A view of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. Credit: Unsplash/Ekrem Osmanoglu

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 27 2026 (IPS)

On Wednesday, July 22, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, and Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Energy, HRH Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, best known as a 123 agreement, as well as an accompanying bilateral safeguards agreement, according to the U.S. Department of Energy and the Saudi Ministry of Energy.

While the agreement was expected to be submitted to Congress for review, President Donald Trump has conditioned U.S. nuclear cooperation on Riyadh, normalizing relations with Israel in order to receive U.S. nuclear technology. A condition that appears difficult to satisfy given the Kingdom’s hardline stance that it will not normalize relations with Israel until a Palestinian state is established with East Jerusalem as its capital, according to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader.

Washington mentions that these two agreements “lay the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar partnership that advances several priority economic and strategic objectives, including nuclear nonproliferation.” The agreement has a 30-year term.

The 123 agreement, named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – a U.S. federal law – provides the legal framework for long-term civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and partner countries. The 123 agreement is mandatory before any significant exports of U.S.-origin nuclear material, such as nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel, and other major components can go to any partner.

Saudi Arabia’s nuclear agreement with the U.S. is more than an energy deal. It has the potential to reshape the Kingdom’s relationship with oil, and its geopolitical role in building the Middle East’s next-generation clean-energy infrastructure.

The advent of nuclear energy could also free up the amount of hydrocarbons Saudi Arabia can export. The Kingdom produced 22,744,529.0 TJ of oil and oil products in 2023, having consumed 6.4 million TJ domestically, equivalent to approximately 28 percent of its production. The Kingdom also produced 3,640,348.0 TJ of natural gas, having consumed all of its domestically produced natural gas that year. For reference, 3,600 TJ is equal to 1 TWh.

Expressed in barrels of oil equivalent (boe), Saudi Arabia produced the energy equivalent to 3.72 billion barrels of oil, in oil and oil products in 2023, consuming 1.05 billion barrels of that oil. This indicates that roughly 72 percent of the Kingdom’s oil and oil products, measured in energy terms, are not domestically consumed, leaving a substantial share available for exports and other uses. Saudi Arabia is the world’s second to third largest exporter of oil, producing 11 percent of global demand.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), transport accounts for roughly 30 percent of Saudi Arabia’s final energy consumption, followed by non-energy uses (29.7 percent), industry (19.9 percent), and commercial and public services (11 percent).

Although the pace at which Saudi Arabia can transition away from fossil fuels remains uncertain, nuclear power could gradually reduce domestic oil consumption, freeing up oil for export. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), a reactor can take about five or more years to be built after licensing and regulatory approvals are already completed.

Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear plant is expected to consist of two reactors, each producing around 1.4 GW, bringing the plant to a total capacity of 2.8 GW (2,800 MW). Assuming a 90 percent capacity factor, annual energy generation will be 22.1 TWh per year, nearly five percent of Saudi Arabia’s 431.9 TWh electricity generation.

Although Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear plant would account for only about 5 percent of the Kingdom’s current electricity generation, it would represent an important step toward reducing domestic hydrocarbon consumption in support of the country’s national strategy, Vision 2030.

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By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

Despite rising geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions and calls to bring production back to domestic shores, the global economy remains more interconnected than it may appear. Trade through global value chains (GVCs) reached historic levels in 2024, according to a new report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

GVCs, the cross-border production networks through which countries exchange materials, services and intermediate inputs used to produce goods and services, accounted for roughly 17 percent of global GDP in real terms between 2022 and 2024. This is up from approximately 16 percent before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

The findings stand to challenge expectations that the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions would have on the campaign of de-globalization. GVC trade expanded rapidly before the Global Financial Crisis and later stabilized at historically high levels. Nevertheless, in 2024 inflation-adjusted GVC trade remained close to its 2022 peak, even as total global trade declined slightly from its 2022 level.

The distinction between real and nominal figures is particularly important following years of elevated inflation and volatile commodity prices. Rising prices can inflate the apparent value of international trade without representing an actual increase in the volume of goods and services exchanged. The OECD’s inflation-adjusted figures indicate that cross-border production itself has remained historically high.

Beneath that overall stability, however, industries have moved in markedly different directions. Manufacturing and transportation remain among the sectors most dependent on internationally sourced inputs.

Coke – a carbon-rich fuel produced from coal and primarily used in steelmaking – refined petroleum products, water and air transport, information and communication technology, electronics, rubber, plastics, chemicals, basic metals and motor vehicles all recorded GVC trade exceeding 35 percent of their gross output in 2024, indicating their heavy reliance on cross-border production networks.

While gains were recorded in those sectors, the motor vehicle industry became less internationally integrated over the period examined, falling from the sixth-most internationalized sector in 2011 to tenth in 2024, being overtaken by chemicals, air transport and electronic equipment.

Pharmaceuticals moved in the opposite direction. Despite increased policy attention toward strengthening domestic medical supply chains following the COVID-19 pandemic, pharmaceutical production became more dependent on internationally sourced inputs between 2011 and 2024.

GVC participation also increased notably in air transport and warehousing, highlighting the continued importance of globally connected logistics networks in supporting production.

The differences illustrate the uneven nature of supply-chain reconfiguration: while some industries have reduced their reliance on foreign inputs, others have become increasingly integrated into cross-border production networks.

The same pattern is visible across national economies. Of the 80 economies examined by the OECD, 49 had a higher share of foreign value added embedded in their exports in 2024 than in 2011.

Across the economies examined, countries generally relied more heavily on foreign inputs to produce their exports than they contributed inputs to exports produced elsewhere. For example, a country importing foreign-made components to manufacture and export a car is participating backward in a GVC. A country supplying steel that is then used to manufacture and export that car elsewhere is participating forward.

These patterns vary depending on the structure of each economy. Large economies such as the United States, China and Brazil are generally less reliant on foreign inputs because more of their production can be sourced domestically. Major commodity exporters such as Norway and Kazakhstan, meanwhile, rank highly in forward participation because their domestically-produced energy and raw materials become inputs in production and exports elsewhere.

Yet, increased GVC participation does not necessarily mean companies are simply buying more supplies from abroad.

Between 2019 and 2024, China, Japan, the United States and the European Union all became more reliant on foreign value in their exports. However, the OECD found that this was not primarily because companies shifted toward foreign suppliers. Instead, these economies increasingly produced and exported goods and services that themselves relied more heavily on international supply chains.

For example, an economy could begin sourcing more car parts domestically but simultaneously increase its exports of cars, which depend heavily on globally connected production networks. Its individual supply chains may become more domestic, while its overall economy becomes more integrated into global production.

The findings suggest that efforts to bring parts of production closer to home can therefore occur alongside deeper global economic integration.

Trade flows – the movement of goods and services across borders – only captures part of that interconnectedness. Multinational companies (MNCs) also operate and produce directly in foreign markets through foreign affiliates — companies they own or control outside their home country.

If a German MNC owns a factory in the United States, that American operation is a foreign affiliate. Products it manufactures and sells within the United States would not count as international trade, as they never crossed a border, yet the factory remains part of the German company’s global production network.

In 2023, foreign affiliates generated approximately USD 25.6 trillion in output, equivalent to one-quarter of global GDP and only slightly below the USD 26.6 trillion value of total world trade in goods and cross-border services.Together, MNCs and their foreign affiliates accounted for roughly 35 percent of world gross output in 2023 but only 60 percent of world exports, demonstrating their outsized role in international trade.

The geography of MNC production is also gradually broadening. While companies headquartered in OECD economies still controlled nearly 85 percent of foreign-affiliate output in 2023, the share of production involving non-OECD companies operating in non-OECD markets, nearly doubled from 4.9 percent in 2011 to 9.3 percent.

The report’s findings suggest that globalization is not simply retreating in the face of geopolitical fragmentation, rather global production is being reorganized across industries, companies and countries. Supply chains may be shifting, diversifying and adapting to new risks, but the networks connecting the global economy remain deeply entrenched and central to the production of goods and services.

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Trump insists the West must unite on his terms against the Rest, particularly China and Iran. Europe, however, wants greater Trump support for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime to replace Putin’s leadership of Russia.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

After Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich appeal for Western unity based on shared race, culture and imperial history, this appears to have been a European effort to strengthen its alliance with the US.

The unsubstantiated charge of Chinese military support to Russia against Ukraine, a claim never corroborated by Kyiv, is expected to worsen relations between Europe and China.

Portraying China as a strategic threat to Europe justifies greater belligerence against Beijing. It no longer seems to matter that China has never endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, China retains strong ties with Kyiv, calling for a ceasefire and political settlement, while repeatedly offering to mediate between the warring neighbours.

The G7summit of the seven largest rich economies in late June followed the EU in trying to consolidate Western strategic solidarity against Russia, China and Iran.

With financial crises from 1997 threatening G7 legitimacy, then US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers initiated the G20. But the recently expanded G7 role marginalises the more inclusive but less amenable G20.

Nurina Malek

More Chinese goods have entered European markets, with prices and quality that most others cannot match. For years, Western leaders happily enabled this by liberalising trade, appreciating cheap Chinese imports, for keeping inflation low.

After decades of state-encouraged investment, China’s still growing industrial capacity now supplies the world, enabled by Western-drafted WTO rules.

Before Trump 2.0, Washington had imposed investment restrictions, Section 301 measures, sanctions, tariffs and more following Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’. Facing less US market access, more Chinese exports have gone elsewhere.

European industry can no longer compete, even where it once led. Instead of neoliberal WTO trade liberalisation, EU protectionism supposedly ‘levels the playing field’.

US advisers increasingly warn European officials that China’s industrial ‘overcapacity’ will soon scale up the ‘China shock’ in most industrially significant supply chains.

China now refines and processes most of the world’s ‘rare earth’ minerals, exercising near-monopsonistic leverage over suppliers by processing at scale at much lower cost.

With China successfully countering Trump’s trade policies, Western leaders worry Beijing will abuse its near-monopolistic control of rare earth elements, which downstream industries need.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that New York and London rare earth market reactions indicate major institutional investors view recent developments as significant.

G7 vs China
Protecting European industry, labour and economic sovereignty is now constrained by the rules Western leaders put in place over decades, often coordinated by the OECD.

Splits inside the EU soon extended beyond commercial faultlines to ostensible strategic interests defined by the fluid geopolitics after the first Cold War.

German car exports to China have been superseded by Chancellor Metz’s military Keynesianism, in line with Trump’s demand for NATO allies to spend much more on the military to greatly strengthen Western military power and global dominance.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier push for unaligned European ‘strategic autonomy’ has given way to a NATO+ strategic view embracing Western imperialism.

Meanwhile, smaller EU member states remain cautious, fearing the collateral effects of new Western ambitions, such as Chinese restrictions on imports that Europe depends on.

Great power rivalry
With the Iran war refusing to fade from daily headlines despite Trump’s on-off-on ceasefire, other myths are also evaporating. Few still believe Israel will accept a ‘two-state solution’ or that peace will prevail between trading partners.

NATO, OECD, G7, EU and other such arrangements have become variable links in the hegemonic US-led bloc. Such coalitions – including Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan – were never seamless together or fully fit-for-purpose.

Trump expects unilateral US aggression against Washington’s chosen enemies must be fully supported and subsidised by NATO allies, with reluctance deemed disloyal, even antagonistic.

Countries not aligned with the major poles may be alternatively courted and coerced by rival poles, especially by the affluent West. Cooperation among others may be seen and portrayed as proof of the existence of an antagonistic bloc.

Multiple poles are likely to coalesce into the West versus the Rest, competing for support and influence, as those courted try to gain from their suitors.

With reduced government engagement and less sustained inter-state cooperation and order, disruptions in an increasingly anarchic world economy have required governments to prioritise resilience as businesses, consumers and labour face rising costs.

As the US and its allies weaponise economic rules and arrangements to discipline both friends and foes, the world economy is slowing unevenly as prices rise sporadically.

The US-Israel war on Iran underscores how current conflicts can develop in unpredictable ways as states and other significant non-state ‘actors’ innovate strategically in unexpected conditions.

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Security Council. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Shihana Mohamed
NEW YORK, Jul 13 2026 (IPS)

As the United Nations (UN) Security Council prepares for its first round of closed-door straw polls this month to select the tenth Secretary-General, the organization stands at a critical crossroads. Multilateralism is fracturing under geopolitical gridlock, and the UN is battling a severe budgetary deficit driven by funding cuts.

Yet the gravest threat to the institution is not financial; it is cultural. To regain the trust of the global public, the UN urgently needs a radical transformation of its organizational culture, beginning with the selection of candidates for its highest office—the post of UN Secretary-General. This requires dismantling entrenched nepotism, cronyism, patronage, and quid pro quo practices in recruitment, promotion and appointment, and replacing them with a culture grounded in merit, integrity, transparency, and gender equity.

Patronage Becomes Institutional Norm

The history of the Secretary-Generalship and senior leadership is marked by allegations and documented cases of favouritism that have undermined the UN’s professed values of merit and equity. During the tenure of former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, concerns were raised about the employment of his son-in-law within the UN system, prompting debate over perceived favouritism, though the appointment was defended on merit grounds. Under Kofi Annan, the Oil-for-Food Programme scandal exposed widespread corruption, bribery, and serious administrative failures.

Such controversies are not confined to the highest levels of leadership. Allegations of politicized staffing and patronage have periodically surfaced across the UN system, highlighting a persistent gap between the organization’s principles and internal realities.

What begins as an exception at the executive level can become embedded practice throughout UN agencies and departments. Mid-level managers often replicate these patterns by shaping job descriptions, tailoring interview panels, sharing interview materials, and influencing or “fixing” vacancies for preferred candidates. In such an environment, backdoor recruitment risks becoming normalized rather than exceptional.

The result is a damaging paradox: while the UN publicly champions fairness, equal opportunity, and transparency, its internal systems often operate through favoritism, personal connections, and exclusion. Talented staff without access to influential networks face limited advancement, while better-connected but less qualified individuals may benefit from patronage, eroding institutional credibility, staff morale, and public trust.

