By Chakravarthi Raghavan
GENEVA, Jul 22 2014 (IPS)

The world of today is considerably different from the one at the end of the Second World War; there are no more any colonies, though there are still some ‘dependent’ territories.

In the 1950s and 1960s, as the decolonisation process unfolded, in most of the newly independent countries leaders emerged who had simply fought against foreign rule, without much thought on their post-independence economic and social objectives and policies.

Some naively thought that with political independence and power, economic well-being would be automatic.

Chakravarthi Raghavan

By the late 1950s, the former colonies, and those early leaders within them who yearned for better conditions for their peoples, realised that something more than political independence was needed, and began looking at the international economic environment, organisations and institutions.

In the immediate post-war years, the focus of efforts to fashion new international economic institutions (arising out of U.S.-U.K. wartime commercial policy agreements) was on international moves for reconstruction and development in war-ravaged Europe.

As a result, in the sectors of money and finance, the Bretton Woods institutions [the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank], were established – even ahead of agreeing on the United Nations Charter and its principle of sovereign equality of states (one nation, one vote in U.N. bodies) – on the basis of the ‘one-dollar one-vote’ principle.“Within the Bretton Woods institutions, there was no direct focus on promoting ‘development’ of the former colonies; what little happened was at best a side-effect of the lending policies of these institutions and the few crumbs that fell off the table here and there, often to further Cold War interests”

In pursuing their wartime commercial policy agreements, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted proposals in 1946 to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for the establishment of an international trade body, an International Trade Organization (ITO).

ECOSOC convened the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment to consider the proposals; the Preparatory Committee for the Conference drafted a Charter for the trade body, and it was discussed and approved in 1948 at a U.N. conference in Havana.

Pending ratification of the Havana Charter, the commercial policy chapter of the planned international trade body was fashioned into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and brought into being through the protocol of provisional application, as a multilateral executive agreement to govern trade relations, i.e., governments agreeing to implement their commitments to reduce trade barriers and resume pre-war trading relations through executive actions subject to their domestic laws.

At Havana, during the negotiations on the Charter, Brazil and India had expressed their dissatisfaction, but had reluctantly agreed to the outcome and the provisional GATT.

The U.S. Senate, as a result of corporate lobbying, was however unwilling to allow the United States to be subject to the disciplines of the Havana Charter and did not consent to an ITO Charter; the result was that the provisional GATT remained provisional for 47 years, until the Marrakesh Treaty which brought the World Trade Organization (WTO) into being in 1995.

Within the Bretton Woods institutions, there was no direct focus on promoting “development” of the former colonies; what little happened was at best a side-effect of the lending policies of these institutions and the few crumbs that fell off the table here and there, often to further Cold War interests.

From about the early 1950s, to the extent that it provided any reconstruction and development loans to the developing world, the IBRD acted in the interests of the United States, its largest single shareholder, and favoured the private sector.

For example, early Indian efforts to obtain IBRD loans for the public sector to set up core industries like steel, which needed large infusions of equity capital that the Indian private sector was in no position to provide, were turned down, based purely on the ideological dogma of private-vs-public-enterprise.

It was only much later that a separate window, the International Development Association (IDA), was created at the World Bank to provide soft loans (with low interest and long repayment periods) to low-income countries.

But the IDA did not function as professed and did not provide loans to set up industries or promote development in poorer countries; in actual practice it acted to advance the interests of the developed countries in the Third World.

IDA loans came with conditionalities to promote structural adjustment programmes, such as unilateral trade liberalisation, resulting in deindustrialisation of the poorer African countries. Even worse, IDA loans came with additional conditionalities to cater to the fads and fashions of the day and the concerns of Northern, in particular Washington-based, civil society.

The IDA “donor countries” dominated its governance and used their clout there to sway IDA lending – initially, the IDA obtained funds from the United States and other developed countries, and there were two or three substantial replenishments thereafter.

Subsequently, the funds from loan repayments and the profits of the World Bank (earned by lending at market rates to developing countries) were used to fund IDA, with small new contributions from the “donors” at every replenishment.

Though developing countries borrowing from the IBRD at market rates thus turned out to be the funders of the IDA, they had no voice in IDA governance, and the developed countries, with very little new money, have maintained control over the IDA and IBRD policies, to promote their own policies and the interests of their corporations in developing countries.

On the trade front, in successive rounds of negotiations at the GATT, the group of major developed countries (the United States, Canada, Europe, and later Japan) negotiated among themselves the exchange of tariff concessions, but paid little attention to the developing countries and their requests for tariff reduction in areas of export interest to them.

The only crumbs that fell their way were the result of the multilateralisation of the bilateral concessions exchanged in the rounds, through the application of the “Most Favoured Nation” (MFN) principle. From the Dillon Round on (through the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds), each saw new discriminatory arrangements against the Third World and its exports.

In the Uruguay Round (1986-94), culminating in the Marrakesh Treaty, the developing countries undertook onerous advance commitments in goods trade, and in new areas such as ‘services’ trade and in intellectual property protection, on the promise of commitment of developed countries to undertake a major reform of their subsidised trade in agriculture and other areas of export interest to developing countries.

These remain in the area of promises while, after the 2013 December  Bali Ministerial Conference, the United States, Europe and the WTO leadership are attempting to put aside as ‘out of date’, all past commitments, while pursuing the ‘trade facilitation’ agreement, involving no concessions from them, but resulting in the equivalent of a 10 percent tariff cut by developing countries.

