By Joseph Chamie
NEW YORK, Oct 20 2015 (IPS)

The demographic revolutions the world is experiencing are profound and far-reaching, affecting virtually every aspect of human society. Whether in politics, business, international relations, environmental affairs or even personal matters, understanding the fundamental demographic changes underway and anticipating their juggernaut consequences can contribute considerably to the setting of meaningful goals, designing effective strategies and achieving genuine progress.

Most observers would probably not go as far as some who claim “demography is destiny.” Many, however, would likely concede that demography is way ahead of anything else in second place regarding the destiny of human populations.

Among the key demographic revolutions underway perhaps first and foremost is the unprecedented growth of world population. The 20th century saw the beginning of rapid growth with the world’s population increasing nearly four-fold during the past century, from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion in 2000.

The world’s annual rate of growth peaked at 2.1 per cent in the late 1960s and is now 1.2 per cent. The global annual increase also hit a record high of 93 million in the late 1980s and is currently 83 million additional people annually.

World population, now at 7.3 billion, is projected to reach 9.7 billion by mid-century and 11.2 billion by the century’s close, according to the UN medium variant projection which assumes declines in high fertility and slight increases in low fertility. It is possible, however, that world population in the future could be larger or smaller than that projection (Table 1).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

If current fertility rates were to remain constant, world population would be 10.9 billion by 2050 and 26.0 billion in 2100. In contrast, if fertility rates for all countries were instantly at the replacement level of about two children per woman, world population would reach 9.3 billion by mid-century and 10.3 billion by the end of the century. Also, if the fertility rates of countries were to fall and remain well below the replacement level, world population would peak at 8.7 billion in 2050 and decline to 7.3 billion by 2100.

Nearly all of world population growth takes place in less developed regions. India and China alone account for close to one-third of the world’s annual births, 19 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. The increase in India’s population is so rapid that it achieves in 10 days the same demographic growth as Europe over an entire year.

Differential rates of demographic growth are contributing to a New International Population Order. Whereas six of the world’s 10 largest populations in 1950 were more developed countries, today the number is two – the United States and the Russian Federation – and by 2035 the Russian Federation is projected to be displaced by Ethiopia (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

Europe’s population, which was double Africa’s in 1965, is expected to be half the size of Africa’s population by 2025. Other noteworthy population changes include India surpassing China in 2022, the population of the Philippines outnumbering Japan in 2029, the United Kingdom exceeding Germany in 2049 and Nigeria overtaking the United States as the third most populous country in 2049.

In 2007, for the first time in human history, the majority of the world became urban dwellers. By mid-century the growing urban population is expected to account for two-thirds of the world’s population, which is the reverse of the world urban-rural distribution in mid-20th century. Most of the world’s projected population growth over the coming decades will be taking place in urban areas.

Another demographic revolution during the 20th century – perhaps humanity’s greatest achievement – is the decline in mortality. Mortality rates across all age groups, especially infants and children, fell remarkably resulting in dramatic increases in life expectancies.

Whereas global life expectancy at birth in 1950 was 47 years, it is projected to be 78 years by mid-century. Increased human longevity is also expected to continue or even accelerate with the current number of centenarians projected to increase 60-fold by 2100.

A further decisive demographic development during the 20th century is the remarkable decline in fertility levels in most regions of the world. Over the past 50 years the average global fertility rate declined from 5 to 2.5 births per woman.

Africa remains the only major region with relatively limited fertility declines. Consequently, the populations of 28 African countries are expected to more than double by 2050 and 10 of them are projected to increase by at least by five-fold by 2100.

In contrast, 83 countries – accounting for nearly half of the world’s current population – have fertility rates below the replacement level. As a result of those low fertility rates, the populations of 48 countries, many in Europe, are projected to be smaller by 2050.

Declining fertility and increasing longevity have resulted in older population age structures. While the 20th century was one of rapid demographic growth, the 21st century is characterized by the unprecedented ageing of population age structures.

Average ages of population, for example, have increased in most countries, with the highest now at 46 years in Italy, Germany and Japan. Among the developed countries the proportion of elderly aged 65 years and older surpassed for the first time the number of children aged 0 to 14 in 2015 and that noteworthy transition is expected among the developing countries in 2075.