The 2026 Secretary-General Race Under Scrutiny

Even in the current selection process for the next Secretary-General, concerns about institutional fairness persist. Accountability investigations by independent watchdog groups have raised questions about the presence of family members of candidate Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, across Vienna- and Rome-based UN agencies. By contrast, candidates such as Michelle Bachelet, Rebeca Grynspan, and María Fernanda Espinosa bring extensive records in multilateral governance and international leadership, with no publicly substantiated findings of comparable family-based appointments during their UN service.

Concerns have also emerged regarding unequal institutional advantages during the selection process. Rebeca Grynspan stepped aside from her role as Secretary-General of UNCTAD in line with General Assembly Resolution 79/327, which encourages candidates holding UN positions to suspend their duties during campaigns to avoid conflicts of interest and undue advantage. Rafael Grossi has remained in office as Director General of the IAEA while pursuing his candidacy.

Critics argue that continued access to institutional visibility and resources may create an incumbency advantage. Whether or not this violates formal rules, it raises broader concerns about fairness and structural imbalance in leadership selection.

The UN’s Persistent Gender Gap

Beyond nepotism and back-door recruitment, the most glaring failure of this selection cycle is the UN’s inability to break its own highest glass ceiling. In over 80 years and nine Secretary-Generals, the organization has never been led by a woman. This persists despite years of relentless, highly coordinated global campaigns by civil society groups, advocates, and the 1 for 8 Billion coalition calling for gender-balanced leadership.

Despite decades of calls for historical justice and General Assembly Resolution 79/327—which notes with regret that no woman has ever held the position of Secretary-General and urges Member States to strongly consider nominating women, two men—Rafael Grossi and Macky Sall—were still nominated to such a narrow and exclusive candidate pool. At a time when women are leading nations and global institutions through major crises, this outcome highlights a gap between the commitments of Member States and their practice. It risks reinforcing the very inequalities the United Nations has pledged to address.

Reform in the UN Cannot Wait

The next Secretary-General must treat institutional integrity as a priority long before taking office—indeed, even before announcing a candidacy. Member States must translate long-standing reform commitments into enforceable mandates. These reforms can no longer remain aspirational; they must become immediate requirements shaping how the UN governs, recruits, and leads.

• Prioritizing a Female Leader to Break the Status Quo: Member States—and especially the five permanent Security Council members with veto power—must recognize that meaningful reform requires breaking entrenched networks of power and patronage. Electing the first female Secretary General in 2026 would signal a decisive shift toward aligning leadership with the principles of equality the UN promotes globally.

• Mandatory Campaign Step-Aside Rules: Any active UN official seeking the post of Secretary General should be required to suspend all institutional duties upon declaring candidacy. This would eliminate even the perception of using institutional platforms, influence, or resources for campaigning.

• Ban on Family Appointments: The UN system should adopt a strict policy prohibiting the hiring, consulting, or internship of immediate family members of any Assistant Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General, agency chief, and Secretary-General candidate. The international civil service must never be treated as a family business.

• Preventing Post-Fixing and Backdoor Recruitment: The Secretary-General’s Office should be empowered to independently review recruitment and selection decisions across the UN system and investigate credible evidence of favoritism, cronyism, or reciprocal patronage. All appointments must follow transparent, merit-based procedures that withstand internal and public scrutiny.

Restoring Institutional Credibility

The world does not need a Secretary-General who merely manages bureaucracy; it needs one who restores moral authority to a fractured international order.

If the next Secretary-General is selected through informal bargaining, backroom deals, entrenched patronage, or continued exclusion of women, the UN risks deepening its legitimacy crisis and accelerating its decline in global relevance.

The UN must first reform itself: break the highest glass ceiling in its history, dismantle entrenched systems of patronage, open its selection process to genuine transparency and scrutiny, and ensure that its leadership reflects the principles and values enshrined in the UN Charter.

The transformation must begin now, starting with this month’s straw polls in the UN Security Council for the Secretary-General selection.

Shihana Mohamed, a Sri Lankan national, is the President of Asia Global Network (www.AsiaGlobalForum.org) and a US Public Voices Fellow on advancing the rights of women and girls. She is the founder of the UN Asia Network for Diversity & Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org) and is a strong advocate for gender equality and the advancement of women. She served at the UN for over 25 years.

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CARICOM Heads of Government during the opening ceremony of the 51st Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Gros Islet, Saint Lucia, on July 5, 2026. Credit: Alison Kentish/IPS

By Alison Kentish
GROS ISLET, Saint Lucia , Jul 6 2026 (IPS)

Caribbean leaders are meeting in Saint Lucia for their annual summit, confronting a convergence of global and regional challenges ranging from rising living costs and climate change to crime, food security and geopolitical tensions.

The 51st Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the regional organisation that promotes economic integration, coordinates foreign policy and fosters cooperation among its 15 member states, runs until Wednesday.

Leaders are expected to discuss regional security, climate resilience, economic integration, trade, migration, food and water security and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.

The country’s Prime Minister Philip J. Pierre assumed the grouping’s rotating chairmanship.

He said he was taking over at a time of “profound uncertainty”, with Caribbean people feeling the effects of international instability in their daily lives.

“Our people feel these pressures every day,” Pierre said during the conference’s opening ceremony, citing the rising cost of food and energy, worsening climate impacts and growing concerns about crime and public safety.

He told the gathering that his six-month chairmanship would focus on ensuring regional integration delivers tangible benefits for Caribbean citizens rather than remaining confined to official meetings and declarations.

“Our people are asking a serious and legitimate question: What more can CARICOM do for me?” Pierre said. “We must make integration work for the ordinary citizen.”

The Saint Lucian leader outlined priorities that included strengthening regional unity, advancing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, improving food and nutrition security, addressing violent crime and illegal firearms, expanding transportation links, increasing access to climate finance and developing a coordinated regional approach to artificial intelligence.

He also called for stronger support for young people, women, people with disabilities and other groups that have historically faced barriers to opportunity.

Pierre renewed CARICOM’s call for climate justice, arguing that Caribbean nations contribute little to global greenhouse gas emissions while bearing a disproportionate share of climate impacts. He urged the international community to expand access to climate finance, loss-and-damage funding and debt relief mechanisms that better reflect the vulnerability of small island developing states.

The summit comes as Caribbean governments continue to navigate the economic effects of global conflicts, supply chain disruptions and inflation while confronting increasingly severe hurricanes, prolonged droughts and other climate-related disasters that disproportionately affect small island developing states.

CARICOM Secretary-General Carla Barnett said the region’s founders envisioned cooperation as a practical response to external pressures.

“Then, as now, external factors and influences put at risk the vision of regional integration,” Barnett said, adding that leaders must accelerate implementation of long-standing regional commitments, particularly within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.

Barnett pointed to progress in expanding the free movement of skilled workers, increasing agricultural production under the region’s food security strategy and strengthening international partnerships but said much work remains to implement agreed regional measures fully.

Outgoing CARICOM Chairman, Prime Minister of St Kitts and Nevis, Terrance Drew said his tenure reinforced the importance of unity during a period marked by global uncertainty, climate threats and questions about regional cohesion.

“The question is no longer whether CARICOM will survive,” Drew said. “The question now is how we strengthen CARICOM for the next generation.”

He said Caribbean governments had continued working together on food security, climate resilience, regional security, Haiti, reparatory justice and international diplomacy despite mounting external pressures.

Founded by the Treaty of Chaguaramas on July 4, 1973, CARICOM promotes economic integration, coordinated foreign policy and functional cooperation among its member states. The organisation now comprises 15 member states and seven associate members and works across areas including climate change, agriculture, education, health, security, trade, transportation and sustainable development.

This year’s meeting is being held under the theme ‘People, Partnerships, Prosperity: Promoting a Secure and Sustainable Future’. Leaders will continue discussions through July 8 before issuing a final communiqué expected to outline decisions on regional security, climate resilience, economic integration and other priorities identified during the conference.

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The demand for critical energy transition materials such as copper, lithium and cobalt is on the rise due to the expansion of clean energy technologies. Credit: Unsplash/Lj. Filipović

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 2 2026 (IPS)

Demand for critical energy transition minerals (CETMs) is expected to surge over the coming decades as countries expand clean technology capacity, develop electric vehicles, create battery storage, implement renewable energy systems, and introduce digital infrastructure according to UNCTADs latest report, The Shifting Dynamics of Critical Minerals Trade.

CETMs include lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, making them vital to producing low carbon clean energy alternatives and renewable technologies used for electricity production and battery storage. These elements are also commonly found within datacenters, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and any field requiring digitalization.

According to the report, demand for lithium is projected to increase by 353 percent by 2040, followed by graphite (131 percent), nickel (69 percent), magnet rare earths (65 percent), cobalt (49 percent), and copper (28 percent).

Naturally this surge in CETM demand also has changed the composition of where CETMs are being used, with clean technologies absorbing a growing share in the industry of CETMs.

Share of Critical Mineral Demand for Clean Technologies. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Although these CETMs are experiencing a surge in demand, from mining to processing or refining, the entire value chain is geographically concentrated between a few countries, dominating the entire global output. This same pattern also follows for reserves of key minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements which are unevenly distributed among a few states.

According to UNCTAD, China accounts for 69 percent of rare earth element production, and produces 78 percent of natural graphite capacity. Indonesia accounts for 67 percent of global nickel production, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for 50 percent of global cobalt reserves and 47 percent of global cobalt mine production.

“Reserves” refer to mineral deposits which can be economically extracted using available technology, differing from total geological resources, which include deposits not yet commercially viable or known. Due to the situation of current reserves and mining output, only a few nations produce the majority of the capacity of critical minerals. The concentration of production and reserves leaves global supply chains highly vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions, and trade restrictions, among other shocks.

Represented is how much of the global reserves/mining output of CETMs is within just the top three countries. Credit: Maximilian Malawista / IPS

Notably, mining output is slightly more concentrated than reserves for every mineral shown, indicating that mining production is controlled by an even smaller group of countries than the resource base itself.

This means that an overwhelming amount of these materials needed for some of the most critical functions for today and for our future rely on three countries for the entire global trade to function.

UNCTAD states: “Mining is capital-intensive and characterized by long lead times, limiting short-term supply responsiveness and leaving concentrated supply chains exposed to geopolitical risks, governance challenges, and environmental and social pressures.”

While the mining process receives much of the attention, UNCTAD argues in their report that refining represents an even larger vulnerability due to processing capacity being concentrated within a even smaller number of countries.

Refining and other downstream stages are even more concentrated” than that of mining, “creating critical bottlenecks in CETM supply chains,” An UNCTAD spokesperson told Inter Press Service. “A country may possess abundant mineral reserves yet remain dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers for refining, separation, precursor materials or advanced components.” They added explaining how there are “technical know-how, industrial capabilities, infrastructure and market power”, which means that “access to mineral resources alone does not necessarily translate into secure access to supply.”

UNCTAD also highlights that the concentration is also within only a few firms, in “several critical mineral markets” where a relatively small number of companies control “significant shares of mining, processing, trading, refining and technology.”

The issue as UNCTAD points out is that refining requires substantial long-term capital investment, access to advanced technologies, significant energy inputs, and specialized infrastructure, along with being an economy of scale to be cost competitive, which creates massive barriers to entry for new players.

Because global supply is concentrated, naturally international trade is the primary mechanism through which these minerals move between countries. The UNCTAD spokesperson remarked that “Cross-border trade in ores, concentrates, refined materials, and downstream components enables access to geographically dispersed stages of production across complex global value chains, particularly in high-technology sectors.”

What this means is that most countries depend on imports of CETMs at some point of their value chain for their manufacturing or developmental needs.

While diversification of processes would be necessary to alleviate risk associated with CETMs, since 2020 restrictive export measures on CETMs have been on the rise.

Mineral-rich economies like China, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are seeking to capture higher value stages of production, rather than just exporting raw materials alone. Restrictive export measures are increasingly being introduced to capture more of the downstream value, encouraging domestic refining, industrial development, and manufacturing, rather than solely relying on commodity exports.

Of these measures, licensing requirements, export taxes, and exports bans make the most common measures.

Since 2020, 37 licensing requirements, 31 export tax measures, 29 export bans, and 1 export quota have been recorded. 18 of these export measures were implemented by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with China introducing 16 followed by Indonesia at 12. Other countries such as Burundi and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have introduced 8 measures each, while Zimbabwe has 7.

While at the moment supply chains are extremely concentrated and are becoming even further concentrated creating higher risk for importers, UNCTAD notes that major CETM importers such as the European Union, Japan, and the United States are adopting strategies to alleviate risk by diversifying import sources, increasing domestic capacity development, recycling, and developing strategic partnerships. In a three-year period, since 2022 such agreements in developmental stages have grown from just 15, to an addition of 58 new agreements targeting a diversification across value chains, and securing mineral access and production in a safe and future proof manner through policy.

As demand for CETMs accelerates, governments are increasingly looking at supply chains with scrutiny, seeing them as a strategic asset. While producing CETM high-capacity nations are seeking to control more value through domestic production of other stages and create more industry, major importers are moving aggressively to diversify supply sources to build more resilient supply chains. The outcome could not only decide the speed at which the global energy transition occurs, but also shape which countries will emerge as the key trading hubs and industrial powerhouses of the clean-energy economy.

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The UN Peacebuilding Commission Celebrates 20 Years of UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 1 2026 (IPS)

From June 22 to 26, the United Nations (UN) commemorated its first annual Peacebuilding Week, marking the 20th anniversary of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s inaugural session. Featuring discussions among world leaders, policymakers, civil society, and advocates, the event explored how collaboration among governments, international organizations, and the private sector can enhance the visibility and effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts worldwide.

The goals of the Peacebuilding Week are particularly critical today, as increasing geopolitical tensions fracture international cooperation and severe financing shortfalls deplete resources, hindering relief efforts for civilians trapped in conflict. Despite a historic surge in active armed conflicts worldwide recorded over the past two years, peacebuilding and relief funding suffered a severe 40 percent decline between 2024 and 2025, leaving millions of people around the globe in a state of extreme insecurity.

“Peace does not occur automatically. It is built through persistent diplomacy, collective action and political will,” said Annalena Baerbock, President of the UN General Assembly. “Wars that never happen because of peacebuilding, conflict-prevention or sustainable-development efforts rarely make headlines. Yet, like everything else, peacebuilding is only possible when properly resourced.”

On June 26, the Peacebuilding Impact Hub—part of the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO) within the UN Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO)—launched its inaugural Peacebuilding Overview, titled Investing in Peace When the World Pays for War. This report analyzes data gathered from governments, civil society, scholars, and UN field operations across numerous, diverse contexts.

By addressing the root causes of conflict and encouraging the implementation of digital technologies—alongside active participation from youth and the private sector—the report aims to forge new paths for peacebuilding that are resilient, inclusive, and globally supported. Aiming to identify structural gaps in data sharing that prevent vital information from being shared internationally and from being fully utilized by policymakers and the public, the report was launched alongside a side event titled Building Peace in a Changing World.

At the event, Paul Fargues, one of the report’s authors and a Political Affairs Officer for the UN Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), told reporters that the world is currently at a “crossroads, where conflict is on the rise, good governance is declining, and civic space is shrinking.” He noted that this is compounded by severe budget cuts and disproportionate investment in military expenditure rather than civilian protection and prevention efforts, making humanitarian relief operations increasingly difficult.

According to the report, over the last two decades, the world has invested only one dollar in peacebuilding efforts for every 100 dollars spent on military expenditure. Fargues added that the world’s most vulnerable populations are projected to suffer the most, particularly in dire contexts where aid constitutes more than 60 percent of all external funding and acts as a vital lifeline. Additionally, the DDPA found that roughly two-thirds of the countries whose economies are most dependent on UN aid are also the ones most adversely affected by the funding cuts.

Fargues argued that some of the central obstacles in advancing peacebuilding efforts today are the persistent structural gaps in the dissemination of evidence and data, which is critically underdeveloped when compared to the development and humanitarian sectors.

“Peacebuilding has no underlying framework to create shared data practices, to generate insights at the global level to enhance evidence-based decision-making, or simply to communicate its value to broader non-technical audiences,” Fargues said. “Peacebuilders and those who support them must do a better job at measuring, proving, and communicating this. Given the incredibly challenging contexts, producing more robust data and evidence of impact is a bare minimum.”

Katherina Ahrendts, the Director-General for Global Order, United Nations and Humanitarian Assistance of the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, stated that although the case for investing in protection and prevention efforts is clear, political and financial contributions lag significantly behind. According to figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for every dollar invested in preventive macroeconomic policies, up to 103 dollars could be generated in returns. DPPA also estimated that with adequate investment in prevention and protection measures, humanitarian needs could be reduced by approximately USD 3.6 billion annually.

Despite these potential gains, the economic case for peacebuilding efforts has not sufficiently influenced global investment priorities.“We are indeed at a critical moment when violent conflict is increasing while budgets are under strain and multilateralism as a whole is increasingly challenged,” said Ahrendts. “From a domestic policy standpoint, we need a much stronger business case, more compelling narratives, and better evidence. We need to showcase that peacebuilding is a smart, strategic, and cost-effective instrument that prevents much higher costs later on.”

“This means framing peacebuilding not only as a moral imperative, but as a matter of security, stability, mutual interests and sound investments. In particular, we need to make clear that peacebuilding and investment are an integral component of an effective security strategy,” she added.

Ana Escobar, the UN Representative for Peace Direct, an organization that empowers local peacebuilding efforts and supports community-driven approaches, remarked that peacebuilding must be grounded in a community-based approach and tailored to match the specific needs of vulnerable communities. Peace Direct defines meaningful impact as seeing communities become safer and more resilient long after external support has ceased.

Rather than implementing a pre-established peacebuilding agenda, Peace Direct works with local peacebuilders and community leaders to define what success looks like to them and identify the changes that they want to see. “That means asking different questions,” Escobar said. “Are communities resolving disputes without violence, and how do we measure that? Do women, youth, and marginalized groups have greater influence in decision-making? Is trust increasing between communities and institutions?”

“Peacebuilding is most effective when power, resources, and evidence flow in the same direction, towards the communities that live with conflict every day…. For local peacebuilders, prevention means that children go to school instead of joining armed groups, farmers return to their lands, markets reopen, women move safely, families remain together. Those are the returns communities measure every day,” added Escobar.

Dr. Cedric De Coning, a Senior Researcher in the Peace, Conflict and Development Research Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), underscored the importance of adaptive peacebuilding. This approach calls for the continuous monitoring of data and updating of peacebuilding measures, acknowledging that a community’s dynamics are constantly shifting. Rather than framing peacebuilding as a rigid structure being “built”, Dr. De Coning argues that it is more of a continuous process that is “nurtured”.

“What adaptive peacebuilding says is that we cannot know that beforehand; it has to emerge from people affected by conflict or people in societies struggling to achieve peace themselves,” said Dr. De Coning.

“As peacebuilders, we have to accompany these societies, and we have to learn together with them constantly and adapt our understanding of what it is that we can support. But we should be careful not to measure peace as something that only makes sense for donor-funded projects…. Peace is something much broader, and we need to measure that broader social transformation: how societies are experiencing peace, how they are living the things they look at, is what we need to look at rather than measuring projects to please donors.”

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(L-R) Horacio (Luis) Carvalho, CEO of Climate Change Ventures, and Faraz Khan, MBE, at London Climate Action Week. Carvalho's firm advises on carbon mitigation and green investment projects. They signed an MOU to develop markets with Brazilian CPR Verde (green rural product certificate), a Brazilian financial credit instrument used to fund environmental preservation, forestry conservation, and carbon sequestration. The markets they are eyeing will be Saudi Arabia, Africa and Pakistan. Credit: Faraz Khan

By Zofeen Ebrahim
LONDON & KARACHI, Pakistan, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

The 30 COP gatherings may not have done what three months of US-Israeli war against Iran did: expose the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels.

As the world faced its biggest energy shock in a decade, the case for investing in clean energy suddenly became far more compelling.

As an intense heatwave grips Europe, with London’s Met Office issuing a “risk to life” warning and the closure of shops, offices and schools alongside disruptions to transport during the London Climate Action Week (LCAW), calls for this shift are gaining even greater momentum.

New Sense of Urgency

“The sentiment is palpable among policymakers, investors and business leaders,” conceded Faraz Khan, MBE.

A Pakistani entrepreneur and co-founder and partner of Pakistan-based Sustainadility, a technology, data and advisory firm, with over 25 years of experience in multi-stakeholder investments and in drafting environmental, sustainability and governance frameworks, is among those gathered to discuss the future of climate finance and the energy transition.

Speaking to IPS by phone on the sidelines of LCAW which closes on June 28, Khan stressed the urgency of transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy, saying the shift would not be possible without investors and businesses.

Khan described the mood at LCAW, as “optimistic” tempered by caution. He also welcomed the attention Pakistan was getting. “Our country was lauded for its efforts in brokering the peace deal,” referring to the Islamabad Memorandum between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From Rule-Making to Seeking Investment

Comparing the two events, he said the annual Bonn climate talks, held from June 8 to 18, focused on diplomatic negotiations and climate rule-making, while LCAW, also an annual event held since 2019, centres on mobilising private investment in sustainability and ESG and scaling these initiatives commercially.

“LCAW is more business- and private sector-orientated,” said Khan, who is also the founder and director of  SeedVentures, a Pakistan-based social impact organisation and impact investor.

Still, he said: “There are two sides to the coin. On the one hand, the US-Iran peace deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz have shown the world that oil remains crucial for the world to exist; but, on the other, many countries recognise that dependence on fossil fuels is not in their national interest and even poses a national security risk.”

Geopolitical conflicts have exposed the vulnerabilities associated with oil production, trade and transportation, which is why investment in alternative energy is expected to accelerate.

At a COP31 presidential meeting with the private sector at LCAW, which Khan attended, the conversation revolved around the circular economy, electrification and climate finance with some of the biggest names in the global climate community, including BlackRock, the World Bank, UNIDO, the IFC and several trade organisations.

“It was a gathering of the who’s who of the climate world,” Khan said with a laugh. “Even we made the cut.”

What was missing, however, Khan said, were women in decision-making roles. He was, however, impressed by those in the Turkish COP team, praising their intellectual rigour and commanding presence in the room, which he found to be “truly impressive”.

Beyond the composition of the meetings, Khan said the discussions themselves reflected a growing determination to move beyond rhetoric.

There was a strong sense in the room that a new precedent was about to be set by shifting the focus from negotiations to implementation, investment and action.

“Governments can create an enabling environment and UN frameworks can provide the rules, but ultimately it is investors, bankable projects and big businesses that will drive change,” he said.

While the Bonn climate talks focused on regulatory frameworks, LCAW’s focus is on climate finance and transactions, he noted. “And at Antalya, where the COP31 will be held this November, it will be about putting money where our mouths are—deploying capital into bankable projects and creating collaborative investment vehicles to scale climate action,” said Khan.

Private Sector Takes Centre Stage

He also observed that China was frequently cited as a global leader in clean energy investment.

“Across the various meetings, I sensed a strong and growing appetite for investment in renewable energy, and I believe this momentum will only accelerate,” he said.

Large businesses and institutions, he added, would be critical to delivering a just transition because their extensive operations and community links give them the reach needed to drive meaningful change.

The emphasis on electrification and reducing dependence on fossil fuels was echoed by Türkiye’s COP31 leadership.

Earlier this month, speaking to The Guardian on the sidelines of the climate talks in Bonn, Murat Kurum, Türkiye’s environment minister, said the 35% target would be “one of the defining priorities” of the COP31 presidency.

“By electrifying daily life, from transport to buildings and industry, we can protect families and businesses from volatile energy markets,” he told the media outlet.

Khan believed Pakistan has an opportunity to position itself at the forefront of this transition.

While Pakistan is frequently showcased as a victim of climate disasters, despite contributing less than 1% of global greenhouse gas emissions, Khan said the global focus on solar should also shine a light on the country’s “silent solar revolution”, which has transformed its investment landscape.

“Pakistan has become a global example of how solar adoption can evolve rapidly, opening up substantial investment opportunities in solar manufacturing and battery production,” he said, adding that modernising the grid and scaling up utility-scale energy storage have become increasingly urgent.

Investing in Nature

Beyond renewable energy, Khan saw significant opportunities in nature-based investments.

Khan said Pakistan’s rich biodiversity—from mangroves and forests to wetlands, rangelands and mountain ecosystems—offers enormous investment potential, with private capital capable of both restoring and protecting these natural assets.

Agriculture accounts for a large share of Pakistan’s economy and is a major driver of biodiversity loss. He said private businesses could invest in regenerative agriculture, agroforestry and sustainable rice and cotton production, either to meet sustainability goals or as part of emerging biodiversity credit markets.

“Just as there are carbon credits, there are biodiversity credits, and these are directly linked to food security and agriculture,” Khan said. Given agriculture’s central role in Pakistan’s economy, he argued that the country holds enormous potential for biodiversity credits. “I think this is going to be truly phenomenal because it presents enormous investment opportunities,” he said.

But realising this potential will depend on Pakistan’s ability to attract sustained private investment.

Investment Challenges

Sadly, there are few takers.

Khan said Pakistan’s high sovereign risk remains the biggest obstacle to attracting international climate investment at scale, although recent policy reforms, including the Pakistan Green Taxonomy, green banking guidelines and ESG standards, have improved investor confidence.

He also pointed to a shortage of bankable projects, with many failing to attract global investors despite their strong fundamentals. Still, he said, the investment potential remains enormous.

Yet time may be of the essence.

If the recent turmoil in the Middle East exposed the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels, Khan believes it also underscored the urgency of accelerating the clean energy transition. For Pakistan, he said, the opportunity is immense—but only if the country can create the conditions needed to attract the investment required to realise it.

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As of now, geopolitics overtook trade policy uncertainty as the primary concern for countries. Credit: Unsplash / Sajimon Sahadevan

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

Amidst increased geopolitical tensions, the risk of volatile energy markets, trade corridors, and regional stability in the Middle East has garnered more attention than trade policy in terms of its power to alter the global economy, according to new findings from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

In their report on trade and development, “Global Economy Faces a Geopolitical Challenge”, UNCTAD says that a protracted escalation “raises the likelihood of deeper disruptions in global trade and finance, potentially, foreshadowing a cascading crisis”.

Credit: UN Conference on Trade and Development (Trade and Development Foresights 2026)

Daily crude oil prices in the Middle East since the beginning of the conflict have risen from around USD 60-70, to a fluctuating rate between a high of over USD 110-. With oil prices surging more than 60 percent, and gas doubling in price, many markets have been left in an inflating scenario as higher energy prices increase macroeconomic pressure and overall slow and contract the economy.

The increase per barrel is largely due to a constriction of supply, where most Gulf economies can barely output oil due to a lack of transport ability through the strait of Hormuz. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) records a spike in the price of Brent crude rising over USD 100 per barrel and remaining at elevated levels, with European gas also jumping roughly “60 percent amid disruptions to LNG exports”.

The numbers are impacted by an estimated loss of capacity of 10 million barrels per day of oil and “about 500 million cubic meters per day of natural gas”. This is roughly 10 percent of global oil production, and roughly 5 percent of global natural gas production for every single day.

The IMF records the following:

Daily Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (in number of vessels) between 26 February and 6 April 2026. Credit: IMF

Oil being an inelastic good means that consumers won’t be able to curb their spending. Rather, they have to pay more for as long as the conflict lasts as fuels are needed for many essential routine tasks, from driving your car, to taking your vitamins, to growing your food, and having your Amazon packages shipped.

In their April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East and Central Asia, the IMF details that a continued conflict will likely for every 10 percent rise in the average oil price lead to a loss of about 0.5 percent of GDP and an inflation increase of around 1 percent in Gulf economies, ultimately affecting global markets heavily.

As the report notes, “Longer trade disruptions or greater damage to oil production capacity raises the possibility of higher and more sustained oil prices and a larger risk premium than is currently embedded in oil futures prices”.

However, for developing countries higher energy prices hit a lot harder to consumers in developing countries, which in this case don’t have the same money to spare. The IMF warns that “Low-income countries and other fragile and conflict-affected states in the MENAP region are especially vulnerable to higher energy, fertilizer, and food prices”.

