U.S. President Barack Obama’s weeklong visit to Asia was meant to reassure allies in the region of American support and re-engagement. But it raised Chinese hackles and failed to dispel doubts over his administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy.

During his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines Apr. 23-29, Obama repeatedly asserted that the key to prosperity in Asia lay in China playing by the rules, rather than bending them to suit its own interests.Chinese commentators have referred to the Obama visit as an effort to form an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

His final stop was in Manila, traditionally a staunch U.S. ally that has an ongoing dispute with China over islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines and the U.S. signed an Agreement on Enhanced Defence Cooperation (AEDC) that will allow the U.S. to redeploy military forces in the islands for the first time in over two decades.

“Our territorial conflicts with China are the reason for this new agreement,” noted Walden Bello, a member of parliament writing in the Philippines Daily Inquirer. “AEDC is the mechanism that will make the Chinese respect our rights to Scarborough Shoal, the nine islands and reefs we claim in the Spratly Islands, our continental shelf and our 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone. The truth of the matter, however, is that the deal will do no such thing.”

Bello, a long-term critic of U.S. policy in the region, argues, “What we see is Washington’s ‘exhibitionist syndrome’, that is, the imperative it feels to ‘show the flag’ to its allies and to China, and to do so in an inexpensive way, with no rent to the host country.”

Obama said in a speech at the Philippines Army headquarters in Manila that nations and peoples have the right to live in security and peace and have their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected. “We believe that international law must be upheld, that freedom of navigation must be preserved and commerce must not be impeded,” he said.

Critics say such comments have drawn further scepticism in the region because what Obama is preaching is not practised by his own nation – as the history of American foreign policy in the past two decades clearly shows. China has also latched on to such arguments to claim that it is the U.S. rather than China that is trying to destabilise the region.

“Obama’s rhetoric about peace and international law sounds hollow because it contradicts what Washington and (he) himself have been up to,” said the state-controlled China Daily in an editorial on Apr. 29, adding “it is now clear that Washington is no longer bothering to conceal its attempt to contain China’s influence in the region. It is even less convincing to say the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific is not targeted against China.”

Announced in January 2012, the Obama administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy is a multi-dimensional one that includes improving bilateral relationships in the region, especially with its traditional allies; deepening working relationships with emerging powers, including China; and promoting trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.

“Asian allies (such as Singapore and the Philippines) believe a U.S.-centric order is good for the region by and large,” argued Dr Tan See Seng, head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) here.

“America is one of the major countries that sets the rules and expects others to follow even as it breaks its own rules. China sees that point very clearly and doesn’t accept that,” Tan told IPS.

China Daily says that for a considerably long period, the Chinese have cherished the “naive thought” that Washington will rein in its unruly allies when they go too far. “Obama’s current trip should be a wake-up call that this is just wishful thinking,” it argued. “Ganging up with its troublemaking allies, the U.S. is presenting itself as a security threat to China.”

The troublesome allies China refers to are Japan and the Philippines. The dispute between Japan and China centres around the uninhabited islands that Japan calls Senkaku and China calls Diaoyu. Chinese claims to the islands are based on historical records going back to the Ming Dynasty in the 14th century but, at the end of World War II, Japan officially transferred ownership of the islands to the U.S. and, in 1972, the U.S. transferred it back to Japan, moves seen by China as illegal.

In an interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, Obama has said that the islands fall under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and that Washington opposes any “unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.” This comment has ruffled many feathers in Beijing.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang was quoted in China Daily as saying that his country “firmly opposes” actions that place the Diaoyu Islands under the cover of the U.S.-Japan treaty and urged Washington to “speak and act cautiously.” He said, “China’s determination and will to safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty and maritime interests is unshakeable.”

Chinese commentators have referred to the Obama visit as an effort to form an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

But Dr Termsak Chalermpalanupap, lead researcher at the ASEAN Studies Centre of the National University of Singapore, told IPS that such an organisation was not necessary.

“Most countries in Southeast Asia don’t want confrontation with China,” argued Termsak, who worked with the ASEAN Secretariat for over 20 years. “China has become the top trading partner for most of these countries and what they welcome is more trade and economic integration with China.”

