Tahrir Square in Cairo is now witnessing protests against Egypt’s new constitution. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS.

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani
CAIRO, Jan 27 2013 (IPS)

Hundreds of thousands hit the streets countrywide on and after the second anniversary of Egypt’s Tahrir Square uprising Jan. 25 to protest the policies of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from which he hails. A chief demand was the abrogation – or modification at least – of Egypt’s newly-approved constitution.

“The amendment of the new constitution is one of the primary demands of the people and parties taking part in anniversary rallies,” Magdi Sherif, head of the centrist Guardians of the Revolution Party told IPS from Cairo’s Tahrir Square. “President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood must heed the voice of the opposition.”

Egypt’s new national charter was approved last month in a contentious popular referendum – although not by the wide margin its mostly Islamist authors had hoped for. Despite its tepid reception by voters, only 64 percent of whom voted in favour, the new constitution formally went into effect immediately following the referendum.

According to Egypt’s secular opposition, the charter is deeply flawed. The six-month drafting process that preceded the referendum was dogged by controversy, culminating in the last-minute withdrawal of most non-Islamist members of the 100-member drafting committee.

Critics say the document fails to guarantee press freedom and free expression and concentrates too much power in the hands of the presidency. Nor, they say, does the charter adequately safeguard judicial independence or do away with Egypt’s longstanding practice of trying civilians in military courts.

“The new constitution employs very broadly-defined terms that could lead to restrictions on freedoms and the violation of basic rights,” Gaber Gad Nassar, constitutional law professor at Cairo University told IPS. “It also contains several articles that could theoretically allow the president to assume dictatorial powers.

“By broadening presidential authority, the charter allows the executive to dominate other branches of government,” Nassar added. He pointed to one article in particular granting the president the right to appoint members of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court (HCC).

Last summer, the HCC ruled Egypt’s first post-Mubarak parliament ‘unconstitutional’ on a technicality. The ruling led to the dissolution of the assembly – three quarters of which had been held by Islamist parties, chief among them the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to the Brotherhood and Morsi supporters, the HCC remains stocked with judges appointed by – and therefore loyal to – the ousted Mubarak regime.

Nassar also blasted the new constitution for allowing journalists to be arrested for certain press-related offences, and for allowing civilians to be tried by military tribunals if they are charged with “violations against Egypt’s armed forces.”

In a reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, Nassar (who says he is unaffiliated with any political parties or groups) added: “Those currently governing the country are carrying out their own agenda. Their lack of vision is deepening the political divide and they refuse to heed the opposition’s objections to the new constitution.”

Yet Murad Ali, official spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), insists that the FJP is – despite accusations to the contrary – “entirely prepared to hear and respond to other political forces’ reservations about certain constitutional articles.”

According to Ali, opposition forces currently in talks with the presidency are demanding the amendment of 15 articles. “And while some of the requested changes are reasonable, others are not,” he said.

For example, he said, certain political forces were demanding the elimination of an article barring former leading members of Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party from political participation. “But this is unreasonable,” Ali asserted. “Neither the Egyptian people nor the FJP will allow former NDP bigwigs to re-enter politics.”

Ali went on to say that the opposition had exaggerated the “expanded powers” allegedly given the president in the new constitution. “A careful reading of the charter will reveal that presidential authority has actually been reduced from the previous 1971 constitution.”

He added, however, that all other contentious constitutional articles – such as those dealing with personal freedoms, judicial independence and presidential oversight – “remain open to debate with other political forces with a view to reaching a compromise.”

The anti-constitution camp has coalesced around the National Salvation Front (NSF) led by former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei and presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabbahi. In its opposition to Morsi, the Brotherhood and the new constitution, the NSF has produced strange bedfellows, uniting liberal, leftist and ‘revolutionary’ groups with supporters of the former regime.

On Monday (Jan. 21), the presidency invited opposition representatives to a ‘national dialogue’ to discuss their proposals for constitutional amendments. Although shunned by the NSF, the dialogue was attended by representatives of certain opposition parties, civil society and Egypt’s three main Christian churches (Coptic Orthodox, Catholic and Evangelical).

Two days later, church representatives – along with those of some political parties – withdrew from the initiative, saying discussions had been “unproductive” and had “failed to yield the desired results.”

For Nassar, the walkout came as no surprise.

“Why should they stay? Conclusions reached by the so-called dialogue committee aren’t binding,” he said. The Shura Council, the upper house of Egypt’s parliament (currently endowed with legislative authority), he noted, “isn’t obliged to implement the committee’s recommendations.”

Nassar added: “Popular pressure and demonstrations are the only means of obtaining a balanced, democratic constitution that reflects the will of the people and the goals of the revolution.”

The FJP’s Ali criticised those who withdrew from the dialogue session, describing the move as “dictatorship by the minority.”

“Parties and groups that represent the 36 percent of the public that voted against the constitution cannot simply walk out when all their demands aren’t met,” he said. “Dialogue is intended to lead to compromise; it’s not a matter of one side making all-or-nothing demands of the other.

“The majority of Egyptian voters approved the national charter. And the choice of the majority must be accepted.”