Due to the conflict, estimates stand that vulnerable economies, mostly least developed countries (16.1 billion) and small island developing states (4.3 billion), could incur a USD 20 billion a year increase in spending, representing a huge composition of their GDP expenditure.

Among least-developed nations, Mauritania is recorded to have their bill increase by 7.3 percent, The Gambia 6.3 percent, Burkina Faso 5.0 percent, Liberia and Zambia 4.3 percent, with 17 other least developed countries also estimating to increase their spending by at least 0.5 percent in terms of GDP points.

Similarly for small-island developing states, Vanuatu is recorded to have an increase of 5.8 percent, Maldives 5.2 percent, Tonga 4.4 percent, Mauritius 4.2 percent, and Fiji 3.2 percent, with 18 other small developing states recording an increase of at least 0.6%.

UNCTAD also expects this conflict to take away capital investment into developing nations, as these assets are perceived as riskier. The UNCTAD report states that “the start of the Middle East conflict triggered a sell-off of developing countries’ assets, with equity markets of emerging markets sliding by more than 12 per cent between 28 February and 29 March.” Likely such effects will trigger a compacting of issues, contributing to an economic downturn that could take years to recover from depending on the length of the conflict.

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Recent geopolitical trends threaten more food crises, especially in developing countries. A new IPES-Food report urges a strategy of ‘resilient self-reliance’, proposing available opportunities to improve equity, sustainability and solidarity.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Geopolitics – referring to political sanctions, trade disputes, military conflicts, multilateral challenges, aid cuts, planetary heating, and corporate interests – is affecting food availability worldwide.

Corporate interests have increasingly reshaped food systems over the last half-century – promoting selective trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, financialization and cost reductions, ostensibly to improve food security efficiently.

Prioritising cost and fiscal savings led to the neglect and closure of buffer stocks. Food systems became more vulnerable as price volatility worsened.

Just-in-time supply chains have also been more susceptible to geopolitical shocks, planetary heating, and market manipulation.

World Bank structural adjustment programmes made developing countries more reliant on food and input imports. Tariffs and sanctions have disrupted food supplies worldwide.

Felice Noelle Rodriguez

Wars in Ukraine, Iran and elsewhere have disrupted supplies, spiking prices, and have most hit poor food-importing countries. Powerful governments have also weaponised food supplies for political reasons, as against Cuba.

Major donor countries have cut aid, with lethal consequences for the most vulnerable, as in Sudan, Palestine, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions – such as the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Health Organization (WHO) – have been deliberately undermined by superpowers abusing international arrangements for their own advantage.

Food prices have been much higher since 2020, following the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine and Iran wars, and other major disruptions. For instance, the Hormuz fertiliser disruptions will hurt food supply for some time to come.

Import bills have risen sharply, worsening debt burdens in poor food-importing countries. Food inflation has hurt low-income communities most, especially when governments juggle imports with debt servicing.

Corporate concentration has also worsened fertiliser and food supply and price volatility, especially hurting smaller producers. Powerful interests have also abused food crises for profit.

Geopolitics has also worsened environmental crises, as planetary heating intensifies extreme weather events, hurting crop yields and food availability.

Managing markets
To enhance food security, governments must effectively influence markets with appropriate policy instruments.

The report proposes adapting policy tools once widely used before corporate-inspired neoliberal reforms, to improve contemporary market management, supply resilience and price stability.

Public stockholdings (PSHs) involve government procurement, storage, and timely release of stocks to enhance food security, including by stabilising prices. PSHs can thus help smallholdings while improving emergency preparations.

Using minimum support prices with its Targeted Public Distribution System, India subsidises grain for two-thirds of its people, while insulating national food prices from international volatility.

Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established a Regional Food Security Reserve to pool members’ stocks and collectively respond to crises.

Supply management
Other supply management mechanisms include production quotas, marketing boards, and import controls.

Market management has also supported other policy goals aimed at improving rural vitality, equity, food sovereignty, environmental sustainability, and democratic participation.

Thus, unlike in the US, Canada’s dairy, poultry, and egg production is subject to quotas and negotiated minimum prices to limit price volatility and stabilise farm incomes.

But policy implementation remains challenging. PSH programmes are often complex and costly, and risk leakage, corruption, and inefficiency.

Government commitments, such as trade agreements, limit policy options. Supply management measures may also raise consumer prices and favour wealthier farmers, as neoliberal critics have been quick to exaggerate.

But these policy tools can also support small-scale producers, reduce waste, strengthen national supply chains, and mitigate risks posed by highly centralised industrial agriculture.

Resilient Self-Reliance
The report promotes resilient self-reliance, requiring appropriate market management to stabilise food supplies and improve equity, sustainability, and food sovereignty.

Resilient self-reliance combines resilience (the ability to withstand and recover from shocks) with food self-reliance (the capacity to meet food needs with domestic production and cooperative trade).

The report recommends innovative trade partnerships, including international buffer stocks and cooperative regionalism, citing CARICOM’s regional food strategy.

Resilient self-reliance upholds food sovereignty norms, emphasising farmer rights, agroecology, territorial markets, and democratic governance, stressing equity, diversity, ecological balance, and flexibility.

Managing markets can also support agroecological transitions, culturally appropriate food diversity, territorial markets, and strategic reserves to cushion shocks.

Vulnerable countries, often due to earlier neoliberal reforms, typically try to reduce their susceptibility to international market volatility, but are usually less able to do so.

Market management mechanisms, agroecological practices, territorial markets, and cooperative trade arrangements can help ensure more stable and equitable food systems.

Stressing the urgent need for policy reform, the authors argue that recent geopolitics not only threatens crises but also offers new opportunities to reform food systems for greater equity, solidarity and sustainability.

For instance, the Hormuz crisis may spur developing economies to accelerate transitions to more renewable energy, thereby reducing their vulnerability to fossil fuel and other energy imports.

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Astana’s futuristic skyline and Japan’s urban landscape converge with symbols of clean energy, connectivity and peace, reflecting a partnership shaped by smart-city cooperation, energy security, and shared memories of nuclear suffering.　Credit: INPS Japan

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
TOKYO, Japan, May 25 2026 (IPS)

The relationship between Japan and Kazakhstan is often described in terms of diplomacy, investment and regional cooperation. But at a time of growing geopolitical uncertainty, it deserves to be understood in broader terms: as a partnership linking cities, resources, technology and peace.

Kisho Kurokawa

For Japan, however, Astana is not simply a distant capital. Its master plan was shaped in part by the late Kisho Kurokawa, one of Japan’s leading architects, who sought to combine Kazakhstan’s nomadic heritage, harsh natural environment and state-building ambitions with forward-looking urban design. That historical connection is now taking on new meaning as Japan and Kazakhstan expand cooperation in smart cities, green technologies, energy security and nuclear disarmament.

On May 22, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike in Astana to discuss cooperation in smart city development, digital technologies, finance, education, emergency response and sustainable urban management. Tokyo, one of the world’s most densely populated metropolitan areas, has developed advanced systems in public safety, disaster preparedness, transportation and administrative services. For rapidly growing Astana, Tokyo’s experience provides a valuable reference point.

Akorda

Yet the deepening Japan-Kazakhstan relationship cannot be explained by urban cooperation alone. Behind it lies a more urgent geopolitical reality: instability in the Middle East and the resulting anxiety over energy security.

Japan has long depended heavily on the Middle East for crude oil. Tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz pose risks that directly affect Japan’s economy and daily life. For Tokyo, diversifying energy sources, critical mineral supplies and transport routes is no longer simply a matter of trade policy. It has become a central element of economic security.

Middle Corridor. Photo credit: TITR

For Japan, rare earths, lithium and other critical minerals are essential to batteries, electronics, renewable energy systems and next-generation industries. Diversifying both sources of supply and transport routes is therefore an energy policy, an industrial policy and a security policy at once. Astana is increasingly becoming an important platform for Japan’s engagement with Central Asia.

Semipalatinsk Former Nuclear Weapon Test site. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

Urban development, environmental technologies, resource cooperation and logistics infrastructure are no longer separate policy fields. They are becoming part of a wider strategic framework in which Japan and Kazakhstan can complement each other: one with advanced technology and urban management experience, the other with resources, geography and a young capital still in the process of defining its future.

But there is a deeper layer to this relationship that should not be overlooked: the memory of nuclear suffering.

Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kazakhstan endured severe radiation damage from repeated Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site, where more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term consequences for local communities and public health.

In 1991, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk test site. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it gave up one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals remaining on its territory and chose the path of a non-nuclear-weapon state. That decision has become a defining feature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.

Japan and Kazakhstan both know, not as an abstract matter of security theory but through historical experience, what nuclear weapons can inflict on human beings, communities, the environment and future generations. This shared memory gives the bilateral relationship a distinct ethical foundation.

That memory has also shaped sustained cooperation among governments, civil society and international organizations. INPS Japan has reported on nuclear disarmament-related conferences and events involving Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Center for International Security and Policy, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Soka Gakkai International.

A Group photo of participants of the regional conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear-free-zone in Central Asia held on August 29, 2023. Photo Credit: Jibek Joly TV Channel

One notable example was the anti-nuclear exhibition “Everything You Treasure — For a World Free From Nuclear Weapons,” jointly organized in Astana by SGI, ICAN and Kazakhstan’s Center for International Security and Policy. Held in September 2022 at Keruen Mall in central Astana, the exhibition used photographs, illustrations and graphics to educate young people about the dangers of nuclear weapons, from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to the continuing humanitarian consequences of nuclear arms.

A documentary produced by CISP, a Kazakh NGO, with support from SGI.

Such initiatives are important because nuclear disarmament cannot be left to diplomats alone. If the memory of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Semipalatinsk is to shape policy, it must also be passed to younger generations. Exhibitions, survivor testimony, documentaries and civil society campaigns help ensure that nuclear weapons are discussed not only as instruments of deterrence, but also as weapons with catastrophic human, environmental and intergenerational consequences.

In 2023, a regional conference in Astana addressed the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, testimony from nuclear test victims, and victim assistance and environmental remediation under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Unlike debates that frame nuclear weapons mainly in terms of deterrence or national prestige, such forums place affected people, their families, communities and environment at the center.

A documentary on Kazakhstan’s nuclear test victims, I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon, produced by Kazakhstan’s CISP with support from SGI, has also helped bring the testimonies of second- and third-generation victims in the Semey region to international audiences. Together with workshops involving the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and discussions on cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones, these efforts keep the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons at the center of global disarmament debates.

Akorda.kz

That message should be taken seriously. Japan and Kazakhstan do not occupy identical security positions. Japan continues to rely on the United States’ nuclear deterrence as part of its security policy, while Kazakhstan, having renounced nuclear weapons, is a member of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Yet both countries share common ground in seeking to transform the memory of nuclear harm into action for international peace.

Japan and Kazakhstan Draw Closer as Iran Crisis Reshapes Energy and Security Priorities. Credit: INPS Japan

At a time when crises in the Middle East are shaking the global energy order and nuclear risks are again moving to the forefront of international politics, the Japan-Kazakhstan relationship is no longer merely a story of friendship. It reflects Japan’s own choices in an age of uncertainty: whether to approach Central Asia only as a source of resources, or as a region with which it can build a broader partnership linking cities, technology, energy security and peace.

Astana, the futuristic capital shaped in part by a Japanese architect, has become more than a symbol of Kazakhstan’s ambitions. It is also a reminder that the future of international cooperation will depend not only on markets and infrastructure, but on memory, responsibility and the courage to imagine security beyond fear.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

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U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Aquidneck (WPB-1309) in the Strait of Hormuz, with a large container ship visible in the background as it transits the critical global trade route (Dec. 2, 2020). Credit: MC2 Indra Beaufort

By Lulseged Desta and Jonathan Mockshell
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Sharp surges in energy, fertilizer, and food prices triggered by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf strikingly illustrate the deep interconnections between geopolitical conflict, food insecurity, and the fragility of fossil fuel–dependent food systems.

Besides carrying roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day (about 27 percent of global oil exports), the Strait of Hormuz also handles 20–30 percent of internationally traded inorganic fertilizers, which uses natural gas as a key ingredient in its production. Its closure has immediately disrupted the flow of these essential commodities, triggering sharp price spikes in fuel and key agricultural inputs.

This situation demonstrates how geopolitical instability can rapidly disrupt essential agricultural functions under current input-dependent, industrial production systems that rely heavily on external energy and supply chains. This crisis highlights, more clearly than ever, a critical reality: food systems tied to fossil fuels are inherently unsustainable, continually undermine food sovereignty, and disproportionately affect farmers, particularly smallholders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). World Food Programme estimates warn that, if the conflict continues, the soaring oil, shipping and food costs will push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, driving the global total beyond its record 319 million¹.

Reducing food systems’ reliance on fossil fuels and external inputs is essential to strengthen our collective resilience to future shocks. The truth is that fossil fuels courses through every stage of the food system – from fertilizers and pesticides to processing, preservation, transportation, packaging, food waste disposal, and even food preparation. Moreover, entrenched economic and political structures lock in this fossil-fuel dependence through massive subsidies and price protections – estimated at over $1 trillion in recent years².

Food systems account for at least 15 percent of total fossil fuel use – mostly through synthetic fertilizers ⁴ – but also to power machinery and vehicles, and generate electricity and heat for key processes like irrigation, grain drying, livestock housing, and food storage.

Agroecological approaches to food production offer an alternative to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels while still meeting the needs of a growing global population. This supports a transition from energy-sink systems to regenerative ones, radically enhancing food systems’ resilience in the face of escalating geopolitical instability and environmental vulnerability.

Agroecology is based on natural processes and local resources for sustainable soil fertility. Crucially, many of these practices draw directly from indigenous knowledge systems, where local communities have long maintained soil health through time. Practical steps include the use of organic fertilization (often blended with minimal synthetic inputs), efficient soil microorganisms, nitrogen-fixing plants, and soil health practices like crop rotation, cover cropping, intercropping, reduced tillage, and crop-livestock integration.

Research consistently shows that agroecological approaches – such as farm diversification and tree integrated systems – outperform conventional systems in climate resilience, nutrient cycling, and soil health^5,6, often while boosting yields^7-9. Agroforestry also provides a source of wood fuel, making it a valuable alternative during fossil fuel shortages and price spikes.

