Troops of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) cheer after taking control, with assistance from the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), of a highly strategic position of the M23, an area known as Three Towers on the hills of Kibati, five 5 kilometres north of Goma. Credit: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 13 2013 (IPS)

As U.N. peacekeeping operations assume a more agressive role in conflict zones, the first concrete results came last week when the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) defeated the M23 rebel group after a 20-month-long insurgency.

That victory was thanks in part to the support provided by the 25,240-strong U.N. Stabilisation Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), but more importantly, the 3,000-strong first-ever U.N. Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) created by the Security Council last March.

An African diplomat told IPS the success in DRC may change the dynamics of peacekeeping in some of the other U.N. operations in Africa, including in Darfur, South Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire.

But any change in the mandate of the 15 peacekeeping operations – eight of which are in Africa – has to be approved by the Security Council, he added.

By accident or by design, the United Nations is currently seeking to strengthen the military component of its peacekeeping operations with “force enablers”, including military and transport helicopters, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), night vision equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Traditionally, U.N. peacekeepers were armed only with light weapons, never heavy artillery.

“I see several priorities for the year ahead,” said Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Herve Ladsous.

One is to meet the shortfalls in equipment by strengthening the military and police capabilities on the ground, he said. South Africa, one of three countries in the FIB, along with Tanzania and Malawi, has already agreed to provide three of its home-made military helicopters and two utility helicopters to MONUSCO.

Two other countries, Bangladesh and Ukraine, are already providing attack helicopters to the same peace mission in the Congo.

Western nations are also providing military equipment, including 10 APCs each from the United States and the European Union, plus two from the United Kingdom. Sweden has provided a transport aircraft for a limited period of two months.

Asked if these weapons are being purchased or provided gratis, Kieran Dwyer, chief of the public affairs division at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, told IPS the United Nations does not purchase military equipment such as attack helicopters.

“Member states provide these,” he said, explaining that troop-contributing countries also equip their own personnel.

Some worry that the shift from defensive to offensive operations, as in DRC, may create dangers for humanitarian organisations in conflict zones.

Michael Hofman, a senior humanitarian specialist with Doctors Without Borders, was quoted by the New York Times Wednesday as saying: “You can have a helicopter, one day used to deliver the Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a village, and next day, to deliver aid to the same village.”

“In this case, it is not even a blurring of the lines,” he added.

Currently, the three major troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions are Bangladesh (8,780 military troops and civilian personnel), Pakistan (8,200) and India (7,840).

In contrast, the five big powers in the Security Council are providing relatively small number of troops: China, (1,995 troops), France (1,770), Russia (362), UK (281) and the United States (82).

The supply of weapons by developing nations, along with their troops, is also providing a boost to their domestic arms industries.

Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Arms Transfers Programme of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IPS many arms and other military equipment used by South African armed forces are produced locally.

Some of them, like the Rooivalk helicopter used in DRC, have been designed in South Africa, and others are increasingly from foreign designs produced under licence in South Africa, he said.

India, the third largest troop contributor, has a large arms industry that assembles and produces Russian-designed armoured vehicles. It also produces its own helicopter based on European technology, but currently it is more likely to deploy helicopters supplied directly from Russia or produced under licence from Eurocopter, Wezeman said.

“India has a nascent UAV industry but I have not heard of Indian UAVs being operational because until now India relies mainly on UAVs supplied by Israel,” said Wezeman.

Pakistan has an arms industry that licence-produces items like armoured vehicles and small arms designed in a variety of countries, including the United States and China. But Pakistan imports its helicopters.

Bangladesh has a very basic arms industry and is very dependent on arms imports, including attack helicopters provided for U.N. missions.

Nicole Auger, a military analyst covering Middle East/Africa at Forecast International, a leader in defence market intelligence, told IPS South Africa has a fast developing arms industry capable of providing the type of weapons used in U.N. peacekeeping operations. These include helicopters, armoured vehicles and UAVs.

She said South Africa relies heavily on foreign partnerships and outside assistance; in many cases a South African defence company will exchange the ownership stake for technology or financial assistance.

UAVs, which were deployed for the first time by U.N. peacekeepers in DRC, seem to be a focus for the South African defence industry right now, she noted. Denel’s Seeker 400 is expected to fly later this year. And its Bateleur MALE is also under development.

Additional domestic UAVs with longer range systems are also under development in South Africa, she added.

As of now, the 15 peacekeeping missions have a total strength of 114,000 personnel and the U.N’s 2013-2014 budget for peacekeeping is about 7.5 billion dollars.

M23 rebels near Sake, Eastern DR Congo. Credit: William Lloyd-George/IPS

By Rousbeh Legatis
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 13 2013 (IPS)

Despite existing local expertise and strategies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to build peace-supporting structures at the community level, official debates and media coverage continue to focus predominantly on military interventions.

“Local actors work in isolation and their actions are not part of a global peacebuilding process in the DRC. Their recommendations and their work on the ground are not taken into account,” Eric Malolo from Reseau Haki na Amani (RHA), a network of civil society organisations, told IPS.“Violence becomes a means of expression when there is no framework of reference." -- Suliman Baldo of ICTJ

As the coordinator of RHA, Malolo works in Orientale, a province in the northeast. RHA was founded in 2004 as a direct response to ethnic tensions between the Hema and Lendu communities in DRC’s Ituri region.