Morsi, for his part, has repeatedly promised to reopen debate on proposed constitutional amendments in the first session of parliament’s lower house, following legislative elections expected some time in April. The offer, however, appears to have been forgotten in the violence and chaos witnessed on the revolution’s second anniversary. (END)

Supporters of Egyptian President Morsi in Tahrir Square to protest dissolution of parliament. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS.

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani
CAIRO, Jul 15 2012 (IPS)

The first major confrontation between Egypt’s new Islamist president and its quasi-ruling military council – fought over the issue of legislative authority – appears to have been won by the latter.

“The Muslim Brotherhood and its allies may have swept last year’s parliamentary polls, but lawmaking power remains in the hands of the military,” Magdi Sherif, political analyst and head of the Guardians of the Revolution Party established in the wake of last year’s Tahrir Square uprising, told IPS. “And recent developments have drawn Egypt’s judiciary into the conflict.”

On Jul. 8, Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first freely-elected president and long-time Muslim Brotherhood figure, issued an executive decree calling on members of the People’s Assembly, the lower house of Egypt’s parliament, to convene. The decree further called for fresh parliamentary polls to be held 60 days after approval of a new constitution via popular referendum.

On Jul. 10, however, Egypt’s High Constitutional Court (HCC) ‘suspended’ implementation of Morsi’s decree based on an earlier HCC ruling calling for the dissolution of parliament’s lower house. The constitutional court went on to stress that its decisions were “final” and “irreversible.”

The following day, Morsi backed down. Vowing to abide by the court ruling, he stressed the presidency’s “respect for the HCC, its judges and all rulings emanating from Egypt’s judiciary.”

Morsi’s Jul. 8 decree reconvening the People’s Assembly – one of his first major acts as Egypt’s new president – had come as a surprise. Not only did it contravene a constitutional court ruling, but it directly countermanded an order issued by Egypt’s military council.

The battle for legislative primacy began in mid-June, when the HCC ruled that the regulations governing last year’s legislative polls – which were swept by the Brotherhood and its Islamist allies – were unconstitutional. The following day, the military council ordered dissolution of parliament’s lower house, almost half the seats of which had been held by the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

Many legal experts continue to question the move’s legitimacy.

“The HCC ruling failed to provide any legal rationale for dissolving the entire assembly,” Atef al-Banna, professor of constitutional law at Cairo University told IPS. “The court only found one-third of the seats in the assembly – those reserved for independents but which were contested by party-affiliated candidates – to be constitutionally questionable.”

When Morsi abruptly ordered the lower house to reconvene, Brotherhood officials hailed the move as a “reflection of the popular will.” The decision was taken, leading FJP member Mohamed al-Baltagi said at the time, “out of respect for the 30 million-plus Egyptians who cast ballots in last year’s parliamentary polls.”

Legal authorities and constitutional law experts, meanwhile, continue to disagree on the legal and constitutional validity of Morsi’s executive diktat.

“Issuing the decree was entirely within Morsi’s legal rights. The President of the republic has the authority to convene the People’s Assembly whenever he wants,” Sarwat Badawi, constitutional law professor at Cairo University told IPS.

According to Badawi, it was the military council’s initial order to dissolve the assembly that was in breach of the law, “since it wasn’t issued by the relevant authority.” The military council, Badawi asserted, “does not have the legal right to order the dissolution of parliament.”

He added: “The HCC, meanwhile, is only mandated with ruling on whether something is constitutional or unconstitutional. Issuing recommendations on how its verdicts should be implemented – as it did when it called for parliament’s dissolution – is outside the court’s purview.”

Mohamed Hamed al-Gamal, former head of Egypt’s State Council, the country’s highest judicial authority in legal disputes between the state and public, strenuously disagreed.

“Morsi’s decision had no constitutional basis and was outside the authority of the presidency,” al-Gamal told IPS. “What’s more, it directly contravened both the HCC ruling and the constitutional addendum.”

Al-Gamal was referring to a Jun. 17 constitutional ‘addendum’ issued by the military council only days after the initial HCC ruling and only days before last month’s hotly-contested presidential runoff. The controversial addendum significantly expanded the military council’s powers at the expense of the country’s democratically elected parliament and presidency.

Along with transferring legislative authority from the dissolved People’s Assembly to the military council, the addendum also transferred several major executive prerogatives – not least of which is the right to declare war – from the presidency to Egypt’s influential generals.

“According to the addendum, the president will share executive authority with the military council,” prominent political analyst Abdullah al-Sennawi told IPS. He went on to describe the move as “nothing less than a soft coup against Egypt’s post-revolution democratic transition.”

Some analysts believe that Morsi’s backdown from last week’s presidential decree was a strategic retreat; that the presidency – and by extension the Brotherhood – is merely saving its strength for its primary objective: the abrogation of the military council’s constitutional addendum.

“Morsi’s subsequent retreat suggests that the decree was a test balloon aimed at measuring the presidency’s strength vis-à-vis the military council,” said Sherif. “If the decree had gone unchallenged, and parliament was allowed to reconvene, Morsi would have taken additional steps aimed at consolidating his position with the ultimate objective of overturning the constitutional addendum and restricting the military’s political role.”

