Delegates gather for the opening plenary of the June UN Climate Meetings in Bonn. Credit: Kiara Worth / IISD/ENB

By Felix Dodds and Chris Spence
APEX, North Carolina / SAN FRANCISCO, California, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

With progress stalled on many issues, this year’s June talks in Bonn—which are supposed to smooth the way towards COP 31 in Antalya at year’s end—were widely judged a failure. What happened? And what does it mean for Antalya?

“Deliberately delaying us.”

“Spreading misinformation.”

“Denying the science.”

“Lacking integrity.”

“Blocking progress.”

“Costing countless lives.”

These were just some of the charges delegates leveled at each other during the UN Climate Meetings held in Bonn this June. As delegates took up multiple issues in small “contact groups” and “informal consultations”, negotiations quickly became tetchy and irritable before descending into levels of rancor and even rudeness rarely seen before. And it was not just one issue where tempers frayed.

What went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda

From talks on climate change research and science to topics like mitigation and funding for adaptation, the mood was often combative and confrontational. By the meeting’s end, differences were so great that in many cases delegates could not even agree to continue working on the draft outcome documents from Bonn when they arrive at COP 31 in Antalya later this year.

This means they will need to start discussions from scratch. In other cases, they failed to finish their work, but at least managed to forward the current working texts. This is hardly a great outcome, however.

In fact, Bonn may have witnessed more arguments over “mandates” (whether a particular group should be discussing certain topics) and “points of order” (whether delegates were playing within the rules) than ever before in the climate change process.

Searching for positives, some participants pointed to one success. Delegates did choose the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to host the Climate Technology Centre (CTC).

The CTC provides technological support to developing countries. It means the Centre’s work will continue beyond 2027 and possibly all the way through to 2041. But even the glow of this minor “win” dims when one recalls that UNEP was already the host.

This agreement simply means it can carry on its work. It doesn’t create something new. When continuing to do something that’s already happening counts as a victory, you know things haven’t gone well.

Too Many Topics

What went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda.

For instance, vulnerable small island nations are eager to talk about keeping global warming under 1.5oC, the threshold at which scientists fear serious “tipping points” will be reached. They also want to talk about phasing out fossil fuels—the major cause of climate change—and about wealthy countries helping them to adapt.

Meanwhile, fossil fuel exporters like Saudi Arabia are keen to talk about what wealthy western nations’ actions, including carbon taxes or a shift to renewables, are doing to their oil-based economies. They believe these “response measures” could harm them—or already are. That said, these same oil and gas-rich nations certainly do not want to talk about getting rid of fossil fuels.

A third example are the western nations, particularly those in Europe, who are making efforts to shake off their dependence on oil and gas.

They are happy to talk about renewable energy and science, but are keen to shut down talk about funding or compensating countries affected by what the Europeans consider to be their virtuous efforts to change. Bailing out oil producers for any “harm” done to their export trade is the last thing on their minds.

As the various groups have added their topics to the negotiations over the years, these divergent views have collided with ever greater force. Although there are frequent calls to simplify the process, no country is going to give up their “pet” topic, especially since that would mean more time to talk about someone else’s favorite issue. Could everyone agree to simplify and give up their preferred agenda item? Maybe. But so far, no one has blinked.

The Rule Is, There Are No Rules!

Making things more difficult still are the UN climate treaty’s “rules of procedure.” These were developed in the 1990s when countries first penned the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—the bedrock agreement on which the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement were also built.

The rules of procedure offer a way out of difficult issues by allowing for countries to vote. In some cases, a two-thirds majority is required to “win” on an issue. Sometimes, the bar is even higher and a three-quarters majority is needed.

The trouble is, these rules were never formally adopted. Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries refused to agree to them. What this means is that consensus is required for everything. So, what happens when a treaty has 198 parties, all with differing views and priorities on what is possibly the most complex issue of our times? One could argue it’s a miracle anything has been agreed at all.

The COP 31 Pileup

What does this mess mean for COP 31, which is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, in November? First, it means an agenda pileup. The annual June climate meeting in Bonn is supposed to help pave the way to the end-of-year COP. Bonn’s job is to resolve much of the low-hanging fruit—agenda items that require some sort of agreement or outcome document, but which can be taken care of relatively quickly. This then leaves the COP to finish up work on the big, meaty, difficult issues.

The problem is, Bonn resolved almost nothing. Even the low-hanging fruit seems to have soured. With so many documents unresolved and “rolled over” (or, in the jargon of the process, ‘Rule 16ed’), COP 31 will have a massive workload. It’s a logjam that seems unlikely to be cleared in Antalya.

