Hassan Rouhani’s election as Iran’s new president has garnered much international attention. In particular, Rouhani’s ascendance has raised hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Reformist leader Mir Hussein Mousavi has been under house arrest since February 2011. Credit: Hamed Saber/cc by 2.0

It would not be surprising for Rouhani to try and find a way out of Iran’s crisis: the enormous damage to the Iranian economy through sanctions is an existential threat to the Islamic Republic.

But often forgotten in the West is the Iranian regime’s other major source of instability: the deep splits caused by the 2009 presidential election and subsequent arrest of three influential reformist leaders, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hussein Mousavi, and his wife Zahra Rahnavard.

Rouhani’s campaign focused not only on improving Iran’s economic condition, but also on lessening the “securitised” atmosphere in Iran, and gaining the release of Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rahnavard. Tehran has been swirling with rumours of their imminent release.

From Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s perspective, the conditional release of Mousavi and Karroubi could begin to heal the regime’s self-inflicted wounds. However, freeing a group labeled as the “sedition” by the regime could also be very risky; it could be viewed as an admission of error by Khamenei and intensify the factional battles within the system.

Iran’s warring political elite have the capability and willingness to sink nuclear negotiations. The resolution of the nuclear crisis does not only depend on U.S.-Iranian relations, but also on other factors including the fate of three Iranian prisoners.

During his campaign, Rouhani appealed to three different constituencies: the ruling conservatives, the reformists, and ordinary Iranian people. A calculating and clever politician, Rouhani managed to win the election without upsetting the delicate political balance in Iran.

Rouhani is a conservative regime supporter, although of a different cut than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He believes in Iran’s system of religious rule, but does not believe in “exporting” the revolution. For him, the Islamic Republic should strengthen itself at home before engaging in foreign adventures.

Javad Zarif, Rouhani’s reported pick for the post of foreign minister, is quite telling in this regard. Zarif, a polished diplomat, helped the United States establish Afghanistan’s post-Taliban government in 2002. He would likely attempt to repair Iran’s relations with the outside world, perhaps including the United States.

Rouhani’s dedication to the reforms espoused by Mousavi, Karroub, and Rahnavard is uncertain. Yes, he would like to decrease repression in Iran and make the people more “prosperous”. But this does not translate into a belief in fundamental reforms.

Most likely, Rouhani would like to see a re-emergence of pre-2009 Iran, in which the left and conservative wings of the Islamic Republic co-existed and worked together in maintaining the revolutionary theocracy.

Nevertheless, the ultra-conservatives within Iran’s political establishment fear his intentions. While labeling him a “principled” revolutionary, they have nevertheless warned him not to include “seditious” figures within his government. These may include officials associated with former President Mohammad Khatami, the bête noir of the ultra-conservatives.

The influential daily newspaper Kayhan, long viewed as the mouthpiece of Iran’s conservative establishment, has been particularly vociferous in its denunciation of the reformists, and not so subtle in its warnings to Rouhani. Other conservatives, such as Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani, have also warned of reformist “cobras raising their heads again”.

It appears that Rouhani’s cabinet will mostly include technocratic and moderate conservatives. Influential reformists such as Khatami will likely play a behind the scenes role in advising Rouhani. But what of Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi?

The husband and wife remain under arrest in their own residence. Reports from Iran indicate that their harsh imprisonment (almost no contact with the outside world) has resulted in serious health issues for them.

Mehdi Karroubi, who is reported to be under arrest at a Ministry of Intelligence safe house, is also reported to be suffering from various ailments. The death of any of them could be a serious blow to the political balance in Iran and Rouhani’s reputation. He has promised to gain their release. Will his government act accordingly?

Rouhani does not command the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; it is likely that the Guards and their chief Khamanei will play the most important role in determining the fates of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard. Thus far, the trio has been held in detention without going to trial.

Interestingly, the Guards-linked website Basirat has declared that “If the law is followed, a competent court must look into the crimes of these individuals.” This is one of the few times that the regime has spoken so openly of trying the reformist trio; it fears a trial would give them an opportunity to publicly challenge Khamenei.

However, the establishment has also indicated that it would forgive the reformists if they repented for their “sins”. Could the regime be considering trying the three opposition leaders? This in itself would not be an admission of defeat, but could pave the way for a compromise between the left and the right. As Khamenei has repeatedly stated, national unity is essential for dealing with Iran’s external enemies. And as Khatami has said, the Iranian “people” could forgive the regime if it forgives the 2009 protestors, and by implication the reformists.

Rouhani, Iran’s bridge-maker, could theoretically lay the groundwork for national unity as he attempts to negotiate the nuclear programme. But the bridge he stands on is shaky. It will take much effort by him and his supporters to guide the regime toward stability.

Progress on nuclear negotiations and the lifting of sanctions could help. The most recent U.S. Congressional sanctions against Iran will make Rouhani’s job only harder, and empower the ultra-conservatives. And any domestic and foreign moves viewed as threatening by ultra-conservatives could imperil Rouhani’s presidency. This would not only result in renewed regime infighting, but the collapse of nuclear negotiations.

Regarding negotiations, it is often said that it takes two to tango — the United States and Iran. But in reality, Rouhani’s dance will have many participants, some of whom are more self-interested and treacherous than others. Rouhani’s cabinet selection will be a major indicator of his intentions.

