Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy sailors stand watch on the submarine Yuan at the Zhoushan Naval Base. Credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/CC-BY-2.0

By Richard Heydarian
SINGAPORE, Jun 11 2014 (IPS)

China’s early-May decision to dispatch the state-of-the-art oil rig, HYSY981, into Vietnam’s 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), has intensified ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, raising fears of uncontrolled military escalation in one of the world’s most important waterways.

It wasn’t long before Vietnamese and Chinese maritime forces were locked in a dangerous naval standoff, which led to low-intensity clashes in the high seas.

China’s unilateral action sparked outrage across Vietnam, paving the way for unprecedented anti-China protests, which snowballed into massive destruction of foreign-owned factories, principally owned by China and Taiwan, and the exodus of thousands of Chinese citizens to neighbouring Cambodia.

The whole episode undermined years of painstaking negotiations between Hanoi and Beijing aimed at peacefully resolving bilateral territorial disputes across the South China Sea.

Shortly after, the Philippines also released photos suggesting Chinese construction activities on the Johnson South Reef, a disputed feature that falls within the Philippines EEZ in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea.

Later, China confirmed that it was indeed engaged in reclamation activities on the disputed reef, but it tried to justify it by claiming it exercised “indisputable and inherent” sovereignty over the said feature based on Beijing’s notorious “nine-dash-line” doctrine, which covers almost the entirety of the South China Sea.

The Philippines and Vietnam contend that China has flagrantly violated the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which explicitly discourages claimant states from unilaterally altering the status by engaging in, among other things, construction activities on disputed features.

Alarmed by the intensifying territorial disputes between China and other claimant states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed “serious concern” and called for a rule-based, peaceful resolution of the disputes.

Expecting a more vigorous response from ASEAN, Vietnamese and Filipino leaders called for the swift finalisation of a legally-binding Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, and vowed to forge a bilateral “strategic partnership” to counter China’s territorial assertiveness. Meanwhile, other Pacific powers such as Japan and the U.S. have also stepped up their criticism of China’s recent actions, underscoring their direct national interest in preserving freedom of navigation in international waters.

“Whatever construction China carries out on the [Johnson South] reef is a matter entirely within the scope of China’s sovereignty,” argued China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Hua Chunyin, dismissing protests by Filipino officials.

Confronting an increasingly assertive and powerful China, the Philippines and Vietnam have moved closer to a genuine alliance. On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) on East Asia in late-May, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III and visiting Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung agreed to forge a bilateral strategic partnership, with a particular focus on maritime and defense cooperation vis-à-vis the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea.

“We face common challenges as maritime nations and as brothers in ASEAN,” declared Aquino during his meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart, underscoring Manila’s desire to establish a closer partnership with neighbouring countries.

“In defense and security, we discussed how we can enhance confidence building, our defense capabilities and interoperability in addressing security challenges.”

“More than ever before, ASEAN and the international community need to continue raising a strong voice in protesting against [China’s territorial assertiveness], securing a strict observance of the international law, and peace and stability in the region and the world,” lamented Dung, underscoring Hanoi’s urgent desire for the multilateral resolution of the ongoing disputes.

Recognising China’s military superiority, and the inefficacy of existing diplomatic mechanisms, both the Philippines and Vietnam have been looking towards external powers such as Japan and the U.S. to counter China’s territorial assertiveness.

Much of Asia’s trade and energy transport passes through the South China Sea, and there is a growing fear that ongoing territorial disputes will spiral into a prolonged, destructive conflict, which could affect all regional economies.

Influential actors across the region have been desperately searching for new mechanisms to deescalate ongoing territorial tensions, preventing claimant states, primarily China, from undertaking any destabilising action.

“Japan intends to play an even greater and more proactive role than it has until now in making peace in Asia and the world something more certain,” declared Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the recently-concluded 13^th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which brought together leading defense officials, experts, and journalists from around the world, and saw spirited exchanges between top officials from Japan, the U.S. and China.

During the high-level gathering, Abe, the keynote speaker, sought to present Japan as a counterweight to China, with Tokyo relaxing its self-imposed restrictions on arms exports, increasing its defense spending, and seeking new ways to expand its security role in the Asian region.

“We take no position on competing territorial claims [in the South China Sea]… But we firmly oppose any nation’s use of intimidation, coercion or the threat of force to assert these claims,” argued U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, underscoring Washington’s growing alarm over China’s territorial posturing in the Western Pacific.

In response, China’s top representative, Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese military, was uncharacteristically blunt in his criticisms, describing Hagel’s remarks as “excessive beyond . . . imagination [and] suffused with hegemonism . . . threats and intimidation.”

Under a new nationalist government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India is also expected to play a more pro-active role in the region, given New Delhi’s growing trade with East Asia and its large-scale investments in the hydrocarbon-rich areas of the South China Sea. The U.S.’ treaty allies such as Australia have also stepped up their efforts at containing China’s rising territorial assertiveness, as the two Pacific powers deepen their naval interoperability and defense cooperation.

Overall, it seems that China’s rising assertiveness has encouraged a flexible counter-alliance of like-minded countries, which are heavily concerned with the economic and geopolitical fallout of the brewing conflict in the South China Sea. It remains to be seen, however, whether China will relent on its territorial claims amid growing international pressure.

