In the two-plus decades since the Soviet collapse, the Georgian Orthodox Church has emerged as one of the South Caucasus country’s most respected and influential institutions. But some observers and theologians now worry that ultra-conservative clerics within the Church are gaining too much power.

The growing sway of fundamentalist and nationalist elements within the Church was on full display on May 17, when a clergy-led mob attacked gay-rights demonstrators in Tbilisi.“The Orthodox Church in Georgia today reflects all those problems that have been problematic for the Georgian nation and state." -- Tamara Grdzelidze of the WCC

That priestly outburst of bigotry was not an isolated incident. Previous occurrences of ultra-conservative muscle-flexing included a mass mobilisation against Georgian ID cards, allegedly because ultras believed the cards referenced the sign of the devil.

Ultras also actively campaigned against President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement Party during the run-up to the October 2012 parliament elections – despite the patriarch’s request to stay out of politics.

The parliamentary election experience suggests to some Church watchers that the Patriarch, Ilya II, is losing his grip over the clergy. Ilya II is 80 years old and rumoured to be in poor health. Although his word is final in all areas of the Church’s internal workings, age may have significantly diminished his ability to pay attention to details and promote general doctrinal unity among the clergy.

While the patriarch remains a popular leader of the Church, it’s difficult to tell where many bishops stand. What is increasingly evident is that a philosophical split is developing within the Church. Theologian Levan Abashidze describes the divide as “serious.”

A press representative for the Church did not respond to an interview request.

According to some outside observers, the Georgian Orthodox Church has been moving in a steadily conservative direction since 1997, when it left the World Council of Churches (WCC). A major factor in this retrograde drift is a decline in the educational level of clergy members.

“The Orthodox Church in Georgia today reflects all those problems that have been problematic for the Georgian nation and state: poor education, economic shortages and unemployment, the lack of the civil society, underdeveloped democracy, a long gap in the organised church life, unqualified clergy … all these factors supporting its isolationist and exclusivist tendencies,” noted Tamara Grdzelidze, a programme executive within the Faith and Order Secretariat of the WCC in Geneva.

When Ilya II became the patriarch in 1977, the Georgian Church counted only about 50 priests. Since the lifting of Soviet-era controls over religious life, the ranks of the clergy have exploded, with upwards of 1,700 ordained priests active today. Not all members of the clergy have gained a thorough grounding in theology via training at a seminary or theological academy.

Limited oversight over the preparation of priests means that the quality of their religious teachings varies widely. Rapid growth helped strengthen the Church, but it created a “vacuum” of knowledge, noted one theologian close to the Patriarchate who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of retribution.

“[People] should know that [beating people] is not Christian, is not Orthodox, is not Georgian. …There is a vacuum of theology,” he said.

Priests who lack proper training are more apt to be part of the ultra-conservative movement within the Church. “[We need to] learn how to think,” the theologian said. “If we start to learn philosophy … tomorrow we will not throw rocks.”

The philosophical struggle within the Church seems set to intensify as Ilya II grows older and attention focuses on succession. In the Orthodox Christian faith, the patriarch is a life-long appointment. After the sitting patriarch’s death, a successor is chosen by the Church’s governing body of archbishops, the Holy Synod.

The outcome of the current succession maneuvering could have far-reaching implications for Georgia’s domestic and foreign policy, given patriarch’s ability to shape public opinion. Earlier this year, Ilya II was identified as Georgia’s most trusted public figure, according to a March 2013 survey by Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC).

Since the May 17 upheaval in Tbilisi, Ilya II has been an advocate of moderation and tolerance. “We need to value people,” he said during his Jun. 2 sermon. “We need to see in people…these positive elements that God awarded them. It is possible that a person has negative sides. But the positive is infinitely more.”

Abashidze noted that there are “certain groups” within the Church that are already engaged in a “strong fight for power”.

“There are groups who are more, let us say, open minded, and who understand that the Church needs real education, real theological education and people with theological knowledge – because otherwise the Church cannot survive,” he said.

Liberals, however, are in the minority, and there are few willing to publicly break ranks with conservatives. In an interview with the Georgian magazine Liberali after the May 17 mob attack, however, one priest urged his colleagues to speak up.

“Probably a lot of religious people were very surprised by what happened,” said Dekan Iakob Makhniashvili. “For every religious person, this day should serve as a good example that religion should not provoke people into aggression and hate.”

