Trump 2.0 has been marked by the blatantly aggressive exercise of power to secure US interests as defined by him. While many recent trends even predate his first term, his reduced use of ‘soft power’ has exposed his bullying, extortionary use of US power.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The US has illegally weaponised more laws and policies, especially by unilaterally imposing sanctions and tariffs, especially on dissenting regimes.

Often, such threats are not ends in themselves but actually weapons to strengthen the US bargaining position to secure more advantageous deals.

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, members are obliged to extend ‘most favoured nation’ status to all other member nations.

On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced supposedly ‘reciprocal tariffs’, ostensibly responding to others having trade surpluses with the US.

Appealing to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is futile, as the US has blocked the appointment of Appellate Body members since the Obama presidency.

Trump 2.0 has also been trying to get rich investors and governments – mainly from Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich Gulf states – to invest in the US.

Most such investments are in financial markets, rather than the real economy. Such portfolio investments have propped up asset prices, even bubbles.

Trump’s bullying is resented but has not been very effective vis-à-vis strong adversaries. Consequently, allies have been most affected and resentful.

Deepening stagflation
Meanwhile, much of the world economy has never really recovered from the COVID-19 slowdown, while Western sanctions and tariffs have raised production costs, worsening inflation.

Recent trends have also deepened the stagnation since 2009. Many governments and the IMF have made things worse by cutting spending when most needed.

Impacts have varied, generally worse in poorer countries, where the IMF limits policy options and credit rating agencies raise borrowing costs.

US Fed chair Powell’s interest rate hikes, ostensibly to address inflation, also reversed ‘quantitative easing’, which had lowered interest rates from 2009.

Trump’s aggression has reduced economic engagement with the US, inadvertently accelerating de-dollarisation, thus undermining the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’.

Central banks worldwide have responded predictably, refusing to be counter-cyclical in the face of economic slowdown, citing inflationary pressures.

Transactional?
Trump’s transactional approach has meant bilateral, one-on-one dealings, further advantaging the world’s dominant power.

Involving one-time asymmetric ‘zero-sum games’, such transactions ensure the US gains, necessarily at the expense of the ‘other’. Transactionalism also enables ‘buying influence’, or corruption.

The resulting uncertainty reduces investments, not only in the US, but everywhere, due to greater perceived risks, exacerbating the stagnation. Thus, Trump 2.0 policies have reduced investment and growth.

The whole world, including the US, has suffered much ‘collateral damage’, but the White House seems content as long as others lose more.

Unipolar sovereigntism
The transitions to unipolar sovereigntism and then to a multipolar world have been much debated.

Three decades ago, the influential US Council on Foreign Relations’ journal, Foreign Affairs, argued that the post-Cold War unipolar world was actually ‘sovereigntist’.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s ‘Daddy’ reference to Trump suggests that the sovereigntist moment is not quite over, as the US ‘No Kings’ mobilisation suggests.

Trump’s ‘America First’ clearly opposes multilateralism, generating broader concerns. He has withdrawn the US from many, but not all, multilateral bodies.

On January 7, the US withdrew from 66 international organisations deemed “wasteful, ineffective, or harmful”, addressing issues it claimed were “contrary” to national interests.

Trump’s continued, selective use of multilateral bodies has served him well, retaining privileges, e.g., permanent membership of the UN Security Council with veto power.

The UN Security Council’s Gaza ceasefire resolution was used to create and legitimise his Board of Peace, now touted by some as an alternative to the UN!

Trump will not withdraw from the WTO as its Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is key to US tech bros’ trillions from transnational IP.

End of soft power
Some of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 20th remarks at Davos are telling:

“More recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

“You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination… If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”

Besides exercising overwhelming military superiority, Trump 2.0 has increasingly weaponised rules, agreements and economic relations to its advantage.

The abandonment of ‘soft power’ – accelerated by Elon Musk’s DOGE – has ripped the velvet glove off US ‘hegemony’, exposing the mailed fist beneath.

USAID and other US government-funded agencies and programmes have been crucial for soft power, fostering the illusion of domination with consent. Abandoning soft power may well increase the costs of achieving America First.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses recent regressive changes to Argentina’s labour laws with Facundo Merlán Rey, an activist with the Coordination Against Police and Institutional Repression (CORREPI), an organisation that defends workers’ rights and resists state repression.

Facundo Merlán Rey

What does the new law change and why did the government decide to push it through?

Capitalising on its victory in last year’s legislative election, which gave it a majority in both parliamentary chambers, the government pushed through a labour law that introduced changes on several fronts simultaneously.

It increases the daily maximum of working hours from eight to 12, with a weekly cap of 48. Hours worked beyond this limit no longer need to be paid separately, but can be accumulated and exchanged for days off at a later date.

It also introduces the concept of ‘dynamic wage’, allowing part of an employee’s pay to be determined based on merit or individual productivity. The employer can decide this unilaterally with no need for a collective agreement. This would allow two people to be paid differently for doing the same work.

The law creates the Labour Assistance Fund, an account to which the employer contributes three per cent of a worker’s salary, of which between one and 2.5 percentage points come from the worker’s pay. If dismissed, the worker receives the amount accumulated in that fund. This is deeply humiliating. It makes the worker contribute to the financing of their dismissal. Given that these contributions previously went into the pension system, the effect will also be to weaken pensions.

The law restricts the right to strike by expanding the list of occupations deemed essential, which means they are required to maintain at least 75 per cent of their operations during a strike. Previously, this category included air traffic control, electricity, gas, healthcare and water. Now it also includes customs, education at all levels except university, immigration, ports and telecommunications. In practice, this means that in these fields a strike will have a much more limited impact.

Finally, the law repeals the special regimes that regulated working conditions in some trades and professions. Over the next six months, hairdressers, private drivers, radio and telegraph operators and travelling salespeople will lose these protections. The Journalists’ Statute will be abolished from 2027 onwards.

At CORREPI, we believe all these measures are unconstitutional, as they directly contravene article 14 of the constitution, which guarantees the right to work and the right to decent living conditions. The changes put employers in a position of almost absolute dominance in an employment relationship, leaving workers with no real scope to defend their rights.

How have trade unions and social organisations reacted?

The most militant groups highlighted the problems with the new law clearly, but the response from the organised labour movement has been insufficient.

Union leaders responded with a belated and low-profile campaign plan. They have long been criticised for preferring discreet agreements to open confrontation, and this time was no different. They negotiated behind the scenes and secured concessions to protect themselves. The law maintains employers’ contributions to trade union health schemes and the union dues paid by workers for two years. The rights of workers as a whole were sidelined.

What impact are the changes having?

Although the law is already in force, its full implementation faces obstacles, partly because it has internal consistency issues that hinder its practical application. When the government attempts to apply it in employment areas that still retain rights, it will likely face legal challenges, which will increase social unrest.

Even so, some of its effects are already being felt. Unemployment is rising slowly but steadily. Factory closures, driven by the opening up of imports and the greater ease of dismissal, are pushing more workers into informal employment and multiple jobs. The result is a fall in consumption and a level of strain with outcomes that are difficult to predict.

The consequences extend beyond the economic sphere. Increasingly demanding working conditions, combined with high inflation and rising household debt, are taking a toll on workers’ mental health. Regrettably, there is already a worrying rise in the suicide rate.

There’s also a consequence that is harder to measure: this reform erodes the collective identity of workers. When work is informal, individuals tend to solve their problems on their own, making it much harder to organise to demand better conditions. In working-class neighbourhoods, drug trafficking is becoming established as an alternative source of employment, generating situations of violence that largely go unnoticed. Unfortunately, everything points to an ever-deepening social breakdown.

What lessons does this experience hold for the rest of the region?

Regional experience shows it is very difficult to reverse this kind of change. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva came to power in 2022 promising to repeal the labour law passed in 2017 under Michel Temer’s government, similarly opposed by social organisations and trade unions. However, he failed to do so, and the framework Temer left remains in force. Once passed, these laws tend to remain in place regardless of who governs next.

That’s why what’s happening in Argentina should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. The reform appears to be part of a broader direction that regional politics is taking under the influence of the USA, one of the main drivers of these changes and a supporter of the governments implementing them.

The weakening of labour rights and collective organising is not a side effect; it is the objective being pursued. Dismantling workers’ ability to organise collectively facilitates the advance of extractive and financial interests and guarantees access to cheap labour. In that sense, Argentina offers a warning to the rest of the region.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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‘Milei managed to capture social unrest and channel it through a disruptive political proposal’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Carlos Gervasoni 13.Dec.2025
‘Society must prepare to act collectively to defend rights and democracy’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Natalia Gherardi 27.Feb.2025
‘The state is abandoning its role as guarantor of access to rights’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Vanina Escales and Manuel Tufró 22.Jul.2024

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Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate from the least developed country (LDC) status in November this year after more than half a century. Bangladesh joined the UN club of LDCs in 1975 and consistently met all three graduation criteria – per capita Gross National Income (GNI), human asset and economic vulnerability – since 2018.

Anis Chowdhury

RMG’s dominance and failure to diversify

Bangladesh is indeed a leading, often the highest, user of Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) facilities among LDCs, largely driving its RMG sector growth through the European Union (EU)’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. This reliance on preferential access has made Bangladesh a dominant exporter among LDCs.

However, the RMG sector’s dominance also made Bangladesh highly vulnerable. In the late 1970s when the RMG sector started its journey, it accounted for less than 5% of Bangladesh’s total exports. By the end of the 1990s, this proportion had reached about three-fourths. After more than four decades, since 2013, it has been hovering between 80-85%, according to the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).

Bangladesh’s heavy reliance on a single export item makes its export basket one of the least diversified among the global economies. This is starkly different from South Korea, a country from which Bangladesh received technical assistance to usher in its RMG sector. South Korea’s textile industry accounted for 33.3% of exports in 1970; it declined to 22.6% within two decades in 1990 as the economy diversified. By 1975 South Korea became a major exporter of electrical machinery and appliances, transport equipment and various other manufacturing products.

Bangladesh’s vulnerability does not arise only from its export product concentration. Bangladesh’s export market is also not diversified with close to 60% going to the EU and UK with apparel comprising more than 90%. The USA, which does not provide any LDC related preferential market access, accounts for about 16% Bangladesh’s exports.

Here, too, Bangladesh’s experience differs from that of South Korea. With the diversification of the economy, South Korea’s exports by destination also became less concentrated. For example, while around 63% of South Korea’s export went to Japan alone in 1960, the combined market share of Japan and the USA fell to around 56% by 1975.

The South Korean State’s autonomy from groups with a vested interest is well documented. Thus, its policies were driven by broader national interest. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s policy space has been captured by the RMG sector.

Undoubtedly, the preferential treatment by the state helped the RMG sector expand rapidly; but at the high cost of failure to diversify. Professor Munir Quddus of Prairie View A&M University and President, Bangladesh Development Initiative (BDI) compared the RMG sector’s support environment with Leather exports to demonstrate the RMG sector’s state capture. His findings, summarized below, are revealing:

The usual justification for such preferential treatment is that RMG is the “largest export sector and foreign exchange earner”. But the argument is perverse. Given some of these subsidies have been in existence for nearly 50 years, prudent policymaking demands that it is high time to redirect scarce resources to support other potentially dynamic export sectors.

Being used to state support, the RMG sector ignored the need for raising productivity. The sector’s average labour productivity is lower than Bangladesh’s competitor countries except Cambodia. The sector’s compliance with the environmental and labour standards has also come under scrutiny. However, it seems by becoming too big through state support, the sector’s demand cannot be ignored.

The cosy relationship between the RMG sector leaders and the fallen kleptocratic regime is well-known. The regime allowed them to flourish through loan defaults and state subsidies and in return the business leaders were cheering on the fascist regime hoping to see its continuation. Understandably, they were fearful that they might not enjoy the same crony relationship with the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus; thus, they cried foul and campaigned for a postponement of LDC graduation.

LDC graduation as structural transformation

The Interim Government accepted the White Paper’s recommendation and viewed the LDC graduation momentum as an opportunity to accelerate structural transformation of the economy. Despite bureaucratic inertia, it did succeed in improving business environment, such as significant reductions in times to obtain business licenses/certificates/permits, simplifications of customs procedures and fast-tracked implementation of national logistic and national tariff policies. It also identified the bottlenecks for potential sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, leather & footwear, electronics, light engineering and fishing & agro-based industries and took measures to remove or ease them.

No doubt a lot still needs to be done as part of an ongoing process of reform and policy adjustment. But that cannot be used as a justification to request a delay on the basis that the preparation is inadequate, particularly when Bangladesh’s macroeconomic performance is far better than the most LDCs, including Nepal and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the two countries scheduled to graduate along with Bangladesh.

Thanks to the macroeconomic management of the Interim Government which succeeded in preventing a total collapse of the economy; it restored discipline in the financial and banking sector, rebuilt the country’s foreign exchange reserves, stabilized the exchange rate and earned the confidence of international financial leaders to re-open trade financing and maintain foreign investment inflows. It earned the diaspora community’s confidence resulting in increased remittances. The Interim Government concluded Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan in record time, ensuring duty-free market access for 99.9% of its products. It also initiated EPA talks with other major trade partners, including the EU.

Graduation delay: Bad signal for LDCs and win for vested interest

The UN-DESA uses three criteria for LDCs – GNI per capita, human asset index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index (EVI). Its evaluation in February 2025 shows that Bangladesh is in a much better position than Nepal and Lao PDR in terms of GNI per capita and EVI. Bangladesh with higher GNI per capita is economically less vulnerable than Nepal and Lao PDR, both of which suffer from additional disadvantages of landlockedness.

Bangladesh’s economy is projected to grow at a faster rate (around 5.0%–5.1% in FY 2005-26 and 5.7% in FY 2026-27 according to the ADB) than both Nepal and Lao PDR despite slightly elevated inflation rates. Bangladesh also performs better in logistics, ranked 88th out of 139 countries by the World Bank compared to Nepal’s rank of 114th and Lao PDR’s 115th. Bangladesh also has better productive capacity according to the UNCTAD’s productive capacity index.

Bangladesh will continue to enjoy DFQF market access for three more years after its graduation as endorsed by the WTO. Australia and Canada indicated extended periods of DFQF access until at least 2034. The UK will allow 92% Bangladesh products duty-free access after 2029. Therefore, a delay for a better performing Bangladesh will be a bad signal for the LDCs aspiring to graduate from LDC status.

It will also mean a win for the vested interest groups and stalling of the momentum towards accelerated structural transformation. The state capture by the RMG sector has already become clear; a highly professional and successful central bank governor has been replaced with a failed (loan defaulter) garment sector businessperson with no background in banking or international macroeconomics. The Transparency International Bangladesh views “such a decision risks turning the central bank once again into an instrument of business lobbies dependent on defaulted loans and political connections, rather than safeguarding national interest, as was the case during the authoritarian kleptocratic regime”.

Bangladesh will be better off spending its diplomatic efforts to secure GSP+ facilities in the EU and EPA with its trading partners instead of lobbying for a LDC graduation delay. It should worry more about EU’s new, stricter and mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations. Whereas ESG failure may cost Bangladesh 30% of EU exports, strict compliance can function as powerful catalysts for production upgrading and accelerating structural transformation while achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Mamunur Rashid/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.

The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.

The uprising

The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.

The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.

On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.

Reforms in the balance

Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.

But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.

The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.

A dynasty returns

The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.

The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.

The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.

Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Interim Head of MONUSCO, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

In the month following the reopening of the Burundi-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has deteriorated considerably, recently marked by an influx of Congolese refugees returning home, where they face overcrowded conditions and a severe shortage of essential services. This comes in the midst of escalating clashes between rebel groups AFC and M23, and forces affiliated with the Kinshasa government, with drone strikes causing widespread destruction and pushing violence closer to Burundi’s borders, where conditions are most dire.

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), described the current humanitarian situation as “extremely volatile”. During a press stakeout on March 26, she highlighted that the rapid spread of the conflict from North and South Kivu into Tshopo Province and toward Burundi’s borders is a major concern, warning that it increases the risk of a broader “regional conflagration.”

Van de Perre also warned that armed militants have been increasingly relying on the use of heavy weapons and drone strikes in densely populated urban areas, which have caused great damage to civilian infrastructure as well as serious risks to civilian safety, underscoring recent violent incidents at the Kisagani Bangoka International Airport and in Goma, the largest city in North Kivu. Additionally, she warned of M23’s growing presence in Goma, where the coalition has managed to gain influence, undermine state authority, and disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries.

Furthermore, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC (UNJHRO) has uncovered a considerable rise in human rights violations committed by armed groups. Since December 2025, approximately 173 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented, affecting at least 111 victims, the majority of whom were women and girls.

Van de Perre described these findings as “only the tip of the iceberg,” and highlighted growing rates of exploitation, particularly along artisanal mining sites, where child labour is especially pronounced. Armed groups have also been alleged to hamper monitoring, investigation, and justice mechanisms, and subject human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors to intimidation and arbitrary detention.

This follows a sharp escalation of hostilities between the armed groups in December 2025, which forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese to flee to Burundi, most coming from Uvira in South Kivu Province and the surrounding areas. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) show that after M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and a relative return of stability, more than 33,000 refugees began returning home since the border’s reopening on February 23, with most crossing through the Kavimira border point. Many of these returnees already received little humanitarian assistance in Burundi due to chronic underfunding.

“Conditions in many areas of return in the DRC remain fragile, with acute humanitarian needs,” said Ali Mahamat, UNHCR Head of Sub-Office in Goma, DRC, on March 24 at a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. “Initial UNHCR assessments in Uvira and Fizi show families arriving with few belongings, in urgent need of shelter, basic household items, health care, and access to water and sanitation. Many returned to find their homes destroyed and belongings looted, leaving them in deep despair and unable to resume normal life without substantial support.”

According to the latest updates from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), roughly 60 percent of returnees are living in damaged shelters and over 30 percent face challenges accessing their land. Returnees face heightened risks of gender-based violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, extortion, and exploitation, with female-headed households disproportionately affected due to limited livelihood opportunities for women, which leave these communities entrenched in poverty and especially vulnerable.

Figures from UNHCR show that approximately 30 percent of returnees had been taking refuge in Burundi’s Busama displacement camp, where they faced significant levels of overcrowding and limited access to clean water, sanitation services, healthcare, and shelter. Currently, roughly 4,500 Congolese refugees remain stuck at transit points as they await being relocated to Busama. Additionally, Burundi continues to host over 109,000 Congolese refugees, with 67,000 of them in Busuma alone.

