Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Demographic realities are well documented, and governments have long been aware of the profound demographic changes now underway. Nevertheless, many policymakers continue to discount or ignore these demographic trends.

This reluctance often reflects the tension between short-term political priorities and long-term demographic realities. As a result, governments are frequently unwilling to acknowledge the full scale of the major demographic transformations reshaping their societies.

In some cases, demographic denialism serves to protect entrenched political or economic interests. More often, however, it reflects an unwillingness to confront politically difficult policy choices, such as raising taxes, expanding immigration, increasing retirement ages, or committing additional resources to pensions, healthcare, and other social welfare programs.

Many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline

Because demographic change typically unfolds gradually, politicians often prioritize policies that deliver immediate political or economic benefits over reforms designed to address long-term challenges such as population decline and demographic ageing. Electoral incentives and short-term political considerations often outweigh the need to adapt to evolving demographic realities.

Governments may also downplay demographic trends because doing so enables them to pursue short-term political priorities and ideological objectives while postponing the more difficult fiscal and policy adjustments required by demographic change.

Moreover, some policymakers continue to pursue measures intended to restore the demographic patterns of the recent past, despite the limited likelihood that such efforts will succeed.

The demographic conditions of the 20th century were historically exceptional. Population growth, fertility rates, age structures, declining mortality, and gains in life expectancy all reached unprecedented levels, particularly during the second half of the century. These conditions were the product of a unique combination of historical, economic, technological, and public health factors and are unlikely to be repeated. Rather than attempting to recreate the demographic environment of the past, governments should focus on adapting institutions, policies, and public finances to contemporary demographic realities.

The world’s population nearly quadrupled during the 20th century, rising from 1.6 billion in 1900, to 2.5 billion in 1950, and then to 6.2 billion by 2000.

Today, the global population is approximately 8.3 billion, more than five times its size in 1900. Although the world’s population is expected to continue growing, the rate of growth has slowed dramatically. According to current projections, the global population is expected to peak at approximately 10.3 in the mid-2080s before declining slightly to around 10.2 billion by the end of the century (Table 1).

Source: United Nations.

The world’s population growth rate, which was 1.7% in 1950, rose to a peak of about 2.3% in the early 1960s. By the end of the 20th century, it had declined to about 1.4%. In 2026, the global growth rate is estimated at approximately 0.8% and is projected to continue decreasing, reaching about -0.1% by the end of the century.

Moreover, many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline.

Fertility levels have also fallen dramatically from the relatively high levels of the mid-20th century. The global fertility rate, which averaged more than five births per woman in the late 1950s, had declined to about half that level by the beginning of the 21st century. By 2026, the world’s fertility rate is estimated at approximately 2.2 births per woman. Furthermore, more than half of all countries now have fertility rates below the replacement level of approximately 2.1 births per woman.

Population ageing is another defining demographic trend. In 1950, only about 5% of the world’s population was aged 65 or older. By 2026, that proportion had more than doubled to nearly 11%. The proportion of the population aged 85 and older has increased even more rapidly, rising from just 0.2% in 1950 to about 1% in 2026.

As populations age, people are also living longer than ever before. Global life expectancy at birth has increased substantially, from about 46 years in 1950 to approximately 74 years in 2026.

Life expectancy at age 65 has also risen substantially. Globally, it increased from about 11 additional years in 1950 to approximately 18 additional years by the mid-2020s. In many countries, however, the gains have been greater, with life expectancy at age 65 exceeding 20 years. In Japan and France, for example, a 65-year-old can expect to live approximately 23 additional years (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century.

In many low-fertility countries, governments have devoted substantial public resources to pro-natalist measures such as cash transfers, tax incentives, subsidized childcare, and housing assistance. While these policies may ease short-term financial constraints for families, they have generally produced only modest and often temporary increases in fertility rates.

At the same time, despite rising old-age dependency ratios and persistent labor shortages, immigration policy remains politically contentious, and, in some countries, highly restrictive. This has occurred alongside growing fiscal strain on pay-as-you-go pension systems and increasing demand for healthcare and long-term care services.

