Credit: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Jan 30 2023 (IPS)

Parliamentarians worldwide face increasing human rights violations and a greater risk of reprisal simply for exercising their mandate or expressing their ideas and opinions.

Asia follows the same trend according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). It is the second most dangerous region for MPs, with the number of cases recorded by the IPU increasing every year.

While instances of physical attacks remain rare in Southeast Asia, governments often resort to politically motivated charges against parliamentarians and opposition leaders in what has come to be known as ‘lawfare”.

Myanmar

Since the military takeover and the suspension of parliament in February 2021, the IPU has received specific reports of human rights violations against 56 MPs elected in the November 2020 vote.

Two new MPs, Wai Lin Aung and Pyae Phyo, were arrested in December 2021. This brings the total number of detained MPs to 30. Many of the detainees are reportedly held incommunicado in overcrowded prisons. where they are mistreated and possibly tortured, with little access to medical care or legal advice.

According to Amnesty International, torture and ill-treatment are institutionalized in Myanmar. Women have been tortured, sexually harassed and threatened with rape in custody,

Stop lawfare!

ASEAN member states must immediately stop using judicial harassment and politically motivated charges against critics and political opponents, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) stated at a January 27 press conference in Manila under the banner: “Stop Lawfare! No to the weaponization of the law and state-sponsored violence.”

The press conference explained the continued use of lawfare and its effect on freedom of expression. It was a show of solidarity with parliamentarians and others facing this kind of repression.

Philippines

The Philippines is ranked 147th out of 180 countries in the 2022 World Press Freedom Index, and the Committee to Protect Journalists ranks the Philippines seventh in its 2021 Impunity Index, which tracks the deaths of media workers whose killers go unpunished .

In the Philippines, “lawfare” has been used systematically by the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte and also by the current administration of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. to suppress opposition voices. A notable case is that of APHR’s board member and former member of parliament in the Philippines: Walden Bello.

On August 8, 2022, Walden Bello was arrested on a cyber libel charge. Bello is facing politically motivated allegations filed by a former Davao City information officer who now works as Chief of the Media and Public Relations Department in the office of the Vice President, Sara Duterte.

The indictment against Walden Bello is a clear example of political intimidation and revenge designed to terrify opponents of the current Philippine government. It is a violation of freedom of expression, which is essential for a democracy.

In addition to Walden Bello, many other political leaders and activists, including Senator Leila De Lima, Senator Risa Hontiveros and Senator Antonio Trillanes, have fallen victim to dubious justice. Senator Leila de Lima, was arrested in February 2017 on trumped-up drug charges, shortly after she launched a Senate investigation into extrajudicial killings under the Duterte administration. She has been in detention ever since, still awaiting trial, despite several key witnesses retracting their testimony.

Many local and regional leaders are also suffering arbitrary detention following questionable arrests in the wake of government “red-tagging” campaigns against local activists and journalists, including human rights and environmental defenders.

Maria Ressa, who, as editor-in-chief of Rappler, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2021 together with a Russian journalist, has repeatedly been a victim of lawfare. They were recently acquitted of tax evasion. Ressa said it was one of several lawsuits former President Duterte used to muzzle critical reporting.

However, Ressa and Rappler face three more lawsuits: a separate tax suit filed by prosecutors in another court, her appeal to the Supreme Court against an online libel conviction, and Rappler’s appeal against the closing of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ressa still faces up to six years in prison if she loses the libel conviction appeal.

The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) therefore call on all “Southeast Asian authorities to stop abusing the justice system to quell dissent and urge ASEAN to reprimand member states that use laws to attack the political opposition.

The Philippine government can take the first step by dropping all charges against Walden Bello and immediately releasing Senator Leila De Lima and all others unjustly detained on politically motivated charges,” said Mercy Barends, president of APHR and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives.

ASEAN

“Lawfare is happening all over Southeast Asia and beyond. Governments in the region use ambiguous laws to prosecute political opponents, government critics and activists. This weaponization of the justice system is alarming and incredibly damaging to freedom of expression.

It creates an atmosphere of fear that not only silences those targeted by such lawfare, but also makes anyone who wants to criticize those in power think twice,” said Charles Santiago, APHR co-chair and former Malaysian MP.

Myanmar and Cambodia

In Myanmar and Cambodia, for example, treason and terrorism laws have been used to crack down on opposition. The most tragic example occurred last July, with the execution of four prominent Myanmar activists on charges of bogus terrorism by the Myanmar junta. These were the first judicial executions in decades and are an extreme example of how the law can be perverted by authoritarian regimes to bolster their power.

In Cambodia, members of the opposition are sentenced to long prison terms on trumped-up charges simply for exercising their right to freedom of expression. Journalists are increasingly subjected to various forms of intimidation, pressure and violence, according to a new report published by the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR).

Thailand

Meanwhile, libel laws are among the most commonly used laws in Thailand where, unlike many other countries, it can be considered a criminal offense rather than just a civil crime. Sections 326-328 of Thailand’s Penal Code establish various defamation offenses with penalties of up to two years in prison and fines of up to 200,000 Thai Baht (approximately USD 6,400).

“I think we as parliamentarians in our respective countries should do our utmost to repeal or at least amend these kinds of laws. Our democracies depend on it. But I also think we can’t do it alone. We need to work together across borders, share experiences with parliamentarians from other countries and stand in solidarity with those who fall victim to it, because at the end of the day we are all in this together,” said Rangsiman Rome, member of the Thai parliament and APHR member.

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change.

https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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Medical equipment supplied by the World Food Programme (WFP) arrives in Beijing. Meanwhile, as COVID-19 infections surged in China, coronavirus experts gathered at the UN health agency in Geneva on January 3, to discuss next steps. Photo courtesy of Yingshi Zhang

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Jan 4 2023 (IPS)

Three years after the coronavirus first emerged in the Chinese city of Wuhan, the Chinese government began in December to abruptly scrap its harsh containment policy known as “zero-Covid.”

This zero-Covid policy relied on strict lockdowns, use of a Covid tracking app, domestic travel restrictions, and quarantining those who test positive along with their close contacts. But the strategy isolated the country from the rest of the world and dealt a severe blow to the world’s second-largest economy.

The government announced that from January 8 onwards, mandatory quarantine on arrival for travelers to China will end and Chinese people will be able to travel abroad again after three years.

The switch followed unprecedented protests against the policies championed by President Xi Jinping, marking the strongest display of public defiance in his decade-long presidency and reminiscent of the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy in many minds.

“What matters is that we reach consensus through communication and consultation. When the 1.4 billion Chinese work with one heart and one mind, and stand in unity with a strong will, no task will be impossible and no difficulty insurmountable”, Xi stated in his nationally broadcast New Year’s message.

“We have now entered a new phase of COVID response where tough challenges remain. Everyone is holding on with great fortitude, and the light of hope is right in front of us. Let’s make an extra effort to pull through, as perseverance and solidarity mean victory.”

The question is: how many Chinese are still being taken in by this tough language now that hospitals have been hit by a tidal wave of mainly elderly patients since the lifting of the zero-covid policy, crematoriums are overloaded and many pharmacies no longer have anti-virus and fever medication.

Initially, photos and video fragments of these harrowing conditions were still censored, but recently even the China Daily reported on them. The magnitude of the outbreak remains unclear for now, and the lack of transparency can be attributed to strict censorship and the fact that government officials have stopped reporting asymptomatic cases and introduced a new definition of covid-related deaths.

Only patients with the virus who die due to pneumonia and respiratory failure now meet the criteria, according to China. The National Health Commission (NHC) further announced that it is no longer releasing an official daily Covid death toll.

In addition, the state news agency Xinhua reported that from January 8, China will lower its priority management of Covid-19 cases and treat it as a class B infection rather than a more severe class A infection. Liang Wannian, head of the expert panel for the COVID-19 response under the NHC, said the shift does not mean China is letting go of the virus, but instead is focusing more resources on rural areas to contain the epidemic.

According to Nikola Davis, science correspondent for The Guardian, China is experiencing this surge for a number of reasons. The relaxation of restrictions has allowed the virus to spread more. Plus, the slow vaccination campaign in much of China, coupled with the use of the less effective locally produced Sinovac vaccine, means the population has little protection and many vulnerable people are still at risk from the virus.

In addition, the tight restrictions previously in place mean few people have contracted Covid before. That means there is little natural immunity at play in the current wave.

As a result, many people are now simultaneously getting Covid and requiring hospital care, leading to increasing pressure on the healthcare system. In addition, the inadequate medical infrastructure (there remains a major shortage of intensive care beds and well-trained staff) as well as substandard general hygiene (clean toilets, washing hands, etc.) must also be added.

So the ink of my contribution on ‘China: From A Health Crisis to A Political Crisis?’ was barely dry before my fears came true: China is in the middle of a relentless covid wave. Chinese authorities estimate that about 250 million people, or 18 percent of the population, were infected with the COVID-19 virus in the first 20 days of December.

Despite this increase, the government insists it has the rising infections and circulating variants under control. Yet these ‘official’ figures do not seem to correspond with the reality on the ground.

People will continue to grope in the dark about the correct figures. The Chinese government and the so-called worldometers are still counting only 5250 covid deaths, while the World Health Organization (WHO) recently published the number of 31,585.