Additionally, internal displacement remains widespread in the DRC, with more than 6.4 million people currently displaced. IFRC estimates that over 5.2 million internally displaced Congolese are concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, 96 percent as a result of ongoing armed violence. According to van de Perre, over 26.6 million people, roughly a quarter of DRC’s population, are projected to face food insecurity this year.

Currently, UNHCR’s response plan to assist returnees, refugees, and displaced Congolese civilians is only 34 percent funded, seeking a total of USD 145 million. MONUSCO is currently on the frontlines providing protection services for nearly 3,000 civilians in Djaiba village. Through the mission, the UN has been able to support over 18,000 farmers in harvesting and transporting crops and has conducted 204 patrols. Van de Perre stressed that stronger governance and security enforcement are crucial in protecting vulnerable civilians, and disarmament and repatriation efforts must be conducted to resolve broader regional tensions.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses Portugal’s presidential runoff election and the rise of the far-right Chega (Enough) party with Jonni Lopes, Executive Director of Academia Cidadã (Citizen Academy) and a Steering Committee member of the European Civic Forum, an organisation working on civic engagement, democratic participation and the protection of civic space at national, regional and international levels.

Jonni Lopes

Why did centre-right voters back a Socialist candidate?

Despite not agreeing with his politics, centre-right voters backed a Socialist candidate to build a firewall around the presidency, recognising that the office demands deliberation, predictability and respect for democratic rules, none of which Chega represents. Seguro’s campaign made this possible. He distanced himself from party politics, avoided turning the race into a debate about the Socialist Party and positioned himself as a stable figure capable of providing institutional continuity during a political crisis.

This was practical risk management, not ideology. The centre-right Social Democratic Party is pushing labour law changes that triggered a joint general strike in December, with over three million workers participating. With Chega already holding significant parliamentary power, voters feared that a far-right president would go further still, using veto powers not to check the government’s agenda, but to entrench it and block any legislation protecting workers’ rights.

This coalition shows that a clear boundary against the far right still exists, at least when it comes to leading the state. It’s a defensive pact: democrats can disagree on policy, but there’s a line when it comes to handing power to a reactionary force that threatens democratic institutions.

What does the result mean for Portugal and Europe?

For Portugal, this result is a temporary reprieve for democracy. Seguro won two-thirds of the second-round vote and over 3.5 million votes, the most ever cast for a presidential candidate in Portugal, despite storms that disrupted voting. This shows that, faced with a genuine far-right threat, Portuguese democracy can still mobilise broadly to defend itself.

But this wasn’t a clear victory against the far right. Ventura won one-third of the vote, strengthened his base and positioned himself as a serious contender for right-wing leadership. In just a few years, Chega has gone from a fringe party to parliament’s second largest.

This sends a mixed message to Europe: broad democratic coalitions can still prevent far-right candidates reaching the top office, but the far right is now mainstream, shapes political agendas and forces other parties to constantly define themselves in relation to it. This is the new normal. This matters particularly for the European Commission, as far-right movements are structural threats and the only response is to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Where does Chega go from here?

Ventura lost the presidential election, but Chega has emerged stronger. Winning a third of the vote against a candidate backed by the entire democratic spectrum cements its position. Ventura can now claim to speak for a significant portion of the right, and his loss only strengthens that claim, as he can frame the firewall as evidence that the political system is rigged against him, feeding narratives of elite persecution. He will also use his parliamentary strength to extract concessions by supporting or blocking the government’s budget and pushing on immigration and security, winning enough policy gains to show he delivers for his voters.

Ventura has already said that support for stability ‘has limits’. If the government hits serious problems, such as a budget crisis or a political deadlock, Chega will position itself as the only force willing to break the impasse and ‘fix things’. He’s not treating the presidential loss as the end of his political project but as a stepping stone to bigger gains in future elections. His calculation is that electoral legitimacy can eventually become governmental power.

What does this mean for civic space and civil society?

Portugal’s civic space is shrinking. Hate speech is becoming normalised, immigration rules are tightening, government administration is becoming more exclusionary, protest organisers face police intimidation and civil society organisations are struggling financially. These create real barriers to people exercising their rights. Chega’s rise and its racist and xenophobic rhetoric now heard in parliament raise the risk that discrimination and violence against migrants will become politically acceptable.

A president committed to rights protection can set limits: vetoing discriminatory laws, refusing to suppress information the public needs and protecting communities and organisations under attack. The presidency alone cannot reverse the shrinking of civic space, but it can prevent the government from fully institutionalising a far-right agenda.

Human rights organisations, labour movements and migrant groups see this moment as an opportunity to strengthen protections, not a final victory. Turnout held strong despite devastating storms and emergency conditions, evidence that people were genuinely mobilised by the threat, particularly urban voters connected to civil society, including unions, who had already fought the government over labour rights. The organisations that coordinated the strike now expect the president to use his powers to defend rights.

How should Seguro use his presidential powers?

Seguro has been clear he won’t be the reason parliament is dissolved, and has committed to working with the government while demanding ‘solutions and results’. This means dissolution of parliament will be a last resort in a genuine crisis, not a tactical move to tackle normal political disagreements. He will use his veto power to block laws he thinks violate the constitution and rights and mediate between the government and opposition to push them towards compromise.

The challenge will be to keep the democratic parties, both government and opposition, at the centre while Chega tries to dictate the agenda. If Seguro dissolves parliament too quickly or without a strong reason, he’ll just fuel Chega’s narrative that the system is broken. If he’s too passive and doesn’t use his veto when rights are threatened, he’ll look complicit in democratic erosion. Both scenarios would help Chega: either the system looks incapable of functioning, or it looks unwilling to defend people’s rights.

Seguro will have to walk a very fine line between doing too much and doing too little, while a far-right opposition waits to exploit whatever mistakes he makes. If he gets it wrong, his historic electoral victory will give way to deeper crisis rather than democratic renewal.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Portugal’s far-right surge CIVICUS Lens 30.May.2025
‘Civil society must engage to prevent discussions devolving into demagoguery’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jorge Máximo 28.May.2025
‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Ana Carmo 19.Feb.2024

 
CIVICUS discusses Nepal’s upcoming election with youth activist Anusha Khanal of the Gen Z Movement Alliance, a youth-led civil society coalition mobilising for democratic accountability and governance reform in Nepal.

Anusha Khanal

What triggered the Gen Z protests, and how did the state respond?

The immediate trigger was the government revealing its authoritarian tendencies by banning 26 popular social media platforms. This happened during the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people exposed the wealth of politicians’ families, contrasting with widespread economic desperation. Inflation was high and unemployment among young people stood at around 23 per cent, and there were no pathways for change within existing political structures. But this wasn’t just about jobs. Young people demanded accountability for decades of corruption, poor governance, service delivery failures and a political system completely disconnected from our realities. The leaders of three parties had rotated in power for years without delivering anything meaningful. We mobilised because we had nothing to lose.

The response was brutal. On the first day of protests, police killed several young people. The government refused to show any responsibility, instead seeking to frame the movement as violent and deny it any legitimacy. It criminalised youth anger instead of listening to it. The choice to emphasise property damage over deaths when some buildings were burned and vandalised told us everything about where their priorities lay. The government showed it did not care about young people.

But repression didn’t stop the movement; it accelerated it. Thousands more young people mobilised, and eventually the pressure became impossible to ignore. Oli’s resignation was a forced concession. But it exposed something important: the political system only moves when threatened directly. That’s a lesson we’re carrying into these elections.

How did civil society organisations engage with the movement?

Young people created the movement, not civil society organisations. Once it started, we received a lot of support from wider civil society. It became a people’s movement, with people of all ages taking part, in person and in spirit. Many civil society groups made a conscious choice to support it, document what was happening, share knowledge, help shape narratives, amplify demands and help exert pressure to translate grassroots anger into political demands. We pushed for accountability, investigations into the killings, protection for protesters and systemic reforms around corruption and governance. We insisted that any negotiation include young people at the table, as stakeholders in decision-making.

A major win was a 10-point agreement with the interim government that included commitments to address corruption, improve governance, ensure youth participation in decision-making and move towards more inclusive democracy. We also pushed for the establishment of the Gen Z Council, a body designed to hold government accountable, monitor implementation of reforms and bridge the gap between the state and young people.

But we’ve been realistic about what civil society can and cannot do. We can organise, advocate, document and monitor. We cannot force a government to implement reforms if the bureaucracy resists or political will collapses after elections. That’s why we’re now focused on maintaining pressure and building systems that make it harder for future governments to ignore youth demands.

How have election candidates addressed the movement’s demands?

Anti-corruption and good governance have become dominant themes across party manifestos. All parties are talking about digital governance, e-governance, going cashless and paperless. Some are promising to establish commissions to investigate past corruption or audit public officials’ assets going back decades. Others focus on timecard systems for service delivery, budget transparency and digitisation of transactions. It’s just that corruption is so visible that ignoring it would be political suicide.

The problem is that most parties are vague on implementation. They describe the what but not the how. There are also ideological differences, but most parties are talking about systemic reform and public-private partnerships.

Across the board, parties are responding to the movement’s anti-corruption demand because they have to. The question is whether these commitments are genuine or just campaign rhetoric.

Why are women and excluded groups still so underrepresented among candidates?

Campaign financing is a massive problem. The government sets spending limits, but everyone knows that’s not what happens on the ground. To run a serious campaign with widespread reach, you need sponsorship from wealthy backers or business interests. If you’re a woman earning a minimum wage, you simply cannot compete against candidates funded by millionaires. There is no public financing system, no state support for candidates from marginalised backgrounds. The economic system excludes most women and poor people before we even get to party selection processes.

Safety is another critical issue that doesn’t get enough attention. Digital violence against women running for office is rampant. Women and queer candidates face abuse, harassment and threats online and offline. When we encourage female and queer colleagues to run, the response is often hesitancy, due to the lack of support and because we haven’t created safe enough spaces for them to participate in politics. Although the constitution guarantees women 33 per cent representation, the reality on the ground is completely different.

Then there’s the distribution of candidacy slots within parties, which is opaque and controlled by party leaders. Even after public pressure, many parties failed to meet the female quota in direct candidacies. Some did better in proportional representation slots, but even there, they selected women who are mostly well-connected and wealthy. The movement emphasised inclusion, but we’ve regressed when it comes to candidate selection.

What obstacles stand in the way of reform?

The first challenge is that we’re almost certainly heading towards a coalition government, which means compromise on every issue. When multiple parties have to negotiate and share power, reform agendas get watered down. Parties will prioritise holding their coalition together over pushing through the anti-corruption and governance reforms they promised. We’ve seen this pattern before. What isn’t clear yet is what kind of coalition will result and what compromises will be made.

The second challenge is the bureaucracy. Nepal’s bureaucracy can be notoriously resistant to change, transparency and accountability. A reform can pass parliament and still die in implementation because mid-level bureaucrats refuse to change how they work. Even though the law to establish the Gen Z Council has been passed, it hasn’t been formed yet. We can identify problems, document failures and advocate loudly, but we cannot force a government to act. If the bureaucracy decides to drag its feet, we have limited leverage. Structural incentives favour the status quo, and that’s before we even consider whether individual politicians will prioritise reforms over personal interests or patronage networks.

But we’re not giving up. Civil society’s role now is to maintain constant pressure, document what does and doesn’t get implemented and call attention when governments fail to keep their promises. The Gen Z Council gives us a formal mechanism to do this, and we can also raise our voices independently of it. We need to build broader coalitions, keep the movement’s demands visible in public discourse and make clear that if a government fails to deliver, there will be consequences. Real change is slow and difficult — but it’s possible if civil society stays organised and vigilant and doesn’t compromise on core demands.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Nepal’s Gen Z uprising: time for youth-led change CIVICUS Lens 10.Oct.2025
‘The government was corrupt and willing to kill its own people to stay in power’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikpal Khatri Chhetri 02.Oct.2025
‘The Social Network Bill is part of a broader strategy to tighten control over digital communication’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikshya Khadgi 28.Feb.2025

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Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons

By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

 
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.

Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.

A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan

In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.

Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.

Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.

The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty

Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.

In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.

At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.

A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads

Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”

The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.

Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.

Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.

Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos

Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, speaks to talibés in Saint-Louis, Senegal, at the opening ceremony of the organisation's centre on Jan. 1, 2026. Courtesy: Ramata Haidara

By Megan Fahrney
SAINT-LOUIS, Senegal, Feb 27 2026 (IPS)

When you walk through the streets of Senegal’s cities, you notice them almost immediately: young boys in worn clothes, clutching plastic cans or tin bowls, weaving between cars and pedestrians to ask for spare change or food. They are often barefoot, alone and hungry. These children are known as talibés.

Boys aged approximately 5-15, known as talibé children, reside in daaras, schools run by marabouts.

Human Rights Watch says many marabouts, “who serve as de facto guardians, conscientiously carry out the important tradition of providing young boys with a religious and moral education.”

However, many of the schools are unregulated.

“However, thousands of so-called teachers use religious education as a cover for economic exploitation of the children in their charge, with no fear of being investigated or prosecuted,” the report says. The talibés from these ‘schools’ spend much of their days begging for food on the streets and suffering a range of human rights abuses. They regularly experience beatings, inadequate food and medical care, and neglect.

Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, is striving to change the narrative. Ba created the organisation Maison des Talibés (“House of Talibés”) three years ago in Saint-Louis, Senegal, with the goal of empowering talibés, improving their living conditions, and teaching them skills to help them succeed in young adulthood.

“I want to improve talibés’ lives,” Ba said. “I’m trying to help them in the future when they grow up [to be] self-sufficient.”

Ba himself was a talibé as a child. A Senegal native, Ba was sent away to Daara at the age of seven in a city called Sokone. He said he remained there for eight years, enduring very tough conditions and was not fed by his marabout.

Once Ba aged out of the daara, he moved to Dakar and later Saint-Louis to be a marabout.

While in Saint-Louis, Ba began to devote his time to French and English study. He got involved with an international organisation that supported talibés but found their approach of simply donating food to the talibés was not going to cut it. Ba knew he needed to equip the children with skills to succeed in young adulthood after leaving the daara.

“They have one way out, which is becoming a marabout,” Ba said. “I don’t want them basically to have one choice, which is a Quranic teacher. I want them to have different choices, different options, [to become] whatever they want.”

Maison des Talibés began as a true grassroots effort. Ba formed relationships with local marabouts, gaining their trust and allowing him to enter the daaras to provide the talibés services. He reached out to his friend, Abib Fall, a doctor in the area, who agreed to provide medical care to talibés in his free time. Ba himself began teaching the children English, providing food and rehabilitating the daaras.

“It’s very fundamental to have a connection with the marabouts; otherwise, you cannot do this work,” Ba said. “I speak the language that they speak, so they listen to me more … I’m a former talibé, so I know them very well.”

Equipped with English language skills, Ba expanded the organisation by speaking with international visitors and businesses in Saint-Louis to request financial support and recruit volunteers.

“The objective is education and handcraft,” Ba said. “I know that if they have the education and the handcraft, they will be like me or better.”

“I know how you get them there, because I went through that and I experienced it,” Ba said.

A 2019 report by Human Rights Watch documented 16 talibé deaths from abuse and neglect and dozens of cases of beatings, neglect, sexual abuse and the chaining and imprisonment in daaras. An estimated 50,000 young boys live as talibés across Senegal, as of 2017.

Though families often send their children to live in daaras voluntarily, the system is widely considered to be trafficking. Many talibés in Senegal come from impoverished communities in Guinea-Bissau and other neighbouring countries.

Over the years, the daara system has evolved from what it once was. Historically, talibés resided predominantly in rural environments, where they worked on farms in exchange for food or received donations from villagers. With urbanisation, the system has transformed into exploitation and begging.

Ramata Haidara, an American Fulbright fellow in Saint-Louis, met Ba outside of a museum in the city. After learning about Maison des Talibés, Haidara immediately got involved as a volunteer English teacher.

Haidara said she has witnessed her students’ confidence grow over time.

“[We] show them that you deserve to have resources and an education and people who are kind to you,” Haidara said.

On January 1, 2026, Maison des Talibés unveiled its first physical building to support talibés by giving them a safe space outside of the daara to learn skills, attend classes, eat, shower and receive medical care.

The centre’s opening ceremony drew over 100 talibés. Ba said the organisation serves many more than that in total, and that he hopes to expand its reach in the future.

Cheikh Tidiane Diallo, a perfume and soap maker living in Morocco, was one of Maison des Talibés’ first students. Diallo said he credits Ba and the organisation with giving him the skills and connections to move to Morocco and pursue his career.

“He has a good heart,” Diallo said of Ba. “He has never given up. I really appreciate that passion from him.”

Ba said he sees his younger self in the talibés he serves and is inspired by them just as they are inspired by him.

“This is a place where they can laugh, a place where they can eat, a place where they can feel okay,” Ba said. “This is our home.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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As US President Donald Trump pushes the world to war, arms spending has been rising worldwide. Wars secure more budgetary allocations, mainly benefiting the US-dominated military-industrial complex.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

In 2024, the US accounted for over 36% of the world’s military spending of $2.7 trillion! This exceeded the total expenditure of the next nine biggest spenders – China, Russia, Germany, India, UK, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, France, and Japan!

China’s military budget for 2025 was $250-300 billion. Most others are US allies who have pledged to increase war spending from under 2% of GDP to 5%!

The US and its allies will be even further ahead despite pushing friends and foes to spend more. Fortune magazine projects that US spending will exceed that of the next 35 highest-spending countries combined!

Despite its huge economic costs, the hike is being justified as helping to achieve ‘peace through strength’. After all, bombing ten nations in Trump 2.0’s first year did not incur any significant American military casualties.

Borrowing for war
Early this year, Dean Baker warned that President Trump was planning to increase annual military spending by $600 billion. Just under 2% of GDP, the spending increase would be massive.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

As Trump is more committed to cutting taxes than the US federal public debt, the “$600 billion increase in annual taxes would come to $6 trillion, roughly $45,000 per household” over the next decade.

The independent Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget projects federal debt for military spending will increase by $5.8 trillion over the next decade!

Trump has long promised to cut US public debt, which is already equivalent to 120% of annual output, and not to increase the deficit! But this would require massive tax increases, impossible to raise with tariffs alone.

Worse, federal government debt, which Trump promised to cut, will rise. Meanwhile, 94% of his Big Beautiful Bill (BBB) tax cuts benefit the top 60%, with only 1% trickling down to the poorest fifth.

The top fifth nominally gets 69%, but only the top 5% will actually pay less! The bottom 95% will pay more tax, with low-income households paying relatively more for tariffs!

Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, was supposed to cut federal government fraud, waste, and debt, but instead cut US growth in 2025’s last quarter.

While the BBB cut $186 billion of food aid for poorer Americans, rising war spending will mainly benefit US military-industrial complex cronies.

US consumers will pay more
Increased tariff rates would have to be impossibly high. And these would need to be even higher if exemptions are granted. Imports would fall sharply with such high tariffs.

Trump claimed additional tariff revenue would cover half a trillion dollars of additional military spending. He has long claimed other countries pay for tariffs.

With deindustrialisation over the past half-century, consumers have been buying more imports, paying for most tariff revenue.

Imports would fall sharply with such high tariffs. As many imports are intermediate goods used in manufacturing, high tariffs would hurt the industries Trump is claiming to promote.

High tariffs will raise consumer prices sharply. Cost-of-living increases would be unaffordable to many, including in Trump’s political base.

Before the 20 February Supreme Court decision declaring them unconstitutional, the tariffs were only expected to raise $300 billion in the first year.

Revenue was expected to fall as consumers bought more domestically produced goods instead of imports.

As many intermediate goods for manufacturing are imported, higher tariffs would hurt the very industries Trump claims to be helping. Thus, high tariffs will sharply raise consumer prices for both imports and US-made substitutes.

Also, massively increasing military spending will divert resources, including labour, away from more productive uses.

Military industrial cronies
US military contracts mainly went to five corporate groups even before Trump 2.0. While projects are worth more, beneficiaries are fewer, reflecting lobbying efforts.

More government military spending is unlikely to increase jobs in the long run, as jobs have decreased drastically since the 1980s due to greater automation.

Military contractors pass the costs of R&D and capital expenditures onto taxpayers, freeing revenue to pay for cash dividends and stock buybacks.

In 2024, the Pentagon’s leading contractor, Lockheed Martin paid out $7 billion for stock buybacks and dividends.

Although Trump once offered to work with China and Russia to cut the trio’s military spending by half, it was difficult to take his offer seriously given his other pronouncements and actions.

US military spending will continue to rise, driven by the same interests and impulses behind the recent massive hikes.

Military expenditure needs wars to secure yet more allocations for buying more military equipment, to the beat of war drums.

The actual political and business relationships are complex and ever-changing. As Walter Scott observed in 1808:

Oh, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive

IPS UN Bureau

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Cover photo of the new UNESCO report, Re|Shaping Policies for Creativity. Credit: Diana Ejaita/UNESCO

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 25 2026 (IPS)

As generative artificial intelligence (AI) rapidly expands across nearly every sector of society, those that work in cultural and creative industries are expected to bear some of the greatest losses. With AI-generated content projected to dominate global markets in the coming years, combined with a lack of strong regulatory frameworks to protect intellectual property and AI’s ability to produce content quickly at a low cost, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) warns that generative AI may become a major driver of inequality, threatening the livelihoods of millions of cultural workers around the world.

“It is no longer sufficient to simply celebrate the potential of digital tools,” said Lodovico Folin-Calabi, Director of the UNESCO Liaison Office in Brussels and UNESCO Representation to the European Union.“We must critically examine how these technologies are deployed, who is designing them, and whose voices are represented or excluded in their development.”

On February 18, UNESCO released the latest edition of its flagship report, Re|Shaping Policies for Creativity, examining how digital transformation and emerging technologies are reshaping the global cultural landscape. Drawing on data from more than 120 countries, the report highlights the growing impact of artificial intelligence, changing global trade dynamics, and increasing pressures on artistic freedom. UNESCO calls on governments, international institutions, and technology platforms to strengthen policy frameworks to prevent widening inequalities and protect the rights and livelihoods of creators, presenting a roadmap of more than 8,100 policy measures.

The report emphasizes that while emerging digital technologies offer new opportunities for innovation and provide artists with tools to expand their reach and streamline creative production, they have also deepened existing inequalities and made economic success increasingly uncertain. It projects that generative AI could lead to global revenue losses of up to 24 percent for music creators and 21 percent for audiovisual creators by 2028. These losses are compounded by artists’ growing reliance on digital income streams, which now account for nearly 35 percent of their earnings—marking a 17 percent increase from 2018.

As digital technologies become more integral to artists’ livelihoods, the rise of AI-generated content, increased risks of intellectual property infringement, and ongoing market volatility may make it even more difficult for cultural workers to remain sustainable. In recent years, streaming platforms and content curation systems have shifted to prioritize specific forms of content from popular creators, leaving smaller, lesser-known creators with far fewer opportunities for exposure or success.

“I think emerging artists struggle more than established artists with the rise of AI,” said Kiersten Beh, a traditional illustrator based in New Jersey. “Senior artists—especially freelance ones—already know how to promote themselves and get their work out there, and many of them have built strong relationships with clients over time. I fear that as an emerging artist, I don’t have these connections yet and instead find myself competing with AI directly.”

The report also underscores persistent gaps in how countries protect artists and their work. Only 61 percent of the countries surveyed were found to have adequate frameworks in place to safeguard artistic freedom and prevent intellectual property infringement from AI.

While approximately 85 percent of countries included cultural and creative sectors in their national development plans, just 56 percent outlined specific cultural objectives, highlighting a clear disconnect between broad commitments and concrete action. Furthermore, only 37 percent of the countries surveyed reported having measures to support cultural workers operating in environments entrenched in political instability, prolonged conflict, or displacement.

“We, international organizations, states, artists, and humanity in general, must stand together in ensuring that AI does not limit the rights of everyone who wants to be involved in artistic creativity,” said Alexandra Xanthaki, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights. “This includes not only artists, but anyone who wants to take part in artistic life.”

These challenges are particularly pronounced in the Global South, where artists face heightened risks tied to technological barriers and widening digital divides. The report notes that essential digital skills are held by approximately 67 percent of people in developed countries, compared with just 28 percent in developing nations. Additionally, only 48 percent of surveyed countries have developed systems to track the consumption of digital cultural content.

Colombian independent expert Viviana Rangel emphasized these imbalances when speaking to UNESCO in October 2025. “Our region doesn’t produce this kind of technology–it consumes it. This places us in a more vulnerable position against the unintended effects of these technologies in the cultural field,” she said, adding that AI systems often sideline the perspectives and inputs of artists in the Global South.

Meanwhile, support for vulnerable artists remains significantly inconsistent and underfunded, leaving many exposed to emerging risks such as digital surveillance and algorithmic bias. Direct public funding for cultural sectors remains strikingly low – below 0.6 percent of the global GDP – and is projected to decline further in the coming years.

Additionally, progress toward ensuring universal support for cultural workers remains uneven, with a pronounced gender gap affecting female artists. Although the share of women leading cultural institutions worldwide has increased from 31 percent in 2017 to 46 percent in 2024, significant disparities persist: women hold 64 percent of leadership roles in developed countries, compared to just 30 percent in developing nations. Moreover, entrenched policy frameworks continue to position women primarily as cultural consumers rather than recognizing and supporting them as creators and leaders.

Achieving a sustainable future for artists and cultural workers in the age of AI will require more than technological adaptation–it demands equitable policy reform and coordinated global action. Through its latest report, UNESCO calls for renewed investment, a more balanced market, and stronger collaborative measures between governments, institutions, and industry leaders to safeguard artistic freedom and ensure that creative work remains a viable livelihood. The agency further stresses that creativity must continue to serve as a vital source of economic opportunity, cultural diversity, and social cohesion in a rapidly digitizing world.

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Credit: Georgios Kostomitsopoulos/NurPhoto via Getty Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 24 2026 (IPS)

The Islamic Republic of Iran has put down another uprising, with a ferocity that makes previous crackdowns seem restrained. The theocratic regime has survived, but it has done so by substituting violence for the economic security it cannot provide and the political legitimacy it no longer has. Its show of force is also an admission of weakness.

The protests that began on 28 December were triggered by a specific event — the collapse of the rial to a record low — but rooted in years of accumulated grievances. The second half of 2025 alone saw at least 471 labour protests across 69 Iranian cities. Inflation stood at 49.4 per cent. The 12-day war with Israel in June sent the Tehran Stock Exchange down around 40 per cent and cost many people their jobs. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions in September. The government cut fuel subsidies in November and slashed exchange-rate subsidies in December. Over 40 per cent of Iranian households now live below the poverty line and around half the population consume fewer than the recommended 2,100 calories per day.

It was this collapse that brought typically conservative bazaar merchants onto the streets. Within two weeks, the protests had spread to all of Iran’s 31 provinces, drawing in the urban middle class, working-class communities and people from rural provinces who had historically been among the regime’s most reliable supporters. What began as an economic stoppage rapidly became political defiance. For the millions who joined the striking merchants, the plummeting currency and rising cost of food were not market failures; they were proof of the regime’s corruption and ineptitude. Generation Z played a central role, demanding not reform but profound change. Lethal repression provided further confirmation the system was beyond reform.

The state’s response evolved. Initially it offered token economic concessions alongside its usual crowd control violence such as batons and teargas. When it became clear that a widespread movement with political demands had taken hold, it shifted to total attrition. On 8 January, authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown and authorised security forces to use military-grade weapons against crowds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a parallel military structure, major political force and economic empire with a direct stake in the regime’s survival – spearheaded the crackdown, with its affiliated Basij paramilitary networks playing a central role in street-level violence.

The casualty figures were deliberately obscured by the internet blackout, but all evidence points in the same direction. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that at least 3,000 civilians — including 44 children — were killed in the first 17 days. Iran Human Rights, citing Ministry of Health sources, documented a minimum of 3,379 deaths across 15 provinces. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported around 7,000 verified fatalities by mid-February, with 12,000 further cases under review. Time magazine cited hospital records suggesting the toll may have reached 30,000. Even the lowest of these figures vastly eclipses the 537 deaths recorded during the 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s concession that ‘several thousand’ had been killed confirmed the order of magnitude.

By 16 January the streets had been cleared, but a quieter repressive campaign continued, with nighttime raids, enforced disappearances and mass detentions in unofficial holding sites outside the legal system, targeting not only protesters but also doctors who treated the wounded, lawyers who provided legal assistance, bystanders who helped and people who posted supportive statements online. Authorities have detained over 50,000 people. Revolutionary Courts have fast-tracked mass indictments through summary trials, often conducted online and lasting mere minutes, with defendants denied independent legal counsel and confessions extracted under torture. Eighteen-year-old Saleh Mohammadi, whose retracted confession was obtained after interrogators broke bones in his hand, has been sentenced to be publicly hanged at the site of his alleged crime. Dozens more face imminent execution.

The regime has, for now, held: its security forces have not fractured, there have been no significant elite defections, and the IRGC has maintained its capacity for suppression. But it rules over a country with a wrecked economy, a battered nuclear programme, weakened regional proxies and a population that has run out of reasons to comply. Each protest cycle has required a higher threshold of state violence to suppress, a sign the regime has no other tool left.

What prevents weakness from becoming collapse is the absence of any alternative. The international response briefly suggested external pressure might tell – but did not. Donald Trump told Iranian protesters that ‘help is on its way’. The European Union listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The UK imposed fresh sanctions. The Iranian diaspora held at least 168 protests across 30 countries. But the international noise simply enabled the regime to spread the narrative that the uprising was foreign-directed.

The exiled opposition is fragmented along ethnic, ideological and generational lines, seemingly more consumed by internal rivalries than the task of converting widespread discontent into sustained political pressure. Inside Iran, the most credible opposition voices — Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh and veteran leader Mir Hossein Mousavi — are imprisoned or cut off from public life.

A weakened regime facing a leaderless opposition can endure, but what it cannot do is reverse its decay. Violence may clear the streets, but it cannot rebuild the economy, restore trust or give Iran’s young people a reason to stay. The regime has bought time, at an ever-rising price, but the crisis it’s suppressed isn’t going away.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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President Donald Trump has shaken up the world economy and the rule of international law in the first year of his second term – ostensibly to make America great again, particularly by reviving US manufacturing jobs.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Tariffs
Trump’s 2nd April 2025 Liberation Day tariffs were ostensibly his primary means for generating manufacturing employment.

When the US Supreme Court overruled him on 20 February, he responded by imposing a 10% tariff on all imports, raised to 15% the next day!

The tariffs are a blunt means for reviving US manufacturing jobs. The policy assumes US manufacturing jobs have been mainly lost due to what the White House deems ‘unfair’ competition from cheap imports.

Undoubtedly, US and other transnational corporations have relocated production and generally sourced imports from abroad to reduce import costs.

Imposing tariffs on imported goods to raise their prices is supposed to induce manufacturers to relocate production and jobs to the US.

Higher tariffs were imposed on countries with larger goods trade surpluses with the US. This ignores the services trade balance, generally more favourable to the US.

Tariff threats are now among the Trump administration’s choice weapons or means of economic coercion, including sanctions, to advance and secure its interests.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

But only $264 billion was collected during Trump 2.0’s first year, much higher than before, but still less than 1% of US federal debt.

Tariff revenue peaked in October 2025 at $31.35 billion, well below expectations, months before the Supreme Court decision.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy found only 4% of tariffs ‘absorbed’ by foreign exporters losing some export earnings. US importers paid the 96% balance of $264 billion in tariffs, weakening the impact of Trump’s business tax cuts.

But Trump’s tariffs have not reduced the US trade deficit, not even for manufactures; this rose to $1 trillion in 2025, as $3.15 trillion in imports exceeded $2.15 trillion in exports.

Although mortgage and loan interest rates have not fallen, inflation continues. The additional tariff revenue would not even have covered the extra military budget Trump has promised.

Congress could have reclaimed its tariff authority, though the current Trump-dominated House of Representatives has not tried.

But with the November midterm elections looming, Forbes reported that the president’s disapproval rating rose to 55% in mid-February, as fewer are confident his administration prioritises curbing inflation.

Financialisation
The US federal debt, around $39 trillion, now requires over $1 trillion in annual debt servicing from the $7 trillion annual budget.

Growing by $1.5-2.0 trillion annually, this unrepayable debt is being ‘rolled over’ for ever-shorter maturities. Hedge funds now hold 27% of US Treasuries, while foreigners, who held half in 2015, now have only 30%.

Treasury bond repurchase – or repo – agreements provide about $4 trillion in financing daily for derivatives speculation. Another financial crash can wipe out many more trillions of often dubious ‘value’.

While the US economy, productive employment, and research funding diminish, various bubbles of unrepayable debt are growing rapidly. Worse, so-called stablecoins and cryptocurrencies have infiltrated financial markets.

Meanwhile, some US mortgage delinquency rates have reached levels worse than in 2007-08. By the end of 2025, financial news agencies were publishing ominous reports of financial vulnerabilities.

Hundreds of billions of promised investments, coerced from other nations using tariff and other threats, will be invested in US financial asset markets but little of this will create manufacturing jobs.

Manufacturing comeback
Trump has promised to make the US a manufacturing superpower once again, leading the world in technology, computing power and military weaponry. But China leads in many – if not most – areas of recent technological advancement.

Dean Baker found the US labour market weakening over Trump 2.0’s first year. Overall, and manufacturing jobs growth both declined from Biden’s last year.

US manufacturing jobs have long been threatened by transnational corporate globalisation and labour-saving technical change, especially automation.

US policy in recent decades has left the private sector responsible for ensuring US industrial technology leadership and progress. Meanwhile, problems, such as poor infrastructure, remain unaddressed.

Trump’s tariffs may also inadvertently reduce US jobs. Many industrial processes require imported parts, with the tariffs proving disruptive.

Trump’s policies have not created enough manufacturing jobs. The president fired his Labor Department’s statistics head in mid-2025 for not reporting enough job growth.

Nonetheless, it reported only 584,000 net new jobs for all of 2025, compared to 1.6 million in 2024, for the US labour force of 165 million!

The Wall Street Journal noted, “The manufacturing boom President Trump promised … is going in reverse”.

The Trump administration could still use the Supreme Court’s ruling to change its strategy to make America great again by drawing better lessons from US economic history and adopting a more pragmatic approach. But so far, it seems unlikely to do so.

IPS UN Bureau

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Fish Value Addition Workshop in Ivory Coast.

By Sidi Tiémoko Touré and Essam Yassin Mohammed
ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, Feb 19 2026 (IPS)

It is an indictment on the global food system that, despite having some of the richest and most endowed natural resources in the world and a burgeoning youth population, West Africa spends more than $2 billion a year importing aquatic foods to feed its people, almost half of which is spent by Côte d’Ivoire alone.

Fish has long been a cherished staple food in West African diets, providing around two-thirds of all animal protein and featuring in popular dishes such as the Ivorian classic, poisson braisé and Senegal’s thieboudienne.

Yet in recent years, the region’s fishing industry has struggled to meet demand with growing external pressures and threats. Some of the highest levels of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the world costs the region more than $9 billion annually, and increasing vulnerability to climate change is also impacting the sector.

These challenges to domestic production have coincided with a decline in fish consumption from more than 13kg per person a year in 2008 to just over 11.5kg in 2025, despite the ongoing popularity of fish and seafood.

From our perspective, Côte d’Ivoire, along with other West African countries, have enormous potential to embrace the investment rule to “fish where the fish are” and reclaim food sovereignty. Not only would a stronger domestic sector reduce the import bill, but it would also create much-needed jobs, especially for young people, as well as improving diets and food security by providing more highly nutritious fish and seafood.

In short, we believe that boosting homegrown aquaculture would allow West Africa to reap the full benefits of the blue economy.

To that end, Côte d’Ivoire is at the forefront of a transformative journey to get West Africa’s fishing industry back on course, setting an example for other countries.

To begin with, the country has launched an ambitious policy framework dedicated to growing the aquaculture sector, including inland fisheries, which extend the benefits beyond coastal communities.

The $25.6 million Project for the Development of Competitive Value Chains in Aquaculture and Sustainable Fisheries (ProDeCAP) focuses on improving marine, lagoon, and inland fisheries, increasing broodstock capacity, setting up commercial seed supply systems, and developing the fish feed industry. It aims to boost annual aquaculture production by 35,000 tons, adding to the country’s overall fish supply directly and indirectly benefiting around 700,000 people, around half of which are women.

Similarly, the Strategic Program for the Transformation of Aquaculture in Côte d’Ivoire (PSTACI) is focusing on four pillars to stimulate the domestic aquaculture sector. These include creating jobs, particularly for young people and in rural areas, as well as piloting innovations with demonstration projects to increase private investment, strengthening governance and boosting national capacities for supplying fishery products.