Examples can be found worldwide. Peruvian cocoa farmers are using bokashi and bio-oil amendments to restore soil organic matter, regenerate microbial activity, and enhance nutrient cycling¹⁰. In Vietnam, rice-fish coculture systems optimize nutrient cycling, curb pests, and diversify outputs – lowering costs while stabilizing farmer incomes¹¹. Ethiopian farmers practicing wheat-fava bean rotations are cutting fertilizer needs while improving soil structure and building long-term fertility11. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF)’, delivers biodiversity benefits while more than doubling farmers’ economic profits and maintaining comparable crop yields, than chemical-based farming ^12,13.

Other farm-level steps to curb fossil fuel dependence include integrating renewable energy sources for on-site generation and operations – like solar panels, biogas digesters, and wind turbines; solar water pumps, adopting fuel-efficient engines and draft animals; and embracing practices such as minimum tillage, precision irrigation, integrated pest management, and low-input crop-livestock systems.

More fundamentally, shifting from global, industrial commodity chains toward territorial, agroecological food networks can relocalize production, processing, and consumption – shortening supply chains and reducing energy-intensive operations. Shorter, localized supply chains reduce reliance on long-distance transport, lower packaging demand, and promote reusable packaging systems, thereby decreasing fossil fuel consumption.

These efforts can be reinforced by complementary practices that strengthen food sovereignty, such as home gardens and urban agriculture. Crucially, agroecology also aligns with reduced production of ultra-processed foods – among the most energy-intensive products – helping to curb fossil fuel use while potentially improving public health.

In the short term, it is crucial that the allocation of emergency funds are earmarked to procure or purchase organic alternatives to synthetic fertilizers, particularly in the most affected regions. Longer-term, it is necessary to reduce structural barriers to farmers’ adoption of these agroecological approaches including reforms to agricultural subsidies and strengthening support for technical assistance and local governance.

References
1. Farge, E. Iran war may push 45 million people into acute hunger by June, WFP says. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-war-may-push-45-million-people-into-acute-hunger-by-june-wfp-says-2026-03-17/ (2026).

2. IPES-Food. Fuel to Fork: What Will It Take to Get Fossil Fuels out of Our Food Systems? https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FuelToFork.pdf (2025).

3. FAO, UNDP, and UNEP. A Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity – Repurposing Agricultural Support to Transform Food Systems. (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP, 2021). doi:10.4060/cb6562en.

4. Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Power Shift: Why We Need to Wean Industrial Food Systems off Fossil Fuels. https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ga_food-energy-nexus_report.pdf (2023).

5. Niether, W., Jacobi, J., Blaser, W. J., Andres, C. & Armengot, L. Cocoa agroforestry systems versus monocultures: a multi-dimensional meta-analysis. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104085 (2020).

6. Beillouin, D., Ben‐Ari, T., Malézieux, E., Seufert, V. & Makowski, D. Positive but variable effects of crop diversification on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Glob. Change Biol. 27, 4697–4710 (2021).

7. Dittmer, K. M. et al. Agroecology Can Promote Climate Change Adaptation Outcomes Without Compromising Yield In Smallholder Systems. Environ. Manage. 72, 333–342 (2023).

8. Rodenburg, J., Mollee, E., Coe, R. & Sinclair, F. Global analysis of yield benefits and risks from integrating trees with rice and implications for agroforestry research in Africa. Field Crops Res. 281, 108504 (2022).

9. Jones, S. K. et al. Achieving win-win outcomes for biodiversity and yield through diversified farming. Basic Appl. Ecol. 67, 14–31 (2023).

10. Altieri, M. A. & Nicholls, C. I. Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture. J. Peasant Stud. 47, 881–898 (2020).

11. FAO. The State of Food and Agriculture 2022. (FAO, 2022). doi:10.4060/cb9479en.

12. Berger, I. et al. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming’, delivers biodiversity and economic benefits without lowering yields. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 2057–2068 (2025).

13. O’Garra, T. Agroecology benefits people and planet. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 1973–1974 (2025).

14. IPES-Food. Food from Somewhere: Building Food Security and Resilience through Territorial Markets. https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FoodFromSomewhere.pdf (2024).

15. Einarsson, R. Nitrogen in the Food System. https://tabledebates.org/building-blocks/nitrogen-food-system (2024) doi:10.56661/2fa45626.

Lulseged Desta, CGIAR Multifunctional Landscapes Science Program; Jonathan Mockshell, Alliance Biodiversity International – CIAT

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Bibbi Abruzzini/Forus - Rabat, Morocco

By Silla Ristimäki, Miguel Santibañez, Emeline Siale Ilolahia and Aoi Horiuchi
HELSINKI, Finland / SANTIAGO, Chile / SUVA, Fiji / TOKYO, Japan, May 20 2026 (IPS)

Just four years of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development remain. What comes after 2030 is already a political battleground.

The next global development framework is being shaped now: through quiet agenda-setting, shifting alliances, financing choices, contested norms, and decisions about who gets to participate and who is pushed to the margins. That matters because the world that will shape what comes next is not the world that adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.

The context is harsher, more fractured and less generous. Geopolitical fragmentation is deepening. Armed conflicts are distorting priorities. Climate impacts are accelerating. Development finance is under growing strain. Civic space is shrinking. Public trust in multilateralism is weaker. And too often, the rights, equality and accountability commitments that gave the SDGs their normative force are treated as negotiable.

“We step into the next decade against the background of climate chaos, growing inequality and increasing poverty. The scaffolding for positive change shall be to infuse democratic values in the blood stream of all our governments from the Right to the Left,” says Dr. Moses Isooba, executive director of the Uganda National NGO Forum and Vice-Chair of Forus.

The post-2030 debate must confront the political and structural weaknesses that limited implementation the first time around.

As a civil society network, we have been here from the very beginning. We have secured the adoption of the SDGs with the Beyond 2015 campaign, pushed for innovation and ambition, challenged power, brought forward the voices of communities, and held systems accountable. That role evolves and as we now look “beyond 2030”, we remain present, engaged, and determined to influence what comes next.

One message comes through clearly: the next agenda will only be credible if we are clear about three things — what must be defended, what must be demanded, and what must be declined.

What must be defended

Some foundations of the current framework remain essential and must not be traded away for the sake of political convenience.

The first is universality. One of the most important achievements of the SDGs was to establish that sustainable development is not only a concern for lower income countries, but a universal responsibility. Policies, consumption patterns and economic models that drive inequality, exclusion and ecological harm must be addressed in all regions. High-income countries must not only finance development but also reform their own adverse policies. If the next framework weakens the recognition that sustainable development must integrate social justice, equality, environmental sustainability, peace and human rights, it will not move us forward. It will mark a retreat.

The second is civic space. Civil society participation is one of the conditions that makes accountability, inclusion and implementation possible yet it is increasingly constrained by financial pressures, exclusion from global decision-making processes and erosion of fundamental rights. A future agenda which prioritises resources and protection for civil society supports the building of stable, sustainable societies.

The third is local leadership. Communities and local civil society actors remain closest to the realities that global frameworks claim to address, yet they are still structurally under-resourced and under-represented. Localisation beyond the “buzzword” can bring essential resources for problem diagnosis and planning, increasing effectiveness and legitimacy for sustainable development and peacebuilding.

And finally, what must be defended is multilateralism itself, not as an abstract ideal, but as the shared political space where common commitments can still be built.

“Safeguarding the structures created to advance peace, cooperation and rights sustains global hope and possibilities to address common global challenges. This is in the interests of us all, future generations and the planet.” Silla Ristimäki, Adviser at Fingo. “This is why ambitious reform of the UN cannot be separated from the post-Agenda 2030 discussion.”

What must be demanded

Defending core principles is not enough. Negotiations about the future must also correct what the Agenda 2030 left unresolved.

At the centre of this is financing. A credible post-2030 framework cannot rest on the same unequal financial architecture that has constrained implementation for years. Debt burdens, unequal fiscal space, volatile aid flows and weak commitments have all narrowed the room for governments and communities to act. Financing reforms must include debt restructuring and relief, fairer lending terms, increased concessional finance, stronger domestic resource mobilisation, tax justice, policy coherence and predictable support for civil society.

“Many countries are spending more on debt than education or health. We need to reform the current unjust international financial architecture,” says Aoi Horiuchi, Senior Advocacy Officer at JANIC, the civil society network for international cooperation in Japan.

Accountability must also be stronger. Voluntary reporting and soft review mechanisms have not been enough. A future agenda must be backed by mandatory, transparent and regular review, with independent oversight and a formal role for civil society and local actors in tracking progress and exposing implementation gaps.

And participation must mean more than consultation after decisions are already taking shape. Civil society needs a formalised, meaningful and safe role in both negotiating and implementing the future framework, especially for local actors and groups continuing to face structural or political exclusion.

“Meaningful change comes from meaningful participation. That’s why we need to defend civic space,” says Horiuchi.

What must be declined

Some directions already visible in early discussions must be rejected outright.

A thinner agenda that lowers ambition in the name of consensus must be declined. So must any attempt to weaken universality, rights, gender equality, civic freedoms or climate ambition for political expediency.

The continuation of a financial status quo that deepens inequality while speaking the language of partnership must also be declined. So must accountability arrangements that remain symbolic, selective or performative.

And tokenistic participation must be named for what it is. A process that brings civil society into the room for appearance’s sake while excluding it from agenda-setting, decision-making and follow-through is managed exclusion.

Finally, as development governance evolves, the expanding role of private and philanthropic actors must not come without public-interest safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. Public goals cannot be left to unaccountable power.

We must get out of silos, create spaces of dialogue, of co-responsibility and raise the question of whether the post-2030 framework will be more honest about power, more serious about accountability, more capable of confronting structural inequality, and more open to those whose lives and rights are most at stake.

Our answer is here:
Defend what must not be lost.
Demand what must be corrected.
Decline what would weaken the future.

IPS UN Bureau

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The January 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) departs significantly from those preceding it, including from Trump’s first term. Is it deliberately misleading? Or is actual policy, including war, being driven by other considerations?

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Much like the latest National Security Strategy (NSS), released by Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio in December 2025, the NDS claims to be about putting ‘America First’.

Both documents promise ‘no more business as usual’. They claim to change decades of strategy, supposedly in the national interest. Unlike earlier US military blueprints, the NDS is filled with vague rhetoric and eschews interventions abroad.

But in Trump 2.0’s first year alone, the US bombed ten countries, threatening at least four more, all in the Americas. Despite scant mention in both documents, the US-Israel war on Iran resumed on 28 February!

Europe
The NDS claims the US is reducing its direct military role in Europe but still wants to be influential.

It pledges to remain central to NATO “even as we calibrate US force posture and activities in the European theater” to meet US priorities.

Nurina Malek

The NDS blows hot and cold on Europe’s aggressive support for Ukraine’s Zelensky, envisaging a reduced troop presence on NATO’s borders with Ukraine.

Many European allies complain the Trump administration has created a ‘security vacuum’ by leaving Europe to confront Russia with uncertain US support.

They also complain about Secretary Pete Hegseth’s insistence on “credible options to guarantee US military and commercial access to key terrain”. The NDS insists on more than access to Greenland and the Panama Canal.

Issued days after Trump claimed he had a “framework of a future deal” on Arctic security with NATO chief Mark Rutte, he insisted it ensured the US “total access” to Greenland, long a territory of NATO ally, Denmark.

However, Danish officials insisted formal negotiations had not yet begun. Trump also threatened European nations opposing his Greenland plan with tariffs.

Western Hemisphere
The NDS supports the NSS and Trump’s ‘Donroe doctrine’ focus on the Western Hemisphere, envisaging the Americas as the US backyard.

In his January Davos speech, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that recent US actions are disrupting established international norms.

The NDS was issued three days later, after a week of tensions between the White House and its Western allies. Cooperation with the Americas, including Canada, is conditional, to “ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests”.

It warns the US will “actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances US interests.”

Trump had declared the US should retake Panama and its Canal, accusing the government of ceding control to China. Later, however, Trump was more ambiguous about ‘taking back’ both the country and the canal.

Many also doubt Trump’s intentions in kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, ostensibly for trial on drug charges in the US.

Asia-Pacific
The previous NDS, issued in 2022 under then-President Joe Biden, had deemed China the US’s principal threat. Biden also embraced Trump 1.0’s Indo-Pacific alliance to encircle China.

In contrast, the new NDS describes China as an established power in the Indo-Pacific region that only needs to be discouraged from dominating the US and its allies.

The goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them… This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle…President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China”.

The NDS even proposes “a wider range of military-to-military communications” with Chinese counterparts! The U-turn followed the administration’s retreat from its threatened tit-for-tat tariff escalation after China’s successful retaliation.

Biden’s 2022 NDS promised the US would “support Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense”. The new NDS offers no such assurances to the self-governing island province of China, which Beijing warns it will take by force if necessary.

The NDS also calls for “a sharp shift – in approach, focus, and tone”, insisting US allies must take more responsibility for countering adversaries such as China, Russia and North Korea.

It insists, “South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited US support”.

Cutting costs of empire
Like Trump, the new NDS wants allies to pay much more for US ‘protection’.

It echoes his frequent criticisms of allies for taking advantage of previous administrations to subsidise their defence and being ungrateful for US protection.

But the terms of such subordination remain ambiguous and arbitrary, even extortionate and corrupt. Gulf monarchies may now regret their generous donations to the president, apparently to little avail so far.

Trump’s treatment of allies, the Netanyahu-led war on Iran, and continuing US-led efforts to ‘contain’ China suggest both documents offer poor guidance to knowing and understanding, let alone anticipating, US policies abroad.

Nurina Malek is an economics graduate of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, currently working on policy research at the Khazanah Research Institute.

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons

By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

 
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.

In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.

The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.

In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.

Lessons from the past

The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.

Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.

The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.

During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.

The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.

What are the implications?

The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.

Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.

Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.

Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.

Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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In mid-1971, US President Nixon ended the dollar’s gold peg at $35 per ounce, triggering de-dollarisation. The 2025 gold and silver rush followed private speculators trying to profit from central banks hedging against perceived new risks.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Many believe OPEC was allowed to raise oil prices from 1972, on condition petroleum purchases would be settled in dollars. ‘Petrodollars’ were thus believed to be the ‘black gold’ underlying the dollar system’s survival after 1971.