Some academic friends and former students, though not epidemiologists, whisper that up to 60% of the Chinese have or have been exposed to covid.

Airfinity, a UK-based company that analyzes health risks worldwide, also comes with worrying figures. They currently estimate 11,000 daily deaths and 1.8 million infections per day in China, while it expects 1.7 million fatalities by the end of April 2023.

The researchers say their model is based on data from China’s regional provinces, before changes in infection reporting, combined with case growth rates from other former zero-Covid countries.

It is feared that the numbers will rise even more in the coming weeks. Especially around the Chinese New Year on January 22, when almost every Chinese goes to visit friends and family.

Is Xi Jinping firmly in the saddle?

Xi Jinping secured a historic third term as leader in October, emerging as China’s most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong. He thus further consolidated his power in a process that began a decade ago, a concentration that has steered China in a more authoritarian direction and which critics warn increases the risk of policy missteps.

The year 2022 ended with unprecedented street protests, followed by the sudden reversal of its zero-Covid policy and coronavirus infections sweeping through the world’s most populous country. This, together with the sluggish economy, has damaged his image considerably.

For decades, China has been the world’s leading economic growth engine and the hub of industrial supply chains. The World Bank and other experts expect the reopening of the Chinese economy to boost growth to 4.3% in 2023, compared to the forecast of 2.7% for 2022.

This is still reasonable by international standards, but remains below the official target of about 5.5%. Choked consumption and disrupted supply chains continue to weigh on the crisis in the huge real estate sector. A prolonged economic slowdown or new logistical concerns, whether due to COVID or geopolitical tensions, could reverberate globally.

Beijing’s relations with the West deteriorated over Xi’s partnership with Moscow just before Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, as well as rising tensions over US-backed Taiwan, which China considers part of its territory.

Xi traveled abroad for the first time since the pandemic began in September, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In November, he met US President Joe Biden at the G20 in Indonesia, where both sides sought to cement relations.

According to Chinese diplomacy, a recent phone call between China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang (the outgoing ambassador to Washington and Xi’s confidant) and US secretary of state Antony Blinken has ironed out the folds.

Diplomatically, Xi appears to be trying to ease some of the tension that has made relations with the West increasingly fraught, even as Beijing tries to strengthen its position as a counterweight to the post-World War II US-led order. Xi’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and meetings with representatives of Gulf states could be viewed in this context.

But things are also rumbling within the government and the almighty Communist Party (CCP). Leaked excerpts of an internal policy brief published in the Sydney Morning Herald, discussed at a recent Politburo, state that “the zero-Covid dynamic was an unqualified success and demonstrated the superiority of the Chinese communist system over the cowardly and immoral West, but that it can now be brushed aside because omicron is ‘just like the flu’”.

“We must resolutely follow the line of the party. We must never deviate from the notes,” Xi told the Politburo during the “self-criticism” session, a Maoist practice that is back in vogue.

Authoritarian regimes with near-absolute control over the media can sometimes facilitate breathtakingly destructive policies. It is difficult to think of a more unhinged policy than suddenly exposing an inadequately vaccinated population to massive infection in the middle of winter, just before the great Chinese New Year inland migration.

Fortitude appears to be one of Xi Jinping’s principles, as his New Year’s letter affirmed: “Everyone stands firm with great fortitude, and the light of hope stands right before us.”

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change.
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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Noeleen Heyzer, UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, talks with Rohingya refugees in a camp in Bangladesh. October 2022. Credit: Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Nov 4 2022 (IPS)

For 10 days in November, the world’s diplomatic attention will largely be focused on three major diplomatic meetings in Southeast Asia.

These include the Group of 20 (G-20) Summit on November 15-16 in Bali, Indonesia, and the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, which will be held November 18-19 in Bangkok, Thailand.

Both follow the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and related meetings, which will take place November 8-13 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and include the East Asia Summit.

The meeting in Cambodia will be the first ASEAN meeting that US President Biden will attend in person as last year’s meetings were held remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He will also become only the second sitting U.S. president to visit the country, after President Barack Obama (also for an ASEAN meeting) in 2012.

While in Cambodia, Biden will, according to a White House statement, “explain the importance of advocating cooperation between the US and ASEAN in ensuring security and prosperity in the region, and the well-being of our combined one billion people”.

This is likely to include much reference to ASEAN’s important position in Washington’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy, and its emphasis on its prized position of ‘centrality’ in Asian diplomacy.

The crisis in Myanmar will also be central to all these meetings. In preparation, in June 2022, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) launched an International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar with the aim of providing strategic, principled, achievable and time-bound policy recommendations to international actors, so that they can better work towards an end to violence and a return to democracy in the country.

Their report, titled “Time is not on our side – The failed international response to the Myanmar coup,” was presented at a press conference in Bangkok on Nov. 2.

The IPI is formed by a committee of MPs from seven different countries in Africa, America, Asia and Europe, consisting of IPI President Heidi Hautala (Vice President of the European Parliament), Mercy Chriesty Barends (Member of the House of Representatives in Indonesia and Board Member of APHR), Taufik Basari (Member of the House of Representatives in Indonesia), Amadou Camara (Member of the Gambia National Assembly, and Steering Committee Member of the African Parliamentary Association on Human Rights), Nqabayomzi Kwankwa (Member of the National Assembly Assembly of South Africa, and Chairman of the AfriPAHR), Ilhan Omar (US Congress member), Nitipon Piwmow (MP in Thailand) and Charles Santiago (MP in Malaysia and President of APHR).

The report: “Time is not on our side”

Since the military of Myanmar staged a coup d’état on February 1, 2021, the situation in the country has steadily deteriorated. The military junta, led by Major General Min Aung Hlaing, has waged a brutal war of attrition against its own people, perpetrating countless atrocities and destroying the country’s economy.

Armed forces have killed at least 2,371 people and displaced hundreds of thousands, bringing the total number of displaced persons in the country to more than 1.3 million. The junta has also imprisoned more than 15,000 political prisoners and routinely used torture against those arrested. At the same time, they cracked down on freedom of expression and association, including intense repression against independent media and civil society.

Yet the Burmese resisted en masse. The initial peaceful demonstrations in the immediate aftermath of the coup, as well as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) in which hundreds of thousands joined a general strike, demonstrated the population’s overwhelming rejection of a return to military rule. The coup has also led to an unprecedented level of unity among those who oppose the military across ethnic borders.

Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) was formed in April 2021 bringing together parliamentarians ousted in the coup, representatives of ethnic minorities and civil society actors. The NUG rightly claims a mandate as a legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. It enjoys widespread legitimacy and support, especially in the interior of the country, and represents the most inclusive government in Myanmar’s history.

The NUG is committed to the establishment of a new constitution and genuine federal democracy in Myanmar, which would be an important step towards fulfilling the ambitions for autonomy of the country’s ethnic minorities.

The junta’s attempts to quell the resistance with extreme violence failed dramatically, serving only to exacerbate existing tensions and incite some anti-junta activists to turn to armed struggle to defend themselves. Anti-military militias known as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – some commanded by the NUG – have been formed across the country, including in previously relatively peaceful areas.

The coup has also sparked a new wave of violence between the military and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), which have struggled for decades for autonomy in the country’s border regions.

Some of these EAOs, such as the armed wings of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), have joined the NUG. However, not all EAOs have formally joined the anti-military struggle as Myanmar’s political landscape remains highly complex and fractured.

The escalating violence has accelerated the near collapse of the economy and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Myanmar’s GDP has fallen by 13 percent since 2019 and 40 percent of the country’s population now lives below the national poverty line. Despite the increased needs, humanitarian actors have struggled to reach vulnerable and remote populations as the military has severely restricted access for humanitarian aid.

Poor response by international community

The international community has been largely unable to respond effectively to the crisis. The junta’s international allies—notably Russia and China—prove steadfast and uncritical supporters, providing both weapons and legitimacy to an otherwise isolated regime.

However, foreign governments that support democracy have not supported their rhetoric with the same force. While a number of countries have imposed sanctions on junta leaders and their personal assets, these efforts remain uncoordinated and have failed to crack down on key revenue-generating entities such as the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).

The United Nations, in particular, is hampered by internal divisions and appears unable to exert any influence. The NUG has attracted supporters worldwide and continues to occupy Myanmar’s seat at the UN, but most governments are hesitant to formally recognize them, despite calls from parliaments and advocates to do so.

ASEAN unable to respond effectively

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, is also plagued by internal divisions and has been unable to respond effectively. The bloc’s five-point consensus, signed in April 2021 and aimed at tackling the crisis, has failed completely, hampered by a lack of will on the part of all ASEAN member states to enforce it, and a military leadership in Myanmar that has shown no intent to implement it.

While some member states, such as Malaysia, have called for new approaches, including direct involvement with the NUG and other pro-democracy forces, others, including Thailand or Cambodia, remain “junta enablers.”

As Myanmar slides into civil war, the possibility for a negotiated solution to the conflict is almost completely closed. The dialogue prescribed in ASEAN’s five-point consensus is impossible under the current circumstances.

The responsibility lies with the junta, which has shown no willingness to engage with those who oppose it and has instead relied solely on brute force in its effort to wipe out any opposition.