Dr Evan Resnick, Coordinator of the U.S. Programme at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore believes the U.S. is concerned about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. “It’s a major artery for international commerce and the U.S. is interested in freedom of navigation for trade and military purposes,” he told IPS.

Tan argues that the U.S. has been used to the “hegemonic manifestation” of its power in the Asian region. But with an emerging China and nationalistic pride contributing to growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, the U.S. sees itself as a declining power and is troubled by what it believes is China’s challenge to it.

“Obama’s ‘pivot’ is an attempt to continue and maintain its interests,” he noted.

Amid growing uncertainties over U.S. commitment to Asia, as multiple flashpoints in Eastern Europe and the Middle East continue to consume global attention, President Barack Obama took a long-awaited trip (Apr. 23-29) to Asia, where he visited leading allies in North- and Southeast Asia.

The highlight of Obama’s Asia trip was, however, the formalisation of a new basing agreement in the Philippines, which gave much-needed momentum to Washington’s so-called ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy. For the Philippine government, it marked an important step towards greater U.S.-Philippine defence cooperation amid growing security challenges in the region.Obama made it clear that Washington takes no position over the sovereignty of the disputed territories in the South China Sea.

Recent months have seen a significant increase in territorial tensions between China and its neighbours, especially the Philippines. The late-March decision of the Philippines to file an arbitration case before a United Nations (UN) Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague has infuriated China, which has threatened sanctions and vehemently opposed the “internationalisation” of what it considers an exclusively bilateral territorial dispute. As a result, the Philippines is confronting the real prospect of a direct military confrontation with China.

Without a minimum deterrence capability, the Philippines has opted for deeper defence cooperation with and military support from its principle ally, the U.S. No wonder, Manila has warmly welcomed the Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, which many believe is a thinly-veiled attempt at constraining China’s territorial assertiveness in the Pacific theatre.

To counter the growing threat from China, which recently imposed a blockade on a Filipino maritime detachment in the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, the Philippines, in recent months, expedited the negotiation of a new security pact with the U.S., the so-called Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

Obama’s visit to Manila (Apr. 28-29) coincided with the formal signing of the EDCA, which grants the U.S. military rotational access to Philippine bases in Subic and Clark. In exchange, the Philippines is poised to benefit from expanded military assistance from and jointmilitary exercises with the U.S.

Filipino officials were quick to frame the latest defence agreement as a landmark deal, reflecting the long-standing alliance between the two countries. But critics claim that the new agreement disproportionately favours the U.S., lacks transparency, and may be in violation of the Philippines’ constitutional restrictions on the establishment of permanent foreign bases on Philippine soil.

“This agreement, concluded after intensive and comprehensive negotiations over the course of nearly two years, marks a milestone in our shared history as enduring treaty allies,” stated Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, a staunch advocate of deeper U.S.-Philippine military alliance. “With the EDCA, the Philippines and the United States as sovereign allies have written a new chapter for our modern and mature partnership, firmly grounded on deeply-held democratic values, common interests and shared aspirations.”

Influential political figures such as Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, chairman of the Philippines Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, were, however, unconvinced. In an interview with Al Jazeera, she argued that the latest security pact only provides “marginal advantages” for the Philippines, while granting the U.S. inexpensive access to foreign military bases, which, in effect, would make “the Philippines sound as if [it were] a satellite ally of America.”

Others like former Senator Joker Arroyo deplored the lack of consultations with legislators and concerned citizens ahead of the signing of the EDCA. “[The government] rushed to sign the EDCA as a gift to President Obama…No one, but no one was consulted about its constitutionality or participated in its preparation,” lamented Arroyo, among the senators who voted for the abrogation of U.S. military bases in the Philippines back in 1991. “What did the Philippines get out of the Obama visit? Zero. Analyse it.”

Both Defensor-Santiago and Arroyo, among other legal experts, contend that the new security pact should have required the ratification of the Philippine Senate (the legislative upper-house) to ensure its compliance with the Philippine constitution and the country’s national interest. For many Filipinos, especially progressives and members of the intelligentsia, EDCA represents a significant regression in the Philippines’ age-old attempt to become a more independent, self-reliant country.