The age-structure revolution is resulting in major economic and social challenges for nations. Areas of special concern for governments, households and individuals include labour force, retirement, pensions, social security, care giving and health services.

International migration will continue to impact population growth, age structure and ethnic composition, especially among the major receiving countries where it has become the dominant force of demographic growth. This in turn will result in significant social, economic, political and cultural consequences not only for receiving societies but also the sending and transit countries.

Those migratory flows are expected to include mounting numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and others displaced by conflict, political upheaval and environmental degradation in many less developed countries.

The more developed regions are expected to continue being net receivers of international migrants, with an average gain of at least two million people per year over the coming decades. The outflow of the highly skilled and educated from the less developed countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, is likely to further challenge and undercut developmental efforts in many of those countries.

The revolutionary demographic changes that the world is experiencing are impacting virtually every aspect of human life. Ignoring those weighty consequences and avoiding the needed adjustments to the changing demographic landscapes will significantly impact societal wellbeing. On the other hand, fully acknowledging the revolutionary demographic changes underway and seriously preparing for the anticipated challenges will contribute significantly to improving human existence on the planet.

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Excerpt:

The world's population reached 7 billion on Oct. 31, 2011. Pictured near an entrance to UN Headquarters is a banner for a global campaign by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) to build awareness of the opportunities and challenges posed by this milestone. Credit: UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

By Joseph Chamie
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 25 2015 (IPS)

As the international community marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, one question worthy of some reflection is: Is world population better or worse off demographically since the establishment of the U.N.?

Some contend that the demography of today’s world population is markedly better than it was seven decades ago. Others argue that humanity is definitely worse off demographically and still others – often sceptics and cynics – feel it is neither better nor worse, but just different.This extraordinary demographic growth continues to pose serious challenges for humanity, including food production, pollution, global warming, water shortages, environmental degradation, crowding, reduced biodiversity and socio-economic development.

To consider the merits of those various perspectives and distinguish between personal opinions and measurable facts, it is useful and appropriate to dispassionately examine some fundamental demographic changes that have occurred to world population since the middle of the 20th century.

Perhaps the most visible demographic change is the increased size of world population, which now at 7.3 billion is five billion larger than at the time of the U.N.’s founding.

While world population has more than tripled in size, considerable variation has taken place across regions. Some populations, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia, have increased 500 percent or more over the past seven decades.

In contrast, other populations, such as those in Europe, increased by 40 percent or less over that time span.

The growth of world population, around 1.8 percent per year at mid 20th century, peaked at 2.1 percent in the late 1960s. The current annual rate of global population growth is 1.1 percent, the lowest since the U.N.’s founding.

In terms of absolute numbers, world population was adding approximately 47 million per year in 1950. The annual increase nearly doubled to a peak of 91 million in the late 1980s and then began declining to its current level of 81 million.

An important consequence of the differential rates of demographic growth globally has been the shift in the geographic distribution of world population. Whereas 70 years ago about one-third of world population resided in more developed regions, today that proportion is about half that level or 17 percent.

Also noteworthy are the regional demographic shifts that have occurred. For example, while Europe and Africa at mid 20th century accounted for 22 percent and 8 percent of world population, respectively, their current proportions are 10 percent for Europe and 16 percent for Africa.

Perhaps the most welcomed demographic change in world population that has taken place is the decline in mortality levels, including infant, child and maternal death rates.

During the past 70 years, the global infant mortality rate fell from approximately 140 to 40 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. The improvements in mortality across all age groups have resulted in an average life expectancy at birth for the world of 70 years, a gain of some 25 years since 1950.

Another remarkable transformation in world population over the past seven decades is the decline in fertility.

As a result of men and women gaining unprecedented control over the number, spacing and timing of their children, global fertility has decreased significantly from an average of about 5 births per woman at mid-20th century to 2.5 births per woman today.

Due to the declines in fertility as well as mortality, the age structure of world population has aged markedly. Over the past seven decades, the median age of world population has increased by six years, i.e., from 24 to 30 years.

In addition, the elderly proportion aged 80 years or older has tripled during this time period, increasing from about 0.5 to 1.6 percent.

The sex composition of world population has been relatively balanced and stable over the recent past, with a global sex ratio of around 100 -102 males for every 100 females.

Although slightly more boys are born than girls, many countries, especially the more developed, have more females than males due to lower female mortality rates.

Notable exceptions to that general pattern are China and India, whose population sex ratios are approximately 107 males per 100 females due in part to sex-selective abortion of female fetuses.

Whereas the sex ratio at birth of most countries is around 105 males per 100 females, it is 117 in China and 111 in India, markedly higher than their ratios in the past.

Increased urbanisation is another significant demographic transformation in world population. A literal revolution in urban living has occurred across the planet during the past seven decades.

Whereas a minority of world population, 30 percent, lived in urban areas in 1950, today the majority of the world, 54 percent, consists of urban dwellers. The migration to urban places took place across all regions, with many historically rural, less developed countries, such as China, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey, rapidly transformed to predominantly urban societies.

Another striking demographic change in world population is the emergence of mega-cities — agglomerations of 10 million or more inhabitants. In 1950, there was a single city in this category: New York, with 12.3 million inhabitants.

Today there are 28 mega-cities, with Tokyo being the largest at 38 million inhabitants, followed by Delhi with 25 million, Shanghai with 23 million and Mexico City, Mumbai and San Paulo each with approximately 21 million.

In addition to internal movements within nations, international migration across countries and regions has also increased markedly over the past decades. A half-century ago 77 million or nearly 3 percent of world population were immigrants, meaning they live in a place different from their place of birth. That figure has tripled to 232 million, representing slightly more than 3 percent of world population.

While most of the international migration is lawful, increasing numbers of men, women and children are choosing due to circumstance and desire to immigrate outside legal channels.

And while precise figures of migrants unlawfully resident are difficult to establish, the total number worldwide is estimated at least 50 million.

The numbers of refugees have also increased substantially during the recent past. At mid-20th century, an estimated one million people remained uprooted following the world war.

In the early 1990s the number of refugees peaked at around 18 million. Latest estimates put the global number of refugees at 16.7 million and growing.

Also, the total number of people forced to flee their homes due to conflict, which includes refugees, asylum seekers and internal displaced persons, has reached 51.2 million, the first time it has exceeded 50 million since the World War II.

From the above discussion, most would probably agree that while some aspects of world population are clearly better today than 70 years ago, others are not necessarily better and still others are decidedly worse.

Lower mortality rates and people living longer lives are certainly welcomed improvements. Men and women having the ability to decide more easily and freely the number, spacing and timing of births has also been an advance.

The logical consequence of lower mortality and fertility is population aging, a remarkable achievement that will, however, require major societal adjustments.

The scale of refugees and internally displaced person is plainly worse than a half century ago. The growing numbers and difficult circumstances of those fleeing their homes are unlikely to improve in the near future given the increasing political upheaval, ongoing civil conflicts and deteriorating economic conditions in many parts of the world.

Finally, the unprecedented growth of world population – the most rapid in human history –added about 5 billion more people since the mid 20th century.

This extraordinary demographic growth continues to pose serious challenges for humanity, including food production, pollution, global warming, water shortages, environmental degradation, crowding, reduced biodiversity and socio-economic development.

The recent declines in world population growth provide some indication of future demographic stabilisation or peaking, perhaps as early as the close of the 21st century.

At that time, would population is expected to be about 10 billion, 2.5 billion more than today or four times as many people as were living on the planet when the United Nations was founded.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

A mother and her three children, part of the indigenous Hmong group, in Sin Chai, northwestern Viet Nam. The general trend in world fertility rates shows they are in decline - due to a combination of factors, including economic development and the improved social role of women. Credit: UN Photo/Kibae Park

By Joseph Chamie
UNITED NATIONS, Jan 15 2015 (IPS)

Is below replacement level fertility the future for humanity? The answer to this seemingly simple question regarding human reproduction is not only of considerable demographic concern, but also has enormous social, economic and environmental consequences for the planet.

Aside from a global mortality catastrophe, the future size of the world’s population is determined basically by the number of children women bear. If the average number of births per woman remains more than about two, world population continues to increase.

However, if women on average have less than two births, then world population eventually decreases. A fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman under low mortality conditions is the replacement level, which over time results in population stabilisation.

Throughout most of human history women bore many children. In addition to offsetting high rates of infant and child mortality, a large number of children provided valuable assistance, needed labour and personal meaning to rural households as well as old-age support to parents.

At the beginning of the 20th century average global fertility was still about six births per woman. By 1950 world fertility had declined slightly to five births per woman, with less than a handful of countries having rates below the replacement level (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations Population Division

At that time, most of the largest countries, such as Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, had rates of six or more births per woman. In addition, 29 countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, had average fertility rates of seven or more births per woman.

As a result of the high fertility rates and comparatively low death rates, world population grew very rapidly during the 20th century, especially in the second half. World population nearly quadrupled during the past century, an unprecedented demographic phenomenon, increasing from 1.6 to 6.1 billion.

Also during the past 50 years, historic declines in fertility rates occurred, resulting in a halving of the world’s average rate to 2.5 births per woman. Those remarkable fertility declines are unequivocal and widespread, with lower rates in virtually every country.

In 1950, 101 countries, or 44 percent of world population, had a fertility rate of six or more births per woman. Today 12 countries – with all but two in sub-Saharan Africa, representing five percent of world population – have a fertility rate of six or more births per woman.

In addition, the transition from high fertility to below replacement levels took place in all European countries as well as in Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. The transition to below replacement fertility also occurred across a broad and diverse range of developing countries, including Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Iran, Lebanon, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia and Vietnam. In sum, 75 countries, or close to half of the world’s population, are experiencing fertility rates below the replacement level (Figure 1).

With regard to future fertility levels, two key questions stand out. First, will countries with below replacement fertility remain at those levels? And second, in the coming decades will the remaining 126 countries also end up with below replacement fertility?

While future fertility rebounds cannot be ruled out, the general pattern over the last five decades has been unmistakable: once fertility falls below the replacement level, it tends to stay there. That trend has especially been the case for the many countries where fertility has fallen below 1.6 births per woman, such as Canada, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Russia.

Some countries consider sustained below replacement fertility as a threat to their economies and societies and have attempted to return to at least the replacement level through various pro-natalist policies, programmes and incentives, including reduced taxes, subsidised care for children and bonuses. However, such government attempts have by and large not achieved their objectives.

The forces that brought about declines in fertility to historic lows are widely recognised and include lower mortality rates, increased urbanisation, widespread education, improvements in the status of women, availability of modern contraceptives and delayed marriage and childbearing.

Other important factors include the costs of childrearing, employment and economic independence of women, divorce and separation, the decline of marriage, co-habitation, childless lifestyles and the need to save for longer years of retirement and elder care. Those forces and factors are likely to continue and become increasingly widespread globally.

According to United Nations medium-variant population projections, by mid-century the number of countries with below replacement fertility is expected to nearly double, reaching 139 countries (Figure 1). Together those countries will account for 75 percent of the world’s population at that time.

Some of the populous countries expected to fall below the replacement fertility level by 2050 include Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. Looking further into the future, below replacement fertility is expected in 184 countries by the end of the century, with the global fertility rate falling below two births per woman (Figure 1).

It is certainly difficult to imagine rapid transitions to low fertility in today’s high-fertility countries, such as Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, where average rates are more than six births per woman. However, rapid transitions from high to low fertility levels have happened in diverse social, economic and political settings.

With social and economic development, including those forces favouring low fertility, and the changing lifestyles of women and men, the transition to below replacement fertility in nearly all the remaining countries with high birth rates may well occur in the coming decades of the 21st century.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

By Joseph Chamie and Barry Mirkin
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 29 2014 (IPS)

As the world marks the 25^th anniversary of the fall of the famous Berlin Wall leading to the reunification of the country and the end of the cold war, a little noted event occurred nearly two decades before the fall that ushered in a trend having profound consequences for the future of Germany as well as for Europe:  German births declined below deaths.

During the 20^th century, except for a few years during the two world wars, the annual number of births exceeded deaths in Germany up until 1972. For every year since that fateful date, births have never exceeded deaths (Figure 1).

Source: Germany official statistics

The historic demographic turnaround in Germany was not due to increasing deaths. On the contrary, the numbers of deaths during the 1970s and 1980s were decreasing and German life expectancies at birth increased by several years for both males and females over the period.

Actually, Germany’s demographic turnaround was the result of declining births as the country’s fertility rate fell below the replacement level.