(END)

Last year, the Philippines brought a complaint against China’s aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea to the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal. It was a master stroke by the Philippine government.

The Chinese “were really unprepared for that and were really embarrassed by it,” one of Vietnam’s top experts on Chinese diplomacy told me during my recent visit to Hanoi to give a series of lectures on foreign policy and economic issues.None of the key players in East Asia today may want war. But neither did any of the Great Powers on the eve of the First World War.

The move put China on the defensive, said another Vietnamese analyst, and was one of the factors that prompted Beijing last year to agree in principle to hold discussions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a Code of Conduct for the disputed body of water – known in the Philippines as the West Philippine Sea, in Vietnam as the East Sea, and in China as the South China Sea.

The budding cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines is the latest development stemming from China’s aggressive territorial claims in the region.

In 2009, China put forward the so-called “Nine-Dash Line” map in which it claimed the whole of the South China Sea, leaving four other countries that border on the strategic body of water with nothing more than their 12-mile territorial seas.

In pursuit of Beijing’s goals, Chinese maritime surveillance ships have driven Filipino fisherfolk from Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the most recent incident, the Chinese tried to disperse Filipino fishing boats approaching the shoal with water cannons.

Chinese government ships have also reportedly chased off Filipino boats trying to replenish a garrison on Ayungin Shoal in the Spratly Islands.

The Philippines and Vietnam are natural allies in their common struggle against China’s drive for hegemony in East Asia. Already partners in ASEAN, the two are likely to be driven closer together by Beijing’s increasingly brazen displays of power as it enforces its claim to some 80 percent of the South China Sea.

Both have also drawn closer to the United States, seeking to use Washington to balance China’s growing military presence in the region.

Vietnam has played the U.S. card more adroitly, however, relying on the Philippines to explicitly invite an expanded U.S. military presence on its soil and seas, something the Vietnamese would not themselves allow. But despite a common interest in containing China, both countries should avoid turning the conflict into a superpower conflict between the United States and China.

Figuring out Beijing’s Motives

The Vietnamese offered several schools of thought on China’s territorial claims. The first sees the Nine-Dash Line as delineating the maritime borders of China and not necessarily possession of the islands in the area.

The second interprets it as saying only that the islands and other terrestrial formations in the area belong to China, leaving the status of the surrounding waters ambiguous. A third opinion is that the map asserts that both the islands and surrounding waters belong to China.

A fourth perspective sees the Nine-Dash Line as an aggressive negotiating device.

According to a diplomat and academic expert who has first-hand experience negotiating with the Chinese, Beijing’s style of resolving territorial issues has the following steps: “First,” he said, “the two parties agree on the principles guiding negotiations. Second, both sides draw up their maps reflecting their respective territorial claims, with China pushing its territorial claims as far as possible.

“Third, they compare the maps to identify overlapping or disputed areas. Fourth, the parties negotiate to resolve the disputed areas. Fifth, if there is agreement, draw up a new map. Finally, they go to the United Nations to legalise the new map.”

Despite varying views on China’s intentions, however, the Vietnamese are one on two key points: 1) that the Nine-Dash Line claim is illegal, and 2) that owing to the number of parties and overlapping claims involved in the South China Sea dispute, only multilateral negotiations can set the basis for a lasting comprehensive solution.

Also, whatever may be their different readings of China’s motives for advancing its Nine-Dash Line claims, there seems to be a consensus among Vietnamese officials and experts that China’s strategic aim is to eventually assert its full control of the South China Sea.

In other words, Beijing’s aim is to legally transform the area into a domestic waterway governed by Chinese domestic laws.

Some of Beijing’s acts are explicit, such as the establishment of Sansha City as a domestic governing unit for the whole South China Sea and the recent passage of a fisheries law requiring non-Chinese vessels fishing in the area to obtain a license from the Chinese government.

Others are more ambiguous, such as Beijing’s views on the issue of freedom of navigation in the disputed area. Ambiguity serves their purpose at a time that they do not yet have the capability to match their power to their ambition.

“But there is no doubt that when they reach that point, of having the power to impose their ambition,” said one Vietnamese analyst, “they will subject the area to Chinese domestic law.”

The United States: From Enemy to Ally?

In an irony of history, the Vietnamese have welcomed Washington’s plans to increase the U.S. military footprint in the region to “balance” China. Once an enemy, Hanoi now has good security relations with the United States, whose navy Vietnam has invited to use the former Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay for logistical and ship repair needs.

For the same reason, the Vietnamese approve of the U.S. military’s controversial build-up in the Philippines. I was told that as a long-time ally of the United States, it was the role of the Philippines to ask the United States to increase its military presence in the Western Pacific.

But inviting the United States to have a larger military presence is counterproductive if the aim is to resolve regional territorial disputes with China.

A larger U.S. presence would transform the regional context into a superpower conflict, thus marginalising the territorial question and the possibility for its resolution.

Moreover, inviting Washington to plant an even bigger military footprint in the Philippines would convert the country into a frontline state like Afghanistan and Pakistan, with all the terrible consequences such a status entails – including the subordination of our economic development to the strategic-military priorities of a superpower.