The July 2022 execution of four political prisoners, the country’s first judicial execution since 1988, highlighted both the brutality of the military and its complete disinterest in negotiations. The coup unceremoniously brought an end to the previous power-sharing arrangement with the civilian leadership. Now the vast majority of Myanmar’s population has expressed a clear desire not to return to the status quo of the past.

The military junta has failed to consolidate its power

Nineteen months after the coup, the military junta has failed to consolidate its power. This is also apparent from a recent report by Noeleen Heyzer, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Myanmar. Large parts of Myanmar’s territory are disputed between the military and forces affiliated with the NUG or EAOs, and it can be argued that the coup has failed.

In areas along the Thai border, EAOs are working together, providing basic services to the population. That way one is showing what a future Myanmar, in which different groups will work together instead of fighting each other, looks like.

In sum

With Myanmar’s future at stake, external pressure on the military and support for the resistance could be the deciding factor in the course of the conflict. The international community can and must do more to help the Myanmar people establish a federal democracy.

It should begin significantly increasing efforts to address the worsening humanitarian crisis, increasing pressure on the illegal junta through coordinated sanctions and arms embargoes, and recognizing the NUG as the legitimate authority in Myanmar.

The NUG, as well as the aligned EAOs, should be provided with funding and capacity building programs in governance and federalism. But urgent action is needed because, as Khin Ohmar, Myanmar activist and chairwoman of the Progressive Voice, said at one of the IPI hearings: “Time is not on our side”.

The countries and international institutions that claim to support democracy in Myanmar must act urgently. If they are serious about helping the Myanmar people in their hour of greatest need, they must adopt creative and effective policies to provide support and pave the way for a better future for the country.

Min Aung Hlaing’s junta has failed to take control of the country, but pro-democracy forces cannot drive the military out of Myanmar’s political life on their own. The forces fighting for federal democracy need all the help they can get from allies in the global community.

Recommendations

The International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) makes a number of recommendations that focus on the urgent need to increase humanitarian assistance to Myanmar, to urge neighboring countries (notably Thailand, India and Bangladesh) to provide more cross-border humanitarian aid and to work as much as possible directly with local, community-based aid groups, and not with the junta.

Pressure on the junta must also be increased, through coordinated and genuinely impactful sanctions. For instance, by calling on governments that have not yet sanctioned the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), especially the United States, to do so as soon as possible.

At the same time, Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces – including the NUG and ethnic organizations– should be recognized and given the political and financial support they need. The NUG and EAOs should start negotiating a future settlement for a federal democracy in Myanmar.

The NUG should also be encouraged to unconditionally restore Rohingya citizenship and accept the return of those who have sought refuge in Bangladesh over the years.

One should acknowledge that the five-point consensus has failed and that Min Aung Hlaing’s junta is not a reliable partner. ASEAN must abandon the five-point consensus in its current form and negotiate a new agreement on the crisis in Myanmar with the NUG, local civil society organizations (CSOs) and representatives of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change.
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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Protesters attend a march against the military coup in Myanmar. Credit: Unsplash/Pyae Sone Htun

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Oct 14 2022 (IPS)

The update on September 26, 2022, of the human rights situation in Myanmar to the UN Human Rights Council says it all: “The people of Myanmar have been caught in a rapid downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity. Urgent action is needed to reverse this catastrophic situation and to restore peace, democracy, and sustainable development”.

Since the military overthrew an elected government on February 1, 2021, and took power in a country ruled by generals for five of the past six decades, the situation for the majority of the population has become increasingly desperate.

The coup, which ended 10 years of provisional democracy initiated by the previous junta, has devastated Myanmar’s economy, leading to mass displacement of people as a result of fighting between armed groups and the military, and relentless bombing on civilian targets of the Burmese Air Force.

Below are the key data, compiled primarily by UN News, Reuters, Frontier, and Human Rights Watch, from the years-long crisis:

– According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a non-profit organization that tracks military action and is frequently cited by the United Nations, 2,343 is the number of opponents of the junta that have been killed since the coup. Killed.

– 1,5,821 opponents of the coup have been arrested by the junta, the AAPP says.

– 160 people were killed in one day on March 27, 2021, as the junta celebrated the annual Armed Forces Day, the bloodiest day in its crackdown on democracy activists.

– According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1,320,000 people have been displaced by fighting. It is estimated that about 14.4 million people—about a quarter of Myanmar’s population—have been displaced from their homes and are in need of humanitarian assistance.

– 30 is the percentage by which Myanmar’s economy has shrunk as a direct result of the coup, the World Bank says. According to the World Bank, 1 million jobs were lost in Myanmar in 2021.

– Potentially $2.8 billion in economic losses from internet shutdowns in Myanmar by 2021.

– More than 60 is the percentage of the value of the kyat currency that has been lost against the dollar since the coup. Capital flight and a decline in foreign investment & aid, and money transfers have led to a shortage of foreign currency. The military regime’s attempts to restrict imports and ration foreign currencies have boosted illegal border trade with China and Thailand. A widening disparity between Thailand’s and Myanmar’s trade figures suggests that smuggling from Thailand has not only recovered to pre-coup levels, but also appears to have reached an all-time high. This boom questions the junta’s claim of a trade surplus. Moreover, it has been fueled by the regime’s own heavy-handed efforts to control trade.

– Compared to March 2020, poverty is estimated to have tripled. With about 40 percent of the population living below the national poverty line by 2022, nearly a decade of progress in poverty reduction has been undone.

– 18 was the percentage contraction the World Bank predicted for Myanmar’s economy in the fiscal year starting April 1, 2021. Failure to see a substantial rebound in economic growth – with GDP estimated to remain in 2022 at around 13 percent lower than in 2019 – continues to test the resilience of the Myanmar population. Food insecurity is on the rise and households are increasingly resorting to negative coping mechanisms – including reducing consumption and asset sales – in the face of uncertainty.

– The suicide rate has continued to rise since the coup as financial hardship, political repression and the collapse of the health care system are negatively impacting mental health.

– 26 is the total number of years in prison that deposed 77-year-old Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi will face if given the maximum sentences in the remaining lawsuits against her.

– Press freedom regresses fast. The country has become a worse jailer of journalists than China. Since the coup, military authorities have arrested about 142 journalists and media workers, an estimated 57 of whom are still in prison in Myanmar, six more than are believed to be imprisoned in China. The junta has forced at least 12 media outlets to shut down, pushing hundreds of media workers to flee the country and revive the exiled media outlets that reported on the country under the last military junta prior to 2011.

– ASEAN is increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress on the Five Point Consensus – a non-binding agreement drafted in April 2021. While many countries have criticized the junta’s lack of “willingness” to comply with the framework, Malaysia has gone a step further and put forward the idea of suspending Myanmar.

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change.
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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“If all I knew about Africa were from popular images, I too would think that Africa was a place of beautiful landscapes, beautiful animals and incomprehensible people, fighting senseless wars, dying of poverty and AIDS, unable to speak for themselves”. This quote from the Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie is in the introduction to Dipo Faloyin’s book ‘Africa is not a country‘. It summarizes Faloyin’s book nicely.

Born in Chicago, raised in Lagos and currently based in London, Nigerian Dipo Faloyin is a senior editor at VICE, the online news service founded in New York in December 2013, which distributes documentaries daily through its website and YouTube channel. VICE promotes itself as “the definitive guide to illuminating information” about “under-reported stories”.

Africa is bigger than Canada, the US and China combined

Africa is big, about 30 million square kilometers, just under twice the size of Russia or bigger than Canada, the United States and China combined! This is not clearly visible on most world maps due to the common use of the Mercator projection. It makes countries near the poles appear larger and those at the equator smaller. However, Africa is a rich and diverse place. It includes more than 1,500 languages and 16 percent of the world’s population.

Repeated stereotypes

“Always use the word ‘Africa’ or ‘black’ or ‘safari’ in your title,” Kenyan writer Binyavanga Wainaina suggested in a 2005 satirical essay. He scoffed at the repeated stereotypes in international coverage of Africa.

Faloyin also argues that there is rarely a balanced or nuanced view of Africa because clichés about poverty, famine and disasters dominate the reporting and Hollywood romance about Africa.

‘Powerless victims’

These writers criticize international coverage of Africa for its emphasis on the suffering of powerless victims. This is spiced up with the occasional celebrity visit or a beautiful shot of wildlife. In doing so, they point to the absurdity of reporting that attempts to capture a vast continent of more than 50 countries in broad generalizations.

Above all, they disdain what is often called Afro-pessimism. This is the tendency to depoliticize stories in sub-Saharan Africa and reduce them to hopeless humanitarian crises or harrowing images.

“Africa Rising”

While the wars, famines, plagues and epidemics were the only ‘news’ from Africa for years, a ‘new’ story has been added for some time. In May 2000 there was the famous front page of The Economist portraying Africa as the hopeless continent; in 2011 this image was replaced by a cover full of clear skies and with the headline ‘Africa Rising‘.

Time magazine followed suit with a cover of the same title. Suddenly the continent is buzzing with mobile phones and energetic companies. Michela Wrong called this the new mandatory slogan in the New York Times of March 20, 2015, now that “it is fashionable these days to be upbeat about Africa”.