For nearly 40 years Germany’s fertility has hovered around 1.4 births per women, or a third less than the replacement level of about two births per woman.

Despite the sustained negative rate of natural increase, Germany’s population remained close to 80 million largely due to international migration.

At the time of reunification in 1990, Germany’s population numbered slightly more than 80 million. However, with large influxes of immigrants in the early 1990s, Germany’s population continued to grow and peaked at almost 84 million about a decade ago. Since then, the country’s population has fallen slightly to about 83 million.

While admittedly the future remains uncertain, the likely paths for Germany’s key demographic components over the coming decades appear reasonably evident. First, mortality rates are expected to remain low as well as improve. Consequently, German life expectancies at birth are expected to increase by six years by mid-century, reaching 83 and 88 years for males and females, respectively.

Second, while fertility may increase somewhat from its current level of 1.4 births per woman, among the lowest in Europe, few expect that it will return to the replacement level any time soon. Approximately 20 percent of the women eventually remain childless and few couples are choosing to have more than two children. Recent population projections anticipate fertility likely increasing to 1.6 births by mid-century and 1.8 births by the century’s close.

Third, in contrast to fertility and mortality, future levels of international migration for Germany are considerably more volatile and therefore difficult to anticipate. The German government currently encourages immigration to address long-term demographic concerns as well as short-term labor force shortages.

Recently released figures for 2013 indicate the highest level of immigration to Germany in 20 years, yielding a net immigration of 437,000 or more than double the number of excess deaths over births.

While the future population size of Germany could follow a number of possible scenarios, the overall conclusion of most population projections is the same: a smaller German population in the future. For example, if fertility and life expectancies increased slightly and net migration levels were moderate, Germany’s current population of 83 million would decline to slightly below 73 million by mid-century.

However, if Germany’s current low fertility were to remain unchanged, its projected population in 2050 would be 69 million.

If some how German fertility rose steadily back to the replacement level by 2050, its population size at that time would still be a couple million less than today. Aside from large-scale immigration, Germany’s fertility would need to increase rapidly to avoid a smaller future population.

Even if fertility were to rise instantly and remain at the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman – an unlikely yet instructive scenario – Germany’s population would change little, hovering around 84 million at mid-century.

Germany’s future population is also being impacted by immigration, which is offsetting declines due to negative natural population change as well as the sizeable numbers leaving Germany. If immigration were to cease, the decline in Germany’s population would even be greater than noted above, falling to 67 million by 2050.

In addition to being less populous in the future, Germany’s population will be decidedly older. Germany’s current median age of 46 years – the world’s second highest after Japan – is expected to increase to 51 years by 2050. Also, the proportion of the German population aged 65 years and older is projected to increase from a fifth to more than a third.

Consequently, Germany’s potential support ratio is expected to fall to half its current level by mid-century, declining from about 3 to 1.5 persons aged 20 to 64 years per person 65 years or older.

An evident consequence of Germany’s ageing population is the raising of its retirement age incrementally from 65 to 67 years. Also, the proportion of the population aged 55 to 64 years who are in the work force has risen to 62 percent from 39 percent in 2002.

A further consequence of Germany’s demographics is its perception as a nation. Twenty-five years ago, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that Germany “is not and can never be an immigration country”. Clearly, that is no longer the case.

Germany now hosts nearly 10 million immigrants or 12 percent of its population. Also, recently Germany has become the second most popular immigration destination after the United States, overtaking Canada and Australia.

Only two countries have more immigrants than Germany: Russia and the United States. Most immigrants to Germany come from other European countries, particularly from Italy, Poland, Russia and Turkey.

Despite those demographic changes, Chancellor Angela Merkel has concluded that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have “utterly failed.” Nevertheless, recognising Germany’s ageing and declining population, she has also made clear that immigrants are welcome in Germany and the nation needs immigrants, but mainly from other European countries.

The changing demographics also have consequences for the relative population standing of European countries. After the Russian Federation with a population of 144 million, Germany’s population of 83 million is the largest population in Europe, followed by France and the United Kingdom at 63 and 62 million, respectively.

By mid-century, however, differential rates of demographic growth are expected to result in Germany’s population falling to fourth place, below the populations of both France and the United Kingdom.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

Indigenous women hauling water in Chiapas, Mexico. Credit: Mauricio Ramos/IPS

By Purnima Mane
WASHINGTON, Aug 6 2013 (IPS)

In the last decade, several countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region have had the opportunity to experience economic growth and establish redistributive fiscal policies aimed at reducing poverty, reducing inequality and improving the coverage and quality of health, education and social protection services.

And yet significant gaps exist in the area of reproductive health and rights, both between countries and as a whole, when it comes to some of the key objectives of the Cairo Programme of Action.

Let us take one of the basic indicators of reproductive health, the maternal mortality ratio. The decline overall in the region is not enough to guarantee the achievement of the target set for 2015.

The average maternal mortality rate in LAC is 80 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, according to estimates by WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and World Bank, 2011. Moreover, there are significant inequities between countries.

For example, the estimated maternal mortality rate in Uruguay was 29 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010, while it was 120 in Guatemala; Haiti exhibits the highest ratio in the region, with 350 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.

A significant proportion of maternal deaths are caused by unsafe abortions, which represent a serious public health concern in the region.

In 2008, the annual rate of unsafe abortion estimated for the region was 31 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44. In 2008, 12 percent of all maternal deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean (1,100 in total) were due to unsafe abortions, according to the World Health Organisation.

Abortion is only legal in six countries, and together, these countries account for less than five percent of the region’s women aged 15-44. (Guttmacher Institute, 2012).

In addition to the discrepancies noted in regard to maternal mortality and access to safe abortion between countries, there are also intra-country disparities.

For example, while the total fertility rate has reduced considerably, in Bolivia (DHS, 2008), the total fertility rate of women with no education was 6.1 compared to 1.9 for women with higher education, and the urban-rural difference is 2.8 to 4.9, respectively; in Panama, maternal mortality is five times higher among indigenous women.

What is even more tragic is that Latin America and the Caribbean has the second highest rate of adolescent pregnancy in the world, with approximately 70 live births per 1,000 women aged 15-19. On an average, 38 percent of women in the region become pregnant before they reach the age of 20 and nearly 20 percent of live births in the region are by adolescent mothers.

The conclusion is clear: universal access to reproductive health is still far from being a reality in the LAC region.

Looking specifically at the seven components of the programme of action, the LAC countries have achieved much higher rates of contraceptive prevalence than Africa or Asia as a whole.

For example, in 2012, the average contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) among married women in Africa was only 26 percent and 47 percent in Asia (excluding China); in Latin America and the Caribbean it was as high as 67 percent of married women [Population Reference Bureau].

As I said before, the LAC countries have brought down their collective maternal mortality rate to 80 deaths per 100,000 live births – a striking improvement over the Sub-Saharan African average of 500 per 100,000 live births and the South Asian average of 220 per 100,000 live births (UNICEF, 2010).

However, in other key areas of the Programme such as expression of and protection for sexual and reproductive rights including access to safe abortion, post-abortion care, and expression of gender identity or sexual orientation, the LAC region continues to be challenged.

The reasons for the progress in this region were mentioned earlier – development as a whole, higher rates of education and access to contraception have helped considerably.

Let us not forget however, that the lack of progress in ensuring reproductive rights and access to safe abortion in particular comes from the fact that a large number of LAC countries stated formal reservations to many of the rights components in the Programme of Action, including concern over abortion, a national belief and/or laws asserting a need to protect life from the moment of conception, and concern over alternate expressions of family beyond that of formal marriage between a man and a woman.

In contrast, while several other countries in other regions expressed similar reservations (notably many Islamic and Catholic countries), only one African and one Asian country (Djibouti and Philippines) presented formal reservations to this effect. These reservations have continued to hamper progress in these areas and produced the situation we see today in this region.

Purnima Mane, PhD, is President and Chief Executive Officer of Pathfinder International, a global leader in sexual and reproductive health.

Papua New Guinea is a natural habitat for diverse food crops and wild plants. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

By Catherine Wilson
PORT MORESBY, Jun 6 2012 (IPS)

Papua New Guinea’s high fertility rate is exerting pressure on land and food production in a country where 80 percent of the population lives in rural communities. But the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) argues that traditions of subsistence agriculture provide a firm foundation to build food security for a growing population.