Finally, a balance of power situation is unstable and prone to generate conflict, since although no one may want a war, the dynamics of conflict may run out of everyone’s control and lead to one. China’s aggressive territorial claims, the U.S. “Pivot to Asia,” and Japan’s opportunistic moves add up to a volatile brew.

Many observers note that the Asia-Pacific military-political situation is becoming like that of Europe at the end of the 19^th century, with the emergence of a similarly fluid configuration of balance-of-power politics.

None of the key players in East Asia today may want war. But neither did any of the Great Powers on the eve of the First World War. The problem is that in a situation of fierce rivalry among powers that hate one another, an incident may trigger an uncontrollable chain of events that may result in a regional war, or worse.

Walden Bello is a representative of Akbayan (Citizens’ Action Party) in the Philippine House of Representatives. He was the author of the House resolution renaming the South China Sea the West Philippine Sea. An earlier version of this commentary was published by Foreign Policy In Focus.

After months of rising tensions over disputed territories in the South China Sea, there are growing signs that the Philippine government is seeking to revive strained relations with Beijing. And no less than the Philippine President Benigno Aquino is spearheading the ongoing efforts to diplomatically resolve territorial disputes and prevent a disastrous conflict in the region.

The move, analysts contend, is partly inspired by lingering uncertainties over the U.S. military commitment to treaty allies such as the Philippines, which are yet to receive substantial military aid to augment their defence capabilities. But, it is the recognition of Beijing’s growing regional influence and the futility of a confrontational approach that has largely encouraged the Aquino administration to rebalance its China diplomacy.

Since late 2012, the Philippines has stepped up its international diplomacy to solicit external support and push back against what it perceives as China’s growing territorial assertiveness. Aside from accelerating negotiations to strengthen bilateral defence ties with Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan, and the U.S., the Philippines has also filed a legal complaint against China’s claim to a vast collection of territorial features stretching across the South China Sea.The Chinese military and para-military forces have expanded their operations across the disputed features and consolidated control over already occupied territories in the South China Sea.

These efforts were primarily led by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) under the guidance of Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, who has enjoyed extensive ties with Washington and is widely recognised as one of the principal regional voices in favour of an increased U.S. military footprint in Asia.

In response, hawkish elements within China have threatened economic sanctions, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry has flatly rejected any calls for international arbitration of maritime disputes. The country’s top leadership, in turn, has largely ignored its Filipino counterparts in varying regional and international gatherings, leading to a breakdown in bilateral communications.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military and para-military forces have expanded their operations across the disputed features and consolidated control over already occupied territories in the South China Sea, namely the Scarborough Shoal, which was the site of a dangerous standoff between Philippine and Chinese forces in mid-2012.

Yet, without substantial diplomatic and military support from external allies such as the U.S. and robust regional support for a diplomatic resolution of the South China Sea disputes, the Philippines stood little chance of coaxing China into meaningful concessions. Things came to head in October, when (a) U.S. President Barack Obama was forced to cancel his much-anticipated Asia trips to address a domestic political crisis, to the outrage of regional allies expecting deeper American commitment to Asia, and (b) the revelation of serious disagreements in the ongoing Philippine-U.S. negotiations over an expanded defence pact.

“Both sides are conscious that no action shall be taken to exacerbate the situation,” President Aquino argued during the early-October APEC Summit in Bali, trying to dispel criticism that China is dragging its feet on developing a regional Code of Conduct (CoC) to peacefully resolve territorial disputes. “I cannot say we are that close to signing the Code of Conduct, but everyone is now convinced that we need to talk about it. So, the solution is now moving forward to end the territorial disputes in the South China.”

More importantly, in late October Aquino went as far as contradicting his own cabinet members, namely defence secretary Voltaire Gazmin, when he vigorously denied the earlier claims that Chinese forces have been placing ‘concrete blocks’ in the disputed Scarborough Shoal, allegedly as a prelude to establishing military fortifications in the area.

He told a large gathering of foreign reporters in Manila that concrete blocks were “very old” and “not a new phenomenon”, most likely dating back to the Cold War era. He also mentioned his earlier conversations with Premier Li Keqiang on the sidelines of the early October ASEAN Summit, emphasising how despite disagreements “at least [both sides] are talking.”

In succeeding weeks it became clear that Manila and Washington were still wide apart on striking a new defence deal to allow deeper bilateral military cooperation and expanded U.S. rotational presence in the Philippines.

“It is at the stage where there is negotiation so it’s a give and take process. Right now, we have not agreed on the issues raised,” Gazmin lamented (Nov. 5), admitting an impasse in the ongoing defence negotiations. “They [U.S.] have proposals that we do not agree with. But that’s how negotiations are.”

Crucially, Gazin didn’t mention any date for the next round of negotiations, reflecting the profound nature of bilateral disagreements. Reportedly, there is lack of a agreement on the nature and duration of “pre-positioning” of U.S. defence equipment in the Philippines, its “ownership”, as well as the added value of a new agreement: specifically, what types of military assets would be leased to Philippines in exchange for greater base access.

The combination of continuing uncertainties regarding Philippine-U.S. defence relations and China’s growing economic might, which has been boosted by its offer to establish a multi-billion Asian infrastructure fund to aid the development of Southeast Asian neighbours, has strengthened Aquino’s call for reviving bilateral ties with Beijing.

It is however far from clear whether China is willing to reciprocate Aquino’s overtures, given the rising popular nationalism in the country, which has precipitated a more muscular regional maritime policy. This may, experts argue, explain China’s initially modest pledge of aid to the typhoon-stricken Philippines, much to the disappointment of those who expected more humanitarian pro-activeness on the part of Asia’s biggest economy.

With the U.S. and Japan taking the lead on providing pivotal financial and logistical assistance to thousands of victims of Haiyan in the Philippines, and facing growing criticism in the region for its ‘meagre’ pledge, China eventually decided to increase its humanitarian assistance from 100,000 dollars to 1.64 million dollars, with Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly offering his “heartfelt sympathies” in a phone conversation with Aquino.

Overall, what is clear is that the Philippines is re-calibrating its bilateral relations with China, and is seeking an alternative approach to resolve territorial disputes. In the end, however, it will take a joint effort by both sides to overcome the recent escalation in tensions and resuscitate diplomatic channels to peacefully resolve the disputes.

After a year of intense diplomatic standoff and territorial brinkmanship among disputing states in the South and East China Seas, the U.S. military ‘pivot’ to the region appears to be in full swing – a move that could further aggravate an already combustible regional dynamic.

Against the backdrop of Chinese territorial assertiveness, the year started off with the bang of big-ticket U.S. arms sales to treaty allies and strategic partners across the region, including an expanded package of sophisticated military hardware featuring state-of-the-art anti-missile systems and warplanes. On top of this, Washington has also stepped-up its joint military exercises with Asian allies perched on the forefront of ongoing territorial spats.

Building on its earlier promise of greater commitment to the freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, an artery for global trade and energy transport, Washington aims to improve its allies’ military capabilities in a bid to rein in Beijing’s strong-willed territorial posturing.

Facing a stubborn economic downturn at home, the dramatic boost in U.S. defence sales to the region underlines Washington’s growing emphasis on a primarily military-oriented (as opposed to trade-and-investment-driven) approach to re-asserting its position as an ‘anchor of peace and stability’ in the region.

Among the biggest beneficiaries of growing U.S. military commitment to the region is the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), a massive trade group that includes top Pentagon suppliers such as Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co and Northrop Grumman Corp. It underscores the extent to which the U.S. ‘pivot’ has energised the American industrial-military complex, further dimming the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing disputes.

“(The pivot) will result in growing opportunities for our industry to help equip our friends,” says Fred Downey, vice-president for national security at the AIA.

Since the formal commencement of the U.S. pivot, after U.S. President Barack Obama’s fateful speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, Washington has come under tremendous pressure to reassure troubled allies such as Japan and the Philippines against Beijing’s assertiveness. In response, the U.S. has beefed up its rotational military presence across the Pacific, while expanding joint exercises – focusing on maritime defence – with and military aid to Pacific partners.

To calm China’s fears of a U.S.-led regional containment strategy, Washington has also focused on deepening economic integration within the Pacific Rim, specifically through the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trading agreement, which aims to facilitate the flow of investments and goods among partner-nations. In addition, the U.S. has also – at least in principle – underlined its support for diplomatic resolution of ongoing territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.

However, the U.S. pronouncements have failed to appease regional partners and deter Chinese assertiveness. Beijing continues to accuse Washington of staging a concerted effort to deny China its (perceived) legitimate interests, while allies have raised doubts as to Washington’s ability – given its dire fiscal woes – to maintain regional ascendancy.

Reflecting on fragile U.S. finances, Ken Lieberthal, director of the Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute and former president Bill Clinton’s top China adviser, has stated, “The most important single element to our (U.S.) success in Asia will be whether domestically we get our house in order, whether domestically we’re able to adopt and integrate a set of policies that will effectively address our fiscal problems over time.”

Given TPP’s failure to gain traction among major Pacific economies, and in the absence of any substantial American investments and economic aid to strategic partners, Washington seems to have instead opted for a full military pivot. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) inability to forge ahead with an effective diplomatic mechanism to settle the disputes has only encouraged this trend.

Since 2011, the U.S. worldwide military sales have hovered above 60 billion dollars.  In 2011, India alone accounted for a 6.9 billion dollar acquisition deal, underscoring New Delhi’s growing anxieties with China’s massive naval buildup, especially in light of its substantial energy-related investments in South China Sea. Last year, overall sales to Pacific partners topped 13.7 billion dollars.

Building on its earlier arms bonanza, the U.S. defence industry has started off the year with a large package of flashy, cutting-edge arms sales to key partners in Northeast Asia: a 5 billion dollar Lockheed Martin radar-evading F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft deal with Japan, a 1.85 billion dollar Lockheed Martin-led retrofitting of Taiwan’s 145 F-16A/B fighters with advanced radars and electronic warfare suits, and a 1.2 billion dollar Northrop Grumman high-flying RQ-4 “Global Hawk” spy drone deal with South Korea.

Beyond propping up allies’ military capabilities to deal with a wide array of challenges, including China, Washington has also encouraged further self-reliance and inter-operability among regional allies, creating a so-called “inversed wall of China” across the Western Pacific.

As a result, the newly-elected Japanese government, under the hawkish Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has supported Washington’s call for a more assertive Japanese regional role. Mr. Abe has pushed for revitalised defence ties with Asian partners, enhanced inter-operability with major naval powers in the Pacific such as Australia and India, and expanded military aid to countries such as the Philippines. He has also pushed for a so-called Asian “security diamond”, bringing together likeminded Pacific powers concerned with a perceived Chinese “threat”.

With Japan locked in a brewing conflict with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, Washington has conducted a series of high-profile joint naval exercises with Tokyo. In November, 47,000 Japanese and American military personnel took part in the biennial Keen Sword exercise off Okinawa islands, which was originally planned to act out the re-capture of disputed islands off the southern coast of Japan. This was followed by a five-day joint air exercise in January, just days after Japanese jets fended off Chinese aircraft surveying the disputed islands.

Overall, the U.S. seems to be gradually passing the buck to Asian partners, prodding them to bear a growing share of defense costs vis-à-vis China’s perceived expansionism. Meanwhile, there is little indication of a renewed push for a diplomatic resolution of the territorial disputes.

With territorial tensions in the South China Sea entering a new phase of confrontation, there are signs of growing Indian involvement in regional affairs.

Aside from its anxieties over China’s expanding naval capabilities, India has direct economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. For many years, India’s state-run Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC) has been involved in joint ventures with TNK Vietnam and Petro Vietnam, conducting exploratory/offshore hydrocarbon projects in the disputed waters of South China Sea.

Meanwhile, India has also been expanding its strategic ties with the booming economies of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hoping to raise bilateral trade to as much as 200 billion dollars in the next decade.

As ASEAN’s major dialogue partner, India has repeatedly underscored its commitment to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, cautioning against rising threats to maritime security.

During the recently-concluded ASEAN-India Summit, many Southeast Asian states, in response to China’s provocative actions, have sought greater role for and involvement of India in ensuring regional stability and deterring Chinese aggressive posturing.

“While the centre of the global economy is shifting eastward, the Indian and Pacific oceans have been and will become even more important in providing the vital sea routes for trade and commerce,” Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared during the summit.

Both India and the ASEAN seem to share growing concerns over China’s increasing maritime assertiveness and naval capabilities.

November of last year – when Chinese (paramilitary) vessels allegedly harassed the Vietnamese Binh Minh 02 seismic survey vessel in the hydrocarbon-rich blocks where India’s ONGC is directly invested – marked a turning point in India’s disposition towards the South China Sea disputes.

“Not that we expect to be in those waters very frequently, but when the requirement is there for situations where the country’s interests are involved, for example ONGC Videsh, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that,” Indian navy chief Admiral D.K Joshi declared in response to the incident, warning China against further provocations.

His comments coincided with a new round of Sino-Indian negotiations over long-standing border disputes, which sparked a war back in 1962 and have embittered bilateral ties since then.

Recent years have witnessed a precipitous escalation in regional maritime disputes, pitting China – which claims almost all features in the South China Sea and continues to prefer bilateral dispute-settlement mechanisms – against Southeast Asian states such as Philippines and Vietnam.

However, last year marked a further deterioration in regional security, with ASEAN failing to adopt a common position on establishing a binding regional Code of Conduct (CoC) to settle maritime disputes.

The situation worsened when the new Chinese leadership engaged in a series of provocative actions, ranging from the issuance of a new Chinese passport, featuring the full extent of Beijing’s territorial claims across Asia, to the recent announcement by Hainan authorities to search and intercept foreign vessels straddling China’s claimed maritime territories, and the new Chinese official map featuring territories within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

In response, the Philippines and Vietnam sought deeper strategic and defence cooperation with sympathetic Pacific powers such as the U.S. and India. Vietnam, Philippines, and Taiwan formally protested against China’s passport design, while the ASEAN bloc expressed deep concerns over new maritime regulations by Chinese provincial authorities in Hainan.

There is also the bigger issue of India-China rivalry. Traditionally, the Indian Navy (IN) has focused on patrolling and safeguarding the country’s interests in the immediate waters stretching from the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean and the Strait Malacca. Yet, China’s rapid rise as a regional naval powerhouse has encouraged continental rival India to speed up its naval modernisation and develop an expeditionary outlook.

Between 2000 and 2012, the IN’s share of annual military expenditures has increased from 15 to 19 percent, while joint exercises with other regional allies, especially the U.S. Pacific Command, have intensified accordingly. An armada of new aircraft carriers, modern French submarines, indigenously designed nuclear submarines, and state-of-the-art aircraft are slated to boost the IN in coming years.

With one of Asia’s most formidable navies, dwarfing all of those in the ASEAN, India’s new naval arms race with China has gained even greater significance in light of rising frictions in the strategic, hydrocarbon-rich waters of South China Sea. Back in 2011, Chinese forces even challenged an IN ship that was patrolling off the coast of Vietnam.

The U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region has been followed by renewed strategic-military commitments with regional partners, but the Philippines and Vietnam are also eagerly seeking India’s muscle to deter China.

“I hope that India supports ASEAN and China in full implementation of the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea and ASEAN Six-Point Principle on the South China Sea…” Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung emphasized during the ASEAN-India summit.

In fact, the summit’s concluding ‘vision statement’ underscored, in the most unequivocal terms, the importance of maritime security: “We (ASEAN and India) are committed to strengthening cooperation to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation and safety of sea lanes of communication for unfettered movement of trade in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.”

Although India has historically stood up to China over territorial disputes as well as the Tibetan issue, in addition to its expressed commitment to defend energy investments in the disputed waters and challenge China’s new passport design, India has actually struck a moderate tone in numerous official pronouncements.

India is not a direct party to the disputes and a bulk of its strategic interests still lie in the Indian Ocean, while its booming bilateral trade with China – hovering above 70 billion dollars annually – means that it has little appetite for risking direct confrontation with Beijing in behalf of ASEAN.

“There are fundamental issues there (South China Sea) that do not require India’s intervention,” India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Kurshid stated in relation to the maritime disputes during the ASEAN-India summit. “(The disputes) need to be resolved between the countries concerned.”

With newly re-elected President Barack Obama having chosen Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination, where he also attended the much-anticipated pan-Pacific East Asia Summit, the U.S. has underscored its commitment to its so-called strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.

Months after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama signaled the formal launch of the pivot in a November speech to the Australian parliament: “As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”

The U.S. already has around 320,000 troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 percent of its formidable global naval assets. Under the pivot strategy, the U.S. is set to commit several thousand additional troops and increase its naval strength by another ten percent in the coming few years.

The Obama administration has repeatedly denied that the pivot is a containment strategy aimed at Beijing, arguing it is simply a logical ‘rebalancing’ towards the region in light of Asia’s stunning economic growth and the increasing importance of maintaining U.S. interests there.

However, more than two years into the so-called U.S. pivot, many strategic commentators across the Pacific have raised major questions as to its real intentions, actual impact, and practicability, given the United States’ deep fiscal constraints ahead of scheduled defence-spending cuts.

Reacting to lingering uncertainties over the U.S. strategy, China, which views the pivot as an act of provocation, as well as other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan, have stepped up their territorial claims in the Western Pacific – indirectly testing America’s resolve to uphold its strategic commitments.

In this sense, the pivot – purportedly to reinforce the United States’ role as an ‘anchor of stability and prosperity’ in the Pacific – has ironically contributed to greater uncertainty, turbulence, and belligerence vis-à-vis the festering maritime disputes.

In a recent op-ed for the Singapore-based daily The Straits Times, Barry Desker, the dean of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), called for ‘mutual restraint’ by all disputing littoral states to ‘diffuse’ tensions, while contending that all parties are “guilty of occupying uninhabited islands and land features.”

And a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group says: “With tensions on the rise, Manila is eager to pursue closer military cooperation with the U.S., and Hanoi (as a strategic partner) is keen to carefully bring in and balance U.S. influence in the region.

“If these countries frame any U.S. assistance as being directed against China, it will be harder for the former to persuade the latter that it will not get involved in territorial disputes.”

The pivot can be traced as far back as the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton injected the U.S. into the centre of decades-long territorial disputes in the South China Sea by announcing that her country had a ‘national interest’ in the freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.

As a result, allies such as Japan and the Philippines have repeatedly sought U.S. re-assurance vis-à-vis existing bilateral mutual defence treaties, especially in the event of military confrontation with China over disputed maritime features in the Western Pacific.

The Philippines and Vietnam are mired in bitter maritime disputes with China over a whole host of features in the Spratly and Paracel chains of islands in the South China Sea, while Japan is contesting China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain of islands in the East China Sea.

Meanwhile, Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, are locked in a separate territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.

In last month’s Australia-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, Clinton sought to calm Chinese nerves by stating, “We (the U.S.) welcomed a strong, prosperous and peaceful China, which plays a constructive role in promoting regional security and prosperity… We do not take a position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.”

The U.S. Navy also invited China to join the large-scale, U.S.-led ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise’ by 2014.

Yet an unconvinced China, under its new leadership, has nudged up its claims. Recently, authorities in the southern Chinese Island of Hainan have issued new laws, whereby beginning next year, they will have the authority to intercept and board any foreign vessel seen to violate China’s ‘sovereignty’ over all claimed features in the South China Sea.

In response, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Surin Pitsuwan warned that such a decision “…has increased a level of concern and a level of great anxiety among all parties, particularly parties that would need the access, the passage and the freedom to go through.” Beijing subsequently insisted that the new authority was not aimed against sea-borne commercial traffic.

China’s new passport design, incorporating disputed territories in the South China Sea under the country’s official map, has also sparked renewed concerns among some of its southern neighbours.

In the face of what it sees as Chinese provocations, however, a deeply divided ASEAN has failed to make any meaningful progress in crafting a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct to resolve disputes, as strongly urged by Washington.

If the pivot is seen in Beijing as a provocation, it has also encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of some of its neighbours.

While the Vietnamese have stepped up their energy exploration projects in disputed territories, and the Japanese government decided to purchase from its private owner one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the Philippines has pushed to upgrade its military ties with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea to defend its own claims.

“While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Filipino President Benigno Aquino stated at last month’s East Asian Summit, prodding further U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes.

How Washington will react to these kinds of pressures, particularly given its own fiscal challenges that have already resulted in nearly 500 billion dollars in cuts to its projected military budgets over the next ten years, adds yet another level of uncertainty to the calculations of the contending parties in the region.

Already, the pivot is being attacked by the U.S. right as insufficient. “This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China’s rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears,” argued Michael Auslin in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. “In reality…it won’t solve Asia’s problems and may even add to the region’s uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.”

Against the backdrop of growing territorial tensions in the South China Sea, inflamed by a more explicit Sino-American rivalry in the Pacific theatre, the recently-concluded ASEAN Summit in Cambodia represented the best chance at bolstering regional security through peaceful, multilateral mechanisms.

With the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) gathering coinciding with the pan-regional East Asia and ASEAN+3 Summits, Cambodia, as the current chair of the ASEAN, took centre-stage in a broader international gathering, which brought together leading Pacific powers such as the U.S., China, Japan and India.

Ahead of the ASEAN Summit, many commentators as well as regional leaders expressed their hopes for some form of diplomatic breakthrough to address festering maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

Recent months have also witnessed growing diplomatic pro-activeness by countries such as Indonesia to mend intra-regional rifts, especially between Cambodia and the Philippines, and re-focus diplomatic efforts on a peaceful and rule-based resolution of ongoing disputes. For instance, the Indonesian-proposed “six points of consensus” highlights the commitment of regional states to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the adoption of a legally binding regional Code of Conduct (CoC).

“We are hoping and expecting that there will be smooth and very productive results of these meetings as far as our advocacies are concerned,” said Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Raul Hernandez. “What is important here is to underscore the ASEAN centrality and, for ASEAN it has always been our position that any initiatives (such as the CoC) should first be accepted and approved by ASEAN and only then would it be presented to other dialogue partners.” His statements echoed Philippine President Benigno Aquino’s cautious optimism regarding a more unified regional stance on the issue of maritime security.

Interestingly, the Philippines has also been very busy with thawing out increasingly frayed relations with both China and Cambodia in recent months, hoping to build positive momentum ahead of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh.

The newly re-elected President Obama also called for easing of tensions among claimant states, warning against an escalation in disputes, while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier identified the territorial conflicts as a ‘critical issue’ in need of urgent resolution.

However, much to the disappointment of some Southeast Asian nations, especially the Philippines and Cambodia – reportedly at the behest of China – once again blocked the inclusion of the South China Sea dispute in the summit’s agenda. After all, China has repeatedly warned against ‘internationalising’ the disputes, while actively sidestepping the issue in all recent regional multilateral forums.

In essence, Cambodia has effectively trammeled any development on the crucial issue of adopting a more binding CoC to not only rein in China’s growing territorial assertiveness in the near future, but to also lay down the foundations of a more robust regional approach to resolve intractable territorial conflicts in the long run.

Far from unprecedented, Cambodia’s recent move mirrored its earlier stance during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in June, where it blocked the inclusion of maritime disputes in the final communiqué. While Cambodia’s actions during the AMM prompted a flash walkout then by the Filipino Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, this time Manila resorted to a formal protest against Cambodia’s decision to once again block the issue from the ASEAN’s agenda.

“Among the principles that the ASEAN community has pledged to abide by is that of centrality; it should also be foremost in our minds as we address concerns in the East Asian maritime region. Prevailing tensions in the area stand to impact regional peace and stability,” President Aquino shrieked in his formal intervention during the ASEAN+3 Summit. “We reiterate our call on all parties concerned to avoid the threat or use of force, and to adhere to universally recognised principles of international law in settling disputes…because respect for the rule of law remains the great equaliser in the relations among nations.”

Aware of Cambodia’s cosy ties with China, Manila’s strategy during the recently-concluded summits was to rally the support of sympathetic and influential external actors such as the U.S., Japan, India and Australia to push for a binding CoC in the South China Sea and exert more pressure on Beijing against further military fortifications and adventurism in the disputed areas.

Refusing to stand idly by, the Philippine president reiterated his concerns in an intervention during the ASEAN+India Summit, emphasising India’s stake in ensuring regional maritime security. “Since a great deal of our (ASEAN and India) trade and resources flow through our seas, the Philippines views that ASEAN and India will mutually benefit from jointly addressing threats to maritime stability through peaceful means in accordance with international law,” Aquino stated.

During the ASEAN+Japan Summit, Aquino underscored the common interest of both Japan and ASEAN states to uphold the rule of law vis-à-vis ongoing disputes by stating, “The Philippines will continue to uphold this principle in its engagement with ASEAN, Japan, and other stakeholders, as the region strives to resolve overlapping maritime claims.”

Foremost in his mind, Aquino also urged the U.S. to play a more active role to stave off rising Chinese assertiveness.

“Each one of our nations has a stake in the stability of Southeast Asia. The United States understands this and, for this reason, has chosen to work with us to ensure the peace and continuous advancement of our region,” Aquino said during the summit, prodding greater U.S. involvement. “While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea.”

In a veiled criticism of China’s preference for a bilateral approach to the disputes, Aquino argued, “We have long said that if it’s a multilateral problem, you can’t have a bilateral solution.” Most interestingly, he also stated, “The ASEAN route is not the only route for us”, suggesting Manila’s possible recourse to greater military cooperation with the U.S. as well as other regional allies such as Australia and Japan, especially if the ASEAN continues to fail in providing a credible multilateral, rule-based approach to ongoing territorial conflicts.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Cambodia, bringing together top leaders of all ten member nations represents a critical juncture to ensure regional security and in shaping the fate of the organisation itself, as divergent strategic positions among member countries threaten the very fabric of the regional body.

Earlier this year during the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia as the ASEAN’s current chair blocked the inclusion of ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea in the final communiqué, provoking uproar among certain members, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, who accused Cambodia of doing China’s bidding. As a result, the meeting failed to issue a final communiqué for the first time in the organisation’s 45-year history – precipitating a diplomatic fallout among member nations, with Philippine-Cambodia relations suffering a temporary but dramatic nosedive.

Cambodia’s actions stood in contrast to the more pro-active chairmanships of Vietnam in 2010 and Indonesia in 2011, where ASEAN made a more concrete move towards establishing a more binding Code of Conduct (CoC) to supplement the highly symbolic 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in South China Sea, which called for a rule-based and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.

The 2012 ministerial meeting failed to build on earlier multilateral efforts to even iron out the contours of guidelines for a more binding regional CoC, ostensibly to rein in territorial tensions and regulate the behaviour of conflicting parties in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China still insists on a bilateral resolution of the disputes.

The whole episode created a cloud of uncertainty over the fate of an organisation found on the principles of solidarity, consensus, and consultation, with a growing number of commentators questioning the very centrality as well as the utility of ASEAN as an agent of stability, cooperation, and security in the region.

Writing for the Asia Times, Southeast Asia expert Amitav Achariya captured this growing concern by stating, “…the idea of ASEAN centrality, which assumes that ASEAN, rather than the great powers like China, Japan, the U.S. or India, should be the building bloc and hub of developing a wider Asian or Asia-Pacific regional architecture, is facing a severe test.”

“That failure (absence of a final communiqué) cast significant doubt on ASEAN’s ability to evolve and tackle tough issues. It also caused troubling allegations, especially from Vietnam and the Philippines, that Cambodia had placed its close relationship with China above the interests of its fellow ASEAN members,” argued Gregory Poling and Alexandra Sander of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Currently, ASEAN members such the Philippines and Vietnam are locked in a bitter conflict with China over a whole host of features in the South China Sea. Diplomacy has partly suffered because of China’s notorious ‘9-dashline’ doctrine, which stipulates that is has ‘inherent and indisputable sovereignty’ over almost all features in the South China Sea.

There is also a domestic political angle: Grappling with a cocktail of outsized domestic economic and political challenges, the Chinese leadership is experiencing a highly sensitive period of transition. With communism losing its ideological appeal, it is popular nationalism that has become the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) main tool to placate an increasingly restive nation.

Thus, in recent years, we have seen rising popular pressure on the political leadership to assert China’s territorial claims in adjacent waters of East and South China Seas. This also partly explains the rising influence of more hawkish elements within the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) – already a beneficiary of a growing chunk of China’s ballooning military budget – which have called for a more aggressive approach to securing the country’s territorial claims.

Adding to the complexity of the issue, the U.S.’ ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific has also injected a new geopolitical layer to the ongoing territorial disputes. Back in April, the Philippines and China squared off over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, culminating in a bitter series of naval and diplomatic jostling over the control of the disputed feature and its surrounding waters.

After securing its control over the shoal, aided by a bilateral agreement that oversaw the withdrawal of Philippine warships from the disputed area, China stepped up its fortifications by expanding its military garrisons and paramilitary infrastructure in occupied features within the Paracels and Spratly chain of islands, encouraging both the Philippines and Vietnam to further deepen their increasingly revitalised military ties with the U.S.

With the U.S. identifying ‘freedom of navigation’ in the South China Sea as a cornerstone of its national interest, and signaling its commitment to the defence of its Asian allies against China’s perceived encroachments, Washington has de facto carved out its place at the centre of simmering territorial conflicts.

Responding in kind, China has rapidly improved it’s ‘anti-access’ and blue naval capabilities to counter U.S. maritime dominance in the Pacific, increased its diplomatic and economic pressure on U.S. allies such as the Philippines, and more aggressively leveraged its favourable ties with ASEAN members such as Cambodia, where Beijing dominates the overall trade and investment picture, to push its interests within regional bodies. Ironically, the U.S. pivot seems to have only encouraged greater Chinese assertiveness.

Despite growing cynicism over this year’s ASEAN summit, there is some room for cautious optimism. The past month or so has witnessed a qualitative shift in the strategic predisposition of countries such as the Philippines. Recognising the importance of healthy bilateral ties with China and Cambodia, Manila has engaged in a diplomatic charm-offensive to restore a measure of ASEAN-wide urgency in pushing for a regional CoC and to de-escalate maritime tensions between China, on one hand, and Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, on the other.

So, in many ways, the upcoming summit in Cambodia marks a make-or-break moment for not only ASEAN as a supposedly coherent regional organisation, but also the prospects of a peaceful resolution of ongoing territorial disputes. After all, the 2012 summit theme is: ‘ASEAN: One Community, One Destiny’.