Incomplete and inaccurate

“This book is a portrait of modern Africa that pushes back against harmful stereotypes to tell a more comprehensive story — based on all the humanity that has been brushed aside to accommodate a single vision of blood, strife and majestic shots of rolling savannahs and large yellow sunsets. . It will unspool the inaccurate story of a continent dragging this bludgeoned narrative towards reality,” Faloyin states explicitly on page 7.

The danger of a neoliberal agenda

The problem is that all reductionist stereotypes are incomplete and inaccurate. And in particular, the latest characterization of Africa as a place full of entrepreneurs, complete with its own ‘silicon savannah‘, has other problems.

In a part of the world that continues to face staggering levels of inequality, there is a danger that Africa will get too close to a neoliberal agenda and goals. Whatever successes the new companies may achieve, there is not much evidence of a trickle-down effect for those at the bottom of society.

Of course, there are success stories in many places that demonstrate the capabilities of developing African economies. Some countries in Africa, such as Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Tanzania or Rwanda are currently among the fastest growing economies in the world. But the ‘Africa Rising’ stories ignore the plight of those who are still far behind in societies that, outside the family or immediate community, don’t offer much of a social safety net, which in most Western societies (to some extent) is visible.

We can therefore sympathize with the plight of Africans who board rickety boats and try to build a new life abroad. Yet it is well known that the so-called economic migrants seeking a better future across the Mediterranean are not the ones at the bottom, who could never afford or even consider such a journey.

Colorful and sometimes funny

“Few things unite the continent more in frustration than the comically inaccurate way Africa and its people are portrayed in popular culture. It’s at times deliberately dismissive, often nonsensical and occasionally inadvertently hilarious” (p. 199).

Faloyin has a smooth pen and colors his book with several well-chosen examples. He examines each country’s colonial heritage and explores a variety of topics, from describing urban life in Lagos and the lively West African rivalry over who makes the best Jollov rice, to the still lingering case of stolen art treasures in Western museums — “90 percent of Africa’s material cultural legacy is being kept outside of the continent” (p. 258) — to the story of democracy in seven dictatorships and the dangers of stereotypes in popular culture.

Africa is home to 54 countries, including island nations along the coast of the continent. These countries are home to diverse groups of people who speak different languages and practice a wide variety of customs.

Take Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. More than 250 different ethnic groups live among the population of more than 200 million inhabitants. While English is the official language of the former British colony, the many languages of ethnic groups indigenous to the West African nation, such as Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo, are also spoken. In addition, Nigerians practice Christianity, Islam and indigenous religions.

So much for the myth that all Africans are the same. The most populous nation on the continent certainly proves otherwise.

Or take Egypt. In particular, the country borders Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Red Sea to the east and Israel and the Gaza Strip to the northeast. Despite its location, Egypt is often described not as an African nation, but as the Middle East – the region where Europe, Africa and Asia converge.

This omission stems mainly from the fact that Egypt’s population of more than 100 million is strongly Arab – with a small minority of Nubians in the south – a drastic difference from the population of Sub-Saharan Africa.

According to scientific research, the ancient Egyptians – known for their pyramids and advanced civilization – were biologically neither European nor Sub-Saharan African, but a genetically distinct group. These people are located on the African continent. Their existence also reveals the diversity of Africa.

The ‘white savior’

Occasionally, the image of the “white savior” also sneaks into Faloyin’s story. Sometimes rightly so, as the West is presented as a ‘white savior’ during the colonization and partition of Africa on 15 November 1884 at the Berlin Conference in the absence of any African representation: “Only 30 per cent of all borders in the world are in Africa, yet nearly 60 per cent of all territorial disputes that have made it to the International Court of Justice come from the continent” (p. 46).

The more recent search in 2012 for Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army is also discussed in detail. Faloyin sarcastically concludes: “The White Savior Industrial Complex is not about justice. It is about having a big emotional experience that validates privilege” (p. 79).

Reprehensible paternalism

The continued affirmation of a paternalistic and ignorant perspective, be it the helpless savages or the noble poor, is fundamentally reprehensible and will not lead to satisfying contributions of any kind in the long run. All the more so since, as Howard French also argued, Africa has been the hub of the machine of modernity for Europe.

What’s the remedy?

But Faloyin also falls short. “While Faloyin excels at articulating the complaint (about the white savior), he has little to offer as a remedy to a problem rooted in a centuries-old global power imbalance. Fairness dictates, too, a recognition that intellectual laziness is hardly the white man’s exclusive preserve,” adds Michela Wrong in The New York Times of August 31, 2022.

Myths and stereotypes

Our views on groups of people stem from socialization, including our parents, peers, national culture, subcultures, and especially the mass media. This is called implicit or unconscious bias. Everyone makes these generalizations, and they help and protect us in this complex world.

They are too simple and mainly based on group membership based on limited characteristics, such as age, a physical characteristic, gender, race or nationality. Generalizations can be helpful, but stereotypes are dangerous.

Based on oversimplified, fixed assumptions about groups of people, stereotypes are often ‘justified’ within social systems, to cover up deeper myths. Africa has been the target of an unfathomable amount of stereotyping, which has led to the widespread belief in much false information.

Many myths about Africa go back centuries. In modern times, new stereotypes about the continent have emerged. Sensation- and simplification-oriented news media continue to associate Africa with famine, war, poverty and political corruption.

This is not to say that such problems do not exist in Africa. Of course, they do. But even in prosperous countries, poverty, abuse of power and chronic diseases play a role in daily life. While the African continent faces enormous challenges, not every African is in need, nor is every African nation in crisis.

Reference:

Dipo Faloyin (2022), Africa is not a country. Breaking Stereotypes of Modern Africa, Harvill Secker, London, 380 pp. https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/444389/africa-is-not-a-country-by-faloyin-dipo/9781787302952

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrives in Naypyitaw on Aug. 3. Credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation MFA

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Aug 11 2022 (IPS)

On August 3rd residents of the Myanmar capital Naypyitaw were suddenly awakened by the sound of military helicopters in the air. The helicopters hovered over the city all day. The way to the regime’s foreign ministry was also blocked for hours.

Although they did not know the reason, it suggested that someone important was coming to Naypyitaw. They had no idea who the visiting dignitary was because all communications were also disrupted. But Russian media reported that their country’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, was on his way to Naypyitaw.

Lavrov’s visit comes as the junta has sparked renewed international outrage with the recent executions of four opponents, including a former lawmaker and a prominent human rights activist, in the country’s first use of the death penalty in decades. Lavrov previously visited Naypyitaw in 2013.

Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing has been to Russia several times since 2013, most recently in July. However, he has not yet met the country’s president, Vladimir Putin.

The international response to Myanmar’s coup d’état and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a toxic convergence between the two “pariah” nations, Sebastian Strangio concludes in The Diplomat on August 5th.

“A true and loyal friend”

The regime’s foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, devised a working lunch for the Russian launch at the Aureum Palace Hotel, owned by U Teza, the chairman of Htoo Group of Companies, one of the main brokers of arms transactions between the military of Myanmar and Russia.

After the meeting, the regime said “to support both sides in the multilateral arena on mutual trust and understanding.” Wunna Maung Lwin expressed “deep appreciation to the Russian Federation, a true friend of Myanmar, for its consistent support to Myanmar, both bilaterally and multilaterally.”

Afterwards, Lavrov met the regime leader Min Aunging in the presidential residence, which has been renamed the “Office of State Administration Council (SAC)” since last year’s coup. Min Aung Hlaing stated that Russia and Myanmar had established diplomatic relations in 1948 and plan to celebrate their Diamond Jubilee next year.

Lavrov commended Myanmar as a “friendly and long-term partner”, adding that the two countries “have a very solid foundation for building cooperation in a wide range of areas”. Lavrov said the Russian government was in “solidarity in dealing with the situation in the country”. He also wished the State Administrative Committee (SAC) success in the elections it plans to organize in August 2023 in order to officially legitimize the takeover.

Calling Russia a “true and loyal friend” is not wrong. In fact, Russia (along with China) has been loyal in supporting the regime in the UN Security Council. As permanent members of the council, these two key nations have used their veto-right to avoid targeting the Myanmar regime.

However, in his comments, Lavrov, made no mention of the junta’s daily air raids on civilians. After all, these advanced fighter jets and helicopters are Russian-made.

Reporting on the meeting between Lavrov and Min Aung Hlaing, the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar wrote of the two nations’ ambitions to become “permanent friendly countries and permanent allies” who will help each other to “manage their internal affairs without outside interference.”

It may sound cynical, “as Myanmar is looking more like Syria or South Sudan every day”, the meeting between Lavrov and Min Aung Hlaing was more like a handshake of “partners in crime.”

Lavrov left for Cambodia on Wednesday afternoon to attend the meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar’s foreign minister has been banned for failing to implement the April 2021 5-point-consensus plan.

ASEAN Special Envoy Prak Sokhonn, who has made two trips to Myanmar since the coup, tempered expectations for major near-term progress: “I don’t think even Superman can solve the Myanmar problem.”

Russia is the main arms supplier to the junta

To this day, Russia is the major arms supplier to Myanmar’s military. Russia has been accused by human rights groups of selling to the regime many of the weapons it has used to attack civilians since last year’s coup. Moscow has supplied fighter jets, helicopters and air defense systems to Myanmar and it is no secret that regime leaders prefer military equipment from Russia to China.