At the same time, Côte d’Ivoire will invest $3 million in a new Aquaculture Research Innovation Hub (ARIH), led by global research centre WorldFish. The hub, which will focus on improving feed, genetics and fish health, will help fill the gaps in research and innovation to modernise the sector.

The hub will bring WorldFish’s global expertise to West Africa, leveraging 50 years of innovation in small-scale fisheries and aquaculture. In 2023 alone, WorldFish developed 70 innovations, upskilled almost 120,000 small-scale fishers, farmers, extension officers, suppliers, students, and community workers, and facilitated the production of 436,600 tonnes of farmed fish using improved tools and technologies.

All of these efforts will help fast-track the growth of the sector and leapfrog the conventional trajectory of unsustainable practices by streamlining the adoption of best practices and proven technologies.

But beyond policy, research and innovation, the final piece of the puzzle is the development of the broader value chain to ensure every link that connects the sector is resilient and effective.

For this, Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring countries need strong private sector partnerships to establish and grow reliable supplies of young fish as well as feed markets, processing infrastructure and sales platforms.

This element is crucial because in each of these stages lies untapped opportunities for new jobs and new sources of food and nutrition. The growth of the aquaculture sector is especially important for women, who can find diverse opportunities in processing and selling fish and other aquatic foods.

To extend the adage: teaching a man to fish might help feed him for a lifetime, but transforming an entire fishing and aquaculture sector will feed, nourish, employ and build resilience across a whole country.

West Africa has both the natural resources and demand for a thriving regional fishing industry. Strategic investments, policies and partnerships are now coming together to make this a reality, offering a swell of opportunities for others to come on board and ride the wave of Africa’s blue economy.

H.E. Sidi Tiémoko Touré, Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries, Côte d’Ivoire
Dr. Essam Yassin Mohammed, Director General of WorldFish

IPS UN Bureau

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Hawa Hussein Farah, a market trader in Garissa Town, Kenya, says extreme heat has shortened her working hours and reduced her daily earnings. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

By Chemtai Kirui
GARISSA, Kenya , Feb 16 2026 (IPS)

By 9 a.m. on a Wednesday, Hawa Hussein Farah is already watching the temperature climb. Awake since 6 a.m., she has prepared her three children for school before walking them to class and heading to Suuq Mugdi, an open-air market in Garissa town, to buy the fruit she will sell.

When she settles into her modest stall, built from wooden poles and covered with draped fabric, the heat is already intensifying beneath the canopy.

On a wooden table, yellow bananas rest in neat clusters beside green-striped watermelons. Mangoes, some blushed red, others golden, are stacked in small pyramids. The shade shields the fruits from direct sunlight, but the air beneath stays warm and dry.

“When it gets this hot, the customers disappear,” Farah says, lifting a bottle of water. “We have to close and go home to rest until it cools.”

Situated in Kenya’s arid northeast, Garissa is in its hottest season. Between January and March, daytime highs typically hover around 36°C (96.8°F).

In early February 2026, temperatures reached 38°C (100.4°F), with “feels-like” readings topping 41°C (107°F), according to Samuel Odhiambo, the county director of meteorological services.

While similar peaks have been recorded in previous years, Odhiambo said recent data show hot conditions are lasting longer, with more consecutive days above seasonal averages. The meteorological agency has issued a biometeorological advisory, warning residents that prolonged exposure increases the risk of heat stress, dehydration, and skin damage.

“If the current pattern continues, temperatures could exceed 40°C (104°F) in March,” he said.

For Farah, these degrees translate into a shorter workday. By noon, exhaustion sets in.

“My body feels weak and I sweat a lot. I drink two or three litres of water in the morning. I don’t even know if it helps.”

She now closes her stall roughly four hours earlier than in cooler months, cutting deeply into her already thin margins.

On cooler days, she brings in about 7,000 shillings (USD 54) in weekly sales. In prolonged heat, that falls to around 4,000 (USD 31), nearly half her usual takings.

Unsold fruit quickly softens, and after two days she lowers prices or sells it to nearby food kiosks for juice to avoid larger losses.

With no fixed salary or protections, each lost hour translates directly into lost income.

As the largest trade hub in northeastern Kenya, Garissa’s economy is anchored by its livestock markets. Data from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)  indicate that this economic dependence makes the region uniquely vulnerable: when extreme heat degrades livestock health and keeps buyers away, the resulting financial contagion directly shrinks customer flow for small vendors like Farah.

Emily Ndung’e, a motorcycle taxi rider in Garissa Town, northeastern Kenya, says prolonged high
temperatures are affecting her income as fewer customers travel during the hottest hours. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Emily Ndung’e, a motorcycle taxi rider, said she is facing similar losses.

Ndung’e says her daily income has plummeted from 1,500 shillings (USD 11.50) to just 500 (USD 3.80) during the heatwave.

Wearing  protective riding gear traps heat against her skin, and she often waits for hours between rides under the relentless sun.

“The heat gives me rashes and I sweat a lot,” Ndung’e says. “But I have to be out here. This is the work I depend on to feed my children.”

She describes the heat as devastating for both her income and her health. With few shaded areas along the roadside, she moves between scattered tree canopies, waiting for the next client.

Even after sunset, the heat lingers in Garissa’s concrete homes and corrugated roofs, offering little relief to those who have spent the day working outdoors.

Patricia Nying’uro, a climate scientist at the Kenya Meteorological Department who serves as the national focal point for the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), says that hotter nights strip away the body’s ability to recover between hot days.

“When temperatures approach 39°C, or even lower in humid conditions, the risk to outdoor workers increases sharply, particularly with prolonged exposure,” Nying’uro said.

Concerns over rising temperatures in Garissa have previously reached Parliament.

In 2022, Aden Duale, then the Garissa Township lawmaker, formally petitioned the Ministry of Environment regarding ‘public concerns’ over rising temperatures. The ministry acknowledged above-average temperatures linked to climate change. In Garissa’s markets, those shifts now translate into extreme heat events that disrupt daily survival.

Duale now serves as Cabinet Secretary for Health and in October 2025 presided over the launch of Kenya’s Climate Change and Health Strategy (2024–2029), marking the first time heat-related mortality is formally tracked at the national level.

Yet, responsibility for addressing the impacts of extreme heat remains limited.

Garissa has a County Climate Change Action Plan (2023–2028), but it focuses largely on drought, floods and livestock disease. Specific provisions for extreme heat, such as adjusted working hours, public cooling spaces or hydration points – are absent.

The National Drought Management Authority said its mandate centres on drought-related risks, adding that extreme heat on its own does not fall within its response frameworks. Officials directed heat-related enquiries to the Kenya Meteorological Department.

For Farah, that gap is tangible.

“We don’t get any help from the government. We need shade because we suffer in the heat,” she said. “I still pay taxes to the county, but the loss is mine to bear.”

Across Kenya, informal workers like Farah account for roughly 80 percent of the workforce. According to a July 2024 report by the International Labour Organization (ILO), Africa now faces the world’s highest heat exposure, affecting 92.9 percent of its workers.

The agency warns that labour capacity can decline by up to 50 percent under extreme heat—a productivity drain contributing to projected global losses of ISD 2.4 trillion by 2030.

Extreme heat poses a direct challenge to United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.8, which mandates safe working environments for all.

Without safeguards against extreme heat, this promise remains unfulfilled, exposing a critical gap in Kenya’s climate strategy and undermining SDG 13’s call for national resilience.

The current National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) prioritises large-scale agriculture and energy infrastructure. It offers few explicit protections for informal market labour.

While the heat is universal, its toll is gendered. Researchers say that women in Garissa face a “double exposure”, navigating extreme temperatures at the stall and then managing the unpaid care of children and seniors in overheated, unventilated homes, facing nearly a 24-hour cycle of stress.

A study by the The Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center found that heat increases a woman’s total work burden by 260 percent when domestic labour is included.

“It’s a regressive tax,” says Kathy Baughman McLeod, CEO of Climate Resilience for All (CRA), citing research in cities like Freetown, Sierra Leone, where informal market women can lose up to 60% of their income during heat-driven disruptions.

“The body perpetually believes it’s under attack,” McLeod adds, “without tools like ‘heat insurance’, currently being piloted in India but absent in Kenya, the crisis erodes both income and physical recovery.”

Sierra Leone was the first country in Africa to adopt a national Heat Action Plan (HAP), which is a comprehensive policy framework designed to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the health and economic impacts of extreme heat.

According to Dr Joyce Kimutai, who co-authored the State of the Climate Kenya 2024 report alongside Nying’uro, establishing localised Heat Action Plans is now the “most urgent task” for national adaptation.

“Heat continues to be a silent killer,” Kimutai said, adding that because the economic impacts remain poorly quantified, policy responses continue to lag behind the rising mercury.

Nairobi County is currently piloting a draft heat-response framework that would allow authorities to trigger adjusted working hours and open public cooling spaces during extreme conditions.

The proposal has not yet been formally adopted, but Kimutai says she hopes it could serve as a model for other counties.

As temperatures in Garissa edge toward 40°C, Farah’s adaptation strategy remains a solitary one. She packs her unsold, softening fruit, shutters her stall four hours early, and absorbs the financial blow.

For now, there is no policy to shield her livelihood, only the heat.

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

13-year-old Ojulu Omod comes to the gold mine site before the day gets too hot. He is out of school and supports his family by mining gold the traditional way. Credit: UNICEF/Demissew Bizuwerk

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 13 2026 (IPS)

Although global rates of child labour have declined since 2020, the practice remains a serious and persistent violation of children’s rights, undermining their safety, social development, and long-term economic stability. These risks are intensified by structural pressures— poverty, climate shocks, protracted conflict, and unsafe migration— that continue to push vulnerable children into crisis, and in some cases, trafficking and exploitation. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warns that African countries remain among the most affected regions, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated policy action, cross-border cooperation, and sustained investment to protect children on the move and those at risk of labour exploitation.

Roughly 137.6 million children across the world are engaged in child labour, representing 7.8 percent of all children globally. Of this number, approximately 54 million children are engaged in particularly hazardous work—such as mining and construction, or work performed for over 43 hours per week.

In a newly-released data brief analyzing child labour trends across Eastern and Southern Africa, UNICEF found approximately 41 million children—nearly one third of the global total—are engaged in child labour as of 2024, accounting for roughly one in five children in the region. While this represents progress from the 49 million children recorded in 2020, UNICEF warns that these gains remain fragile and could be reversed without strengthened policies and adequate financing.

“Children belong in classrooms, not workplaces,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa. She emphasized that ending child labour requires an inclusive approach that aims to revitalize education systems and strengthen protection measures for children worldwide.

“Supporting parents with decent work is essential so children can go to school, learn, play, and build a brighter future,” Kadilli added, urging governments, the private sector, civil society, and communities to work together to build a coordinated response aligned with “national and continental commitments” to put a definitive end to child labour.

The report highlights the severity of the crisis: 13.4 million children in Eastern and Southern Africa are engaged in hazardous work. It is only second to West and Central Africa when it comes to the prevalence of child labour globally. Education disparities are particularly pronounced, with six in ten adolescents engaged in child labour out of school, compared with just two in ten of their non-working peers.

According to the report, Eastern and Southern Africa has a disproportionately high share of young children engaged in child labour compared to other regions. Roughly 65 percent of children in child labour in the region are between the ages of 5 and 11, which greatly contrasts with other parts of the world where older adolescents make up a larger share. Although notable progress has been made in reducing child labour across all age groups, the decline has been slowest among the youngest children.

UNICEF notes that child labour in Eastern and Southern Africa is heavily concentrated in agriculture, which accounts for approximately 78 percent of all cases among children aged 5 to 17. This is even more pronounced among younger children, with more than 80 percent of those aged 5 to 11 working in agricultural fields. However, hazardous work is disproportionately concentrated in other sectors, with 55 percent of child labor in industry and 56 percent in services being classified as hazardous, compared to the 26 percent found in agriculture.

On February 11, during the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour in Marrakesh, Morocco, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) called on governments to strengthen protection measures, enhance international cooperation, and improve monitoring systems to ensure that migration and trafficking are central to efforts to end child labour. The agency emphasized that unsafe migration is a key driver of child labour, as displaced communities often resort to it in the absence of access to basic services, stable livelihoods, and social protection.

“If we are serious about ending child labour, we must face a reality that is still too often overlooked: migration,” said Amy Pope, IOM Director-General. “Today, millions of children are on the move, they’re forced by conflict, they’re pulled by poverty, they’re displaced by the impact of climate shocks. And they’re searching for opportunity and for safety. Evidence shows that migrant children are often the most exposed to child labour. They work longer hours, they earn less, they are less likely to attend school, and they face higher risks of injury, exploitation, and death.”

According to the latest figures from IOM, approximately 30,000 child victims of trafficking have been identified globally, though the true number is likely far higher due to widespread underreporting and gaps in detection. Children account for nearly one in four detected trafficking victims worldwide, with roughly 20 percent aged between 9 and 17 years of age.

Among all identified victims, 61 percent face sexual exploitation, with girls being disproportionately affected. Recruitment into armed groups is common among boys. Traffickers commonly exert control through psychological, physical, and sexual abuse, as well as threats against victims or their families and restrictions on finances, medical care, essential services, and freedom of movement.

Pope underscored the urgency of closing systemic gaps in labour governance and protection systems that leave migrant children vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. “These children are often missing from child labour policies, overlooked in protection systems, and invisible in the data that guides decisions,” she said. “Along migration routes, children are exploited in agriculture, domestic work, hospitality, and construction — and these abuses follow them across borders wherever protection fails. Protection must move with the child: prevention must reflect real labour and mobility realities, and systems must work together across sectors and borders.”

UNICEF is calling on the international community to address both the root causes and consequences of child labour. The plan includes expanding social protection programs for vulnerable families, promoting universal access to quality education, strengthening monitoring efforts to identify at-risk children, ensuring decent work opportunities for youth and adults, and enforcing stronger labour laws to enhance corporate accountability and eliminate exploitation across supply chains. Together, these efforts aim to ensure that families are not forced to rely on their children for survival—and that children are free to learn, grow, and simply be children.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Despite lacking both evidence and theory, many economists claim trade liberalisation accelerates development. But only a few economies have gained many jobs from external market access.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Multilateral trade liberalisation
In conventional trade theory, gains from trade liberalisation are mainly one-time increases in output and exports due to static comparative advantage.

Post-World War Two (WWII) US foreign policy transformed multilateral relations and transnational institutions, including international economic governance.

With the growing power of transnational corporations, many multilateral institutions, including the United Nations system, have been reconfigured or marginalised.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a ‘second-best’ compromise after the US Congress vetoed the creation of the International Trade Organisation, despite widespread international enthusiasm for the 1948 Havana Charter.

Almost half a century later, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995, following the 1994 Marrakesh Declaration concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.

Trade mahaguru Jagdish Bhagwati argued that multilateral trade has been undermined by plurilateral and bilateral arrangements favouring dominant partners.

With the era of trade liberalisation essentially over since the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC), free trade advocacy has received a new lease of life from mythmaking about the ‘pre-Trump’ era.

Uneven, mixed effects
Mainstream trade theory does not entertain the possibility of ‘unequal exchange’, however defined.

Nor does it even incorporate Bhagwati’s notion of ‘immiserising growth’ when productivity gains reduce prices for consumers, rather than increase producers’ earnings.

The three decades of trade liberalisation from the 1980s saw slower, but more volatile growth than the post-WWII quarter-century termed the ‘Golden Age’. More recently, stagnationist tendencies have dominated since the GFC.

With trade liberalisation, many developing countries have experienced greater food insecurity and deindustrialisation, as the manufacturing shares of their national income shrank.

Much import-substituting industrialisation after WWII or independence has since collapsed. Besides resource processing, very few new industries have emerged in Africa.

‘Aid for Trade’ for poorer developing countries implicitly acknowledges trade liberalisation’s adverse effects by mitigating some of them. Why then should they abandon protectionism if they need to be compensated for doing so?

Wealthy nations have also insisted that developing countries end manufacturing tariffs. But as Dani Rodrik has quipped, why rich nations “need to be bribed by poor countries to do what is good for them is an enduring mystery”.

African nations and Caribbean and Pacific small island developing states enjoyed preferential access to European markets, which full multilateral trade liberalisation would eliminate.

Such preferences for Sub-Saharan Africa have pitted African against Asian least developed countries, undermining the collective negotiating strengths of both.

Many countries had expected the current Doha Round to eliminate rich nations’ producer subsidies, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, but that has not happened.

Cutting farm support in the North could make food agriculture in developing countries more viable, but would also raise food import prices in the interim.

World Bank ‘structural adjustment’ programmes and IMF fiscal discipline requirements have undermined rural infrastructure and productivity, setting back smallholder agriculture in most developing countries.

Setbacks, not gains
Trade liberalisation also reduces tariff revenue. Such losses have hurt developing nations, especially the poorest, for whom tariffs often accounted for up to half of all tax revenue.

Such revenue cuts severely undermined the fiscal means of developing nations, crucial for government spending and investment, including for development and welfare.

Most governments are unable to replace lost tariff revenue with new or higher taxes. Meanwhile, more borrowing to offset lost tariff revenue has worsened indebtedness.

Trade liberalisation advocates are typically vague about how it is supposed to raise exports, incomes, and tax revenue, besides compensating for lost tariff revenue.

Instead, tax burdens typically become more regressive as overall tax revenue declines. Real consumption is supposed to rise as import prices fall with lower tariffs, but could also decline due to increasing consumption taxes.

Less policy space
Trade liberalisation has also reduced available development policy tools, especially those relating to trade, investment, and industrialisation.

The constraints imposed by trade liberalisation and investment agreements have generally limited the scope for and potential of development policy initiatives.

The actual role and impact of trade policy for growth and employment remain moot. But there are no analytical reasons or robust empirical evidence that trade liberalisation per se ensures sustainable development.

World Bank and most other studies acknowledged modest, if not negative, net gains for most developing countries from any realistically achievable outcome.

It is often ignored that realistic expectations of gains from trade liberalisation rely crucially on a strong positive export supply response.

However, such a response is unlikely when internationally competitive, productive and export capacities do not already exist, as in most developing countries, especially the poorest.

Hence, most of the Global South has not been able to overcome the worst consequences of trade liberalisation to achieve sustainable development.

In any case, the WTO Doha Round talks were ended by rich nations in 2015.

With the increasingly blatant self-interested contravention of WTO rules by the US, European and other wealthy nations, developing countries may best enhance their development prospects by reverting to GATT rules.

This would allow them to opt in, as appropriate, rather than resign themselves to the uniform ‘one size fits all’ WTO rules and regulations, regardless of context, circumstances, capacities and capabilities.