Although still the dominant world reserve currency, the dollar’s role has gradually declined over the decades. Trump 2.0’s rhetoric and actions appear to have accelerated de-dollarisation.

Trump’s 2 April 2025 ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs announcement triggered even greater uncertainty and volatility in foreign exchange and other markets worldwide.

Greater policy unpredictability has caused governments and investors to explore new options. Authorities worldwide are considering and developing alternatives to the dollar system.

Besides higher inflation, Trump’s threats and actions, particularly his tariffs, sanctions and wars, have pushed investors to sell dollar assets and seek alternatives.

Various factors have significantly accelerated de-dollarisation. In the first half of 2025, the dollar fell by over 10%, its sharpest fall since the 1973 oil crisis.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Geopolitical economy commentator Ben Norton highlighted an April 2025 note by the Deutsche Bank foreign exchange research head, noting:

“We are witnessing a simultaneous collapse in the price of all US assets [including stocks, foreign exchange, and bonds] … we are entering uncharted territory in the global financial system…

“The market is rapidly de-dollarising. In a typical crisis environment, the market would be hoarding dollar liquidity…The market has lost faith in US assets. They are actively selling down their US assets.

“US administration policy is encouraging a trend toward de-dollarisation to safeguard international investors from a weaponisation of dollar liquidity.”

Western confiscations
The weaponisation of central banks by the US, Europe, and their allies has caused other central banks to seek ‘safety’ by switching from dollar assets to gold.

Increased weaponisation of the dollar and Western confiscation of others’ assets under various pretexts have accelerated this trend.

Billions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan central bank gold, held at the Bank of England, was confiscated by the UK government during the 2019 Washington-instigated Caracas coup attempt.

After the coup failed, the Bank of England refused to return the gold to Venezuela. Trust in Western governments and central banks thus continued to erode.

Similarly, the US Fed and European Central Bank confiscated over $300 billion worth of Russian dollar-, euro- and sterling-denominated assets after it invaded Ukraine.

European authorities have since pledged to transfer these Russian assets to Ukraine rather than return them to their owners.

Western confiscations of the central bank reserves of Iran, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Russia and others have alarmed authorities and publics worldwide.

Central banks’ reserve managers have increasingly viewed gold as safe despite greater volatility. Besides serving as a hedge, the precious metal also offered lucrative speculative gains.

Mitigating risk
Many monetary authorities have reversed their earlier accumulation of dollar-denominated US Treasury bills and bonds in their official reserves.

While US government debt has continued growing, inflationary pressures have mounted, albeit episodically. Gold and silver holdings are believed to help hedge against inflation and fiat currency debasement.

Gold holdings in central bank reserves increased significantly after the 2008-09 global, actually Western, financial crisis, followed by the Western turn to ‘quantitative easing’.

For the first time in three decades, central banks’ total gold holdings in their international reserves exceeded their US Treasury bond holdings in 2025.

About 36,200 tons, or a fifth of all gold holdings, is now held by central banks, rising rapidly over two years from 15% at the end of 2023!

Meanwhile, rising gold prices drew more speculative investments for profit. But such price spikes are not sustainable indefinitely.

Once gold was seen as overpriced, investors turned to other precious metals, notably silver, and other financial assets.

BRICS’ golden hedge?
After Lord Jim O’Neill identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as significant new financial powers outside the Western sphere of influence, BRICS was formed in 2009 by adding South Africa.

BRICS now has ten members and ten partners. Together, they account for 44% of world income, measured by purchasing power parity, and 56% of its people.

Russia, China, and India have been among the largest recent buyers of gold. Other major purchasers include Uzbekistan and Thailand, both BRICS partners.

Trump 2.0 has generated significant apprehension internationally. Without BRICS’ help, his weaponisation of economic policies and agreements has accelerated de-dollarisation.

Although Trump accuses the BRICS of conspiring to accelerate de-dollarisation, their precious metal purchases make sense as a hedge for their reserves.

IPS UN Bureau

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At a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. Credit: EEAS

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

“Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return (…) we need a more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy.” These were some of the words pronounced one week ago by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, at the EU Ambassadors’ Conference in Brussels. A speech that sparked considerable controversy: an almost immediate rebuttal from the President of the Council, Antonio Costa; rumours of a motion of censure against Von der Leyen in the European Parliament; more or less public reproaches from several European leaders; and a swift and complete retraction by the President herself.

The question, however, remains: was this a miscalculation by a President known for always trying to swim with the current? Or do her words reflect a deeper alignment with the mindset of a new (dis)order defined by Trumpian chaos and the authoritarian impulses emanating from Beijing and Moscow, among others?

Multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

In the former case, despite its seriousness, the mistake would still be forgivable. In the latter, we would be facing a far more significant—and particularly dangerous—problem.

In Brussels, some interpret it as a clearly failed attempt by Von der Leyen to steer the Union’s position towards the theses defended at that time by the German Chancellor Merz—her compatriot and party colleague—on the need to adopt policies more aligned with Trump.

Position that Merz himself has changed in the last few years, taking into account his particularly weak position, with approval ratings plummeting to just 26% less than a year after taking office—figures as low as Trump’s.

Returning to the President of the Commission, it was indeed troubling to observe that -in a Europe already deeply divided over the major geopolitical challenges of our time (the war in Iran and across the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, the situation in Venezuela)- it was precisely the individual recognised globally as the face of the European Union who delivered a speech so starkly at odds with the Union’s founding principles.

For the European project, with all its strengths—and its shortcomings—was built precisely on the ashes of the Second World War, on the traumatic experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 1920s and 1930s, and in opposition to the Stalinist totalitarianism that developed beyond the Iron Curtain.

It was founded on the principles of humanism, on respect for and the promotion of human rights, and on the idea of shared social rights and values. It was also grounded in the need for a rules-based international order which, despite its many imperfections, remains the only real mechanism capable of steering us away from the chaos and the law of the jungle to which some of the world’s major powers seek to drag us.

Are the United Nations in crisis? Undoubtedly, and no one seriously disputes it. Is multilateralism in retreat, and is respect for international law at a low point? Another undeniable tragedy. However, does this mean that the response to such a bleak context should be—as I have suggested—to adopt the very mindset of those responsible for this deterioration? Put differently: have we lost all sense of reason?

We are living in turbulent times. Europe must indeed strive for greater strategic autonomy—but this autonomy cannot be confined solely to defence. It must also—and urgently—extend to genuine autonomy in the realm of technological goods and services, where dependence on the United States places Europe in a position bordering on vassalage.

Moreover, at a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. This is already happening with India, and should be finalised as soon as possible with Mercosur.

However, to suggest that Europe’s future—or, in other words, the future of the Europe that truly matters—could lie in a further weakening of the international order and the system of international organisations is, I say this unequivocally, simply irresponsible.

For multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

Europe needs multilateralism, among other reasons, to remain being Europe. And for that reason, it must commit to it now more than ever—without naïveté, with realism, but fully aware of the interdependence between the future of the European project and the existence of a minimum level of order and cooperation among nations, including the major powers.

This requires defending and promoting—against the alternative of chaos—the very spaces and institutions that make such cooperation possible, rather than ignoring or sidelining them.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich speech last month seemed to seduce the European elite behind President Trump, against the ‘Rest’, especially the resource-rich Global South.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Billed as the world’s leading forum for international security, the conference programme made clear whose interests and security were prioritised.

In its first year, Trump 2.0 bombed ten nations, besides threatening aggression against four other Latin American nations, but none were represented at Munich!

The Munich conference shed all pretence of objectivity and diplomacy on Iran, applauding Israeli-led military intervention to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasised the world’s return to great power competition after the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’, making his loyalty clear.

At Davos in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that Trump 2.0’s geopolitical “rupture” had forced many to abandon earlier illusions.

Dangerous new trends have been emerging, hardly any ‘order’. Trump insists US supremacy must be even more dominant, isolating rather than confronting rivals.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Trump’s predecessors’ ‘rules-based order’ had offered a legal and diplomatic fig leaf to subordinate other states to US supremacy.

Now, Washington repudiates the very framework it demanded others accept, instead of the ostensibly universal but sometimes inconvenient ‘rule of law’.

Instead of diplomatic and commercial negotiations, economic and military threats prevail. Without velvet gloves of soft power, the mailed fists of military force and economic weaponry are exposed.

Reuniting the West
Rubio welcomed this “new era in geopolitics”, urging better transatlantic relations while reiterating Trump 2.0’s demands for Europe to pay more, albeit more gently.

After the end of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations urged defending the ‘Judaeo-Christian’ West against the ‘Rest’, including Catholic Latin America.

In Munich, Cuban-American Rubio reinvented himself as a White Christian European, warning his European audience that the West is under threat.

For Rubio, “the West had been expanding” to “settle new continents, build vast empires extending out across the globe” over the last five centuries.

His history obscured Western imperialism’s dispossession, exploitation and slaughter of indigenous peoples worldwide, especially in the Global South.

Praising the superiority of European civilisation and values, he lamented setbacks to these “great Western empires” due to “godless communist” and “anti-colonial” uprisings after the Second World War.

Rather than progress inspired by the 1776 US Declaration and War of Independence, for Rubio, national self-determination was a civilisational setback.

“We in America have no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline”. For Rubio, no more ‘liberal’ human rights, freedom and democracy rhetoric.

He did not hesitate to invoke racist, white supremacist mythology and crusader ideology to demand stronger militaries to defend Western civilisation.

The renewed Western alliance will share their common civilisational identity, bound by “Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, ancestry”.

Ethno-chauvinistic beliefs about race, religion and culture are the new bases for solidarity and authority. ‘Defending Christians’ became the pretext for the US 2025 Christmas Day bombing of Nigeria.

Another Western century?
Rubio appealed for pan-European Western unity against multilateralism and other threats, calling for increased military spending and immigration controls.

He urged Europe to “take back control” of ‘Western’ industries and supply chains. After all, NATO allies have joined the US in seizing foreign assets at will.

Vassal-like and desperate for reassurance after a year of Trump’s blatant contempt and threats, the audience welcomed his speech with a standing ovation.

Fearing Washington might negotiate with Moscow over Ukraine without them, European leaders have intensified demands for all-out war against Russia.

Rubio is working to secure critical minerals supplies against “extortion from other powers”, including Europe, through opaque bilateral agreements secured with threats.

Trump 2.0 is making military threats for profit, including post-war ownership, mining and other rights. For many, NATO’s US-Europe divide is not over peace, but rather sharing Ukraine war costs and spoils.

While funding for European welfare states and other ‘social’ purposes continues to fall, military budgets continue to spike, as demanded by Trump.

Meanwhile, Merz has invoked military Keynesianism to justify Germany’s largest-ever military budget since the Cold War, aimed at strengthening NATO.

Ostensibly to strengthen national security, the Trump administration has cut social programmes. Instead, US military spending is being prioritised.

Meanwhile, the US Congress has shown support by approving a larger War Department budget than the Pentagon requested.

Armaments contracts have mainly benefited established companies, while the ‘tech bros’ increasingly supply newer weapons and related systems using artificial intelligence.

Following Trump, the European elites are strengthening their already powerful militaries and securing commercial deals for their own advantage, rather than defending the peaceful multilateral cooperation they once advocated.

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Credit: Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Feb 6 2026 (IPS)

In early January, an emergency UN Security Council meeting on Venezuela followed a familiar path of paralysis. Members clashed over the US government’s abduction of Nicolás Maduro, with many warning it set a dangerous precedent, but no resolution came.

This wasn’t exceptional. In 2024, permanent members cast eight vetoes, the highest since 1986. In 2025, the Council adopted only 44 resolutions, the lowest since 1991. Deep divisions prevented meaningful responses to Gaza and to conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine.

Designed in 1945, the Security Council is the UN’s most powerful body, tasked with maintaining international peace and security, but also crucially protecting the privileged position of the most powerful states following the Second World War. Of its 15 members, 10 are elected for two-year terms, but five – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – are permanent and have veto powers. A single veto can block any resolution, regardless of global support. The Council’s anachronistic structure reflects and reproduces outdated power dynamics.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has continually used its veto despite breaching the UN Charter. On Gaza, the USA vetoed four ceasefire proposals before the Council passed Resolution 2728 in March 2024, 171 days into Israel’s assault. By then over 10,000 people had been killed.

When the Council is gridlocked, it means more suffering on the ground. Civilian protection fails, peace processes stall and human rights crimes go unpunished.

The case for reform

Since the UN was established, the number of member states has quadrupled and the global population has grown from 2.5 to 8 billion. But former colonial powers that represent a minority of the world’s population still hold permanent seats while entire continents remain unrepresented.

Calls for reform have been made for decades, but they face a formidable challenge: reform requires amendment of the UN Charter, a process that needs a favourable two-thirds General Assembly vote, ratification by two-thirds of member states and approval from all five permanent Council members.

The African Union has advanced the clearest demand. Emphasising historical justice and equal power for the global south, it calls for the Council to be expanded to 26 members, with Africa holding two permanent seats with full veto rights and five non-permanent seats.

India has been particularly vocal in demanding a greater role on a reformed Council. The G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – has proposed expansion to 25 or 26 members with six new permanent seats: two for Africa, two for Asia and the Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe. New permanent members would gain veto powers after a 10-to-15-year review period.

Uniting for Consensus, a group led by Italy that includes Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan and South Korea, opposes the creation of new permanent seats, arguing this would simply expand an existing oligarchy. Instead, they propose longer rotating terms and greater representation for underrepresented regions.

The five permanent members show varying degrees of openness to reform. France and the UK support expansion with veto powers, while the USA supports adding permanent African seats but without a veto. China backs new African seats, but virulently opposes Japan’s permanent membership, while Russia supports reform in principle but warns against making the Council ‘too broad’.

These positions reflect competition and a desire to prevent rivals gaining power. Current permanent members fear diluted influence, while states that see themselves as rising powers want the status and sway that comes with Council membership.

Adding new members could help redress the imbalance against the global south, but wouldn’t necessarily make the Council more effective, accountable and committed to protecting human lives and human rights, particularly if more states get veto powers.