Moscow has so far seen Naypyitaw primarily as a military and technical partner, with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu leading efforts to position Russia as the main supplier of advanced weapons to Myanmar. Russia has also provided postgraduate education to at least 7,000 Myanmar officers since 2001.

In addition to military ties, Shoigu also sees benefits in securing a highly committed partner where South and Southeast Asia meet, in addition to Russia’s long-standing partnerships with India and Vietnam. Until recently, the two countries’ economic and non-military trade relations have remained modest, but appear to be deepening.

Moscow now also wants to expand diplomatic, economic, trade and security ties with Myanmar. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the junta was one of the first to support the Kremlin. The junta’s spokesman said Russia was still a powerful nation that plays a role in preserving the balance of power for world peace.

In recent months, the two countries have established direct banking and financing channels to support increased bilateral trade, including Myanmar’s purchase of Russian energy products.

Indeed, in the wake of the coup, major oil and gas multinationals – including Total, Chevron, Petronas, Woodside and Eneos – have announced their withdrawal from Myanmar, and the regime is eager to find replacements to develop and exploit new and existing gas fields.

Russia’s Rosneft, which has been conducting limited onshore oil and gas exploration in Myanmar for a decade, said in April 2021 it planned to drill test wells.

A hug or stranglehold?

As an International Crisis Group (ICG) briefing published on Aug. 4 noted, the Myanmar coup and the war between Russia and Ukraine have pushed the two sides into a strong mutual embrace.

Russia has relentlessly supported the junta since it took power; it was one of the few countries to send representatives to the March 2021 Armed Forces Day parade — which coincided with a violent crackdown on anti-coup protesters — and has continued its arms deliveries to Myanmar.

At the same time, the SAC has expressed strong support for Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Even though Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, who has pledged his support to the democratic resistance, has voted in favor of resolutions condemning Moscow’s aggression.

The day after the invasion, a junta spokesman said the invasion was “justified for the permanence of their country’s sovereignty”. As late as July, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing went to Moscow, where he spoke with Russian officials about deeper defense cooperation and possible cooperation on energy projects.

“Faced with tougher international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the two countries are actively exploring ways to strengthen their security and economic ties,” the ICG briefing said. This toxic convergence is inevitable: increasingly isolated from the West, Myanmar’s military regime in Moscow has sought advanced weapon systems and technical training for military officers that may soon be hard-pressed to obtain elsewhere. curb heavy dependence on ‘neighbouring country’ China, which has also chosen to recognize the SAC government.

For Russia, closer relations with Myanmar offer an opportunity to ramp up arms sales, while undermining Western efforts to form a global coalition to counter Russian adventurism in Ukraine. Given their mutually besieged state, the ICG notes, Myanmar and Russia are “likely to ignore the potential long-term downsides of their growing relationship in favor of short-term benefits.”

No way back?

The regime in Myanmar is isolated and faces sanctions and convictions at home and abroad. It has also struggled in the past year to crush the armed resistance. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has also been confronted with Western sanctions and has been conducting a long and costly military campaign there. As both countries become more heavily sanctioned and diplomatically isolated, the importance of their relations with each other has grown.

Min Aung Hlaing has clearly chosen to wreak utter destruction. He has sent government leaders to prisons, including deposed state adviser Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Last month, he ordered the execution of prominent activists, including a lawmaker. There seems to be no turning back for the regime.

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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A child looks after his younger sibling in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military junta is responsible for shocking violence against children caught up in the bloody aftermath of last February’s coup, a top independent Human Rights Council-appointed investigator said in June 2022. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has reported that landmines and unexploded ordnance have maimed or killed children in many regions of the country, with the highest casualty rate in Shan State in northeast Myanmar. Credit: World Bank/Tom Cheatham

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Aug 2 2022 (IPS)

Myanmar has been embroiled in violence and civil unrest since the military ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup in February 2021. The initially widespread peaceful protests were crushed with deadly force by the military and police.

The nonviolent opposition has since turned into armed resistance and the country has slipped into what some UN experts characterize as civil war. More than 1 million people are displaced by the violence, according to the UN.

In the first six months after the Myanmar military coup, civilians have been killed, imprisoned, tortured, disappeared, forcibly displaced and persecuted, as documented in a detailed report by Fortify Rights and the Schell Center for International Human Rights at the Yale Law School. The report argues that these acts amount to crimes against humanity.

Execution by Hanging

The executions of four political prisoners by the illegal military junta in Myanmar have also briefly disturbed some Western media and governments. Even the UN Security Council, including China and Russia, condemned the executions.

The G-7 also followed. They said the executions reflect “contempt” for the Myanmar people’s desire for democracy. These executions of four political prisoners, despite international appeals, set Myanmar back decades, it is said.

The brutal and inhumane nature of the military junta was reaffirmed when the families asked to collect the bodies after the hanging, the junta stated that they were not required by law to release the bodies.

“These horrific acts by a ruthless junta that has shown no qualms about waging war against the Myanmar people to bolster its power. The world community, and all ASEAN members in particular, should view these cold-blooded killings as yet another wake-up call about the true nature of the terror regime that Myanmar’s military is trying to impose on the country,” said Eva Sundari, former member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and board member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).

Through spokesman General Zaw Min Tun, the junta boasted in its response about the junta’s justice system, claiming that the four detainees enjoyed “full rights” and were “allowed to defend themselves in court”.

The question is what this means for the rest of the world — including India, China, Russia and ASEAN — and their involvement with the junta? The seriousness of the situation is compounded by the fact that the Myanmar regime plans to execute 41 additional political prisoners, and given the current situation, Myanmar’s military regime has nothing to lose in the proceedings.

“When the principles of civilized societies are challenged, it is not only an act of resistance to the principles in question, but also a demonstration of contempt for civilization itself,” said Youk Chhang, a survivor of the killing fields of the war under the Khmer Rouge, in the authoritative The Diplomat.

Landmines

Amnesty International has accused Myanmar’s military of committing widespread atrocities in Kayah, in the eastern part of the country. These war crimes are probably crimes against humanity. “The use of landmines by the Myanmar military is abhorrent and cruel.

At a time when the world has overwhelmingly banned these inherently arbitrary weapons, the military has placed them in people’s gardens, homes and even stairwells, as well as around churches,” said Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s deputy director of Crisis Response, in a statement.

Amnesty’s report states that landmines have been deployed in at least 20 villages in Kayah. Earlier this month, the Karenni Human Rights Group also accused military forces of planting landmines in villages and settlements in Kayah state. Villagers whose livelihoods depend on working their fields live in perpetual fear due to the presence of these landmines.

Earlier, UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, reported that landmines and unexploded ordnance have maimed or killed children in many regions of the country, with the highest casualty rate in Shan State in northeast Myanmar.

Beyond the immediate danger, planting landmines could prevent people fleeing violence from returning to their homes and fields, Amnesty International noted. “The military appears to be systematically laying landmines near where it is stationed and in areas from which it is withdrawing.”

Thailand

The Thai government appears increasingly complicit in the deadly reign of terror by the Myanmar junta. On June 30, a plane from Myanmar, identified as a Russian-made MiG-29, violated Thai airspace during a bombing raid in eastern Myanmar. The jet raid led to the evacuation of homes and classrooms in the Phop Phra district in Thailand’s Tak province.

Videos taken from Thai territory and shared on social media show Myanmar jets shelling and bombing villages in Karen state, where deadly fighting rages between junta forces and armies controlled by the ethnic Karen National Union and the anti-coup People’s Defense Forces (PDF). In response, the Thai Air Force dispatched two of its own fighter jets and the Thai embassy in Yangon has reportedly issued a diplomatic warning to the junta.

Commenting on the incident, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said in his typical nonchalant and authoritarian manner that the invasion of Thai sovereignty was “no problem”. The Thai government obviously wants to downplay and cover up the scale of the atrocities and humanitarian disasters unfolding in Myanmar.

Just a day before the Myanmar plane caused Thai schoolchildren to flee in panic, a Royal Thai Army delegation in Naypyidaw was shaking hands and exchanging gifts with Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the genocidal junta. While Thai authorities appear to be promoting ‘business as usual’ with Min Aung Hlaing’s criminal regime, the people of Myanmar and border communities in both countries are paying the price.

The desperate situation for the citizens of Myanmar has been exacerbated by the actions of the Thai authorities. Forced to live in the shadows, unable to gain legal status and faced with dwindling aid and resources, Myanmar refugees in Thailand have reported extortion and arbitrary arrest and detention.

Thai foreign policy towards Myanmar has arguably moved from deliberate blindness to complicity in mass atrocities at this point, https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/thailands-myanmar-policy-is-costing-communities-on-both-sides-of-the-border/ said.

Judgment of the ICC in The Hague

On Friday, July 22, the International Court of Justice ruled definitively that The Gambia has jurisdiction to continue its case against Myanmar for the genocide of the Rohingya. This is the first time a Genocide Convention case has been accepted from a country with no direct connection to the alleged crimes – resulting in a vote against by Chinese judge Xue Hanqin.

She agreed with the junta’s second objection which stated that “the applicant must have some territorial, national or other form of connection with the alleged acts”.

All 16 judges unanimously rejected three of Myanmar’s objections. It is worth noting that while Myanmar is now represented by a junta-led legal team, the objections in question are the same as those filed under the National League for Democracy government in 2020.