Although life expectancy continues to increase, especially at older ages, reforms such as gradually raising retirement ages, broadening the tax base, restructuring pension systems, and adapting healthcare financing have often advanced slowly because of political resistance. As a result, fiscal adjustments frequently lag behind demographic change, contributing to mounting budgetary pressures and, in some cases, greater intergenerational tension.

In some countries, political leaders have responded to inconvenient demographic trends by weakening the independence of statistical agencies, reducing funding for demographic research and data collection, firing statisticians, sidelining professional expertise, or publicly questioning well-established demographic evidence. Such actions can make it more difficult for policymakers and the public to assess demographic change accurately, evaluate policy options, and develop effective long-term responses.

Similarly, rather than modernizing public safety nets, diversifying revenue sources, or implementing gradual reforms to retirement and pension systems, many governments postpone difficult policy decisions to minimize electoral backlash. Prolonged delays, however, can undermine the long-term financial sustainability of public programs and increase the likelihood that pension and social insurance trust funds will become insolvent or require abrupt corrective measures.

Another form of political avoidance is the maintenance of restrictive immigration policies despite persistent labor shortages. In many countries, immigration has historically helped offset population decline driven primarily by sustained below-replacement fertility. Without sufficient immigration, population decline and demographic ageing are likely to accelerate in these societies.

The major demographic shifts of the 21st century – including population decline, demographic ageing, sustained below replacement fertility, increasing longevity, migration, refugee movements, and asylum pressures – are well documented and widely recognized. Nevertheless, many governments continue to prioritize efforts to reverse these trends while devoting comparatively less attention to adapting institutions and public policies to long-term demographic realities.

Rather than focusing primarily on restoring the demographic conditions of the recent past, policymakers may benefit from placing greater emphasis on adapting economic, fiscal, and social institutions to the demographic realities of the present and the decades ahead. Such an approach recognizes demographic change not as a temporary departure from historical norms, but as a defining structural feature of the 21st century that requires sustained institutional adaptation rather than attempts at demographic restoration.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of numerous publications on population issues.

By Joseph Chamie
NEW YORK, Oct 20 2015 (IPS)

The demographic revolutions the world is experiencing are profound and far-reaching, affecting virtually every aspect of human society. Whether in politics, business, international relations, environmental affairs or even personal matters, understanding the fundamental demographic changes underway and anticipating their juggernaut consequences can contribute considerably to the setting of meaningful goals, designing effective strategies and achieving genuine progress.

Most observers would probably not go as far as some who claim “demography is destiny.” Many, however, would likely concede that demography is way ahead of anything else in second place regarding the destiny of human populations.

Among the key demographic revolutions underway perhaps first and foremost is the unprecedented growth of world population. The 20th century saw the beginning of rapid growth with the world’s population increasing nearly four-fold during the past century, from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion in 2000.

The world’s annual rate of growth peaked at 2.1 per cent in the late 1960s and is now 1.2 per cent. The global annual increase also hit a record high of 93 million in the late 1980s and is currently 83 million additional people annually.

World population, now at 7.3 billion, is projected to reach 9.7 billion by mid-century and 11.2 billion by the century’s close, according to the UN medium variant projection which assumes declines in high fertility and slight increases in low fertility. It is possible, however, that world population in the future could be larger or smaller than that projection (Table 1).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

If current fertility rates were to remain constant, world population would be 10.9 billion by 2050 and 26.0 billion in 2100. In contrast, if fertility rates for all countries were instantly at the replacement level of about two children per woman, world population would reach 9.3 billion by mid-century and 10.3 billion by the end of the century. Also, if the fertility rates of countries were to fall and remain well below the replacement level, world population would peak at 8.7 billion in 2050 and decline to 7.3 billion by 2100.

Nearly all of world population growth takes place in less developed regions. India and China alone account for close to one-third of the world’s annual births, 19 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. The increase in India’s population is so rapid that it achieves in 10 days the same demographic growth as Europe over an entire year.