A French-Mexican initiative from 2015 offers a more modest path: voluntary veto restraint in mass atrocity situations. The proposal asks permanent members to refrain from vetoes in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. This complements efforts to increase the political costs of vetoes, including the Code of Conduct signed by 121 states and General Assembly Resolution 76/262, which requires debate whenever a veto is cast.

New challenges

Now a new challenge has emerged from the Trump administration, which recently launched the Board of Peace at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This has mutated from a temporary institution set up by a Security Council resolution to govern over Gaza into a seemingly permanent one that envisages a broader global role under Trump’s personal control. Its membership skews toward authoritarian regimes, and human rights don’t get a mention in its draft charter.

Instead of legitimising the Board of Peace, efforts should focus on Security Council reform to address the two fundamental flaws of representation and veto power. Accountability and transparency must also be enhanced. Civil society must have space to engage with the Council and urge states to prioritise the UN Charter over self-interest.

Some momentum exists. The September 2024 Pact for the Future committed leaders to developing a consolidated reform model. Since 2008, formal intergovernmental negotiations have addressed membership expansion, regional representation, veto reform and working methods. These became more transparent in 2023, with sessions recorded online, allowing civil society to track proceedings and challenge blocking states.

However, reform efforts faced entrenched interests, geopolitical rivalries and institutional inertia even before Trump started causing chaos. The UN faces a demanding 2026, forced to make funding cuts amid a liquidity crisis while choosing the next secretary-general. In such circumstances, it’s tempting to defer difficult decisions.

But the reform case is clear, as is the choice: act to make the Council fit for purpose or accept continuing paralysis and irrelevance, allowing it to be supplanted by Trump’s Board of Peace.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Image: AI generated / shutterstock.com

By Jordan Ryan
Jan 19 2026 (IPS)

 
The Trump administration’s recent announcement of its withdrawal from 66 international organisations has been met with a mixture of alarm and applause. While the headline number suggests a dramatic retreat from the world stage, a closer look reveals a more nuanced, and perhaps more insidious, strategy. The move is less a wholesale abandonment of the United Nations system and more a targeted pruning of the multilateral vine, aimed at withering specific branches of global cooperation that the administration deems contrary to its interests. While the immediate financial impact may be less than feared, the long-term consequences for the UN and the rules-based international order are profound.

At first glance, the withdrawal appears to be a sweeping rejection of global engagement. The list of targeted entities is long and diverse, ranging from the well-known UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to more obscure bodies like the International Lead and Zinc Study Group. However, as Eugene Chen has astutely observed, the reality is more complex. The vast majority of the UN-related entities on the list are not independent international organisations, but rather subsidiary bodies, funds, and programmes of the UN itself. The administration is not, for now, withdrawing from the UN Charter, but rather selectively defunding and disengaging from the parts of the UN system it finds objectionable.

This selective approach reveals a clear ideological agenda. The targeted entities are overwhelmingly focused on issues that the Trump administration has long disdained: climate change, sustainable development, gender equality, and human rights. The list includes the UN’s main development arm, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs; its primary gender entity, UN Women; and a host of bodies dedicated to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The inclusion of the UN’s regional economic commissions, which play a vital role in promoting regional cooperation and development, is particularly telling. This is not simply a cost-cutting exercise; it is a deliberate attempt to dismantle the architecture of global cooperation in areas that do not align with the administration’s narrow, nationalist worldview.

The decision to remain a member of the UN’s specialised agencies, such as the World Health Organization (from which the administration has already announced its withdrawal in a separate action) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, is equally revealing. This is not a sign of a renewed commitment to multilateralism, but rather a cold, calculated decision based on a narrow definition of US national security interests. The administration has made it clear that it sees these agencies as useful tools to counter the influence of a rising China. This ‘à la carte’ approach to multilateralism, where the US picks and chooses which parts of the system to support based on its own geopolitical interests, is deeply corrosive to the principles of collective security and universal values that underpin the UN Charter.

What, then, should be done? The international community cannot afford to simply stand by and watch as the UN system is hollowed out from within. A concerted effort is needed to mitigate the damage and reaffirm the importance of multilateral cooperation.

First, other member states must step up to fill the financial and leadership void left by the United States. This will require not only increased financial contributions, but also a renewed political commitment to the UN’s work in the areas of sustainable development, climate action, and human rights. Second, civil society organisations and the academic community have a crucial role to play in monitoring the impact of the US withdrawal and advocating for the continued relevance of the affected UN entities. Finally, the UN itself must do a better job of communicating its value to a sceptical public. The organisation must move beyond bureaucratic jargon and technical reports to tell a compelling story about how its work makes a real difference in the lives of people around the world.

The Trump administration’s latest move is a stark reminder that the post-war international order can no longer be taken for granted. It is a call to action for all who believe in the power of multilateralism to address our shared global challenges. The UN may be a flawed and imperfect institution, but it remains our best hope for a more peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world. We must not allow it to wither on the vine.

Related articles by this author:
Venezuela and the UN’s Proxy War Moment
The Danger of a Transactional Worldview
The Choice Is Still Clear: Renewing the UN Charter at 80

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Quietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.

Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.

It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.

New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.

It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.

Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.

They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.

Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.

MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.

White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.

MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.

For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.

Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.

Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.

Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.

Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.

Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.

China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.

Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.

The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.

Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.

The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.

With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.

The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.

Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.

The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.

Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.

As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.

Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.

While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.

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General Plenary Session of Leaders at the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 30. Credit: Ueslei Marcelino/COP3

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Nov 12 2025 (IPS)

COP30 Brazil, though shadowed by the absence of many world leaders, remains a pivotal milestone in the global fight against climate change, tasked with building on the Paris Agreement’s momentum. Yet the glaring lack of commitment, coupled with withdrawals from the accord, casts a grim shadow over the future. The planet continues to warm, and scientists warn that current targets may not prevent a catastrophic temperature spike. While the summit’s focus on implementation not just new promises—is a welcome shift, it’s clear: words alone won’t cool the Earth.

James Alix Michel

Brazil’s leadership in championing nature-based solutions, like safeguarding the Amazon rainforest, is a beacon of hope. The conference ignited critical discussions on climate finance, adaptation, and resilience for vulnerable nations. The Baku-to-Belem Roadmap’s goal of mobilizing $1.3 trillion annually for developing countries is ambitious but necessary. Yet challenges loom large: wealthy nations’ apathy, geopolitical fractures, and the lingering impact of the U.S. withdrawal from Paris. COP30’s success hinges on action.

The Stakes Are Dire

The IPCC warns: we’re on track for 2.5–3°C warming by 2100 if pledges are not met. This spells ruin: crippling droughts, unlivable cities, mass migration, and ecosystems collapsing. The Amazon, a vital carbon sink, is nearing a ‘tipping point’ of irreversible dieback. Island nations face existential threats. The climate crisis is not a distant threat—it’s here.

Why COP30 Matters

1. Implementation Over Pledges: Past summits yielded lofty goals, but delivery has lagged. COP30 must hold nations accountable. No more empty vows.

2. Climate Finance: Developing countries need predictable funding, not charity. The $100 billion/year promise remains unfulfilled. Wealthy nations must pay their share.

3. Adaptation and Resilience: Frontline communities in Africa, Small Island States, and the Global South can’t wait. Funding for early warnings, flood defenses, and drought-resistant crops isn’t a favor; it’s justice.

4. Global Unity: Geopolitics must not derail progress. The world needs cooperation, not competition.

The Human Cost:

Millions already suffer. Cyclones, wildfires, famine, mass migration, and sea-level rise. This isn’t ‘someday’; it’s now. Indigenous groups, youth activists, and scientists plead: stop debating. Act.

Yet amid the urgency, COP30 saw glimmers. Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pushed for Amazon protection. African nations demanded reparations for historical emissions. The Global South called for “Equity first.”

The Road Ahead: COP31 and Beyond.

Future summits must:

• • Enforce transparency: Track emissions cuts, not just promises.
  • Prioritize loss & damage: Compensate those already paying the price.
  • Work towards ending fossil fuels: No new coal projects.
  • Empower youth: Include communities, not just politicians.

A Call to Leaders: Pledges Aren’t Leadership

When leaders make commitments, they bind their nations to honor them. Empty promises are not leadership. The world isn’t a battleground for wars—it’s our only home. We’re all in this together. No more excuses. Action isn’t optional.

The clock ticks. The Amazon burns. The oceans rise. We need solutions. And we know what the solutions are. Now we need action.

Let’s choose life. For the planet and for ourselves.

James Alix Michel, Former President Republic of Seychelles, Member Club de Madrid, Founder James Michel Foundation.

IPS UN Bureau

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Ahmed Salem Lebsir, battalion chief and director of the Polisario Front Military School, stands beside an installation marking Morocco’s invasion of the territory 50 years ago. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ROME, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

Ehmudi Lebsir was 17 when he trudged more than 50 kilometres across the desert to stay alive. Half a century on, the Sahrawi refugee still has not gone home to what was then Spanish province of Western Sahara.

On 6 November 1975, six days after Moroccan troops pushed into the territory, hundreds of thousands of Moroccan civilians streamed south under military escort. Branded the “Green March”, it was, in effect, an invasion and the start of a military occupation of Sahrawi land.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades

Dubbed “Africa’s last colony,” Western Sahara is roughly the size of the United Kingdom and remains the continent’s only territory still awaiting decolonisation. Yet on 31 October this year, that goal slipped further from reach.

Marking the 50th anniversary of Morocco’s incursion, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that, by endorsing Rabat’s autonomy plan, lent weight to Morocco’s sovereignty claim over the territory.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades.

Lebsir speaks to IPS by videoconference from the Tindouf camps in western Algeria. Nearly 2,000 kilometres southwest of Algiers, this harsh desert where summer temperatures can touch 60C has been the closest thing to home the Sahrawi people have known for 50 years.

“We faced a choice: remain in Algeria as refugees, or build the machinery of a state, with its ministries and a parliament,” recalls Lebsir, now a senior representative of the Polisario Front. Founded in 1973, it is recognised by the United Nations as the “legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people”.

A man walks past a mural in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where the Polisario Front has managed life in exile while building state institutions. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

On arriving in Tindouf in 1975, Lebsir was tasked with setting up schools in the camps. He later oversaw cohorts of Sahrawi students in Cuba, spent a decade in the Sahrawi Parliament and served in the SADR’s Ministries of Justice and Culture.

It was in that parliament that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was proclaimed in February 1976.

“After a century of Spanish presence, we never imagined Madrid would leave and abandon us to our fate,” he says. “There’s no going back: either we have an independent state, or our people will be buried.”

After the Polisario declared independence in 1976, the UN reaffirmed the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination. But the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), created in 1991, has never delivered the vote it was set up to hold.

Tomás Bárbulo was also 17 when Moroccan forces moved in. The son of a Spanish soldier based in Laayoune —Western Sahara’s capital, 1,100 kilometres south of Rabat—, he had returned to Madrid three months before that 6 November.

“The Sahrawis have survived napalm and white phosphorus, persecution, exile, the systematic plunder of their natural resources, and attempts to erase their identity through the influx of hundreds of thousands of settlers,” the journalist and author tells IPS by phone from Madrid.

Bárbulo, whose La Historia Prohibida del Sahara Español (Destino, 2002) is a standard work on the conflict, lays the stalemate chiefly at the door of “Morocco’s unyielding position, often blessed by the Security Council’s major powers.” The UN, he says, “has capitulated to Rabat”.

Ironically, even the UN does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The occupied territory has been on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963. In legal terms, the decolonisation of Western Sahara remains “unfinished.”

Mohamed Dadach in Laayoune, the capital of occupied Western Sahara. Released in 1999 after 24 years in prison, he is known as the “Sahrawi Nelson Mandela.” Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Open-air prison’

The UNHCR estimates that between 170,000 and 200,000 Sahrawis live in Algeria’s desert camps. However, life inside the Moroccan-held territory itself is harder to gauge, since Rabat does not even acknowledge the Sahrawi people exist.

Understanding living conditions there is equally difficult. Senior observers such as Noam Chomsky have labelled the territory as a “vast open-air prison”.

In a report released last July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that Morocco has blocked visits by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) since 2015.

“OHCHR continues to receive allegations of human rights violations, including intimidation, surveillance and discrimination against Sahrawi individuals, particularly those advocating for self-determination,” he wrote.

Despite restrictions, international rights groups continue to document abuses. Amnesty International’s 2024 report says Rabat curtails “dissent and the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Western Sahara” and “violently represses peaceful protests”.

Human Rights Watch denounced that courts hand down long sentences based “almost entirely” on activists’ confessions, without probing claims they were extracted under police torture.

At 36, Ahmed Ettanji is one of the most prominent Sahrawi activists in the occupied zone, something he has paid for with 18 arrests and repeated torture.

Speaking by phone from Laayoune, he says the visibility afforded by international NGOs is the only thing keeping him out of prison, or worse.

“We are marking fifty years of a harsh military blockade, extrajudicial killings and every kind of abuse,” he says. “There are thousands of disappeared and tens of thousands of arrests. The economic interests of world powers always trump human rights.”

After five decades, entire generations have been born in the Algerian desert, many families knowing each other only through video calls. Yet Ettanji insists not all is bleak.

“Born under occupation, people my age were expected to be the most assimilated, the most pro-Moroccan. That has not happened. The desire for self-determination is very much alive among the young.”

Sunset on a beach in occupied Western Sahara. In addition to a coastline rich in fishing resources, Sahrawis watch helplessly as Rabat exploits the rest of their natural wealth with the complicity of powers like the US, France, and Spain. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Autonomous Region of the Sahara’

The autonomy plan that the UN has now effectively endorsed is Rabat’s sole political offer in five decades. First floated in 2007, it was backed by the Trump administration in 2020.

How this “Autonomous Region of the Sahara” would actually work is left largely undefined, beyond talk of local administrative, judicial and economic powers.

Polisario rejects the scheme, but rejection has not brought the Sahrawis any closer to deciding their own future.

For many Sahrawis, the timing of the Security Council’s move, on the very anniversary of Morocco’s 1975 incursion, felt less like coincidence than calculated cruelty.