*Editor’s note:  Molly Corso is a freelance journalist who also works as editor of Investor.ge, a monthly publication by the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia.

This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

Georgia may be touted as the most pro-Western country in the South Caucasus, but the recent backlash against LGBT activists in Tbilisi underscores how wide the cultural divide is when it comes to defining democratic values.

While most Georgians condemn the violent May 17 attack on an anti-homophobia rally, many do not see the core issue as having anything to do with a lack of tolerance, a right to freedom of assembly or respect for minority rights.

Rather, many see the central issue as a matter that goes to the heart of Georgia’s national heritage and cultural identity: should Georgians be expected to embrace a lifestyle seen as common in the West, but unsuitable for Georgian society and incompatible with the teachings of the country’s main unifying force, the Georgian Orthodox Church?

Many Georgians would answer no to that question. After years of jumping through hoops to meet Western demands, some say they have seen no results – popularly defined as economic prosperity and territorial security – out of the process. How showing greater respect for gay rights, an issue often misinterpreted in Georgia as meaning general avowal of personal homosexuality, will change that situation leaves many at a loss to explain.

“If the West wants us, they have to take us as we are,” declared Georgian Orthodox Church Bishop Iakob of Bodbe and Tsurtaveli in response to international criticism of the attempt to drive LGBT activists from Freedom Square, an event in which he took part.

Criticism coming from the West about the May 17 events appears to be doing more to fuel resentment than fostering soul-searching. “Whoever — America or Europe — comes to us as a friend, we will be friends, of course. But if it wants to dictate its own [agenda], we will not accept that,” said a Tbilisi tobacco stand worker named Nodar.

One Tbilisi printing shop clerk agreed. “In general, [the West] has been treating [Georgia] like a little child: ‘If you will behave well, we will take you to ride the rides” said Manuchar. “That is having a really bad effect on people.”

The explanation for such sentiments lies, in part, in the context of current times.

“Georgian society at the moment is very poor, very frustrated, very unhappy and…caring [more] about economic and survival issues [than self-expression],” said political scientist Marina Muskhelishvili, co-founder of the Centre for Social Studies in Tbilisi. “Nobody can expect that it [Georgia] will become European in a moment … and tolerate all lifestyles and all behaviours.”

In recent years, as Georgians have grappled with economic, political turmoil and perceived encroachments on their country’s sovereignty, interest in all things seen as intrinsically Georgian – in particular, the Church — has increased. The issue of gay rights, as Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili explained to European diplomats on May 24, is “relatively new to us,” news outlets reported.

Against that backdrop, international calls for respecting those minorities’ right to assemble can come across more as demands to change “core values,” said Koba Turmanidze, country director of the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), which runs annual surveys on values in the South Caucasus.

“[I]t is hard to say whether people understand that no one asks you to become gay, no one asks you to marry a person of your gender; you are just asked not to beat these people up,” Turmanidze said.

While Georgian television reported Western diplomats as expressing “surprise” at the attack on LGBT activists, in reality, the display served as “maybe [a] very good reminder” that Georgia, though “going ahead fast” toward democracy, has not yet arrived at its final destination, observed political scientist Alexander Rondeli, founder of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies in Tbilisi (GFSIS).

Muskhelishvili cautioned that the cultural divide could widen if Western governments do not listen more and lecture less. “For many years, Western partners were promoting [the] development of Georgia. But in many cases they were following their own vision of what is on the agenda” within the country, she said.

Women’s rights, for instance, are “not a priority” for Georgians since they are more concerned with “how to feed their family” than about “who is the boss in the family,” she noted.

Representatives of the US Embassy and European Union’s mission in Tbilisi did not comment when queried on the cultural-divide question.

The Georgian government should do more to inform the public about the role civil rights plays in any partnership with the West, said Viktor Dolidze, chair of the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration.

At present, many Georgians see the prospect of membership in the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation purely in terms of the benefits of enjoying a greater degree of stability and prosperity. Few are taking into account the fact that membership in such organisations will require Georgia to harmonise its values with EU and NATO norms, Dolidze added.

With time, though, more and more Georgians will come to understand the challenges, said GFSIS’s Rondeli. “Only now, [a] generation of Georgians understand[s] they have to have [a] modern, democratic, inclusive, nation state,” he said. “And now, people are starting to understand that it is very difficult to achieve.”

*Editor’s note: Molly Corso is a freelance journalist who also works as editor of Investor.ge, a monthly publication by the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia.

This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.