So now that the matter has been given the green light, it will probably take a few more years before real progress can be made.

A ‘murder regime’

Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has made Myanmar a murder republic, claims David Scott Mathieson in The Irrawaddy: “The execution of four dissidents was not necessary to know that the regime of the coup leader Supreme General Min Aung Hlaing now falls into the same category as the Iraq of Saddam Hussein or a Latin American dictatorship in the 1980s.

That should have been clear since the day of the coup, given his decade-long massacre during the so-called ‘transition.’ But Min Aung Hlaing’s Myanmar is a new category of repressive military junta: a murder republic.” He hopes that “Min Aung Hlaing and his clique will eventually face trial.

Ideally, it should be more humanistic than how the killers of the SAC (the junta) have treated the people of Myanmar. Stand against a wall in front of a firing squad. That is what tyrants should be afraid of.”

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

IPS UN Bureau

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The crimes of trafficking and aggravated smuggling of persons are of great concern to UNHCR. More than 3,000 people died or went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean and the Atlantic last year, hoping to reach Europe, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said on April 2022, appealing for $163.5 million to assist and protect thousands of refugees and asylum seekers. Credit: IOM 2020/Alexander Bee

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Jul 4 2022 (IPS)

A mass attempt on June 24, 2022, of about 2000 African migrants to scale the border fence between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla left at least 37 people dead.

Several human rights organizations call for an investigation into what ranks as the deadliest day in recent memory along this section of the EU’s only land border with Africa. Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, congratulated the coordinated action of the Spanish Civil Guard and the Moroccan security forces. He blamed the mafias and smugglers for the deaths.

On the other hand, Moussa Faki Mahamat, the head of the African Union Commission, expressed “my deep shock and concern at the violent and degrading treatment of African migrants attempting to cross an international border from Morocco into Spain.”

Also Esteban Beltrán, director of Amnesty International Spain, stated: “It is time to put an end to this policy which allows and encourages serious human rights violations. A ‘business as usual’ approach is no longer valid amid the blood and shame”. It is essential “to understand our double standards and ensure that all refugees have the opportunity – as Ukrainians have had – to escape war and repression by seeking asylum through legal and safe channels”.

Mixed Migration Centre

The Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) is a global network engaged in mixed migration data collection, research, analysis, and policy and program development. Their June 2022 report, entitled “Security costs: How the EU’s exclusionary migration policies place people on the move toward Italy and Greece at greater risk – a quantitative analysis”, puts the migration issues in perspective.

The MMC report clearly documents the main protection risks faced by Asian and African migrants and refugees as they travel to Europe along the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR), the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR) and the Western Balkans Route (WBR).

The report confirms that a ‘securitized approach’—one that often criminalizes refugees and migrants— coupled with a lack of legal and safe mobility pathways is reducing the protection space for people moving along the main migration routes to and through Europe.

Since its inception in 2014 and through early 2021 MMC’s 4Mi survey has conducted more than 75,000 interviews (that’s about 1,000 interviews per month). The refugees and migrants who took part in the surveys feel that their journey to Europe poses serious risks, including detention, physical and sexual violence, robbery, bribery/extortion and even death.

Children are also exposed to similar protection risks, including detention. The three routes each pose their own specific protection risks, but also share common challenges. Militias are most prevalent on the CMR, and ‘state’ actors on the EMR and the WBR, while criminal gangs are frequently reported across all three routes.

Smugglers are a concern among respondents but are rarely considered to be the main perpetrators of abuse. The CMR—and Libya in particular—is more often reported as dangerous. On the EMR and the WBR routes, migrants and refugees often indicate Turkey, Iran, and Greece as locations where protection incidents are more likely to occur.

Refugees and migrants use a number of strategies to mitigate the risks they expect to face, such as traveling in groups and carrying cash. The latter to prevent them from having to work (under lousy exploitative conditions) to pay for their travels, or to buy themselves ‘free’ and avoid other problems.

The EU’s externalization policies have worsened rather than improved the situation.

Opinions on protection risks are in line with what other studies and reports have noted: that abuse, violence and death are common when migrants and refugees travel through the countries where European externalization policies are implemented — most notably Libya, Niger and Mali across the CMR, and Turkey in the EMR.

Against this background, the externalization policies of the EU and its Member States, and their partnerships with authorities in third countries, remain a major concern in terms of their ethical and financial costs and their impact on the protection of people on the move. Only for the EU does this policy seem effective because arrivals in Europe along various migration routes have been reduced.

In fact, however, it is very likely that the current approach increases the protection risks of migrants and refugees. Indeed, studies have confirmed how these measures violate international and human rights standards set for the protection of people on the run.

A case in point is Europe’s ongoing collaboration with the Libyan coast guard to intercept and return large numbers of migrants and refugees to Tripoli, the city most often considered to be dangerous by the migrants, and one that human rights groups and international organizations have often mentioned in connection to severe forms of violence against, and the unlawful detention of migrants and refugees.

A 2021 report by Amnesty International, for example, highlighted that physical violence and other abuses in Libya had shown no indication of diminishing over the past decade.

The awareness of migrants and refugees of the protection risks in the CMR also points to something else: that there is a feeling that such risks are inevitable on these migration journeys to Europe. One explanation could be that increasingly restrictive border controls and the lack of legal routes mean that migrants and refugees seeking to enter Europe have no other options. Greece is a case in point.

Numerous reports and studies have demonstrated how the EU-Turkey Statement and tighter border controls across the WBR have stemmed the flow of people and exposed migrants to considerable protection risks by forcing them to take highly perilous routes.

Also, the widespread tendency to indiscriminately incarcerate migrants entering the country for lengthy periods of time, in line with the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal, as well as the practice of pushbacks by the Greek coast guard might have led migrants and refugees to opt for the more dangerous, yet more available, paths to Europe.

Bangladeshis, for example, for whom it seems “easier” and safer to use the EMR route, have chosen to try the dangerous crossing via the CMR from Libya to Italy. The question is therefore: why do respondents in the survey continue to use certain routes and locations, despite the many known and very real risks?

The tightening of border controls increases the reliance on smugglers to evade border controls, with smugglers decreasing the chances of arrest by employing increasingly dangerous strategies, ultimately increasing the risks to refugees and migrants.

Such strategies include departing on longer and therefore more dangerous sea and desert routes, choosing unsafe embarkation and boarding points and dumping people on ‘boats’ in rough seas.

The findings of this study regarding the most common perpetrators of abuse across the three routes raise questions about the implications of the EU approach to protecting people on the move.

The prominence of militias and armed gangs are the main perpetrators of abuse reported by respondents who have traveled the CMR. In addition, they traverse areas marked by ongoing political instability, conflict and insecurity, and the collapse of the rule of law.

Nevertheless, the role played by militias and gangs in the protection risks faced by migrants and refugees cannot be separated from the EU’s externalization policies or its interaction with local political economies.

Libya and Niger have been systematically engaged by the EU to stem migratory flows and fight migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Local militias have sometimes even become involved in fighting smuggling groups and/or intercepting refugees and migrants at sea and returning them to Libya.

In summary, while it would be simplistic to argue that EU border policy alone creates all the protection risks faced by migrants and refugees, there seems to be a worrying alignment between the perpetrators the migrants fear most and the actors who secured the funding mobilized by the EU for migration management and the fight against people smuggling.

While the data shows that smugglers remain a major concern for people fleeing to Europe, respondents say they are rarely among the most common perpetrators of violence. These findings indicate that an EU approach mainly focused on ‘securitisation’ and the fight against people smuggling – an approach based on the argument that breaking the so-called business model of smuggling would ensure the safety of refugees and migrants by ending making their perilous crossing of the Mediterranean — may not be as effective as portrayed in political and policy circles.

Recommendations

The Center for Mixed Migration calls on policy makers and authorities to improve European migration management policies, in particular the full implementation of the objectives set out in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. The EU and its Member States should:

• Provide detailed and evidence-based analyzes of the impact of EU cooperation with third country partners on both human rights and local economies affected by the implementation of EU externalization measures. These analyzes should be performed on a case-by-case basis for all affected communities in each partner country;

• Support the sharing of information on perpetrators of human rights violations between law enforcement actors at national and international level, including outside Europe, while ensuring that all cooperation is in line with international human rights and refugee law;

• Expanding cooperation with the Government of Turkey to increase its capacity in all provinces to properly implement refugee status and provide international protection, taking into account age-, gender- and diversity-specific vulnerabilities and protection challenges (e.g. Afghans, single women with children and young men);

• All aid that contributes to the interception, return and often detention of refugees and migrants in shutting down Libya, as it is not a safe place. Also ensure that no one is at risk of inhumane and degrading treatment in Libya and support humanitarian programs that respond to the needs of the people;

• Improving the monitoring of deaths along migration routes to Europe by including more details in the data systems on deaths along the route;

• Open new channels of legal entry and strengthen existing ones by granting humanitarian visas, creating humanitarian corridors between transit countries and Europe, expanding Member States’ resettlement programs and facilitating alternative legal routes, such as family reunification, university scholarships and training programmes.