As an archipelagic country, the Philippines has a disproportionately small navy and coast guard force, which deprives it of credibly defending the country’s maritime territorial claims. A combination of massive corruption, lack of strategic foresight, and continued focus on domestic insurgency has undermined the Philippines’ efforts at building a fully-functioning, modern military.

As a result, the Philippines has continued to rely on American military support to deal with both security as well as humanitarian challenges. No wonder, latest surveys suggest that the absolute majority of the Filipinos continue to regard the U.S. with high levels of trust and respect.

Earlier in his trip, Obama went the extra mile to reassure Japan that the U.S. will stand by its ally if a military confrontation were to erupt over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.

During his visit to Manila, however, Obama carefully avoided making a similar commitment, and instead called for the Philippines to seek a diplomatic compromise with China in accordance with international law. He made it clear that Washington takes no position over the sovereignty of the disputed territories in the South China Sea.

“We believe that nations and peoples have the right to live in security and peace, to have their sovereignty and territorial integrity respected,” said Obama in his speech before the Philippine armed forces. “We believe that international law must be upheld, that freedom of navigation must be preserved and commerce must not be impeded. We believe that disputes must be resolved peacefully and not by intimidation or force.”

Obama’s latest trip deepened Washington’s strategic footprint in Asia, but also demonstrated its unwillingness to militarily confront China over the South China Sea disputes. As a result, the Philippines will have to contemplate alternative diplomatic strategies to avoid an outright confrontation with China and preserve its territorial integrity.

President Barack Obama watches archers on horseback demonstrate their skills at the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, Japan, Apr. 24, 2014. Caroline Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and her husband Dr. Edwin Schlossberg watch at right. Credit: Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy

By John Feffer
WASHINGTON, Apr 29 2014 (IPS)

President Barack Obama’s recent tour of Asia was an opportunity to reenergise his foreign policy after a series of setbacks in the global arena.

The four countries on the week-long tour — Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines – have all been eager to upgrade their relationships with the United States in light of their concerns over Chinese maritime ambitions and an uncertain global economy.Ever since the Obama administration announced its “strategic rebalance” of U.S. foreign policy several years ago, the effort has encountered both domestic and foreign challenges.

But if the president thought that his short pass through Pacific would provide a lift to the much-vaunted U.S. “pivot” to Asia, he soon discovered that the world is not cooperating with his best-laid plans.

Ever since the Obama administration announced its “strategic rebalance” of U.S. foreign policy several years ago, the effort has encountered both domestic and foreign challenges.

At home, budget constraints have prevented the release of sufficient resources to finance a significant Pacific reorientation. Indeed, the threat of a government shutdown over the federal budget forced the president to postpone an earlier version of his Asia trip last October.

At the geopolitical level, meanwhile, the pivot was intended to reduce the liabilities of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. But that region has refused to allow the Pentagon and State Department to shift their attention.

The war in Syria, the collapse of negotiations between Israel and Palestine, the reversal of political fortunes in Egypt, and the ongoing talks with Iran have all continued to demand considerable U.S. focus.

An even greater distraction for the president at the moment is the crisis in Ukraine. Russia has already annexed one part of the country, the peninsula of Crimea. International sanctions have so far failed to discourage Moscow from fanning the flames of conflict in eastern Ukraine.

As Obama prepared to head toward Asia, Polish Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak urged the United States to “re-pivot to Europe” in order to bolster its NATO alliances.

Reassuring concerned allies over the potential military actions of a great power was also the expressed purpose of Obama’s trip to Asia. The president provided a good deal of rhetorical and symbolic assurances during his Pacific tour. But the pull of other pressing concerns has turned the “strategic rebalance” into a half-pivot at best.

Last week, Obama did reiterate that Washington would support Tokyo in any conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. But he was also careful not to endorse Japanese sovereignty over the islands that China also claims.