In much of Africa, this will complete the “deindustrialisation process” and ensure that the Third World will remain “hewers of wood and drawers of water”.  (END/IPS COLUMNIST SERVICE)

* This text is based on Chakravarthi Raghavan’s recently published book, ‘The THIRD WORLD in the Third Millennium CE’.

Excerpt:

Framing rules at the World Trade Organization for maintaining public stockholding programmes for food security in developing countries is not an easy task, and for Ambassador Jayant Dasgupta, former Indian trade envoy to the WTO, “this is even more so when countries refuse to acknowledge the real problem and hide behind legal texts and interpretations in a slanted way to suit their interests.”

“The major problem is that the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) was negotiated in early 1990s and there are many issues which were not taken into account then,” says Ambassador Dasgupta, who played a prominent role in articulating the developing countries’ position on food security in the run-up to the WTO’s ninth ministerial meeting in Bali, Indonesia, last year.

“If the WTO has to carry on as an institution catering for international trade and its member states, especially the developing and least-developed countries, the rules have to be modified to ensure food security and livelihood security for hundreds of millions of poor farmers,” Ambassador Dasgupta told IPS Thursday.

Ironically, the rich countries – which continue to provide tens of billions of dollars for subsidies to their farmers – are insisting on inflexible disciplines for public stockholding programmes in the developing world.“Credible disciplines for food security are vital for the survival of poor farmers in the developing countries who cannot be left to the vagaries of market forces and extortion by middlemen” – Ambassador Jayant Dasgupta, former Indian trade envoy to the WTO

The United States, a major subsidiser of farm programmes in the world and charged for distorting global cotton trade by the WTO’s Appellate Body, has called for a thorough review of farm policies of  developing countries seeking a permanent solution for public stockholding programmes to address food security.

“Food security is an enormously complex topic affected by a number of policies, including trade distorting domestic support, export subsidies, export restrictions, and high tariffs,” says a United States proposal circulated at the WTO on July 14.

“These policies [in the developing countries],” continues the proposal, “can impede the food security of food insecure peoples throughout the world.” The United States insists that food security policies must be consistent with the rules framed in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that came into effect in 1995.

“Public stockholding is only one tool used to address food security, and disciplines regarding its application are already addressed in the Agreement on Agriculture,” the United States maintains.

The agriculture agreement of the trade body was largely based on the understandings reached between the two largest subsidisers – the European Union and the United States – which culminated in what is called the Blair House Agreement in 1992. The major subsidisers were provided a “peace clause” for ten years (1995-2005) from facing any challenges to their farm subsidy programmes at the WTO.

The AOA also includes complex rules regarding how its members, especially industrialised countries, must reduce their most-distorting farm subsidies.

In the face of increased legal challenges at the WTO and also demands raised for steep cuts in subsidies during the current Doha trade negotiations, several industrialised countries shifted their subsidies from what are called most trade-distorting “amber box” measures to “green box” payments which are exempted from disputes. Jacques Berthelot, a French civil society activist, says that the United States has placed some of its illegal subsidies into the green box.

When it comes to disciplines on food security, however, the United States says it is important to ensure that “[food security] programmes do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other members.”  The United States has suggested several “elements” for a Work Programme on food security, including the issue of public stockholding programmes, for arriving at a permanent solution. Washington wants a thorough review of how countries have implemented food security in developing countries.

The U.S. proposal, says a South American farm trade official, is aimed at “frustrating” the developing countries from arriving at a simple and effective solution that would enable them to continue their public stockholding programmes without many hurdles. “The United States is interested in preserving the Uruguay Round rules but not address the issues raised by the developing countries in the Doha Round of trade negotiations that seek to address concerns raised by developing countries,” the official adds.

The G-33 group – with over 45 developing and least-developed countries – has brought the food security issue to the centre-stage at the WTO. Over the last two years, the G-33, led by Indonesia with China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Cuba and Peru among others, has called for updating the external reference price based on 1986-88 prices to ensure that they can continue with their public stockholding programmes under what is called de minimis support for developing countries.

Following the G-33’s insistence on a solution for public stockholding programmes for food security, which became a make-or-break issue at the WTO’s Bali ministerial meeting, trade ministers had agreed on a decision “with the aim of making recommendations for a permanent solution.” The ministers directed their negotiators to arrive at a solution in four years.

Over the last six months, there has been little progress in addressing the core issues in the Bali package raised by developing countries, including food security. “We are deeply concerned that the Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes is getting side-lined,“ India told members at the WTO on July 2.

“In this and other areas, instead of engaging in meaningful discussion, certain members have been attempting to divert attention to the policies and programmes of selected developing country members,” says New Delhi, emphasising that “the issues raised are in no way relevant to the core mandate that we have been provided in the Bali Decisions.”

At a time when the industrialised countries want rapid implementation of the complex agreement on trade facilitation, their continued stonewalling tactics on the issues raised by developing countries has created serious doubts whether food security issue will be addressed in a meaningful manner at all.

“Credible disciplines for food security are vital for the survival of poor farmers in the developing countries who cannot be left to the vagaries of market forces and extortion by middlemen,” says Ambassador Dasgupta. “The delay in addressing food security will pose problems for millions of people below poverty who are dependent on public distribution programmes.”