Differential rates of demographic growth are contributing to a New International Population Order. Whereas six of the world’s 10 largest populations in 1950 were more developed countries, today the number is two – the United States and the Russian Federation – and by 2035 the Russian Federation is projected to be displaced by Ethiopia (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

Europe’s population, which was double Africa’s in 1965, is expected to be half the size of Africa’s population by 2025. Other noteworthy population changes include India surpassing China in 2022, the population of the Philippines outnumbering Japan in 2029, the United Kingdom exceeding Germany in 2049 and Nigeria overtaking the United States as the third most populous country in 2049.

In 2007, for the first time in human history, the majority of the world became urban dwellers. By mid-century the growing urban population is expected to account for two-thirds of the world’s population, which is the reverse of the world urban-rural distribution in mid-20th century. Most of the world’s projected population growth over the coming decades will be taking place in urban areas.

Another demographic revolution during the 20th century – perhaps humanity’s greatest achievement – is the decline in mortality. Mortality rates across all age groups, especially infants and children, fell remarkably resulting in dramatic increases in life expectancies.

Whereas global life expectancy at birth in 1950 was 47 years, it is projected to be 78 years by mid-century. Increased human longevity is also expected to continue or even accelerate with the current number of centenarians projected to increase 60-fold by 2100.

A further decisive demographic development during the 20th century is the remarkable decline in fertility levels in most regions of the world. Over the past 50 years the average global fertility rate declined from 5 to 2.5 births per woman.

Africa remains the only major region with relatively limited fertility declines. Consequently, the populations of 28 African countries are expected to more than double by 2050 and 10 of them are projected to increase by at least by five-fold by 2100.

In contrast, 83 countries – accounting for nearly half of the world’s current population – have fertility rates below the replacement level. As a result of those low fertility rates, the populations of 48 countries, many in Europe, are projected to be smaller by 2050.

Declining fertility and increasing longevity have resulted in older population age structures. While the 20th century was one of rapid demographic growth, the 21st century is characterized by the unprecedented ageing of population age structures.

Average ages of population, for example, have increased in most countries, with the highest now at 46 years in Italy, Germany and Japan. Among the developed countries the proportion of elderly aged 65 years and older surpassed for the first time the number of children aged 0 to 14 in 2015 and that noteworthy transition is expected among the developing countries in 2075.

The age-structure revolution is resulting in major economic and social challenges for nations. Areas of special concern for governments, households and individuals include labour force, retirement, pensions, social security, care giving and health services.

International migration will continue to impact population growth, age structure and ethnic composition, especially among the major receiving countries where it has become the dominant force of demographic growth. This in turn will result in significant social, economic, political and cultural consequences not only for receiving societies but also the sending and transit countries.

Those migratory flows are expected to include mounting numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and others displaced by conflict, political upheaval and environmental degradation in many less developed countries.

The more developed regions are expected to continue being net receivers of international migrants, with an average gain of at least two million people per year over the coming decades. The outflow of the highly skilled and educated from the less developed countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, is likely to further challenge and undercut developmental efforts in many of those countries.

The revolutionary demographic changes that the world is experiencing are impacting virtually every aspect of human life. Ignoring those weighty consequences and avoiding the needed adjustments to the changing demographic landscapes will significantly impact societal wellbeing. On the other hand, fully acknowledging the revolutionary demographic changes underway and seriously preparing for the anticipated challenges will contribute significantly to improving human existence on the planet.

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Latin American demographers and government delegates analyse the region's population and development challenges in Rio de Janeiro. Credit: Fabiana Frayssinet/IPS

By Fabiana Frayssinet
RIO DE JANEIRO, Jul 17 2013 (IPS)

Nearly 20 years after the landmark U.N. conference on population and development, the countries of Latin America have an opportunity to make headway with a new agenda on these issues, thanks to the favourable economic context that has made it possible to reduce social inequalities.

The situation in the region was debated at the preparatory meeting in Rio de Janeiro for the first session of the Regional Conference on Population and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, to be held Aug. 12-15 in Montevideo under the auspices of two specialised United Nations agencies.