Moreover, the Obama administration has quietly expressed dismay at Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s more provocative actions, such as his visit to Yasukuni shrine and his controversial interpretations of World War II history, which have outraged neighbouring countries.

Obama’s greater emphasis on Asia has failed to repair the relationship between the principle U.S. allies in the region, Japan and South Korea.

Despite some progress in the negotiations, the president was also unable to persuade the Japanese to remove trade barriers necessary for the completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed trade pact involving 12 countries.

To a certain degree the discussions in Japan were moot, since the president lacks the votes in Congress to achieve “trade promotion authority,” the fast-track authorisation that nearly every trade pact has required for passage.

In South Korea, Obama’s visit was overshadowed by the ferry disaster that has so far left more than 200 dead. North Korea, meanwhile, tried to capitalise on Obama’s trip by ramping up its preparations for a fourth nuclear test.

Both Washington and Seoul have threatened repercussions should the North conduct a test, which would likely demonstrate the viability of its uranium enrichment programme.

But North Korea already endures some of the toughest sanctions in the world. Its decision to flout these warnings is yet more evidence that the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” has failed to address either North Korea’s nuclear programme or any of the country’s underlying security concerns.

The trip to Malaysia reinforced the perception that the Obama administration has not put democracy and human rights front and centre of its foreign policy. In the first trip of a U.S. president to Malaysia in nearly 50 years, Obama did mention democracy in his official speech.

But Malaysia’s potential participation in the TPP and its role in pushing back against the expansion of China’s maritime influence all make the country critical to U.S. role in the Pacific. Obama needs Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s support, not his irritation, so it was left to National Security Advisor Susan Rice to meet with leading oppositionist Anwar Ibrahim.

The one success the administration is touting from this swing through Asia is a new basing agreement with the Philippines, which gives the U.S. military greater flexibility in its access to the country. The Philippine government asked the United States to withdraw from its military bases in 1992.

But the new agreement does not add substantially to the previous two agreements signed by the two countries, the Mutual Defence Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement. Even this modest bump-up in cooperation, however, generated sizable demonstrations in Manila over the rotation of U.S. troops in and out of the country.

The enormous panda in the room, of course, is China. Obama and his entourage took pains to emphasise that all of these negotiations and treaties and military upgrades are for the general stability of the region and are not targeted at any particular country.

The Chinese, however, view the Pacific pivot as a form of containment. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, the Pentagon was drafting a set of contingency plans to deal with any possible military moves by China.

“As outlined by Obama and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping last June, the Pacific Ocean is large enough for the development of the two countries, and each side should respect the core interests of the other,” China’s Xinhua news agency observed before issuing a not-so-veiled warning.

“Meanwhile, it’s advisable for the United States not to underestimate China’s determination to defend its territories.”

Obama’s four-country trip did the minimum required to maintain the narrative of a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy to Asia. But distracted by other foreign policy challenges and soon heading into the mid-term election cycle, the president may not be able to return his attentions to the Far East any time soon.

After a year of intense diplomatic standoff and territorial brinkmanship among disputing states in the South and East China Seas, the U.S. military ‘pivot’ to the region appears to be in full swing – a move that could further aggravate an already combustible regional dynamic.

Against the backdrop of Chinese territorial assertiveness, the year started off with the bang of big-ticket U.S. arms sales to treaty allies and strategic partners across the region, including an expanded package of sophisticated military hardware featuring state-of-the-art anti-missile systems and warplanes. On top of this, Washington has also stepped-up its joint military exercises with Asian allies perched on the forefront of ongoing territorial spats.

Building on its earlier promise of greater commitment to the freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, an artery for global trade and energy transport, Washington aims to improve its allies’ military capabilities in a bid to rein in Beijing’s strong-willed territorial posturing.

Facing a stubborn economic downturn at home, the dramatic boost in U.S. defence sales to the region underlines Washington’s growing emphasis on a primarily military-oriented (as opposed to trade-and-investment-driven) approach to re-asserting its position as an ‘anchor of peace and stability’ in the region.