Jan Servaes is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change ( https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8 ) and co-editor of the 2021 Palgrave Handbook of International Communication and Sustainable Development. ( https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030697693)

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By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Jun 15 2022 (IPS)

“The illegal military junta provides further evidence to the international community of its disregard for human rights as it prepares to hang pro-democracy activists,” said Thomas Andrews and Morris Tidball-Binz, UN special rapporteurs in Myanmar for human rights and extrajudicial arbitrary executions, respectively on June 10, 2022.

“These death sentences, handed down by an illegal court of an illegal junta, are a vicious attempt to instill fear in the people of Myanmar.”

While at least 114 people have been sentenced to death (including two minors) since the coup of February 1, 2021, only 73 are actually in custody. The others are on the run or in hiding. The military junta announced last week that it will continue with four executions.

The four individuals were tried and convicted in military tribunals and reportedly had no access to legal assistance during their rejected appeals, in violation of international human rights law.

These are 53-year-old Ko Jimmy, also known as Kyaw Min Yu, the leader of the 88 Generation Student Group that stood up against the regime of former dictator Ne Win, and the ousted 40-year-old NLD MP Phyo Zayar Thaw. Phyo Zayar Thaw, a legislator for the National League for Democracy from 2012 to 2020, made a name for himself as a member of Acid, Myanmar’s first hip-hop band. Acid paved the way for other Myanmar hip-hop artists.

They were sentenced to death in January by a military tribunal along with two other anti-coup opponents on charges of treason and terrorism. The other two men are Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw, who were convicted in April 2021 of killing a junta informant in Hlaing Tharyar municipality.

According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, the military junta will not say where they have been holding Phyo Zayar Thaw and Ko Jimmy since their arrest. Their family fears that they have been severely tortured. If the lynchings continue, they will be Myanmar’s first judicial executions since 1988.

In a June 9 press release in the junta daily Global New Light of Myanmar, the junta defended its decision by stating that it “has every right to exercise all powers and authorities granted by the state constitution”.

Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun stated in two separate interviews with RFA Burmese that appeals against the death sentences have been completed and dismissed. So there is no more chance for leniency and “the execution will be carried out”.

Many foreign governments and organizations have condemned the decision. The spokesman for the UN Secretary-General, Stéphane Dujarric, said he was “deeply disturbed” by the decision and, referring to an article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, called it a “blatant violation of the law on the life, liberty and security of the person”.

“The Secretary-General reiterates his call for respect for people’s rights to freedom of opinion and expression and also to drop all charges against those arrested on charges related to the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and rights,” Dujarric added.

The embassies of France and the United States condemned the announcement, as did the government of national unity NUG. Even Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is this year’s deputy ASEAN chairman, has urged Myanmar’s military government not to carry out the planned executions of the four political prisoners, suggesting the move may further isolate the junta and raise further obstacles to restore peace.

Also Amnesty International called the news about the resumption of executions ‘shocking’. They called on authorities to “immediately” drop the plan and called on the international community to step up intervention efforts.

“The death sentence has become one of many horrific ways in which the Myanmar military is trying to instill fear among those who oppose its rule and would contribute to grave human rights violations, including deadly violence against peaceful protesters and other civilians,” the organisation stated.

The UN also stressed that the imposition of the death penalty took place alongside the military’s extrajudicial killings of civilians, now estimated at nearly 2,000.

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change.

https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

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A demonstration, against Myanmar's military coup, outside the White House in Washington, DC. Credit: Unsplash/Gayatri Malhotra

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Nov 8 2021 (IPS)

Before the February 1 coup, China was among the top international partners of the now-in-opposition National League for Democracy (NLD). From 2015 to early 2020, when China closed its borders due to COVID-19, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi made five trips to China and met the Chinese President Xi Jinping five times.

During one such visit, Xi announced that he would work with the NLD leadership to “jointly create a China-Myanmar community with a shared destiny”. President Xi Jinping himself visited Myanmar in January 2020.

This visit was the first state visit to Myanmar by a Chinese president after a 20-year hiatus, demonstrating the high level of bilateral ties. Xi stated that China “fully supports Myanmar in a development model that meets national conditions”.

Just days after the November 2020 elections, Xi sent a congratulatory message to Aung San Suu Kyi. In the statement, Xi, in his capacity as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), pledged that China would work with San Suu Kyi, particularly in promoting inter-party and inter-government relations.

When tensions between the NLD and Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, escalated in late 2020 and rumors of a coup d’état rose, diplomatic discussions took place behind the scenes. For example, on 12 January 2021, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with army chief Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw.

Wang Yi said: “China will continue to support Myanmar in protecting its sovereignty, national dignity and legitimate rights and interests, support the country in pursuing a development path appropriate to its own national circumstances and Myanmar’s military in playing an appropriate role in and making a positive contribution to the process of transformation and development of the country.”

Min Aung Hlaing replied: “Myanmar is very pleased to witness the increasing international status and influence of China, will remain committed to deepening Myanmar-China friendship and strengthening of all-round cooperation with China, and will continue to support China’s position on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang.”

After the coup, China declined to condemn the coup, while also rejecting any involvement in the coup. It urged all parties in Myanmar to “resolve their differences”.

The UN Country Team in Myanmar remains “deeply concerned over the humanitarian impact” of the country’s ongoing crises stemming largely from the military coup in February, the UN Spokesperson said on October 21. Credit: World Bank/Markus Kostner

However, China immediately reversed contacts with the NLD. A series of letters from the NLD party and the parallel opposition National Unity Government (NUG) went unanswered for months. Only in July, after a congratulatory letter from the NLD to the CPC on the occasion of its 100th anniversary, Beijing finally broke the silence.

However, this did little to change China’s stance with the junta. On the contrary, in the weeks that followed, China expanded working-level ties with the junta’s State Administrative Council (SAC) and invited them to participate in important bilateral and multilateral meetings.

China’s Janus Face

The Chinese government states that “the friendship between China and Myanmar is open to all people in Myanmar”, and claims to maintain strong relations with the NLD. But looking closely at the actions of Chinese stakeholders over the past few months it reveals a rather ambiguous image: a Janus face.

As Chatham House’s Gareth Price puts it, “China may feel that regardless of the outcome, it will remain Myanmar’s most important partner. But that sentiment may be a misjudgment because if the military is forced to withdraw, it could result in a more pronounced anti-China tilt, threatening its strategic interests.”

This begs the fundamental question: What are China’s true intentions regarding the NLD? Jason Tower, Burma country director at the US Institute of Peace (USIP), tries to answer this question in a well-documented article.

Also, the policy letter from Chatham House, — “Who decides China’s foreign policy?” –, challenges conventional wisdom that China functions as a unitary player in its foreign policy-making process. In reality, Beijing’s approach to external issues is the result of intense negotiations between sub-national authorities with a wide range of objectives.

The number of central government agencies, provincial authorities and large state-owned enterprises with influence over the country’s foreign policy has increased as China’s international relations have become more complex.

Economic cooperation

Following China’s decision in early August to work more closely with the junta’s SAC, local and national Chinese officials quickly pushed ahead with initiatives that deepened economic ties. Everything is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Myanmar.

The center of this activity was Lincang City, in China’s Yunnan province, across the border of Myanmar’s Kokang Special Autonomous Zone (SAZ) and home to a huge cross-border industrial zone.

Chinese government documents show that the zone had generated more than $31 billion in investments by the end of 2020. The main selling point for the mainly Chinese investors is the access it provides to the Indian Ocean through the port of Yangon and the planned Kyauk Phyu Deep Sea Port Project in southern Rakhine state.

In late August, Lincang signed an agreement with the junta’s commercial authorities to open the trade route to Yangon, the China-Myanmar New Corridor. It links a new 201-kilometer rail line that starts at Lincang and connects to China’s national rail system with a highway that goes to Myanmar’s largest city, Yangon, and its port.

In September, neighboring Guangxi province followed Lincang’s lead and struck new business deals with the junta through a separate China-ASEAN Expo. The Expo hosted an exhibition of a major China-backed industrial zone in Mandalay and saw the signing of key deals on e-commerce between Chinese companies and junta-affiliated Myanmar companies.

Mutual political support

According to some international observers, China was initially reluctant to fully embrace the junta. Therefore, China made a deal with the United States not to offer Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations (for the time being) to the delegate elected by the generals. Should this be understood as a Chinese concession to the NLD? Not when the representation agreement is read in full; because, after all, it leaves the current representative, an outspoken pro-NLD supporter, effectively muzzled, notes the South China Morning Post.

Other key political developments reinforce the perception that the emerging alliance between China and the SAC goes beyond the economy.

First, just two days after announcing the UN deal between China and the US, China’s foreign ministry stressed the role Myanmar had accepted in August as coordinator for the China-ASEAN relationship.

The statement, which made no mention of the political crisis, also emphasized China’s desire to proceed with the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, clearly reassuring its southern neighbor following the deal with the US at the United Nations.

Second, in early September, the SAC Ministry of Health expressed its support for China in the controversy over the origin of COVID-19. Beijing gave the announcement prominent coverage on state CCTV.

Third, when the UN Human Rights Council met in Geneva in mid-September, Myanmar was one of 40 countries to sign a declaration submitted by China condemning foreign interference justified by “human rights or democracy.” This is especially significant as China has argued since the coup that “Western forces” are behind much of the violence, and has repeatedly expressed the need to “prevent foreign interference in Myanmar.”

