By Yilmaz Akyüz
GENEVA, Mar 30 2015 (IPS)

Debt restructuring is a component of crisis management and resolution, and needs to be treated in the context of the current economic conjuncture and vulnerabilities.

International debt workout mechanisms are not just about debt reduction, but include interim arrangements to provide relief to debtors, including temporary hold on debt payments and financing.

They should address liquidity as well as solvency crises but the difference is not always clear. Most start as liquidity crises and can lead to insolvency if not resolved quickly.

Yilmaz Akyuz

Liquidity crises also inflict serious social and economic damages as seen in the past two decades even when they do not entail sovereign defaults.

International mechanisms should apply to crises caused by external private debt as well as sovereign debt. Private external borrowing is often the reason for liquidity crises. Governments end up socialising private debt. They need mechanisms that facilitate resolution of crises caused by private borrowing.

Only one of the last eight major crises in emerging and developing economies was due to internationally-issued sovereign debt (Argentina). Mexican and Russian crises were due to locally-issued public debt; in Asia (Thailand, Korea and Indonesia) external debt was private; in Brazilian and Turkish crises too, private (bank) debt played a key role alongside some problems in the domestic public debt market.

We have had no major new crisis in the South with systemic implications for over a decade thanks to highly favourable global liquidity conditions and risk appetite, both before and after the Lehman Brothers bank collapse in 2008, due to policies in major advanced economies, notably the United States.

But this period, notably the past six years, has also seen considerable build-up of fragility and vulnerability to liquidity and solvency crises in many developing countries."There are problems with standard crisis intervention: austerity can make debt even less payable; creditor bailouts create moral hazard and promote imprudent lending, and transform commercial debt into official debt, thereby making it more difficult to restructure”

Sovereign international debt problems may emerge in the so-called ‘frontier economies’ usually dependent on official lending. Many of them have gone into bond markets in recent years, taking advantage of exceptional global liquidity conditions and risk appetite. There are several first-time Eurobond issuers in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.

In emerging economies, internationally-issued public debt as percentage of gross domestic product has declined significantly since the early 2000s. Much of the external debt of these economies is now under local law and in local currency.

However, there are numerous cases of build-up of private external debt in the foreign exchange markets issued under foreign law since 2008. Many of them may face contingent liabilities and are vulnerable to liquidity crises.

An external financial crisis often involves interruption of a country’s access to international financial markets, a sudden stop in capital inflows, exit of foreign investors from deposit, bond and equity markets and capital flight by residents. Reserves become depleted and currency and asset markets come under stress. Governments are often too late in recognising the gravity of the situation.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending is typically designed to bail out creditors to keep debtors current on their obligations to creditors, and to avoid exchange restrictions and maintain the capital account open.

The IMF imposes austerity on the debtor, expecting that it would make debt payable and sustainable and bring back private creditors. It has little leverage on creditors.

There are problems with standard crisis intervention: austerity can make debt even less payable; creditor bailouts create moral hazard and promote imprudent lending, and transform commercial debt into official debt, thereby making it more difficult to restructure; and risks are created for the financial integrity of the IMF.

Many of these problems were recognised after the Asian crisis of the 1990s, giving rise to the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, originally designed very much along the lines advocated by the U.N. Conference on Trade and development (UNCTAD) throughout the 1980s and 1990s (though without due acknowledgement).

However, it was opposed by the United States and international financial markets and could not elicit strong support from debtor developing countries, notably in Latin America. It was first diluted and then abandoned.

The matter has come back to the attention of the international community with the Eurozone crisis and then with vulture-fund holdouts in Argentinian debt restructuring.

After pouring money into Argentina and Greece, whose debt turned out to be unpayable, the IMF has proposed a new framework to “limit the risk that Fund resources will simply be used to bail out private creditors” and to involve private creditors in crisis resolution. If debt sustainability looks uncertain, the IMF would require re-profiling (rollovers and maturity extension) before lending. This is left to negotiations between the debtor and the creditors.

However, there is no guarantee that this can bring a timely and orderly re-profiling. If no agreement is reached and the IMF does not lend without re-profiling, then it would effectively be telling the debtor to default. But it makes no proposal to protect the debtor against litigation and asset grab by creditors.

There is thus a need for statutory re-profiling involving temporary debt standstills and exchange controls. The decision should be taken by the country concerned and sanctioned by an internationally recognised independent body to impose stay on litigation.

Sanctioning standstills should automatically grant seniority to new loans, to be used for current account financing, not to pay creditors or finance capital outflows.

If financial meltdown is prevented through standstills and exchange controls, stay is imposed on litigation, adequate financing is provided and contractual provisions are improved, the likelihood of reaching a negotiated debt workout would be very high.

The role of the IMF in crisis management and resolution is incontrovertible. However, the IMF cannot be placed at the centre of international debt workout mechanisms. Even after a fundamental reform, the IMF board cannot act as a sanctioning body and arbitrator because of conflict of interest; its members represent debtors and creditors.

The United Nations successfully played an important role in crisis resolution in several instances in the past.

The Compensatory Financing Facility – introduced in the early 1960s to enable developing countries facing liquidity problems due to temporary shortfalls in primary export earnings to draw on the Fund beyond their normal drawing rights at concessional terms – resulted from a U.N. initiative.

A recent example concerns Iraq’s debt. After the occupation of Iraq and collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to implement stay on the enforcement of creditor rights to use litigation to collect unpaid sovereign debt.

This was engineered by the very same country, the United States, which now denies a role to the United Nations in debt and finance on the grounds that it lacks competence on such matters, which mainly belong to the IMF and the World Bank.

Edited by Phil Harris   

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS – Inter Press Service. 

* This article is partly based on South Centre Research Paper 60 by Yilmaz Akyüz titled Internationalisation of Finance and Changing Vulnerabilities in Emerging and Developing Economies.

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By Yilmaz Akyüz
GENEVA, Feb 16 2015 (IPS)

After a series of crises with severe economic and social consequences in the 1990s and early 2000s, emerging and developing economies have become even more closely integrated into what is widely recognised as an inherently unstable international financial system. 

Both policies in these countries and a highly accommodating global financial environment have played a role. Not only have their traditional cross-border linkages been deepened and external balance sheets expanded rapidly, but also foreign presence in their domestic credit, bond, equity and property markets has reached unprecedented levels.

Yilmaz Akyuz

New channels have thus emerged for the transmission of financial shocks from global boom-bust cycles.

Almost all developing countries are now vulnerable, irrespective of their balance-of-payments, external debt, net foreign assets and international reserve positions, although these play an important role in the way such shocks could affect them.

Stability of domestic banking and asset markets is susceptible even in countries with strong external positions.

Those heavily dependent on foreign capital are prone to liquidity and solvency crises as well as domestic financial turmoil.

The new practices adopted in recent years – including more flexible exchange rate regimes, accumulation of large stocks of international reserves or borrowing in local currency – would not provide much of a buffer against severe external shocks such as those that may result from the normalisation of monetary policy in the United States. “The surge in capital inflows that started in the early years of the new millennium, and continued with full force after a temporary blip due to the collapse in 2008 of the Lehman Brothers financial services firm, holds the key to the growing internationalisation of finance in developing countries”

And the multilateral system is still lacking adequate mechanisms for an orderly and equitable resolution of external financial instability and crises in developing economies.

This process of closer integration was greatly helped by highly favourable global financial conditions before 2008, thanks to the very same credit and spending bubbles that culminated in a severe crisis in the United States and Europe. The crisis did not slow this process despite initial fears that it could lead to a retreat from globalisation.  Integration has even accelerated since then because of ultra-easy monetary policies pursued in advanced economies, notably in the United States, in response to the crisis.

The surge in capital inflows that started in the early years of the new millennium, and continued with full force after a temporary blip due to the collapse in 2008 of the Lehman Brothers financial services firm, holds the key to the growing internationalisation of finance in developing countries.

It has resulted in a rapid expansion of gross external assets and liabilities of developing economies. More importantly, the structure of their external balance sheets has undergone important changes, particularly on the liabilities side, bringing new vulnerabilities.

The share of direct and portfolio equity in external liabilities has been increasing. An important part of the increase in equity liabilities is due to capital gains by foreign holders. In many developing countries presence in equity markets is greater than that in the United States and Japan.

While still remaining below the levels seen a decade ago as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), external debt build-up has accelerated since the crisis in 2008. This is mainly due to borrowing by the private sector, which now accounts for a higher proportion of external debt than the public sector in both international bank loans and security issues. A very large proportion of private external debt is in foreign currency. There is also a renewed tendency for dollarisation in domestic loan markets.

As a result of a shift of governments from international to domestic bond markets and opening them to foreigners, the participation of non-residents in these markets has been growing. The proportion of local-currency sovereign debt held abroad is greater in many developing countries than in reserve-issuers such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. It is held by fickle investors rather than by foreign central banks as international reserves.

International banks have been shifting from cross-border lending to local lending by establishing commercial presence in developing countries. Their market share in these countries has reached 50 percent compared with 20 percent in developed countries.

These banks tend to act as conduits of expansionary and contractionary impulses from global financial cycles and increase the exposure of developing economies to financial shocks from advanced economies.

One of the key lessons of history of economic development is that successful policies are associated not with autarky or full integration into the global economy, but strategic integration seeking to use the opportunities that a broader economic space may offer while minimising the potential risks it may entail. This is more so in finance than in trade, investment and technology.

For one thing, the international financial system is inherently unstable in large part because multilateral arrangements fail to impose adequate discipline over financial markets and policies in systemically important countries which exert a disproportionately large impact on global conditions.

For another, the multilateral system also lacks effective mechanisms for orderly resolution of financial crises with international dimensions.

Thus, closer integration of several into the international financial system in the past ten years, after a series of crises with severe economic and social consequences, is a cause for concern.

In all likelihood, these countries will be facing strong destabilising pressures in the years ahead as monetary policy in the United States returns to normalcy after six years of flooding the world with dollars at exceptionally low interest rates.

In weathering a possible renewed instability, they cannot count on the more flexible currency regimes they came to adopt after the last bouts of crises or the reserves they have built from capital inflows or the reduced currency exposure of the sovereign.

It is important that they, as well as the international community, avoid going back to business-as-usual in responding to a new round of financial shocks, bailing out investors and creditors and maintaining an open capital account at the expense of incomes and jobs.

They need to include many unconventional policy instruments in their arsenals to help lower the price that may have to be paid for the financial excesses of the past several years

They should also take the occasion to rebalance the pendulum and to bring about genuine changes in the international financial architecture. (END/IPS COLUMNIST SERVICE)

Edited by Phil Harris   

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS – Inter Press Service. 

* This column is based on Internationalization of Finance and Changing Vulnerabilities in Emerging and Developing Economies, South Centre Research Paper 60, January 2015, which is available here.

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"Indignados" in Málaga, Spain, protest cuts in health and education. Credit: Inés Benítez/IPS

By Roberto Savio
ROME, Jul 8 2013 (IPS)

At the last summit of European heads of state held in Brussels at the end of June, the main theme was youth unemployment, which has now reached 23 percent of European youth (although it stands at 41 percent in Spain).

Last year, the International Labour Organisation issued a dramatic report on Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012 in which it spoke of a “lost generation”.

According to projections, the generation currently seeking to enter the market place will retire with a pension of just 480 euros – if it actually succeeds in entering the market – because of temporary jobs without social contributions.

After long discussions, Europe’s leaders decided to allocate six billion dollars to fight youth unemployment. After much shorter discussions, they decided to allocate up to 60 billion dollars to support Europe’s banks. This, on top of the striking subsidies already received: the European Central Bank alone has given 1,000 billion dollars to the banks at nominal cost.

All the efforts to create a European banking system under a central regulator are now on hold until the German elections in September. As a member of the German delegation at the June summit is reported to have said: ”We know well what we are supposed to do, to calm financial markets. But we are not elected by financial markets, we are elected by German citizens.” (IHT, Jun. 28, 2013).

And of course, no effort has been made to explain to Germany’s citizens why it is in their interest to show economic solidarity with the most fragile countries of Europe. Democracy, as it is understood today, is based on leaders who follow popular feelings, not on leaders who feel it their duty to push their electors towards a world of vision and challenges.

The summit was also obliged to accept the blackmail of British Prime Minister David Cameron: either you maintain the subsidies that then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher obtained in 1973, when you insisted that we join Europe (which makes Britain a net recipient of European money), or we will block the European budget.

This is because the anti-Europe electorate in Britain is growing and Cameron could not afford to appear weak. But Cameron was one of the strongest proponents of the subsidy for the banks, and no wonder: the financial system now accounts for 10 percent of Britain’s gross domestic product (GDP).

It is a very curious situation, in which Europe has not only spent several hundred billion dollars on its banks, it has even invited the International Monetary Fund (whose controlling member is the U.S.) to join the European institutions and manage the European crisis.

And, in an unprecedented sign of independence from the U.S., Europe has rejected American calls for reducing austerity and starting policies of growth as Washington and Tokyo have been doing, so far with proven success.

Nevertheless, what is common to the three most powerful players in the West (U.S., Europe and Japan) has been their inability – and unwillingness – to place banks under control and react to their string of crimes.

Central bankers from the entire world join in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) based in Basel. Now its Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has come up with a proposal that would tighten the relationship between the capital of the banks and the volume of financial operations they can afford. The proposal establishes that banks must maintain high-quality capital, like stock or retained earnings, equal to seven percent of their loans and assets, and that the biggest banks may be required to hold more than nine percent.

This is not exactly a revolutionary proposal, and has been criticised as insufficient by many analysts and regulators. This is confirmed by the fact that the U.S. Federal Reserve estimates that between 90 and 95 percent of banks with assets of less than 10 billion dollars already respect such parameters. Well, even this bland proposal has been received with a howl of protest from many banks, claiming that they would have great difficulty in raising capital.

Under the old capitalist economy, no enterprise would run without capital adequate to its need. Today we have a new branch of the economy, which wants to play without capital, and expects the state to bail it out if anything goes wrong. So, let us just look briefly at how many times things went wrong without anybody ever going to jail:

On Apr. 28, 2002, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), won a lawsuit ordering 10 banks to pay 1.4 billion dollars in compensation and fines because of fraudulent activities. One year later, the SEC discovered that 13 out of 15 financial institutions randomly investigated were guilty of fraud. In 2010, Goldman Sachs agreed to a fine of 550 million dollars to avoid a trial for fraud.

In July last year, the U.S. Senate presented a 335-page report on the British bank HSBC. Over the years it helped drug dealers and criminals recycle illicit money. The fine was 1.9 billion dollars.

In November 2012, SAC Capital was fined 600 million dollars, and in the same month the second leading British bank, Standard Chartered, was fined 667 million dollars.

In February this year, Barclays Bank announced that it had set aside 1.165 billion euros to face fines for “illicit transactions”.

And in March this year, Citigroup accepted a fine of 730 million dollars for “selling investments based on junk to unsuspecting clients”.

We all know that the crisis in which we find ourselves (which, for the optimists, will end in 2020 and for the pessimists in 2025) originated in the U.S., caused by the 10 largest banks’ decision to sell derivatives based on junk and certified by the Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rating agencies. U.S. taxpayers “donated” 750,000 million dollars to the banks, while the British did the same for HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays Bank and Northern Rock.

While this financial disaster was happening, the ‘Big Five’ (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bearn Sterns) paid their executives three billion dollars between 2003 and 2007, And, in 2008, they received 20 billion dollars in bonuses while their banks were losing 42 billion dollars.

All of this was certified by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, which control 75 percent of the world market. Now Standard & Poor’s has been requested to pay 500 million dollars.

But what about the millions of people who have lost their jobs? The millions of young people who see no future in their lives? It’s the old story: if you steal bread, you go to jail, but if you steal millions, nothing will happen to you … and if you steal millions in a bank, even less reason to worry.

Meanwhile, back at the summit table, the priority for survival is to allocate taxpayers’ money to banks, even if all talk is about youth unemployment.

(END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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Quantitative Easing (QE) has been favourable to developed countries, stimulating local investment and exports. Credit: Bigstock.

By Fernando J. Cardim de Carvalho
RIO DE JANEIRO , Jun 25 2013 (IPS)

It took world leaders some time to realise that the financial crisis initiated by the collapse of the subprime mortgage segment of U.S. financial markets in 2007 would not exhaust its effects in an ordinary recession.

For most of 2007 and 2008, government authorities, especially in the U.S., argued, rightly, that subprime mortgages were a relatively small segment of the U.S. financial system, concluding – wrongly, as it turned out – that the crisis could be easily contained through the use of conventional policy instruments at the disposal of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.

In fact, the crisis spread out to other segments of U.S. financial markets and, in September 2008, with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, it spread out to most of the rest of the world.

As domestic financial sectors in the countries hit by the shock waves were engulfed by their own crises, credit supply contracted and the financial crisis was transformed into an economic crisis, with falling output and rising unemployment.

The realisation that the crisis was deeper than most analysts expected initially led governments to react through implementation of anti-cyclical macroeconomic policies. Expansive fiscal and monetary policies were implemented, in one form or another, not only in the U.S. and Western European countries, but also in many developing economies in 2008 and early 2009.

The collapse of output and employment in the developed economies was contained and the ghost of a disaster like that of the early 1930s was, at least temporarily and at least for some countries, exorcised.

At this point, economic policy debates in the richest economies suffered a reversal.

Output was still lower and unemployment much higher than before the crisis both in the U.S. and in Europe. Nevertheless, the debate switched from real problems to fiscal balances. Conservative groups, ranging from the lunatic extreme right of the Tea Party in the U.S. to the moralising posture of northern European governments led by right wing parties or coalitions, prevented the further use of fiscal policy to raise output and to create jobs.

It is a fascinating discussion as to why this happened, but there is no room in this commentary to explore the question. The fact is that aggressive expansionary fiscal policies have become politically unacceptable even while output is low (or even falling, as is the case with many European countries, and not only the “peripheral” ones) and unemployment is growing. Under these conditions, the only instrument left to try to increase market demand and to stimulate production was monetary policy.

Monetary policy, traditionally, impacts the economy through variations of interest rates. The interest rates under the control of monetary authorities like the U.S. Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, for instance, were, however, already very low, near zero.

There was not much conventional monetary policy could do to compensate for the lack of a rational expansionary fiscal policy. It was in this context that quantitative easing (QE) policies were formulated in the U.S., U.K. and more recently in Japan, while the European Central Bank struggles with itself to determine what should be its policy. QE policies are simply initiatives to funnel money into the economy in amounts great enough to facilitate the expansion of the supply of credit for private borrowers, both firms and consumers.

It may be too soon to assess whether they worked as expected or not. Of course, the developed economies where these policies were implemented are still struggling with the crisis and its developments. A generous reading of these policies is often based on a counter-factual: things are not that good yet, but they would be much worse if those policies had not been applied.

For developing economies, the impact is certainly ambiguous. On the one hand, accepting the assumption that without QE policies developed countries would be in a much worse situation than they are now, it is better than nothing.

If output had contracted further in those economies, trade would be even lower nowadays, creating balance of payments problems for many developing countries.

On the other hand, from the point of view of developing countries, monetary easing is certainly not the ideal way to support output and employment.

QE increases money supply at the same time that it reduces domestic interest rates in the developed economies. In a world of free capital flows, as is mostly the case now, this means that a large part of this liquidity will flow out of the country that created it.

In part, although governments deny it, this is precisely what they expect: capital outflows devaluate the currency of the country practicing QE, so it will have two stimuli for the price of one: lower interest rates stimulate domestic production and investment, and devalued currencies stimulate exports.

Of course, for developing countries the impact is exactly the opposite: they receive too much foreign liquidity, their exchange rates tend to become overvalued, reducing exports and stimulating imports.

Deficits in the balance-of-payments current account tend to emerge, but it is easy to finance them since there is so much liquidity in the world.

Until, of course, QEs are discontinued and borrowing countries will find out, as they did many times in the past, that foreign debt accumulated to the point of leading them to a crisis.

Would it be better not to have developed countries practicing QE? Well, governments in these countries had to do something and monetary policy was the only instrument left after right wing parties prevented them from using fiscal policy.

Expansionary fiscal policies in those countries, however, would be much better for developing economies because they expand their domestic economies without undervaluing their currencies. Fiscal expansion, in contrast to monetary expansion, is not a beggar-thy-neighbour type of policy.

There is evidence now that the Federal Reserve expects to stop QE3 relatively soon. QE had some deleterious impacts on developing countries, as just argued, but its reversal is also full of risks.

It is possible that interest rates will rise too much and too quickly, creating serious problems for those countries and firms that borrowed more in this period.

Increased volatility itself, because of the uncertainties such a change in direction engender, is a problem, scaring investors and depressing production and investment. To expand the economy to get out of a depression is the correct attitude, but QE was an instrument that definitely contributed to increased short and medium term risks of the macroeconomic situation.

(END/COPYRIGHT IPS)

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