Among the biggest beneficiaries of growing U.S. military commitment to the region is the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), a massive trade group that includes top Pentagon suppliers such as Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co and Northrop Grumman Corp. It underscores the extent to which the U.S. ‘pivot’ has energised the American industrial-military complex, further dimming the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing disputes.

“(The pivot) will result in growing opportunities for our industry to help equip our friends,” says Fred Downey, vice-president for national security at the AIA.

Since the formal commencement of the U.S. pivot, after U.S. President Barack Obama’s fateful speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, Washington has come under tremendous pressure to reassure troubled allies such as Japan and the Philippines against Beijing’s assertiveness. In response, the U.S. has beefed up its rotational military presence across the Pacific, while expanding joint exercises – focusing on maritime defence – with and military aid to Pacific partners.

To calm China’s fears of a U.S.-led regional containment strategy, Washington has also focused on deepening economic integration within the Pacific Rim, specifically through the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trading agreement, which aims to facilitate the flow of investments and goods among partner-nations. In addition, the U.S. has also – at least in principle – underlined its support for diplomatic resolution of ongoing territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.

However, the U.S. pronouncements have failed to appease regional partners and deter Chinese assertiveness. Beijing continues to accuse Washington of staging a concerted effort to deny China its (perceived) legitimate interests, while allies have raised doubts as to Washington’s ability – given its dire fiscal woes – to maintain regional ascendancy.

Reflecting on fragile U.S. finances, Ken Lieberthal, director of the Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute and former president Bill Clinton’s top China adviser, has stated, “The most important single element to our (U.S.) success in Asia will be whether domestically we get our house in order, whether domestically we’re able to adopt and integrate a set of policies that will effectively address our fiscal problems over time.”

Given TPP’s failure to gain traction among major Pacific economies, and in the absence of any substantial American investments and economic aid to strategic partners, Washington seems to have instead opted for a full military pivot. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) inability to forge ahead with an effective diplomatic mechanism to settle the disputes has only encouraged this trend.

Since 2011, the U.S. worldwide military sales have hovered above 60 billion dollars.  In 2011, India alone accounted for a 6.9 billion dollar acquisition deal, underscoring New Delhi’s growing anxieties with China’s massive naval buildup, especially in light of its substantial energy-related investments in South China Sea. Last year, overall sales to Pacific partners topped 13.7 billion dollars.

Building on its earlier arms bonanza, the U.S. defence industry has started off the year with a large package of flashy, cutting-edge arms sales to key partners in Northeast Asia: a 5 billion dollar Lockheed Martin radar-evading F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft deal with Japan, a 1.85 billion dollar Lockheed Martin-led retrofitting of Taiwan’s 145 F-16A/B fighters with advanced radars and electronic warfare suits, and a 1.2 billion dollar Northrop Grumman high-flying RQ-4 “Global Hawk” spy drone deal with South Korea.

Beyond propping up allies’ military capabilities to deal with a wide array of challenges, including China, Washington has also encouraged further self-reliance and inter-operability among regional allies, creating a so-called “inversed wall of China” across the Western Pacific.

As a result, the newly-elected Japanese government, under the hawkish Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has supported Washington’s call for a more assertive Japanese regional role. Mr. Abe has pushed for revitalised defence ties with Asian partners, enhanced inter-operability with major naval powers in the Pacific such as Australia and India, and expanded military aid to countries such as the Philippines. He has also pushed for a so-called Asian “security diamond”, bringing together likeminded Pacific powers concerned with a perceived Chinese “threat”.

With Japan locked in a brewing conflict with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, Washington has conducted a series of high-profile joint naval exercises with Tokyo. In November, 47,000 Japanese and American military personnel took part in the biennial Keen Sword exercise off Okinawa islands, which was originally planned to act out the re-capture of disputed islands off the southern coast of Japan. This was followed by a five-day joint air exercise in January, just days after Japanese jets fended off Chinese aircraft surveying the disputed islands.

Overall, the U.S. seems to be gradually passing the buck to Asian partners, prodding them to bear a growing share of defense costs vis-à-vis China’s perceived expansionism. Meanwhile, there is little indication of a renewed push for a diplomatic resolution of the territorial disputes.