As a side note on this last point, it should be said that ‘human rights and democracy’ are under pressure as universal values in many Asian countries. Leaving aside the question of how many ASEAN countries are ‘democratic’, the West, and especially the US, often gets a lot of bang for the buck with references to its own ‘past’.

The reality of party-to-party engagement

The resumption of ties between the CPC and the NLD followed a letter sent by the NLD commemorating the 100th anniversary of the CPC. Subsequently, the CPC invited the NLD’s liaison officer for relations with China, to participate via video link in a seminar for South and Southeast Asian political parties ahead of the China-ASEAN Expo.

While the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was also invited, only the NLD was featured in the video of the event broadcast by Chinese state media. While China is once again more lenient on the NLD, there is no indication of Chinese warmth to the parallel NLD-dominated NUG.

On the contrary, Chinese commentators have argued since the founding of the NUG that Aung San Suu Kyi and the other detained NLD leaders may disagree with the path taken, and question the legitimacy of the NUG on this basis.

The CPC has also warned NLD leaders to avoid revolutionary or destabilizing activities. Instead, it has encouraged the NLD to distance itself from the NUG, especially its September 7 Declaration.

Meanwhile, Chinese state media are repeating the junta’s propaganda about the coup, rejecting all of the NUG’s proposals. For example, a crucial step of the NUG was the annulment of the 2008 constitution, which allowed the military to retain significant powers. Many ethnic armed organizations and civil society figures fully support this NUG position.

However, China’s official position calls for an end to the post-coup violence through a political solution based on that constitution.

Is China playing with fire?

A closer look at China’s position that “the friendship between China and Myanmar is open to all the people of Myanmar” provides additional clues to Beijing’s calculations against the NLD.
Beijing remains concerned about the risks to its strategic investments in Myanmar from growing anti-China sentiment.

Since March, Chinese projects have been targeted by protesters and have caused tens of millions of dollars in damage.

Keeping lines open with the NLD could facilitate China’s relationship with the people of Myanmar, who largely continue to support the party. China is therefore warning the Tatmadaw to refrain from banning the NLD, which would cause a popular reaction and further destabilization.

But China is playing a complicated game. Maneuvering in such a way as to provide the NLD with a layer of legitimacy while ignoring the wider NUG movement by China carries risks. Ethnic armed groups, civil society and political parties collaborating with the NUG were already suspicious of the previous NLD government’s compromises with the military. A shattering of their unity could blow up any successful political settlement.

In sum

Interpreting China’s delicate dance with Myanmar’s dictators is complicated at best. China continues to maintain contacts with both the NLD and the junta. But where the NLD connection does not provide material support, Beijing has since August engaged in economic, diplomatic and humanitarian activities that strengthen and directly benefit ties with the military junta.

The Chatham House policy document and Richard McGregor’s “The Party” seem to confirm this. Far from being a well-orchestrated unit, the formulation and implementation of Chinese foreign policy in Beijing’s power corridors is prone to clashes between central government agencies, provincial-level governments, and large state-owned enterprises, each working for their own greater authority and budgetary power.

“Consensus-seeking remains one of the most common forms of decision-making in the Chinese political system. As China has become a major player on the global stage, foreign policy decision-making now requires more time and expertise than has been necessary in the past… Despite President Xi’s rock-solid approach to party control, the foreign policy decision-making process of China continues to be fluid in nature, opaque in execution and erratic in coordination.”

If China is seriously concerned about its long-term interests in Myanmar, it must radically rethink its approach. The declared policy of friendship between China and Myanmar could be a starting point, but it must recognize that the military is effectively waging a war with its people.

There is no way for China to maintain this friendship with the general public while showering the junta with recognition, aid and new business deals. China must also realize that these deals could ultimately fail if the junta proves incapable of governing the country.

Jan Servaes is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

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Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha (on screen) of Thailand addresses the general debate of the General Assembly’s seventy-fifth session last September. Credit: UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

By Jan Servaes
BRUSSELS, Aug 11 2021 (IPS)

Could the rise of the youth-led ‘Ratsadon’ movement lead to changes in Thai politics?

Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha now faces an ongoing threat as the movement continues to mobilize many, especially young people, against the government. They have broken traditional taboos by opening new conversations about the monarchy and shaping public discourse to question many conservative views in Thai society.

Their main demands are: First, they want the former coup leader and now elected prime minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha, to resign. Second, they want to change the constitution, which was written by a commission appointed by the military during Prayuth’s military rule. Third, they want to reform the monarchy, and Article 112 of the Criminal Code, known as the lese majeste act.

According to Tamara Loos, professor of history and Thai studies at Cornell University, the Ratsadon movement is not just about the monarchy, but rather “a massive cultural shift” away from total submission to the established powers.

Young people question those in positions of power, from state authorities to parents and teachers. Outsiders see parallels with the ‘roaring sixties’ in the US and Western Europe.

Supporters of the Ratsadon group believe that Thailand can change for the better. They want to shake up the social fabric to decentralize power, reduce inequality and create more opportunities for ordinary Thais.

Ratsadon, which means ‘common people’ in the Thai language, is run by young Thais – in their twenties and thirties or even younger. Their logo is the raised three fingers from the Hunger Games. The same symbol used by the opposition in Hong Kong and Myanmar.

Months of street protests and calls for reform were seen as an act of defiance against the old establishment in Thailand. They followed an important political development when the progressive Future Forward Party was disbanded in February 2020.

Founded in 2018, Future Forward became popular among young voters. It took a critical stance against the military, monopolies and the current 2017 constitution, which was written during Prayuth’s military rule.

The Future Forward party came third in the 2019 general election with around 6.3 million votes before being dissolved by the Constitutional Court on February 21, 2020 for violating “election laws” that are still up for debate. Even the US embassy in Bangkok condemned the ban.

Thus, the establishment seems largely intact, thanks to the thick layer of nepotism and corruption ingrained in the Thai system. Prime Minister Prayuth is still in power as opposition calls for the former junta leader to resign went unanswered.

Meanwhile, attempts to amend the constitution as a result of the 2014 coup have also floundered, stalling in a parliament packed with Prayuth’s allies.

The ongoing protests resulted in lawsuits. Nearly 700 protesters have been charged with crimes ranging from causing unrest to sedition. Among them, a record 103 have been accused of the infamous Lese Majesty Law.

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) call for the Thai authorities to end legal prosecution against individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression and to amend article 112 to bring it into line with Thailand’s human rights obligations under the 1966 International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights.

But public pressure on the government is mounting. The recent spate of COVID-19 outbreaks has sparked a new wave of anti-government protests that have seen older political groups return, including some of Prayuth’s former allies.

Only 6% of Thailand’s population of more than 70 million has been fully vaccinated and most of the country including Bangkok is under lockdown with a night-time curfew. Gatherings of more than five people are currently banned.

The Nikkei COVID-19 Recovery Index ranks more than 120 countries and regions on infection management, vaccine rollouts and social mobility at the end of each month. Thailand is listed last in the current listing.

The Prayuth government is feeling the hot breath of popular anger and is trying to find a way out. If we are to believe a leaked government document, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and Health Minister Anutin Charnvirakul want to be exempted from any future prosecution for the fiasco of the COVID-19 campaigns.

On the other hand, others are called in, such as “Captain” Thamanat, the rapidly rising heroin-convicted Secretary-General of the ruling military Palang Pracharath Party who seems to be protected by powerful interests.

What does this mean for the anti-government movement? How will all the groups reconcile their differences and how much of a threat do they pose to the government now?

Political commentator Voranai Vanijaka recounts the differences: Royalists are afraid to support the Move Forward Party and the Progressive Movement to remove General Prayuth, because then the monarchy will also come under attack.

People also don’t want to support Pheu Thai because of the shadow of Thaksin Shinawatra and the history of the red shirts. The Re-solution Movement is trying to put constitutional reform and the junta-appointed 250 senators back at the center of attention.

But, Voranai says, at the moment we seem to be content to release our frustrations on social media. “We post really mean things about General Prayuth with really mean hashtags. Then we post really mean things about each other. We then go to bed convinced that we have done our bit for democracy, especially if we get a lot of ‘like’ clicks and shares.”

“Continue to criticize and condemn the Prayuth regime, it is not only our democratic right, but it is also a democratic duty of the conscientious citizen. But understand that as long as we, the common people, cannot overcome our hatred of each other and cross the barrier, as long as we cannot find a unifying actor/factor, General Prayuth will continue to giggle for at least four, if not more years.”

However, initially peaceful and playful demonstrations have become increasingly grim and violent.

“Thais are tired of seeing the same general (and his cronies) in power amidst continuing economic malaise,” observes Paul Chambers, a political analyst and lecturer at Thailand’s Naresuan University.

“With the voice of the people increasingly silenced in parliament, more people will take to the streets to make their voices heard,” Chambers said. “Repressing them can only be temporary,” he added. “Thai elites will eventually have to make concessions to reformers. The only question is when.”

Jan Servaes was UNESCO-Chair in Communication for Sustainable Social Change at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He taught ‘international communication’ in Australia, Belgium, China, Hong Kong, the US, Netherlands and Thailand, in addition to short-term projects at about 120 universities in 55 countries. He is editor of the 2020 Handbook on Communication for Development and Social Change
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-981-10-7035-8

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau