Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, learns how to pan for gold in a free-mercury mine in Baguio, the Philippines, in 2024. Credit: Minamata Convention on Mercury

By Kizito Makoye
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 5 2026 (IPS)

Ask any woman miner in the Katoro goldfield in Tanzania’s northern Geita region, and she will tell you that she touches toxic mercury with her bare hands when extracting gold from crushed ore.

Many also say they carry the mercury-gold amalgam home and burn it in kitchens, exposing themselves and their families to toxic fumes that waft into the air.

For many women in Tanzania’s artisanal mining communities, the use of mercury is deeply embedded in their survival.

Globally, mercury used in artisanal gold mining contaminates rivers, enters fish and travels through Indigenous food systems – affecting distant communities.

Monika Stankiewicz, the United Nations’ Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, warned this week that mercury pollution linked to artisanal gold mining continues to wreak havoc globally, with some women so fearful of the toxic metal’s effects that they are delaying motherhood.

During visits to mining communities in different countries, Stankiewicz said she heard stories that exposed the hidden human cost behind the global gold rush – where poverty often leaves families choosing between earning a living and protecting their health.

“I’ve heard women saying they are afraid to get pregnant because they are afraid their children will be affected by mercury,” Stankiewicz tells IPS on the sidelines of the Eighth GEF Assembly. “So it was really heartbreaking.”

Her account paints a grim picture of women and children exposed to hazardous mercury in domestic settings as the human toll of the global gold rush continues to grow, from Geita to Brazil’s Amazon despite visible risks to human health and ecosystems.

For Stankiewicz, the challenge extends beyond environmental regulation to the harsh reality facing millions of low-income miners worldwide, whose families struggle to survive today while carrying health risks that may last for generations.

“It is always a different context,” Stankiewicz said, recalling her years of interactions with artisanal miners.

“In different countries where I met with miners, the situation was quite specific. So it’s difficult to have one story that represents the entire informal sector,” she said.

Mercury pollution linked to artisanal and small-scale gold mining remains one of the world’s largest sources of human-generated mercury emissions.

In Tanzania, where roughly 1.2 million artisanal miners depend on gold for income, mercury is still widely used because it is cheap, accessible and effective at recovering gold.

Mercury is a toxic substance that attacks the central nervous system. According to Stankiewicz, exposure to the liquid metal may cause neurological damage, including memory loss and tremors, respiratory illness from inhaling mercury vapour, reproductive health impacts and harm to children’s developing nervous systems.

Children are particularly vulnerable.

Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary, Minamata Convention on Mercury at the Eighth GEF Assembly in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

“Even low levels can affect brain development, learning and memory, and motor skills,” she said.

The consequences can be lifelong.

“We know from past experiences, such as the Minamata disease in Japan, that high levels of mercury exposure, particularly during pregnancy, can lead to severe and permanent neurological damage in children.”

In many artisanal mining communities, women process ore, store mercury and supervise the burning of amalgam to prevent theft.

“If they are not processing directly, they are often most trusted to either store the mercury or watch over the amalgam as it gets burnt to ensure it is not stolen,” Stankiewicz explains.

“They also face compounded risks during pregnancy, as mercury can affect the developing foetus they carry.”

The unsafe disposal of mercury in Tanzania has created a toxic mix in the country’s river system, exposing people downstream to serious health risks due to water and fish contamination, she added.

Mercury enters rivers, fish and agricultural systems, exposing communities who may never set foot inside a mine.

“For families and communities relying on fishing or farming, the impact can mean reduced food safety and food security, loss of income from contaminated natural resources and long-term degradation of ecosystems they depend on,” Stankiewicz says.

She notes that Indigenous communities in the Arctic continue to experience mercury contamination, even though they do not engage in mercury-intensive artisanal mining, because mercury circulates globally through the atmosphere before accumulating in colder ecosystems.

In Brazil, the crisis carries another dimension.

“Despite their distance and very different contexts, both regions reflect a similar underlying reality: artisanal and small-scale gold mining exists at the intersection of livelihoods, informality, and, in some cases, illegality,” she says.

“In the Brazilian Amazon, we are seeing a growing presence of organised criminal networks linked to illegal gold mining, including money laundering, gold laundering, illegal mercury supply chains, and operations in protected and Indigenous areas.”

“In East Africa, including Tanzania, the situation is different in scale and structure, but the sector is still affected by widespread informality and illicit trade, such as smuggling and unregulated cross-border flows, which limit oversight and undermine efforts to control mercury use.”

For Stankiewicz, criminalising poverty does not solve the mercury problem.

She recalls meeting miners who had already stopped using mercury but remained trapped outside formal markets.

“They still struggled to formalise their activities and to have access to formal markets, to have a fair price for their gold and also to protect themselves from illegal activities.”

The lesson, she said, is that governments must avoid pushing miners deeper underground.

“It’s important to work directly with miners and not push them underground so that activity becomes fully illegal, because then it’s difficult to reach out with capacity building and awareness raising.”

Her message to a miner in Geita or the Brazilian Amazon is grounded in empathy rather than judgement.

“First of all, I would say that this is a very difficult choice for any family member or parent to either think of earning money or then also put at risk their own health.”

“So I do not wish anyone to be in a situation to make such a choice.”

Still, she urges immediate protective action.

“The most immediate and practical advice is really for miners to protect themselves from mercury exposure and to avoid certain practices that really may affect their health.”

“This is like burning amalgam in residential areas and also open burning.”

She believes the long-term answer lies elsewhere.

“Formalisation is the way to go.”

The Minamata Convention, which entered into force nearly a decade ago, has increasingly focused on helping countries move in that direction. Between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2025 the GEF committed USD 174.0 million for programming to support the implementation of the Convention under its eighth replenishment.

Earlier this week, the 71st Council of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) also acknowledged USD 200 million for smaller projects, including support for countries’ national implementation plans under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and work to address mercury in artisanal and small-scale gold mining under the Minamata Convention on Mercury.

Under Article 7 and National Action Plans, governments are encouraged to eliminate the most dangerous practices, strengthen public health responses, formalise mining operations and introduce mercury-free technologies.

Progress, Stankiewicz says, is visible.

More countries have adopted action plans, more governments have recognised ASGM as a significant sector, and communities are becoming increasingly aware of mercury’s risks.

“On the ground, this is translating into concrete measures: the introduction of mercury-free technologies in some mining areas, stronger regulatory frameworks, efforts to formalise parts of the sector, and increasing integration of health considerations into national responses.”

But she warns against celebrating too early.

“The next phase, and the real test, is ensuring that these efforts are aligned with realities on the ground, sustained, scaled, and translated into lasting improvements in the lives of mining and downstream communities.”

For communities in Tanzania and Brazil that depend on gold, the challenge remains unresolved.

Gold still brings income.

Mercury still brings risk.

And between the two lies a difficult question millions of families continue to confront every day: how to survive today without sacrificing tomorrow.

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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Credit: Rizwan Tabassum/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, May 22 2026 (IPS)

Narges Mohammadi, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her human rights activism in Iran, has been allowed to go home. After guards found her unconscious in her cell, the apparent victim of a heart attack, she was granted temporary release from prison and transferred to a hospital. However, she still faces the threat of being taken back to jail once her condition has improved.

Mohammadi has been repeatedly imprisoned for criticising the theocratic regime, demanding women’s rights, advocating for prison reform and campaigning against the death penalty. Over her lifetime she’s been sentenced to a total of 44 years. She’s already spent more than a decade behind bars, including 161 days in solitary confinement, and has also been sentenced to 154 lashes. In February she was handed a further seven-and-a-half-year sentence. From prison – where she experienced cardiac and blood pressure problems and severe weight loss – she has documented systematic rights violations against political prisoners, including sexual and physical abuse of women detainees, torture and extensive use of solitary confinement.

Mohammadi’s case is one among many. While her ordeal has rightly drawn international attention, others more distant from the spotlight are in danger. Three more women human rights activists – Pakhshan Azizi, Sharifeh Mohammadi and Varisheh Moradi – are on death row at imminent risk of execution. The dangers they and countless others face have grown sharply since the current war began.

Repression tightens

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made clear he wants regime change in Iran. On 1 March, an Israeli strike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But if the intention was to topple the regime, it didn’t happen. Iran’s ruling theocratic structures run deep, with multiple layers of planned succession. Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, injured in the same attack, was quickly named his replacement, despite Iran’s official ideology formally rejecting hereditary succession.

While clerical leaders have been killed, Iran’s coercive apparatus has gained in its day-to-day power, hardening the theocracy into something closer to a military dictatorship, with the Basij, the paramilitary volunteer force long deployed to crush public dissent, now front and centre.

Israeli and US hopes that Iranians would rise up against the regime have been disappointed. Iran has seen successive mass protest waves, each crushed with large-scale lethal violence. They include the Green Movement that demanded democracy in 2009 and 2010 and the Woman, Life, Freedom protests that demanded women’s rights in 2022 and 2023. The latest uprising came in December 2025 and January 2026, triggered by economic collapse, forging a movement that united broad sections of society to demand an end to the theocratic regime. The state suppressed it with shocking brutality, killing thousands and detaining tens of thousands.

By February, the uprising had been crushed. The Israeli-US intervention was unlikely to reignite a meaningful mass protest movement. If anything, for some Iranians the war has stoked patriotism and more intense enmity towards Israel and the USA. The anticipated revolt simply hasn’t happened.

Much of Iran’s vast diaspora has rallied in support of the war as a means of toppling the regime. But while the diaspora is united in demanding change, its array of ethnic minority organisations, Islamist factions, leftists, monarchists and republicans is bitterly divided over what should come next. Reza Pahlavi, son of the last shah, enjoys some support but others are wary about monarchical nostalgia and his close ties to Israel and the USA. The most credible potential unifying figures inside Iran are imprisoned or otherwise silenced.

Instead of losing control, the regime has tightened its repression. Even as Iran’s leaders wage a social media propaganda war abroad, at home they’ve imposed a near-total internet shutdown, including a block on VPN services. The blackout has caused immense economic harm, disrupting businesses and financial transactions and hitting women the hardest. This comes on top of the economic effects of the current US blockade of Iranian ports, sending inflation and unemployment soaring.

Under the cover of war and the internet shutdown, the government has accelerated executions of political prisoners. While precise figures are hard to get, rights groups report close to 200 executions so far this year, most preceded by prolonged torture to extract false confessions. Secret hangings are reportedly being carried out on an almost daily basis. Among those killed are people detained during the January protests. On 4 May, it was reported that three people arrested at protests on 8 and 9 January – Ebrahim Dolatabadinejad, Mohammadreza Miri and Mehdi Rasouli – had been hanged. For families, the suffering doesn’t end there, as authorities reportedly refuse to return bodies and pressure relatives to stay silent.

Local priorities

Democracy and human rights in Iran depend on the regime’s departure. But the latest war isn’t about any of this. For Netanyahu, with an election impending and anger remaining at his corruption charges and Israel’s security failures around the 7 October Hamas attacks, permanent warfare is a political strategy. Donald Trump’s many social media announcements provide little clue of what motivates a president who promised not to mire the USA in foreign wars, but distraction from low popularity ratings and his many appearances in the Epstein files may be a factor.

This war isn’t the way to achieve change. The regime appears entrenched and capable of surviving a longer conflict. Any peace deal would leave it intact, which its rulers would treat as a victory.

Real change will come when protests can grow into a mass movement large enough to withstand the lethal repression the state will inevitably deploy. That can only happen with sustained support that respects the autonomy of local civil society leaders and strengthens their capacity. The immediate priorities must be to protect credible local sources of information amid the information blackout and ensure the safety and security of Iran’s democracy and human rights activists.

Above all, states must press the Iranian government to halt executions and release everyone detained for speaking out, protesting and demanding change, beginning with Narges Mohammadi. Temporary medical release is nowhere near enough. The Iranian regime must let her be free.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Olalekan Jeyifous (Nigeria), Devotees of the Petrotopia 01, 2021.

By Vijay Prashad
May 22 2026 (IPS-Partners)

 
In 1921, a few years into the Soviet experiment, V. I. Lenin published an essay with the revealing title ‘New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise’. The essay opened a line of inquiry that would remain with Lenin until the end of his life three years later. What captivated him was the issue of how to build socialism in a country ravaged by war, with minimal capital at its disposal, a largely peasant society with high rates of illiteracy (around 70%), and no public administration capable of running a socialist-oriented state. In the essay, Lenin reflected:

After an enormous, unparalleled exertion of effort, the working class in a small-peasant, ruined country, the working class which has very largely become declassed, needs an interval of time in which to allow new forces to grow and be brought to the fore, and in which the old and worn-out forces can ‘recuperate’. … One must understand this and reckon with the necessary or rather, inevitable slackening of the rate of growth of new forces of the working class.

This newsletter will be dedicated to the idea of ‘the interval of time’ necessary for a ‘ruined country’ to be resuscitated out of its backwardness to socialism (I’ve been thinking about this as I re-read our 100th dossier, The Future). We will discuss this idea in terms of the slowness of a socialist process to mature as capitalist society shudders in crisis. The concept of ‘slow to mature’ will be introduced here and deepened further in the work of our institute.

Konstantin Yuon (USSR), People, 1923.

All socialist revolutions in the modern world have taken place in the poorer nations, where the peasantry predominates and where wealth has been systematically leached from their territory into distant lands. In these poorer nations, the new revolutionary governments – whether in the Soviet Union (1917), Vietnam (1945), China (1949), or Cuba (1959) – had to develop their own state capacity out of almost nothing and build capital sums for the construction of infrastructure and industry. Neither state capacity nor capital came easily to these revolutionary processes, forcing them to experiment in ways that have not been properly documented. Here are six points built from what we do know about these processes, which serve as a baseline to develop a theory of the concept ‘slow to mature’. We encourage you to write to us with your own ideas about this concept based on your experiences and study.

1. Trust accumulates slowly, and old habits are difficult to break.

Revolutionary governments inherit structures shaped over generations by ancient hierarchies of caste and tribe that govern agrarian relations, by colonial humiliation and expropriation, and by total social deprivation. The Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, for instance, discovered quickly that the old tsarist bureaucratic culture did not disappear in October 1917. Corruption, deference to authority, and distrust of collective institutions persisted for years. In China after the 1949 Revolution, the Communist Party repeatedly confronted the remnants of Confucian hierarchy, regional patronage systems, and peasant survival habits formed through centuries of insecurity. In Cuba after 1959, the revolutionary leadership spoke openly of creating a ‘new human being’ because they understood that socialist consciousness could not be legislated overnight.

People who live through the violence of colonialism and the inequalities of capitalism learn to protect themselves individually or through familial networks. For a socialist project to succeed, people must learn to trust collective systems. That trust grows slowly through experience – through schools that function, clinics that heal, housing that shelters, and institutions that endure. A revolution can seize state power quickly, but it cannot rapidly transform social psychology.

Douglas Pérez (Cuba), The porvenir (The Future), 2008.

2. Trade and finance networks favour the existing global order.

Capitalism does not merely dominate through ideology but through entrenched networks of trade and finance, as well as through the infrastructure of transport and communications. Countries attempting socialist transformation enter a world already organised around capitalist accumulation. After the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union struggled because industrial supply chains, banking networks, and commercial routes were controlled by hostile capitalist powers. Cuba’s experience after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 showed this sharply: the island lost access to fuel, spare parts, credit, and trade relationships almost overnight because the world economy was structured around systems from which Cuba was largely excluded (and from which it is now being excluded further by the illegal US-run oil embargo). Vietnam, after reunification in 1975, faced enormous difficulties rebuilding an economy devastated by war while remaining outside of dominant financial and commercial circuits. Existing systems reproduce themselves because every institution, from ports to currencies to software standards, works in their favour. Building alternative networks takes decades, not years.

3. Capital and infrastructure costs are immense in countries impoverished by colonialism.

When the Vietnamese revolutionaries defeated US imperialism, they inherited a country physically devastated by bombardment and chemically poisoned by Agent Orange. Cuba inherited a monocrop sugar economy tied almost entirely to the United States. China in 1949 emerged from a century of humiliation and warlordism, Japanese imperialism, and civil war with low life expectancy, mass illiteracy, and weak industrial capacity.

These revolutions had to build railways and ports, schools and scientific institutions, electric grids and steel factories – almost from scratch. The North Atlantic capitalist countries industrialised over centuries, financed through enslavement, colonial plunder, and imperial tribute. Socialist state institutions in poorer countries that had been colonised were expected to compress this process into a few decades while under blockade or military threat and were then accused of state failure. The sheer material burden slowed transformation.

Đặng Thái Tuấn (Vietnam), Untitled (Mobile Convenience Store), 2021.

4. External pressures – such as sanctions, sabotage, diplomatic isolation, and war – slow development.

Every revolutionary state in the Third World has faced military encirclement or economic punishment. The Soviet Union was invaded by soldiers from over a dozen foreign countries after 1917 and later confronted the Nazi invasion, which killed at least twenty-seven million Soviet citizens and destroyed tens of thousands of towns and villages. Cuba has endured decades of US sanctions designed explicitly to create shortages and social discontent. Chile’s Popular Unity government attempted structural transformation but confronted immediate economic destabilisation, elite resistance, and external intervention before long-term reforms could consolidate. Nicaragua’s Sandinista government faced a Contra war financed by the United States and the mining of the country’s ports, including Corinto. Vietnam fought an anti-colonial war from 1945 to 1975.

These pressures consumed resources that would have gone to social development. Sanctions increase transaction costs, limit access to technology, and create chronic shortages. War destroys infrastructure and redirects labour to defence. Under these harsh conditions, inefficiencies emerge not from ideology or planning errors but from the permanent emergency conditions imposed by hostile powers.

5. Every process is inefficient in its early stages.

Revolutionary states try to create new administrative systems while simultaneously expanding education and health care, as well as conducting agrarian reform and industrial development. Mistakes and bureaucratic confusion, bottlenecks, and shortages are inevitable. The early Soviet planning system struggled with coordination because there was no historical precedent for the administration of a continental economy rooted in social justice rather than profit. China’s communes and industrial experiments suffered from weak technical expertise and uneven local implementation. In Cuba, shortages of trained professionals intensified when many fled to Miami after the revolution.

Public administration learns through practice. Institutions mature through trial and error. Socialist administrations in poorer nations are expected to achieve efficiency immediately while they confront embargoes, low literacy rates, and technological scarcity. Early inefficiency is therefore not exceptional but characteristic of any large-scale social transformation.

Ming Wong (Singapore), Ascent to the Heavenly Palace III, 2015.

6. Short electoral cycles obstruct social transformation.

Social transformation requires planning horizons measured in decades – not in the four- or five-year electoral cycles that reward immediate consumption over long-term reconstruction. Revolutionary governments require patience before visible gains appear. Even outside of explicitly socialist states, governments that attempt redistributive or developmental programmes often face sabotage through elections before projects mature. Transformative politics demand continuity, but electoral systems shaped by media cycles and financial pressures reward short-term management. Socialist experiments therefore repeatedly confronted the contradiction between historical time (the long duration needed to remake society) and electoral time (the compressed rhythm of modern politics).

Eva Schulze-Knabe (DDR), Demonstrierende Frauen (Women Marching), 1952.

In Bertolt Brecht’s The Mother (1931), the lead character, Pelagea Vlassova, toils through tragedy after tragedy until the Russian Revolution sweeps her into action. When she finds herself in a kitchen with several women, one of whom complains that they hear communism is nothing but a crime, she responds by singing:

It’s sensible– anyone can understand it. It’s easy.
If you’re not an exploiter, you can grasp it.
It’s good for you. Look into it.
The stupid call it stupid, and the rotten call it rotten.
It is against what’s rotten, and against stupidity.
The exploiters call it a crime.
But we know
it is the end of crime.
It is not madness but
the end of madness.
It is not chaos
but order.
It is the simple thing
so hard to bring about.

When thinking about ‘slow to mature’, I remembered Vlassova’s song. Vlassova worked her entire life yet had little to show for it but her dignity. She might not have had a full education, but she had her wits about her. She knew that communism is a ‘simple thing’, but she was not one to live in a dreamworld. It is simple, but ‘hard to bring about’.

This story was originally published by Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research

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Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS discusses Gen Z-led protests in the Philippines with Charles Zander, a 17-year-old climate justice activist from Bohol and youth campaigner for Greenpeace Philippines.

Charles Zander

What brought you to activism?

I grew up in Bohol, an island province in the Philippines where the climate crisis knocks on our doors every week. When I was younger, politics felt distant, but that changed in 2021, when Typhoon Odette hit our province. My home was severely damaged, but others suffered a lot more. I knew people who lost everything. Coastal communities were flattened and some villages were so cut off that it took weeks for supplies to reach them. In my case, it took two years before we had electricity again, and a year before we had water or I could access education.

My two childhood best friends died in the aftermath, and losing them changed me. At first, I didn’t think I was doing activism. It started with relief work: distributing food, organising community support, listening to people who had lost everything. I realised people needed to be heard. But the more you listen, the more questions appear. Why were some communities still waiting for aid?

Eventually, I realised if you grow up in a place where disasters are routine, silence feels like complicity. I joined local groups working on climate justice, community education and disaster response. And I saw protest as the moment when patience runs out.

What are young Filipinos demanding?

For many young Filipinos, the climate crisis is not a policy issue; it is the story of our lives. Climate injustice is therefore at the core of our struggle, but it connects to many other struggles. We live in a country hit by stronger typhoons every year, yet coal plants still get approved. We have coastal communities losing their homes to storm surges, yet development decisions rarely involve them. We have severe flooding everywhere in the country, and our government is pocketing climate adaptation funds.

When disaster hits, wealthy neighbourhoods rebuild quickly and sometimes are not damaged at all, while remote island communities wait for assistance for months, if not years. Disasters expose inequality, so climate protests are about fairness, about whose lives are considered worth protecting.

How were recent protests organised, and what role did social media play?

There are many active organisations, youth groups and community leaders, and when a major event such as a typhoon or a scandal creates urgency, conversations spread through networks and messaging groups. At some point someone proposes a date, which we often tie to a symbolic moment, such as the day of a national hero. The most recent one, in February, was on the 40th anniversary of the 1986 People Power Revolution. This has practical implications: on holidays, people don’t have school or work, so they can participate without worrying about their livelihoods. And because they’re home, people are paying more attention to social media, which increases our reach.

In this sense, nobody owns the protests. Movements grow because many people decide the moment has come. But organising involves logistics, including permits, safety planning, communication, outreach and coordination among groups with different priorities and strategies. That process can be messy, but it also reflects the democratic nature of grassroots movements. Eventually we all come together and get onto the streets.

Social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Instagram, allow young people to organise quickly across islands, cities and movements. Calls for protests can reach people within hours. Organisers can document events, share live updates and counter disinformation.

We use memes a lot. Older generations might respond to more technical explanations, but Gen Z and Gen Alpha are more reachable through humour and jokes. We also link issues to people’s actual lives so they feel compelled to act. But there needs to be more work on making sure people really know what they are fighting for when they join, not joining because it looks cool on social media.

Ultimately, technology is just a tool. A hashtag cannot replace a community. The underlying work is slower and happens when no one is watching. Protests are the visible tip of the iceberg, but below the surface there are community workshops, policy research meetings with local leaders, training of young volunteers and network-building across the country. A protest is just one day, but organising is the thousands of conversations that make that day possible. Without that groundwork, protests would fade quickly.

What risks have you faced?

For me personally, one of the most tangible dangers has been surveillance, online and offline. After participating in a major climate and social justice march, I noticed my online activity and messages being monitored more closely. It’s a subtle kind of pressure, but it makes you think twice about who you trust, how you communicate, what you post.

There’s also intimidation. At one protest, for instance, local authorities questioned volunteers about their involvement, contacts and affiliations. This is meant to create fear.

This has emotional and practical impacts. It can be exhausting and sometimes isolating. But it also shapes how you organise. You become strategic, deliberate, more protective of your peers. The fact that there are risks shows that those in power recognise the potential of youth movements to challenge the status quo. It is a reminder that our struggle matters.

What have the protests achieved, and where have they fallen short of ambition?

Change rarely arrives all at once. Sometimes protests produce policy progress, stronger commitments and greater attention to issues. Sometimes the impact is cultural. A protest can shift what people believe is possible, what people believe is right.

In the Philippines, the most visible achievement concerned the corruption around flood control projects. Although change is slow, we have seen some politicians arrested. A sitting senator is in hiding right now because of an arrest warrant. If we hadn’t spoken up, we would have lost so much more money from climate adaptation projects while our communities continued to suffer.

But movements also face setbacks. Governments delay action, hiding behind procedural issues, and public attention moves on quickly. This is discouraging. What failure teaches, though, is that we should communicate more effectively, build stronger alliances and sustain momentum beyond a single protest. A movement is not defined by the moment it wins, but by whether it continues after losing.

Is it right to call these Gen Z protests?

I have mixed feelings about it. I understand why the label appears. Many of the visible faces in recent movements are young people. The label captures something real: many young people feel the future they are inheriting was shaped by decisions made long before they had any political voice. The climate crisis is the clearest example. Policies that created the crisis were implemented decades ago, yet the consequences will unfold across the lifetimes of today’s young people. That creates a sense of urgency, and calling these protests Gen Z protests signals that a new generation is politically active and unwilling to remain passive.

But movements are rarely that simple. In almost every movement, people from many generations stand together, students marching alongside workers, community elders joining demonstrations, parents bringing their children, veteran organisers who have been fighting for decades showing up alongside people attending their first protest.

When protests are framed only as Gen Z movements, something important gets lost. It can unintentionally erase the contributions of older generations who built the foundation for these struggles. Every movement stands on ground that someone else cleared. Civil rights campaigns, climate movements and labour struggles didn’t start with Gen Z. These are long historical arcs that young people are entering and pushing forward.

The most powerful movements are intergenerational. Older organisers bring experience, historical memory and institutional knowledge. Younger generations bring new energy, new tools and new ways of communicating. One generation can ignite a movement, but lasting change requires many generations moving together.

It is also wrong to call us leaderless. We are not leaderless; we are leaderful. We just refuse to adopt some of the hierarchical ways of organising of previous generations, because sometimes leading collectively works much better than having someone dictate everything.

What keeps you going?

People, particularly young people, keep going because the problems are immediate and impossible to ignore. Protesting means refusing to accept the future we are being handed and making our voices matter.

Hope is not a passive feeling. It’s found in action, not in waiting. I see hope in the movement, because when young people, elders, students and communities stand together, there’s a shared strength, and the possibility of a world that values dignity, justice and sustainability becomes real. We keep moving because we are not alone. I also find hope in history, because it shows that while change is messy, people have always managed to push the boundaries of what is possible.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Credit: UKBET (UK Bangladesh Education Trust)

By Mohammed A. Sayem
SYLHET, Bangladesh, May 8 2026 (IPS)

When catastrophic floods swept through the Haor wetlands of Sunamganj in 2022, they destroyed far more than homes and crops. They shattered childhoods.

Jannat was only nine years old when floodwater swallowed her family’s house, farmland, and livestock. Like thousands of displaced families in northeastern Bangladesh, they took shelter in a school building converted into an emergency flood centre. But when the water receded, there was nothing left to return to.

The family migrated to a slum in Sylhet city to survive. Her father, once a farmer in the fertile haor lands, began pulling a rented rickshaw. Her mother started working as a domestic worker. Jannat’s school life ended almost overnight. Instead of carrying books, she began washing dishes and cleaning clothes in another family’s home for food and a small income.

Her story reflects a growing reality across climate-vulnerable Bangladesh. The 2022 floods in Sylhet, Kanaighat, Companygonj and Sunamganj were among the worst in more than a century. United Nations agencies estimated that nearly 7.2 million people across northeastern Bangladesh were affected, including around 3.5 million children. Entire villages disappeared under water, electricity collapsed across districts, schools were turned into emergency shelters, and thousands of hectares of cropland were destroyed. UNICEF reported that 1.6 million children were stranded by the floods, while hundreds of educational institutions and community clinics were damaged or submerged.

Credit: UKBET (UK Bangladesh Education Trust)

The crisis did not end in 2022. In 2024, another devastating wave of flooding inundated nearly 75 per cent of Sylhet district, affecting more than two million people across northeastern Bangladesh and displacing thousands of families yet again. More than 800 schools were flooded and large areas of farmland went underwater, deepening poverty and food insecurity. This year again, heavy rainfall and upstream water flows submerged more than 46,000 hectares of standing Boro rice fields in the haor region during harvesting season, threatening livelihoods and increasing the risk of climate migration and child labour. Experts warn that repeated climate shocks are trapping vulnerable families in a cycle of disaster, displacement, and poverty.

Yet hope can still rise from disaster.

The Doorstep Learning Programme (DLP) of UKBET, a UK-based international NGO working in Bangladesh, was created to support children trapped in domestic labour and other vulnerable situations in urban slums. Rather than waiting for children to return to school on their own, the programme brings education, counselling, and rehabilitation support directly to their communities. Through flexible learning support and family livelihood assistance, it helps children return to education while reducing families’ dependence on child labour for survival.

Credit: UKBET (UK Bangladesh Education Trust)

DLP identified Jannat and supported her return to school alongside her younger brother. The programme also helped her father secure his own rickshaw, giving the family a more stable livelihood and a chance to rebuild their future.

As global leaders gather at the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in May–June 2026 to discuss climate financing and resilience, stories like Jannat’s must remain at the centre of international attention. (Global Environment Facility) Climate change is no longer only about rising temperatures or environmental loss. It is about children losing education, dignity, and hope.

Credit: UKBET (UK Bangladesh Education Trust)

Local community-led initiatives that protect vulnerable children and strengthen climate resilience deserve far greater global investment and support through mechanisms such as the GEF Trust Fund and international adaptation financing.

Because children like Jannat are not victims to be pitied. They are futures worth protecting.

Mohammed A Sayem is Executive Director, UKBET
Sylhet, Bangladesh
msayem@ukbet-bd.org

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses the status of political prisoners in Venezuela with Manuel Virgüez, director of Movimiento Vinotinto, a Venezuelan human rights organisation that works for citizen empowerment, democracy and justice.

Manuel Virgüez

What’s the status of political prisoners?

Following the 2024 presidential election, the state detained around 2,000 people as part of what it called Operation Tun Tun. In early 2026, around 1,000 remained in detention, although various organisations put the total at between 950 and 1,200, depending on the classification criteria they use. Since 8 January, when Jorge Rodríguez, President of the National Assembly, announced imminent releases, and following the approval of an amnesty law, that number has fallen to around 450.

Among those released were human rights defender Rocío San Miguel, activist Javier Tarazona and journalist Eduardo Torres. The vast majority of those released were members of civil society or political activists. On 16 April, it was unofficially reported that around 50 former employees of Petróleos de Venezuela, detained in 2025, had been released. If this is confirmed, the current number of political prisoners remaining would be around 380.

The group that remains in detention consists mainly of dissident military personnel and former public officials. The authorities are reluctant to release them because they pose a direct threat to the regime’s stability. They are the ones who have suffered the worst treatment: various organisations, including Movimiento Vinotinto, have documented enforced disappearances, inhuman treatment, torture and persecution of family members. In some cases, people remained missing for weeks or months, with no knowledge of their whereabouts or whether they were still alive. These are some of the most serious violations recorded in recent decades in Venezuela.

How did these arrests differ from previous ones?

Two things distinguished them from previous waves of repression. The first was the abusive use of the concept of ‘eradication’, provided for in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, to transfer all cases to courts in Caracas. People detained in states such as Bolívar, hundreds of kilometres from the capital, were required to appear there. This was an unprecedented violation of the procedural principles of Venezuelan law. Not even in the 1960s, in the face of guerrilla movements, was there such a concentration of cases in a single court.

The second thing was the criminalisation of everyday acts. The state used anonymous reports via mobile apps to identify and arrest people, and a simple WhatsApp status update could be treated as an act of terrorism. The presumption of innocence ceased to exist in practice and the burden of proof was reversed: it was the detainee who had to prove they were not guilty.

What does the amnesty law entail and what does it exclude?

The law provides for the closure of cases linked to political events from different periods in Venezuelan history. This is no minor matter. After years of mass detentions and restrictions on freedom, the state implicitly acknowledges that those people should not have been imprisoned. The credit goes, above all, to the detainees’ families, human rights organisations and the international community.

But the law falls short. It does not provide for any mechanism of redress for those who were unjustly detained. Nor does it provide for the restitution of property. Many political prisoners had their businesses, homes and vehicles confiscated and won’t recover them on release. The law also offers no clear guarantees for those in exile. On 16 April, former legislator Alexis Paparone returned to Venezuela and was detained for several hours before being brought before a court, demonstrating that returning remains risky.

The law effectively excludes dissident military personnel and makes no provision for the thousands of politically motivated dismissals that have taken place, in violation of International Labour Organization Convention 111, nor for political disqualifications. As long as leaders such as María Corina Machado are unable to exercise their political rights, there can be no talk of a genuine transition.

What conditions are required for a genuine democratic transition?

There can be no reconciliation without justice. What Venezuela has experienced is one of the darkest periods in South America’s recent history. Bringing victims and perpetrators together without a prior process of accountability is not reconciliation; it is impunity. Where there’s no justice, there’s vengeance, and that generates endless cycles of violence. Societies that have not dealt with their crimes have carried that wound for generations.

For there to be justice, profound institutional reform is needed: in the armed forces, the electoral system, the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office. Cosmetic changes are not enough. It will be a long-term process, but the first steps must be taken to call general elections and move towards real economic recovery.

What’s possible, and necessary, is a pact of coexistence: an agreement to respect the constitution and live without mutual persecution. But such a pact requires the Chavista regime to acknowledge its mistakes and its crimes. Without that, any transition will remain incomplete.

Even so, I am optimistic. Venezuelan civil society, despite all it has lost, remains standing. There are signs that something is changing, and we must seize this opportunity. I’m confident that we will be able to lay the foundations for a democracy that says ‘never again’ to authoritarianism.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Venezuela: ‘People once again believe they can influence what happens in their country’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro González Caro 29.Mar.2026
Venezuela: democracy no closer CIVICUS Lens 29.Jan.2026
Venezuela: ‘We are seeing an economic transition, but no democratic transition’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Guillermo Miguelena 29.Jan.2026

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Displaced mothers and children at a malnutrition treatment center in Chuil, Jonglei State, South Sudan. Credit: WFP/Gabriela Vivacqua

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, May 1 2026 (IPS)

In 2026, the humanitarian situation in South Sudan has taken a considerable turn for the worse, with widespread food shortages, ongoing disruptions to food production systems, and rising rates of malnutrition affecting over half of the population. Compounded by the vast scale of needs and an overwhelming lack of access to basic services, humanitarian experts warn that nationwide levels of hunger are projected to worsen to catastrophic levels if urgent intervention is not secured.

On April 28, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) published a joint statement underscoring the escalation of the hunger crisis in South Sudan, noting that approximately 56 percent of the population, or roughly 7.8 million people, are projected to face acute food insecurity by July. They stress that the main drivers of food insecurity are climate shocks, flooding, mass displacement, and protracted armed conflict, all of which hinder effective agricultural yields and reduce food availability for hundreds of thousands of families.

“Hunger in South Sudan is intensifying, not stabilizing,” said Ross Smith, WFP Director of Emergencies and Preparedness. “Between April and July of this year, more than half of the population is projected to face crisis levels of hunger or worse, including people already in catastrophic conditions, where starvation and a collapse of livelihoods are a daily reality. This is among the highest proportions of any country’s population facing crisis levels of hunger today.”

The latest figures from the Integrated Food Security Classification Phase (IPC) show that over 280,000 additional civilians have been pushed into acute food insecurity since late 2025, including 73,000 civilians who are facing catastrophic (IPC Phase 5) levels of hunger. This marks a 160 percent increase from last year’s figures. An additional 2.5 million people face emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of hunger, and 5.3 million have been reported to rely on unsustainable coping mechanisms to survive.

Children have been hit particularly hard, with UNICEF reporting that approximately 2.2 million children between the ages of six months and five years suffer from acute malnutrition, marking an increase of over 100,000 cases compared to last year. Over 700,000 children are projected to face the highest levels of hunger by July. Roughly 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished, which has significantly dangerous, long-term implications for both mothers and children.

“Every day of delayed humanitarian access and supply delivery is a day a child’s life and future hangs in the balance,” said Lucia Elmi, UNICEF Director of Emergencies. “We are calling on all parties to grant timely, safe access to conflict-affected, including areas of displacement, and scale up nutrition interventions. We must act now if we are to save children’s lives.”

Widespread displacement continues to hinder South Sudan’s road to recovery, with rampant insecurity, overcrowding, and a shortage of critical supplies in displacement shelters complicating humanitarian relief efforts. The UN agencies note that nearly 300,000 people have been displaced this year in the Jonglei state alone, with many communities entirely cut off from humanitarian assistance. Numerous families report being unable to access food services due to rising prices, disrupted markets, and economic decline, which has significantly reduced household purchasing power.

Additionally, displaced communities face elevated risks of contracting infectious diseases due to persistent overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The agencies have recorded a sharp rise in cholera, malaria, and measles infections, particularly among “vulnerable and already acutely malnourished children”. Furthermore, treatment for malnutrition has been severely compromised over the past several months, with a substantial portion of the nation’s healthcare and nutritional support facilities having been damaged or closed entirely due to conflict. Life-saving medical interventions are largely unavailable due to continued shortages of medical supplies.

In April, IPC conducted a detailed Risk of Famine Analysis, assessing hunger conditions across seven counties to determine which regions were at a high risk of developing famine. The analysis identified four counties that are projected to contract famine in the coming months, a significant increase from just one county identified last year. The Upper Nile and Jonglei regions are particularly vulnerable, as the renewed escalation of armed hostilities has driven further displacement and reduced humanitarian reach to the most at-risk communities.

Risks are especially pronounced in Akobo, where IPC projects the return of over 100,000 South Sudanese civilians currently displaced in Gambela and Ethiopia. This large-scale return could further exacerbate hunger conditions, as humanitarian and healthcare personnel face severe shortages of supplies, funding, and staffing in assisting already strained communities.

IPC also warns that hunger conditions could escalate to catastrophic levels (IPC Phase 5) in the coming months across multiple areas, including Doma and Yomding in Ulang County; Pulturuk, Waat, and Thol Lankien in Nyirol County; and Kuerenge Ke and Mading in southern Nasir County. All of these regions remain largely inaccessible due to ongoing conflict, which has limited humanitarian reach.

In response, the UN has called for an end to the isolation of these communities in relief efforts, stressing the urgent need for closer monitoring and a strengthened humanitarian response.

“Now, more than ever, we cannot afford to lose the hard-won gains made in recent years, especially as South Sudan works to strengthen its agrifood systems and build on encouraging signs of local agricultural production,” said Rein Paulsen, FAO Director, Office of Emergencies and Resilience. “These gains remain highly vulnerable to conflict, insecurity, and climate shocks—the very forces driving today’s food crisis. We must act urgently and collectively to protect livelihoods, sustain food production, and prevent millions more people from falling deeper into hunger.”

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The UN report has highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources. Credit: UNU-INWEH

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 30 2026 (IPS)

A newly released United Nations report has raised urgent concerns that the world’s push toward clean energy and digital technologies is driving a hidden crisis in some of the planet’s most vulnerable regions, where mining for critical minerals is depleting water supplies, damaging health, and deepening inequality.

The report, Critical Minerals, Water Insecurity and Injustice, released by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH), warns that the race for minerals essential to electric vehicles, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence could replicate the injustices of the fossil fuel era.

Demand for these minerals is expected to surge dramatically in the coming decades. According to the report, global demand could quadruple by 2050, with lithium, cobalt, and graphite seeing increases of up to 500 percent. These materials are indispensable for batteries, solar panels, and digital infrastructure.

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, says the world lacks an enforceable governance model for critical minerals. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, told IPS News in an exclusive interview that the world is lacking an enforceable governance model for critical minerals.

He said that without binding international agreements, laws, and policies, environmental and health costs—especially water depletion and pollution—are pushed onto mining regions, leaving affected communities without effective accountability or recourse.

“The climate, energy, sustainability, and the so-called “green” policies are narrowly carbon-centric. Demand projections are driven by decarbonisation targets, but water security, health and WASH impacts are not hard constraints in transition planning. As a result, mineral extraction expands even in highly water-stressed regions,” Madani said.

He added that the trade and industrial policies reinforce structural asymmetries and that high-income economies retain control over refining, manufacturing, finance, and intellectual property, while mineral-rich countries are locked into raw extraction with weak benefit-sharing. “Together, these failures reproduce inequality rather than delivering a just transition,” Madani told IPS.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress. Credit: UNU-INWEH

The report has further highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources.

Producing just one tonne of lithium requires nearly 1.9 million litres of water. In 2024 alone, global lithium production consumed an estimated 456 billion litres, an amount equivalent to the annual domestic water needs of about 62 million people in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, one of the world’s richest lithium reserves, mining accounts for up to 65 percent of regional water use, intensifying shortages for local communities and farmers.

Across the so-called Lithium Triangle, spanning Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, groundwater levels are falling. The report cites evidence of declining water tables and disrupted ecosystems as brine extraction alters underground water systems.

“Everyone needs money. But everyone also needs the basics, like water,” a resident in Bolivia’s Uyuni region is quoted as saying in the report.

Cases of Birth Defects, Miscarriages, and Chronic Illnesses

Toxic chemicals and heavy metals released during extraction often seep into rivers, soil, and groundwater.

The report documents widespread pollution in mining regions such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where cobalt extraction is concentrated. In some areas, rivers have turned highly acidic, with pH levels below 4.5, rendering water unsafe for drinking and agriculture.

Health impacts are severe. In communities near mining sites, 72 percent of respondents reported skin diseases, while more than half of women reported gynaecological problems. Prolonged exposure to contaminated water has also been linked to cases of birth defects, miscarriages, and chronic illnesses.

Children are particularly vulnerable. Studies cited in the report show higher rates of congenital abnormalities in areas close to mining activity, along with increased risks of developmental disorders.

“These are not isolated cases. They reflect systemic health disparities driven by environmental exposure,” reads the report.

Who Benefits and Who Pays?

Beyond health, water scarcity and pollution are undermining traditional livelihoods. Farming, fishing, and livestock rearing are becoming increasingly difficult in mining regions.

In Bolivia, lithium extraction has reduced water availability for quinoa farming, a staple crop. In parts of Africa, declining fish populations have resulted from river contamination, which has cut off a key source of food and income.

In some cases, mining operations displace entire communities. Indigenous populations, whose lands often contain mineral reserves, are among the hardest hit.

The report estimates that more than half of critical mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous territories .

A main finding of the report is the imbalance between who benefits and who pays the price.

While extraction largely occurs in the Global South, the economic and technological gains are concentrated in wealthier nations. Countries rich in minerals often lack the infrastructure and capacity to process them, limiting their role to low-value extraction.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces over 60 percent of the world’s cobalt, more than 70 percent of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

Meanwhile, the profits flow to multinational corporations and industrial economies that dominate refining and manufacturing.

The report describes this dynamic as a “structural sustainability paradox,” where the environmental benefits enjoyed in developed countries are effectively subsidised by ecological and social harm in poorer regions.

Experts warn that the current trajectory could repeat patterns seen in the fossil fuel industry.

“The clean energy transition is not automatic. Without deliberate policy intervention, it can reproduce extractive colonialism under a new label,” the report states.

Communities in mining zones are increasingly being described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress.

The report has recommended stronger international regulations, mandatory environmental standards, and greater transparency in supply chains. It also urges investment in recycling and circular economy models to reduce reliance on new mining, as well as the adoption of technologies that use less water.

Crucially, it emphasises the need to include local communities in decision-making and ensure they benefit from resource extraction. “Achieving climate goals must not come at the expense of those least equipped to bear the costs,” the report reads.

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, says legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity is crucial. Credit: UNU-INWEH

Strategic Policy Needed

Dr Abraham Nunbogu, a UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, told Inter Press Service that a practical step to move up the value chain and keep more economic benefits is a strategic industrial policy: using export conditions, licensing, or joint-venture requirements to promote local refining, processing, and manufacturing.

“Second, benefit-sharing and reinvestment mandates: legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity. Third, regional value-chain cooperation: pooling resources across neighbouring countries to achieve economies of scale in processing and manufacturing that individual countries cannot reach alone,” Nunbogu said.

He added that the final step would be to address power imbalances by linking mineral access to ethical sourcing standards and technology transfer obligations in trade agreements.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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The global economy, is at the precipice of “stagflation” – growth slowdown and higher inflation – due to the energy price shock following the illegal US-Israel war on Iran. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently termed this as a “textbook negative supply shock”. For the first time since the 1970s, the prospect of stagflation seems real.

Anis Chowdhury

Prospects of global stagflation

The IMF simulated three possible macroeconomic scenarios depending on the duration of this conflict and the extent of damages to energy infrastructure in the region. These range from a marginal drop in this year’s forecast global growth rate – from 3.4% to 3.1% – to a moderate decline to 2.5% and a sharp decline to 2%. The projected spikes in “headline inflation” – covering all goods and services, including volatile items, e.g., energy and food – range from 4.4% to 5.8% in 2026.

The IMF rightly doubts whether inflation can be checked with monetary tightening without causing substantial increase in unemployment. But it does not offer any solutions; instead advises the central banks to remain ready “to act decisively to maintain price stability”.

The IMF’s overall policy advice is conservative. However, it acknowledges the need for monetary and fiscal policy to support economic activities if the if financial conditions tighten sharply and global activity deteriorates markedly.

Inflation phobia and policy over-reaction

Ben Bernanke and his co-researchers found that the recession in the 1970s did not result from the oil-price shocks “per se, but from the resulting tightening of monetary policy”. Bob Barsky and Lutz Kilian found “that the oil price increases were not nearly as essential a part of the causal mechanism generating the stagflation of the 1970s as is often thought”. Ed Nelson blamed central banks’ “faulty doctrine” for the 1970s stagflation.

So, it was not inflation that caused output to decline, but rather, inappropriate and draconian efforts to curb inflation that inevitably repressed growth, and produced world’s first stagflation. This may happen again if central bankers overreact and tighten the financial conditions to kill the current “textbook supply shock” inflation.

The problem is the central bankers’ dogmatic group-thinking despite contrary empirical evidence. For example, the fear of unhinged inflation expectations and wage-price spirals do not have any empirical basis as reported in IMF research and the Australia’s Reserve Bank.

Yet, the central bankers and the IMF favour monetary tightening fearing the risk of “unhinged” inflation expectations and wage-price spirals.

Revisiting the inflation target

The central bankers’ group-thinking bias insists on an inflation target of 2% – a figure “plucked out of the air”, yet became “global economic gospel”. Don Brash, the acclaimed former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, who was the first central bank governor to adopt a 2% inflation target admitted that it was based on a chance remark by then New Zealand Finance Minister Roger Douglas “during the course of a television interview”. It became “the mantra, repeated endlessly” as Brash and his colleagues “devoted a huge amount of effort” to preaching his new gospel “to everybody who would listen – and some who were reluctant to listen”.

Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s former Chief Economist, questioned the wisdom behind the 2% inflation target and argued for a higher, e.g., 4% target following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. IMF research also advocated for a long-run inflation target of 4%. Such a moderately higher inflation should widen policy space.

Joe Gagnon and Chris Collins argued that “the case for raising the inflation target is stronger” than it is usually thought. Their research revealed that “the benefits [of a higher inflation target] clearly exceed the costs”.

Thus, one should not be surprised when The Financial Times says, “It is time to revisit the 2% inflation target”.

Rethinking inflation

Almost all central bankers see inflation as an outcome of excess demand, caused by either an increase in aggregate demand or a decrease in aggregate supply at a given price. Prices rise to eliminate the excess demand.

A common view is that higher prices lead to demand for higher wages which in turn cause higher prices, thus generating wage-price spirals. Therefore, central bankers focus on containing demand by raising interest rate regardless of the sources of inflation.

On the other hand, optimal policy-mix differ when inflation is seen as the result of a distributional conflict or disagreement. Guido Lorenzoni and Iv´an Werning analysed the impacts of supply shocks arising from “non-labour” inputs, such as energy under the different relative bargaining powers of labour and firms where the non-labour input price is perfectly flexible, and goods prices are more flexible than wages.

They found that the optimal policy response to a supply shock coming from the scarce non-labour input is to “run the economy hot”, i.e., to allow demand to exceed supply capacity and higher inflation. Their findings imply that it would be more efficient to reach the adjustment with the help of higher price inflation than through lower price inflation and deeper wage deflation by causing higher unemployment.

David Ratner and Jae Sim analysed the trade-off of anti-inflationary measures considering inflation as an outcome of distributional conflict. They found that restrictive anti-inflationary measures are more costly in terms of unemployment.

Interestingly, their finding corroborates the IMF’s observation that the aggregate supply curve has become flatter making restrictive anti-inflationary measures more costly in terms of higher unemployment. Unfortunately, the central bankers’ anti-inflation group bias dismisses the higher unemployment or growth declines due to restrictive policies as “short-term pains for long-term gains”.

Recent IMF research revealed permanent scars of recessions, including those arising from external shocks and macroeconomic policy mistakes; they all “lead to permanent losses in output and welfare”. The Lancet reported “substantial effects on suicide rates”. The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills, investigated the human cost of austerity policies during economic crises to emphasise that health indicators can significantly deteriorate.

Optimal policy response

In light of the above, the central bankers should reconsider their hawkish anti-inflationary policy-setting.

The governments around the world are trying to ease fuel-price impacts by fiscal measures such as a temporary reduction of fuel excise duty, subsidies and price caps. The mainstream commentators, including the IMF, argue that these measures may have significant fiscal costs if the crisis lingers on, and would put extra-burden on central banks, which are focused on controlling inflation.

Significantly, the optimal policy-mix should include tax revenue raising measures. Governments should consider enhancing tax progressivity. In particular, an excess profit tax should be imposed on the beneficiaries of higher interest rates and fuel prices, such as banks and fuel companies to fund cost of living support measures.

Dr. Ken Henry, Australia’s former Treasury Secretary has recently argued that a 100% tax on windfall profits from gas would be “socially optimal”. Tony Wood held “A windfall profit tax may be the least-worst solution to the gas crisis”.

Research based on US data reveals that an excess profit tax reduces existing racial and ethnic inequalities and inequalities between groups with different educational attainments. It can also accelerate renewable energy transition when increasing geopolitical tensions and climate impacts threaten continued volatility in fossil fuel and gas markets.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

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Trump 2.0 has been marked by the blatantly aggressive exercise of power to secure US interests as defined by him. While many recent trends even predate his first term, his reduced use of ‘soft power’ has exposed his bullying, extortionary use of US power.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The US has illegally weaponised more laws and policies, especially by unilaterally imposing sanctions and tariffs, especially on dissenting regimes.

Often, such threats are not ends in themselves but actually weapons to strengthen the US bargaining position to secure more advantageous deals.

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, members are obliged to extend ‘most favoured nation’ status to all other member nations.

On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced supposedly ‘reciprocal tariffs’, ostensibly responding to others having trade surpluses with the US.

Appealing to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is futile, as the US has blocked the appointment of Appellate Body members since the Obama presidency.

Trump 2.0 has also been trying to get rich investors and governments – mainly from Europe, Japan, and the oil-rich Gulf states – to invest in the US.

Most such investments are in financial markets, rather than the real economy. Such portfolio investments have propped up asset prices, even bubbles.

Trump’s bullying is resented but has not been very effective vis-à-vis strong adversaries. Consequently, allies have been most affected and resentful.

Deepening stagflation
Meanwhile, much of the world economy has never really recovered from the COVID-19 slowdown, while Western sanctions and tariffs have raised production costs, worsening inflation.

Recent trends have also deepened the stagnation since 2009. Many governments and the IMF have made things worse by cutting spending when most needed.

Impacts have varied, generally worse in poorer countries, where the IMF limits policy options and credit rating agencies raise borrowing costs.

US Fed chair Powell’s interest rate hikes, ostensibly to address inflation, also reversed ‘quantitative easing’, which had lowered interest rates from 2009.

Trump’s aggression has reduced economic engagement with the US, inadvertently accelerating de-dollarisation, thus undermining the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’.

Central banks worldwide have responded predictably, refusing to be counter-cyclical in the face of economic slowdown, citing inflationary pressures.

Transactional?
Trump’s transactional approach has meant bilateral, one-on-one dealings, further advantaging the world’s dominant power.

Involving one-time asymmetric ‘zero-sum games’, such transactions ensure the US gains, necessarily at the expense of the ‘other’. Transactionalism also enables ‘buying influence’, or corruption.

The resulting uncertainty reduces investments, not only in the US, but everywhere, due to greater perceived risks, exacerbating the stagnation. Thus, Trump 2.0 policies have reduced investment and growth.

The whole world, including the US, has suffered much ‘collateral damage’, but the White House seems content as long as others lose more.

Unipolar sovereigntism
The transitions to unipolar sovereigntism and then to a multipolar world have been much debated.

Three decades ago, the influential US Council on Foreign Relations’ journal, Foreign Affairs, argued that the post-Cold War unipolar world was actually ‘sovereigntist’.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s ‘Daddy’ reference to Trump suggests that the sovereigntist moment is not quite over, as the US ‘No Kings’ mobilisation suggests.

Trump’s ‘America First’ clearly opposes multilateralism, generating broader concerns. He has withdrawn the US from many, but not all, multilateral bodies.

On January 7, the US withdrew from 66 international organisations deemed “wasteful, ineffective, or harmful”, addressing issues it claimed were “contrary” to national interests.

Trump’s continued, selective use of multilateral bodies has served him well, retaining privileges, e.g., permanent membership of the UN Security Council with veto power.

The UN Security Council’s Gaza ceasefire resolution was used to create and legitimise his Board of Peace, now touted by some as an alternative to the UN!

Trump will not withdraw from the WTO as its Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is key to US tech bros’ trillions from transnational IP.

End of soft power
Some of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 20th remarks at Davos are telling:

“More recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

“You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination… If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”

Besides exercising overwhelming military superiority, Trump 2.0 has increasingly weaponised rules, agreements and economic relations to its advantage.

The abandonment of ‘soft power’ – accelerated by Elon Musk’s DOGE – has ripped the velvet glove off US ‘hegemony’, exposing the mailed fist beneath.

USAID and other US government-funded agencies and programmes have been crucial for soft power, fostering the illusion of domination with consent. Abandoning soft power may well increase the costs of achieving America First.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses recent regressive changes to Argentina’s labour laws with Facundo Merlán Rey, an activist with the Coordination Against Police and Institutional Repression (CORREPI), an organisation that defends workers’ rights and resists state repression.

Facundo Merlán Rey

What does the new law change and why did the government decide to push it through?

Capitalising on its victory in last year’s legislative election, which gave it a majority in both parliamentary chambers, the government pushed through a labour law that introduced changes on several fronts simultaneously.

It increases the daily maximum of working hours from eight to 12, with a weekly cap of 48. Hours worked beyond this limit no longer need to be paid separately, but can be accumulated and exchanged for days off at a later date.

It also introduces the concept of ‘dynamic wage’, allowing part of an employee’s pay to be determined based on merit or individual productivity. The employer can decide this unilaterally with no need for a collective agreement. This would allow two people to be paid differently for doing the same work.

The law creates the Labour Assistance Fund, an account to which the employer contributes three per cent of a worker’s salary, of which between one and 2.5 percentage points come from the worker’s pay. If dismissed, the worker receives the amount accumulated in that fund. This is deeply humiliating. It makes the worker contribute to the financing of their dismissal. Given that these contributions previously went into the pension system, the effect will also be to weaken pensions.

The law restricts the right to strike by expanding the list of occupations deemed essential, which means they are required to maintain at least 75 per cent of their operations during a strike. Previously, this category included air traffic control, electricity, gas, healthcare and water. Now it also includes customs, education at all levels except university, immigration, ports and telecommunications. In practice, this means that in these fields a strike will have a much more limited impact.

Finally, the law repeals the special regimes that regulated working conditions in some trades and professions. Over the next six months, hairdressers, private drivers, radio and telegraph operators and travelling salespeople will lose these protections. The Journalists’ Statute will be abolished from 2027 onwards.

At CORREPI, we believe all these measures are unconstitutional, as they directly contravene article 14 of the constitution, which guarantees the right to work and the right to decent living conditions. The changes put employers in a position of almost absolute dominance in an employment relationship, leaving workers with no real scope to defend their rights.

How have trade unions and social organisations reacted?

The most militant groups highlighted the problems with the new law clearly, but the response from the organised labour movement has been insufficient.

Union leaders responded with a belated and low-profile campaign plan. They have long been criticised for preferring discreet agreements to open confrontation, and this time was no different. They negotiated behind the scenes and secured concessions to protect themselves. The law maintains employers’ contributions to trade union health schemes and the union dues paid by workers for two years. The rights of workers as a whole were sidelined.

What impact are the changes having?

Although the law is already in force, its full implementation faces obstacles, partly because it has internal consistency issues that hinder its practical application. When the government attempts to apply it in employment areas that still retain rights, it will likely face legal challenges, which will increase social unrest.

Even so, some of its effects are already being felt. Unemployment is rising slowly but steadily. Factory closures, driven by the opening up of imports and the greater ease of dismissal, are pushing more workers into informal employment and multiple jobs. The result is a fall in consumption and a level of strain with outcomes that are difficult to predict.

The consequences extend beyond the economic sphere. Increasingly demanding working conditions, combined with high inflation and rising household debt, are taking a toll on workers’ mental health. Regrettably, there is already a worrying rise in the suicide rate.

There’s also a consequence that is harder to measure: this reform erodes the collective identity of workers. When work is informal, individuals tend to solve their problems on their own, making it much harder to organise to demand better conditions. In working-class neighbourhoods, drug trafficking is becoming established as an alternative source of employment, generating situations of violence that largely go unnoticed. Unfortunately, everything points to an ever-deepening social breakdown.

What lessons does this experience hold for the rest of the region?

Regional experience shows it is very difficult to reverse this kind of change. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva came to power in 2022 promising to repeal the labour law passed in 2017 under Michel Temer’s government, similarly opposed by social organisations and trade unions. However, he failed to do so, and the framework Temer left remains in force. Once passed, these laws tend to remain in place regardless of who governs next.

That’s why what’s happening in Argentina should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. The reform appears to be part of a broader direction that regional politics is taking under the influence of the USA, one of the main drivers of these changes and a supporter of the governments implementing them.

The weakening of labour rights and collective organising is not a side effect; it is the objective being pursued. Dismantling workers’ ability to organise collectively facilitates the advance of extractive and financial interests and guarantees access to cheap labour. In that sense, Argentina offers a warning to the rest of the region.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate from the least developed country (LDC) status in November this year after more than half a century. Bangladesh joined the UN club of LDCs in 1975 and consistently met all three graduation criteria – per capita Gross National Income (GNI), human asset and economic vulnerability – since 2018.

Anis Chowdhury

RMG’s dominance and failure to diversify

Bangladesh is indeed a leading, often the highest, user of Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) facilities among LDCs, largely driving its RMG sector growth through the European Union (EU)’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. This reliance on preferential access has made Bangladesh a dominant exporter among LDCs.

However, the RMG sector’s dominance also made Bangladesh highly vulnerable. In the late 1970s when the RMG sector started its journey, it accounted for less than 5% of Bangladesh’s total exports. By the end of the 1990s, this proportion had reached about three-fourths. After more than four decades, since 2013, it has been hovering between 80-85%, according to the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).

Bangladesh’s heavy reliance on a single export item makes its export basket one of the least diversified among the global economies. This is starkly different from South Korea, a country from which Bangladesh received technical assistance to usher in its RMG sector. South Korea’s textile industry accounted for 33.3% of exports in 1970; it declined to 22.6% within two decades in 1990 as the economy diversified. By 1975 South Korea became a major exporter of electrical machinery and appliances, transport equipment and various other manufacturing products.

Bangladesh’s vulnerability does not arise only from its export product concentration. Bangladesh’s export market is also not diversified with close to 60% going to the EU and UK with apparel comprising more than 90%. The USA, which does not provide any LDC related preferential market access, accounts for about 16% Bangladesh’s exports.

Here, too, Bangladesh’s experience differs from that of South Korea. With the diversification of the economy, South Korea’s exports by destination also became less concentrated. For example, while around 63% of South Korea’s export went to Japan alone in 1960, the combined market share of Japan and the USA fell to around 56% by 1975.

The South Korean State’s autonomy from groups with a vested interest is well documented. Thus, its policies were driven by broader national interest. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s policy space has been captured by the RMG sector.

Undoubtedly, the preferential treatment by the state helped the RMG sector expand rapidly; but at the high cost of failure to diversify. Professor Munir Quddus of Prairie View A&M University and President, Bangladesh Development Initiative (BDI) compared the RMG sector’s support environment with Leather exports to demonstrate the RMG sector’s state capture. His findings, summarized below, are revealing:

The usual justification for such preferential treatment is that RMG is the “largest export sector and foreign exchange earner”. But the argument is perverse. Given some of these subsidies have been in existence for nearly 50 years, prudent policymaking demands that it is high time to redirect scarce resources to support other potentially dynamic export sectors.

Being used to state support, the RMG sector ignored the need for raising productivity. The sector’s average labour productivity is lower than Bangladesh’s competitor countries except Cambodia. The sector’s compliance with the environmental and labour standards has also come under scrutiny. However, it seems by becoming too big through state support, the sector’s demand cannot be ignored.

The cosy relationship between the RMG sector leaders and the fallen kleptocratic regime is well-known. The regime allowed them to flourish through loan defaults and state subsidies and in return the business leaders were cheering on the fascist regime hoping to see its continuation. Understandably, they were fearful that they might not enjoy the same crony relationship with the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus; thus, they cried foul and campaigned for a postponement of LDC graduation.

LDC graduation as structural transformation

The Interim Government accepted the White Paper’s recommendation and viewed the LDC graduation momentum as an opportunity to accelerate structural transformation of the economy. Despite bureaucratic inertia, it did succeed in improving business environment, such as significant reductions in times to obtain business licenses/certificates/permits, simplifications of customs procedures and fast-tracked implementation of national logistic and national tariff policies. It also identified the bottlenecks for potential sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, leather & footwear, electronics, light engineering and fishing & agro-based industries and took measures to remove or ease them.

No doubt a lot still needs to be done as part of an ongoing process of reform and policy adjustment. But that cannot be used as a justification to request a delay on the basis that the preparation is inadequate, particularly when Bangladesh’s macroeconomic performance is far better than the most LDCs, including Nepal and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the two countries scheduled to graduate along with Bangladesh.

Thanks to the macroeconomic management of the Interim Government which succeeded in preventing a total collapse of the economy; it restored discipline in the financial and banking sector, rebuilt the country’s foreign exchange reserves, stabilized the exchange rate and earned the confidence of international financial leaders to re-open trade financing and maintain foreign investment inflows. It earned the diaspora community’s confidence resulting in increased remittances. The Interim Government concluded Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan in record time, ensuring duty-free market access for 99.9% of its products. It also initiated EPA talks with other major trade partners, including the EU.

Graduation delay: Bad signal for LDCs and win for vested interest

The UN-DESA uses three criteria for LDCs – GNI per capita, human asset index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index (EVI). Its evaluation in February 2025 shows that Bangladesh is in a much better position than Nepal and Lao PDR in terms of GNI per capita and EVI. Bangladesh with higher GNI per capita is economically less vulnerable than Nepal and Lao PDR, both of which suffer from additional disadvantages of landlockedness.

Bangladesh’s economy is projected to grow at a faster rate (around 5.0%–5.1% in FY 2005-26 and 5.7% in FY 2026-27 according to the ADB) than both Nepal and Lao PDR despite slightly elevated inflation rates. Bangladesh also performs better in logistics, ranked 88th out of 139 countries by the World Bank compared to Nepal’s rank of 114th and Lao PDR’s 115th. Bangladesh also has better productive capacity according to the UNCTAD’s productive capacity index.

Bangladesh will continue to enjoy DFQF market access for three more years after its graduation as endorsed by the WTO. Australia and Canada indicated extended periods of DFQF access until at least 2034. The UK will allow 92% Bangladesh products duty-free access after 2029. Therefore, a delay for a better performing Bangladesh will be a bad signal for the LDCs aspiring to graduate from LDC status.

It will also mean a win for the vested interest groups and stalling of the momentum towards accelerated structural transformation. The state capture by the RMG sector has already become clear; a highly professional and successful central bank governor has been replaced with a failed (loan defaulter) garment sector businessperson with no background in banking or international macroeconomics. The Transparency International Bangladesh views “such a decision risks turning the central bank once again into an instrument of business lobbies dependent on defaulted loans and political connections, rather than safeguarding national interest, as was the case during the authoritarian kleptocratic regime”.

Bangladesh will be better off spending its diplomatic efforts to secure GSP+ facilities in the EU and EPA with its trading partners instead of lobbying for a LDC graduation delay. It should worry more about EU’s new, stricter and mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations. Whereas ESG failure may cost Bangladesh 30% of EU exports, strict compliance can function as powerful catalysts for production upgrading and accelerating structural transformation while achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Mamunur Rashid/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.

The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.

The uprising

The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.

The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.

On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.

Reforms in the balance

Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.

But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.

The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.

A dynasty returns

The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.

The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.

The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.

Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and Interim Head of MONUSCO, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

In the month following the reopening of the Burundi-Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border, the humanitarian crisis in the DRC has deteriorated considerably, recently marked by an influx of Congolese refugees returning home, where they face overcrowded conditions and a severe shortage of essential services. This comes in the midst of escalating clashes between rebel groups AFC and M23, and forces affiliated with the Kinshasa government, with drone strikes causing widespread destruction and pushing violence closer to Burundi’s borders, where conditions are most dire.

Vivian van de Perre, Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), described the current humanitarian situation as “extremely volatile”. During a press stakeout on March 26, she highlighted that the rapid spread of the conflict from North and South Kivu into Tshopo Province and toward Burundi’s borders is a major concern, warning that it increases the risk of a broader “regional conflagration.”

Van de Perre also warned that armed militants have been increasingly relying on the use of heavy weapons and drone strikes in densely populated urban areas, which have caused great damage to civilian infrastructure as well as serious risks to civilian safety, underscoring recent violent incidents at the Kisagani Bangoka International Airport and in Goma, the largest city in North Kivu. Additionally, she warned of M23’s growing presence in Goma, where the coalition has managed to gain influence, undermine state authority, and disrupt humanitarian aid deliveries.

Furthermore, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC (UNJHRO) has uncovered a considerable rise in human rights violations committed by armed groups. Since December 2025, approximately 173 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented, affecting at least 111 victims, the majority of whom were women and girls.

Van de Perre described these findings as “only the tip of the iceberg,” and highlighted growing rates of exploitation, particularly along artisanal mining sites, where child labour is especially pronounced. Armed groups have also been alleged to hamper monitoring, investigation, and justice mechanisms, and subject human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society actors to intimidation and arbitrary detention.

This follows a sharp escalation of hostilities between the armed groups in December 2025, which forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese to flee to Burundi, most coming from Uvira in South Kivu Province and the surrounding areas. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) show that after M23’s withdrawal from Uvira in January and a relative return of stability, more than 33,000 refugees began returning home since the border’s reopening on February 23, with most crossing through the Kavimira border point. Many of these returnees already received little humanitarian assistance in Burundi due to chronic underfunding.

“Conditions in many areas of return in the DRC remain fragile, with acute humanitarian needs,” said Ali Mahamat, UNHCR Head of Sub-Office in Goma, DRC, on March 24 at a press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. “Initial UNHCR assessments in Uvira and Fizi show families arriving with few belongings, in urgent need of shelter, basic household items, health care, and access to water and sanitation. Many returned to find their homes destroyed and belongings looted, leaving them in deep despair and unable to resume normal life without substantial support.”

According to the latest updates from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), roughly 60 percent of returnees are living in damaged shelters and over 30 percent face challenges accessing their land. Returnees face heightened risks of gender-based violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, extortion, and exploitation, with female-headed households disproportionately affected due to limited livelihood opportunities for women, which leave these communities entrenched in poverty and especially vulnerable.

Figures from UNHCR show that approximately 30 percent of returnees had been taking refuge in Burundi’s Busama displacement camp, where they faced significant levels of overcrowding and limited access to clean water, sanitation services, healthcare, and shelter. Currently, roughly 4,500 Congolese refugees remain stuck at transit points as they await being relocated to Busama. Additionally, Burundi continues to host over 109,000 Congolese refugees, with 67,000 of them in Busuma alone.

Additionally, internal displacement remains widespread in the DRC, with more than 6.4 million people currently displaced. IFRC estimates that over 5.2 million internally displaced Congolese are concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri, 96 percent as a result of ongoing armed violence. According to van de Perre, over 26.6 million people, roughly a quarter of DRC’s population, are projected to face food insecurity this year.

Currently, UNHCR’s response plan to assist returnees, refugees, and displaced Congolese civilians is only 34 percent funded, seeking a total of USD 145 million. MONUSCO is currently on the frontlines providing protection services for nearly 3,000 civilians in Djaiba village. Through the mission, the UN has been able to support over 18,000 farmers in harvesting and transporting crops and has conducted 204 patrols. Van de Perre stressed that stronger governance and security enforcement are crucial in protecting vulnerable civilians, and disarmament and repatriation efforts must be conducted to resolve broader regional tensions.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses Portugal’s presidential runoff election and the rise of the far-right Chega (Enough) party with Jonni Lopes, Executive Director of Academia Cidadã (Citizen Academy) and a Steering Committee member of the European Civic Forum, an organisation working on civic engagement, democratic participation and the protection of civic space at national, regional and international levels.

Jonni Lopes

Why did centre-right voters back a Socialist candidate?

Despite not agreeing with his politics, centre-right voters backed a Socialist candidate to build a firewall around the presidency, recognising that the office demands deliberation, predictability and respect for democratic rules, none of which Chega represents. Seguro’s campaign made this possible. He distanced himself from party politics, avoided turning the race into a debate about the Socialist Party and positioned himself as a stable figure capable of providing institutional continuity during a political crisis.

This was practical risk management, not ideology. The centre-right Social Democratic Party is pushing labour law changes that triggered a joint general strike in December, with over three million workers participating. With Chega already holding significant parliamentary power, voters feared that a far-right president would go further still, using veto powers not to check the government’s agenda, but to entrench it and block any legislation protecting workers’ rights.

This coalition shows that a clear boundary against the far right still exists, at least when it comes to leading the state. It’s a defensive pact: democrats can disagree on policy, but there’s a line when it comes to handing power to a reactionary force that threatens democratic institutions.

What does the result mean for Portugal and Europe?

For Portugal, this result is a temporary reprieve for democracy. Seguro won two-thirds of the second-round vote and over 3.5 million votes, the most ever cast for a presidential candidate in Portugal, despite storms that disrupted voting. This shows that, faced with a genuine far-right threat, Portuguese democracy can still mobilise broadly to defend itself.

But this wasn’t a clear victory against the far right. Ventura won one-third of the vote, strengthened his base and positioned himself as a serious contender for right-wing leadership. In just a few years, Chega has gone from a fringe party to parliament’s second largest.

This sends a mixed message to Europe: broad democratic coalitions can still prevent far-right candidates reaching the top office, but the far right is now mainstream, shapes political agendas and forces other parties to constantly define themselves in relation to it. This is the new normal. This matters particularly for the European Commission, as far-right movements are structural threats and the only response is to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Where does Chega go from here?

Ventura lost the presidential election, but Chega has emerged stronger. Winning a third of the vote against a candidate backed by the entire democratic spectrum cements its position. Ventura can now claim to speak for a significant portion of the right, and his loss only strengthens that claim, as he can frame the firewall as evidence that the political system is rigged against him, feeding narratives of elite persecution. He will also use his parliamentary strength to extract concessions by supporting or blocking the government’s budget and pushing on immigration and security, winning enough policy gains to show he delivers for his voters.

Ventura has already said that support for stability ‘has limits’. If the government hits serious problems, such as a budget crisis or a political deadlock, Chega will position itself as the only force willing to break the impasse and ‘fix things’. He’s not treating the presidential loss as the end of his political project but as a stepping stone to bigger gains in future elections. His calculation is that electoral legitimacy can eventually become governmental power.

What does this mean for civic space and civil society?

Portugal’s civic space is shrinking. Hate speech is becoming normalised, immigration rules are tightening, government administration is becoming more exclusionary, protest organisers face police intimidation and civil society organisations are struggling financially. These create real barriers to people exercising their rights. Chega’s rise and its racist and xenophobic rhetoric now heard in parliament raise the risk that discrimination and violence against migrants will become politically acceptable.

A president committed to rights protection can set limits: vetoing discriminatory laws, refusing to suppress information the public needs and protecting communities and organisations under attack. The presidency alone cannot reverse the shrinking of civic space, but it can prevent the government from fully institutionalising a far-right agenda.

Human rights organisations, labour movements and migrant groups see this moment as an opportunity to strengthen protections, not a final victory. Turnout held strong despite devastating storms and emergency conditions, evidence that people were genuinely mobilised by the threat, particularly urban voters connected to civil society, including unions, who had already fought the government over labour rights. The organisations that coordinated the strike now expect the president to use his powers to defend rights.

How should Seguro use his presidential powers?

Seguro has been clear he won’t be the reason parliament is dissolved, and has committed to working with the government while demanding ‘solutions and results’. This means dissolution of parliament will be a last resort in a genuine crisis, not a tactical move to tackle normal political disagreements. He will use his veto power to block laws he thinks violate the constitution and rights and mediate between the government and opposition to push them towards compromise.

The challenge will be to keep the democratic parties, both government and opposition, at the centre while Chega tries to dictate the agenda. If Seguro dissolves parliament too quickly or without a strong reason, he’ll just fuel Chega’s narrative that the system is broken. If he’s too passive and doesn’t use his veto when rights are threatened, he’ll look complicit in democratic erosion. Both scenarios would help Chega: either the system looks incapable of functioning, or it looks unwilling to defend people’s rights.

Seguro will have to walk a very fine line between doing too much and doing too little, while a far-right opposition waits to exploit whatever mistakes he makes. If he gets it wrong, his historic electoral victory will give way to deeper crisis rather than democratic renewal.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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CIVICUS discusses Nepal’s upcoming election with youth activist Anusha Khanal of the Gen Z Movement Alliance, a youth-led civil society coalition mobilising for democratic accountability and governance reform in Nepal.

Anusha Khanal

What triggered the Gen Z protests, and how did the state respond?

The immediate trigger was the government revealing its authoritarian tendencies by banning 26 popular social media platforms. This happened during the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people exposed the wealth of politicians’ families, contrasting with widespread economic desperation. Inflation was high and unemployment among young people stood at around 23 per cent, and there were no pathways for change within existing political structures. But this wasn’t just about jobs. Young people demanded accountability for decades of corruption, poor governance, service delivery failures and a political system completely disconnected from our realities. The leaders of three parties had rotated in power for years without delivering anything meaningful. We mobilised because we had nothing to lose.

The response was brutal. On the first day of protests, police killed several young people. The government refused to show any responsibility, instead seeking to frame the movement as violent and deny it any legitimacy. It criminalised youth anger instead of listening to it. The choice to emphasise property damage over deaths when some buildings were burned and vandalised told us everything about where their priorities lay. The government showed it did not care about young people.

But repression didn’t stop the movement; it accelerated it. Thousands more young people mobilised, and eventually the pressure became impossible to ignore. Oli’s resignation was a forced concession. But it exposed something important: the political system only moves when threatened directly. That’s a lesson we’re carrying into these elections.

How did civil society organisations engage with the movement?

Young people created the movement, not civil society organisations. Once it started, we received a lot of support from wider civil society. It became a people’s movement, with people of all ages taking part, in person and in spirit. Many civil society groups made a conscious choice to support it, document what was happening, share knowledge, help shape narratives, amplify demands and help exert pressure to translate grassroots anger into political demands. We pushed for accountability, investigations into the killings, protection for protesters and systemic reforms around corruption and governance. We insisted that any negotiation include young people at the table, as stakeholders in decision-making.

A major win was a 10-point agreement with the interim government that included commitments to address corruption, improve governance, ensure youth participation in decision-making and move towards more inclusive democracy. We also pushed for the establishment of the Gen Z Council, a body designed to hold government accountable, monitor implementation of reforms and bridge the gap between the state and young people.

But we’ve been realistic about what civil society can and cannot do. We can organise, advocate, document and monitor. We cannot force a government to implement reforms if the bureaucracy resists or political will collapses after elections. That’s why we’re now focused on maintaining pressure and building systems that make it harder for future governments to ignore youth demands.

How have election candidates addressed the movement’s demands?

Anti-corruption and good governance have become dominant themes across party manifestos. All parties are talking about digital governance, e-governance, going cashless and paperless. Some are promising to establish commissions to investigate past corruption or audit public officials’ assets going back decades. Others focus on timecard systems for service delivery, budget transparency and digitisation of transactions. It’s just that corruption is so visible that ignoring it would be political suicide.

The problem is that most parties are vague on implementation. They describe the what but not the how. There are also ideological differences, but most parties are talking about systemic reform and public-private partnerships.

Across the board, parties are responding to the movement’s anti-corruption demand because they have to. The question is whether these commitments are genuine or just campaign rhetoric.

Why are women and excluded groups still so underrepresented among candidates?

Campaign financing is a massive problem. The government sets spending limits, but everyone knows that’s not what happens on the ground. To run a serious campaign with widespread reach, you need sponsorship from wealthy backers or business interests. If you’re a woman earning a minimum wage, you simply cannot compete against candidates funded by millionaires. There is no public financing system, no state support for candidates from marginalised backgrounds. The economic system excludes most women and poor people before we even get to party selection processes.

Safety is another critical issue that doesn’t get enough attention. Digital violence against women running for office is rampant. Women and queer candidates face abuse, harassment and threats online and offline. When we encourage female and queer colleagues to run, the response is often hesitancy, due to the lack of support and because we haven’t created safe enough spaces for them to participate in politics. Although the constitution guarantees women 33 per cent representation, the reality on the ground is completely different.

Then there’s the distribution of candidacy slots within parties, which is opaque and controlled by party leaders. Even after public pressure, many parties failed to meet the female quota in direct candidacies. Some did better in proportional representation slots, but even there, they selected women who are mostly well-connected and wealthy. The movement emphasised inclusion, but we’ve regressed when it comes to candidate selection.

What obstacles stand in the way of reform?

The first challenge is that we’re almost certainly heading towards a coalition government, which means compromise on every issue. When multiple parties have to negotiate and share power, reform agendas get watered down. Parties will prioritise holding their coalition together over pushing through the anti-corruption and governance reforms they promised. We’ve seen this pattern before. What isn’t clear yet is what kind of coalition will result and what compromises will be made.

The second challenge is the bureaucracy. Nepal’s bureaucracy can be notoriously resistant to change, transparency and accountability. A reform can pass parliament and still die in implementation because mid-level bureaucrats refuse to change how they work. Even though the law to establish the Gen Z Council has been passed, it hasn’t been formed yet. We can identify problems, document failures and advocate loudly, but we cannot force a government to act. If the bureaucracy decides to drag its feet, we have limited leverage. Structural incentives favour the status quo, and that’s before we even consider whether individual politicians will prioritise reforms over personal interests or patronage networks.

But we’re not giving up. Civil society’s role now is to maintain constant pressure, document what does and doesn’t get implemented and call attention when governments fail to keep their promises. The Gen Z Council gives us a formal mechanism to do this, and we can also raise our voices independently of it. We need to build broader coalitions, keep the movement’s demands visible in public discourse and make clear that if a government fails to deliver, there will be consequences. Real change is slow and difficult — but it’s possible if civil society stays organised and vigilant and doesn’t compromise on core demands.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons

By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

 
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.

Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.

A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan

In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.

Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.

Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.

The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty

Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.

In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.

At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.

A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads

Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”

The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.

Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.

Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.

Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos

Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, speaks to talibés in Saint-Louis, Senegal, at the opening ceremony of the organisation's centre on Jan. 1, 2026. Courtesy: Ramata Haidara

By Megan Fahrney
SAINT-LOUIS, Senegal, Feb 27 2026 (IPS)

When you walk through the streets of Senegal’s cities, you notice them almost immediately: young boys in worn clothes, clutching plastic cans or tin bowls, weaving between cars and pedestrians to ask for spare change or food. They are often barefoot, alone and hungry. These children are known as talibés.

Boys aged approximately 5-15, known as talibé children, reside in daaras, schools run by marabouts.

Human Rights Watch says many marabouts, “who serve as de facto guardians, conscientiously carry out the important tradition of providing young boys with a religious and moral education.”

However, many of the schools are unregulated.

“However, thousands of so-called teachers use religious education as a cover for economic exploitation of the children in their charge, with no fear of being investigated or prosecuted,” the report says. The talibés from these ‘schools’ spend much of their days begging for food on the streets and suffering a range of human rights abuses. They regularly experience beatings, inadequate food and medical care, and neglect.

Mamadou Ba, president and founder of Maison des Talibés, is striving to change the narrative. Ba created the organisation Maison des Talibés (“House of Talibés”) three years ago in Saint-Louis, Senegal, with the goal of empowering talibés, improving their living conditions, and teaching them skills to help them succeed in young adulthood.

“I want to improve talibés’ lives,” Ba said. “I’m trying to help them in the future when they grow up [to be] self-sufficient.”

Ba himself was a talibé as a child. A Senegal native, Ba was sent away to Daara at the age of seven in a city called Sokone. He said he remained there for eight years, enduring very tough conditions and was not fed by his marabout.

Once Ba aged out of the daara, he moved to Dakar and later Saint-Louis to be a marabout.

While in Saint-Louis, Ba began to devote his time to French and English study. He got involved with an international organisation that supported talibés but found their approach of simply donating food to the talibés was not going to cut it. Ba knew he needed to equip the children with skills to succeed in young adulthood after leaving the daara.

“They have one way out, which is becoming a marabout,” Ba said. “I don’t want them basically to have one choice, which is a Quranic teacher. I want them to have different choices, different options, [to become] whatever they want.”

Maison des Talibés began as a true grassroots effort. Ba formed relationships with local marabouts, gaining their trust and allowing him to enter the daaras to provide the talibés services. He reached out to his friend, Abib Fall, a doctor in the area, who agreed to provide medical care to talibés in his free time. Ba himself began teaching the children English, providing food and rehabilitating the daaras.

“It’s very fundamental to have a connection with the marabouts; otherwise, you cannot do this work,” Ba said. “I speak the language that they speak, so they listen to me more … I’m a former talibé, so I know them very well.”

Equipped with English language skills, Ba expanded the organisation by speaking with international visitors and businesses in Saint-Louis to request financial support and recruit volunteers.

“The objective is education and handcraft,” Ba said. “I know that if they have the education and the handcraft, they will be like me or better.”

“I know how you get them there, because I went through that and I experienced it,” Ba said.

A 2019 report by Human Rights Watch documented 16 talibé deaths from abuse and neglect and dozens of cases of beatings, neglect, sexual abuse and the chaining and imprisonment in daaras. An estimated 50,000 young boys live as talibés across Senegal, as of 2017.

Though families often send their children to live in daaras voluntarily, the system is widely considered to be trafficking. Many talibés in Senegal come from impoverished communities in Guinea-Bissau and other neighbouring countries.

Over the years, the daara system has evolved from what it once was. Historically, talibés resided predominantly in rural environments, where they worked on farms in exchange for food or received donations from villagers. With urbanisation, the system has transformed into exploitation and begging.

Ramata Haidara, an American Fulbright fellow in Saint-Louis, met Ba outside of a museum in the city. After learning about Maison des Talibés, Haidara immediately got involved as a volunteer English teacher.

Haidara said she has witnessed her students’ confidence grow over time.

“[We] show them that you deserve to have resources and an education and people who are kind to you,” Haidara said.

On January 1, 2026, Maison des Talibés unveiled its first physical building to support talibés by giving them a safe space outside of the daara to learn skills, attend classes, eat, shower and receive medical care.

The centre’s opening ceremony drew over 100 talibés. Ba said the organisation serves many more than that in total, and that he hopes to expand its reach in the future.

Cheikh Tidiane Diallo, a perfume and soap maker living in Morocco, was one of Maison des Talibés’ first students. Diallo said he credits Ba and the organisation with giving him the skills and connections to move to Morocco and pursue his career.

“He has a good heart,” Diallo said of Ba. “He has never given up. I really appreciate that passion from him.”

Ba said he sees his younger self in the talibés he serves and is inspired by them just as they are inspired by him.

“This is a place where they can laugh, a place where they can eat, a place where they can feel okay,” Ba said. “This is our home.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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As US President Donald Trump pushes the world to war, arms spending has been rising worldwide. Wars secure more budgetary allocations, mainly benefiting the US-dominated military-industrial complex.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

In 2024, the US accounted for over 36% of the world’s military spending of $2.7 trillion! This exceeded the total expenditure of the next nine biggest spenders – China, Russia, Germany, India, UK, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, France, and Japan!

China’s military budget for 2025 was $250-300 billion. Most others are US allies who have pledged to increase war spending from under 2% of GDP to 5%!

The US and its allies will be even further ahead despite pushing friends and foes to spend more. Fortune magazine projects that US spending will exceed that of the next 35 highest-spending countries combined!

Despite its huge economic costs, the hike is being justified as helping to achieve ‘peace through strength’. After all, bombing ten nations in Trump 2.0’s first year did not incur any significant American military casualties.

Borrowing for war
Early this year, Dean Baker warned that President Trump was planning to increase annual military spending by $600 billion. Just under 2% of GDP, the spending increase would be massive.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

As Trump is more committed to cutting taxes than the US federal public debt, the “$600 billion increase in annual taxes would come to $6 trillion, roughly $45,000 per household” over the next decade.

The independent Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget projects federal debt for military spending will increase by $5.8 trillion over the next decade!

Trump has long promised to cut US public debt, which is already equivalent to 120% of annual output, and not to increase the deficit! But this would require massive tax increases, impossible to raise with tariffs alone.

Worse, federal government debt, which Trump promised to cut, will rise. Meanwhile, 94% of his Big Beautiful Bill (BBB) tax cuts benefit the top 60%, with only 1% trickling down to the poorest fifth.

The top fifth nominally gets 69%, but only the top 5% will actually pay less! The bottom 95% will pay more tax, with low-income households paying relatively more for tariffs!

Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, was supposed to cut federal government fraud, waste, and debt, but instead cut US growth in 2025’s last quarter.

While the BBB cut $186 billion of food aid for poorer Americans, rising war spending will mainly benefit US military-industrial complex cronies.

US consumers will pay more
Increased tariff rates would have to be impossibly high. And these would need to be even higher if exemptions are granted. Imports would fall sharply with such high tariffs.

Trump claimed additional tariff revenue would cover half a trillion dollars of additional military spending. He has long claimed other countries pay for tariffs.

With deindustrialisation over the past half-century, consumers have been buying more imports, paying for most tariff revenue.

Imports would fall sharply with such high tariffs. As many imports are intermediate goods used in manufacturing, high tariffs would hurt the industries Trump is claiming to promote.

High tariffs will raise consumer prices sharply. Cost-of-living increases would be unaffordable to many, including in Trump’s political base.

Before the 20 February Supreme Court decision declaring them unconstitutional, the tariffs were only expected to raise $300 billion in the first year.

Revenue was expected to fall as consumers bought more domestically produced goods instead of imports.

As many intermediate goods for manufacturing are imported, higher tariffs would hurt the very industries Trump claims to be helping. Thus, high tariffs will sharply raise consumer prices for both imports and US-made substitutes.

Also, massively increasing military spending will divert resources, including labour, away from more productive uses.

Military industrial cronies
US military contracts mainly went to five corporate groups even before Trump 2.0. While projects are worth more, beneficiaries are fewer, reflecting lobbying efforts.

More government military spending is unlikely to increase jobs in the long run, as jobs have decreased drastically since the 1980s due to greater automation.

Military contractors pass the costs of R&D and capital expenditures onto taxpayers, freeing revenue to pay for cash dividends and stock buybacks.

In 2024, the Pentagon’s leading contractor, Lockheed Martin paid out $7 billion for stock buybacks and dividends.

Although Trump once offered to work with China and Russia to cut the trio’s military spending by half, it was difficult to take his offer seriously given his other pronouncements and actions.

US military spending will continue to rise, driven by the same interests and impulses behind the recent massive hikes.

Military expenditure needs wars to secure yet more allocations for buying more military equipment, to the beat of war drums.

The actual political and business relationships are complex and ever-changing. As Walter Scott observed in 1808:

Oh, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive

IPS UN Bureau

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Cover photo of the new UNESCO report, Re|Shaping Policies for Creativity. Credit: Diana Ejaita/UNESCO

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 25 2026 (IPS)

As generative artificial intelligence (AI) rapidly expands across nearly every sector of society, those that work in cultural and creative industries are expected to bear some of the greatest losses. With AI-generated content projected to dominate global markets in the coming years, combined with a lack of strong regulatory frameworks to protect intellectual property and AI’s ability to produce content quickly at a low cost, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) warns that generative AI may become a major driver of inequality, threatening the livelihoods of millions of cultural workers around the world.

“It is no longer sufficient to simply celebrate the potential of digital tools,” said Lodovico Folin-Calabi, Director of the UNESCO Liaison Office in Brussels and UNESCO Representation to the European Union.“We must critically examine how these technologies are deployed, who is designing them, and whose voices are represented or excluded in their development.”

On February 18, UNESCO released the latest edition of its flagship report, Re|Shaping Policies for Creativity, examining how digital transformation and emerging technologies are reshaping the global cultural landscape. Drawing on data from more than 120 countries, the report highlights the growing impact of artificial intelligence, changing global trade dynamics, and increasing pressures on artistic freedom. UNESCO calls on governments, international institutions, and technology platforms to strengthen policy frameworks to prevent widening inequalities and protect the rights and livelihoods of creators, presenting a roadmap of more than 8,100 policy measures.

The report emphasizes that while emerging digital technologies offer new opportunities for innovation and provide artists with tools to expand their reach and streamline creative production, they have also deepened existing inequalities and made economic success increasingly uncertain. It projects that generative AI could lead to global revenue losses of up to 24 percent for music creators and 21 percent for audiovisual creators by 2028. These losses are compounded by artists’ growing reliance on digital income streams, which now account for nearly 35 percent of their earnings—marking a 17 percent increase from 2018.

As digital technologies become more integral to artists’ livelihoods, the rise of AI-generated content, increased risks of intellectual property infringement, and ongoing market volatility may make it even more difficult for cultural workers to remain sustainable. In recent years, streaming platforms and content curation systems have shifted to prioritize specific forms of content from popular creators, leaving smaller, lesser-known creators with far fewer opportunities for exposure or success.

“I think emerging artists struggle more than established artists with the rise of AI,” said Kiersten Beh, a traditional illustrator based in New Jersey. “Senior artists—especially freelance ones—already know how to promote themselves and get their work out there, and many of them have built strong relationships with clients over time. I fear that as an emerging artist, I don’t have these connections yet and instead find myself competing with AI directly.”

The report also underscores persistent gaps in how countries protect artists and their work. Only 61 percent of the countries surveyed were found to have adequate frameworks in place to safeguard artistic freedom and prevent intellectual property infringement from AI.

While approximately 85 percent of countries included cultural and creative sectors in their national development plans, just 56 percent outlined specific cultural objectives, highlighting a clear disconnect between broad commitments and concrete action. Furthermore, only 37 percent of the countries surveyed reported having measures to support cultural workers operating in environments entrenched in political instability, prolonged conflict, or displacement.

“We, international organizations, states, artists, and humanity in general, must stand together in ensuring that AI does not limit the rights of everyone who wants to be involved in artistic creativity,” said Alexandra Xanthaki, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights. “This includes not only artists, but anyone who wants to take part in artistic life.”

These challenges are particularly pronounced in the Global South, where artists face heightened risks tied to technological barriers and widening digital divides. The report notes that essential digital skills are held by approximately 67 percent of people in developed countries, compared with just 28 percent in developing nations. Additionally, only 48 percent of surveyed countries have developed systems to track the consumption of digital cultural content.

Colombian independent expert Viviana Rangel emphasized these imbalances when speaking to UNESCO in October 2025. “Our region doesn’t produce this kind of technology–it consumes it. This places us in a more vulnerable position against the unintended effects of these technologies in the cultural field,” she said, adding that AI systems often sideline the perspectives and inputs of artists in the Global South.

Meanwhile, support for vulnerable artists remains significantly inconsistent and underfunded, leaving many exposed to emerging risks such as digital surveillance and algorithmic bias. Direct public funding for cultural sectors remains strikingly low – below 0.6 percent of the global GDP – and is projected to decline further in the coming years.

Additionally, progress toward ensuring universal support for cultural workers remains uneven, with a pronounced gender gap affecting female artists. Although the share of women leading cultural institutions worldwide has increased from 31 percent in 2017 to 46 percent in 2024, significant disparities persist: women hold 64 percent of leadership roles in developed countries, compared to just 30 percent in developing nations. Moreover, entrenched policy frameworks continue to position women primarily as cultural consumers rather than recognizing and supporting them as creators and leaders.

Achieving a sustainable future for artists and cultural workers in the age of AI will require more than technological adaptation–it demands equitable policy reform and coordinated global action. Through its latest report, UNESCO calls for renewed investment, a more balanced market, and stronger collaborative measures between governments, institutions, and industry leaders to safeguard artistic freedom and ensure that creative work remains a viable livelihood. The agency further stresses that creativity must continue to serve as a vital source of economic opportunity, cultural diversity, and social cohesion in a rapidly digitizing world.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Credit: Georgios Kostomitsopoulos/NurPhoto via Getty Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 24 2026 (IPS)

The Islamic Republic of Iran has put down another uprising, with a ferocity that makes previous crackdowns seem restrained. The theocratic regime has survived, but it has done so by substituting violence for the economic security it cannot provide and the political legitimacy it no longer has. Its show of force is also an admission of weakness.

The protests that began on 28 December were triggered by a specific event — the collapse of the rial to a record low — but rooted in years of accumulated grievances. The second half of 2025 alone saw at least 471 labour protests across 69 Iranian cities. Inflation stood at 49.4 per cent. The 12-day war with Israel in June sent the Tehran Stock Exchange down around 40 per cent and cost many people their jobs. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions in September. The government cut fuel subsidies in November and slashed exchange-rate subsidies in December. Over 40 per cent of Iranian households now live below the poverty line and around half the population consume fewer than the recommended 2,100 calories per day.

It was this collapse that brought typically conservative bazaar merchants onto the streets. Within two weeks, the protests had spread to all of Iran’s 31 provinces, drawing in the urban middle class, working-class communities and people from rural provinces who had historically been among the regime’s most reliable supporters. What began as an economic stoppage rapidly became political defiance. For the millions who joined the striking merchants, the plummeting currency and rising cost of food were not market failures; they were proof of the regime’s corruption and ineptitude. Generation Z played a central role, demanding not reform but profound change. Lethal repression provided further confirmation the system was beyond reform.

The state’s response evolved. Initially it offered token economic concessions alongside its usual crowd control violence such as batons and teargas. When it became clear that a widespread movement with political demands had taken hold, it shifted to total attrition. On 8 January, authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown and authorised security forces to use military-grade weapons against crowds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a parallel military structure, major political force and economic empire with a direct stake in the regime’s survival – spearheaded the crackdown, with its affiliated Basij paramilitary networks playing a central role in street-level violence.

The casualty figures were deliberately obscured by the internet blackout, but all evidence points in the same direction. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that at least 3,000 civilians — including 44 children — were killed in the first 17 days. Iran Human Rights, citing Ministry of Health sources, documented a minimum of 3,379 deaths across 15 provinces. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported around 7,000 verified fatalities by mid-February, with 12,000 further cases under review. Time magazine cited hospital records suggesting the toll may have reached 30,000. Even the lowest of these figures vastly eclipses the 537 deaths recorded during the 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s concession that ‘several thousand’ had been killed confirmed the order of magnitude.

By 16 January the streets had been cleared, but a quieter repressive campaign continued, with nighttime raids, enforced disappearances and mass detentions in unofficial holding sites outside the legal system, targeting not only protesters but also doctors who treated the wounded, lawyers who provided legal assistance, bystanders who helped and people who posted supportive statements online. Authorities have detained over 50,000 people. Revolutionary Courts have fast-tracked mass indictments through summary trials, often conducted online and lasting mere minutes, with defendants denied independent legal counsel and confessions extracted under torture. Eighteen-year-old Saleh Mohammadi, whose retracted confession was obtained after interrogators broke bones in his hand, has been sentenced to be publicly hanged at the site of his alleged crime. Dozens more face imminent execution.

The regime has, for now, held: its security forces have not fractured, there have been no significant elite defections, and the IRGC has maintained its capacity for suppression. But it rules over a country with a wrecked economy, a battered nuclear programme, weakened regional proxies and a population that has run out of reasons to comply. Each protest cycle has required a higher threshold of state violence to suppress, a sign the regime has no other tool left.

What prevents weakness from becoming collapse is the absence of any alternative. The international response briefly suggested external pressure might tell – but did not. Donald Trump told Iranian protesters that ‘help is on its way’. The European Union listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The UK imposed fresh sanctions. The Iranian diaspora held at least 168 protests across 30 countries. But the international noise simply enabled the regime to spread the narrative that the uprising was foreign-directed.

The exiled opposition is fragmented along ethnic, ideological and generational lines, seemingly more consumed by internal rivalries than the task of converting widespread discontent into sustained political pressure. Inside Iran, the most credible opposition voices — Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh and veteran leader Mir Hossein Mousavi — are imprisoned or cut off from public life.

A weakened regime facing a leaderless opposition can endure, but what it cannot do is reverse its decay. Violence may clear the streets, but it cannot rebuild the economy, restore trust or give Iran’s young people a reason to stay. The regime has bought time, at an ever-rising price, but the crisis it’s suppressed isn’t going away.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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President Donald Trump has shaken up the world economy and the rule of international law in the first year of his second term – ostensibly to make America great again, particularly by reviving US manufacturing jobs.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Tariffs
Trump’s 2nd April 2025 Liberation Day tariffs were ostensibly his primary means for generating manufacturing employment.

When the US Supreme Court overruled him on 20 February, he responded by imposing a 10% tariff on all imports, raised to 15% the next day!

The tariffs are a blunt means for reviving US manufacturing jobs. The policy assumes US manufacturing jobs have been mainly lost due to what the White House deems ‘unfair’ competition from cheap imports.

Undoubtedly, US and other transnational corporations have relocated production and generally sourced imports from abroad to reduce import costs.

Imposing tariffs on imported goods to raise their prices is supposed to induce manufacturers to relocate production and jobs to the US.

Higher tariffs were imposed on countries with larger goods trade surpluses with the US. This ignores the services trade balance, generally more favourable to the US.

Tariff threats are now among the Trump administration’s choice weapons or means of economic coercion, including sanctions, to advance and secure its interests.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

But only $264 billion was collected during Trump 2.0’s first year, much higher than before, but still less than 1% of US federal debt.

Tariff revenue peaked in October 2025 at $31.35 billion, well below expectations, months before the Supreme Court decision.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy found only 4% of tariffs ‘absorbed’ by foreign exporters losing some export earnings. US importers paid the 96% balance of $264 billion in tariffs, weakening the impact of Trump’s business tax cuts.

But Trump’s tariffs have not reduced the US trade deficit, not even for manufactures; this rose to $1 trillion in 2025, as $3.15 trillion in imports exceeded $2.15 trillion in exports.

Although mortgage and loan interest rates have not fallen, inflation continues. The additional tariff revenue would not even have covered the extra military budget Trump has promised.

Congress could have reclaimed its tariff authority, though the current Trump-dominated House of Representatives has not tried.

But with the November midterm elections looming, Forbes reported that the president’s disapproval rating rose to 55% in mid-February, as fewer are confident his administration prioritises curbing inflation.

Financialisation
The US federal debt, around $39 trillion, now requires over $1 trillion in annual debt servicing from the $7 trillion annual budget.

Growing by $1.5-2.0 trillion annually, this unrepayable debt is being ‘rolled over’ for ever-shorter maturities. Hedge funds now hold 27% of US Treasuries, while foreigners, who held half in 2015, now have only 30%.

Treasury bond repurchase – or repo – agreements provide about $4 trillion in financing daily for derivatives speculation. Another financial crash can wipe out many more trillions of often dubious ‘value’.

While the US economy, productive employment, and research funding diminish, various bubbles of unrepayable debt are growing rapidly. Worse, so-called stablecoins and cryptocurrencies have infiltrated financial markets.

Meanwhile, some US mortgage delinquency rates have reached levels worse than in 2007-08. By the end of 2025, financial news agencies were publishing ominous reports of financial vulnerabilities.

Hundreds of billions of promised investments, coerced from other nations using tariff and other threats, will be invested in US financial asset markets but little of this will create manufacturing jobs.

Manufacturing comeback
Trump has promised to make the US a manufacturing superpower once again, leading the world in technology, computing power and military weaponry. But China leads in many – if not most – areas of recent technological advancement.

Dean Baker found the US labour market weakening over Trump 2.0’s first year. Overall, and manufacturing jobs growth both declined from Biden’s last year.

US manufacturing jobs have long been threatened by transnational corporate globalisation and labour-saving technical change, especially automation.

US policy in recent decades has left the private sector responsible for ensuring US industrial technology leadership and progress. Meanwhile, problems, such as poor infrastructure, remain unaddressed.

Trump’s tariffs may also inadvertently reduce US jobs. Many industrial processes require imported parts, with the tariffs proving disruptive.

Trump’s policies have not created enough manufacturing jobs. The president fired his Labor Department’s statistics head in mid-2025 for not reporting enough job growth.

Nonetheless, it reported only 584,000 net new jobs for all of 2025, compared to 1.6 million in 2024, for the US labour force of 165 million!

The Wall Street Journal noted, “The manufacturing boom President Trump promised … is going in reverse”.

The Trump administration could still use the Supreme Court’s ruling to change its strategy to make America great again by drawing better lessons from US economic history and adopting a more pragmatic approach. But so far, it seems unlikely to do so.

IPS UN Bureau

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Fish Value Addition Workshop in Ivory Coast.

By Sidi Tiémoko Touré and Essam Yassin Mohammed
ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, Feb 19 2026 (IPS)

It is an indictment on the global food system that, despite having some of the richest and most endowed natural resources in the world and a burgeoning youth population, West Africa spends more than $2 billion a year importing aquatic foods to feed its people, almost half of which is spent by Côte d’Ivoire alone.

Fish has long been a cherished staple food in West African diets, providing around two-thirds of all animal protein and featuring in popular dishes such as the Ivorian classic, poisson braisé and Senegal’s thieboudienne.

Yet in recent years, the region’s fishing industry has struggled to meet demand with growing external pressures and threats. Some of the highest levels of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the world costs the region more than $9 billion annually, and increasing vulnerability to climate change is also impacting the sector.

These challenges to domestic production have coincided with a decline in fish consumption from more than 13kg per person a year in 2008 to just over 11.5kg in 2025, despite the ongoing popularity of fish and seafood.

From our perspective, Côte d’Ivoire, along with other West African countries, have enormous potential to embrace the investment rule to “fish where the fish are” and reclaim food sovereignty. Not only would a stronger domestic sector reduce the import bill, but it would also create much-needed jobs, especially for young people, as well as improving diets and food security by providing more highly nutritious fish and seafood.

In short, we believe that boosting homegrown aquaculture would allow West Africa to reap the full benefits of the blue economy.

To that end, Côte d’Ivoire is at the forefront of a transformative journey to get West Africa’s fishing industry back on course, setting an example for other countries.

To begin with, the country has launched an ambitious policy framework dedicated to growing the aquaculture sector, including inland fisheries, which extend the benefits beyond coastal communities.

The $25.6 million Project for the Development of Competitive Value Chains in Aquaculture and Sustainable Fisheries (ProDeCAP) focuses on improving marine, lagoon, and inland fisheries, increasing broodstock capacity, setting up commercial seed supply systems, and developing the fish feed industry. It aims to boost annual aquaculture production by 35,000 tons, adding to the country’s overall fish supply directly and indirectly benefiting around 700,000 people, around half of which are women.

Similarly, the Strategic Program for the Transformation of Aquaculture in Côte d’Ivoire (PSTACI) is focusing on four pillars to stimulate the domestic aquaculture sector. These include creating jobs, particularly for young people and in rural areas, as well as piloting innovations with demonstration projects to increase private investment, strengthening governance and boosting national capacities for supplying fishery products.

At the same time, Côte d’Ivoire will invest $3 million in a new Aquaculture Research Innovation Hub (ARIH), led by global research centre WorldFish. The hub, which will focus on improving feed, genetics and fish health, will help fill the gaps in research and innovation to modernise the sector.

The hub will bring WorldFish’s global expertise to West Africa, leveraging 50 years of innovation in small-scale fisheries and aquaculture. In 2023 alone, WorldFish developed 70 innovations, upskilled almost 120,000 small-scale fishers, farmers, extension officers, suppliers, students, and community workers, and facilitated the production of 436,600 tonnes of farmed fish using improved tools and technologies.

All of these efforts will help fast-track the growth of the sector and leapfrog the conventional trajectory of unsustainable practices by streamlining the adoption of best practices and proven technologies.

But beyond policy, research and innovation, the final piece of the puzzle is the development of the broader value chain to ensure every link that connects the sector is resilient and effective.

For this, Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring countries need strong private sector partnerships to establish and grow reliable supplies of young fish as well as feed markets, processing infrastructure and sales platforms.

This element is crucial because in each of these stages lies untapped opportunities for new jobs and new sources of food and nutrition. The growth of the aquaculture sector is especially important for women, who can find diverse opportunities in processing and selling fish and other aquatic foods.

To extend the adage: teaching a man to fish might help feed him for a lifetime, but transforming an entire fishing and aquaculture sector will feed, nourish, employ and build resilience across a whole country.

West Africa has both the natural resources and demand for a thriving regional fishing industry. Strategic investments, policies and partnerships are now coming together to make this a reality, offering a swell of opportunities for others to come on board and ride the wave of Africa’s blue economy.

H.E. Sidi Tiémoko Touré, Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries, Côte d’Ivoire
Dr. Essam Yassin Mohammed, Director General of WorldFish

IPS UN Bureau

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Hawa Hussein Farah, a market trader in Garissa Town, Kenya, says extreme heat has shortened her working hours and reduced her daily earnings. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

By Chemtai Kirui
GARISSA, Kenya , Feb 16 2026 (IPS)

By 9 a.m. on a Wednesday, Hawa Hussein Farah is already watching the temperature climb. Awake since 6 a.m., she has prepared her three children for school before walking them to class and heading to Suuq Mugdi, an open-air market in Garissa town, to buy the fruit she will sell.

When she settles into her modest stall, built from wooden poles and covered with draped fabric, the heat is already intensifying beneath the canopy.

On a wooden table, yellow bananas rest in neat clusters beside green-striped watermelons. Mangoes, some blushed red, others golden, are stacked in small pyramids. The shade shields the fruits from direct sunlight, but the air beneath stays warm and dry.

“When it gets this hot, the customers disappear,” Farah says, lifting a bottle of water. “We have to close and go home to rest until it cools.”

Situated in Kenya’s arid northeast, Garissa is in its hottest season. Between January and March, daytime highs typically hover around 36°C (96.8°F).

In early February 2026, temperatures reached 38°C (100.4°F), with “feels-like” readings topping 41°C (107°F), according to Samuel Odhiambo, the county director of meteorological services.

While similar peaks have been recorded in previous years, Odhiambo said recent data show hot conditions are lasting longer, with more consecutive days above seasonal averages. The meteorological agency has issued a biometeorological advisory, warning residents that prolonged exposure increases the risk of heat stress, dehydration, and skin damage.

“If the current pattern continues, temperatures could exceed 40°C (104°F) in March,” he said.

For Farah, these degrees translate into a shorter workday. By noon, exhaustion sets in.

“My body feels weak and I sweat a lot. I drink two or three litres of water in the morning. I don’t even know if it helps.”

She now closes her stall roughly four hours earlier than in cooler months, cutting deeply into her already thin margins.

On cooler days, she brings in about 7,000 shillings (USD 54) in weekly sales. In prolonged heat, that falls to around 4,000 (USD 31), nearly half her usual takings.

Unsold fruit quickly softens, and after two days she lowers prices or sells it to nearby food kiosks for juice to avoid larger losses.

With no fixed salary or protections, each lost hour translates directly into lost income.

As the largest trade hub in northeastern Kenya, Garissa’s economy is anchored by its livestock markets. Data from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)  indicate that this economic dependence makes the region uniquely vulnerable: when extreme heat degrades livestock health and keeps buyers away, the resulting financial contagion directly shrinks customer flow for small vendors like Farah.

Emily Ndung’e, a motorcycle taxi rider in Garissa Town, northeastern Kenya, says prolonged high
temperatures are affecting her income as fewer customers travel during the hottest hours. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Emily Ndung’e, a motorcycle taxi rider, said she is facing similar losses.

Ndung’e says her daily income has plummeted from 1,500 shillings (USD 11.50) to just 500 (USD 3.80) during the heatwave.

Wearing  protective riding gear traps heat against her skin, and she often waits for hours between rides under the relentless sun.

“The heat gives me rashes and I sweat a lot,” Ndung’e says. “But I have to be out here. This is the work I depend on to feed my children.”

She describes the heat as devastating for both her income and her health. With few shaded areas along the roadside, she moves between scattered tree canopies, waiting for the next client.

Even after sunset, the heat lingers in Garissa’s concrete homes and corrugated roofs, offering little relief to those who have spent the day working outdoors.

Patricia Nying’uro, a climate scientist at the Kenya Meteorological Department who serves as the national focal point for the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), says that hotter nights strip away the body’s ability to recover between hot days.

“When temperatures approach 39°C, or even lower in humid conditions, the risk to outdoor workers increases sharply, particularly with prolonged exposure,” Nying’uro said.

Concerns over rising temperatures in Garissa have previously reached Parliament.

In 2022, Aden Duale, then the Garissa Township lawmaker, formally petitioned the Ministry of Environment regarding ‘public concerns’ over rising temperatures. The ministry acknowledged above-average temperatures linked to climate change. In Garissa’s markets, those shifts now translate into extreme heat events that disrupt daily survival.

Duale now serves as Cabinet Secretary for Health and in October 2025 presided over the launch of Kenya’s Climate Change and Health Strategy (2024–2029), marking the first time heat-related mortality is formally tracked at the national level.

Yet, responsibility for addressing the impacts of extreme heat remains limited.

Garissa has a County Climate Change Action Plan (2023–2028), but it focuses largely on drought, floods and livestock disease. Specific provisions for extreme heat, such as adjusted working hours, public cooling spaces or hydration points – are absent.

The National Drought Management Authority said its mandate centres on drought-related risks, adding that extreme heat on its own does not fall within its response frameworks. Officials directed heat-related enquiries to the Kenya Meteorological Department.

For Farah, that gap is tangible.

“We don’t get any help from the government. We need shade because we suffer in the heat,” she said. “I still pay taxes to the county, but the loss is mine to bear.”

Across Kenya, informal workers like Farah account for roughly 80 percent of the workforce. According to a July 2024 report by the International Labour Organization (ILO), Africa now faces the world’s highest heat exposure, affecting 92.9 percent of its workers.

The agency warns that labour capacity can decline by up to 50 percent under extreme heat—a productivity drain contributing to projected global losses of ISD 2.4 trillion by 2030.

Extreme heat poses a direct challenge to United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.8, which mandates safe working environments for all.

Without safeguards against extreme heat, this promise remains unfulfilled, exposing a critical gap in Kenya’s climate strategy and undermining SDG 13’s call for national resilience.

The current National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) prioritises large-scale agriculture and energy infrastructure. It offers few explicit protections for informal market labour.

While the heat is universal, its toll is gendered. Researchers say that women in Garissa face a “double exposure”, navigating extreme temperatures at the stall and then managing the unpaid care of children and seniors in overheated, unventilated homes, facing nearly a 24-hour cycle of stress.

A study by the The Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center found that heat increases a woman’s total work burden by 260 percent when domestic labour is included.

“It’s a regressive tax,” says Kathy Baughman McLeod, CEO of Climate Resilience for All (CRA), citing research in cities like Freetown, Sierra Leone, where informal market women can lose up to 60% of their income during heat-driven disruptions.

“The body perpetually believes it’s under attack,” McLeod adds, “without tools like ‘heat insurance’, currently being piloted in India but absent in Kenya, the crisis erodes both income and physical recovery.”

Sierra Leone was the first country in Africa to adopt a national Heat Action Plan (HAP), which is a comprehensive policy framework designed to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate the health and economic impacts of extreme heat.

According to Dr Joyce Kimutai, who co-authored the State of the Climate Kenya 2024 report alongside Nying’uro, establishing localised Heat Action Plans is now the “most urgent task” for national adaptation.

“Heat continues to be a silent killer,” Kimutai said, adding that because the economic impacts remain poorly quantified, policy responses continue to lag behind the rising mercury.

Nairobi County is currently piloting a draft heat-response framework that would allow authorities to trigger adjusted working hours and open public cooling spaces during extreme conditions.

The proposal has not yet been formally adopted, but Kimutai says she hopes it could serve as a model for other counties.

As temperatures in Garissa edge toward 40°C, Farah’s adaptation strategy remains a solitary one. She packs her unsold, softening fruit, shutters her stall four hours early, and absorbs the financial blow.

For now, there is no policy to shield her livelihood, only the heat.

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

13-year-old Ojulu Omod comes to the gold mine site before the day gets too hot. He is out of school and supports his family by mining gold the traditional way. Credit: UNICEF/Demissew Bizuwerk

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 13 2026 (IPS)

Although global rates of child labour have declined since 2020, the practice remains a serious and persistent violation of children’s rights, undermining their safety, social development, and long-term economic stability. These risks are intensified by structural pressures— poverty, climate shocks, protracted conflict, and unsafe migration— that continue to push vulnerable children into crisis, and in some cases, trafficking and exploitation. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warns that African countries remain among the most affected regions, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated policy action, cross-border cooperation, and sustained investment to protect children on the move and those at risk of labour exploitation.

Roughly 137.6 million children across the world are engaged in child labour, representing 7.8 percent of all children globally. Of this number, approximately 54 million children are engaged in particularly hazardous work—such as mining and construction, or work performed for over 43 hours per week.

In a newly-released data brief analyzing child labour trends across Eastern and Southern Africa, UNICEF found approximately 41 million children—nearly one third of the global total—are engaged in child labour as of 2024, accounting for roughly one in five children in the region. While this represents progress from the 49 million children recorded in 2020, UNICEF warns that these gains remain fragile and could be reversed without strengthened policies and adequate financing.

“Children belong in classrooms, not workplaces,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa. She emphasized that ending child labour requires an inclusive approach that aims to revitalize education systems and strengthen protection measures for children worldwide.

“Supporting parents with decent work is essential so children can go to school, learn, play, and build a brighter future,” Kadilli added, urging governments, the private sector, civil society, and communities to work together to build a coordinated response aligned with “national and continental commitments” to put a definitive end to child labour.

The report highlights the severity of the crisis: 13.4 million children in Eastern and Southern Africa are engaged in hazardous work. It is only second to West and Central Africa when it comes to the prevalence of child labour globally. Education disparities are particularly pronounced, with six in ten adolescents engaged in child labour out of school, compared with just two in ten of their non-working peers.

According to the report, Eastern and Southern Africa has a disproportionately high share of young children engaged in child labour compared to other regions. Roughly 65 percent of children in child labour in the region are between the ages of 5 and 11, which greatly contrasts with other parts of the world where older adolescents make up a larger share. Although notable progress has been made in reducing child labour across all age groups, the decline has been slowest among the youngest children.

UNICEF notes that child labour in Eastern and Southern Africa is heavily concentrated in agriculture, which accounts for approximately 78 percent of all cases among children aged 5 to 17. This is even more pronounced among younger children, with more than 80 percent of those aged 5 to 11 working in agricultural fields. However, hazardous work is disproportionately concentrated in other sectors, with 55 percent of child labor in industry and 56 percent in services being classified as hazardous, compared to the 26 percent found in agriculture.

On February 11, during the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour in Marrakesh, Morocco, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) called on governments to strengthen protection measures, enhance international cooperation, and improve monitoring systems to ensure that migration and trafficking are central to efforts to end child labour. The agency emphasized that unsafe migration is a key driver of child labour, as displaced communities often resort to it in the absence of access to basic services, stable livelihoods, and social protection.

“If we are serious about ending child labour, we must face a reality that is still too often overlooked: migration,” said Amy Pope, IOM Director-General. “Today, millions of children are on the move, they’re forced by conflict, they’re pulled by poverty, they’re displaced by the impact of climate shocks. And they’re searching for opportunity and for safety. Evidence shows that migrant children are often the most exposed to child labour. They work longer hours, they earn less, they are less likely to attend school, and they face higher risks of injury, exploitation, and death.”

According to the latest figures from IOM, approximately 30,000 child victims of trafficking have been identified globally, though the true number is likely far higher due to widespread underreporting and gaps in detection. Children account for nearly one in four detected trafficking victims worldwide, with roughly 20 percent aged between 9 and 17 years of age.

Among all identified victims, 61 percent face sexual exploitation, with girls being disproportionately affected. Recruitment into armed groups is common among boys. Traffickers commonly exert control through psychological, physical, and sexual abuse, as well as threats against victims or their families and restrictions on finances, medical care, essential services, and freedom of movement.

Pope underscored the urgency of closing systemic gaps in labour governance and protection systems that leave migrant children vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. “These children are often missing from child labour policies, overlooked in protection systems, and invisible in the data that guides decisions,” she said. “Along migration routes, children are exploited in agriculture, domestic work, hospitality, and construction — and these abuses follow them across borders wherever protection fails. Protection must move with the child: prevention must reflect real labour and mobility realities, and systems must work together across sectors and borders.”

UNICEF is calling on the international community to address both the root causes and consequences of child labour. The plan includes expanding social protection programs for vulnerable families, promoting universal access to quality education, strengthening monitoring efforts to identify at-risk children, ensuring decent work opportunities for youth and adults, and enforcing stronger labour laws to enhance corporate accountability and eliminate exploitation across supply chains. Together, these efforts aim to ensure that families are not forced to rely on their children for survival—and that children are free to learn, grow, and simply be children.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Despite lacking both evidence and theory, many economists claim trade liberalisation accelerates development. But only a few economies have gained many jobs from external market access.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Multilateral trade liberalisation
In conventional trade theory, gains from trade liberalisation are mainly one-time increases in output and exports due to static comparative advantage.

Post-World War Two (WWII) US foreign policy transformed multilateral relations and transnational institutions, including international economic governance.

With the growing power of transnational corporations, many multilateral institutions, including the United Nations system, have been reconfigured or marginalised.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a ‘second-best’ compromise after the US Congress vetoed the creation of the International Trade Organisation, despite widespread international enthusiasm for the 1948 Havana Charter.

Almost half a century later, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995, following the 1994 Marrakesh Declaration concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.

Trade mahaguru Jagdish Bhagwati argued that multilateral trade has been undermined by plurilateral and bilateral arrangements favouring dominant partners.

With the era of trade liberalisation essentially over since the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC), free trade advocacy has received a new lease of life from mythmaking about the ‘pre-Trump’ era.

Uneven, mixed effects
Mainstream trade theory does not entertain the possibility of ‘unequal exchange’, however defined.

Nor does it even incorporate Bhagwati’s notion of ‘immiserising growth’ when productivity gains reduce prices for consumers, rather than increase producers’ earnings.

The three decades of trade liberalisation from the 1980s saw slower, but more volatile growth than the post-WWII quarter-century termed the ‘Golden Age’. More recently, stagnationist tendencies have dominated since the GFC.

With trade liberalisation, many developing countries have experienced greater food insecurity and deindustrialisation, as the manufacturing shares of their national income shrank.

Much import-substituting industrialisation after WWII or independence has since collapsed. Besides resource processing, very few new industries have emerged in Africa.

‘Aid for Trade’ for poorer developing countries implicitly acknowledges trade liberalisation’s adverse effects by mitigating some of them. Why then should they abandon protectionism if they need to be compensated for doing so?

Wealthy nations have also insisted that developing countries end manufacturing tariffs. But as Dani Rodrik has quipped, why rich nations “need to be bribed by poor countries to do what is good for them is an enduring mystery”.

African nations and Caribbean and Pacific small island developing states enjoyed preferential access to European markets, which full multilateral trade liberalisation would eliminate.

Such preferences for Sub-Saharan Africa have pitted African against Asian least developed countries, undermining the collective negotiating strengths of both.

Many countries had expected the current Doha Round to eliminate rich nations’ producer subsidies, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, but that has not happened.

Cutting farm support in the North could make food agriculture in developing countries more viable, but would also raise food import prices in the interim.

World Bank ‘structural adjustment’ programmes and IMF fiscal discipline requirements have undermined rural infrastructure and productivity, setting back smallholder agriculture in most developing countries.

Setbacks, not gains
Trade liberalisation also reduces tariff revenue. Such losses have hurt developing nations, especially the poorest, for whom tariffs often accounted for up to half of all tax revenue.

Such revenue cuts severely undermined the fiscal means of developing nations, crucial for government spending and investment, including for development and welfare.

Most governments are unable to replace lost tariff revenue with new or higher taxes. Meanwhile, more borrowing to offset lost tariff revenue has worsened indebtedness.

Trade liberalisation advocates are typically vague about how it is supposed to raise exports, incomes, and tax revenue, besides compensating for lost tariff revenue.

Instead, tax burdens typically become more regressive as overall tax revenue declines. Real consumption is supposed to rise as import prices fall with lower tariffs, but could also decline due to increasing consumption taxes.

Less policy space
Trade liberalisation has also reduced available development policy tools, especially those relating to trade, investment, and industrialisation.

The constraints imposed by trade liberalisation and investment agreements have generally limited the scope for and potential of development policy initiatives.

The actual role and impact of trade policy for growth and employment remain moot. But there are no analytical reasons or robust empirical evidence that trade liberalisation per se ensures sustainable development.

World Bank and most other studies acknowledged modest, if not negative, net gains for most developing countries from any realistically achievable outcome.

It is often ignored that realistic expectations of gains from trade liberalisation rely crucially on a strong positive export supply response.

However, such a response is unlikely when internationally competitive, productive and export capacities do not already exist, as in most developing countries, especially the poorest.

Hence, most of the Global South has not been able to overcome the worst consequences of trade liberalisation to achieve sustainable development.

In any case, the WTO Doha Round talks were ended by rich nations in 2015.

With the increasingly blatant self-interested contravention of WTO rules by the US, European and other wealthy nations, developing countries may best enhance their development prospects by reverting to GATT rules.

This would allow them to opt in, as appropriate, rather than resign themselves to the uniform ‘one size fits all’ WTO rules and regulations, regardless of context, circumstances, capacities and capabilities.

IPS UN Bureau

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Close-up-of-a-yellowfin-tuna-swimming-in-the-sea. Credit: Freepik---EyeEm

By James Alix Michel and Dona Bertarelli
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

The world is entering a decisive period for the future of the ocean. With the High Seas Treaty coming into force and meaningful progress being made on the World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, global momentum for stronger marine governance is building. Yet, new pressures linked to the push for deep-sea mining — the extraction of minerals from seabed thousands of meters below the ocean surface — threaten to undermine these gains. To safeguard progress, global decision-making will have to keep pace with such emerging risks. In this context, Africa will host several global discussions in 2026, including those that will shape the ocean’s future, with a series of opportunities for leadership starting with the African Union Summit in February to the Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya in June.

Dona-Bertarelli-and-James-Alix-Michel-meeting-at-Our-Ocean-Bali-in-2018. Credit: Dona-Bertarelli-Philanthropy

These concerns are particularly relevant to the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), one of the most biodiverse marine regions in the world, with endemism as high as 22 per cent yet at the convergence of multiple environmental stresses. Coral reefs and mangrove forests are deteriorating, while illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and sand mining put additional pressure on already fragile ecosystems. The lasting impacts of the 2020 Wakashio oil spill in Mauritius show how quickly harm to the ocean can ripple across communities. In such a fragile setting, the introduction of a new extractive industry demands the highest level of scrutiny.

In the face of these emerging challenges, Seychelles has an important role to play. For decades, it has demonstrated leadership in championing the blue economy and protecting marine ecosystems. Early ratification of the BBNJ Treaty, along with advocacy for High Seas marine protected areas such as the Saya de Malha Bank, has positioned the country as a respected voice for responsible ocean governance. If deep-sea mining begins in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean is likely to follow, including on the mid-Indian Ridge east of Seychelles’ EEZ and within the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries agreement region. Catalyzing a new wave of continental leadership on deep-sea protection would advance a vision of ocean stewardship grounded in equity and sustainability. A precautionary pause on deep-sea mining would give concrete expression to that vision.

Polymetallic nodules on the deep seabed. Credit: Deep-Rising

Scientific research continues to underline this need for caution. Deep-sea mining would have an irreversible impact on seabed ecosystems and species. And recent studies of the midwater zone, where waste plumes from deep-sea mining would spread, show that mining particles could reduce the nutritional quality of the natural food supply for zooplankton by up to ten times. This would decrease food quality and trigger effects that move through the food web, ultimately affecting larger species and the overall health of the ocean millions of people rely on. In an environment where more than 99.99 percent of the deep ocean floor has yet to be explored or directly observed, introducing large scale industrial activity could cause damage that cannot be undone.

The economic risks for the region are equally significant. The Western Indian Ocean’s natural assets have been conservatively valued at 333.8 billion dollars, making the ocean one of the region’s most important sources of long-term wealth. Within this, fisheries represent the single largest asset and a cornerstone of economic resilience. The region generates about 4.8 percent of the global fish catch, roughly 4.5 million tonnes each year, underscoring how many economies and communities depend on healthy stocks. In Seychelles and across the region, tuna fisheries in particular underpin national revenue, employment and food security. Undermining the sustainability of fisheries could therefore not only threaten livelihoods but also diminish long-term economic opportunity.

Deep-sea-creature. Credit: Schmidt-Ocean-Institute

The accelerating push for deep-sea mining activities also raises concerns about repeating historic patterns seen in other extractive sectors across Africa. The uneven distribution of benefits from land-based resource exploitation has shown how easily local communities can be left with environmental impacts while external actors capture most of the value. Without strong governance frameworks that ensure fair participation and transparent decision-making, current deep-sea mining models risk following a similar trajectory, privileging short-term economic gain for multinational corporations over regional priorities.

Finally, the argument that deep-sea mining is necessary for the renewable energy transition is also increasingly at odds with current evidence. Rapid advances in recycling technologies, circular economy approaches, and alternative materials are already reducing the projected demand for minerals from new extractions. These pathways can support the global transition without the need to industrialize one of the least understood parts of the planet. The United Nations Environment Programme has also made clear in their 2022 report that “there is currently no foreseeable way in which investment into deep-sea mining activities can be viewed as consistent with the Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles”.

White-sand-and-clear-turquoise-water-on-a-Seychelles-beach. Credit: Unsplash—Alin-Mecean

In parallel, African-led nature-positive initiatives are demonstrating how ocean resources can be managed in ways that support both people and the environment. Initiatives such as the Great Blue Wall aim to create connected networks of protected and restored marine areas that strengthen biodiversity, climate resilience and community wellbeing across the WIO region. These efforts demonstrate what a regenerative blue economy can look like in practice. Preserving these gains requires ensuring that new activities do not compromise the progress already made.

Across the continent, young leaders, civil society and scientific institutions are calling for greater accountability in decisions that shape our collective future. Their message is clear: long-term wellbeing for everyone must come before short-term gains for a select few. This call also echoes a growing movement worldwide, with more than 40 countries now supporting a pause on deep-sea mining, including France, Fiji, Chile and Mexico. A precautionary pause on deep-sea mining is not a rejection of economic progress, but a commitment to sound science, inclusive dialogue and responsible stewardship. We are hopeful that countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world will hear this call and secure the future of the ocean for generations to come.

James Alix Michel is the former President of Seychelles (2004–2016) and a global advocate for the blue economy, ocean conservation and climate resilience.

Dona Bertarelli is a Swiss philanthropist, IUCN Patron of Nature and biodiversity champion, deeply committed to a healthy balance between people and nature.

IPS UN Bureau

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Educated Afghan women in Kabul’s informal economy, working in retail as Taliban rules curb professional opportunities. Credit: Learning Together.

By External Source
KABUL, Jan 28 2026 (IPS)

Young women in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, are trying their hands at unfamiliar tasks in embroidery, tailoring and designing beads in market stalls. Many should instead have been sitting at desks writing computer software or reporting news, the fields they trained for.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, highly educated women have been removed from their official positions and shut out of much of the formal workforce, compelling them to take up jobs unrelated to their field of training to cope with economic hardship and to avoid the mental strain of unemployment.

Professional opportunities for women have been drastically limited. Almost all women are barred from working in offices, the media, and other fields related to their education.

Lida, (a pseudonym) a computer science graduate, previously earned a good salary as an IT officer at the Ministry of Economy, a job she held for more than six years. She now lives in southeastern Kabul, working as a tailor and running a small shop. Her late husband, who worked for the Ministry of Rural Development, was killed in a Kabul bombing ten years ago.

Lida now shares a house with the family of her brother along with her five children, and says she is in dire financial straits. To make ends meet, she has sent one of her sons to sell plastic bags on the streets. Her younger son is still at school. Her daughter’s education has been suspended following Taliban’s edicts.

“When the Taliban returned to power I was forced out of my job, says Lida, “and I have not been able to find any within my profession in the last four years and therefore, had no option but to work as a shop assistant”.

The Taliban do not directly grant work permits to women to operate the shops. Instead, either a male family member or another man must first obtain the work permit for the shop

Many women are flocking to Kabul’s informal sector, but it provides limited opportunities, crowding them into shops, which only sell women’s clothing and cosmetics, serving primarily female customers.

The Taliban do not directly grant work permits to women to operate the shops. Instead, either a male family member or another man must first obtain the work permit for the shop. Only then can women work in the shop as salespeople or assistants, receiving a salary or a commission based on an agreed arrangement.

“Working in a tailoring workshop is very difficult and frustrating”, Lida complains adding, “I wish I could at least work in a computer shop, which is related to my field of study”.

Mursal, (a pseudonym) 27, a journalism graduate, has faced a similar fate. She worked as a reporter for eight years in various media outlets and, before the Taliban returned, was employed in an advocacy organization for journalists, where she enjoyed a good income and benefits.

Mursal, like dozens of other educated women, has become a shopkeeper. Private media outlets do not have adequate capacity to absorb many women, so instead of reporting the news, she now sells traditional Afghan clothes and products geared towards women.

Voicing her frustrations Mursal said she initially felt “very undervalued”. “People used to cast strange glances at us and, apart from that, my family wasn’t very happy with the job I was engaged in”. It is uncommon for women to operate shops in Afghanistan,

Mursal sells women’s clothes in southwestern Kabul, where she lives with her parents, both former government employees who are now unemployed.

“I have six sisters and one brother”, says Mursal, adding, “I cannot get married until they are on their feet, because I am responsible for all of them”. Her brother is only ten years old. Mursal makes about ten thousands Afghanis (127 euros) a month selling in the shop, which is hardly sufficient for the family to get by.

Even so, the Taliban’s moral police do not give the women any breathing space under the increasing precarious job situation. According to Mursal, officials from the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice visit their shops three times a week to enforce an all-day rule requiring them to wear masks, which they find suffocating. They are also forced to conceal or remove pictures on women’s sleepwear.

“If the sleepwear is hidden, how would customers know which ones or what to buy?” she points out.

Defiance in the face of adversity

While the women agonize over the likelihood of years of academic effort going to waste, they have nevertheless turned their situation as shopkeepers into a form of resistance to Taliban’s violations of their rights.

Forced to run shops to support their families, they may be glad to earn a little income, but their deeper pain comes from knowing that their skills and dreams in their chosen professions remain unused.

Still, it is a testament to their resilience in the face of severe restrictions imposed by the Taliban that they have readily taken up often unwanted jobs in the informal sector simply to survive and support their families.

The shift is not just about earning a living; it is a silent resistance. By taking on these roles, Afghan women are sending a clear signal that they will not remain silent and be airbrushed from the society.

Even when doors are closed to them in their professions, they find ways to stay active, contribute, and make a difference. They demonstrate that even a small window of opportunity can be transformed into meaningful participation, proving that Afghan women will continue to fight for their rights in any way they can.

Their resilience is a reminder that Taliban restrictions may limit opportunities, but they cannot erase ambition or their determination to create change.

By taking up these jobs, they make sure their presence is felt in society and stand strong in the face of the Taliban, who are trying to erase them from public life. Afghan women refuse to stay silent. They make it clear Afghan women will not disappear, they insist on being seen, heard, and counted.

Excerpt:

 
CIVICUS speaks to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC) about labour rights abuses in Myanmar’s garment industry since the 2021 military coup.

Myanmar’s garment sector, which employs hundreds of thousands of workers, is in deep crisis. Since the coup, labour protections have collapsed, independent unions have been dismantled and workers who try to organise face intimidation, dismissal and arrest. Inside factories, reports show multiple cases of child labour, forced overtime, harassment, poverty wages and unsafe conditions. At the same time, rising living costs and US tariffs are pushing many workers further into insecurity as factories close and layoffs become more common. Garment workers, most of them women, are trapped between exploitation, repression and a rapidly shrinking industry.

How have conditions inside Myanmar’s garment factories changed since the coup?

Our monitoring between February 2021 and October 2024 shows a sharp rise in both the number and severity of pre-existing labour rights abuses. Since the coup, factory employers have increasingly worked with the military to restrict organising and silence workers. This collaboration has led to threats, arrests and violent attacks against workers. In one case, security forces carried out joint military and police raids on the homes of workers who demanded unpaid wages and limits on overtime.

Factories have also expanded surveillance. Workers report invasive searches, phone confiscation and installation of CCTV inside factories, including near toilets. Employers also force workers to lie during audits. These practices aim to hide abuses and have exacerbated the abuses workers already faced.

What abuses do garment workers suffer in the workplace?

Factories force workers to meet extreme production targets through excessive and often unpaid overtime. Many workers must stay overnight until dawn, often without enough food, water or ventilation, leading to exhaustion and health problems. Managers threaten and abuse workers who refuse to work overtime or fail to meet targets. We have documented a case where supervisors denied workers food and water as punishment for not meeting targets.

Health and safety conditions have worsened. Workers report dirty, insufficient toilets, poor food quality and unsafe drinking water. They’ve also reported blocked emergency exits, inadequate ventilation and leaking roofs that put lives at risk. Factory-provided transport creates further dangers, as they are often overcrowded and suffer frequent road accidents. In one case, a major crash involving a worker shuttle left several workers badly hurt, including one who needed abdominal surgery.

Women workers face particularly severe abuses, including hair-pulling, physical assault, sexual harassment and verbal attacks. In one case, supervisors punched and kicked women workers and called them ‘dogs’.

What happen to workers who try to speak out or organise?

Workers who dare speak out face brutal reprisals. After the military declared 16 labour unions and labour rights organisations illegal, arrests, home raids and surveillance increased, particularly against union leaders and activists linked to the Civil Disobedience Movement. The movement began after the coup and brings together workers who refuse to cooperate with military rule through strikes and other forms of non-violent resistance.

Inside factories, employers threaten and dismiss union leaders on false grounds. In one case, a factory reopened and refused to reinstate union members and publicly humiliated them. Employers have also created Workplace Coordination Committees to replace independent unions, denying workers the right to choose their representatives and silencing their complaints. Prominent union leaders such as Myo Myo Aye have been arrested multiple times simply for continuing to organise.

What should international brands be doing in this context?

Under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, brands operating in conflict settings must carry out heightened, conflict-sensitive due diligence and demonstrate, with independent and verifiable evidence, that it works. In Myanmar’s current context, where surveillance and violent repression run through all the supply chain, this standard is exceptionally hard to meet.

Any brand that stays must deliver clear and demonstrable improvements in working conditions. Brands that can’t meet this threshold must carry out a responsible exit, working with workers and their representatives and taking steps to reduce harm, rather than adding to the instability garment workers already face under military rule.

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Myanmar’s junta tightens its grip CIVICUS Lens 12.Dec.2025
Historic wins and hard truths at International Labour Conference CIVICUS Lens 27.Jun.2025
Business and Human Rights Treaty: a decade of struggle for corporate accountability CIVICUS Lens 08.Mar.2025

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Without a classroom or facilities, our community teachers provide lessons to children engaged in domestic labour. Credit: UKBET

By Mohammed A. Sayem
SYLHET, Bangladesh, Jan 19 2026 (IPS)

While other children her age prepared for school, eight-year-old Tania once began her workday. Each morning, she picked up a jharu—the household broom—and cleaned floors inside a private home. At the same time, another child of her age in that household lifted a schoolbag and left for class. One carried a broom. The other carried books.

For years, this was Tania’s daily reality. And for thousands of children across Bangladesh, it still is.

Tania A, who has transitioned from child labour to mainstream school. Credit: UKBET

Child rights organisations note that many domestic child workers face neglect, mistreatment, and abuse. Most cases go unreported because the work happens behind closed doors, beyond public scrutiny and accountability.

Despite clear legal safeguards, child labour persists. Bangladeshi law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 14 and limits work for those aged 15–17 to non-hazardous conditions. Yet an estimated 3.4 million children are engaged in illegal labour, and thousands of them work as domestic workers. Exact figures remain uncertain, as domestic labour is informal, unregulated, and largely hidden.

In the north-eastern city of Sylhet, UK Bangladesh Education Trust (UKBET), a UK-based international NGO, has developed a community-based intervention aimed at reaching these children. Through its Doorstep Learning Programme, UKBET trains and deploys community teachers to identify children involved in domestic labour and provide education at their places of work, with the consent of employers. Learning sessions may take place in a kitchen corner or shared courtyard—wherever space is available and permitted.

Alongside education, the programme addresses the economic drivers of child labour. Parents receive small livelihood grants to start or expand family businesses, reducing dependence on a child’s earnings. As household income stabilises, children are supported to transition into formal schooling or vocational training. Awareness sessions further promote child rights and discourage the recruitment of child domestic workers.

Today, UKBET operates in 21 of the 42 wards of Sylhet City. Even within this limited coverage, the need is substantial, with thousands of domestic child workers still waiting for attention and support.

Early evidence suggests the model works. An independent evaluation supported by Shahjalal University of Science and Technology found that 80% of enrolled children between programme inception and 2024 are continuing in school, 74% of family support businesses remain active, and no supported families have sent children back to work. Among girls receiving vocational training, nearly 69% are earning in safer employment. Interviews with employers also indicated they did not hire replacement child workers after children were withdrawn from domestic labour.

For Tania, the shift has been transformative. In January 2026, she enrolled in school. She no longer starts her day with a jharu in her hand. She now carries her own schoolbag. Her family has secured a stable source of income and no longer depends on the money she once earned.

Tania’s story illustrates what targeted, community-based interventions can achieve. But her experience is still not typical. Thousands of domestic child workers remain hidden inside private homes, excluded from education, and denied their rights.

Children like Tania do not need sympathy alone. They need visibility, opportunity, and sustained action. Their lives may be hidden—yet they must not remain invisible.

For further information about UKBET’s work with children engaged in domestic labour:
Mohammed A. Sayem
Director, UKBET – Education for Change
Email: msayem@ukbet-bd.org, Web: www.ukbet-bd.org

IPS UN Bureau

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By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 23 2025 (IPS)

The UN Staff Union is on edge — hoping for the best and expecting the worse — as the General Assembly will vote on a proposed programme budget for 2026 by December 31.

The President of the UN Staff Union (UNSU), Narda Cupidore, has listed some of the proposals which will have an impact on staff members, including:

• Proposed decrease of the 2026 regular budget by 15.1%
• A total of 2,681 posts (about 18.8%) proposed for abolishment across the Secretariat, more than half of which are already vacant.
• Administrative functions will be centralized through new Common Administrative Platforms (CAPs) beginning in New York and Bangkok next year.
• Proposed relocation of approximately 173 posts to lower cost duty stations, including Nairobi, Bonn, Valencia, Tunis, and Vienna.

IF the proposed changes are approved by the General Assembly, the following measures are expected to take effect:

• Mitigating measures: reductions in staffing will be managed through vacancy elimination, the early separation programme, lateral reassignments within entities, followed by global placement.
• Downsizing policy: if further staff reductions are required, the downsizing policy will be enacted in accordance with the established rules under ST/AI/2023/1, considering appointment type, performance, and years of service.

WHAT HAPPENS Next…

• December 2025: Await General Assembly resolution
• January – March 2026: mitigating measures
• April 2026 onward: Downsizing policy applied if needed

Early Separation Program (a mitigating measure): Office of Human Resources has advised:

• Rounds 1 and 2 are still open and will not be finalized until January 2026.
• Round 3 is currently active, focused on a specific criterion as outlined in this round.
• Colleagues who expressed interest in the program will receive individual responses confirming approval or non-approval once all rounds of the exercise are closed.

Support for Staff

The Staff Support Framework 2.0 – expected to be available soon – to help navigate upcoming changes, provide structured guidance on prioritizing reassignment over terminations, and minimize involuntary separations.

As the Fifth Committee continues its deliberations in the coming days toward adopting a resolution and approving the budget, the UN Staff Union (UNSU) remains actively engaged in monitoring the negotiations, says Cupidore in a memo to staff members.

“At the same time, we are evaluating the potential implications of these decisions, our entitlements and working conditions”.

Meanwhile, the US State Department is in the process of eliminating over 132 domestic offices, laying-off about 700 federal workers and reducing diplomatic missions overseas.

The proposed changes will also include terminating funding for the UN and some of its agencies, budgetary cuts to the 32-member military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 20 other unidentified international organizations.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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CIVICUS discusses climate displacement and Tuvalu’s future with Kiali Molu, a former civil servant at Tuvalu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently a PhD candidate at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and the University of Bergen in Norway. His research focuses on state sovereignty and climate change in the Pacific.

Kiali Molu

Why have so many Tuvaluans applied for Australia’s climate mobility visa?

This visa is part of the Falepili Union Treaty agreed by Australia and Tuvalu. The treaty combines a special mobility pathway, guarantees around Tuvalu’s statehood and sovereignty and a broader security arrangement. Under the mobility component, Tuvaluans can apply for residency in Australia through a ballot system, without being forced to permanently relocate.

Many applications are driven by practical reasons, such as employment opportunities to be able to support families back home. Others value the ability to travel more freely, particularly given Australia’s historically long and uncertain visa processes. Access to education opportunities and social protections also matter. What’s important is that selection under this pathway does not require people to leave Tuvalu. It creates choice and security in a context where the future feels increasingly uncertain.

How is climate change reshaping daily life in Tuvalu?

Rising sea levels and frequent king tides regularly flood homes, public buildings and roads, interrupting community gatherings, education and work. Coastal erosion continues to reduce habitable land, while saltwater intrusion contaminates groundwater and destroys pulaka pits that are central to food security, as they’re used to grow staple root crops.

These impacts extend beyond infrastructure: higher reliance on imported food means families face rising costs, and stagnant water means a rise in waterborne diseases. Constant flooding is increasing anxiety about displacement and cultural continuity, and farming and fishing livelihoods are becoming harder to sustain. Climate change affects our food, health, housing and identity every single day.

What does potential resettlement mean for Tuvaluan culture and identity?

Our identity is inseparable from our community, our land and the ocean surrounding it. Tuvaluan culture is rooted in fenua – shared practices around agriculture and fishing, church life and the falekaupule, a community meeting house. Large-scale resettlement risks disrupting these foundations. The transmission of everyday cultural practices, language and oral history may weaken if younger Tuvaluans grow up away from the islands.

However, mobility doesn’t automatically mean cultural loss. Tuvaluan communities abroad are finding ways to preserve collective life, language and traditions through associations, churches and digital platforms. Initiatives such as the Tuvalu Digital Nation aim to safeguard cultural heritage virtually. Still, there is no substitute for ancestral land, and this raises profound questions about what it means to be Tuvaluan if our homeland becomes uninhabitable.

What climate adaptation measures does Tuvalu urgently need?

Adaptation for Tuvalu is not only about renewable energy and seawalls. While these remain essential, there’s also a critical legal and political dimension. The international system still defines statehood on the basis of physical territory, offering little protection to nations facing permanent land loss due to climate change.

We believe Tuvalu should push for a new global legal framework that rethinks sovereignty in the context of climate displacement. This would protect Tuvalu’s international legal personality, maritime boundaries and political rights even if parts of its territory become uninhabitable. This diplomatic strategy is needed as much as physical adaptation measures because it addresses national survival, not just infrastructure resilience.

What responsibilities do major polluters have towards climate-vulnerable states?

Major polluters have legal and moral obligations towards climate-vulnerable countries. International law increasingly recognises duties to reduce emissions, prevent environmental harm and cooperate in protecting those most at risk. Recent legal developments, including advisory opinions from international courts, reinforce that these responsibilities are enforceable, not optional.

These obligations go beyond emissions cuts. They include providing climate finance through mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund, supporting adaptation efforts and sharing technology. For countries like Tuvalu, this support is fundamental to preserving lives, culture and sovereignty. Continued inaction by major emitters should not be seen solely as political failure, but also as a breach of international law.

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‘The ICJ’s advisory opinion strengthens climate justice by establishing legal principles states cannot ignore’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Abdul Shaheed 24.Sep.2025
International Court of Justice signals end to climate impunity CIVICUS Lens 01.Aug.2025
‘Australia must turn its climate rhetoric into action’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jacynta Fa’amau 27.Sep.2024

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