The fate of the long-suffering Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rahnavard could be the most important indicator of all.

Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Iran's Jun. 14 elections garnered voter participation rates close to 73 percent. Credit: Mohammad Ali Shabani

By Farideh Farhi
HONOLULU, Hawaii, Jun 15 2013 (IPS)

Iran’s Jun. 14 presidential election results, announced the day after voting was held, were nothing less than a political earthquake.

The Centrist Hassan Rowhani’s win was ruled out when Iran’s vetting body, the Guardian Council, qualified him as one of the eight candidates on May 21.

Furthermore, a first-round win by anyone in a crowded competition was not foreseen by any pre-election polling.

Up to a couple of weeks ago, conventional wisdom held that only a conservative candidate anointed by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could win. Few expected the election of a self-identified independent and moderate who was not well-known outside of Tehran, and few expected participation rates of close to 73 percent.

The expected range was around 60 to 65 percent, in favour of conservative candidates, who benefit from a stable base that always votes.

But the move a few days before the election by reformists and centrists – guided by two former presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – to join forces and align behind the centrist Rowhani proved successful. It promises significant changes in the management and top layers of Iran’s various ministries and provincial offices.

Rowhani has also promised a shift towards a more conciliatory foreign policy and less securitised domestic political environment.

The centrist-reformist alliance formed when, in a calculated action earlier this week, the reformist candidate Mohammadreza Aref withdrew his candidacy in favour of Rowhani. But the strong support for Rowhani underwriting his first-round win came from an unexpected surge in voter turnout.

Much of the electorate, disappointed by Iran’s contested 2009 election and the crackdown that followed, was skeptical of the electoral process and whether their votes would really be counted, and they also questioned whether any elected official could change the country’s direction.

Although low voter turnout was the expectation, with the centrist-reformist alliance, the mood of the country changed, with serious debate beginning about whether or not to vote. As more people became convinced, Rowhani’s chances increased. Hope overcame skepticism and cynicism.

The case for voting centred on the argument that the most important democratic institution of the Islamic Republic – the electoral process – should not be abandoned out of fear that it would be manipulated by non-elective institutions and that abandoning the field was tantamount to premature surrender.

Reformist newspaper editorials also articulated the fear that a continuation of Iran’s current policies may lead the country into war and instability.

Syria, in particular, played an important role as the Iranian public watched peaceful protests for change there turn into a violent civil war.

The hope that the Iranian electoral system could still be used to register a desire for change was a significant motivation for voters.

Beyond the choice of Iran’s president, the conduct of this election should be considered an affirmation of a key institution of the Islamic Republic that was tainted when the 2009 results were questioned by a large part of the voting public.

The election was conducted peacefully and without any serious complaints regarding its process.

Unlike the previous election, when results were announced hurriedly on the night of the election, the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of conducting the election, with over 60,000 voting stations throughout the country, chose to take its time to reveal the complete results.

Other key individual winners of this election, beyond Rowhani, are undoubtedly former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami who proved they can lead and convince their supporters to vote for their preferred candidate.

Khatami in particular had to rally reformers behind a centrist candidate who, until this election, had said little about many reformist concerns, including the incarceration of their key leaders, Mir Hossein Mussavi, his spouse Zahra Rahnavard and Mehdi Karrubi.

Khatami’s task was made easier when Rowhani also began criticising the securitised environment of the past few years and the arrests of journalists, civil society activists and even former government officials.

Meanwhile, Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose own candidacy was rejected by the Guardian Council, saw his call for moderation and political reconciliation confirmed by Rowhani’s win.

He rightly sensed that despite the country’s huge economic problems, caused by bad management and the ferocious U.S.-led sanctions regime imposed on Iran, voters understood the importance of political change in bringing about economic recovery.

Conservatives, on the other hand, proved rather inept at understanding the mood of the country, failing in their attempt to unify behind one candidate and stealing votes from each other instead.

The biggest losers were the hardline conservatives, whose candidate Saeed Jalili ran on a platform that mostly emphasised resistance against Western powers and a reinvigoration of conservative Islamic values.

Although he was initially believed to be favoured, due to the presumed support he had from Khamenei, he ended up placing third, with only 11.4 percent of the vote, behind the more moderate conservative mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf.

The hardliners loss did not, however, result from a purge. Other candidates besides Rowhani received approximately 49 percent of the vote overall, and so while this election did not signal the hardliners’ disappearance, it did showcase the diversity and differentiation of the Iranian public.

Rowhani, as a centrist candidate in alliance with the reformists, will still be a president who will need to negotiate with the conservative-controlled parliament, Guardian Council and other key institutions such as the Judiciary, various security organisations and the office of Ali Khamenei, which also continues to be controlled by conservatives.

Rowhani’s mandate gives him a strong position but not one that is outside the political frames of the Islamic Republic. He will have to negotiate between the demands of many of his supporters who will be pushing for faster change and those who want to maintain the status quo.

For a country wracked by eight years of polarised and erratic politics, Rowhani’s slogan of moderation and prudence sets the right tone, even as his promises constitute a tall order.

Whether he will be able to decrease political tensions, help release political prisoners, reverse the economic downturn and ease the sanctions regime through negotiations with the United States remains to be seen.

But Iran’s voters just showed they still believe the presidential office matters and they expect the president to play a vital role in guiding the country in a different direction.