Demographers and government representatives from the region were convened by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to a Jul. 15-17 meeting that took stock of pending challenges from the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in September 1994, which approved a plan of action to 2014.

The current context of economic growth and improvements in income distribution opens an opportunity for progress in the elimination of socioeconomic imbalances and improvement in quality of life, says the basic document by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Conference speaker Juan José Calvo, of the Uruguayan government’s population commission, agrees with this analysis of a Latin American population that over the last six decades has expanded from 167 million people to 596 million, according to 2010 figures.

“In the last 20 years we have seen extremely significant progress, in some cases giant strides, which does not mean that we do not still face big challenges, even in the same areas. In other words, we have lifted dozens upon dozens of Latin Americans out of poverty and extreme poverty, but that does not change the fact that it is still the main problem to be solved,” Calvo told IPS.

The ICPD programme of action recommended a set of interlinked quantitative goals, such as universal access to primary school education, with a special emphasis on girls; the promotion of health and reproductive rights, including family planning; the reduction of maternal and child mortality and morbidity rates; gender equality; and an increase in life expectancy.

In the framework of “sustainable development,” it took account of more general issues such as reduction of poverty and social, generational and ethnic inequalities.

In some countries these indicators improved, along with others that can help interrupt the cycle of inequality, like education. In Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, for instance, nearly all children and teens under 15 are in school, while on average in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, one-quarter of young people in that age range are out of the system, Calvo said.

Another stride forward was a rapid fall in fertility that began in the first half of the 20th century. Latin America and the Caribbean had some of the highest fertility rates in the world, at nearly six children per woman.

Four decades later, fertility in the region was below the world average of 2.9 children per woman, and in recent decades it has dropped to 2.17.

Since 1950, average life expectancy in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased by 23 years, to 75 years. During the same period, infant mortality plunged from 138 to 18 per 1,000 live births.

But these improvements are not evenly distributed among countries, regions or ethnic groups. “Latin America and the Caribbean remains the most unequal region on the planet, and that is probably its top priority challenge,” said Calvo.

“While we have made significant advances in most of the indicators that measure improvements in living conditions, there are still unacceptable gaps in sexual and reproductive health, poverty and education,” he added, referring, for example, to indigenous peoples.

Calvo said the basic problems could be traced back to the 1990s, when “the neoliberal governments that were predominant in the region gave up government planning as an instrument of public policies.”

At present, “several progressive governments have resumed planning, including demographic planning,” he said.

“Many have created social development ministries and institutes for young people and for women, for example, which are effective mechanisms for implementing more advanced regulatory frameworks,” he said.

However, not even these governments have been able to overcome internal conservative positions that hinder progress on issues like sexual and reproductive rights, regarded as “fundamental” by Brazilian demographer George Martine.

According to Elsa Bercó of Brazil, “fundamentalist” concepts blocked free discussion in Cairo of issues like sexual orientation, abortion and teenage pregnancy.

These issues “were not materialised in public policies or in the decisions of higher courts,” said Sonia Correa, the founder of the Brazilian women’s group SOS Corpo.

Martine told IPS that “In Cairo progress was made in terms of development, gender equity and reproductive rights, but not all of the agenda was discussed, and some touchier issues were left out of the debate for ideological reasons.”

He attributed this to “religious opposition, which is even capable of influencing governments whose own agenda is more progressive.”

Meanwhile, Magdalena Chu, the founder of the postgraduate course on Demography and Population at the Cayetano Heredia University in Peru, highlighted the region’s advances in sexual and reproductive rights.

“Nowadays there is more of a sense that people are free to plan their families, and to use this or that method of family planning,” she said. But she also blames conservative sectors for the fact that many governments have not been able to openly implement these policies.

Speakers at the meeting in Rio de Janeiro brought up other pending issues, like urbanisation processes and their consequences for the environment.

These are “inevitable” processes, but “there is a lack of policies on the part of administrators,” according to Martine.

“We have made advances on the road to development, but we still have a great deal to do,” Calvo summed up.