IPS UN Bureau

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Close-up-of-a-yellowfin-tuna-swimming-in-the-sea. Credit: Freepik---EyeEm

By James Alix Michel and Dona Bertarelli
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

The world is entering a decisive period for the future of the ocean. With the High Seas Treaty coming into force and meaningful progress being made on the World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, global momentum for stronger marine governance is building. Yet, new pressures linked to the push for deep-sea mining — the extraction of minerals from seabed thousands of meters below the ocean surface — threaten to undermine these gains. To safeguard progress, global decision-making will have to keep pace with such emerging risks. In this context, Africa will host several global discussions in 2026, including those that will shape the ocean’s future, with a series of opportunities for leadership starting with the African Union Summit in February to the Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya in June.

Dona-Bertarelli-and-James-Alix-Michel-meeting-at-Our-Ocean-Bali-in-2018. Credit: Dona-Bertarelli-Philanthropy

These concerns are particularly relevant to the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), one of the most biodiverse marine regions in the world, with endemism as high as 22 per cent yet at the convergence of multiple environmental stresses. Coral reefs and mangrove forests are deteriorating, while illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and sand mining put additional pressure on already fragile ecosystems. The lasting impacts of the 2020 Wakashio oil spill in Mauritius show how quickly harm to the ocean can ripple across communities. In such a fragile setting, the introduction of a new extractive industry demands the highest level of scrutiny.

In the face of these emerging challenges, Seychelles has an important role to play. For decades, it has demonstrated leadership in championing the blue economy and protecting marine ecosystems. Early ratification of the BBNJ Treaty, along with advocacy for High Seas marine protected areas such as the Saya de Malha Bank, has positioned the country as a respected voice for responsible ocean governance. If deep-sea mining begins in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean is likely to follow, including on the mid-Indian Ridge east of Seychelles’ EEZ and within the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries agreement region. Catalyzing a new wave of continental leadership on deep-sea protection would advance a vision of ocean stewardship grounded in equity and sustainability. A precautionary pause on deep-sea mining would give concrete expression to that vision.

Polymetallic nodules on the deep seabed. Credit: Deep-Rising

Scientific research continues to underline this need for caution. Deep-sea mining would have an irreversible impact on seabed ecosystems and species. And recent studies of the midwater zone, where waste plumes from deep-sea mining would spread, show that mining particles could reduce the nutritional quality of the natural food supply for zooplankton by up to ten times. This would decrease food quality and trigger effects that move through the food web, ultimately affecting larger species and the overall health of the ocean millions of people rely on. In an environment where more than 99.99 percent of the deep ocean floor has yet to be explored or directly observed, introducing large scale industrial activity could cause damage that cannot be undone.

The economic risks for the region are equally significant. The Western Indian Ocean’s natural assets have been conservatively valued at 333.8 billion dollars, making the ocean one of the region’s most important sources of long-term wealth. Within this, fisheries represent the single largest asset and a cornerstone of economic resilience. The region generates about 4.8 percent of the global fish catch, roughly 4.5 million tonnes each year, underscoring how many economies and communities depend on healthy stocks. In Seychelles and across the region, tuna fisheries in particular underpin national revenue, employment and food security. Undermining the sustainability of fisheries could therefore not only threaten livelihoods but also diminish long-term economic opportunity.

Deep-sea-creature. Credit: Schmidt-Ocean-Institute

The accelerating push for deep-sea mining activities also raises concerns about repeating historic patterns seen in other extractive sectors across Africa. The uneven distribution of benefits from land-based resource exploitation has shown how easily local communities can be left with environmental impacts while external actors capture most of the value. Without strong governance frameworks that ensure fair participation and transparent decision-making, current deep-sea mining models risk following a similar trajectory, privileging short-term economic gain for multinational corporations over regional priorities.

Finally, the argument that deep-sea mining is necessary for the renewable energy transition is also increasingly at odds with current evidence. Rapid advances in recycling technologies, circular economy approaches, and alternative materials are already reducing the projected demand for minerals from new extractions. These pathways can support the global transition without the need to industrialize one of the least understood parts of the planet. The United Nations Environment Programme has also made clear in their 2022 report that “there is currently no foreseeable way in which investment into deep-sea mining activities can be viewed as consistent with the Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles”.

White-sand-and-clear-turquoise-water-on-a-Seychelles-beach. Credit: Unsplash—Alin-Mecean

In parallel, African-led nature-positive initiatives are demonstrating how ocean resources can be managed in ways that support both people and the environment. Initiatives such as the Great Blue Wall aim to create connected networks of protected and restored marine areas that strengthen biodiversity, climate resilience and community wellbeing across the WIO region. These efforts demonstrate what a regenerative blue economy can look like in practice. Preserving these gains requires ensuring that new activities do not compromise the progress already made.

Across the continent, young leaders, civil society and scientific institutions are calling for greater accountability in decisions that shape our collective future. Their message is clear: long-term wellbeing for everyone must come before short-term gains for a select few. This call also echoes a growing movement worldwide, with more than 40 countries now supporting a pause on deep-sea mining, including France, Fiji, Chile and Mexico. A precautionary pause on deep-sea mining is not a rejection of economic progress, but a commitment to sound science, inclusive dialogue and responsible stewardship. We are hopeful that countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world will hear this call and secure the future of the ocean for generations to come.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

Dona Bertarelli is a Swiss philanthropist, IUCN Patron of Nature and biodiversity champion, deeply committed to a healthy balance between people and nature.

IPS UN Bureau

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Educated Afghan women in Kabul’s informal economy, working in retail as Taliban rules curb professional opportunities. Credit: Learning Together.

By External Source
KABUL, Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

Young women in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, are trying their hands at unfamiliar tasks in embroidery, tailoring and designing beads in market stalls. Many should instead have been sitting at desks writing computer software or reporting news, the fields they trained for.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, highly educated women have been removed from their official positions and shut out of much of the formal workforce, compelling them to take up jobs unrelated to their field of training to cope with economic hardship and to avoid the mental strain of unemployment.

Professional opportunities for women have been drastically limited. Almost all women are barred from working in offices, the media, and other fields related to their education.

Lida, (a pseudonym) a computer science graduate, previously earned a good salary as an IT officer at the Ministry of Economy, a job she held for more than six years. She now lives in southeastern Kabul, working as a tailor and running a small shop. Her late husband, who worked for the Ministry of Rural Development, was killed in a Kabul bombing ten years ago.

Lida now shares a house with the family of her brother along with her five children, and says she is in dire financial straits. To make ends meet, she has sent one of her sons to sell plastic bags on the streets. Her younger son is still at school. Her daughter’s education has been suspended following Taliban’s edicts.

“When the Taliban returned to power I was forced out of my job, says Lida, “and I have not been able to find any within my profession in the last four years and therefore, had no option but to work as a shop assistant”.

The Taliban do not directly grant work permits to women to operate the shops. Instead, either a male family member or another man must first obtain the work permit for the shop

Many women are flocking to Kabul’s informal sector, but it provides limited opportunities, crowding them into shops, which only sell women’s clothing and cosmetics, serving primarily female customers.

The Taliban do not directly grant work permits to women to operate the shops. Instead, either a male family member or another man must first obtain the work permit for the shop. Only then can women work in the shop as salespeople or assistants, receiving a salary or a commission based on an agreed arrangement.

“Working in a tailoring workshop is very difficult and frustrating”, Lida complains adding, “I wish I could at least work in a computer shop, which is related to my field of study”.

Mursal, (a pseudonym) 27, a journalism graduate, has faced a similar fate. She worked as a reporter for eight years in various media outlets and, before the Taliban returned, was employed in an advocacy organization for journalists, where she enjoyed a good income and benefits.

Mursal, like dozens of other educated women, has become a shopkeeper. Private media outlets do not have adequate capacity to absorb many women, so instead of reporting the news, she now sells traditional Afghan clothes and products geared towards women.

Voicing her frustrations Mursal said she initially felt “very undervalued”. “People used to cast strange glances at us and, apart from that, my family wasn’t very happy with the job I was engaged in”. It is uncommon for women to operate shops in Afghanistan,

Mursal sells women’s clothes in southwestern Kabul, where she lives with her parents, both former government employees who are now unemployed.

“I have six sisters and one brother”, says Mursal, adding, “I cannot get married until they are on their feet, because I am responsible for all of them”. Her brother is only ten years old. Mursal makes about ten thousands Afghanis (127 euros) a month selling in the shop, which is hardly sufficient for the family to get by.

Even so, the Taliban’s moral police do not give the women any breathing space under the increasing precarious job situation. According to Mursal, officials from the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice visit their shops three times a week to enforce an all-day rule requiring them to wear masks, which they find suffocating. They are also forced to conceal or remove pictures on women’s sleepwear.

“If the sleepwear is hidden, how would customers know which ones or what to buy?” she points out.

Defiance in the face of adversity

While the women agonize over the likelihood of years of academic effort going to waste, they have nevertheless turned their situation as shopkeepers into a form of resistance to Taliban’s violations of their rights.

Forced to run shops to support their families, they may be glad to earn a little income, but their deeper pain comes from knowing that their skills and dreams in their chosen professions remain unused.

Still, it is a testament to their resilience in the face of severe restrictions imposed by the Taliban that they have readily taken up often unwanted jobs in the informal sector simply to survive and support their families.

The shift is not just about earning a living; it is a silent resistance. By taking on these roles, Afghan women are sending a clear signal that they will not remain silent and be airbrushed from the society.

Even when doors are closed to them in their professions, they find ways to stay active, contribute, and make a difference. They demonstrate that even a small window of opportunity can be transformed into meaningful participation, proving that Afghan women will continue to fight for their rights in any way they can.

Their resilience is a reminder that Taliban restrictions may limit opportunities, but they cannot erase ambition or their determination to create change.

By taking up these jobs, they make sure their presence is felt in society and stand strong in the face of the Taliban, who are trying to erase them from public life. Afghan women refuse to stay silent. They make it clear Afghan women will not disappear, they insist on being seen, heard, and counted.

Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS speaks to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC) about labour rights abuses in Myanmar’s garment industry since the 2021 military coup.

Myanmar’s garment sector, which employs hundreds of thousands of workers, is in deep crisis. Since the coup, labour protections have collapsed, independent unions have been dismantled and workers who try to organise face intimidation, dismissal and arrest. Inside factories, reports show multiple cases of child labour, forced overtime, harassment, poverty wages and unsafe conditions. At the same time, rising living costs and US tariffs are pushing many workers further into insecurity as factories close and layoffs become more common. Garment workers, most of them women, are trapped between exploitation, repression and a rapidly shrinking industry.

How have conditions inside Myanmar’s garment factories changed since the coup?

Our monitoring between February 2021 and October 2024 shows a sharp rise in both the number and severity of pre-existing labour rights abuses. Since the coup, factory employers have increasingly worked with the military to restrict organising and silence workers. This collaboration has led to threats, arrests and violent attacks against workers. In one case, security forces carried out joint military and police raids on the homes of workers who demanded unpaid wages and limits on overtime.

Factories have also expanded surveillance. Workers report invasive searches, phone confiscation and installation of CCTV inside factories, including near toilets. Employers also force workers to lie during audits. These practices aim to hide abuses and have exacerbated the abuses workers already faced.

What abuses do garment workers suffer in the workplace?

Factories force workers to meet extreme production targets through excessive and often unpaid overtime. Many workers must stay overnight until dawn, often without enough food, water or ventilation, leading to exhaustion and health problems. Managers threaten and abuse workers who refuse to work overtime or fail to meet targets. We have documented a case where supervisors denied workers food and water as punishment for not meeting targets.

Health and safety conditions have worsened. Workers report dirty, insufficient toilets, poor food quality and unsafe drinking water. They’ve also reported blocked emergency exits, inadequate ventilation and leaking roofs that put lives at risk. Factory-provided transport creates further dangers, as they are often overcrowded and suffer frequent road accidents. In one case, a major crash involving a worker shuttle left several workers badly hurt, including one who needed abdominal surgery.

Women workers face particularly severe abuses, including hair-pulling, physical assault, sexual harassment and verbal attacks. In one case, supervisors punched and kicked women workers and called them ‘dogs’.

What happen to workers who try to speak out or organise?

Workers who dare speak out face brutal reprisals. After the military declared 16 labour unions and labour rights organisations illegal, arrests, home raids and surveillance increased, particularly against union leaders and activists linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement. The movement began after the coup and brings together workers who refuse to cooperate with military rule through strikes and other forms of non-violent resistance.

Inside factories, employers threaten and dismiss union leaders on false grounds. In one case, a factory reopened and refused to reinstate union members and publicly humiliated them. Employers have also created Workplace Coordination Committees to replace independent unions, denying workers the right to choose their representatives and silencing their complaints. Prominent union leaders such as Myo Myo Aye have been arrested multiple times simply for continuing to organise.

What should international brands be doing in this context?

Under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, brands operating in conflict settings must carry out heightened, conflict-sensitive due diligence and demonstrate, with independent and verifiable evidence, that it works. In Myanmar’s current context, where surveillance and violent repression run through all the supply chain, this standard is exceptionally hard to meet.

Any brand that stays must deliver clear and demonstrable improvements in working conditions. Brands that can’t meet this threshold must carry out a responsible exit, working with workers and their representatives and taking steps to reduce harm, rather than adding to the instability garment workers already face under military rule.

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Myanmar’s junta tightens its grip CIVICUS Lens 12.Dec.2025
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Business and Human Rights Treaty: a decade of struggle for corporate accountability CIVICUS Lens 08.Mar.2025

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Without a classroom or facilities, our community teachers provide lessons to children engaged in domestic labour. Credit: UKBET

By Mohammed A. Sayem
SYLHET, Bangladesh, Jan 19 2026 (IPS)

While other children her age prepared for school, eight-year-old Tania once began her workday. Each morning, she picked up a jharu—the household broom—and cleaned floors inside a private home. At the same time, another child of her age in that household lifted a schoolbag and left for class. One carried a broom. The other carried books.

For years, this was Tania’s daily reality. And for thousands of children across Bangladesh, it still is.

Tania A, who has transitioned from child labour to mainstream school. Credit: UKBET

Child rights organisations note that many domestic child workers face neglect, mistreatment, and abuse. Most cases go unreported because the work happens behind closed doors, beyond public scrutiny and accountability.

Despite clear legal safeguards, child labour persists. Bangladeshi law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 14 and limits work for those aged 15–17 to non-hazardous conditions. Yet an estimated 3.4 million children are engaged in illegal labour, and thousands of them work as domestic workers. Exact figures remain uncertain, as domestic labour is informal, unregulated, and largely hidden.

In the north-eastern city of Sylhet, UK Bangladesh Education Trust (UKBET), a UK-based international NGO, has developed a community-based intervention aimed at reaching these children. Through its Doorstep Learning Programme, UKBET trains and deploys community teachers to identify children involved in domestic labour and provide education at their places of work, with the consent of employers. Learning sessions may take place in a kitchen corner or shared courtyard—wherever space is available and permitted.

Alongside education, the programme addresses the economic drivers of child labour. Parents receive small livelihood grants to start or expand family businesses, reducing dependence on a child’s earnings. As household income stabilises, children are supported to transition into formal schooling or vocational training. Awareness sessions further promote child rights and discourage the recruitment of child domestic workers.

Today, UKBET operates in 21 of the 42 wards of Sylhet City. Even within this limited coverage, the need is substantial, with thousands of domestic child workers still waiting for attention and support.

Early evidence suggests the model works. An independent evaluation supported by Shahjalal University of Science and Technology found that 80% of enrolled children between programme inception and 2024 are continuing in school, 74% of family support businesses remain active, and no supported families have sent children back to work. Among girls receiving vocational training, nearly 69% are earning in safer employment. Interviews with employers also indicated they did not hire replacement child workers after children were withdrawn from domestic labour.

For Tania, the shift has been transformative. In January 2026, she enrolled in school. She no longer starts her day with a jharu in her hand. She now carries her own schoolbag. Her family has secured a stable source of income and no longer depends on the money she once earned.

Tania’s story illustrates what targeted, community-based interventions can achieve. But her experience is still not typical. Thousands of domestic child workers remain hidden inside private homes, excluded from education, and denied their rights.

Children like Tania do not need sympathy alone. They need visibility, opportunity, and sustained action. Their lives may be hidden—yet they must not remain invisible.

For further information about UKBET’s work with children engaged in domestic labour:
Mohammed A. Sayem
Director, UKBET – Education for Change
Email: msayem@ukbet-bd.org, Web: www.ukbet-bd.org

IPS UN Bureau

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By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 23 2025 (IPS)

The UN Staff Union is on edge — hoping for the best and expecting the worse — as the General Assembly will vote on a proposed programme budget for 2026 by December 31.

The President of the UN Staff Union (UNSU), Narda Cupidore, has listed some of the proposals which will have an impact on staff members, including:

• Proposed decrease of the 2026 regular budget by 15.1%
• A total of 2,681 posts (about 18.8%) proposed for abolishment across the Secretariat, more than half of which are already vacant.
• Administrative functions will be centralized through new Common Administrative Platforms (CAPs) beginning in New York and Bangkok next year.
• Proposed relocation of approximately 173 posts to lower cost duty stations, including Nairobi, Bonn, Valencia, Tunis, and Vienna.

IF the proposed changes are approved by the General Assembly, the following measures are expected to take effect:

• Mitigating measures: reductions in staffing will be managed through vacancy elimination, the early separation programme, lateral reassignments within entities, followed by global placement.
• Downsizing policy: if further staff reductions are required, the downsizing policy will be enacted in accordance with the established rules under ST/AI/2023/1, considering appointment type, performance, and years of service.

WHAT HAPPENS Next…

• December 2025: Await General Assembly resolution
• January – March 2026: mitigating measures
• April 2026 onward: Downsizing policy applied if needed

Early Separation Program (a mitigating measure): Office of Human Resources has advised:

• Rounds 1 and 2 are still open and will not be finalized until January 2026.
• Round 3 is currently active, focused on a specific criterion as outlined in this round.
• Colleagues who expressed interest in the program will receive individual responses confirming approval or non-approval once all rounds of the exercise are closed.

Support for Staff

The Staff Support Framework 2.0 – expected to be available soon – to help navigate upcoming changes, provide structured guidance on prioritizing reassignment over terminations, and minimize involuntary separations.

As the Fifth Committee continues its deliberations in the coming days toward adopting a resolution and approving the budget, the UN Staff Union (UNSU) remains actively engaged in monitoring the negotiations, says Cupidore in a memo to staff members.

“At the same time, we are evaluating the potential implications of these decisions, our entitlements and working conditions”.

Meanwhile, the US State Department is in the process of eliminating over 132 domestic offices, laying-off about 700 federal workers and reducing diplomatic missions overseas.

The proposed changes will also include terminating funding for the UN and some of its agencies, budgetary cuts to the 32-member military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 20 other unidentified international organizations.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses climate displacement and Tuvalu’s future with Kiali Molu, a former civil servant at Tuvalu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently a PhD candidate at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and the University of Bergen in Norway. His research focuses on state sovereignty and climate change in the Pacific.

Kiali Molu

Why have so many Tuvaluans applied for Australia’s climate mobility visa?

This visa is part of the Falepili Union Treaty agreed by Australia and Tuvalu. The treaty combines a special mobility pathway, guarantees around Tuvalu’s statehood and sovereignty and a broader security arrangement. Under the mobility component, Tuvaluans can apply for residency in Australia through a ballot system, without being forced to permanently relocate.

Many applications are driven by practical reasons, such as employment opportunities to be able to support families back home. Others value the ability to travel more freely, particularly given Australia’s historically long and uncertain visa processes. Access to education opportunities and social protections also matter. What’s important is that selection under this pathway does not require people to leave Tuvalu. It creates choice and security in a context where the future feels increasingly uncertain.

How is climate change reshaping daily life in Tuvalu?

Rising sea levels and frequent king tides regularly flood homes, public buildings and roads, interrupting community gatherings, education and work. Coastal erosion continues to reduce habitable land, while saltwater intrusion contaminates groundwater and destroys pulaka pits that are central to food security, as they’re used to grow staple root crops.

These impacts extend beyond infrastructure: higher reliance on imported food means families face rising costs, and stagnant water means a rise in waterborne diseases. Constant flooding is increasing anxiety about displacement and cultural continuity, and farming and fishing livelihoods are becoming harder to sustain. Climate change affects our food, health, housing and identity every single day.

What does potential resettlement mean for Tuvaluan culture and identity?

Our identity is inseparable from our community, our land and the ocean surrounding it. Tuvaluan culture is rooted in fenua – shared practices around agriculture and fishing, church life and the falekaupule, a community meeting house. Large-scale resettlement risks disrupting these foundations. The transmission of everyday cultural practices, language and oral history may weaken if younger Tuvaluans grow up away from the islands.

However, mobility doesn’t automatically mean cultural loss. Tuvaluan communities abroad are finding ways to preserve collective life, language and traditions through associations, churches and digital platforms. Initiatives such as the Tuvalu Digital Nation aim to safeguard cultural heritage virtually. Still, there is no substitute for ancestral land, and this raises profound questions about what it means to be Tuvaluan if our homeland becomes uninhabitable.

What climate adaptation measures does Tuvalu urgently need?

Adaptation for Tuvalu is not only about renewable energy and seawalls. While these remain essential, there’s also a critical legal and political dimension. The international system still defines statehood on the basis of physical territory, offering little protection to nations facing permanent land loss due to climate change.

We believe Tuvalu should push for a new global legal framework that rethinks sovereignty in the context of climate displacement. This would protect Tuvalu’s international legal personality, maritime boundaries and political rights even if parts of its territory become uninhabitable. This diplomatic strategy is needed as much as physical adaptation measures because it addresses national survival, not just infrastructure resilience.

What responsibilities do major polluters have towards climate-vulnerable states?

Major polluters have legal and moral obligations towards climate-vulnerable countries. International law increasingly recognises duties to reduce emissions, prevent environmental harm and cooperate in protecting those most at risk. Recent legal developments, including advisory opinions from international courts, reinforce that these responsibilities are enforceable, not optional.

These obligations go beyond emissions cuts. They include providing climate finance through mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund, supporting adaptation efforts and sharing technology. For countries like Tuvalu, this support is fundamental to preserving lives, culture and sovereignty. Continued inaction by major emitters should not be seen solely as political failure, but also as a breach of international law.

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International Court of Justice signals end to climate impunity CIVICUS Lens 01.Aug.2025
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Although inequality among countries still accounts for a far greater share of income inequality worldwide than national-level inequalities, discussions of inequality continue to focus on the latter.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

South Africa (SA) and Brazil, the previous G20 host, have long had the world’s highest national-level inequalities. However, their current governments have led progressive initiatives for the Global South.

Although due to take over the G20 presidency next year, US President Trump refused to participate in this year’s summit, inter alia, because of alleged SA oppression of its White minority.

Inequality growing faster
The G20 report utilises various measures to show the widening gap between the rich and the poor.

National-level inequality is widespread: 83% of countries, with 90% of the world’s population, have high Gini coefficients of income inequality above 40%.

While income inequality worldwide is very high, with a Gini coefficient of 61%, it has declined slightly since 2000, primarily due to China’s economic growth.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Meanwhile, wealth concentration has continued. Wealth inequality is even greater than income inequality, with the richest 10% owning 74% of the world’s assets.

The average wealth of the richest 1% grew by $1.3 million from 2000, accounting for 41% of new wealth by 2024! Private wealth has risen sharply since 2000, while public assets have declined.

Besides income and wealth, the report reviews other inequalities, including health, education, employment, housing, environmental vulnerability, and even political voice.

Such inequalities, involving class, gender, ethnicity, and geography, often ‘intersect’. The promise of equal opportunity is rarely meaningful, as most enjoy limited social mobility options.

The report thus serves as the most comprehensive and accessible review of various dimensions of economic inequality available.

Harmful effects
The G20 report condemns ‘extreme inequality’ for its adverse economic, political, and social consequences.

Inadequate income typically means hunger, poor nutrition and healthcare. Economies underperform, unable to realise their actual potential.

Inequality, including power imbalances, influences resource allocation. Such disparities enhance the incomes of the rich, often at the expense of working people.

Natural resources typically enrich owners while undermining environmental sustainability and social well-being.

The report argues that economic inequality inevitably involves political disparities, as the rich are better able to buy influence.

New rules and policies favour the rich and powerful, increasing inequalities and undermining national and worldwide economic performance.

High inequality, due to rules favouring the wealthy, also undermines public trust in institutions. The declining influence of the middle class threatens both economic and political stability, especially in the West.

Drivers of inequality
The report argues that public policy can address inequalities by influencing how market incomes are initially distributed and how taxes and transfers redistribute them.

Market income distribution is determined by asset distribution (mediated by finance, skills, and social networks) and among labour, capital, and rents. Returns to shareholders are prioritised over other claims.

Increased inequality in recent decades is attributed to weakened equalising policies, or ‘equilibrating forces’, and stronger ‘disequilibrating forces’, including wealth inheritance.

New economic policies over recent decades have favoured the wealthy by weakening labour via market deregulation and restricting trade unions.

Tax systems have become less progressive with the shift from direct to indirect taxes, lowering taxes paid by large corporations and the wealthy. Fiscal austerity has exacerbated the situation, especially for the vulnerable.

Financial deregulation has also generated more instability, triggering crises, with ‘resolution’ usually favouring the influential.

Privatisation of public services has also favoured the well-connected, at the expense of the public, consumers, and labour.

International governance
International economic and legal institutions have also shaped inequality.

More international trade and capital mobility have lowered wages, increased income disparities and job insecurity, and weakened workers’ bargaining power.

Liberalising financial flows has favoured wealthy creditors over debtors, worsening financial volatility and sovereign debt crises.

International inequalities have adverse cross-border effects, especially for the environment and public health. Overconsumption and higher greenhouse gas emissions by the rich significantly worsen planetary heating.

International health inequalities have been worsened by stronger transnational intellectual property rights and increased profits at the expense of poorer countries.

International tax agreements have enabled the wealthy, including transnational corporations, to pay less than those less fortunate. Meanwhile, Oxfam reported that the top one per cent in the Global North drained the South at a rate of $30 million per hour.

Inaction despite consensus?
The report claims a new analytical consensus that inequality is detrimental to economic progress, and reducing inequality is better for the economy.

Inequality is attributed to policy choices reflecting moral choices and economic trade-offs. It argues that combating inequality is both desirable and feasible.

Recent research from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has criticised growing national inequalities.

However, there is no evidence of serious efforts by the G20, IMF, and OECD to reduce inequalities, especially inter-country, particularly between North and South.

IPS UN Bureau

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Integration of crop-livestock systems in Urubici, State of Santa Catarina, southern Brazil. Credit: Ivan Cheremisin's/Unsplash

By Appolinaire Djikeng
NAIROBI, Kenya, Nov 14 2025 (IPS)

As the world gathers in Brazil for the UN climate talks, the country’s livestock sector – one of the largest in the world – is understandably in the spotlight.

Livestock are a significant contributor of greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil (and around the world) and have been linked to deforestation, but these animals represent so much more than that to so many, especially in the Global South.

Brazil accounts for approximately 20 per cent of global beef exports. The livestock sector is a major contributor to the country’s economy – responsible for 8.4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly nine million jobs.

For 1.3 billion people worldwide, livestock is a lifeline: a protector of livelihoods, guardian of nutrition, cornerstone of tradition, and potential pathway out of poverty. For the majority and especially pastoralists, reducing herd sizes is not an easy, or frankly viable, option.

COP30 is supposed to bring people from vastly different contexts together, to find solutions that work for everyone, as well as funding to enable it to happen. This year’s host offers special lessons for Africa’s livestock sector, as Brazil’s livestock sector was not always so productive and efficient.

Brazilian policies and investments have seen livestock productivity rise 61 per cent in the past two decades, while pasture land use and emissions intensity – that is, the emissions per unit of meat, milk or eggs produced – have gone down.

The key to this success has been avoiding uniform prescriptions and instead adopting regionally adapted and context-specific approaches.

For example, high-yield tropical grasses like Brachiaria have become central to boosting productivity across the country’s Cerrado region, improving cattle health and overall performance, and reducing costs. In southern Brazil, where smaller farms are more common, the integration of crop-livestock systems have increased land efficiency, promoted biodiversity, and diversified farm incomes. Mineral supplements and high-energy feeds have had the biggest impact in the Southeast of Brazil, where there are large feedlots.

Much like Brazil thirty years ago, many of today’s developing countries struggle to produce meat, milk and eggs efficiently. Poor quality feed, animal health, and genetics mean animals take much longer to reach slaughter weight or milk volume. Even if herd sizes are smaller, the emissions per unit of product can be 16 times higher.

The impact is that hunger and poverty are prevalent in these countries and, in some, still rising. Micronutrient deficiency – a result of insufficient animal-source food consumption – is also widespread among children, which has a devastating effect on health and economic development (contributing to annual GDP losses up to 16 per cent).

This is why at the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) we are researching science-based interventions that raise productivity and cut emissions intensity. For example, MaziwaPlus is an animal health-oriented project focused on Mastitis, a disease in dairy cows responsible for milk yield losses of up to 25 per cent. With Scotland’s Rural College we are also working on highly digestible forages, which could result in 20 per cent methane emissions reductions. EnviroCow is another productivity-oriented initiative, trying to identify livestock that remain productive despite environmental challenges.

And ILRI’s work does not stop at research. The Institute also connects evidence with policy and practice, as seen in Kenya’s recent submission to the UNFCCC’s Sharm el-Sheikh portal, which cites participatory rangeland management approaches developed by ILRI and partners.

Unlocking these benefits at the global level will require reframing the worldwide sustainability discussion around livestock – seeing it as a solution to be invested in, rather than a problem to be swept under the rug.

For example, climate finance should start rewarding reductions in emissions intensity (not just absolute emissions), so that countries improving productivity and lowering emissions per litre of milk or kilo of meat are supported. Moreover, the world needs to invest far more than the 0.2 per cent of climate finance currently put towards livestock research and innovation (and even less to developing solutions in low- and middle-income countries).

Most importantly, livestock should be embedded in national climate plans. Livestock should be recognised as more than a source of emissions, and as an important solution for climate resilience, food security, and adaptation – especially in developing countries and regions where they are the backbone of rural economies.

But as COP30 concludes, the conversation cannot end there.

This year’s conference must be a moment when the world recognises that livestock, managed well, are an important part of a more pragmatic global strategy which both protects the planet and raises the welfare of its people.

The timing could not be more fitting as next year will begin the UN-declared International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. Rangelands cover over half of the Earth’s land surface, store vast amounts of carbon, and support hundreds of millions of pastoralist livestock keepers, yet barely feature in most national climate plans.

If we choose to recognise and act on the potential of rangelands and pastoralists, they can become one of the great success stories of climate and development – driven by science, stewardship, and local knowledge.

Professor Appolinaire Djikeng is the Director General of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).

IPS UN Bureau

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Session of the Second World Summit for Social Development in Doha

By Isabel Ortiz
DOHA, Nov 12 2025 (IPS)

Qatar hosted the Second World Summit for Social Development from 4–6 November. According to the United Nations, more than 40 Heads of State and Government, 230 ministers and senior officials, and nearly 14,000 attendees took part. Beyond plenaries and roundtables, more than 250 “solution sessions” identified practical ways to advance universal rights to food, housing, decent work, social protection or social security, education, health, care systems and other public services, international labor standards, and the fight against poverty and inequality.

In these difficult times for multilateralism, the summit delivered a global agreement, the Doha Political Declaration, that many feared would not materialize. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the text a “booster shot for development,” urging leaders to deliver a “people’s plan” that tackles inequality, creates decent work and rebuilds social trust.

Isabel Ortiz

Even so, veteran voices urged pragmatism. Both the Copenhagen Declaration and Doha’s recommitment are workable texts to advance social justice. While not the ideal many hoped for, the Doha outcome addresses the key issues—and, above all, constitutes an international consensus adopted by all countries amid a crisis of multilateralism.

Juan Somavía, former UN-Under Secretary General and a driving force behind the 1995 Summit, welcomed the Doha’s Declaration as a meaningful foundation to move the agenda forward. Roberto Bissio, coordinator of Social Watch and a lead participant in Copenhagen, added “Let’s revive hope in these turbulent times… Now in Doha our governments are renewing their pledges of three decades ago, and adding new commitments that we welcome, to reduce inequalities, to promote care and to ensure universal social protection, which is a Human Right.”

However, Somavia, Bissio and many UN and civil society leaders in Doha, also stressed the distance between pledges and delivery. The pressure mounted through the week. At the closing, UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed said that the message from unions, civil society and youth was unequivocal: people expect results, not rhetoric. “The outcomes of this Summit provide a strong foundation,” she said. “What matters most now is implementation.”

The test now is whether governments will translate the Doha declaration into action: budgets, laws and programs that reach people. Magdalena Sepulveda, Director of UNRISD, called for bold political action: “What we need now is that states are going to take the political will to implement the Doha Declaration in a swift manner with bold measures.”

The trend, however, is moving the other way, as many governments adopt austerity cuts and have limited funding for social development. More than 6.7 billion people or 85% of the world’s population suffer austerity, and 84% of countries have cut investment in education, health and social protection, fueling protests and social conflict. “The concept of the welfare state is being eroded before our eyes in the face of an ideological commitment to austerity and a shrinking state” said Amitabh Behar, Executive Director of Oxfam International. “A wave of youth-led Gen Z protests is sweeping the world. A recurring slogan during the recent protests in Morocco was ‘We want hospitals, not stadiums’… Public services are being dismantled while wealth is hoarded at the top. The social contract will not survive this neglect.”

The good news is that governments do have ways to finance the Doha commitments. Austerity is not inevitable; there are alternatives. There are at least nine financing options for social development: raise progressive taxes (such as on corporate profits, finance, high wealth, property, and digital services); curb illicit financial flows; reduce or restructure debt; increase employers contributions to social security and formalize employment; reallocate spending away from high-cost, low-impact items such as defense; use fiscal and foreign-exchange reserves; increase aid and transfers; adopt more flexible macroeconomic frameworks; and approve new allocations of Special Drawing Rights. In a world awash with money yet marked by stark inequality, finding the funds is a matter of political will. In short: austerity is a choice, not a necessity.

History will not judge Doha by its communiqués but by whether the promises made—on rights, jobs and equity—reach people. Implementation is feasible, as there are financing options even in the poorest countries. If leaders go ahead, Doha will be remembered not as an echo of 1995, but as the moment words gave way to action.

Isabel Ortiz, Director, Global Social Justice, was Director at the International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, and a senior official at the UN and the Asian Development Bank.

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Ibrahim Olabi, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in Syria. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 12 2025 (IPS)

Eleven months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria continues to grapple with severe instability as the country navigates a turbulent political transition. Rates of displacement have surged, and humanitarian organizations are struggling to support large numbers of refugees returning home. In recent weeks, the United Nations (UN) has documented numerous cases of enforced disappearances and abductions, calling for stronger accountability measures as the transition continues to unfold.

The ongoing displacement crisis at the Syrian borders was detailed in the latest regional flash update from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). According to the update, roughly seven million civilians remain displaced within Syria, while more than 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home, with roughly half of them departing from IDP sites in northern Syria.

As of November 6, UNHCR has recorded approximately 1,208,802 Syrians having crossed back into Syria from bordering nations since December 8, 2024. The majority of these returnees are projected to have departed from Türkiye, with UNHCR recording roughly 550,000 Syrian returnees in the past year.

Additionally, roughly 362,027 have been recorded returning to Syria from Lebanon. Smaller numbers of returnees have been recorded returning from Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and afar. Currently, it is estimated that at least 1,476 Syrians have participated in the repatriation programme organized by UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the General Security Office (GSO).

Both internally displaced Syrians and those returning home continue to endure harsh living conditions, compounded by severe shortages of humanitarian supplies. UNHCR notes that additional funding is urgently required to facilitate an effective political transition for civilians, with the agency recording widespread destruction to homes, an overwhelming lack of employment opportunities, and shrinking availability of access to basic services.

Aid operations are increasingly strained, struggling to keep pace with the growing scale of needs across the country. Winterization efforts are underway as harsh temperatures are projected to exacerbate already dire living conditions. UNHCR estimates that reduced funding threatens to leave roughly 750,000 Syrian refugees without winter assistance.

“Humanitarian budgets are stretched to breaking point and the winter support that we offer will be much less this year,” said Dominique Hyde, UNHCR’s Director of External Relations. “Families will have to endure freezing temperatures without things many of us take for granted: a proper roof, insulation, heating, blankets, warm clothes or medicine.”

UNHCR chief Filippo Grandi has urged the international community, the private sector, and Syrian communities to “come together and intensify their efforts to support recovery”, to ensure that returns are dignified and sustainable. “With renewed commitment, the international community can help preserve hope and support stability and durable solutions for one of the largest refugee situations of our time,” said Grandi.

To support displaced Syrian families ahead of the harsh winter season, UNHCR has scaled up its winterization response across Syria, supplying over 17,000 displaced and returnee families with essential non-food items. The agency delivered winter kits with essential winter supplies such as blankets, heaters, mattresses, and warm clothing in Aleppo, Hama, Dar’a, Quneitra, Homs, Qamishli, Sweida, and rural Damascus.

“Our teams are on the ground, determined to protect refugees from the cold, but we are running out of time and resources,” added Hyde. “We need more funding to help make many lives slightly more tolerable.” UNHCR aims to raise at least $35 million to repair damaged homes, insulate shelters, and provide warmth, blankets, and other essentials for children and the elderly, along with funding for medicines and hot meals.

To help meet the most urgent needs, UNHCR has continued distributing support through its Return and Reintegration Financial Assistance programme, providing critical financial aid to more than 45,000 returnees. Additionally, over 24,500 returnees have been supported at key border crossings with Türkiye and Lebanon over the course of this year, with UNHCR and its partners continuing to monitor civilian movement and welfare through home visits and referrals to lifesaving services.

Despite these efforts, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has underscored growing insecurity in Syria, marked by “worrying reports” of continued enforced disappearances and abductions. On November 7, OHCHR spokesperson Thameen Al-Keetan informed reporters in Geneva that at least 97 people have been abducted since the beginning of the year, adding to the more than 100,000 individuals who went missing during the five decade rule of the Assad regime.

Karla Quintana, the Head of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP), added that “everyone in Syria knows someone who has gone missing”. OHCHR also highlights the disappearance of Hamza Al-Amarin, a volunteer with the Syria Civil Defense, who went missing in July of this year while assisting with a humanitarian evacuation mission in Sweida. OHCHR and its partners continue to urge for strengthened accountability measures and the protection of all humanitarian personnel.

“We stress that all armed actors – both exercising State power and otherwise – must respect and protect humanitarian workers at all times, everywhere, as required by international human rights law and applicable humanitarian law,” said Al-Keetan. “Accountability and justice for all human rights violations and abuses, past and present, are essential for Syria to build a durable, peaceful and secure future for all its people.”

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Belém—30th Conference of the Parties (COP30). Credit: Antônio Scorza/COP30

By Erik Solheim
OSLO, Norway, Nov 11 2025 (IPS)

When world leaders now gather in Belém, Brazil for the UN climate conference, expectations will be modest. Few believe the meeting will produce any breakthroughs. The United States is retreating from climate engagement. Europe is distracted. The UN is struggling to keep relevant in the 21st century.

But step outside the negotiation tents, and a different story unfolds—one of quiet revolutions, technological leaps, and a new geography of leadership. The green transformation of the world is no longer being designed in Western capitals. It is being built, at scale, in the Global South.

Ten years ago, anyone seeking inspiration on climate policy went to Brussels, Berlin or Paris. Today, you go to Beijing, Delhi or Jakarta. The center of gravity has shifted. China and India are now the twin engines of the global green economy, with Brazil, Vietnam and Indonesia closely behind.

Erik Solheim

China has made the green transition its biggest business opportunity, turning green action into jobs, prosperity and global leadership. China is now making more money from exporting green technology than America makes from exporting fossil fuels.

India, too, is reshaping what green development looks like. I was in Andhra Pradesh last month, when I visited a wonderful six-gigawatt integrated energy park—solar, wind, and pumped storage. It delivers round-the-clock clean power. There is nothing like that in the West. In another state, Tamil Nadu, an ecotourism circuit is protecting mangroves and marine ecosystems while creating local jobs in tourism. The western state of Gujarat, long a laboratory for industrial innovation, has committed to 100 gigawatts of renewables by 2030, with the captains of Indian business – Adani and Reliance – driving large-scale solar and wind investments with the state government.

These are not pilot projects. They are national strategies. And they are succeeding because the economics have flipped.

The cost of solar power has fallen by over 90 percent in the last decade, largely thanks to the intense competition between Chinese solar companies. Battery storage is now competitive with fossil fuels. What was once an environmental aspiration has become a financial inevitability. In Indian Gujarat, solar-plus-storage projects are already cheaper than coal. Switching to clean energy is no longer a cost—it is a saving.

That is why climate action today is driven not by diplomacy, but by economics. The question is no longer if countries will go green, but who will own the technologies and industries that make it possible.

Europe, long the moral voice of the climate agenda, now risks losing the industrial race. After years of blocking imports from developing countries on grounds of “inferior” green quality, it now complains that Chinese electric vehicles are too good— too cheap and too efficient. Europe cannot have it both ways. The world cannot build a green transition behind protectionist walls. The markets must open to the best technologies, wherever they are made.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil understands this new reality. That is why he chose Belém, deep in the Amazon, as the site for climate talks. The location itself is a statement: the future of climate policy lies in protecting the rainforests and empowering the people who live within them.

Forests are not just carbon sinks; they are living economies. When I was Norway’s environment minister, we partnered with Brazil and Indonesia to reward them for reducing deforestation. Later, Guyana joined our effort—a small South American nation where nearly the entire population is of Indian or African origin.

Guyana has since turned conservation into currency. Under its jurisdictional REDD+ programme, the country now sells verified carbon credits through the global aviation market known as CORSIA. In the third quarter of this year, these credits traded at USD 22.55 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent, with around one million credits sold through a procurement event led by IATA and Mercuria.

The proceeds go directly to forest communities—building schools, improving digital access, and funding small enterprises. It is proof that the carbon market can deliver real value when tied to real lives. You cannot protect nature against the will of local people. You can only protect it with them. Last year in Guyana, I watched children play soccer and cricket beneath the jungle canopy—a glimpse of life thriving in harmony with the forest, not at its expense.

That, ultimately, is what Belém should represent: not another round of procedural debates, but a vision for linking markets, nature and livelihoods.

The Global South has also sidestepped one of the West’s greatest political failures: climate denial. In India, there is no major political party—or public figure, cricket star or Bollywood artist—questioning the reality of climate change. Leaders may differ on ideology, but not on this. Across Asia, from China to Indonesia, climate action unites rather than divides. Because here, ecology and economy move together.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India puts it simply: by going green, we also go prosperous. President Xi Jinping of China and President Lula of Brazil share that same message—a vision that draws people in, instead of lecturing them. It is this integration of growth and sustainability that explains why the Global South is moving faster than most of the developed world.

None of this means diplomacy is irrelevant. The UN still matters. But its institutions must evolve to reflect the realities of the 21st century. The Security Council, frozen in 1945, still excludes India and Africa from permanent membership. Without reform, multilateralism risks losing its meaning.

Yet, while negotiations stall, transformation continues. From solar parks in Gujarat to high-speed rail across China, from mangrove tourism in Tamil Nadu to carbon markets in Guyana—climate leadership is happening in real economies, not in press releases.

Belém will not deliver a grand agreement. But it doesn’t need to. The world is already moving—faster than our diplomats.

The story of Belem will not be written in communiqués, but in kilowatts, credits, and communities.

The real climate leaders are no longer in Washington or Brussels.

They are in Beijing, Delhi, São Paulo, and Georgetown.

The future of climate action is already here.

It just speaks with a southern accent.

The author is the former Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme and Norway’s Minister for Environment and International Development.

IPS UN Bureau

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Women cooperative in Merzouga, Morocco. Credit: Forus/Both Nomads

By Mavalow Christelle Kalhoule
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Oct 30 2025 (IPS)

Thirty years ago, world leaders gathered in Copenhagen and made a promise: people would be at the center of development. This November, Heads of State and Government will meet again in Doha, Qatar, for the Second World Summit for Social Development or WSSD2.

For civil society, the Second World Summit for Social Development is a call to action to reshape social contracts, rebuild trust, and mobilise for implementation and accountability so that “leave no one behind” becomes more than a slogan. And civil society can help make that happen, not as bystanders, but as solution providers and accountability partners.

At the same time, governments also expect the private sector to share and take up responsibilities, not only by creating jobs, but by driving social development more rapidly and on a larger scale

“Solutions” are already here, in the form of community-rooted “fixes” and strategies.

Civil society and movements are working hard: from expanding social protection for informal workers, to youth alliances linking skills training with decent, safe jobs. Investments in the care economy are creating fair work, easing the burden on women, and improving childhood and support for older people. Civic groups are making local budgets transparent, while digital inclusion programs are designed with persons with disabilities and rural communities.

These ideas have been adopted and funded. What they need now is political will, stable support, and true collaboration between governments, civil society, and communities.

From slogans to systems: a practical agenda for Doha and beyond

To move from aspiration to action, we propose five concrete steps that governments, United Nations agencies, and civil society can take together starting in Doha.

1) Set up a national platform for social development in every country by mid-2026.
Give it a public mandate, a diverse membership, and a simple job: translate the declaration’s three pillars into a country plan with milestones, budget linkages, and annual public reviews. Include unions, employers, women’s rights groups, youth networks and Older People’s Associations, organisations of persons with disabilities, faith groups, and local authorities. Build in independent monitoring and a public dashboard so people can see progress and gaps.

2) Protect and expand social protection with a focus on those most often left out.
Adopt or update a national social protection strategy that commits to at least a two-percentage-point annual increase in coverage until universal floors are reached, as the declaration encourages. Prioritise universal child benefits, disability-inclusive schemes, and lifecycle guarantees for older persons. Publish grievance mechanisms and coverage maps down to district level.

3) Link promises to money.
Ask finance and planning ministries to table, within 12 months, a “social spending compact” that identifies protected budget lines for health, education, and social protection, lays out debt management measures that shield social spending, and commits to transparent tax reforms to broaden fiscal space fairly. Invite multilateral banks to align country frameworks and provide concessional windows for social policy, as the declaration urges.

4) Close the digital divide as a social policy priority, not a tech afterthought.
Treat access to affordable internet, digital assistive technologies, and digital public infrastructures and assistance as an enabler of social rights. Co-design digital inclusion targets with communities and invest in last-mile connectivity, inclusive ID systems, and digital literacy, while safeguarding rights and privacy.

5) Build accountability into the calendar.
Use the UN Commission for Social Development in early 2026 as the first checkpoint: each government should present its national platform’s workplan, spending compact outline, and coverage targets. Regionally, UN commissions can convene mid-year stock-takes. Civil society will publish parallel reports that track delivery, spotlight gaps, and lift up solutions that can be scaled.

The promise — and the gaps — of Doha

The already agreed Doha Political Declaration restates the three pillars of social development and links them explicitly to human rights and non-discrimination. It nods to today’s realities: deepening inequalities; demographic shifts; and the digital divide that keeps billions offline.

There is progress to welcome. For the first time, the text recognises the rights of older persons. It commits to universal social protection, including “social protection floors” that guarantee basic income security and essential services throughout the life course.

But the text is cautious where courage is needed. Financing is the missing bridge. The declaration references recent global financing discussions (including the Seville outcomes under the Financing for Development track), yet stops short of specifying how countries will protect social spending while tackling debt, or how multilateral banks will resource social policy at scale.

It says little about crisis settings: places where conflict, disasters, or displacement make social development both hardest and most urgent.

Universal health coverage appears, but without the strength advocates for sexual and reproductive health and rights or for non-communicable diseases hoped for.

And while the declaration acknowledges digital transformation, it does not spell out practical steps to close the divides that map so closely onto poverty, geography, gender, and disability.

None of that should deter us. As Essi Lindstedt of Fingo in Finland, reminds us “This is not only the time for declarations, it’s the time for delivery”.

The negotiation window may be closed, but the implementation window is wide open. The real work begins in capitals, municipalities, and communities, channeling the urgency and hope of citizens for dignity and wellbeing. “Poverty should not be seen as natural. Social policy can end poverty. Therefore, social policy should be managed as a global investment that enables every person, community and country to chart their own course to thriving.”

“We must go to the grassroots. Since Copenhagen, in the Sahel and particularly in Chad, our communities continue to struggle for access to water, to the land, healthcare, education, food, and essential infrastructure. We are facing security challenges, the simple fact of living together. All of these challenges are deeply interconnected and addressing them means putting human dignity at the center of development. Across the whole chain of actors — economic, social, and political — we must never lose sight of the most vulnerable,” says Jacques Ngarassal, of CILONG, the civil society network in Tchad.

“We need to ensure social cohesion”.

From closed negotiations to open implementation

That is where civil society comes in. National coalitions and grassroots organisations are already demonstrating that social progress is possible when communities lead.

The declaration invites this by calling for “multi-stakeholder engagement” and stronger national coordination to avoid policy silos. We should take that invitation literally, insisting on inclusion while modeling it: intergenerational, gender-responsive, disability-inclusive, locally led.

The next stage must therefore shift the focus from consultation to co-creation. Governments cannot deliver on the declaration alone. When it comes to financing what matters – civil society can connect those dots domestically.

As Carlos Arana of the Asociación Nacional de Centros (ANC) in Peru noted, many countries face “policy incoherence”: ambitious social plans undermined by debt pressures and austerity. Others are excluded from concessional finance because they have crossed an arbitrary income threshold, even where inequalities remain deep.

“We see two realities today. On one hand, our societies have moved toward greater equality; yet on the other, deep inequalities persist. We can say we have made some progress, but at this moment, what matters most is not to go backward. Around the world, there is growing concern about the weakening of democracies as conservative forces regain strength. This rollback is most visible in social policies and in the shrinking spaces for participation that many of our countries opened decades ago,” adds Josefina Huamán, Executive Secretary of ANC which is also the secretary of la Mesa de Articulación de Asociaciones Nacionales y Redes de ONGs de América Latina y el Caribe.

“In my own country, for example, spaces created 20 years ago to build consensus between the State, civil society, and political parties have eroded. They have weakened because a ruling class, empowered elites who perhaps never truly disappeared, have reclaimed hegemony. What is vanishing is that participatory spirit — the affirmation of men and women of all ages and backgrounds as active subjects in democracy. This conservative, or even neoconservative, resurgence is something we are witnessing clearly in Latin America — in Bolivia, in Argentina, in Peru — and it should deeply concern us all.”

The solution is to rethink how we measure and resource progress. Moving “beyond GDP” means judging success by well-being, equity, and sustainability. It also means linking Doha’s commitments to the broader Financing for Development agenda and to reforms of the international financial architecture.

Civil society is already leading: generating citizen data, advocating tax justice, and pressing for transparency in public spending. Governments and donors must now back these efforts with coherent policy and long-term, flexible funding.

The Doha Declaration closes one chapter and opens another. Civil society is ready. Open the door, and we will help carry this agenda from the conference hall to the places where it matters most: the neighborhoods, villages, and city blocks where trust is rebuilt and futures are made.

As Zia ur Rehman, Executive Director of the Pakistan Development Alliance and Chair of the Asia Development Alliance, reminds us:

“The true legacy of the Second World Summit for Social Development will not be the text agreed in Doha, but the accountability and hope we build afterwards. Civil society has shown we are ready. The question now is whether leaders are willing to meet us halfway.”

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

A damaged classroom and school equipment at Dahilig Elementary School in the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur, Philippines, weeks after Severe Tropical Storm Kristine (Trami) wreaked havoc in October 2024. Credit: UNICEF/Larry Monserate Piojo

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 30 2025 (IPS)

In 2024, the climate crisis has disrupted schooling for millions of students worldwide, weakening workforces and hindering social development on a massive scale. With extreme weather patterns preventing students from accessing a safe, and effective learning environment, the United Nations (UN) and the Geneva Global Hub for Education in Emergencies (EiE Hub) continue to urge the international community to assist the most climate-sensitive areas in building resilient education systems that empower both students and educators.

On October 28, members of the EiE Hub released a statement that calls on stakeholders and world leaders to center children’s education at the forefront of global discussions at COP30 to be held in Belém, Brazil in November. It is projected that without urgent intervention, tens of millions of children are at risk of falling behind on their education, which threatens long-term economic development and stability.

“Children are more vulnerable to the impacts of weather-related crises, including stronger and more frequent heatwaves, storms, droughts and flooding,” said Catherine Russell, Executive-Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in January. “Children cannot concentrate in classrooms that offer no respite from sweltering heat, and they cannot get to school if the path is flooded, or if schools are washed away. Last year, severe weather kept one in seven students out of class, threatening their health and safety, and impacting their long-term education.”

According to figures from UNICEF, approximately half of the world’s school-aged children receive access to quality education, with an estimated 1 billion children residing in countries that are described as “extremely high-risk” to climate shocks and natural disasters. Members of the EiE Hub estimate that at least 242 million students experienced disruptions to their education in 2024 due to climate-related events, with more than 118 million affected by heatwaves in May alone. Beyond hindering learning quality and teachers’ ability to effectively instruct, climate-induced disasters and shocks also increase the risk of school dropouts and expose children to heightened protection risks.

These risks are especially severe in communities across the Global South, where the impacts of climate-induced disasters are most pronounced. Frequent climate shocks devastate local economies, undermine adaptation efforts, and exacerbate pre-existing inequalities. Women, girls, displaced persons, and individuals with disabilities are disproportionately affected—facing higher risks of violence, adverse health impacts, loss of livelihood opportunities, and increased rates of child, early, and forced marriage.

In August, a report published by UNICEF and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) found that roughly 5.9 million children and adolescents in Latin America and the Caribbean could be pushed into poverty by 2030 due to loss of education as a result of climate change if governments do not intervene soon. This represents the most optimistic scenario as the projected number of young people pushed into poverty could be as high as 17.9 million.

According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Asia-Pacific region is considered to be the most climate-sensitive environment in the world, in which communities in coastal and low-lying areas are disproportionately impacted by rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns. Additionally, these communities rely on fisheries and agriculture, which are climate-sensitive economies, putting them at further risk.

A World Bank report titled Gender Dimensions of Disaster Risk and Resilience highlights the heightened vulnerability of boys and girls during climate-related shocks and how this impacts them differently. In Fiji, numerous households that lost one or both parents to natural disasters intensified by climate change, underscoring the link between families who experienced the loss of a parent and increased rates of school dropouts and child labor.

The report also found that girls who lost both parents were 26 percent less likely than boys to join the workforce within five years of a disaster and were 62 percent more likely to be married during the same period. In Uganda, the World Bank recorded that the likelihood of engaging in child labor often increases for both boys and girls following a natural disaster.

“If children and young people don’t have the resources to meet their basic needs and develop their potential, and if adequate social protection systems are not in place, the region’s inequalities will only be perpetuated,” said Roberto Benes, UNICEF Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Despite this, education systems receive only a small percentage of available climate and government funding. From 2006 to March 2023, it is estimated that only 2.4 percent of funding from multilateral climate action budgets go toward climate-resilience programs for schools. According to EiE Hub, during the last cycle of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs 2.0), less than half of the NDCs met the standards for being child-sensitive, and have therefore been largely overlooked by governments.

EiE Hub calls on governments, donors, and civil society groups to make education a key part of climate action dialogue going forward, particularly in discussions at COP30. The organization highlights the importance of increased investment in climate-resilient education systems—especially in vulnerable and conflict-affected areas—as every USD $1 a government invests in education, national GDP can increase by approximately USD 20.

Additionally, the organization also stresses the need to involve children and youth in climate policymaking and to invest in resilient school infrastructure and climate education. By integrating green skills and climate learning into curriculum, education can become a powerful tool for resilience and climate action.

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Opposition to data centres (DCs) has been rapidly spreading internationally due to their fast-growing resource demands. DCs have been proliferating quickly, driven by the popularity of artificial intelligence (AI).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

In October 2024, McKinsey projected that global energy demand by DCs would rise between 19% and 22% annually through 2030, reaching an annual demand between 171 and 219 gigawatts.

This greatly exceeds the “current demand of 60 GW”. “To avoid a [supply] deficit, at least twice the [DC] capacity built since 2000 would have to be built in less than a quarter of the time”!

As tech companies are not paying for the additional energy generation capacity, consumers and host governments are, whether they benefit from AI or not.

As DCs increasingly faced growing pushback in the North, developers have turned to developing countries, outsourcing problems to poorer nations with limited resources.

Understanding these energy- and water-guzzling facilities is necessary to better protect economies, societies, communities, and their environments.

Energy needs
With growing corporate and consumer demand for AI, DC growth will continue, and even occasionally accelerate.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

As demand for AI and DCs increases, supporting computers will require significantly more electricity. This will generate heat, needing the use of water and energy for cooling. Much energy used by DCs, from 38% to 50%, is for cooling.

Electricity generation, whether from fossil fuels or nuclear fission, requires more cooling than renewable energy sources such as photovoltaic solar panels or wind turbines.

A small-scale DC with 500 to 2,000 servers consumes one to five megawatts (MW). For tech giants, a ‘hyperscale’ DC, hosting tens of thousands of servers, consumes 20 to over 100MW, like a small city!

Data centres not cool
As the popular focus is on DCs’ enormous energy requirements, their massive water needs to cool equipment tend to be ignored, understated and overlooked.

Locating new DCs in developing countries will further heat local microclimates and the planetary atmosphere. Worse still, heat is more environmentally threatening in the tropics, where ambient temperatures are higher.

Establishing more DCs will inevitably crowd out existing and other possible uses of freshwater supplies, besides reducing local groundwater aquifers.

Unsurprisingly, DC investors rarely warn host governments about the amount of locally supplied energy and water required.

DCs require much freshwater to cool servers and routers. In 2023, Google alone used almost 23 billion litres to cool DCs. In cooling systems using evaporation, cold water is used to absorb severe heat, releasing steam into the atmosphere.

Closed-loop cooling systems absorb heat using piped-in water, while air-cooled chillers cool down hot water. Cooled water recirculated for cooling requires less water but more energy to chill hot water.

Investors expect subsidies
Like other prospective investors, DCs have relocated to areas where host governments have been more generous and less demanding.

Led by US President Trump’s powerful ‘tech bros’, many foreign investors have profited from subsidised energy, cheap land and water, and other special incentives.

Prospective host governments compete to offer tax and other incentives, such as subsidised energy and water, to attract foreign direct investment in DCs.

The US pressured Malaysia and Thailand to stop Chinese firms from using them as an “export-control backdoor” for its AI chips. Washington alleges that DCs outside China buy chips to train its AI for military purposes. So far, only Malaysia has complied.

This limits Chinese firms’ access to such chips. Washington claims that Chinese substitutes for US-made chips are inferior and seeks to protect US technology from China.

High-tech DC jobs?
Data centres are emerging everywhere, but not many jobs will be created. Advocates claim DCs will provide high-tech jobs.

DCs are largely self-operating, requiring minimal human intervention, except for maintenance, which they determine independently. Thus, job creation is minimised.

Construction and installation work will be temporary, with most managerial functions being performed remotely from headquarters. A Georgetown University report estimates only 27% of DC jobs are ‘technical’.

While the DC discourse mainly focuses on foreign investments, there is little discussion on growing national desires for data sovereignty.

Acceding to so many foreign requests will inevitably block national capacity ambitions to develop end-to-end DC capabilities and not just host them.

Thus far, there is limited interest in the ‘afterlife’ of DCs, such as what happens after they have outlived their purpose, or the disposal of waste materials.

Higher energy and water costs, subsidies, tax incentives and other problems caused by DCs are hardly offset by their modest employment and other benefits.

IPS UN Bureau

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Women’s rights have steadily eroded in Afghanistan since 2021. Credit: UN Women
 
The recent blackout exposed how vital the Internet has become for Afghan women and how, when that connection is lost, hope fades and isolation takes hold.

By UN Women
NEW YORK, Oct 22 2025 (IPS)

When the Taliban recently cut off the Internet and phone networks across Afghanistan, millions of women and girls were silenced. For those with connectivity, the blackout severed their last link to the outside world – a fragile connection that had kept education, work, and hope alive.

Many women in Afghanistan still lack access to the Internet, a basic phone, or the literacy to use digital tools. For those that do, that connection is a rare lifeline to life-saving services and the outside world.

For now, access has largely been restored. But the message was clear: in Afghanistan, this valuable gateway to learning, expression, and services for women and girls can be shut down at any moment.

Afghan women are already banned from secondary and higher education, from most forms of work, and public spaces such as parks, gyms, and sports clubs.

Many women are also receiving humanitarian aid, including in earthquake-affected eastern Afghanistan, and among those returning – many forcibly – from Iran and Pakistan.

The digital and phone blackout intensified feelings of stress, isolation and anxiety among women and girls.

Women entrepreneurs participate in business development training in a UN Women-supported Multi-Purpose Women’s Centre in Parwan province, eastern Afghanistan in January 2025. Photo: UN Women/Ali Omid Taqdisyan

What happens when Afghan women and girls go offline?

In Afghanistan, the impact of Internet and phone blackouts falls more heavily on women and girls. It eliminates what is, for many, a final means of learning, earning, and connecting.

When women and girls lose Internet access, they lose the ability to:

• Access aid: Those who are connected can use the Internet or phones to find out about support available, and aid agencies rely on connectivity to continue operations.
• Learn about disasters: Recent data shows 9 per cent of women use the Internet to access information on climate disasters.
• Seek services and reporting mechanisms for survivors of gender-based violence or those at risk.
• Learn: Online classes and study groups were a lifeline for girls banned from secondary schools, and women banned from universities.
• Work: Online businesses are a vital source of income for many women to sustain their families after being pushed out of many formal roles.
• Connect: Social apps and social media provided safe spaces to support one another and exchange information.
• Be visible: For women already excluded from public life, the digital world is one the last places to exist and resist.

For more on what life looks like for women in Afghanistan today, see our FAQs.

Going dark in the middle of humanitarian crises

The national internet blackout started a month after a 6.0 earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan on 31 August, with major aftershocks continuing throughout September and the emergency response and early recovery continuing.

Despite facing many challenges, women-led organizations have played a crucial role delivering life-saving aid and services to women and girls affected by the earthquake, and Afghan women and girl returnees from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.

During the blackout, NGOs were forced to halt humanitarian operations and cease field missions to emergency sites. Staff could not process payments or place orders for essential goods destined for women and their families.

When banks went offline, women affected by humanitarian crises were unable to access emergency cash assistance to buy essentials such as food.

The shutdown also made it much harder for survivors of gender-based violence to access help at a time when household tensions were rising across the country, and the risk of violence was escalating.

A UN Women team assessed the earthquake damage in Nurgal, one of the worst affected districts in Kunar province, northeastern Afghanistan.

Online livelihoods switched off

In Afghanistan, waves of directives banning women from most jobs and restricting their movement without a male guardian have systematically pushed them out of public life.

For many women entrepreneurs, the Internet offers a rare space to work, build small businesses, and sell their products – such as nuts, spices, handicrafts, clothes and artworks – to customers within Afghanistan and overseas.

“There is no space for us to work outside our homes,” explained business owner Sama*, from Parwan in eastern Afghanistan. “There’s also no local market where we can display and sell our products.”

With the support of UN Women, Sama built an online shop selling knitted bags, purses and jewelry.

“Through my online shop, I became well known,” she says. “I’m earning money, solving my financial problems, and becoming self-sufficient.”

When the blackout struck, women like Sama lost their only source of income overnight – a warning that for many Afghan women, connectivity is not a luxury, but a lifeline.

From blackout to global action

The Internet blackout in Afghanistan was a stark reminder that the digital world is not neutral. It can be space of empowerment. It can also be a tool of exclusion and isolation.

The stories of Afghan women remind us what is at stake: education, mental health, livelihoods, and hope. When women are silenced online, they are cut off further from opportunity and from the world.

How UN Women is supporting women and girls in Afghanistan

Through its flagship programme, Rebuilding the Women’s Movement, UN Women in Afghanistan partnered with 140 women-led organizations across 24 provinces and supported 743 women staff with salaries and training – amplifying resilience even as public life is restricted.

Read more about our work in Afghanistan.

*Name was changed to protect her identity.

IPS UN Bureau

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Kathmandu’s Singha Durbar in flames

By Jan Lundius
ROME, Oct 2 2025 (IPS)

In the Global South, where people under the age of 18 comprise more than 50 percent of the population, youth activism is increasing rapidly. Youngsters are more agile and volatile than older people, less restrained by family, prestige and work. However, many suffer from marginalisation, lack of employment, and poverty. Furthermore, insecurity and limited life experience make young people an easy target for manipulating and unscrupulous politicians, criminal networks, and religious fanatics.

Students and young citizens come together by using social media to make their presence felt and mount protests in public spaces. The role of new media technologies as an organising tool has led besieged authorities to ban online platforms, though imposed restrictions have rather than contain protests accelerated them.

Rebellious youth generally belong to the Gen Z, which refers to “digital native”, the first generation fully immersed in a digital world, with constant access to internet and social media. An upbringing that has shaped their world view, making them independent, pragmatic and focused on social impact.

South Asia has recently experienced massive protest movements involving crowds of young people. In July 2022, after an economic collapse in Sri Lanka, a rebellion forced its president to flee the country. In July 2024, upheavals ended the long rule of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, and in September this year, violent protests in Nepal forced Prime Minister Khadga Oli’s government to resign.

Even though specific incidents triggered these upheavals, they were all due to long-term, shared grievances evolving from stark wealth gaps, rampant nepotism, and unlimited corruption. Above all, youngsters protested against members of powerful dynasties, favouring a wealthy and discredited political elite.

Sri Lankans were in 2022 faced with a galloping inflation, daily blackouts, as well as shortages of fuel, domestic gas, food, medicines, and essential imports. Amid massive desperation, huge crowds of mostly young people did on 25 March take to the streets under the slogan Aragalya, Struggle.

Political power had by then become embedded within the Rajapaksa dynasty. From 2005 to 2022, two brothers – Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, had alternately shared the presidency and prime minister post, while another brother headed their political party; a fourth was speaker of the parliament, and other relatives occupied influential political positions.

While Gotabaya Rajapaksa served as defence minister, he was credited with ending the twenty-six-year-long civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. After churches and luxury hotels in April 2019 had been targeted by ISIS-related suicide bombers, killing 270 people, Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who at the time were in opposition, accused the current government of leniency. When Gotabaya ran for the presidency the same year, he based his campaign on his record as a militant leader, embracing a Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism inspired by his brother Mahinda’s ethno-nationalist rhetoric, favouring the Buddhist establishment. Gotabaya was elected with an overwhelming majority and six ministries were then headed by members of the Rajapaksa clan.

Most Aragalaya protesters considered their personal hardships to be a result of the mismanagement and corruption of the Rajapaksa-led government. They demanded that the president be deposed and a thorough “system change” brought about. After appointing an astute insider, Ranil Wickremesinghe, as acting president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled to Singapore. Wickremesinghe’s government refused to hold elections and persistently portrayed Aragalaya as a chaotic movement, captured by militants, fascists, and terrorists.

Several Aragalaya supporters were wary of being used by partisan or militant groups, particularly those with leftist ideologies which had a long history of organizing protests and strikes. One exception could have been the leftist National People’s Power (NPP), established in 2019. The 2024 elections, which Wickremesinghe had been forced to accept, was won by a NPP coalition lead by Anura Dissanayake.

So far, Dissanayake and his NPP coalition have not introduced any radical political or economic changes. They have largely continued the Wickremesinghe government’s economic and foreign policies, raising questions about the extent to which the NPP coalition is willing, or able, to depart from established governance patterns and deliver the systemic change that has been promised. Deep set divisions and ethnic-religious tensions continue to harass the nation and NPP is apparently trying to tread lightly to avoid stirring up any violent disaccord.

The same could be said about Bangladesh, where an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus seems to be cautious not to cause any antagonistic violence. Yunus’ group of personal supporters and experts presides over a nation with a chilling rise in mob violence and political discord; women are often being targeted, as well as there are reports of attacks on religious minorities.

The formerly dictatorial, but secular and highly corrupt political party, the Awami League, has been banned and democratic elections are promised by the interim government in February 2026. Some are optimistic about democratic elections, described by Yunus as becoming the most “beautiful elections ever”. However, others are unsure if elections will actually be held within a political scenario where violence is a common-day affair.

In Bangladesh, it was a quota system for jobs that forced youngsters into the streets. It was mainly students who led the protests. Student politics had for several years been ferocious, especially since religious and political fractions used them as a mobilising force. Violent feuds within educational institutes had killed many and seriously hampered the academic atmosphere.

Student anger became unified through a common resentment of reserved positions in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS), a cherished field of government service. The reserved positions were destined to “freedom fighters, i.e. veterans from the 1971 liberation war, as well as their children and grandchildren. Protests erupted in full force on 1 July after the Supreme Court in June 2024 had reinstated a 30 percent quota reserved for veteran descendants, generally interpreted as an intent by the governing party to favour its traditional supporters.

Bangladesh became a sovereign nation in December 1971, after a war against Pakistan, which was supported by India. Sheik Mujibur Rahman was until his assassination in 1975 president and prime minister. Following further turmoil with counter coups, General Ziaur Rahman eventually took over as president; he was in May 1981 assassinated in yet another coup. Ziaur Rahman’s widow, Begum Khaleda Zia, served from 1991 to 1996 as the second female prime minster in the Muslim world (after the Pakistani Benazir Bhutto) and again between 2001 and 2006, when Bangladesh, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index was listed as the most corrupt country in the world. Following the end of her government’s term, a military-backed caretaker government charged Khaleda Zia and her two sons with corruption and in 2018 she was sentenced to 17 years in prison.

Sheikh Hasinah, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was prime minister between 1996 and 2001, and again from 2009 to 2024, following several controversial elections. Her tenure as prime minister was marked by economic mismanagement, rampant corruption, leading to a rising foreign debt, increased inflation, youth unemployment, banking irregularities and an enormous wealth gap. The Financial Times reported that more than an estimated USD 200 billion was allegedly plundered from Bangladesh during Sheikh Hasinah’s time as prime minister, with a lot of these money ending up in countries such as the UK.

As the case had been in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, several members of the Nepalese political elite considered themselves as privileged and not accountable, while favouring family members and supporters to syphon wealth from overprized building endeavours.

Khadga Prassad Oli, a communist who began his political career as “spokesman for the oppressed”, seemed to be unaware of the anger accumulating around him within a nation where some two thousand men and women daily left to look for livelihoods in other countries (remittances from Nepalis working abroad constitute a third of the country’s GDP). Of those who stayed behind, more than 80 percent work in the informal sector, while youth unemployment in the formal sector is more than 20 percent.

On 4 September this year, the government ordered authorities to block 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, X, YouTube, LinkedIn, Instagram, Reddit, Signal and Snapchat, for not complying with a deadline to register with the country’s ministry of communication. The measure was explained as a means to tackle fake news, hate speech, and online fraud.

By then, youngsters had with increasing anger accessed platforms where politicians’ children posted photos of their opulent existence, awash with designer clothes, luxury holidays, and lavish parties. The close down of all media platforms, except the Chinese TikTok, further inflamed the resentment of Nepalese youth.

Soon Kathmandu was burning – Singha Durbar, i.e. Nepal’s administrative headquarters; the health ministry; the parliament building; the Supreme Court; the presidential palace; the prime minister’s residence, offices of the governing communist party, and the Kathmandu Hilton, were all set ablaze.

Nepal, the oldest sovereign, and until 2008 only Hindu state in South Asia, was for 250 years, under a strict caste system, ruled by the Shah dynasty. After internal power struggles and murders within the “Royal House of Gorkha” the monarchy was abolished and it was only in 1990 that it had ceded partial power to political parties. After that, a series of failing civilian governments gave in 1996 rise to a “Maoist” insurgency, which took sixteen thousand lives.

The leader of that rebellion, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, was in 2008 elected prime minister. However, he and his erstwhile revolutionaries proved incapable of improving Nepalese living standards and soon indulged themselves in corruption. After the September Gen Z-led upheaval a caretaker Prime Minister has been appointed. Sushila Karki, has a good record after being Nepal’s first female Chief Justice, between 2016 and 2017.

While new leaders seem to have emerged in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, the general public is now asking itself if these recently arrived politicians will be more prudent, corruption free and restrained in controversial actions, than their predecessors.

Much of the outcome depends on the “big brother” in the area – The Republic of India, where millions of migrant workers from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka reside and work. Indian democracy has, with all its shortcomings, been characterized by a collective political discourse in which concerns of a diversity of all Indians could find a space. However, under prime minister Modi we now witness the rise of Hindu nationalism, rooted in homogeneity and exclusion, questioning who really belongs in the Hindutva community, while marginalizing those who don’t, among them migrants, Muslims, and many others. A dangerous polarization that could worsen the situation in neighbouring countries, particularly considering the huge number of their emigrants being present in a country prone to discriminate against them, as well as forcing them back to a tumultuous situation in their countries of origin.

This is part 1 of an analysis of the connection between youth movements and political change, part 2 will analyse how youth-led revolutions have changed political scenarios globally.

IPS UN Bureau

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