Its objective is to help reconcile these two tribes and to address frequent conflicts over land, with dialogue-supporting initiatives at the community-level.

“Barzas” – large community meetings organised by RHA – proved to be a very useful tool, enabling local populations to develop a deeper understanding of local conflict dimensions and how these are perceived by the different groups living in the same community.

“Most problems identified during these gatherings do not necessarily find a solution, but the main thing is letting the communities speak out and enter a process of intercommunity and pacific coexistence,” Malolo said.

Not only are locals working and living in the affected communities not sufficiently involved in ongoing peacebuilding efforts in the central African country, they often also lack political support.

In the context of property and identity-related conflicts, Malolo said, politicians are generally elected because they campaigned on a platform of protecting their own ethnic community’s interests.

“A latent intercommunity conflict is the reason for the presence of such extremist politicians,” he said. “To not risk these votes, they hinder decisively ongoing reconciliation process between communities.

“Even administrative staff receives instructions from politicians to stop the conflict resolution process started by some local actors. Or in other words, efforts started by local actors are often blocked by politicians who don’t agree with this kind of change,” he added.

Most experts agree that to be effective, peacebuilding requires intertwined processes and structures that run from the grassroots to the national level – especially in deeply fragmented and traumatised societies like the DRC.

But a look at official policymaking appears to prove Malolo’s point. The new Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) agreement for DRC, an accord signed by 11 African heads of state in Addis Ababa in February, has “no mention of local civil society and it was not prepared with any involvement of those local actors,” Maria Lange, DRC country manager at International Alert, a London-based charity, told IPS.

“The domestic oversight committee established by the DRC government for the implementation of the domestic commitments under the PSCF does not include any civil society representatives – these are limited to a parallel monitoring committee which has no decision-making authority,” she said.

A military emphasis

Even though the peace agreement represents an important milestone, Aloys Tegera from the Pole Institute regards the military approach backed up by the international community with scepticism.

The U.N. Security Council’s creation in March of its 3,000-strong “first-ever ‘offensive’ combat force“, alongside the 20,500 peacekeepers already in the country, was hailed by the political elite and raised expectations among Congolese “which cannot be met”, Tegera told IPS.

People are bound to learn that realistically, a political solution is the only way forward, said the research director at the Goma-based think tank.

“When I read the current military discourse of many Congolese, however, I am afraid to say that 20 years of suffering and wars have not taught us much,” he said.

For Tegera, the conflict is rooted in a “deadly triangle” of “identity, land and power”.

Where to find the most critical conflict-drivers – inside or outside the country – to what extent they matter and how to tackle them are still controversial questions. What is clear is that a myriad of local, regional and international actors pursue their own interests, and fall back on violence as an instrument to enforce them.

This is often carried out by local armed actors such as militias and rebel groups, who are characterised more often than not by a lack of political ideology, said Suliman Baldo of the New York-based International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).

“They are fictitious creations of whoever is intervening and mainly of these very greedy neighbours,” the director of ICTJ’s Africa Programme told IPS.

At the community and provincial levels, in an atmosphere of localised violence, these groups have gained the upper hand, overruling traditional leaders who would be more disposed to resolving conflicts “traditionally”, that is to say, through dialogue and accommodation with other groups.

“Violence becomes a means of expression when there is no framework of reference. There is no state to settle disputes among the population, there is no traditional authority to moderate tendencies towards violence and to find solutions and resolutions for problems within or among different groups,” Baldo explained.

Concluding that there is a power vacuum at the local level, however, is a false assumption. Where central authority collapses, other actors step in, creating alternative governance structures.

The evolving role of civil society

Over the years, many of the gaps left by dysfunctional or nonexistent state institutions have been filled by Congolese civil society groups, which provide essential social services such as healthcare and schooling. However, they have also been co-opted into transitional institutions – for example, holding a certain number of seats in provincial and national assemblies.

“It is precisely because civil society has been forced into this state-substitution role that many have lost their awareness and practice of its fundamental role of holding the government to account,” Lange said.

While there are hardworking civil society groups pushing to achieve lasting and sustainable peace, others show core weaknesses that prevent them from fulfilling their proper functions, she added.

Many are “politicised and riven by power struggles”, organised along ethnic lines, and “follow donor priorities instead of the priorities of the people and communities they are meant to serve,” she said, citing the study “Ending the Deadlock – Towards a new vision of peace in eastern DRC” by International Alert, which included the results of extensive consultations with local NGOs, representatives of local ethnic communities, and church and academic leaders .

The study recommends a dialogue that begins at the grassroots, is revised at the provincial level, and finalised at the national level.

A bottom-up dialogue in itself would not be enough, said Tegera, stressing the importance of making strides in three key development sectors: education, roads and energy.

“With these three in place, within 20 years, there is a chance to see an emerging middle class, able to ask for accountability and proper governance. This is the only way forward for DRC everyone should press for,” he said.