondly, development partners should fund data systems as core public infrastructure. It is untenable to finance classrooms, teachers, and learning materials while leaving ministries without the capacity to know which children are missing, where they are, and what barriers they face.

Results-based financing should also reward governments and implementers for verified inclusion outcomes, not only aggregate enrolment.

Education agencies and partners should standardise how the world counts ‘excluded.’ Globally tested tools already exist. For example, the UNICEF–Washington Group Child Functioning Module, provides a standardised approach for identifying children with disabilities in surveys and administrative systems.

For displaced learners, stronger coordination between education and humanitarian data systems is essential. According to UNHCR, there are 12.4 million refugee children of school age worldwide, and nearly 46% of them out of school.

The takeaway is straightforward: The most excluded children are often the least counted.

Closing the education gap requires closing the education data gap, so that every child is visible, reachable, and supported well before exclusion becomes permanent.

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Excerpt:

Healthy soils teeming microbes are the foundations of resilient, sustainable and global food production ecosystems. Credit: Fabiola Ortiz/IPS

By Esther Ngumbi
URBANA, Illinois, US, May 6 2026 (IPS)

A newly published review in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment has revealed disturbing statistics on the growing environmental threats posed by global food production. The global food system, designed to feed and nourish humanity, is now a major contributor to climate change via greenhouse gas emissions, and the largest driver of freshwater depletion, biodiversity loss, and nutrient pollution.

Alarmingly, this new review brings attention to a concerning cruel twist and a deeper problem manifested through feedback loops between environmental change pressures including climate change and global food production.

In this vicious hard to break feedback loop, farmers are forced to use more inputs including fertilizers and toxic pesticides to sustain high yields, which in turn ruins and further compromises the environment while making food production harder in the long term.

In this vicious hard to break feedback loop, farmers are forced to use more inputs including fertilizers and toxic pesticides to sustain high yields, which in turn ruins and further compromises the environment while making food production harder in the long term

The central question then becomes: How do we break these vicious feedback loops that threaten to undermine our global food system in the longer term? What specific foundational strategies stand a chance of reducing environmental pressures and improving global food systems and agricultural production resillience?

First and foremost, the foundations for breaking this cruel cycle begin in the soil, by investing in revitalizing and improving the health of soils and agricultural lands that power global food production. Healthy soils teeming microbes are the foundations of resilient, sustainable and global food production ecosystems.

Healthy soils store and filter water and cycle nutrients, support the growth of nutritious food while simultaneously helping agricultural crop plants to cope with water stress, combat diseases and pests, and use nutrients more effectively, reducing the need for additional inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.

Convincingly, smart investments channeled towards improving soil health and soil microbiome can help farmers and food producers to produce more and healthy crops with less, limit environmental damage and simultaneously break the emerging feedback loops between global food production and environmental damage.

The good news is that improving and building soil health and soil microbiomes is a top priority for many stakeholders involved in food production in the United States and around the world including farmers, researchers, governments, philanthropists, non-governmental  and non-profit organizations, research funding agencies, the African Union and the United Nations.

Excitingly, adoption of several sustainable regenerative  practices including cover cropping, crop rotation, conservation tillage, planting diverse crops, integrating livestock and agroforestry, alongside with inoculation of soils with microbes including arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi can improve soil health and quality, improving biodiversity, mitigate climate change, and extend soil longevity beyond 10,000 years. Moreover,  research is confirming that these strategies do indeed work.

Second, another intervention that can reduce environmental decline while improving global food production is investing in innovative  climate-smart agriculture and precision agriculture practices. Scientific evidence has shown that adopting these practices can sustain global food production while limiting environmental harm.

Complementing and accompanying these foundational strategies is the urgent need to prioritize breeding and developing  multi-stress and stress-resilient crops and integrating stress resilient traits from wild relatives of domesticated crops.

Additionally,  multi-stress and climate-resilient crops can be grown alongside other annual and perennial crop species while being integrated into broader sustainable and regenerative farming practices including agroforestry. Collectively, these practices can sustain food production while minimizing environmental harm, thereby breaking feedback loops.

Finally, these strategies must be paired with policies and incentives to ensure maximum adoption. Farmers who adopt regenerative and sustainable soil building, climate-smart, precision agriculture practices while planting stress resilient crops should be supported and rewarded.

Alongside policies and incentives, there is a need to ensure that farmers, who are central in global food production embrace and adopt these sustainable feedback loops breaking practices. Embracing these practices can improve agricultural productivity, resilience and efficiency.

Of course, it is critical to understand and be aware of the constraints that still hinder stakeholders in global food production including farmers from adopting these global food production and environmental pressures feedback loop breaking practices.

Feeding our growing world sustainably requires everyone to confront the vicious cycle of food production and environmental decline. Researchers, policymakers, governments, private businesses, civil society, and philanthropists must act with urgency.

We should view mitigation and adaptation as interconnected strategies to address the dual challenge of producing food while protecting the environmental systems that enable it. The most effective and sustainable solutions will strengthen agriculture and reduce environmental harm. Time is of the essence.

Esther Ngumbi, PhD is Assistant Professor, Department of Entomology, African American Studies Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign