Women have taken the helm in Lebanon’s protests, but not in the realm of formal politics. This role is symbolized in this statue of a protesting woman in Martyrs' Square, Beirut. Credit: Mona Alami

By Mona Alami
Beirut, Lebanon, Dec 21 2021 (IPS)

Despite its apparent liberalism, Lebanon scores low in gender equality, especially in politics.

According to the Gender Gap index, Lebanon ranks third last in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with only Syria and Yemen, both plagued by war, scoring lower.

According to Reliefweb, since 2010, Lebanon has witnessed a consistent decline in its relative gender gap score – reaching close to zero in terms of political empowerment.

In November, incumbent Prime Minister Najib Mikati was criticized for saying that Lebanon’s Independence Day celebrations were similar to a “divorced woman celebrating her wedding anniversary … but let’s not forget that if she had remained understanding until her last day in the marriage, she wouldn’t be divorced…”

Rima Husseini, professor at the Lebanese American University (LAU), says empowerment in the country is superficial.

“On the surface, we are seen as an example because Lebanon has a high number of educated women, with many female entrepreneurs. In appearance, we seem more liberated, but that does not translate into political empowerment at a practical level,” she says in an exclusive interview with IPS.

There is only one woman in the current government.

In the previous election in 2018, only six of 86 women who registered to run for the 128-seat Parliament won their seats. Five of them were members of political parties, which helped facilitate their victory.

Paula Yaacoubian, ventured into politics without the usual patronage – a family name, wealth, or the support of a male political leader.

Only one, former television news presenter Paula Yacoubian ran as an independent, won a seat. Unlike other female candidates, she did not come from a political family nor backed by a local male political leader.

While under Article 7 of the Lebanese constitution, gender equality is guaranteed, personal status is often in the hands of religious communities.  Lebanon recognizes 18 religious communities, each with a different status law, which means gender equality may not apply.

“Inequality stems from the patriarchal framework of households, where family codes and communal laws see women as objects owned by their family. This reality affects women’s political participation in Lebanon,” explains Husseini.

The patriarchal system, where women educate their sons differently from their daughters, is one of the biggest challenges faced by Lebanese women. Another stems from the sectarian system, one of the most detrimental factors hindering women’s political representation, explains Yaacoubian.

More than two decades have passed since Lebanon adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Yet, it has failed so far to comply with the treaty, more specifically when it comes to the gender quota system allowing women’s integration into political life.

“Lebanon’s patriarchal system, which is built on laws that aim to control women and youth, does not allow for real citizenship, with factors of separation such as class and religion prevailing,” says Husseini. “When you think of it, there is no real Lebanese citizenship, no social contract that binds us together. Women have a great role to play but cannot because of the legal system that differentiates between men and women.”

This translates to Lebanon falling behind regarding women’s representation, with no quotas to act as a safeguard, unlike other regional countries.

In nearby Jordan, in appearance, a more conservative country than Lebanon, nine percent of women hold ministerial positions. Another 12 percent participate in Parliament, with an additional 32 percent participating in the local legislatures.

Women played a major role in recent protests in Lebanon. However, this has not translated into political power. Credit: Mona Alami

In Iraq, Women set an unprecedented historical record in the 2021 election. According to an article by the New Arab, 97 female candidates were elected to the 329-seat chamber this year, which equals 29.4 percent of the new Iraqi parliament. This represents 14 more seats than the required quota for female MPs, which is 83, or 25% of parliament according to Iraq’s electoral laws.

The New Arab estimates that the support for female candidates was so significant that 57 MPs will enter the next parliament based solely on registered votes rather than the allocated quota system.

“Conversely, women’s access to politics is restricted in Lebanon. As an example, former MP Dina Boustany only entered parliament after the death of her father. Women get into parliament due to their familial relations,” says Myriam Sfeir, Director of the LAU Arab Institute for Women. “There is a famous saying: ‘women enter parliament as a result of the death of a relative’. Then they leave political life when their male descendant comes of age. In addition, Lebanese political parties are simply more willing to fund men.”

Yaacoubian, who is the only woman to have broken the rules by venturing into politics without the sponsor of a family name, wealth, or the support of a male political leader, underlines that entering political life as a woman is not without cost in Lebanon.

“Women are treated as if they are missing some quality (that men are supposed to have). The prevailing mentality is that men know better, although studies have shown that women tend to be less corrupt and more humane in politics,” she says.

Independent political players such as Yaacoubian, explains Husseini, are often the object of bullying, with efforts made to diminish their value on a personal level or attack their reputation, which would never happen to a male political candidate.

Despite remaining on the sideline of the Lebanese parliamentary life, women have been at the helm of the 2019 protest movement.

They succeeded in easing conflict between separate sectarian regions, such as Ain Remaneh and Chiyah in Beirut, and protected protestors when the riot police attacked them.

In November, three judges, all women, handed in their resignation to protest political interference in the judiciary’s work and the undermining of decisions issued by judges and courts.

“Women are very present, especially as civil society actors. Lebanese women are demanding to be included on decision tables. They are carving a space for themselves in the political world. However, a quota system is essential to ensure better representation in the next parliamentary elections,” says Sfeir.

Women must be brave and persevere at any cost if they want to enter politics, concludes Yaacoubian.

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Poverty and hunger are on the rise in Lebanon. The World Food Programme estimates food prices have increased by 628 percent in two years. Credit: Mona Alami /IPS

By Mona Alami
Beirut, Nov 18 2021 (IPS)

On the streets of Beirut, Hadi Hassoun begs for a few pounds to feed his five children. He has little hope of a job, especially now that the economic crisis in Lebanon has destroyed wealth.

The country already significantly lagged with UN Sustainable Development Goals of poverty and inequality, but the situation has gone from bad to worse.

In the past year, poverty has tripled, and one in every four children in the country are skipping meals. The Lebanese pound (LP) has witnessed a devaluation exceeding 90%, dropping from 1,500 LP to the dollar to over 22,000 LP to the US dollar. At least half of the population is suffering in extreme ways because of this situation, experts say.

The streets of Beirut are an illustration of Lebanon’s dire situation. Hassoun sits begging on the streets of Hamra. “I have five kids, and my youngest daughter has a congenital heart problem,” he explains. “So, I do my best to raise some money every day to try catering to their basic needs.”

In Beirut, the UNICEF office reported that three out of 10 children go to bed hungry or skip meals.

A few meters away, Khalid, using a pseudonym, is a garbage collector for one of Beirut’s main waste management companies. The man, in his sixties, hails from Wadi Khaled, a border town over 150 km away from Beirut.

“I do not have the means to visit them anymore because of rising fuel prices, so I send them money every two weeks, which allows them to eat basic staples such as rice and lentils,” he says. Khalid makes 60,000 LP per day, which amounts to less than $2.5 a day.

The World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that food prices have gone up by 628 percent in just two years.

According to Nassib Ghobril, chief economist for Lebanese Byblos Bank, the CPI rose by 144% in September 2021 compared with the same month in 2020, while it registered its 15th consecutive triple-digit increase since July 2020.

“The cumulative surge in inflation is due, in part, to the inability of authorities to monitor and contain retail prices, as well as to the deterioration of the Lebanese pound’s exchange rate on the parallel market, which has encouraged opportunistic wholesalers and retailers to raise the prices of consumer goods disproportionately,” Ghobril says.

He adds that the smuggling of subsidised imported goods has resulted in shortages of these products locally, which also contributed to price increases.

“Further, the emergence of an active black market for gasoline during the summer has put upward pressure on prices and inflation.”

The prices of fresh or frozen cattle meat in Lebanon jumped by 118.6% in the period, constituting the highest increase in the price of this item in the region, reported Ghobril.

In parallel, the price of bread and other manufactured articles sold went up by 32.8%, representing the third-highest increase in bread prices among MENA countries.

The impact is devastating.

“My family can barely afford bread,” says Khalid.

Lebanon falls short on the UN SDGs at every level, particularly when it comes to poverty and inequality.

Economist Kamal Hamal Hamdan explains that while there are no credible governmental statistics, at least 55% of the Lebanese population live under the poverty line.

“However, estimates actually point to 75% of the Lebanese population falling under the poverty line. This number goes up to 85% in extremely poor areas such as North Lebanon or the Baalback Hermel area,” points out Adib Nehme, a Lebanese development and poverty consultant.

However, both Ghobril and Hamadan believe these statistics may not consider the various sources of income of Lebanese in the form of aid and remittances. Lebanon received last year $ 6.5 billion in remittances from Lebanese expatriates.

Before the crisis, the wealthiest 10 percent of the population owned almost 70 percent of total wealth. Nehme underlines that around 73% of the Lebanese population earned 2.4 million LP per month before the crisis.

“If these people managed to keep their jobs despite Lebanon’s meltdown, this means that around three-quarters of the population earns around $120,” says Nehme.

Additionally, Hamdan underlines that around 60% of wage earners in the pre-crisis era contributed to 25% of the Lebanese GDP, which has worsened.

The financial crisis plaguing Lebanon has created further inequality. The poor and the middle class have been the hit hardest. When they have the luxury have bank accounts, their funds are frozen, and when withdrawn, the funds earn a lower than the black-market rate.

The richest and politically connected have been able to transfer their funds despite the unofficial capital control imposed by Lebanese banks.

“One has to keep in mind that around 963 depositors own $23billion, that is not considering these people’s wealth in land and investments. There is growing polarisation because of concentration of wealth, with Lebanon’s economic collapse,” says Nehme.

Hamdan and Nehme believe this is leading to the disintegration of the country’s social and economic fabric.

“This could lead to growing social pressure and transient violence across the country,” says Hamdan.

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At a time when HIV rates have stabilised or declined elsewhere, the epidemic is still advancing in the Arab world, exacerbated by factors such as political unrest, conflict, poverty and lack of awareness due to social taboos.

According to UNAIDS (the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS), an estimated 270,000 people were living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in 2012.

“It is true that the Arab region has a low prevalence of infection, however it has the fastest growing epidemic in the world,“ warns Dr Khadija Moalla, an independent consultant on human rights/gender/civil society/HIV-AIDS.With the exception of Somalia and Djibouti, the [HIV] epidemic is generally concentrated in vulnerable populations at higher risk, such as men-who-have-sex-with-men, female and male sex workers, and injecting drugs users

The United Nations estimates that there were 31,000 new cases and 16,500 new deaths in 2012 alone. “Infections grew by 74 percent between 2001 and 2012 while AIDS-related deaths almost tripled,” says Dr Matta Matta, an infection specialist based at the Bellevue Hospital in Lebanon.

However, both Moalla and Matta explain that figures can be often misleading in the region, due to under-reporting and the absence of consistent and accurate surveys.

With the exception of Somalia and Djibouti, the epidemic is generally concentrated in vulnerable populations at higher risk, such as men-who-have-sex-with-men, female and male sex workers, and injecting drugs users.

In Libya, for example, 90 percent of those in the latter category also live with HIV, notes Matta. Furthermore, adds Moalla, most Arab countries do not have programmes allowing for exchange of syringes.

The legal framework criminalising such activities in most Arab countries means that it is difficult to reach out to specific groups.  With the exception of Tunisia, which recognises legalised sex work, female sex workers who work clandestinely in other countries are not safeguarded by law and thus cannot force their clients to use protection, which allows for the spread of disease.

Lack of awareness, the absence of voluntary testing and of sexual education, social taboos, as well as poverty, are among the factors driving HIV in the region. “Arab governments and societies deny the epidemic and the absence of voluntary testing means that for every infected person we have ten others that we do not know about,” stresses Moalla.

People living with HIV or those at risk face discrimination and stigma.  “More than half of the people living with HIV in Egypt have been denied treatment in healthcare facilities,” explains Matta.

This bleak scenario is compounded by the security challenges prevailing in the region which not only make it difficult to deliver prevention and other programmes, but also restrict access to services by those on treatment and cause displacement and loss of follow-up according to the UNAIDS report.

The war in Iraq that began in 2003, for example, led to the destruction of most of the country’s programmes and facilities under the National AIDS Programme and, according to Moalla, the national aids centre in Libya was recently burnt down.

In addition, in some countries, conflict has significantly increased the vulnerability of women. By 2012, for example, only eight percent of the estimated number of pregnant women living with HIV in the MENA region received appropriate treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission according to the UNAIDS report.

Meanwhile, only a few governments have worked on effective programmes to fight the epidemic, although there are signs of the emergence of NGOs tackling the problem with people living with HIV and providing them with support.

“North African countries and Lebanon have generally done better than others, while Gulf countries are doing the least,” says Moalla, adding that less than one in five people living with HIV are receiving the medicines they need in the Arab region.

While some efforts have been made with the UNDP HIV Regional Programme pioneering legal reform in several countries, as well as drafting an Arab convention on protection of the rights of people living with HIV in partnership with the League of Arab States, these are not enough.

“The Arab world attitude taking the high moral ground on the issue of HIV is no barrier for the epidemic,” says Matta. “The region’s governments need to address a growing problem that is only worsened by the general upheaval.”

(Edited by Phil Harris)

As the region is rocked by violence against a backdrop of the rise of radical groups, Jordan’s lesbian gay bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community fears that new instability in the Hashemite kingdom could lead to increased intolerance towards the community. 

The Jabal Amman historical district, crisscrossed by quaint streets, cafés and art galleries has become a hub for the Jordanian capital’s LGBT community.

“Jordan does not have any laws against homosexuality; it does not, however, protect civil liberties for people facing discrimination on basis of their sexual preferences,” says Madian, a local activist. “Jordan does not have any laws against homosexuality; it does not, however, protect civil liberties for people facing discrimination on basis of their sexual preferences” - Madian, a Jordanian activist

Despite the absence of any article in Jordanian law that explicitly outlaws homosexual acts, there have been several crackdowns on members of the gay community. “The targeting of the LGBT community is not something that is systematic, but it still happens from time to time,” says George Azzi, head of the Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality.

In October 2008, security forces in Amman “launched a campaign that targets ‘homosexuals’,” after security forces verified that they were gathering and meeting up at a park near a private hospital in Amman, according to a study on Law and Homosexuality: Survey and Analysis of Legislation Across the Arab World by Walid Ferchichit.

In the last few years, a few arrests have been made on the margin of private parties. Most of the arrests were made under the vaguely worded indecency law and the need to “respect the values of the Arab and Islamic nation”, although the arrests were rarely followed by formal charges.

The Hashemite Kingdom is an Islamic country, where homosexuality is considered as a sin. “Some members of the LGBT community have even been arrested for satanic worshipping,” notes Madian.

The basic form of social organisation in Jordan is heavily influenced by tribalism, which weighs on social norms and relations between people. “Members of the LGBT community fall prey to discrimination or violence not necessarily at the hand of the state but of society or their families,” says Azzi.

He recalls two members of the gay community who had to be smuggled out of Jordan to escape the wrath of their families who discovered their sexual preferences, and possible death.

Credit: LGBT Jordan on Twitter

“I know of four people at least who were killed in last few years for this reason,” says Madian.

He also says that while some victims have been the target of honour killings, others have been killed by gangs because they had to seek impoverished and dangerous areas for sexual favours to avoid the scrutiny of friends and families.

Nevertheless, despite such individual cases, the topic of homosexuality seems to be increasingly tolerated in Jordan. In 2012, a book called “Arous Amman” (Amman’s fiancée) by Fadi Zaghmout was published, featuring a homosexual character who was driven to marry a woman despite being gay.

Increasingly, Facebook pages and Twitter accounts are advocating gay rights and the LGBT community in the country.

“The LGBT community has been able to carve a space for itself in society, while staying away from anything that could raise its profile,” says Adam Coogle, a researcher at Human Rights Watch.

But, with social and cultural mores considering homosexuality a sin and unnatural, advocating rights remains a taboo in the Hashemite Kingdom, and LGBT activism a somewhat difficult task. “We tried organising a few years back by creating an NGO but our application was rejected by the Ministry of Social Affairs on the basis of the indecency law,” says Madian.

Gay activism has also become more challenging today due to the security situation prevailing in the region, worrying both activists and human rights organizations.

With Jordan home to thousands of Salafi Jihadists, it is directly concerned by possible rising numbers of home-grown members of the Islamic State. Members of the gay community fear that renewed insecurity could jeopardise their space in society.

“Nonetheless, members of the LGBT community are not alone in being concerned about Jihadist threats which also target secular people as well as religious minorities,” adds Coogle.

(Edited by Phil Harris)

Gays partying in Beirut. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Aug 24 2014 (IPS)

In a country where civil liberties remain the prerogative of the powerful and wealthy, the Lebanese gay scene is to be treaded carefully.

The recent arrest of 27 members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community shows that those not so lucky – those belonging to the more vulnerable tranches of society – are always at risk of experiencing the darker side of Lebanon.

On August 9, a raid targeted Hamam Agha, a popular public bath in the hipster Hamra area in the capital Beirut. Of the 27 men arrested, “there are still 14 non-Lebanese in detention, in spite of the fact that the judge has ruled they should be released,” says Ahmad Saleh, an activist from Helem, a Beirut-based NGO, advocating LGBT rights at parliamentary level.Article 534 of the Lebanese penal code states that any sexual intercourse “contrary to the order of nature is punished by imprisonment for up to one year.” The obscurely-worded article has been repeatedly used to crackdown on the LGBT community in Lebanon.

Article 534 of the Lebanese penal code states that any sexual intercourse “contrary to the order of nature is punished by imprisonment for up to one year.” The obscurely-worded article has been repeatedly used to crackdown on the LGBT community in Lebanon.

This month’s incident was not, unfortunately, isolated. In 2013, security forces raided Ghost, a gay nightclub in the Dekwaneh suburbs of Beirut. Four people were arrested during the raid and were subjected to physical and verbal harassment. In a similar case a year earlier in the Burj Hammoud popular area – another Beirut suburb – 36 men were arrested in a cinema and forced to undergo anal probes.

According to researcher Lama Fakih from Human Rights Watch (HRW), men often arrested on unrelated charged are subjected to anal testing if suspected of being gay. “However there are no real statistics,” she points out. The tests also violate international standards against torture, including the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Lebanon has ratified, according to HRW.

While anal probes have been banned by former minister of Justice Antoine Kortbawi, they are still used by the police, or as a threat to force detainees to admit their homosexuality, explains Saleh.  According to HRW, two people have been subjected to anal probes since the directive was enacted last year.

While the struggle to change the law continues in Lebanon, the country has scored points in terms of the advocacy of legal rights. In January 2014, Judge Naji El Dahdah of the Jdeideh Court in Beirut dismissed a claim against a transgender woman accused of having a same-sex relationship with a man.

The judge stressed that a person’s gender should not be based on their personal status registry document, but on their outward physical appearance and self-perception.

In 2012, the Lebanon Medical Association issued a directive to put an end to the practice of anal examinations supposed to detect homosexuality.

The Lebanese Psychiatric Society issued a statement in early 2013 saying that: “the assumption that homosexuality is a result of disturbances in the family dynamic or unbalanced psychological development is based on wrong information.”

And in 2009, Judge Mounir Suleiman of the Batroun Court decided that consensual relations could not be deemed unnatural.

In addition to advances made on the legal front, the Lebanese public has become more aware of gay rights thanks to changes in mentalities and the promotion of creative works focusing on gay issues.

The media and the art scene have been challenging social norms. Wajdi and Majdi, two gay figures from a comedy TV show called La Youmal, have popularised the image of the LGBT community in Lebanon. Popular TV host Paula Yacoubian has also defended gay rights in Lebanon in a tweet. Mashrou’ Leila, a famous Lebanese rock band, has discussed homosexuality in Lebanon in its songs and last year a Lebanese movie called Out Loud featured five young Lebanese engaged in a group marriage. The movie was nonetheless banned in Lebanon by the censors.

“Youth are becoming increasingly aware of gay issues,” says activist Ghassan Makarem.  Compared with other countries in the region, Lebanese have far more liberal views than their counterparts as shown in a 2013 Pew Research Centre study. Some 18 percent of the Lebanese population believe that homosexuality should be accepted in society, compared with Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia where over 94 percent of the population view homosexuality as deviant.

However, Makarem adds, “despite recent positives, being gay can still mean being the subject of discrimination, from a legal standpoint, especially for those without the right connections or wealth.”

(Edited by Phil Harris)

Food price rises as far back as 2008 are believed to be the partial culprits behind the instability plaguing Arab countries and they have become increasingly aware of the importance of securing food needs through an international strategy of land grabs which are often detrimental to local populations.

Between 2007 and 2008, rises in food prices caused protest movements in Egypt and Morocco. “This has become an important concern for countries in the Arab region which want to meet the growing demands of their populations,” notes Devlin Kuyek, a researcher at GRAIN, a non-profit organisation supporting small farmers and social movements in their struggles for community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems.Arab countries ... have become increasingly aware of the importance of securing food needs through an international strategy of land grabs which are often detrimental to local populations

Arab countries, which appear to have started losing confidence in normal food supply chains, are now relying on acquisitions of farmland around the world. Globally, land deals by foreign countries were estimated at about 80 million ha in 2011, according to figures provided by the World Bank.

The 2008 international food price crisis caused alarm among policy-makers and the public in general about the vulnerability of Arab countries to potential future food supply shocks (such as, for example, in the event of closure of the Straits of Hormuz) as well as the perceived continued sharp increase in international food prices in the long term, explains Sarwat Hussain, Senior Communications Officer at the World Bank.

Increasing food prices are caused by entrenched trends that include population growth combined with high urbanisation rates, depleting freshwater sources, increased demand for raw commodities and biofuels, as well as speculation over farmland.

To face such threats, Arab countries have worked on buying or leasing farm land in foreign countries. “Investment in land often takes the form of long-term leases, as opposed to outright purchases, of land. These leases often range between 25 and 99 years,” says Hussain.

Currently, the United Arab Emirates accounts for around 12 percent of all land deals, followed by Egypt (6 percent) and Saudi Arabia (4 percent), according to GRAIN.

“It is however very difficult to estimate the total value of land grabbed today because most deals remain in the negotiations phase and are, for the most, very obscure ,” adds Hussain.

Land acquisitions are becoming institutionalised as clear strategies are developed by governments, which also rely on the private sector and international organisations, explains Kuyek.

Some governments of member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – have adopted explicit policies to encourage their citizens to invest in food production overseas as part of their long-term national food security strategies.

Such policies cover a variety of instruments, including investment subsidies and guarantees, as well as the establishment of sovereign funds focusing exclusively on investments in agriculture overseas.

Countries falling victims of the land acquisition mania range from Western countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Romania to countries in Latin America, Asia or Africa.

Globally, the largest targeted countries are Brazil with 11 percent by land area; Sudan with 10 percent; Madagascar, the Philippines and Ethiopia with 8 percent each; Mozambique with 7 percent; and Indonesia with 6 percent, according to the World Bank.

“The main driving force seems to be biofuels expansion, with exceptions in Sudan and Ethiopia, which are seeing a trend towards growth of food from Middle Eastern and Indian investors,” Hussain points out.

Governments, often through sovereign wealth funds, are negotiating the acquisition or lease of farming land. According to GRAIN, the Ethiopian government has made deals with investors from Saudi Arabia, as well as India and China among others, giving foreign investors control of half of the arable land in its Gambela region.

Powerful Saudi businessmen are pursuing deals in Senegal, Mali and other countries that would give them control over several hundred thousand hectares of the most productive farmlands. -“The [Saudi Arabian] al-Amoudi company has acquired ten thousand hectares in south western Ethiopia to export rice,” notes Kuyek.

Besides food security concerns, it appears that such acquisitions are increasingly perceived by international companies as a useful investment tool allowing for diversification. A number of investment companies and private funds have been acquiring farmland around the globe.  These include Western heavyweights such Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, but also Arab players such as Citadel Capital, an Egyptian private equity fund.

Kuyek explains that large land acquisitions are triggering debates in developing countries and can become electoral issues.  Land grabs can have adverse repercussions on indigenous populations which find themselves evicted from the land they have used over generations for cultivation and irrigation.

“People are concerned by the sale of their local resources,” adds Kuyek.

This has translated into the creation of local groups that are challenging large land sale deals negotiated by their governments. As an example, farmers in Serbia have made formal complaints about the purchase of farmland by an Abu Dhabi company, Al Rawafed Agriculture, according to The National newspaper.

Small opposition groups will nonetheless face increasing difficulty in fighting-off governments and institutions, for which food security has become a matter of political survival.

A declining economy and a severe drought have raised concerns in Lebanon over food security as the country faces one of its worst refugee crises, resulting from the nearby Syria war, and it is these refugees and impoverished Lebanese border populations that are most vulnerable to this new threat.

A severe drought has put the Lebanese agricultural sector at risk. According to the Meteorological Department at Rafik Hariri International Airport, average rainfall in 2014 is estimated at 470 mm, far below annual averages of 824 mm.

The drought has left farmers squabbling over water. “We could not plant this year and our orchards are drying up, we are only getting six hours of water per week,” says Georges Karam, the mayor of Zabougha, a town located in the Bekfaya area in Lebanon.“Any major domestic or regional security or political disruptions which undermine economic growth and job creation could lead to higher poverty levels and associated food insecurity” – Maurice Saade of the World Bank's Middle East and North Africa Department

The drought has resulted in a substantial decline in agricultural production throughout the country. “The most affected products are fruits and vegetables, the prices of which have increased, thus affecting economic access of the poor and vulnerable populations,”says Maurice Saade, Senior Agriculture Economist at the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Department.

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs. Although most households in Lebanon are considered food secure, lower income households are vulnerable to inflationary trends in food items because they tend to spend a larger share of their disposable income on staples, explains Saade.

Lebanon’s poverty pockets are generally concentrated in the north (Akkar and Dinnyeh), Northern Bekaa (Baalbek and Hermel) and in the south, as well as the slums located south of Beirut. These areas currently host the largest number areas of refugee population, fleeing the nearby Syria war.

According to Clemens Breisinger, senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Lebanon currently imports about 90 percent of its food needs. “This means meant that the drought’s impact should be limited in term of the food available on the market,” he says.

However, populations residing in Lebanon’s impoverished areas are still at risk, especially those who are not financially supported by relatives (as is the custom in Lebanon) or benefit from state aid or from local charities operating in border areas. Lebanese host populations are most likely the most vulnerable to food insecurity, explains Saade.

According to the UNHCR, there are just over one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. While the food situation is still manageable thanks to efforts of international donors who maintain food supplies to the population, “these rations are nonetheless always threatened by the lack of donor funding,” Saade stresses. In addition, refugee populations are largely dependent on food aid, because they are essentially comprised of women and children, with little or no access to the job market.

Given that Lebanon depends to a large extent on food imports, mostly from international markets, maintaining food security also depends on the ability of lower income groups to preserve their purchasing power as well as the stability of these external markets.

“This means that any major domestic or regional security or political disruptions which undermine economic growth and job creation could lead to higher poverty levels and associated food insecurity,” says Saade.

In addition any spikes in international food prices, such as those witnessed in 2008, could lead to widespread hunger among vulnerable populations.

Breisinger believes that despite increased awareness of the international community, the factors leading to a new food crisis are still present.Increased demand for food generally, fuel prices, the drop in food reserves, certain government policies as well as the diversion of grain and oilseed crops for biofuel production are elements that put pressure on the food supply chain and can eventually contribute to hunger in certain vulnerable countries.

To avoid such a risk, some countries have implemented specific measures such as building grain reserves. “I am not sure how Lebanon has reacted so far,” says Breisinger.  With little government oversight and widespread corruption, Lebanon’s vulnerability to food insecurity has been compounded by unforgiving weather conditions, a refugee crisis and worsening economic conditions which, if left unattended, could spiral out of control.

Hezbollah clashes with Syrian rebels on the outskirts of Ersal seem to be widening the divide between residents of the Eastern Bekaa town – increasingly dominated by Syrian rebels, including the radical Nusra Front – and other regions as well as the Lebanese state. 

At the bottom of the rugged Syrian Qalamoun mountain chain lies the predominantly Sunni town of Ersal. The region is known historically as a smuggling route between Syria and Lebanon.

Since the beginning of the Syria revolution, politics have pushed its people away from their Bekaa neighbours, who mostly belong to the Shiite community. Ersal largely sympathises with the Sunni-led uprising against Syrian President Bashar Assad, while Bekaa Shiites support the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is currently fighting alongside Syrian regime forces.“Clashes between Hezbollah and Syrian rebels have aggravated tensions between local residents and their neighbours, and every incident is causing a backlash on the village [Ersal]” – deputy mayor of Ersal, Ahmad Fleety

Despite the fall of Qalamoun to Hezbollah and Assad regime troops in March, fighting has resumed in the Syrian region as well as the barren valley and rocky tops of Ersal in Lebanon, where rebels are also present.

“The clout of Syrian insurgents over the town has become an unavoidable reality,” says a Lebanese army officer speaking on condition of anonymity.

This week, seven members of Hezbollah died and 31 others were wounded, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The fighters were killed in an ambush in the hills above Ersal. The rugged area is also used a rocket launch pad by rebels who frequently target Hezbollah villages in Bekaa.

“The Syrian-Lebanese border there is the soft belly of Hezbollah’s stronghold as it overlooks the Bekaa and more importantly the city of Baalbeck, which is the birthplace of the militant organisation,” says Professor Hilal Khashan from the American University of Beirut.

“Rebels, including the Nusra Front, are using Ersal to launch attacks on Hezbollah, which is self-compelled to retake the region, at a very high cost,” he adds.

The military source underlines that an estimated 6,000 Syrian fighters have found refuge in Ersal. Hundreds of opposition militants are believed to be hiding in the hills and caves above the town. Dirt tracks connecting Ersal to the Bekaa mountain tops are also used by residents to ferry aid, gasoline and supplies to insurgents.

Deputy mayor Ahmad Fleety admits that Ersal is paying a high price for backing the Syrian revolution.  “Clashes between Hezbollah and Syrian rebels have aggravated tensions between local residents and their neighbours, and every incident is causing a backlash on the village,” he says.

The official points out that an Ersal resident, Khaled Hujairi, was wounded in nearby Laboueh after the funeral of one of the Hezbollah fighters who died in the recent battles.

However, the divide separating Ersal residents from those residing in surrounding villages dates back to the beginning of the uprising and a spate of tit-for-tat kidnappings between Sunnis and Shiites.

Relations between the two communities took a turn for the worse after four Shiites were killed in June last year near Ersal.  The trend was only exacerbated when the town remained under siege for several weeks early this year, after the village became a transit point from Syria into Lebanon for booby-trapped cars targeting Shiite areas.

Ersal’s grim reality is only compounded by the town’s isolation. A small asphalt road connects it to the rest of Bekaa, and from there onward to the capital Beirut. Syrian planes frequently fly over, firing missiles into the village and the mountain tops above it. An attack this week led to the injury of seven Ersal residents.

These repetitive incidents rarely draw any complaints from Lebanon.

“Ersal is an outlying territory neglected by the government, which can explain the rise of extremism there. If Ersal residents felt they belonged to the Lebanese state, they would not be so supportive of Syrian rebels,” points out Khashan.

In addition, relations with the state have been strained by a series of incidents, the most recent leading last year to clashes between an army patrol and local residents, claiming the lives of two Lebanese armed forces members as well as one suspect who was being pursued.

The presence of over 120,000 Syrian refugees – which exceeds the local population threefold – is further straining relations with the state and other villages. “Ersal people have chosen to support the Syrian revolution, they won’t back down,” says local activist Abu Mohamad Oueid.

The deepening feeling of distrust between old neighbours now turned foes seems to be here to stay, and the fates of Ersal residents to be intertwined with that of Syrian rebels.

With jihadists leading a Sunni uprising against Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are beginning to reverberate across the region, raising fears of contagion in divided Lebanon where a suicide bombing took place on Friday after a period of calm.

The advance on Baghdad of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is threatening a fragile quiet in Lebanon. On Friday, an explosion rocked the mountainous Dahr al-Baydar crossing in the Bekaa region as a suicide bomber blew himself up near an Internal Security Forces checkpoint. The bombing took place shortly after the convoy of General Security Chief Abbas Ibrahim had passed.

Lebanon’s National News Agency reported that two people were killed and a number of others were wounded in the attack. “The danger resides in the dormant terrorist cells that exist across the country, we have uncovered several plots and security breaches in the last week alone,” said a Lebanese army officer speaking on condition of anonymity.“Weapons held both by Shiite Hezbollah and Palestinian factions are a source of constant threat for Lebanon, which is the scene of a permanent struggle” – Wehbe Katisha, retired Lebanese general and military expert

A document from Israel’s Mossad secret service, published by local newspaper An-Nahar on the day of explosion reported that Islamists with the Al Qaeda-affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades planned to assassinate a senior Lebanese security official, possibly General Ibrahim.

The kick-off early this year of a security plan has allowed the arrest of several terrorists who were responsible for a string of bombings targeting Shiite regions, where populations support the Hezbollah militant group.  The organisation is currently heavily involved in Syria where some 5,000 Hezbollah fighters are believed to be spearheading operations alongside troops of President Bachar Assad, according to a source close to the party.

The Syrian uprising has been led largely by Syrian Sunnis waging war against a government headed by the Assad clan, which belongs to the Alawite community, an offshoot of Shiite Islam.

While Hezbollah’s control of borders areas in Syria has disrupted supply lines which allowed for the transfer of booby-trapped cars from Syria into Lebanon has damaged the capabilities of terror groups, it has not put a complete end to it, according to experts.

There are still illegal passageways for the transfer of ammunition or explosives, both in the Bekaa and North Lebanon areas,” said Wehbe Katisha, a retired Lebanese general and military expert.

Against this background, new reports are also pointing to possible attacks on Dahieh (Beirut’s southern suburbs and a bastion for Hezbollah), added Katisha. Early this week, members of Hezbollah and the Lebanese army boosted security measures around the area after news that a terrorist group might attack two hospitals in the region.

General Wehbe Katisha stressed that the state’s institution’s weakness combined with the proliferation of Sunni jihadist networks as well as Shiite militias are factors conducive to renewed sectarian violence. “Weapons held both by Shiite Hezbollah and Palestinian factions are a source of constant threat for Lebanon, which is the scene of a permanent struggle,” he pointed out.

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have played a major role in the string of bombings that took place last year and early this year.  One of the main networks dismantled by the Lebanese armed forces was headed by Palestinian commander Naim Abbas, a member of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, an affiliate of the Syrian radical organisation, the Nusra Front.

The organisation has claimed the twin suicide bombing targeting last November of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, staged by a Lebanese and a Palestinian national. “Reports are showing that Palestinian radical groups in refugee camps are getting restless and more active,” said the security source.  The situation in Lebanon’s main Palestinian camp Ain al-Hilweh is precarious amid reports of a growing influx of foreign extremist Sunni militants from Syria and other Lebanese areas.

This opinion is also shared by Katisha who added that Palestinian groups can be easily manipulated by foreign groups while some Syrian refugees in the Bekaa are willing to fight Hezbollah.

In an attempt to shield the country from the Iraqi violence, the Lebanese Army has carried out raids on Syrian refugee camps in Ersal, on Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. The outskirts of Ersal are now home to a few thousands Syrian rebels who withdrew from Syrian border regions after they were reclaimed by Assad’s forces and Hezbollah. Early this month, three teens were briefly kidnapped and tortured, with local media reports linking the abduction to the Nusra Front.

“Al-Qaeda does not have an official presence in Lebanon but many individuals have adopted its discourse and are taking advantage of the rising Sunni-Shiite rivalry in Lebanon. The events in Iraq, with the surge of Sunnis against the divisive policies of (Shiite prime minister) Nouri Maliki, are finding a strong echo among the country’s marginalized Sunni. There is a feeling that in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, the struggle is the same for Sunnis who are repressed by Iranian proxy groups,” said Lebanese Salafi Sheikh Nabil Rahim.

The messages of al-Qaeda’s affiliates such as ISIS and the Nusra Front are becoming more appealing to Lebanese Sunnis who are angry at Hezbollah’s increasing military clout over Lebanon as well as its involvement in the war against the Sunni majority’s revolution in Syria.

Since 2005, and the killing of the country’s Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, a member of the Sunni community, followed by the toppling in 2011 of the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Lebanese Sunnis are increasingly at odds with Hezbollah. Five members of the militant group are currently being tried in absentia for the killing of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

“The latest development in Iraq will certainly fuel sectarian tensions in the region as well as Lebanon. It is also increasing the popularity of ISIS among Sunnis in certain areas in Lebanon, something we are trying to fight,” explained Sheikh Rahim.

Only days after the surge of ISIS in Iraq, Lebanon has once again been drawn into the circle of regional violence, the gains of ISIS hundreds of kilometres away seemingly emboldening radical groups in the ‘Land of the Cedars’.

The war in Syria has brought back to the forefront the concept of ‘jihad’, with tens of thousands of fighters currently waging what they believe to be a religious war there.

On both sides of the religious divide, Lebanese militants have relied on similar arguments to justify what they perceive as a never-ending war of convictions, which poses great dangers in a region where self-identities are shaped by belief instead of citizenship.

On this cold morning, a cortege of vehicles headed by a car covered in coloured flower arrangements drives through the busy streets of Dahieh – a  bastion of Shiite Hezbollah – surrounded by militants carrying Kalashnikovs.

Every few minutes, a staccato of gunfire is followed by ululations, as men dressed in fatigues wave the yellow banners of the Party of God. “Labayka Ya Hussein”, says one militant, invoking Hussein whose martyrdom is a widely spread symbol among Shiites.Sunni and Shiite religious narratives used in the Syrian war are reminiscent of an enmity over 14 centuries old.

What appears like a wedding procession is in fact the funeral of a Hezbollah fighter killed in Syria.  Surprisingly, the funerals of Shiite Hezbollah fighters bear a striking resemblance to the “martyrs’ weddings” of Sunni jihadists organised in Palestinian camps in Lebanon or Jordan, during which confectionery and juices are generously distributed.

The strong similarities between funeral processions of Sunni and Shiite fighters killed in Syria and staged as celebrations underline the converging views on jihad of the two groups, at odds since the beginning of the Syria war in which Sunnis support the rebellion and Shiites fight alongside the regime of President Bachar Assad, a member of the Alawite community, a Shiite sect.

For both Shiite and Sunni jihadists, the fight in Syria was initially motivated by the desire to protect their fellow coreligionists. “We fight to defend the children and women being slaughtered by the Assad regime,” said Abu Horeira, a Lebanese jihadist from Tripoli who fought in Qussayr. In April 2013, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, relied on a similar analogy, promising to defend the Lebanese Shiite inhabitants of Al-Qusayr: “We will not abandon the Lebanese residents of Al-Qusayr.”

As the battles in Syria increased in intensity, the political discourse of jihadists in Lebanon further polarised, with religious motivations coming to the fore. “Religious arguments are often used to appeal to the masses,” says Shiite cleric Sayed Hani Fahs.

Lebanese sheikhs on both sides of the divide have relied on religious text to provide a rationale for their call for Jihad, which is mentioned over 150 times in the Quran, the sacred book of both Sunnis and Shiites.

“Jihad in Syria is an obligation for all Sunnis,” said Salafi Sheikh Omar Bakri, in a previous interview.  While Hezbollah has not officially called for jihad, fighters such as unit commander Abou Ali have reported that “everyone who goes to fight in Syria has received a taklif sharii (a religious command).”

Militants from the capital Beirut, the Bekaa and Tripoli, both Shiites and Sunnis, have answered the call to fight in Syria. “Early this year, at least 100 ( Sunni) men from North Lebanon were killed in Qalaat al Hosn, in Homs,” said a military source speaking on condition of anonymity. They belonged to Jund al Cham, an al-Qaeda style organisation.

On the other hand, security estimates point to the involvement of over 5,000 Hezbollah fighters in Syria. A source close to the militant organisation believes that at least 500 of its members have been killed in Syria.

“My place is secured in heaven if I die ( in Syria) and my family taken care of,” says Abou Ali, who has been deployed several times in Qussayr, Qalamoun and Damascus.  Abou Ali , like many other fighters from Hezbollah, argues that he is defending his community, his religious beliefs and his sect’s dignity.

Sunni and Shiite religious narratives used in the Syrian war are reminiscent of an enmity over 14 centuries old.  In several speeches, Hezbollah figures have revived fears rooted in the events that led to the Sunni/Muslim schism, invoking the protection of Shiite religious shrines, namely  that of Sayyeda Zeinab, to justify their involvement in Syria. Zeinab was the daughter of Imam Ali, who is revered by Shiites, and Fatima, who was the daughter of prophet Muhammad.

“There is no better satisfaction than dying fighting to protect the religious shrine of Sit Zeynab,” says another Hezbollah fighter on condition of anonymity. This discourse has been reinforced in many Shiite minds by scenes of beheading perpetrated by rebel groups.

In a recent interview with a Free Syria Army fighter on the Lebanese border of the Syrian Qalamoun region, the fighter , a secular man, admitted  that rebels often resorted to this tactic to make “an example of traitors”, regardless of whether they belonged to regime forces or to Hezbollah. For Shiites nonetheless, these beheadings are a stark reminder of the beheading of Hussein, Zeinab’s brother, during the Battle of Karbala.

Religious ideology has served as a magnet for both Shiite and Sunni fighters willing to give up their life for the Syrian “religious” cause.

A recent report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s College in London put the number of foreign Sunni jihadists at about 10,000. The same can be said of Shiite fighters fuelling the war in Syria, which has attracted Shiites from Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

According to Michael Knights, an expert from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a think tank that was spun off from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), there are between 800 and 2,000 Iraqi Shiites in Syria which, including Hezbollah, would put the number of Shiite fighters at no less than 6,000 militants.

Armageddon ideology used in the Syria conflict has fanned Shiite-Sunni fires in Lebanon as well as across the region. Reducing the conflict there to a battle within Islam, as portrayed by jihadists on one side and by Hezbollah on the other, could portend a greater conflict that would wreak havoc in region where the Muslim divide runs deep, and religious identities prevail over nationalism.

“There is no difference between foreign jihadists and Hezbollah militants fighting in Syria, both  are practising political terrorism,” says Sayed Fahs, who believes the only hope for both communities resides in replacing sectarianism by citizenship.

Bystanders carry a victim of a shoot-out in a Palestinian camp in Saida, Lebanon. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Jul 30 2012 (IPS)

Every day Lebanon is being plunged further into a state of general insecurity, as chaos from the war in Syria seeps across the border.

Repeated kidnappings, multiple Syrian incursions resulting in the death of Lebanese citizens, and the widespread use of weapons are just some of the indicators pointing to the slow meltdown of the country’s public institutions.

Following the release of three officers and eight soldiers linked to the deaths of Sunni Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Wahed and his companion – who were shot and killed at a military checkpoint in Kweikhat – gunmen stormed the streets of the northern Akkar region in protest.

The gunmen’s deployment was accompanied by the erection of multiple roadblocks and heavy gunfire, in an obvious show of militant force.

“The security situation is definitely spinning out of control due to the government’s disagreement on a unified security approach. Public institutions and the state are losing their credibility,” a high security officer, clearly discontent with the current condition of the country, admitted to IPS.

The repeated infiltration of Syrian security forces into Lebanese territory – whose diverse population is split between supporters of the opposition Free Syrian Army and communities loyal to the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad – without any condemnation from the Lebanese government, has gradually jeopardised the sovereignty of the state.

Syrian troops have also carried out a number of cross-border raids into Lebanon since the outbreak of the revolt against Assad’s regime in March 2011, sparking fears of a spillover of the conflict.

In the northern region of Wadi Khaled, the most recent incidents involved Syrian security forces kidnapping a member of Lebanese customs and two general security members in the Buqaiaa village.

Last week, 30 Syrian state troops entered Lebanon’s eastern border region of Masharii al-Qaa and opened sporadic fire on residents of the area.

Masharii al-Qaa (the Qaa Projects) consists of Ersal, a Sunni village, and Qaa, which is predominately Christian. Ersal supports Syrian opposition fighters, whom Qaa residents view with great suspicion. As a result the area has become both a hub for Syrian refugees and a town under fire from Syrian government forces.

This month, three people were killed and another seven injured when Syrian troops fired shells and rocket propelled grenades into Wadi Khaled during clashes between gunmen on the Lebanese side of the border.

“We (don’t understand) why the state is so hesitant to send military troops to the borders. It is not normal that a nation refuses to protect its own territory,” Rateb Ali, a local resident, told IPS.

Others sources in the area admit they have lost faith in Lebanon’s institutions, including the police, army, judiciary and government.

The political vacuum in the north has led local residents to divert their trust to local political figures and charity organisations. “No one wants the Syrian crisis to spill over into Lebanon. They want to avoid the emergence of radical movements, which could easily exploit the state’s absence in the region,” sociologist Talal Atrissi, referring to the various Salafist groups that have established themselves in north Lebanon, told IPS.

Mistrust in the government has been exacerbated by other unresolved security incidents, including the unsolved assassination attempt of MP Boutros Harb, a member of the ‘March14’ anti-Syrian and Iranian coalition.

Local residents aborted the attempt, wrangling with three suspects that were installing an explosive device in Harb’s residence before they managed to flee the scene.

“We have clear leads in that particular attempt, which we cannot share for political reasons. This is exactly why we need to be given the political means to fight back, which will only happen if there is a clear consensus among all government figures. If not, the situation will spin out of control, and it will be too late to fix things,” the security source warned.

Many fear that Lebanon is slowly turning into a failed state, which is usually defined by several key indicators including: loss of control of its geographical territory and the use of physical force within it; implosion of the structures of power and authority; and the internal collapse of law and order. The current political situation is pushing Lebanon inexorably to face all three.

“Lebanon is a soft state. There was an international decision to build the country in a way that the state will always have limited power in order for different communities to prevail,” Dr. Hillal Khashan, political science professor at the American University of Beirut, told IPS.

Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has been a democracy, home to 18 religious communities.

“Lebanon’s system was not designed to work in the first place. It (experiences) phases of functionality and breakdown, without totally collapsing – a situation that we are now facing,” Dr. Karim Makdessi, associate professor at the Issam Fares Institute, a local think tank, told IPS, adding that public institutions are still operating while admitting that their credibility has been tarnished.

Both political scientists agree that when the state weakens and the power of public institutions diminishes, religious sects strengthen.

“Chaos is a way of life in Lebanon. People are used to it,” stressed professor Khashan. “I still believe that we are far from being a failed state, like Afghanistan. In spite of worrying indicators, I do not think the country will reach a state of total collapse.”

(END)

Since its inception, Hezbollah’s clout within its community has been solid. However, in recent weeks, the Party of God has been facing increasing difficulties controlling its support base and stymieing discontent. These developments have led analysts to question whether or not Hezbollah is losing its grip on its followers.

Last month, gunmen attacked the headquarters of the local TV station al-Jadeed in Beirut. Setting tires ablaze, they surrounded the area, opening fire and hurling Molotov cocktails at the building. Local residents apprehended one of the gunmen after his clothes caught on fire.

Local media reported that the suspect is a Shiite member of Saraya al-Moqawama, a special unit comprised of members of various Lebanese factions militarily affiliated to Hezbollah, but the party immediately denied the allegation.

Soon after, Lebanese daily An Nahar reported that Hezbollah supporters in the Rweiss neighborhood of Beirut’s southern suburbs assaulted an Internal Security Forces (ISF) patrol after they arrested a gunman on a motorcycle, identified as Ali Shoaib.

Immediately following the arrest, members of the Party of God intervened and engaged in a dispute with the patrol. The party again denied the incident.

“There is a definite feeling that Hezbollah is not able to control its supporters and smaller contingents. Dahieh (Hezbollah’s bastion in the capital’s southern suburbs) is plagued by many security problems, from daily armed clashes between local families, to the increased trafficking of weapons and drugs, and prostitution,” a high-ranking officer within the ISF admitted to IPS.

Besides having to reign in on such activity, Hezbollah has been faced with a growing wave of discontent among its supporters.

Last month, during one of the protests against the kidnapping of 11 Shiite pilgrims in Syria and the arrest of Ali Shoaib, the local TV station MTV reported that demonstrators attacked a four-car Hezbollah convoy, which was escorting a party official, and forced it to turn back.

The 11 pilgrims were kidnapped on May 22 in the Syrian city of Aleppo as they were driving back to Lebanon from a religious pilgrimage to Iran.

They are rumored to be held by Syrian opposition forces, which blame Hezbollah for its staunch support of president Bashar al-Assad.

“Hezbollah seems to have forgotten about the issue and is not talking about it anymore, as if it never happened,” Hassan, a young man from Dahieh, who works in a clothing store, complained to IPS.

Many of Hezbollah’s once fierce supporters now also decry the party’s mismanagement of the multiple crises afflicting the country.

“The fact that Hezbollah is a main force within this government should grant me a feeling of security, but in reality it does not,” remarked Mohamad, a clean-cut young man in his twenties hailing from Nabatiyeh, a village located in South Lebanon.

Such complaints have become more widespread among the Shiite community. Since the beginning of the year, Lebanon has witnessed multiple Syrian incursions, rising sectarian tension, a wave of protests as well as electrical and water shortages. “Lebanon has no electricity and no security, and the situation is worsening every day,” Hassan told IPS.

“This government, which in theory is ours (as it is led by Hezbollah), is ironically working against us,” he added cynically.

His friend, Hatem, who just graduated from high school, lamented the soaring corruption in government.

“I am supposed to enroll in pharmaceutical school, but what for? The sector is oversaturated because politicians back illegal operators. I want to leave Lebanon; foreign countries take care of their people, but my government and leaders do not,” he said bitterly.

Despite such crippling criticism, the party still has hardcore supporters.

Rola, a young mother, said that her memories of the civil war keep her loyal to the Party of God.

“Who will protect us when (Christian) Lebanese Forces attack us? I have not forgotten Sabra and Shatila. Hezbollah is the only party capable of protecting me and all the Shiite community,” she told IPS.

The Sabra and Shatila massacre of September 1982 led to the deaths of about 1000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians residing in the two Palestinian camps, at the hands of a gang of former members of the Lebanese Phalangist militia, which were later integrated into the Lebanese Forces.

The killing spree was carried out supposedly in retaliation for the assassination of newly elected Lebanese president Bachir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Phalanges.

Kassem Kassir, a political writer who specialises in Islamic movements, believes Rola’s attitude is likely shared by scores of others in the community.

“It is true that many complaints and remarks have been raised by the Hezbollah constituency. However, the bulk of them still follow the party politically. Just look at the recent partial Koura parliamentary elections, in which 97 percent of Shiites voted for the party’s candidate,” he told IPS.

“Members of the Shiite community might complain, but they will not mobilize against Hezbollah in the current uncertain regional situation.”

(END)

Though most Lebanese take great pride in their national education system, deep sectarian rifts in public schools have made it impossible to ignore the political and religious fragmentation of society or its long-term impacts on youth. 

Sectarian rifts have seeped into most public schools in Lebanon. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

“I do not want to send my daughter to an Islamic school, where she will be forced to wear a veil when she is (just) nine years old. I don’t want that type of lifestyle for her. I would rather scrape every penny I have to send her to a secular school, where she will have the opportunity to mingle with members of other communities,” Dallal, a Shiite resident of south Lebanon, told IPS.

Dallal’s dilemma is not uncommon in Lebanon, where the government officially recognises 18 different sects. Many other mothers living in areas dominated by one of the country’s many religious communities feel the same tension when it comes to their children’s education.

“There is also (segregation) between schools in the north and south, and east and west,” Mona Fayad, professor of psychology at the Lebanese University, told IPS.

Since the end of the 15-year civil war in 1990, different religious groups took root throughout rural areas, dividing society into pockets based on religious affiliation. The only exception is the capital, Beirut, where the historic presence of diverse cultural identities has fostered a higher level of tolerance.

Before 1975 most schools had a diverse student population but during the war, and the exodus of various religious groups, uniformity became the norm in rural public schools. For example, in some Shiite villages in the south, it is not uncommon for students to reach high school without encountering any members of the Sunni community.

Conversely, in Akkar, a bastion of Sunni Islam, Shiites are seen as alien entities and students from the two communities seldom mingle with each other.

“It is not (only) the education system that is at the root of the problem, but the segregation of communities at the school level,” Ali Demashkieh, founder of the NGO Teach For Lebanon, told IPS.

In an attempt to overcome religious hatred generated by years of rivalry among the various Lebanese communities, the 1989 Taif Accord included a special section proclaiming education should be uniform across the country in order to promote national unity. The Accord also called for the creation of a common history textbook for the whole country.

In 1992, a group of educators presented a curriculum they considered suitable for Lebanese of all backgrounds. “The book was published but its distribution to schools was suspended following political disagreements over its content,” Antoine Messara, one of several experts who worked on revamping the education system at the time, told IPS.

Now, over two decades after the end of the civil war, the state still allows Lebanese schools the freedom to use their own history textbooks. Experts like Demashkieh, are concerned that “too much leeway (sometimes) leads to very personal interpretations of history in certain schools”.

Consequently, some institutions are promoting a biased understanding of national history according to their religious affiliation, or the political views of the principal, experts say.

The recent controversy around attempts to scrap the words ‘Cedar Revolution’ from a national middle school history curriculum illustrates the issue. A ministerial committed decided to refer to the revolution, made famous by the one-million strong protests that forced the Syrian army out of Lebanon on Apr. 26 2005, as ‘a wave of demonstrations’, eliciting anger from the country’s politicians who took part in the rallies.

As a result of such disharmony over what constitutes ‘history’, many Lebanese children turn to their family for answers their teachers cannot provide, which worsens the situation.

“Much (historical) knowledge is transmitted through conduits – parents and other family members – and not through schools,” said Messara.

Schools are now also becoming more politicised along religious lines, which is evident in Hezbollah-run institutions, according to researcher Catherine Le Thomas.

“Hezbollah Islamic schools blur the sharp division that is sometimes made between ‘civil society’ and ‘partisan society’. (With) Hezbollah, or a major portion of the Shiite community, this distinction seems to have dissolved. Instead, we observe the establishment of a true ‘resistance society’, supporting the fight against Israel on the outside and promoting the party’s ideals and projects on the inside,” she wrote recently.

Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that Lebanese public schools demand fees for registration and books. In impoverished rural areas, many view religious schools as a more affordable alternative.

“It makes a huge difference for parents if they don’t have to worry about buying books or providing lunch for their children. Also, people who do not send their children to religious schools are perceived as outcasts in small rural societies,” stressed Demashkieh.

He added that many other problems plague the education sector. A 2007 study, for example, showed that primary education completion rates in Lebanon are lower than those in Jordan and Syria, with only 51 percent of students finishing the programme.

Fayad maintains that the education system could act as a powerful tool for fostering national cohesion if public schools integrate to allow students the social interaction necessary to build relationships with peers of other faiths and political backgrounds.

“Religious communities in Lebanon feel they are alone in their painful interpretation of the war,” she concluded. “But all of the 18 communities, with no exception, have felt the same pain.”

(END)

The Arab Spring brought a host of new actors to the political stage. In Jordan, it pushed the Salafists to the fore, where some of the group’s more radical elements are now calling for holy war in neighbouring Syria. The Jordanian regime is growing increasingly concerned about the possible spillover effects of violence in Syria, especially since Jordanian Jihadist-Salafist Sheikh Abou Mohamad Tahawi recently released a fatwa calling for jihad in Syria.

“I called for any man able to go for jihad in Syria; it is the responsibility of any good Muslim to stop the bloodshed perpetrated by the Nusayri regime,” the Sheikh told IPS, referring to the ruling regime in Syria, which is Alawite, an offshoot of Shiite Islam.

“The Alawite and Shiite coalition is currently the biggest threat to Sunnis, even more than the Israelis,” Tahawi stressed. Jordanian Jihadist-Salafists seem to have responded to Sheikh Tahawi’s call. According to journalist Tamer Smadi, a specialist on radical movements in the Hashemite Kingdom, a group of over 30 Jihadists tried to enter Syria a few weeks ago. All but seven, including Abu Anas Sahabi, an explosives specialist, were caught by Jordanian intelligence services.

Jihadists’ increasing radicalism has widened the gulf between extreme and moderate Salafists. The reformist wing has even met with the U.S. embassy, an unusual move for Salafists who do not recognise national politics.

“The Arab Spring resulted in the division of the Salafi community here in Jordan,” said Smadi.

Salafism – a movement that calls for a purer and more radical interpretation of Islam, following the precepts of the ‘Salaf al-Saleh’, or ‘the righteous predecessors’ – has been present in Jordan since the 1960s, when it was brought into the country by returning university students from Egypt and Syria.

Sheikh Mohamad Nasreldine Albani, an Albanian-Syrian religious leader, also played an influential role in the movement in the 1980s by heading a Salafi faction called Tabligh wal Daawa (Muslim Calling) in the city of Zarqa.

Salafism is based on three pillars: belief in one god, the ‘daawa’ or the missionary task, and ‘jihad’.

According to Sheikh Omar Bakri, a radical cleric who was expelled from Britain in 2005 for his alleged links with al-Qaeda, “Most Salafists, however, only apply the first two principles of true Islam without fulfilling the third, the jihad.”

The hawkish wing of the movement came into the public sphere in 2005, when Jihadist-Salafists under the leadership of Abu Mussaab al-Zarqawi organised a series of suicide bombings in several hotels around the capital, Amman, killing 60 and wounding dozens. Al-Zarqawi was later linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The resulting crackdown on the Salafist community forced the Jihadists among them to move largely underground until, when the pan-Arab pro-democracy movements kicked off in late 2010, they started participating in and organising protests in Jordan.

Jihadist-Salafists, a loosely structured faction who only number around 1,500 in Jordan, have recently begun to stage several demonstrations, the largest of which was held on Apr. 15 this year in the city of Zarqa and drew around 350 protesters.

The protest resulted in a violent clash with the police, leaving dozens of wounded policemen and numerous civilian causalities. In response, the Jordanian regime unleashed a harsh crackdown on the community, raiding several Jihadists’ homes in Zarqa and nearby towns and charging 146 with terrorist activities.

In Jordan, the vast majority of Salafists are traditionalists who focus on Islamic ‘fiqh’, or religious knowledge. But for over a year now, new players have emerged, namely reformists who subscribe to a more moderate approach to Salafism. In early April 2011, the ruling regime and several Salafist leaders held a meeting to negotiate demands.

Such reform is unprecedented within a religious faction that, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, does not believe in political organisation. Traditional Salafists also generally reject the notion of nationalism and refuse to partake in political life, as they believe in the rule of a global Islamic Ummah.

“Reformers are coming to understand that the community has a greater role to play, whether politically, economically or socially,” said Ibrahim Hamad, himself a Salafist reformist. The Salafist reformists have also begun coordinating aid to Syrian refugees who have fled the ongoing violence in their country to Jordan.

“They (reformists) are growing in areas where Syrian refugees are present. Up until now they have distributed about five million dollars in aid, 60 percent of which is provided through countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait,” Smadi explained.

(END)

The Arab Spring sent scores of sick and injured Libyans, fleeing their war- torn country, straight to Jordan, where the influx of patients is putting a lot of pressure on Jordanian hospitals and disrupting the lives of Libyan and Jordanian patients alike.

Former Libyan rebel fighter Faraj Fakhri is being treated in Amman’s Chmeisani hospital. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

“Hospitals have stopped admitting Libyan patients, with the exception of emergency cases and those who can pay cash up front. It’s a very difficult situation for patients, especially those undergoing cancer or in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatments,” Awni Bashir, former minister of social development and head of the Chmeisani hospital and the Jordanian Association of Private Hospitals, told IPS.

In the last six months alone about 52,000 Libyan patients sought treatment in Jordan; today, about 15,000 remain.

Stress of overcapacity in hospitals might explain several recent cases of patients’ distraught family members assaulting medical staff. “The number of attacks is still minimal with about 10 to 12 cases recorded this year,” said Bashir.

But another crisis might be looming on Jordan’s horizon, which is home to about 100,000 Syrian refugees.

“Syrian patients are starting to trickle in and we worry that we might face a similar situation in the next few months,” Bashir said.

Strain on limited resources

The popular uprising in Libya last year ended the 40-year dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi but not before it claimed thousands of lives and left countless Libyans injured.

While driving from Ajdabiya to Benghazi during the Libyan revolution, rebel fighter Faraj Fakhri’s motorcade came under heavy fire. His car crashed and his body was riddled with bullets. Fakhri now sits in Amman’s Chmeisani hospital. He has been operated on twice and is waiting to undergo three more operations.

“Thank God almighty I can now move my leg. I came to Jordan to be operated on, as my country does not have the same medical facilities, especially in the current situation,” he said, looking down at his torn up leg.

Sharing Fakhri’s room is Hajj Omar, a patient in his seventies who has also undergone a leg operation. “The doctor operated on me out of the goodness of his heart. I was in pain and hospitals were refusing to treat Libyans like me because we couldn’t afford to pay for our care,” said Omar.

Since 2006, Jordan has specialised in medical tourism, providing tens of thousands of people with cosmetic surgery, neurological surgery, orthopaedic care, organ transplants, fertility treatments and cancer procedures. The country’s medical tourism industry contributes four percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP) and earns about a billion dollars a year, according to the Oxford Business Group.

But the flood of casualties from the Libyan revolution has wreaked havoc on the sector.

“We were receiving 18 planes every week, with most Libyans heading directly to our hospitals, (putting) significant pressure on our medical sector,” said Ahmad Rajaei al-Hiari, director of the Medical Tourism Directorate in the country.

Similarities in language, culture and tradition, the absence of visa requirements for Libyans and convenient direct flights between Amman and Tripoli attracted a multitude of Libyan patients.

There is now a serious shortage of beds for Jordanian patients, forcing private hospitals to keep 10 percent of emergency beds free for nationals. The medical sector has a total of about 4,000 beds in private hospitals, and another 8,000 in public institutions.

The problem is not limited to the hospitals; Libyan patients are also utilising tourism facilities like hotels, restaurants and car rental services. “Some hotels are simply refusing Libyan guests until payment is made,” said a healthcare source.

Others have asked Libyan guests to vacate their rooms by the end of the week, unless they can settle their bills in cash.

The situation is exerting a heavy financial burden on the Hashemite Kingdom; Amman and Tripoli are now locked in a financial dispute over Libya’s outstanding debt of 200 million dollars for unpaid “medical bills as well as accommodation expenses.”

The new Libyan government made a 65-million-dollar payment to the Kingdom’s hospitals and hotels last month. Earlier this week Libya transferred an additional 60 million dollars to Jordan.

In the meantime, hospitals are experiencing a shortage of funds and cash flow difficulties, which in turn have impacted the medical supply chain. As a result, the Kingdom’s hospitals currently owe more than 65 million dollars to medical equipment suppliers.

About 20 percent of all Libyan patients treated in Jordan were wounded during last year’s conflict; others were seeking care for problems related to nerves, vision, cancer or infertility.

(END)

On a warm Friday afternoon, police cars blocked the roads around the Al Husseini mosque, where hundreds of men were kneeling for the noon prayers. At the end of the service, the crowds rose and marched in a compact protest behind a car bearing a banner for the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A protest in Amman, now a weekly sight. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS.

“With our blood, our soul, we sacrifice ourselves for Jordan,” chanted the crowd.

Such protests have become a weekly sight in the Hashemite Kingdom, but they have been relatively peaceful, contrary to uprisings in neighbouring countries.

“Protestors are slowly upping the ante, with slogans becoming more daring day by day,” observed Mohamad Masri, a political scientist at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Jordan University.

In the streets of Amman, rumours abound of misspent public funds involving three corruption scandals – namely, allegations surrounding the state-owned National Resources Investment and Development Corporation (Mawared), the illegal licensing of a Dead Sea casino, and the Jordan Petroleum Refinery.

“Unfortunately the protests have failed to garner momentum: the opposition is fragmented, different groups have too many different grievances,” remarked activist Tareq Zureikat. The pro-democracy movement is a mix of tribal Jordanians, leftists and IAF followers.

The authorities have played successfully on these divisions. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, several demonstrations have been attacked by individuals resorting to explicitly divisive slogans and “seeking to stir up anti-Palestinian feelings or, in some cases, inter-tribal rivalry.”

For the most part, Jordanians of Palestinian origin have also remained on the sidelines of demonstrations, despite participation by the IAF, which has a large Palestinian base. “This can be attributed to the fact that Jordanian-Palestinians feel and act like they are guests in this country,” explained Masri.

Jordanian-Palestinians are those who were exiled from Palestine after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and amount to over 30 percent of the Kingdom’s population. Concentrated in urban centres, they are highly visible in the private sector.

Trans-Jordanians, on the other hand, constitute the tribal base of the regime and tend to dominate the public sector. Tribal patriarchs have been increasingly wary of the growing power of the entourage of Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian descent.

However, inter-communal rivalry is not the only factor preventing the pro-democracy movement from getting ahead. “There is an awareness among demonstrators not to follow in the footsteps of Syria,” said Adnan Hayajneh, a political scientist working at the Hashemite University.

Other fears include the possibility of a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Last April, Islamist Salafist demonstrators armed with daggers and clubs attacked police in Zarqa, an incident that ignited the anger of the local population.

“There is a fear that the IAF, being the only organised (body participating in protests), would win far more seats than their share of votes if real and transparent elections take place. But a dialogue with the Brotherhood could lead to an agreement to cap the number of seats the organisation runs for,” pointed out Zureikat.

Masri estimates the IAF could obtain about 35 percent of total seats should such should free and fair elections be held.

Zureikat believes that allowing the opposition to regroup its forces is creating awareness among the population that their demands may not be so diverse.

Issues like corruption, which are the byproduct of a failing system, should have the power to unite disparate groups against a common foe.

“The problem of corruption will be solved by the separation of powers within the state, ensuring proper checks and balances, the creation of an independent judiciary as well as the establishment of a fair electoral law,” explained Zureikat. An independent judiciary would narrow military courts’ jurisdiction and the clout of the secret services, while guaranteeing accountability for corruption and human rights violations.

“The new electoral law published this month perpetuates the failing of the previous ones by favouring tribes instead of political parties and communal interests over national interests,” Masri said.

Though the regime introduced dozens of changes to the constitution last year – including the expansion of parliamentary powers, limitations to the jurisdiction of military courts and the enforcement of temporary laws in the absence of elected lawmakers – its response to the population’s grievances has been generally slow and inefficient, with authorities still appearing to bank on communal antagonisms.

Although Trans-Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians do not appear to voice unified protests, the fact that they are both dissatisfied with the prevailing order is in itself significant. “After all, a group that is heavily represented in the public sector and viewed as one of the system’s main pillars is taking to the streets,” Masri noted.

In response to increased popularity of Islamic movements in Jordan, lawmakers are currently discussing a law that forbids the establishment of any political party based on religious lines. It is a decision, however, that may have unsavoury repercussions on the Jordanian streets as disaffection with the monarchy continues to grow.

“There is increased questioning of the regime’s legitimacy and authorities need to restore confidence,” says Masri.

A Syrian refugee family in the Lebanese border village of Ersal Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

By Mona Alami
QAA, Lebanon, Apr 13 2012 (IPS)

A few kilometres separate the two Lebanese villages of Ersal and Qaa from the Syrian border, both of which have been unwillingly drawn into the violence of the Syrian uprising. Unrest has been brewing in the region for weeks and recently it was on the receiving end of intermittent gunfire from the Syrian army. The situation remains tense despite the fragile new ceasefire.

Official sources are now reporting Syrian army incursions into Masharii Qaa (the Qaa Projects), a border town consisting of Ersal, a Sunni village, and Qaa, which is predominately Christian. Ersal supports Syrian opposition fighters, whom Qaa residents view with great suspicion.

An increase in violent altercations, coupled with the area’s proximity to warring Syria, have made it a convenient smuggling hub and refuge for beleaguered Syrian refugees and the injured fleeing escalating fighting in their country – causing serious disruptions in the social fabric of the two villages.

In the past two weeks, the northern Lebanese border came under mortar and bullet attacks from the Syrian army and early this week, Ali Shaaban, a cameraman for the local television station New TV, was killed in Wadi Khaled.

“(People in) Ersal are drawing us into problems by supporting Syrian terrorists,” said Saadeh Toum, Qaa’s former mayor, who claims that Ersal inhabitants are harboring members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the area.

But in nearby Ersal, residents deny playing any part in the conflict. “There are no FSA members in the region. The only support we are bringing to the opposition is first aid kits and medication along with food. We have not been able to smuggle anything in or out of the borders for the past week,” pointed out Abu Wadi, a Syrian activist who runs an underground clinic on the other side of the border and is responsible for the region’s underground railroad.

It is here, on the eastern flank of the mountain, only a few kilometres away from the battered city of Homs, that Syrian militants have set up their headquarters in a computer repair shop that looks more like the office of a non-governmental organisation. Syrian women come in and out, asking for the next round of aid cartons.

One month ago, a truck loaded with 200 loaves of bread would leave every other day for a secret destination: Baba Amr, in Homs. “We were supplying Free Syrian Army officers with their daily ration of bread,” boasted a local resident, speaking to IPS on condition of anonymity.

“Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, the Qaa Projects have become a haven for smugglers, regardless of their political affiliation,” explained an officer in the Lebanese army, who participated in the arrest two weeks ago of 10 armed militants in the Bekaa valley, who were driving two vehicles loaded with weapons, mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades into Syria, dressed in military uniforms.

In Ersal, residents and Syrian refugees are waiting for the snowcaps on the chain of mountains separating the two countries to melt.

“Up until now, our only connection to Syria has been through the Qaa Projects, which is heavily encircled by Syrian and Lebanese forces. As soon as the snow melts, we will regain access to Rif Dimashk, the Damascus suburb. It will be impossible for the army to control such a vast expanse of land,” said Ahmad, another Syrian on the lam.

The tension between Qaa residents and their pro-Syria neighbours in Ersal – in an area that falls largely within Hezbollah’s domain – also illustrates the villages’ apparent disconnect from the central government.

According to Mohamad Ezzedine, a member of Ersal’s municipality, the only organisations currently distributing aid in the region are Islamic relief organisations financed by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Lebanese High Relief Commission, which is responsible for refugees, is not present in the Projects, although it is active in the northern border region of Wadi Khaled.

According to Lebanese activist Abou Mohamad Ali Oueid, there are about 185 Syrian families currently seeking refuge in Ersal. “Most are staying with local families (but) they have, in a way, overstayed their welcome due to the length of the crisis. We have no other solution than putting up tents on our private property as the government has refused to establish formal refugee camps,” he added.

As a result of improper government action, human rights activist Nabil Halabi claims that the severe shortage of food and shelter has been compounded by attempted hijackings, by pro-Syrian militants, of ambulances transporting injured Syrian refugees to city hospitals.

Within Ersal itself, which forms part of a region that has one of the highest poverty rates in Lebanon, internal tensions are rising as Syrian refugees begin to fill farming and construction jobs, ordinarily carried out by locals.

“They (the Syrians) are willing to work for half our pay, and this is making tensions worse. It is an additional source of pressure in a region that is already very tense,” Oueid said ominously.

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Mar 26 2012 (IPS)

The Druze stronghold of Sweida, Syria, witnessed several pro-democracy protests last week. While the movement remains marginal, it is charged with symbolism: the Druze have long been considered the “spiritual cousins” of the Alawites, the religious group to which the Assad family belongs.

The question now on the table is whether or not the recent outbursts of Druze opposition to the regime could be a tipping point in favour of the Syrian revolutionaries.

Over the centuries the Druze minority, which make up about three percent of the Syrian population and are located primarily in the Sweida area, also known as Jabal al-Druze (the Druze mountain), has spearheaded various Syrian revolutions, including battling Ottoman rule and the authority of the French mandate system.

Over the last decade, the community developed excellent relations with president Bashar al-Assad, who could sometimes be spotted visiting local Druze families.

These close ties, however, did not make Sweida immune to the pro-democracy uprising, which has claimed almost 7,500 lives in Syria since Jan. 2011.

“Demonstrations are taking place more frequently although on a much smaller scale than in other regions. Last week, fifteen protests took place in several Druze villages,” Rima Fleyhan, a member of the Syrian opposition, told IPS.

Protests are mostly taking place in the Sweida capital and Qraya – the birthplace of the historical Druze revolutionary figure, Sultan Pacha al-Atrash, who led the Syrian Revolution from 1925–1927 – and springing up more regularly in Chahba, another city in the Druze region.

“While still marginal, the protest movement is essentially comprised of students, lawyers and engineers as well as leftists. Since its inception, it always consisted of the community’s elite,” acknowledged Talal el-Atrache, author of ‘When Syria awakes’, who spoke to IPS over the phone from Sweida.

Conversely, elsewhere in the country, the overwhelming majority of protestors have been from farming communities and impoverished areas, with the movement slowly expanding into the upper echelons of society.

“When the pro-democracy movement first started, Bashar al-Assad met with the (Druze) community’s three (highest ranking) sheikhs (clerics) and warned: ‘We are both Druze and Alawites, minorities in this country. Do not get involved in the protests’,” activist Muntaha al-Atrash, daughter of Sultan Pasha al- Atrash, told IPS.

According to several sources, Druze sheikhs tried to contain the movement before things got out of hand by intervening personally to quell demonstrations in order to avoid violent repercussion from the government.

In spite of such efforts, two local ‘popular committees’ have been formed, affiliated with the opposition’s Local Coordination Committee (LCC). “We have also formed a unit comprised of Druze military men,” added colonel Aref Hamoud from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who spoke to IPS on the phone from Turkey.

According to a post by the LCC, the FSA’s Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash Brigades attacked a military outpost yesterday, resulting in the killing of one officer from the national army and the defection of 28 soldiers, though this information is difficult to verify independently, due to the media ban enforced in Syria.

Several obstacles continue to hamper the Sweida-based pro-democracy movement. Security police and “shabiha” (thugs) loyal to President Assad have been able to disperse most protests rapidly. According to Fleyhan, the absence of religious centres poses a major logistical problem for the Druze, since mosques have served as convenient rallying points for protestors elsewhere in the country.

Another factor accounting for lower turnout at protests can be attributed to the massive emigration of Druze youth, leaving the region devoid of a group that has been at the very core of the revolution in other parts of Syria.

Experts like Talal el-Atrache cite several other reasons as possible causes, “mainly, the ongoing militarisation of the rebellion resulting from repression, which is diverting the popular uprising from its initial goals,” he said.

Ashraf Jaramani, a local resident also involved in politics believes that the deadly threat of civil strife as well as the Islamist dimension of the protests may have discouraged the Druze from plunging into the movement.

“If Syria follows Egypt and Libya, who will guarantee the Druze that the Muslim Brotherhood will not govern the country? What will happen to minorities rights then?” Jaramani asked IPS.

The community is also wary of an internationalisation of the conflict, in which Syria could become a battleground for the rivalry between Shiite and Sunni countries.

“The Druze do not want Syria to follow in Lebanese footsteps,” stressed Talal el-Atrache, referring to the decade and a half long civil war that plagued Lebanon from 1975 to 1990.

The Druze community in Lebanon has attempted to inflame their coreligionists. In several editorials in his weekly newspaper, Walid Joumblatt, the most prominent leader of the community, urged the Druze in Syria to take the side of the revolution.

“Beware you Arab strugglers in the Druze Mountain against yielding to the Shabbiha in confronting your brothers in Syria,” he said. The Druze leader had also previously called on young Druze soldiers in the Syrian army to “disobey military commands to kill their brothers.”

The Center for Documenting Violations in Syria, run by activists in the LCC, puts the number of slain soldiers from Sweida at 31, as of Jan. 25. Others believe the most recent figure is likely closer to 80.

For Muntaha al-Atrash, the Druze playing a larger role in the protests will be a major drawback for the regime, as Sweida, together with the Daraa province, form the District of Hauran.

The Assad regime, wary of the threat such a united front might pose, is still attempting to court the minority. Security forces have avoided killing any Druze demonstrators while activists say that detained prisoners were given preferential treatment. The regime is avoiding a violent crackdown in regions inhabited by religious minorities, in order to preserve the ‘Islamic label’ given to the Syrian revolution, said Fleyhan.

But some activists believe that security forces are losing patience and will end up making tactical mistakes, which will backfire as pressures mounts in the region.

“When (the whole) of Hauran rises,” predicts Muntaha al-Atrash, “it will be difficult to bring it down.”

Excerpt:

Chants erupt from the second floor of a decrepit building in Tripoli in the Sunni stronghold of Bab el-Tebbaneh. Young voices loudly sing “Yalla Erhal Ya Bashar,” or “Come on, leave, Bashar,” directed at the Syrian president, Bashar al- Assad. It has become the anthem of the Syrian revolution.

Behind a broken door, women and children gather around a hot pot of coffee. Souhaib Aal, one of the teenagers sitting in the small, run-down room, proudly shows a makeshift copy of a Free Syrian Army (FSA) ID card. “I want to be like the FSA soldiers when I grow up. They have shown strength and courage in battling Assad’s dictatorship!” he says with a proud smile.

The building bears the scars of the violent battle that raged last weekend between Sunni residents from Bab el-Tebbaneh and their Alawite neighbors in Jabal Mohsen. The Syrian regime is made up of Alawites who rule a Sunni-majority country. The fighting, which left three people dead, ended last Saturday after Tripoli lawmakers hammered out a ceasefire.

The onslaught on Homs has enflamed emotions in nearby Lebanon, reviving tensions between Lebanese Sunnis, who largely support the Syrian rebellion, and Alawites, who support the regime in Damascus. The conflict between the groups has been ongoing for generations and seems set to continue for long.

“We feel with the people in Homs,” says Amina Hamoud, a young Sunni mother interviewed by IPS. Homs, a flashpoint city in the Syrian uprising, has been under siege by regime forces for months but has experienced intense shelling over the last ten days, leaving over 300 people dead.

“We experienced before them the repression of the Assad regime,” Hamoud says in reference to a 1986 massacre in Tripoli by the occupying Syrian army, which left more than 320 people dead. Hamoud lost seven of her relatives. “My cousin of 17 was killed by Syrian soldiers in front of his mother.”

The people of Bab el-Tebbaneh watch with horror television images of a battered Homs, less than 200 kilometres away. The Syrian regime has blamed the violence on armed terrorist gangs.

While rivalries between the two communities have been on the rise since the 2005 assassination of Sunni Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri – a killing blamed on Syria and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah – the Homs onslaught has aggravated sectarian sentiment in Tripoli. Another factor, according to Mohammad Kabbara, MP from the Lebanese parliamentary bloc Future, which supports the uprising, is the Tripoli- based Alawite Arab Democratic Party’s “unrelenting support of the Syrian regime.”

A few hundred metres from Bab el-Tabbaneh, across Syria Street, the demarcation line separating the two areas, brand new posters of Bashar al-Assad hang on the dilapidated walls. Cars drive through the winding streets with songs dedicated to the glory of Assad turned on full blast. Men dressed in military attire sit in compact groups in coffee shops.

“The Syrian Alawites are victims of persecution and of a plot fomented by Arab countries,” says Ali Boubo, a mechanic from Jabal Mohsen. “Similarly, Salafists from Bab el-Tebbaneh want to draw us into conflict in Lebanon.” Boubo attributes “the conspiracy” to the Alawites’ staunch opposition to Israel. For the past several years, Syria has been part of the ‘defense axis’ against Israel, along with Iran and Hezbollah.

Around Jabal Mohsen, residents perceive the feud with Bab el-Tebbaneh as regional and not local. “(Saad) Hariri, (son of slain PM Rafic Hariri) has publicly called for Syria’s downfall. He should be ashamed of himself and focus on fighting our enemy Israel, instead of Syria,” says Abu Ahmad, the owner of a grocery store in Jabal Mohsen.

Similar to their Syrian counterparts, Jabal Mohsen residents blame Salafists and the Sunni Future Movement for the wave of violence. Tripoli is home to the largest Salafist community in Lebanon.

However, according to Salafist Sheikh Nabil Rahim, “the Salafists are aware of the sectarian dimension of the conflict and want to avoid being drawn into it at all costs.” But sources within the community told IPS that if civil strife in the city continues, they might join the battle.

Meanwhile, local politicians have renewed calls for the demilitarisation of Tripoli. MP Kabbara told IPS that Prime Minister Najib Mikati should clamp down on the spread of weapons in the city and work on disarming the involved parties. “The army should reinstate its sovereignty over all areas and protect the citizens from aggression.”

But many in Bab el-Tebbaneh don’t believe there will be an end to the strife soon. Jihad el-Rahi, a mother of three whose house was shelled on Saturday, says that she has avoided sending her daughter to school in Jabal Mohsen due to renewed sectarian sentiment.

“Strife profits thugs and politicians. They say the situation in Tripoli will improve when Syria falls. But who knows when? Do we have to slaughter each other until then?”

Odette Klysinska, a Catholic French native, sits in her living room in an affluent neighbourhood in Beirut, clutching her will in one hand, shocked to learn that it is no longer legally valid in the country she now calls home.

Klysinska is married to a Druze – a member of Lebanon’s minority religious community – and is suffering the brunt of the country’s ‘personal law status’, which prohibits Catholics, Sunnis and Shiites from bequeathing possessions or property to offspring of different faiths.

“How can a mother be banned from providing for her own children in death? It’s inconceivable,” she told IPS in disbelief.

Lebanon’s personal law, which includes marriage, inheritance and divorce, is ruled by ten different religious codes applied to 17 religious sects, with several of the country’s religious groups falling under one single jurisdiction.

The law is a byproduct of both Ottoman and colonial history, according to the Lebanese lawyer Amal Takieddine, and the site at which many of the country’s bloody wars were seeded.

She explains that the Ottoman empire of the 1830s gave four religious groups – Jews, Armenians, Orthodox Christians and Sunni Muslims – exclusive authority over family law.

By the 1900s, European powers expanded the number of recognised sects in Lebanon to 17, further embedding civil freedoms into the hands of a few religious leaders.

Thus Klysinska is not alone in her ordeal. Scores of individuals from a diverse range of faiths and backgrounds have fallen victim to the rigid and divisive legislation.

Hassan, who chose not to disclose his full name, is a member of the Sunni community, which forbids wills and only allows women to receive a specified fraction of a family’s inheritance, leaving the rest in the hands of sons.

The father of a 20-year-old girl, Hassan was forced to convert to a Shiite to enable his daughter to inherit his wealth and properties.

Nibal Khodr, a young Druze, faced an equally difficult situation when her husband died in a motorcycle accident and she was refused sole legal guardianship of her child.

Now, every financial decision she makes on behalf of her underage son requires the stamp of approval of a local Druze cleric, or sheikh.

“The Lebanese personal law system is archaic and treats people as subhumans. Thankfully, I have a foreign nationality that gives me some sort of protection,” she asserted.

According to Tony Daoud, director of CHAML (Non-sectarian Nonviolent Youth Lebanese Citizens), most Lebanese religious laws deny mothers sole custody of their children after the death of their spouse. In addition, their limited rights can be easily revoked under claims of a “doubtful reputation,” or if they choose to remarry.

Lebanese personal laws also stifle basic freedoms, such as the right to decide how to dispose of a deceased loved one’s remains. Lebanese Muslim and Orthodox communities, for example, do not allow cremation, even if the deceased explicitly requested it in writing in a will. The practice is, however, accepted by the Catholic and Protestant churches.

“This situation has produced a lack of equality between people and promotes confusion,” Takieddine stressed.

Unlike the laws that prevent the Catholic Klysinska from writing her Druze daughter into her will, the Druze themselves are free to allocate their inheritance to whomever they please. In the absence of a will, inheritance issues refer back to Islamic law, which strictly prescribes that male descendents are entitled to twice the share of wealth as their female relatives.

Christian churches, on the other hand, treat both sexes equally in their blanket inheritance laws.

“The absence of a clear-cut law that applies to everyone prompts people to seek out loopholes in existing legislation, like converting to a different religion or selling assets to their offspring while still alive,” Takieddine added.

In an attempt to reform the system, CHAML has contributed to a new civil draft law tackling issues of civil marriage, adoption and inheritance, which was submitted to the Lebanese parliament in 2011 and is currently under review by a parliamentary committee.

Unsurprisingly, religious groups like the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hez al Tahrir have expressed strong opposition to the proposal, which they claim “contradicts sacred Shariah law.”

But “A civil law for personal status is one of the main pillars of a civil and unified state,” Takieddine argued, adding that a multiplicity of personal laws has created a society in which individuals identify more closely with religious communities than with the state itself, giving the former greater control over civil liberties.

“Any feelings of kinship and loyalty in society are focused on religious groups,” Takieddine stressed. The adoption of a civil law could rectify this problem and also promote much-needed dialogue and unity among communities, which are still recovering from the 15-year-long civil war that raged from 1975-1990.

Civil laws could liberate youth from the sectarian grip of a country divided along religious lines, which might to lead to a relaxation of highly divisive religious affiliations and the unchecked political power of religious groups.

“Many of Lebanon’s wars are deeply rooted in the country’s personal law, which nurtures a sense of fear between members of various communities. Civil marriage and the unification of a civil law could translate into a more stable society that enjoys freedom of choice,” said Daoud.

As the Syrian uprising enters its tenth month, the country’s economy is suffering. Since last March, the Syrian government has been cracking down on pro-democracy protests, and the once peaceful uprising has morphed into a full-blown armed rebellion in areas such as Homs, Hama and Jabal al-Zawiya.

“The situation is extremely difficult to assess,” Damascus-based economist Jihad Yazigi, author of the Syria Report, tells IPS on phone. The report published by the Middle East Information and Communication Agency (MEICA) headquartered in Paris is one of the leading sources of information on the Syrian economy.

However, international rating agency Moody’s decision to downgrade neighbouring Lebanon’s banking sector outlook from stable to negative earlier this month was partly motivated by the deteriorating situation in Syria and other regional hotspots. It cited Lebanese banks’ asset and loan exposures to Syria and other countries witnessing unrest.

Syria’s economy is already showing signs of severe strain. While the IMF predicted a 2 percent contraction, Business Monitor International estimated it at 9.6 percent, a figure that Yazigi says might be even higher, around 15 percent.

The number of tourists visiting Syria declined by 64 percent since last March, according to figures published by the Ministry of Tourism. Additional pressures were added by renewed sanctions, particularly on the oil sector. “The EU was the main purchaser of Syrian oil, and the country is now trying to find new clients,” Nassib Ghobril, head economist at Lebanon’s Byblos Bank, which also operates in Syria, tells IPS.

Syria’s oil production was 385,000 barrels per day in 2010, 99 percent of which was sent to Europe. Oil Minister Sufian Allaw said last week that Syria had suffered a loss of more than 2 billion dollars since last September as a result of its inability to export crude oil and petroleum products.

There are now three-hour daily power cuts in capital Damascus, which has remained relatively unscathed by the wave of protests. In certain areas outside Damascus, cuts exceed eight hours, according to local residents.

The crisis is taking a toll on the financial sector. The Syrian Pound has lost nearly 50 percent of its value against the dollar as a result of capital flight, falling from 47 to 71 Egyptian pounds to the dollar. This has translated into a 20 percent inflation rate, estimates Yazigi, although it is officially listed at 3.38 percent as of September 2011, according to the Syrian Central Bureau of statistics .

Officials have tried to stem a run on banks by adding transaction fees to dollar withdrawals, raising interest rates on deposits and restricting purchase of foreign currencies. In November, as a result of the sanctions, Banque Saudi Fransi, a Saudi lender part-owned by Credit Agricole SA, announced it was selling its 27 percent stake in Bemo Saudi Fransi, Syria, citing financial risks.

The total assets of Syrian banks currently amount to 44 billion dollars and are divided among the 14 private and six state-owned banks, according to Ghobril.

“At the retail banking level, some indebted clients who were initially delaying payments are now starting to default,” says a professional in the banking sector who has worked with Syrian banks, and asked that his name not be printed for professional reasons. “Banks have a limited margin of freedom. It’s very difficult to claim back laptops and cars.”

Pressures are also increasing at the corporate lending level, adds the source, as more companies have requested extensions on their loans, in the form of overdrafts, discounted bills and letters of credit.

A recent post in Syria Comment, a blog by political scientist Joshua Landis, also raised the possibility that state banks could eventually default on payments to the private banking system.

“The million dollar question is how long the government can meet its budgetary requirements, estimated around 21 billion dollars a year,” says the banker. Before the crisis, the Central Bank’s foreign reserves were 18 billion dollars, according to official data. Some experts estimate reserves to be around 11 billion dollars today.

As fiscal pressures increase, it is left with no option but to print bills, a measure that will lead to further inflation, says the editor of the Syria Report.

The Central Bank has not published figures since last May, which renders projections on the economic future of Syria uncertain. Much will depend on how much monetary support the Assad regime is receiving from its allies, namely Iraq and Iran.

By - - and Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Nov 3 2011 (IPS)

Syrian refugees fleeing the brutal crackdown on citizens calling for an end to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime have encountered a sinister reception in neighbouring Lebanon.

Rather than feeling safe outside of the many arms of the repressive Syrian state, political refugees and activists seeking sanctuary are being continuously hounded for their activities.

Since March, the Baath Party’s grip on Syria has been shaken by pro-democracy protests. Assad’s military apparatus has responded with brute force, sending tanks and troops into the streets to battle non-violent demonstrators in clashes that have so far resulted in well over 3,000 deaths.

However, loyalty to the Assad regime is not limited to Syria; it also runs deep in Lebanon, which is currently governed by a coalition of parties allied with Damascus, namely Hezbollah and the Lebanese Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).

Syrian authorities planted an active military and intelligence service on Lebanese soil during its occupation of that country from 1976-2005. Today, the proxy apparatus of the Syrian regime has come back to life with renewed vigour.

Local human rights organisations in Beirut say that attacks against Syrian activists are on the rise while over a dozen opposition members have disappeared in recent months.

Two weeks ago, Kurdish activist Kadar Saleh Beeri was beaten by unidentified assailants after taking part in protests against Assad outside the Syrian embassy in Beirut.

“I was attacked by men holding sticks and guns as I left the demonstration with others,” Beeri told IPS.

“The pressure we face as activists here in Lebanon is constant. I have been threatened and insulted. In an effort to divert attention, I have changed my cell phone number several times, but ‘they’ always seem to track me down,” he said, referring to Syria’s proxies in Lebanon.

Beeri is not alone in his daily struggle.

Saleh Damerji, a Syrian journalist working for a Kurdish TV station, has been living in Lebanon for over 15 years. Two years ago, he joined the Syrian opposition and has since been a target of sustained threats and intimidation.

“Pro-Assad supporters in Lebanon are waging a psychological war against the opposition. Our families here and in Syria have been threatened numerous times and have been tracked down,” he told IPS.

Damerji’s car was vandalised last week after he appeared on a local TV station to discuss the events unfolding in Syria.

“I have been called by strangers pretending they were post office employees who had a package to deliver. A quick investigation at the local post office revealed the claim to be false,” Damerji said.

Beeri also complained that someone claiming to be a ‘member’ of the United Nations Refugee Agency has repeatedly requested his address.

In some cases, activists and opposition members face such severe harassment they are forced to move from house to house to escape the scrutiny of Syria’s local agents in Lebanon.

Omar Idilbi, a member of the local Syrian Coordination Committee, told IPS last month that he had changed his address several times. He also refused to meet for an interview in the Hamra area – a popular Beirut neighborhood that is a bastion of the SSNP as well as the home base of the Syrian embassy – because it was “too risky”. IPS has since been unable to track him down.

According to Nabil Halabi, a lawyer with the Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, Idilbi was sued by a Lebanese national for “damaging Lebanese-Syrian relations”, a legal procedure that was aimed at forcing him to disclose his place of residence.

Threats and pressure are not the only challenges Syrian activists in Lebanon are forced to overcome.

Last February, just as anti-government activity was on the rise, six members of the Jasem family were arrested by Lebanese intelligence agents for disseminating pro-democracy leaflets calling for regime change in Syria.

Shortly after their release on Feb. 25, three of the brothers disappeared.

In May, 86-year-old Shibli al-Ayssami – a founder of the Syrian Baath Party living in exile in the United States – was kidnapped while on a visit to Lebanon.

“Besides these highly publicised cases, we have (evidence that) 12 members of the Syrian opposition were kidnapped in Lebanon before being transferred to Syria. They were moved out of the country in Syrian embassy cars boasting diplomatic licence plates and were not searched at the borders,” Halabi told IPS.

Last week Lebanese Internal Security Forces chief Gen. Ashraf Rifi informed Lebanese members of parliament that allies and personnel of the Syrian embassy in Beirut were responsible for the abductions of the Jasem brothers and Ayssami, though Syrian ambassador Abdul Karim Ali denied that allegation.

Halabi referred to scores more cases, of mysterious disappearances of protestors and activists, which have been reported but have neither been investigated nor recorded.

The lawyer also denounced the Lebanese authorities’ lax approach to the problem as well as the collusion of some of its officers.

“During the last anti-government protests last Sunday, I was filming a man who was pointed out to me as one of the people involved in several attacks on demonstrators,” Halabi said.

“Suddenly, a Lebanese army officer intervened and forced me to delete some of my footage. When I invoked my immunity as a lawyer and threatened to lodge a complaint against him, he ran away,” Halabi added.

In spite of the increasingly dangerous environment, members of the Syrian opposition say they will not relent in their efforts to topple Assad’s regime.

“It is, however, sad that the legal system in Lebanon fails to protect us. The only advice given to us by officials and authorities alike is to lie low,” Damerji said.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
DAMASCUS, Aug 19 2011 (IPS)

Scores of buses carrying Syrians out of the country are waiting in uneven lines on the Lebanese-Syrian border for their paperwork to be processed. There are no Arab or Western tourists eager to cross to the other side, usually seen in hordes this time of year.

“It’s completely dead for the season. We are barely working, and the situation is worsening day by day since the beginning of the unrest,” says Youssef, a taxi driver.

Since Mar. 15 and the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has been rocked by pro-democracy protests. A violent crackdown by the government has followed. So far, there have been more than 2,000 fatalities and at least 12,000 arrests, according to activists and NGOs.

A highway cuts through the white and reddish mountains leading to the Syrian capital, Damascus. Here, posters of late president Hafez al-Assad – who handed the reigns of the country to his son, Bashar, before his death in 2000 – adorn the high grey walls of military bases punctuating the landscape.

The national anthem and patriotic Syrian songs play continuously on the radio. In between, the broadcaster reads out messages, all naturally in support of the country’s regime. “We salute our leader,” she says at one point. As if to emphasize her words, a sign on the road reads, “Hafez al-Assad, our leader forever.”

Beyond the large plain and its long highways, Damascus appears in its haphazard glory. The city is a mix of new whitewashed stone buildings amidst elegant as well as rundown houses, built in the Turkish Ottoman or French mandate style. The stern facades of official government buildings show a strong Soviet influence.

The resulting architectural dichotomy between old and new, beauty and ugliness, seems to pervade every street corner. Abu Rumaneh area leading to the new Four Seasons Hotel boasts glossy plush stores selling designer goods. In the chic Melki area, where the old bourgeoisie and nouveau riche reside, flowerbeds and green lawns line colourful pathways in the middle of the streets.

Here, people’s loyalties are divided between those supporting the regime and those with the protestors. All complain about extensive misinformation being circulated from both sides of the divide.

“We do not know what news media to trust any more,” says Hassan, a resident of Melki. “We often receive phone calls from our friends warning us not to take the Mazzeh road that leads to our neighborhood because of reports of gunfire, when the streets are in fact totally calm.”

Away from the richer areas, and on the streets of the city’s more popular souk areas, the story is different.

“Protesters are unrelenting. We are organising short protests at night, mostly after the Tawarih Ramadan prayers to escape the scrutiny of intelligence services,” says Abou Alaa, a local resident.

Off-duty military men and customs officers patrol the streets. Some men, clearly intelligence personnel, stand conspicuously on street corners wearing dark glasses, mingling with the effervescent crowds.

Wherever you go in Damascus, the streets are buzzing with rumours.

“Some say the violence should be blamed on thugs, radical Islamists, or militants,” says Hani, a local resident. “But I believe the protesters are peaceful, they want to be acknowledged and make ends meet. The government could do more.”

Someone not familiar with the modus operandi of the Assad regime would find that a harmless statement. But those who know how things used to be before the uprising realise that lifting the shroud of silence that has been suffocating the country for over 40 years is no small feat. But now, in coffee shops and taxi cabs, more and more people are willing to express their opinion.

“Damascus and Aleppo (Syria’s two largest cities) are rallying. They are like two enormous saucepans requiring some time to heat, that have now come to the boil. Protests are taking place in the Mouhajireen area in the centre of Damascus, a few kilometres away from the Central Bank,” says a Damascus-based economist.

Thousands also demonstrated this week in Saad Allah Al Jabri Square, in the mainly quiet city Aleppo.

An army bus passes by with three pictures plastered on its side, of Hafez al Assad, one of Bashar, and one of a hawk, the country’s coat of arms representing the military. It is a holy trinity that now seems endangered by a receding atmosphere of fear.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Aug 11 2011 (IPS)

A wave of mysterious disappearances is befalling members of the Syrian opposition in Lebanon, where Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus had a strong presence during its occupation of the country from 1976 until 2005.

On May 24 at 4:30 in the afternoon, 86-year-old Shibli al-Ayssami, a Syrian former politician and opposition member, left his daughter’s house on the outskirts of the Lebanese mountain city of Aley. He was going for a walk, as he had done every day since he had arrived in Lebanon from his home in Washington five days earlier. Two hours later, the elderly man had vanished without a trace.

“We have not heard from him since,” Ayssami’s daughter, Rajaa Charafedine, told IPS

After several months with no leads, some new information surfaced last week. According to a source that is close to the investigation, three dark-coloured four-wheel drive vehicles with tinted windows were seen circling the area before Ayssami’s disappearance. At one point, the cars blocked the road leading to Charafedine’s house, and two men pushed Ayssami into one of the cars. The three vehicles were then spotted a few hours later crossing the border into Syria, en route to Damascus, added the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity as the case is still under investigation.

Ayssami was one of the founders of the Syrian Baath Party. He was the minister of education, culture and agriculture in the 1960s and was vice-president of Syria in 1966, before the government was toppled by Hafez al-Assad, the father of current president, Bashar al-Assad. He was imprisoned and sentenced to death but was able to escape to Lebanon. Two years later he co-founded the Baath Party in Iraq. He retired from political life in 1992.

Walid Saffour, president of the Syrian Committee for Human Rights, said his organisation has information that Ayssami was kidnapped by a patrol led by a Lebanese security forces officer who is “known for his loyalty to a major Lebanese political party that is allied with the Syrian authorities.”

“Our information points to Ayssami being detained in one of the branches of the military intelligence in Damascus,” said Saffour.

Ayssami’s kidnapping is not the first of its kind to take place in Lebanon since the beginning of the Syrian pro-democracy uprising and the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on it.

In February, when anti-regime activity was just beginning in Syria, Lebanese military intelligence agents arrested six Syrians belonging to the Jasem family while they were distributing flyers calling for democratic change in Syria. Three of them disappeared in the early hours of the morning after their release on Feb. 25, according to Nadim Houry, head researcher at Human Rights Watch’s Beirut office.

“Three civilian cars were seen waiting by the police station the night of the Jasems’ disappearance. One of the drivers was identified as a member of the Lebanese security services who was at the time in charge of security at the Syrian Embassy,” a high-ranking officer from the Lebanese security services, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told IPS. The Lebanese security officer who allegedly led the kidnapping was identified as Salah al-Hajj by pan-Arab daily ‘al-Hayat’.

“We could not arrest him due to the current fiery political situation, but he was stripped of any official responsibilities,” the Lebanese security services officer said. In March, the Syrian embassy issued a statement denying that anybody associated with it had played any role in the disappearance of the Jasem brothers.

The Jasem case bears many similarities to a host of disappearances that occurred in Lebanon during the heyday of Syria’s occupation of the country in the 1990s, and even after its military withdrew in 2005.

In one instance, Nawar Aboud – an accountant at the United National Alliance (UNA), a political group affiliated with Syrian opposition figure Refaat al-Asad – was arrested on Dec. 24, 2008 by members of the Lebanese Military Intelligence in Tripoli, Lebanon’ s northern capital. Aboud was taken to a local military base for interrogation along with two other UNA employees. Like the Jasem brothers, he disappeared after his release the next day.

“Lebanon has a painful history of people being detained and illegally transferred to Syria. This issue is too sensitive to be dealt with lightly,” said Houry. If members of the security services are involved in the kidnapping of members of the Syrian opposition, they should be prosecuted. Lebanon’s judiciary should open an independent and transparent inquiry to shed light on these disappearances and establish responsibility for them… Only a credible and transparent investigation will put to rest fears that Lebanon’s security services may have acted outside the law and cooperated with Syrian security services in the kidnapping of Syrian opposition members.”

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
WADI KHALED, Lebanon, Jul 21 2011 (IPS)

A soldier and an Islamist – both fleeing the crackdown on Syrian pro-democracy protesters and seeking refuge in neighbouring Lebanon – have discovered that they share similar views on the ongoing uprising.

The town of Wadi Khaled. Credit: Mona Alami/IPS

Since the Baath regime came to power in the 1950s, Syria has been a traditionally secular country, using its military forces to suppress any Islamic threats. In 1982, for example, then president Hafez al-Assad launched a violent onslaught on Hama, where the Muslim Brotherhood had instigated an insurgency against the government. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people were killed by the military.

The use of army and intelligence services to suppress dissent has not changed under the rule of president Bashar al-Assad, who took over from his father, Hafez, after his death in 2000.

Since pro-democracy rallies broke out last March, a sprawling wave of violence has met protesters, resulting in over 1,400 deaths and over 5,000 arrests. The regime has attributed some of the unrest on radical Islamic factions.

Sitting across from Rahman in a small room overlooking the green fields separating Syria from Lebanon is Omar, a Syrian soldier who used to work in the media office of the Syrian army in Homs. “The system is based on the principle of loyalty to the regime; people’s credentials or level of professionalism are unimportant. It boils down to their allegiance,” Omar told IPS, preferring not to use his full name.

This structure of cronyism has contributed to a growing feeling of mistrust among officers. “Most soldiers are unhappy with the regime’s excessive reliance on violence, but they are too afraid to denounce it. It’s one soldier against the other, the informant always having the upper hand,” Omar explained.

A similar scenario is unfolding in other areas, such as Tell Kalakh, where neighbours are pitted against one another. The city, which lies some 30 kilometres away from Homs, boasts a population of some 30,000, including a Sunni community as well as an Alawite community – the same religious group to which the Syrian Assad regime belongs.

During the month of May, the region was the scene of a violent crackdown of pro-democracy protests. The Syrian news agency, ‘SANA’, however, blamed the unrest on Lebanese armed gangs that destroyed public and private property and “killed, plundered and terrorised people”.

“Recent protests have only exacerbated tensions between the two communities, which are already high, especially since the arrest of a few hundred of our men last year for trafficking. The arrests focused on the Sunni community in spite of the fact that illegal smuggling is one of the main activities of all the region’s residents, whether Sunni or Alawite,” said Rahman, who added that the alleged participation of Alawites in the recent repression has further aggravated the situation.

The wave of violence has led Omar to doubt the military – which he joined 20 years ago. “I started thinking that all I had been taught was a web of lies. The unrest was blamed on Islamist groups and foreign armed gangs, when on the ground I knew it was the work of our military forces,” he told IPS.

Such testimonials are very difficult to verify independently due to the media ban enforced in Syria.

The pathways of both the Islamist and the soldier seem to have crossed in Tell Kalakh. Omar acknowledges an informal network within the Syrian army facilitated his escape from Syria before an Islamic NGO picked him up in Lebanon.

Here, in a little Lebanese village by the Syrian border, the two men discuss the blindness and brutality of the system in place.

“If a soldier gets called up to the intelligence headquarters in Damascus, he knows he is finished,” says Omar. “Nowadays, it does not take much to put one’s loyalty in doubt.”

Rahman’s experience was similar. Accused of fomenting sectarian strife, he was imprisoned last year for nine months before his release in March. He claims he was tortured during much of that period before he was set free when his culpability could not be established. “The interrogator who was handling my case apologised to me, saying that torture was ‘routine procedure’,” Rahman said.

He went on to describe other humiliations – he was beaten for hours on one occasion for washing using toilet water before praying, which is strictly forbidden in the prison.

Omar wonders how Western countries – which traditionally fear Islamist movements – expect events in Syria to unfold considering the violent and demeaning situation the people face every day. “Do they believe that the Syrian people will sit and silently witness the slaughter?” he asks. “Soon enough we will all call for Jihad.”

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
DAMASCUS, Jul 1 2011 (IPS)

Since pro-democracy protests began last March, Syria’s once profoundly secular society has been shaken up, with deep divides splitting up communities along sectarian lines.

At nearly a quarter to four in Damascus Koranic prayers erupt from speakers atop the large Omeyyade mosque. In a nearby street, Elias, a Christian souvenir shop owner is discussing the recent protests rocking Syria.

“Arabs want to demonstrate every time they pray,” he says with a smirk, obviously in reference to the pro-democracy Muslim demonstrators swarming the streets every Friday. “Pretty soon we are all going to be out of business. The only clients I see now are in my dreams.”

His openness is relatively unusual in a country where people are known for few words and a suspicious attitude towards strangers, but the sentiment of his statement is not uncommon. In recent months, as protests gained in intensity, a radicalisation of the street seems to have taken place in certain areas.

“Tensions have been observed in certain cities and villages where different religious communities live together, such as Jabla and Banyas, which are home to both Alawites and Sunnis,” one analyst told IPS on condition of anonymity.

Larger urban towns have also fallen victim to religious divides – namely between Christians and Sunnis in Hama, Homs and Lattakia.

“The Druze will always be losers if a regime change occurs – they better remain on the sidelines,” advocates Hilal, a retired merchant from the Druze Sweidah region, which has remained relatively calm thus far.

Some attribute religious tensions to the government, which has been playing the sectarian card by blaming the protests on armed thugs and Islamists. “The regime has been seeking to legitimise its crackdown on demonstrators by brandishing the Islamist threat and the spector of chaos in the event it is overthrown,” Talal el Atrach, a Damascus based journalist and author of ‘Quand la Syrie s’éveillera’ (When Syria awakes), told IPS. “This has exacerbated popular fears among minorities.”

Minorities have also been affected by some of the chants heard during the Daraa protests: ‘No Iran; no Hezbollah; we want a Muslim ruler who fears God.’

However, “for the most part, protestors have called for peaceful change, with Muslim and Christians united,” sociologist Hassan Abbas, who resides in Damascus, told IPS.

Although sectarianism has been under control during the 40-year regime of President Bashar al-Assad, it has persisted within society, albeit non-violently. “Members of different communities rarely intermarry, for example, and if they do, they elope,” a Damascus Sunni resident told IPS on condition of anonymity.

Various factors, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the spread of Wahabism – a radical form of Islam – financed with Saudi Arabian oil money, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq have all had an affect on Syria. These factors boiled to the surface in 1982, when the Muslim Brotherhood led an uprising in Hama. The revolt was violently suppressed by what was viewed as predominantly Alawite-led troops, resulting in the deaths of some 25,000 inhabitants, mainly Sunnis.

Over the last four decades, authoritarian practices have destroyed political freedoms in Syria, which has contributed to the rise of political Islam, explains el Atrach. Salafism, a radical form of Islam has also appeared in certain impoverished areas, while remaining minimal.

The ruling Baath regime has also relied on a common sectarian, regional and tribal background to ensure its survival, not because of religious beliefs but to guarantee loyalty. Syria’s last two presidents – the late Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, who is now in power – both hail from the Alawite community.

“The regime [governed by Alawites] has used the community to assert its power and not the other way round. Many Alawites have actually suffered from marginalisation: some of their villages are not even equipped with proper sanitation,” says Abbas.

The schism separating Syrians is not simply sectarian however, but also involves geographical borders. Political scientist and blogger Joshua Landis posted a comment explaining that the government’s siege against Daraa has been effective in unifying the ‘muhafiza’, or district, of Daraa against the Assad regime. “By treating the entire muhafiza as criminals, the sentiments of most of its inhabitants have turned against the regime. It’s interesting that identity runs not only along religious, ethnic, and tribal lines, but also along geographical lines, in that the people of Daraa – not only the city, but the entire muhafiza – are viewing themselves as a unit, separate from those who comprise the leadership of Syria.”

“People have to keep in mind that this revolution is not one that is religious, but is born from the many social fractures between rich and poor – with a large portion of the population originating from rural areas and feeling disenfranchised,” explained Abbas.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
DAMASCUS, Jun 30 2011 (IPS)

As protests persist in Syria, the economy is becoming an increasing concern for many, who wonder if it will eventually falter in light of the recent unrest.

“The global financial crisis had a moderate affect on Syria,” Syrian economist Samir Seifan told IPS. But now, “people are only spending on basic items, which is resulting in a smaller economy. Foreign and local investments are also dwindling due to uncertainty.”

According to the Institute of International Finance, the global association of financial institutions based in Washington, D.C., the Syrian economy will shrink by 3 percent this year as a result of the pro- democracy protests and instability which has persisted for some 100 days now.

International companies have been flocking out of Syria due to the internal conflict. The Qatari Diar real estate company put an end to two projects – one in Damascus and another on the Syrian Mediterranean coast. Another Qatari firm, Qatar Electricity and Water Company, has delayed building two power plants in Syria – a 900 million dollar project. In addition, a 500 million dollar project planned by Emaar Properties, and another by the Gulf Majid Al-Futtaim Group have also been put on hold.

The new sanctions imposed on various members of the regime are also making people wary, an analyst here told IPS on condition of anonymity. “This will certainly affect the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country,” he explained.

As a result of decreasing FDI, there is a loss of confidence in the Syrian pound, which has been battered to a pulp since the start of the protests, according to analysts.

“Syria’s central bank was forced to raise interest rates on bank deposits from 7 percent to 9 percent in early May, and to lower reserve requirements from 10 percent to 5 percent,” economist Nassib Ghobril from the Byblos Bank in Beirut, a Lebanese institution with subsidiaries in Syria, told IPS.

“The Syrian pound has lost about 3 percent of its value on the official market,” explains Seifan. However, it is rumoured the loss reached 17 percent on the secondary black market – before the Syrian central bank intervened by introducing certain financial measures, such as banning the withdrawal of amounts over 5,000 dollars and increasing interest on deposits.

Bankers also say they have detected a flight of capital in the last two months. Depositors are said to have withdrawn the equivalent of at least 680 million dollars from privately owned banks.

Matters were only made worse when President Bashar al-Assad warned last week of a possible economic collapse. “This affected the Syrian stock market which has been dropping since,” explained Jihad Yazigi, editor in chief in Damascus of ‘The Syria Report’, an online business journal based in Paris.

“Private traditional banks [excluding Islamic banks] have witnessed a decrease of 10.2 percent in demand deposits, which amounts to 2.1 billion dollars,” adds Ghobril.

Further aggravating the economic situation in Syria is the decline in tourism. There were about 8.33 million tourists last year, a 40 percent hike from the previous year, according to the ministry of tourism. “The real figure, however, is about four million,” Seifan says. “Regardless, tourism growth is currently at zero percent, and this will have repercussions on subsidiary activities, like restaurants and commerce at large.”

Such gloomy predictions will only exacerbate the unemployment situation, estimated to be at about 20 percent. “This figure goes up to 30 percent in the youth segment of the population,” emphasises Seifan.

About one third of the population lives below the poverty line. In fact, growing social and regional inequalities – some 40 percent of the government budget is said to be allocated to large cities – are said to have triggered the recent unrest.

“Rural regions, such as Daraa have also been suffering from a severe draught for the past four years,” adds Yazigi.

Poverty and draughts have pushed populations from rural towns and villages to immigrate into cities – namely, Damascus and Aleppo – which has only put more pressure on urban dwellers, who are already facing excessive inflation and rising real estate costs.

In a bid to quell the protests, al-Assad has restored fuel subsidies and increased public salaries as well as put in place cash transfers to low-income households. Increasing government spending has not managed to calm demonstrators.

As long as oil operations continue to be unaffected by the unrest and are not targeted by sanctions, the government can still keep the economy on its feet, according to some analysts.

The fact that the oil sector is “very diversified, does not rely on external factors, and [Syria’s] population is relatively debt free means that it is not likely to collapse any time soon,” stresses Seifan.

Yazigi, on the other hand chooses to mitigate his answer. “Loss of confidence in the economy may be nonetheless a major aggravating factor.”

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Jun 1 2011 (IPS)

Since pro-democracy protests began over two months ago, Syria has been engaged in a fierce media war – with journalists arrested and international press banned from entering the country. This has severely curtailed the flow of information out of the country.

“There is no independent press in Syria,” says Human Rights Watch Director Nadim Houry. “And journalists apprehended by authorities are held in complete isolation and forced to remain incommunicado,” he told IPS in Beirut.

The deteriorating state of journalism in Syria has placed the country among the worst in the world – in terms of freedom of the press. As a result of the information vacuum, the media is forced to depend on eyewitness accounts and second-hand reports.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), about 20 local and international journalists have been physically assaulted, detained, or expelled from Syria since the start of the country’s popular uprising on Mar. 15.

“All foreign journalists are turned away at the borders,” says a taxi driver talking to IPS on condition of anonymity. “Any person carrying a pocket camera will automatically raise the suspicions of Syrian custom agents.”

Dorothy Parvaz, an online reporter for Al Jazeera English, arrived in Syria on Apr. 29. She was detained by an unidentified security service for six days and denied any contact with the outside world. On May 4, authorities admitted she was in custody and shortly thereafter, an Al Jazeera spokesperson announced that they had received information that she had been deported and was being held in Tehran. News of her release was made public on May 18.

Parvaz was dragged by her hair, handcuffed and imprisoned with other people, reports the Al Jazeera website. She describes hearing “interrogations and beatings taking place about 10 metres away”.

“The beatings were savage,” Parvaz says, “those being hit were crying out, ‘Wallahi!’ (I swear to God).” Similar grizzly accounts of tortured prisoners were reported by Khaled Sid Mohand, an Algerian journalist working for the French newspaper Le Monde, in an interview with L’Express magazine.

Ghadi Frances, a journalist for the Lebanese daily As-Safir, was also detained in Damascus on May 7 for a day. “I was arrested because I was reporting on a Friday in areas where demonstrations were taking place,” Frances told IPS. “However, intelligence services treated me very politely as soon as they discovered I was a journalist.”

Fayiz Sara, a contributor to the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, was arrested on Apr. 11 and released last week according to the CPJ. Syrian officials detained Mohamed Zayd Mastou, a correspondent for Al- Arabiya, on Apr. 6. Akram Darwish, a freelance photographer, has been detained in Qamishli in northeastern Syria since May 3. There is no information regarding the current status of Mastou or Darwish.

Ghassan Saoud, a contributor to the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar and the Kuwaiti daily Al-Qabas, was detained and beaten by plainclothes police before being released in Damascus.

A total of five Reuters employees were either arrested and released, or expelled from Syria over the past two months – as have two Jordanian journalists.

“It’s unfair that the Syrians are getting away with this. So many high ranking people intervened for my release that I am not free to speak on the matter,” says an Arab journalist imprisoned by Syrian intelligence services, who spoke to IPS on condition of anonymity.

Internally, Syrian journalists whose reports differ from the official government line are forced to resign or are brought in for interrogation, stresses Houry.

“This was the case of local journalist Samira Masalmeh,” he points out. Masalmeh, who was the editor of the state-run newspaper Tishrin, was fired after giving an interview to Al Jazeera – in which she held security forces responsible for the violence in Daraa.

As a result of the strict restrictions on media organisations operating in Syria, journalists stationed in neighbouring Lebanon are having a very hard time producing detailed coverage.

“When I was reporting this month from Syria, I discovered that many reports published by wires about possible demonstrations were completely inaccurate,” underscores Frances.

Such inaccuracies will continue until freedom of the press is granted in the country. Until then, intimidation, violence and incarceration will further blur the picture of what is really happening in Syria.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, May 25 2011 (IPS)

Syrians from the border town Tell Khalakh have been fleeing a wave of violence over recent weeks to cross into neighboring Lebanon. But those seeking refuge now face an uncertain fate.

Syrian territory lies only a few hundred metres from the Wadi Khaled area in Lebanon, home to 17 villages scattered close to the Kabir River which runs along the border.

“Naturally, we are happy to take them into our homes, but I fear that in a few weeks we will have a real humanitarian problem on our hands,” Mahmoud Khazaal, former mayor of the Bayouk village tells IPS.

Syrian pro-democracy protests, which started over two months ago, have drawn fierce response from the government headed by President Bashar Assad, whose family has been in power for more than 30 years.

Since the conflict hit Tell Khalakh, some 5,000 people have escaped to Lebanon, Khazaal estimates. As a result, the small population of 1,400 in Bayouk now hosts some 600 people from 120 Syrian families.

“The number of refugees is certainly higher, with many who have moved to Tripoli in Lebanon’s north still unaccounted for,” Khaled Daher, MP for the Northern region of Lebanon told IPS.

Debaybiyeh and other villages around, located 20 kilometres from Tripoli and near the Syrian townHalat, are hosting about 400 Syrian families.

“The region simply does not have the means or capacity to tackle to the needs of so many people,” says Khazaal.

North Lebanon is poor; according to a UNDP study about 17 percent of the people there live in extreme poverty. The former mayor complains that aid has been coming in only for a few days and in very small quantities.

“The Ministry of Social Works is providing food portions for a family of ten that will only feed two people. We need more.”

Last week, caretaker social affairs minister Salim Sayegh declared that the ministry was mapping out the possibilities of accommodating a larger numbers of refugees, adding that schools and other municipal buildings in the north were being considered as locations.

“We are already facing sanitation problems due to the large number of refugees, with homes inhabited by dozens of people at a time,” says Khazaal. “In addition, many refugees have serious medical conditions and the closest clinic is 40 kilometres away.”

The scorching hot summer season ahead will only worsen the plight of the refugees, says Daher.

For the Syrians who have found refuge in the village, declining living conditions are far from being a priority.

Souad, a woman in her thirties, crossed the Kabir River on foot with three children. “We were targeted by snipers and my mother was shot in the arm. She is now at a Lebanese hospital,” she told IPS on phone from her village.

Others, such as Mohamad, talk about the dead that have been left lying in the streets of the village, and of the neighbourhoods that are constantly being bombed.

Refugees speak of masked men dressed in black fighting along soldiers, people they call ‘shabiha’.

“The members of the army’s fourth regiment have sent armed Alawites from surrounding villages to attack our homes,” adds Souad. “We can’t go back.”

Refugee accounts are difficult to verify independently as Syrian authorities have banned all foreign journalists from the country.

Another problem that refugees face is their uncertain legal status in Lebanon. Some have been detained by Lebanese authorities. Human Rights Watch (HRW) says Lebanon’s security forces have arrested nine Syrian men and one child since May 15, allegedly for crossing illegally into Lebanon.

“I know of 15 cases of refugees being detained. Many are injured refugees who are now guarded by Lebanese security forces at hospital,” says Daher.

The Lebanese army, which has beefed up its presence on the borders, has said that it has arrested three Syrian soldiers considered deserters, while turning a blind eye to the influx of illegal refugees.

“We do not believe that women and children are a security threat, but deserters are a different matter,” says a military source. “We had to hand the soldiers back to Syria because they do not qualify for refugee status as per theagreements existing between the two countries. We do not want to be perceived as interfering in Syrian internal affairs.”

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, May 13 2011 (IPS)

As the Syrian uprisings escalate in violence, Lebanon’s black market in arms is flourishing, with prices of light and medium weapons driven higher by Lebanese and Syrian demand.

“Prices have tripled in less than two months,” says Wael, a local arms dealer, whose name has been changed to protect his identity.

According to local dealers, Syrians have been crossing the borders into neighbouring Lebanon to purchase weapons since late January, when the country erupted with pro-democracy protests which were subject to bloody government crackdown.

Lebanese residents, fearing Syria’s wave of violence may spread, have also started to buy light weapons.

Since the start of the uprisings, dozens of soldiers and hundreds of civilians have been killed – with activists putting the total deaths at about 800.

Syrian authorities, however, have blamed the unrest on “armed gangs”, Salafi groups and a Western conspiracy. ‘SANA’, Syria’s official news agency, quoted a military source recently, saying that the army and security units are continuing to chase “armed terrorist groups”.

“On Wednesday, tens of the groups’ members seized a huge amount of weapons and varied ammunition in Baba Amr in the Homs province and Daraa countryside. Two military members were martyred and five others were injured in the clashes,” the publication printed on its website.

Activists have denied buying weapons, blaming the military deaths on members of the secret intelligence services, who have been allegedly gunning down soldiers refusing to shoot at protestors.

“We are not armed. This is nonsense,” one Syrian activist told IPS, on condition of anonymity.

The broader Syrian picture remains murky amid accusations and counter-accusations in the absence of media coverage, as most foreign journalists are banned from the country. But in neighbouring Lebanon, arms dealers are pointing out that many Syrians are purchasing weapons for self-defence. They also admit that some weapons sales seem part of a concerted and more structured effort.

“It is, however, extremely difficult to know what segment of society these buyers represent, as they keep their identity a secret,” Wael explained.

“Locals are also buying weapons in fear of rising sectarian tensions, as a result from the destabilisation of the [Bashar] Assad regime,” says Brahim, another local weapons dealer who spoke to IPS on condition of anonymity.

Although who exactly is behind the buying is unclear, the rising prices of various weapons indicate there is indeed an increased demand.

On the streets of Beirut, the price of an AK-47 assault rifle jumped from 850 dollars to 1,450; while an M4, sold previously for 5,800 dollars, is now 7,500. An M16 rifle now costs 2,500 dollars – a 50 percent hike from its former price tag. The M16 is a U.S. army standard service rifle, which was used during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, U.S. Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan used the M4 carbine as a front-line weapon.

The PKC machine gun is now 4,200 dollars, up from 3,300 in only a few months. The American made ‘Energa’, a single shot grenade launcher, was previously 80 dollars and is now 350. The asking price of a B7 rifle went from 700 dollars to 1,000.

“The price of a Kalashnikoff, which varied between 1,000 dollars to 1,200 dollars only a few months ago, is now being sold for 1,600 dollars in Beirut and 2,000 dollars in Tripoli. The cost of ammunition has also dramatically increased,” says Brahim.

Since the end of the Civil War in 1990, instability in Lebanon has translated into big bucks for local arms dealers. According to Brahim and Wael, the market is controlled by prominent political parties who use their clout and wide network of allies to protect smugglers from prosecution. Each political party relies generally on one main buyer, someone who has all the necessary contacts abroad and knows the ins and outs of the business.

Brahim admits that weapons shipments to Lebanon have increased significantly in recent months and are traditionally smuggled into the country from Iraq and Syria though Lebanon’s porous border.

“It seems that in light of recent regional events, Lebanese political parties have decided to allow the trade of light and medium weapons while they put a ban on the sale of heavier fire arms, such as canons and rockets,” says Wael.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Apr 21 2011 (IPS)

Hezbollah’s hardening stance in the Bahraini crisis has sowed discord between Lebanon and the Gulf island, currently home to about 5,000 Lebanese expatriates. As the situation escalates, many fear that the status of other Lebanese in the rest of the Gulf could come under threat.

In recent weeks, some 16 Lebanese have been expelled from Bahrain. “These deportations came in the wake of the Bahrain protests and statements made by some Lebanese figures regarding the Bahraini internal political situation,” Aziz Qazzi, Lebanon’s ambassador to Bahrain told IPS.

Further straining the relationship between Lebanon and Bahrain is the latter’s suspension of flights to and from Beirut. The move came in response to a speech made by Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, in which he criticized the Bahrain government’s handling of the protests.

Since February, Bahrain has been gripped with massive demonstrations staged by the majority Shiite community against the Sunni al-Khalifa ruling family. Protestors have called for more freedom and the creation of a constitutional monarchy. The dissent was crushed by local and Gulf Countries Cooperation (GCC) troops. The GCC group comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Nasrallah called the Bahrain government’s actions “unjust”. He also accused Arab countries of remaining silent because of sectarian prejudice against the Shiite protestors. Bahrain, on the other hand, accused Hezbollah’s Shiite organisation for training members of its opposition.

Lebanese national Zahy Alameh, director of a television station in Bahrain, believes the situation has become more complicated for Lebanese expatriates. “Nasrallah’s speech has put us in a very difficult position. Some Lebanese,who have residency visas, were not allowed to re-enter the country,” he tells IPS.

According to the Lebanese daily As Safir, at least 14 of those expelled from Bahrain are Shiites. This information was not, however, confirmed by Qazzi. “Deported Lebanese are members of different religious communities,” he insisted.

Najib, a Lebanese businessman who lives in neighbouring Saudi Arabia and visits Bahrain on a weekly basis, emphasises that most Lebanese with a GCC residency are now systematically turned away at Bahraini customs. GCC residency usually grants holders entry into other GCC countries.

“Out of the four of us who tried crossing the border last week, only one, a Jordanian national, was allowed entry. The rest of us, all Lebanese, were not allowed in,” he says.

The businessman, however, shrugs off any possible negative repercussions resulting from Nasrallah’s speech in other Gulf countries. “No discriminatory policies are applied to the Lebanese community in Saudi Arabia,” he points out.

He admits nonetheless that some individuals have been discouraging Saudi residents from doing business with Lebanese Shiite owned companies.

The deportation of Lebanese from Bahrain is not the first time inflammatory comments made by Lebanese political figures have caused such action. In 2009, dozens of long-term Lebanese Shiite residents were expelled from the UAE because of their alleged affiliation with Hezbollah.

Hussein, whose last name has been omitted for the sake of anonymity, converted from Shiite to Sunni in order to find employment at government owned companies in the Gulf. “I kept failing the background check made by the local police and converting allowed me to find better job opportunities,” he tells IPS.

“The crisis between Lebanon and Bahrain is linked to regional geopolitics between Iran and the Gulf countries. However, Lebanese can’t do much about it,” Hilal Khashan, political scientist at the American University of Beirut tells IPS.

Regional tensions have also affected the internal political situation in Lebanon, which has yet to form a government after over two months of wrangling. The Western and Arab backed outgoing Sunni prime minister, Saad Hariri, had accused Iran of meddling in Lebanon’s affairs and taking Arab societies “hostage”. Iran, along with Syria, is a major supporter of Hezbollah, which heads the March 8 movement now holding the majority of parliament seats and charged with forming the new cabinet.

“Hezbollah is militarily in control of Lebanon; Lebanese are thus helpless,” says Khashan. If local factions allow regional powers to come into play, the local political crisis in Lebanon could take a turn for the worse.

The Lebanese economy could also be affected by the increased deportation of Lebanese from the Gulf. Plagued by a 55 billion dollar debt, the economy is strongly reliant on foreign direct investment as well as transfers made by its expat community.

According to research company Information International, there are about 500,000 Lebanese residing in the Gulf, working mainly in tourism, building and contracting, media, and banking. While there are no exact figures, some 200,000 live in KSA, 60,000 in the UAE, 50,000 in Kuwait and 40,000 in Qatar.

Economist Ghazi Wazni estimates that of the 8 billion dollars transferred by Lebanese expatriates in 2010 to Lebanon, about 3.5 to 4 billion dollars was sent by those in the Gulf.

“We are hopeful that the crisis will not spread to other countries,” says Qazzi.

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By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Apr 18 2011 (IPS)

Despite scarce official news reports emerging from Syria, information leaking out from activists on the ground describe the situation as deteriorating. While the government remains vague about events unfolding in the country, Friday prayers continue to ignite dissent that seems to be spreading to all social classes.

“People are very angry, especially since men arrested in the city of Banyas were released and accounts of torture circulated among residents,” says one activist, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.

Al Jazeera reported on Apr. 13 that at least 200 male residents in Banyas were apprehended by security forces. According to the activist, in response, the women of the city demonstrated on Thursday for their release.

“The revolution has developed its own dynamics. When the regime kills protesters, it creates more anger on the streets, which leads to more protests,” says Anas al-Abdah, a founding member of the Syrian opposition group, Movement for Justice and Development.

This week, demonstrations saw a turnout of thousands, with the pro-democracy movement spreading to other cities like Baida, Latakia, Douma (a suburb of Damascus) and Homs. In the village of Ain Arab in northern Syria, some 600 Kurds held a one-hour peaceful protest, according to AFP.

Al Jazeera reported Sunday that at least five people were killed amid protests near the Syrian city of Homs. It quoted government sources saying that two policemen were killed in the town of Talbiseh on Sunday while other reports claimed protesters had been killed.

Amnesty International reports that the conflict in Syria has resulted in 171 deaths to date, and a list submitted by one activist indicates that there have been 972 arrests.

“The regime has chosen the course of violent clampdown. It cannot back down at this stage, so yes, I foresee a lot more bloodshed. But I stress that the violence is perpetrated by one side only,” says Abdah.

On Friday, President Bashar al-Assad announced the release of hundreds of protestors, except those involved in ‘criminal’ acts. The Syrian government has repeatedly claimed that ‘gangs’ are behind much of the violence targeting the country. The country’s official news syndicate Sana, quoting an official source, added that 19 people, including members of the security forces, were killed by ‘armed gangs’.

“Armed men are regime-hired thugs known as ‘shabiha’, who are sent into neighbourhoods to attack protesters,” says Abdah.

Pro-state media has blamed the uprising on an external plot to overthrow al-Assad, accusing the U.S., Saudi Arabia and anti-Syrian Lebanese factions – allegations Syrian activists finds laughable.

Such claims have not deterred protestors, who initially called for freedom but are now demanding regime change. “While the protests have been very limited in scope and number in large cities like Damascus and Aleppo, the fact that they are happening at all is significant,” says one activist.

“Syria is witnessing the re-emergence of civil society, one that is in its embryonic stage, with local community leaders emerging and directing the protest movement,” adds Abdah.

In response, the Syrian government is relying on a dual approach: while heavily cracking down on protestors, it also accepted to meet with a delegation from Daraa, a city that has become a symbol of Syrian dissent. On Saturday, President al-Assad promised that the emergency law in place since 1963 will be lifted by Apr. 25. The implementation of reforms has become a real necessity for the regime, if it wants to survive.

But while promises of change are made, the violence continues. In recent weeks, killings among military ranks have spurred speculation that soldiers are being executed for refusing to shoot at demonstrators.

Abdah contends that while there are ‘elite’ army units loyal to the Assad family, the vast majority is comprises ordinary Syrians. “The rift within the army has already begun. There are confirmed reports of conscripts and junior officers being executed for disobeying orders to fire on protesters. We have the names of these people. There are also confirmed reports of conscripts deserting in order to avoid killing civilians,” he adds.

If the use of excessive force against civilians persists, the army hierarchy will be faced with a difficult choice: either acting as an active participant in the bloody crackdown, or taking a stand against security forces.

However, a recent statement issued by the Syrian ministry of interior does not indicate that the regime is likely to change its tactics, hinting that in fact violence against protesters could escalate: “There is no more room for leniency or tolerance in enforcing the law, preserving the security of the country and citizens, and protecting public order.”

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
DAMASCUS, Mar 30 2011 (IPS)

Caught in a wave of pro-democracy and pro-government protests, the Syrian political landscape seems far more complex than its Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, where demonstrations ousted decades’ old regimes. President Bashar al-Assad’s speech today may however give new momentum to pro-democracy protests.

Dressed in plain clothes, policemen and members of the Moukhabarat, the Syrian secret services, keep a watchful eye on the Seven Seas Square. A few hours later, it is the scene of a massive rally in support of the president, with tens of thousands of pro-regime protesters pouring onto the streets.

The show of support comes on the heels of demonstrations against the Assad government which have rocked the country over the past few weeks, resulting in the deaths of 55 people at the hands of the Syrian security apparatuses, according to Amnesty International. Syrian activists, however, claim the number of the dead is closer to 100.

In a country where half the population seems to be spying on the other half, many are wary of revealing their true political views. “Many among the country’s middle class have become frustrated with the situation. They are asking for wider political reforms,” says Jihad Yazigi, editor of the Syria Report.

“About 11 percent of the Syrian population lives on less than two dollars a day,” emphasises Yazigi.

The southern town of Daraa, where the protests began, is a rural area plagued by drought for the past four years and widespread poverty.

Even among businesspeople and entrepreneurs in the capital Damascus, frustration with the regime and its rampant corruption is on the rise.

Take for example the Makhlouf family: As the president’s cousins, they are able to control all ventures in the country and ensure they receive a piece of every pie. If they are not granted a percentage of profits, they simply block the business from opening.

“A large international clothing retailer that recently opened in Damascus was prevented from operating until it agreed to give away some of its shares to a relative of the ruling family,” says one economist, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The emergency law has also been a point of contention for activists. In force since 1963, it effectively suspends most constitutional rights of Syrian citizens. Opposition parties are for the most part banned and freedom of the press is practically non-existent.

In spite of this dire situation, Syrians seem to be divided around the fate of the regime. “The pro-Assad rally witnessed today is very different from the “Damascus Spring”, which was in essence a secular movement,” says Talal el-Atrache, journalist and co-author of “Quand la Syrie s’éveillera” (When Syria Awakes).

The Damascus Spring was a period of political and social debate that broke out after the death of President Hafez al-Assad in 2000. However, the movement was followed by a wave of arrests and was suppressed by the government.

While few Syrians are supporters of the regime, the president does enjoy some level of support — for honourable and less honourable reasons, according to Karim Emile Bitar, a fellow at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) in Paris.

“Many Syrians appreciate the fact that their country was less subservient to U.S. interests than other Arab regimes (in terms of foreign policy). And the president is supported by many members of his own Alawite community,” underlines Bitar.

Other minorities, such as the Christians and Druze, believe the regime is the only line of defence against Sunni fundamentalism.

“There is also fear of the possible ‘Lebanisation’ of the country if unrest prevails in Syria,” points out el-Atrache, referring to the 15-year civil war between the many religious factions in Lebanon.

Within the Sunni community, many blame the country’s problems on the president’s ‘Hashya’ (entourage) and point out that his power is restricted to foreign policy, deflecting the blame away from Assad when it comes to domestic issues.

According to Bitar, if Assad wants to save his regime and stay in power, he will have to introduce accountability and enact radical reforms that are bound to displease members of his family.

“I am referring specifically to the potential dismissal of a few security officials who are related to the president and the economic reforms that will impact the business interests of the Makhlouf family. It remains to be seen whether Assad will decide to break these bonds and sacrifice the interests of influential family members. If he does, he might regain some popular support,” he adds.

However, the recent crackdown that accompanied promises of political reform leaves little hope for real change. President Assad’s speech to the nation today dealt another blow to those calling for real political change.

Assad attributed the recent strife “to the instigation of satellite TV stations,” adding that the objective behind “the latest plot against Syria was aimed at ending its leadership of the resistance against Israel”. He also said that the government will start working on reforms without specifying any time or scope.

However, new economic and demographic realities as well as advances in communication tools leave authoritarian regimes with no other choice but to reform, if they want to survive. It seems the Syrian regime is still oblivious to this simple fact.

Excerpt:

By Mona Alami
DAMASCUS, Mar 29 2011 (IPS)

Pro-democracy ‘Day of Dignity’ rallies in Syria have led to many casualties in recent days. Before real political reforms are introduced, many lines will be crossed, lives lost, and human rights discarded

“The regime has been rattled by protests, which have resulted in its use of certain (oppressive) means that will be counterproductive in the longer run,” says writer and former political prisoner Yassine Hajj Saleh.

According to the National Organisation for Human Rights in Syria (NOHR), Syrian security forces arrested, as of Mar. 22, 34 people in Daraa alone, over 49 people in Damascus and its suburbs, 10 in Hama, four in the city of Aleppo and two in Banyas. Many, however, are still unaccounted for.

The arrests were dovetailed by a rising death toll resulting from this week’s government crackdown on the demonstrations. Estimates of the number of dead vary greatly, with the government claiming 37 fatal casualties, Amnesty International putting the figure closer to 55 and activists reporting over 100.

The recent bloodshed presents a very grim picture for human rights organisations and activists in Syria. “Syria’s security forces are showing the same cruel disregard for protesters’ lives as their counterparts in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain,” observed Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Amnesty International also said in a Mar. 24 press release that the Syrian government ordered security forces to attack protesters during the ongoing unrest.

“The violent oppression of the protests organised in Daraa and Lattakia is in contradiction with promises of reforms made by the regime,” says Abou Mohamad, a Daraa activist, whose last name has been omitted for the sake of anonymity.

In recent weeks, various reports indicated that Syria’s security forces used live ammunition against protesters in Daraa. Protests in Lattakia last Saturday are said to have also ended in two deaths after demonstrators were targeted by snipers.

In an effort to quell tensions, the government of Prime Minister Naji Otri resigned on Mar. 29, while Bouthaina Shaaban, adviser to the president declared that the emergency law, in place since 1963, will be lifted.

“Are things better today than under the rule of President Bashar al-Assad’s father (Hafez al-Assad) from a human rights standpoint? Yes and no,” answered Nadim Houry, the director of HRW in Beirut.

Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000 after the death of his father, who ruled Syria for over 20 years. “Today’s events are not comparable to the 1980s, which were an exceptional time period,” added Houry, referring to the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama. In response to the riots, then president Hafez al-Assad sent in the army, crushing the insurrection and killing tens of thousands of people.

In addition to the brutal response from the Syrian security apparatus and the arrests of dozens of protesters, this month’s demonstrations have also resulted in the detainment of a number of writers and activists charged with inciting unrest.

Louay Hussein, a blogger known for his call for reforms, and Mazen Darwish, the head of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression in Syria, were both apprehended by police but then released amid increasing unrest. Syrian poet Mohmad Dibbo was also detained during a protest in the city of Banyas, according to NOHR.

Since Mar. 24, the government has released some 260 people, according to Al-Jazeera, in an attempt to quell the population’s anger at the recent killings.

Despite this move, Syria’s prisons are still filled with political prisoners, journalists, and human rights activists. In an interview with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), activist Haytham al Maleh called on the international community to exert pressure on the Syrian regime to respect their international commitments with regards to human rights.

“The Syrian regime has signed all international conventions, including the Arab Charter of Human Rights, which was adopted by the Arab League,” he told FIDH.

While no real information exists as to how many activists and opposition members are in Syrian prisons, Maleh stated that there were more than 4,000, while HRW says the figure is around 1,000, including opposition members. Abou Mohamad also underlined that many of the youth who had promoted the pro-democracy movement on Facebook were still unaccounted for.

“As one activist put it, ‘In the 1980s, people went to jail without trial. Now we get a trial, but we still go to jail,'” stated Houry. “Ten years into Bashar al-Assad’s rule, and the people’s initial hopes for more democracy and transparency remain unfulfilled.”

Many have argued that Assad has been unable to carry out the promises of reform made when he took power because of the political entrenchment of an “old guard” that refuses any political leniency.

Although no real reforms have been implemented thus far, the Syrian government has rushed to make economic changes in an effort to soothe the discord.

“Already the government has moved to create jobs by offering to pay for the first year’s salary of new hires in the public sector. An order has gone out to provide Stateless Kurds in the northeast with equal rights, which means they can go to secondary school and university and work legally. Also, the new VAT tax has been delayed indefinitely,” points out Joshua Landis, director of the Middle East Centre.

The country is still however in a situation of political crisis. Today tens of thousands of protestors rallied in Damascus in a show of support to the president while surrounding cities, where pro-democracy protests took place in previous days, remained calm.

“The demands for political reform of the pro-democracy protestors are legitimate. Whether the people respond to what President Assad will say tomorrow will certainly reflect on the mood of the population, after this coming Friday’s prayers,” points out Hajj Saleh.

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By Mona Alami
BEIRUT, Mar 29 2011 (IPS)

In spite of its recent successes, Hezbollah seems to be experiencing increasing difficulty in harmonising the interests of its Shiite constituency and those of its Iranian patrons as it delves into the chaos of Lebanese politics.

“Hezbollah is in a period of consolidation and preparing for the next war with Israel,” says Nicholas Blanford, correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly who has just completed a book on Hezbollah’s military wing that will be published this summer.

Taking root in the Shiite community residing in South Lebanon, the Party of God has been able in recent years to constantly reinvent itself. The organisation began as a militant group notorious for its acts of war and terrorism, including the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, which resulted in the deaths of over 60 people.

After the end of the 1975-1990 civil war, it morphed into a military movement dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon until 2000, when the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) withdrew from the territory. Today, Hezbollah has transformed once again, this time into an active Lebanese political party.

Over the years, the faction has learned to steer Lebanese politics in its favour, often with the use of force. “However, Hezbollah’s ideological goals — namely the liberation of Jerusalem and the establishment of an Islamic state — have never changed. Nevertheless, Hezbollah understands the Lebanese reality that makes the latter very difficult,” argues Blanford.

It is an opinion shared by political analyst Joseph Alagha. “The party has stressed that it ideologically defends the establishment of an Islamic state, but it has learnt that such a political programme is not practical because of the confessional and sectarian nature of Lebanon and the opposition they will face from the majority of Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim,” he underlines.

Ever the pragmatic player, Hezbollah has chosen, at least for now, to shelve its political ideology and practice a more ‘down to earth’ approach that would go over better with the Lebanese population and, more importantly, its Christian allies.

Other than its religious ideology, Hezbollah has also had to contend with the legitimacy of its arms after Israel’s withdrawal. Since 2000, Hezbollah has sidestepped the issue by declaring that Israel is still occupying Lebanese land in the Shebaa Farms and, therefore, their weapons are still a necessity.

The liberation of Shebaa has come under fire, however, as its ownership is still being questioned. Hezbollah claims that it is Lebanese land, while Israel says that it is Syrian. During the stalemate, the debate over the ‘armed resistance’ remained on the backburner, until the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.

“Another cornerstone in the history of Hezbollah is certainly built around Syria’s pull out from Lebanon,” says researcher Kassem Kassir, a Lebanese expert on Islamic movements.

Up until 2005, Hezbollah had found in Syria an amenable ally that would protect and justify its use of weapons. But the end of the occupation brought the debate back to the forefront, as the militant group is the only party in Lebanon still armed.

“Hezbollah had to turn to a defensive approach both on the internal and external fronts that would allow for the protection of its resistance programme,” adds Kassir.

This new balance of power did not garner the support of the Lebanese population as a whole, with many, who had previously endorsed Hezbollah’s resistance, calling for its integration into the Lebanese army. The situation also led to clear cut divisions between the Hezbollah-led ‘March 8’ and Sunni-led ‘March 14’ movements as well as sectarian tensions.

The situation between the two groups grew tenser in 2006, when Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three others in an ambush, instigating a month long war that killed over 1,200 Lebanese civilians.

“Both Iran and Hezbollah knew that the 2006 war came at a huge cost,” underlines Blanford.

In the wake of the hostilities with Israel, Iran’s money poured into Lebanon to quell any dissent within the Shiite community. But its plans to gain even greater political power in Lebanon did not end there.

The party was able to buttress itself internally in 2007 by organising an 18 month long sit-in in Beirut’s downtown area, demanding a ‘consensual president’ and guaranteed veto power in the new government after the ‘March 14’ movement won the majority of votes in the elections.

They took their demands to the next level in May 2008, when they deployed armed gunmen on the streets of Beirut and in certain mountain villages to protest the government’s crackdown on Hezbollah’s illegal telecom network. Fierce gun battles in the country further deepened the rift between the Shiites and other communities.

“Hezbollah operates essentially around two poles: its obedience to Iran’s Wilayat al fakih and its obligation to its Shiite constituency,” says Blanford. The theory of Wilayat al faqih, promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini as one of the basis of the Iranian Constitution, states that religious jurists should lead Islamic governments. In recent years, it has become clearer that Hezbollah is facing more challenges in bringing together both interests and aligning the poles side by side.

In addition, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, has not shied away from making fiery statements against pro-Western Arab countries, such as Egypt and more recently Bahrain, where a protest organized by the Shiite population was violently repressed.

Harsh criticism of the Gulf country in particular had significant local repercussions. Last week, various reports claimed that Bahrain has stopped providing Shiite Lebanese with visas due to Nasrallah’s recent discourse. This move comes after the UAE’s expulsion of hundreds of Lebanese Shiites in 2009 for similar reasons.

The path Hezbollah is currently treading on seems to be one that is increasingly narrowing. And if a conflict between Israel and Iran ever breaks out, as many have argued, the intervention in a war that is not its own, will certainly significantly damage the party’s stature with its community.

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