Papua New Guinea, a fertile island nation in the South Pacific, is a natural habitat for diverse food crops and wild plants. Most people in rural and peri-urban areas grow their own fruit and vegetables for consumption, while in rural villages selling agricultural produce can be a significant source of income.

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the nation’s strong agricultural sector could easily ensure food security, with agricultural exports of 882 million dollars exceeding imports of 425 million dollars. Furthermore, the country has an agricultural labour force of five million, out of a population of 6.9 million people.

However, Sim Sar, programme director of agricultural systems improvement at NARI, warns, “Food production is not keeping pace with population growth. Approximately 42 percent of the population in rural and urban areas are unable to meet a target food energy requirement of 2000 calories per person per day.”

The fertility rate in Papua New Guinea is 4.6 children per woman, according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), compared to the average fertility rate in developed countries of 1.7 births per woman. The National Research Institute (NRI) predicts the current population could rise to seven million by 2014 and 8.5 million by 2024.

Attaining food security will entail addressing both population growth and agricultural productivity.

The UNFPA’s 2011 State of World Population Report emphasises, “In many parts of the developing world, where population growth is outpacing economic growth, the need for reproductive health services, especially family planning, remains great.”

Contraceptive prevalence in Papua New Guinea is 24 percent, while the regional range in the Pacific Islands is 20.5-46.1 percent, lagging well behind the 62 percent average in all other developing countries.

Distant rural communities and under-resourced rural health centres are obstacles to the dissemination of family planning materials and services.

Russel Kitau, Chair of Public Health at the University of Papua New Guinea, believes too many people ask, “Why should the government stop (us) from having many children? Who is going to take care of (us) when we get old? Is it the government?”

“Another (obstacle) is the fear that the side effects of contraception might cause cancer,” he continued, adding that some people believe women’s use of contraceptives could encourage infidelity.

Through the National Health Plan (2011-2020), the government aims to expand free family planning coverage and improve sexual and reproductive health for adolescents.

“We are doing our best to train our health workers to go back to the health centres and implement the family planning programme,” Kitau explained. “But funding for family planning is very low compared with programmes for (prevention and treatment of) HIV/AIDS. The small amount of donations and funding from development partners is not sufficient or sustainable in the long run.”

A large and growing population will be a reality for years to come in Papua New Guinea and Sar believes the agricultural sector must be at the centre of strategies to ensure sustainable nutritious food supplies.

“Agriculture in PNG is the primary source of food security,” he explained. “Hence the key strategy to attain food security is the enhancement of productivity, efficiency and stability of agricultural production systems.”

A socio-economic farmer survey conducted by the Fresh Produce Development Agency, which is tasked with developing a sustainable and commercially viable horticulture industry, reported that farmers grow an average of 4.7 commonly cultivated crops for sale, including sweet potatoes, bananas, tomatoes, taro, peanuts, beans, corn, carrots, cabbage, broccoli, cassava, cucumbers and pawpaws.

When questioned about challenges to productivity, 65 percent of growers identified pests and diseases, 32 percent cited the high price or shortage of fertilisers and seeds, while 22 percent blamed bad weather.

In order to boost production of local foods, as well as conserve crop diversity, NARI has released 27 new farming technologies since 2003. These include high yielding and disease tolerant banana varieties; drought tolerant sweet potatoes; upland rice varieties; improved peanut production methods; pest control technology packages for bananas; methods of controlling taro beetle with insecticides; and drought coping strategies.

Land is central to agricultural productivity and sustaining lives in the developing world, especially when, in times of poverty, people turn to land-based resources for sustenance. Most land in Papua New Guinea is held under customary tenure and has not been surveyed or registered, so there are disputes over land access and rights.

According to the NRI, land registration and secure land titles encourage efficient land-use, provide access to competitively priced credit and create incentives for investment, thereby enhancing agricultural productivity.

Land registration would also allow for easier and more robust exchanges of land between parties, thereby making land which is not being utilised accessible to those who need it.

“Though 80-90 percent of land is under customary tenure, not everyone has access to land due to uneven distribution (among) clan members, migration and death,” Sar added. “Hence the number of landless people is increasing, particularly those residing in urban areas or those in marginalised and disadvantaged areas.”

Only by investing now in family planning, agriculture and land reform will Papua New Guinea ensure a sustainable future for the next generation.

(END)