Morsi supporters, meanwhile, have been arrayed in Cairo’s Tahir Square since mid-June – in varying numbers – to protest the dissolution of the Islamist-led People’s Assembly and the terms of the constitutional addendum. Many of them denounce Egypt’s judiciary, describing it as “politicised” and “packed with Mubarak-era holdovers.”

“The recent constitutional court rulings only confirm that Egypt’s judiciary, like most other state institutions, remains full of Mubarak loyalists with counter-revolutionary agendas,” Mohamed Aweida, leading member of the as-yet-unlicensed Arab Unity Party told IPS from the square.

“The idea that these court rulings are being used to achieve political ends has a lot to support it,” Sherif, too, conceded. “This includes the uncanny timing of its initial verdict dissolving parliament, issued only days before last month’s presidential runoff.

“What’s more, the constitutional court took only 45 days to arrive at a ruling, when decisions on major constitutional issues usually take years,” Sherif added. He went on to note that two similar Mubarak-era HCC rulings – both regarding the constitutionality of parliament – had taken five and two years, respectively, to decide.

Like the delayed after-effects of an earthquake below the ocean before the subsequent tsunami hits adjacent coastlines, Egyptian anger finally exploded this week after several days of stunned silence following the controversial results of Egypt’s first-round of presidential elections.

The headquarters of Ahmed Shafik, the last serving prime minister in the hated regime of former president Hosni Mubarak was set on fire and vandalised by an angry mob Monday night. Vocal marchers headed downtown to Talat Harb square while fights broke out in Tahrir Square where crowds gathered to protest the election results.

Results from the first round of voting saw Muhammad Mursi from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) secure first place, closely followed by Shafik, who ran as an independent. The two will contest a run-off election on Jun. 16 and 17.

Secular leftist and Nasserite, Hamdeen Sabahi, came in third, while former MB member and moderate Islamist Abdel-Moneim Abolfotoh came in fourth.

While many revolutionaries are secular and against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), special contempt is reserved for Shafik who has shown no remorse for the behaviour of the Mubarak regime, and is allegedly supported by the interim military government.

Shafik has also promised to resort to extreme force against protestors in order to “reestablish security and order” should he be re-elected.

The delayed anger of the protestors was due to disbelief that the political freedom they had fought so hard for during the revolution last year had left them to choose between a bad and a worse candidate.

“We are stuck between two right-wing conservative powers – the military and the Brotherhood,” said Hosni Abdel Rahim, a student movement leader and a member of Egypt’s small Democratic Front (DF) party, a socialist-oriented movement comprising intellectuals.

“Young people are now very angry as they feel they have nothing to lose. The economy is on the verge of collapse, employment opportunities are limited and now the one issue they put their hope into, their political freedom, hangs in the balance. This is a very incendiary situation,” Abdel Rahim told IPS.

The belittling of the revolution and its supporters by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), supported by a sycophantic media, have added to the revolutionaries’ woes.

The MB for its part mobilised its well organised supporters and civil society bases to win votes while the supporters of Shafik relied on well-funded resources. Supporters of the revolution had access to neither of these essential elements.

The palpable anger and confusion of Egyptian activists is being compounded by their inability to unite. Activists are torn between voting for Islamist Mursi despite their misgivings about the MB and the remnants of the old regime.

This was evident as IPS attended a meeting called by founders of the DF to formulate a strategy for the course of action over the next few weeks.

Moehsien Rashad said that supporting the MB is an interim strategy. “At least at this point we can pressure Mursi and the MB who control parliament to formulate a new constitution to show they differ from the previous regime. This pressure can’t be applied to Shafik under whom the system will remain unchanged,” Rashad told IPS.

However, Rashad’s friend and DF colleage Ibrahim Nawar believes the MB is the most dangerous threat to the Egyptian state and poses a far higher risk than voting for Shafik.

“Once they are in power they will transform the country into a theocratic Islamic state which is part of their platform. This happened during the Iranian revolution when Iran’s theocracy supporters made promises to civil society to implement civil law but when they swept to power reneged and forced a theocracy on all Iranians,” Nawar told IPS.

“The Brotherhood has betrayed the country over the last 15 months. They only joined the revolution at a later stage in the hope of milking it for political mileage. They also sided with the military in clamping down on the rights of protestors and mulled constitutional changes without consulting other political parties,” added Nawar.

Other activists, meanwhile, are showing their disdain for the elections by urging a boycott of the run-off in June. This attitude was evident during the first round with over 50 percent of Egyptians not voting.

DF secretary-general Wael Hossam is ambivalent about who to support. “I think there was a lot of political engineering involved in the recent results including voting irregularities. The Presidential Electoral Commission (PEC) has refused most electoral appeals stating they were not legally based or were lodged too late,” Hossam told IPS.

Several international monitors said they felt more like observers than monitors because PEC restrictions surrounding their monitoring were extremely strict and electoral changes were prohibited.

However, despite the divisions Egyptians appear united in promising to take to the streets should Shafik win the run-off. Simultaneously, some fear a military coup if their alleged candidate loses and the Brotherhood takes over.