Does this mean COP 31 will fail? Not necessarily. One silver lining that could be observed in Bonn was how well the two countries presiding over COP 31 seemed to be working together. In an unusual arrangement, the government of Türkiye is physically hosting and organizing the COP, while the government of Australia is joining as co-president tasked with handling the diplomatic negotiations.

Their collaborative spirit and air of quiet competence provided a ray of hope in Bonn. Also, there are two pre-COP events in October—one taking place in Fiji, the other in Tuvalu—that might help.

Still, the signs are not good overall.

Fixing the Process

Bonn did not occur in a vacuum. By common consent, the UN climate process has been getting steadily more complicated by the year, especially since the Paris Agreement was inked back in 2015. Bonn was just the latest example—and one of the more extreme—in how confusing and difficult it has become from an agenda perspective.

There is also a growing interest in these negotiations to reckon with. Some of the early COPs attracted only a few thousand participants, while today the numbers regularly top 50,000 and more.

The most extreme, COP 28, topped 83,000! Some argue this is making it more difficult, while others see this as a positive development, since it demonstrates to politicians that climate change remains a critical issue. Either way, this evolution adds to the organizational complexity of the process.

These recent travails and complications have led to a steady stream of think pieces, reports, and meetings aimed at streamlining, simplifying and improving the system. They contain many good ideas for shedding agenda items and other alterations.

Perhaps one day frustration will mount to a point where some of these good ideas actually happen. But with countries so divided on the substance of the talks, it is hard to imagine them agreeing on their organization, at least in the short term.

Does It Really Matter?

In spite of the mess the process is in right now, we can see four reasons to remain positive and not to give up hope.

First, COP 31 is not a “make or break” COP. Sure, it needs to keep the momentum going. But there are no major outcomes needed in Antalya.

Instead, delegates and observers are looking more to COP 32 in 2027—which will review countries’ success in implementing their pledges under the Paris Agreement—and COP 33, which is tasked with completing a second “global stocktake” of progress. COP 33, in particular, will need to end with something noteworthy. Interestingly, COP 33 is also likely to take place hard-on-the-heels of the U.S. Presidential elections.

Looking further out, COP 35 in 2030 should mark another important moment in the process, with countries scheduled to submit their next set of pledges or “Nationally Determined Contributions”.

A second reason to stay positive—and no disrespect to the climate negotiations—is that we already have in place the major agreements we need to make progress.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement are the launch pads we need. A lot of the negotiations occurring these days in Bonn and at the COPs are relatively minor and procedural. Now, our work can and should be more about implementing what we’ve agreed.

To be clear: the COPs have an important role to play in reviewing progress and encouraging countries to do more. But the foundations are already in place, the promises made. Now, it is about doing what we have said we would.

Thirdly, the creation of “Coalitions of the Willing” in recent years show there is an appetite for promoting implementation even on issues where there is not yet consensus among all 198 member states.

Alliances designed to advance progress on critical matters such as energy, agriculture, water, oceans, and health can only help us move forward. While some, such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), have failed in their original goals, the potential is certainly there.

The recent alliance to transition away from fossil fuels, and another initiative on financing known as the “Vulnerability to Viability Compact”, are positive developments that could and should help us on the path to implementation.

Are we doing what is needed? Not yet. At least, not fast enough. But—and this is our fourth and final note of positivity—there is hope here. It’s worth noting that, since the Paris Agreement in 2015, the trajectory of global warming has changed. Back in 2015, the world was staring down the barrel of 4-6oC in warming by the end of this century. These numbers should cause any sensible person to quail. They are extinction-level predictions; apocalyptic in their scope, horrifying in their impact.

Today, the numbers have fallen to between about 2.1oC and 2.8oC, depending on your assumptions. These numbers are still very, very bad. They threaten breaching all sorts limits, passing many points of no return.

Even at 1.5oC warming, we are seeing unprecedented weather such as the heatwaves felt recently in Europe. Still, we have started to bend the curve. As a result of government policies, scientific breakthroughs, private sector initiatives and action from many, many stakeholders, things are slowly beginning to change.

Our friend Christiana Figueres, who played a major role in the Paris Agreement, talks often about “stubborn optimism”. We agree. This is the time to double down on climate action. With renewed energy and dogged persistence, we can keep bending the curve and change humanity’s future.

This, surely, is something participants at future COPs should be striving towards.

Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence have participated in United Nations talks on climate change and other environmental negotiations since the 1990s. They co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022) and wrote Environmental Lobbying at the United Nations: A Guide to Protecting Our Planet (Routledge, 2025). Their next book, Political Heroes of the Environment: Profiles in Courage, is due for release in 2027.

Civil society organisations warn that if agriculture becomes part of a carbon market, it will spur more land grabbing in Africa. Credit: Patrick Burnett/IPS

By Stephen Leahy
UXBRIDGE, Canada, Jun 12 2013 (IPS)

U.N. climate talks have largely stalled with the suspension of one of three negotiating tracks at a key mid-year session in Bonn, Germany.

Meanwhile, civil society organisations claim the controversial issue of “carbon farming” has been pushed back onto the agenda after African nations objected to the use of their lands to absorb carbon emissions."There is a profound danger to agriculture here, with real potential for more land grabbing and expansion of monocultures in order to harvest credits." -- Helena Paul of EcoNexus

At the Bonn Climate Change Conference this week, Russia insisted on new procedural rules. That blocked all activity in one track of negotiations called the “Subsidiary Body for Implementation” (SBI). The SBI is a technical body that was supposed to discuss finance to help developing countries cope with climate change, as well as proposals for “loss and damage” to compensate countries for damages.

The SBI talks were suspended Wednesday.

“This development is unfortunate,” said Christiana Figueres, executive secretary of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Figueres also said the two-week Bonn conference, which ends Friday, had made considerable progress in the two other tracks. A complex new global climate treaty is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2015 with the goal of keeping global warming to less than two degrees C.

“Governments need to look up from their legal and procedural tricks and focus on the planetary emergency that is hitting Africa first and hardest,” said Mithika Mwenda of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), an African-wide climate movement with over 300 organisations in 45 countries.

And where there is “progress” at the climate talks it is in the wrong direction, according to civil society.

“We’ve seen many governments in Bonn call for a review of the current failed carbon markets to see what went wrong, why they haven’t actually reduced emissions and why they haven’t raised finance on a significant scale,” said Kate Dooley, a consultant on market mechanisms to the Third World Network.

“If we don’t learn these lessons we’ll be doomed to repeat these environmentally and financially risky schemes, at the cost of real action to reduce emissions,” Dooley said in a statement.

In Bonn, two key African negotiators appear to be pushing the World Bank agenda rather than their national interests, civil society organisations claim. Those negotiators are also working for organisations receiving World Bank funding.

One appears to want African nations’ mitigation actions to be based on agriculture, they said.

The World Bank and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation and other organisations favour what they call “climate smart” agriculture. This is defined as forms of farming that are sustainable, increase productivity and with a focus on soaking up carbon from the atmosphere.

African environment ministers from 54 nations recently stated they were not obligated to use their lands to mitigate carbon emissions since Africa is not responsible for climate change. They also instructed African negotiators at the Bonn climate talks to focus on helping African agriculture adapt to a changing climate.

“Are these people serving two masters?” asked Mariam Mayet of the Africa Centre for Biosafety, which works to protect farmers’ rights and biodiversity across the continent.

“What is the World Bank’s level of influence over these individuals, and is there a risk that this is impacting on their actions and the outcome here?” Mayet told IPS.

In December 2011, more than 100 African and international civil society organisations sent a joint letter to African ministers asking for “no soil carbon markets in Africa”.

Globally, agriculture is a major source of global warming gases like carbon and methane – directly accounting for 15 percent to 30 percent of global emissions. Changes in agricultural practices such as reducing or eliminating plowing and fertiliser use can greatly reduce emissions.

Agriculture can also be used to absorb or trap carbon in the soil. When a plant grows, it takes CO2 out the atmosphere and releases oxygen. The more of a crop – maize, soy or vegetable – that remains after harvest, the more carbon is returned to the soil.

Civil society organisations warn that if agriculture becomes part of a carbon market, it will spur more land grabbing in Africa, with woodlands being used mainly for carbon sequestration instead of food production.

“There is a profound danger to agriculture here, with real potential for more land grabbing and expansion of monocultures in order to harvest credits,” Helena Paul of EcoNexus, an environmental NGO, previously told IPS.

Soils are extraordinarily variable and different climatic regimes affect how they function, said Ólafur Arnalds, a soil scientist at the Agricultural University of Iceland. While soils are a key part of the planet’s carbon cycle, we don’t know enough about soil carbon, Arnalds told IPS at a recent Soil Carbon Sequestration conference in Iceland.

That complexity does not suit carbon markets well and drives up costs of accounting and verification. However, Arnalds does believe that soils and agriculture have an important role in climate change and farmers should be compensated for their efforts.

Developed countries must support more effective mitigation in all countries where emissions are either high or growing. Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS

By Smita Nakhooda
BONN, Germany, Jun 10 2013 (IPS)

Developed countries report that they delivered more than 33 billion dollars in Fast Start Finance (known as FSF), beyond the pledges they made at COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009. Recent analysis suggests that the funding delivered may have exceeded 38 billion dollars.  But that is not the whole story.

The story behind the headline lies in how this money has been allocated. What has it supported, and how much of it represents new funding to support the additional challenges that climate change poses for development?

My colleagues at ODI in the United Kingdom, the World Resources Institute (WRI) in the United States, the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) in Japan, Germanwatch in Germany and Cicero in Norway have analysed our countries’ FSF contributions to try and answer these questions. These countries’ climate finance contributions are among the largest.

In Copenhagen, four years ago, these and other developed countries promised to deliver 30 billion dollars from 2010 to 2012 as Fast Start Finance. This would kick-start the delivery of 100 billion dollars per year by 2020. A substantial share of this finance may flow through the Green Climate Fund, a new mechanism to deliver money to developing countries so they can mitigate and adapt to climate change. Now, what does all this mean in reality?

Climate finance contributions have increased

Our first message is a positive one: finance for climate-related activities in developing countries has increased significantly during the FSF period, despite unprecedented economic difficulties and austerity measures in developed countries brought on by the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, this trend applies to all of the countries we reviewed. The UK, for example, appears to have increased its climate finance four-fold relative to environment-related spending before the FSF period.

A challenge, however, is that countries counted very different forms of finance, resulting in major differences between the scale and objectives of different contributions.

A large share of Germany’s 1.6-billion-dollar FSF contribution is directed through its International Climate Initiative, which is indirectly financed through revenues from emission trading. With the exception of its 615-million-dollar contribution to the Climate Investment Fund, Germany counts only grants towards its FSF. By contrast, Japan and the United States include as FSF a large share of export credit and development finance for low-carbon infrastructure. In Japan’s case, some efficient fossil fuel options are also counted. Japan has also reported on leveraged private finance in its total.

Many countries also seek FSF “credit” for projects and programmes that they were already supporting prior to the FSF period.

For instance, the United States counts its contribution to the Montreal Protocol Fund, which it has been supporting since the early 1990s, as FSF. A significant share of Japanese FSF was pledged prior to 2010 through initiatives such as the Cool Earth Partnership. All five countries count contributions to the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) since 2010, although countries pledged to fund the CIFs at a cumulative level of at least 6.1 billion dollars in 2008.

These pledges were made in the context of efforts to scale up climate related finance in the lead up to Copenhagen. But while these are important programmes, for which sustained support is essential, the pledges are not technically “new” during the FSF period.

Of the five countries we studied, only Norway has met the international commitment to deliver 0.7 percent of its gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance (ODA) and can claim that its contribution was additional by this standard during the FSF period (although it has ramped up its domestic ODA commitment to one percent of GNI). Only Germany and Norway have clearly spelled out how they define “new and additional” in their self-reporting on climate finance.

Using climate finance effectively

There has been a strong focus on funding activities that can help developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This includes financing clean electricity from renewable energy, the use of more efficient technologies, and better public transport systems.

Such programmes can play a vital role in supporting countries to meet their basic infrastructure and energy needs without the emissions. Such finance is essential.

Emissions in many rapidly growing developing countries are rising fast. While they may bear less historical responsibility for climate change, today some of the largest emitters in the world are developing countries. There are abundant opportunities to take more climate compatible approaches to development – but they often pose additional costs or risks. International public finance can help countries seize such opportunities.

But the truth is that we are already feeling the impacts of climate change. These impacts will be particularly severe in poor countries. And global efforts to address climate change so far have been inadequate.

This reinforces the imperative to support more effective mitigation in all countries where emissions are either high or growing. But it also strengthens the case to scale up adaptation finance.

During the FSF period countries committed to scale up adaptation finance. Adaptation finance would focus on the developing countries that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and African countries. About 12 percent of the total FSF contribution of the five countries we studied supported adaptation, with the share ranging from about seven percent in Norway to about 35 percent in the UK and Germany.

In practice, of course, adaptation and mitigation activities may be quite interlinked. Norway, for example, has prioritised efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, particularly in tropical forests, which also have adaptation benefits.

Future public support for climate action, however, is highly uncertain. This is a substantial challenge. There is an urgent need for greater clarity on the level of public finance that developing countries can expect from the international community.

The FSF experience reinforces the importance of scaling up finance in order to meet the ever more urgent challenges of climate change. This will require political commitment and leadership at the national level, and enhanced global cooperation.

*This commentary is based on a joint analysis by Smita Nakhooda (ODI), and Taryn Fransen of the World Resources Institute (WRI), reflecting on the FSF experience on the occasion of the 38th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, as well as the second part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, taking place from Jun. 3-14, 2013, in Bonn, Germany.

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