People like Garazi Hach Embarek, daughter of a Basque nurse who treated the first displaced families half a century ago and a founding member of the Polisario Front. The 47-year-old has spent years taking the cause into classrooms, universities, town halls and any forum that will listen.

In an interview with IPS in Urretxu, 400 kilometres north of Madrid, Hach Embarek does not hide her dismay. “Active resistance is extremely difficult, and the Moroccan lobby remains highly influential,” laments the Sahrawi activist.

“We live in turbulent times, where anything seems to go, but this is neither just nor legal. Under the guise of peace, the real aim is simply to legitimise injustice,” she adds, before stressing the need “to forge new alliances.”

“Colonialism is far from over, and we’re merely the casualties of continued misgovernance in Africa’s last colony.”

Credit: Forus - UN High-Level Political Forum 2025

By Sarah Strack and Christelle Kalhoulé
NEW YORK, Sep 26 2025 (IPS)

This September the UN turns 80, but the lessons of peace, justice, and cooperation are still unfinished. The world today faces the flames of inequality, conflict, ecological collapse and growing digital threats. In short, the very problems the UN was created to solve are once again staring us in the face.

That’s why the UN’s latest reform push, “UN80,” matters. Launched this spring, it promises to make the multilateral system more inclusive and accountable. But here’s the real question: can it align with 21st century’s needs? Will it be remembered as a budget drill or the start of a renewal that truly delivers for people where they live?

If this moment is going to count, three things must happen.

First, reforms must put people at the center, and we must avoid a reform by spreadsheet.

The UN is under financial strain. Geopolitical tensions are sky-high, negotiations are gridlocked, Member States are late on dues and membership fees, arrears run into the billions, and the UN’s mandate, efficiency, and effectiveness are under question.

“In a polycrisis world, shrinking the UN’s capacity is like cutting the fire brigade during wildfire season,” warns Christelle Kalhoulé, Forus Chair and civil society leader in Burkina Faso. “Reform cannot be about cutting corners. It must be about giving people the protection, rights, and solidarity they are being denied today.”

The UN80 Initiative marks the most sweeping reform effort in decades, with three tracks: streamlining services and consolidating IT and HR systems, reviewing outdated mandates, and exploring the consolidation of UN agencies into seven thematic “clusters.”

On paper, these reforms could bring overdue coherence. But the process has too often felt opaque, with key documents surfacing via leaks and staff unions flagging limited transparency and consultation.

Increasing the use of tools like AI is among the “solutions” being floated to “flag potential duplication” and shorten resolutions — yet without clear guardrails, there’s a risk of automating cuts and reinforcing bias rather than empowering people-first innovation. And the debate has too often been framed around cash flow, back payments, and cuts. The United States alone owes $1.5 billion in dues. Major donors are cutting ODA, and several UN humanitarian agencies are planning double-digit reductions in 2025 in their budgets.

As Arjun Bhattarai, Executive Director of the NGO Federation of Nepal warns: “Reform cannot be a synonym for austerity. Cutting budgets may make spreadsheets look tidy in New York, but it leaves communities in Kathmandu, Kampala, Khartoum, or Kyiv without support when they need it most.”

The danger is a reform focused on management efficiencies instead of reimagining what the UN must be to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Second, a better compass exists.

Despite its flaws, multilateralism remains indispensable. Without the UN, the world would be poorer when it comes to peace, cooperation, and collective problem-solving.

What makes the UN matter most, however, are not the halls of New York or Geneva, but the people and communities it exists to serve.

The UN was created “for the people and by the people”. Protecting, safeguarding and promoting healthy sustainable lives for communities must remain the core priority.

Our measure for reform is simple: a transformed UN must reduce inequalities, ensure fairer and more inclusive representation across its governance structures, deliver public goods fairly with accountability, and protect people better, faster, while safeguarding rights.

As Moses Isooba, Executive Director of the Uganda National NGO Forum, puts it: “A reformed UN must stand closer to the people than to the corridors of power. It must be measured not by the length of resolutions, but by the depth of hope it restores and the changes it makes for communities worldwide.”

If UN80 becomes a technocratic exercise in “doing less with less,” we will emerge with a smaller, weaker UN at precisely the moment we need it most.

If instead it becomes a justice-driven reimagining — linking architecture and finance to a clear vision of protection, equity, participation, and decentralization — it could renew the UN’s capacity to act as a backbone of international cooperation.

As Justina Kaluinaite, Policy and advocacy expert at the Lithuanian NGDO Platform, stresses: “The UN will survive another 80 years only if it learns to listen. True reform is not about doing more with less, but about doing better with those who have been left out.”

Third, put reforms through three simple tests.

When leaders meet in New York, we challenge them to have every reform proposal answering three questions:

1. The Inequality Question: Does this reform measurably narrow gaps — by income, gender, geography, or status — in who is protected and who benefits?

2. The Localisation Question: Does it move money, decisions, and accountability closer to communities, with transparent targets and timelines?

3. The Rights Question: Does it strengthen — not dilute — protection, gender equality, and human rights?

As Christelle Kalhoulé, sums it up: “The measure of UN80 should not be how much paper it saves, but how many lives it protects. History and the legacy we leave to future generations will not ask whether the UN balanced its budget in 2025; it will ask whether it stood with people.”

If leaders embrace this moment, the UN can emerge sharper, stronger, and more inclusive, with a justice-driven renewal of multilateralism, reclaiming its place as the backbone of global cooperation. If not, UN80 may go down in history as the moment when multilateralism chose retreat over renewal.

If UN80 is going to matter, it must prevent crises before they explode, deliver for both people and planet, give underrepresented countries and communities a real voice, keep civil society free and strong, and fix financing so money reaches those on the frontlines. The real test isn’t how tidy the org chart looks, it’s whether lives are saved, trust is rebuilt, and the UN proves it can still rise to the moment and be fit to serve this 21st century world.

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Suriya Phosri/Getty Images via Gallo Images

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)

Algorithms decide who lives and dies in Gaza. AI-powered surveillance tracks journalists in Serbia. Autonomous weapons are paraded through Beijing’s streets in displays of technological might. This isn’t dystopian fiction – it’s today’s reality. As AI reshapes the world, the question of who controls this technology and how it’s governed has become an urgent priority.

AI’s reach extends into surveillance systems that can track protesters, disinformation campaigns that can destabilise democracies and military applications that dehumanise conflict by removing human agency from life-and-death decisions. This is enabled by an absence of adequate safeguards.

Governance failings

Last month, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish the first international mechanisms – an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance – meant to govern the technology, agreed as part of the Global Digital Compact at the Summit of the Future in September. This non-binding resolution marked a first positive step towards potential stronger regulations. But its negotiation process revealed deep geopolitical fractures.

Through its Global AI Governance Initiative, China champions a state-led approach that entirely excludes civil society from governance discussions, while positioning itself as a leader of the global south. It frames AI development as a tool for economic advancement and social objectives, presenting this vision as an alternative to western technological dominance.

Meanwhile, the USA under Donald Trump has embraced technonationalism, treating AI as a tool for economic and geopolitical leverage. Recent decisions, including a 100 per cent tariff on imported AI chips and purchase of a 10 per cent stake in chipmaker Intel, signal a retreat from multilateral cooperation in favour of transactional bilateral arrangements.

The European Union (EU) has taken a different approach, implementing the world’s first comprehensive AI Act, which comes into force in August 2026. Its risk-based regulatory framework represents progress, banning AI systems deemed to present ‘unacceptable’ risks while requiring transparency measures for others. Yet the legislation contains troubling gaps.

While initially proposing to ban live facial recognition technology unconditionally, the AI Act’s final version permits limited use with safeguards that human rights groups argue are inadequate. Further, while emotion recognition technologies are banned in schools and workplaces, they remain permitted for law enforcement and immigration control, a particularly concerning decision given existing systems’ documented racial bias. The ProtectNotSurveil coalition has warned that migrants and Europe’s racial minorities are serving as testing grounds for AI-powered surveillance and tracking tools. Most critically, the AI Act exempts systems used for national security purposes and autonomous drones used in warfare.

The growing climate and environmental impacts of AI development adds another layer of urgency to governance questions. Interactions with AI chatbots consume roughly 10 times more electricity than standard internet searches. The International Energy Agency projects that global data centre electricity consumption will more than double by 2030, with AI driving most of this increase. Microsoft’s emissions have grown by 29 per cent since 2020 due to AI-related infrastructure, while Google quietly removed its net-zero emissions pledge from its website as AI operations pushed its carbon footprint up 48 per cent between 2019 and 2023. AI expansion is driving construction of new gas-powered plants and delaying plans to decommission coal facilities, in direct contradiction to the need to end fossil fuel use to limit global temperature rises.

Champions needed

The current patchwork of regional regulations, non-binding international resolutions and lax industry self-regulation falls far short of what’s needed to govern a technology with such profound global implications. State self-interest continues to prevail over collective human needs and universal rights, while the companies that own AI systems accumulate immense power largely unchecked.

The path forward requires an acknowledgment that AI governance isn’t merely a technical or economic issue – it’s about power distribution and accountability. Any regulatory framework that fails to confront the concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a few tech giants will inevitably fall short. Approaches that exclude civil society voices or prioritise national competitive advantage over human rights protections will prove inadequate to the challenge.

The international community must urgently strengthen AI governance mechanisms, starting with binding agreements on lethal autonomous weapons systems that have stalled in UN discussions for over a decade. The EU should close the loopholes in its AI Act, particularly regarding military applications and surveillance technologies. Governments worldwide need to establish coordination mechanisms that can effectively counter tech giants’ control over AI development and deployment.

Civil society must not stand alone in this fight. Any hopes of a shift towards human rights-centred AI governance depend on champions emerging within the international system to prioritise human rights over narrowly defined national interests and corporate profits. With AI development accelerating rapidly, there’s no time to waste.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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By Anna Naupa
Sep 8 2025 (IPS)

 
Globally, there is a 0.36% deterioration in average levels of peacefulness, as more countries are increasing their levels of militarisation against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, increasing conflict, and rising economic uncertainty.

But this statistic omits most Pacific island countries. In 2025, only three are ranked by the Global Peace Index (GPI): New Zealand in 3rd place, Australia in18th and Papua New Guinea ranking 116th out of 163 nations.

As regional dialogue about an ‘Ocean of Peace’ concept advances, a dedicated Pacific Peace Index—as suggested by Solomon Islands’ Professor Transform Aqorau at the July 2025 Pacific Regional and National Security Conference—might provide additional form to an evolving political dialogue amongst Pacific Islands Forum member states.

But, how is Pacific peace defined? How might our own Pacific measure of peacefulness complement existing efforts to safeguard peace and security in the region?

What is Pacific Peace?

Peace is more than the absence of conflict or violence; it is a global public good that enables people to live full, healthy and prosperous lives without fear.

“Peace must serve the people, not geopolitics, not elites in the region, not distant interests,” Professor Aqorau says, in articulating a vision for Pacific peace. Peace must also tackle broader factors affecting safety and wellbeing across the Pacific, particularly for women and vulnerable populations, says Fiji’s Shamima Ali.

Peace and development are two sides of the same coin. The Pacific 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent places peace alongside harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, as a key element for attaining free, healthy, and productive lives for Pacific peoples. Delivering Pacific peace, therefore, entails securing well-being; protecting people, place and environment; advancing development; and securing futures for present and future generations, the latter efforts entailing climate action and protection of sovereignty.

While global indices are variably critiqued for omissions of Pacific Islands data, unilateral development and indicator bias, poorly contextualized methodologies, or the significant resourcing required to produce Pacific datasets, indices can nonetheless usefully inform policy-makers.

What could a Pacific Peace Index measure?

The current starting point for measuring and monitoring peace in the region is found in the form of existing country commitments to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 (the ‘Peace Goal’).

The Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development has contextualised eight SDG 16 indicators for regional reporting that address experiences of violence, access to justice, civil registration and legal identity, transparency of public expenditure, and public access to information and views on participation in decision-making processes.

In 2022, a regional monitoring report led by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat found that limited data availability for SDG16 hampered measurement of progress in the Pacific. This is broadly reflective of global trends, where investment is needed in further data generation efforts and statistical capacity to measure SDG 16.

The report also found that the Pacific was regressing on advancing effective institutions, transparency, and accountability.

But are SDG16’s Pacific contextualised indicators sufficient to meet the expectations of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the Pacific 2050 Strategy’s Peace and Security pillar? Can this type of reporting serve as a potential proxy ‘Pacific Peace Index’?

While answers to these questions are both technical and political in nature, there are two things to keep in mind:

1) Peace has deep roots in Pacific social and cultural structures

Despite close alignment with regional strategies, the current SDG 16 contextualised indicators do not encapsulate the depth of a Pacific vision for peace.

Pacific Islands Countries’ policy commitments to aspects of peace are well-documented. Each year new initiatives are announced that respond to an expanded concept of security, ranging from traditional security cooperation to tackling gender-based violence, climate mitigation and humanitarian assistance or investing in democratic processes.

But, knowledge gaps remain about the contribution of locally driven peace initiatives to national and regional efforts, and how these contribute to overall Pacific well-being. Addressing these gaps allows for a more comprehensive telling of an aggregated Pacific narrative of peace, which could be factored into a Pacific Peace Index. For example, peace-building dialogues following the Bougainville crisis, Solomon Islands’ ethnic tensions, and series of Fiji coups have highlighted the important contributions of locally-driven approaches, including drawing on traditional dispute resolution.

2) Telling a story of purposeful peace

Yet, Pacific peace is more than a collection of discrete data points and time-bound security-related projects. Peace is an evolving process, it is future-oriented and a proactive, purposeful exercise.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Baron Waqa has stressed that peace must be “anchored in sovereignty, resilience, inclusion and regional solidarity.” Many Pacific scholars agree, arguing that there is no real peace without addressing longstanding issues of colonisation, militarisation, restricted sovereignty and justice, which continue to bear on many Pacific islanders.

To tell a regional story means connecting, for example, Tuvalu’s international statehood recognition, the recent landmark ICJ advisory opinion on climate change, the nuclear legacies in the region, political instability, elections, and well-being measures, to the region’s vision of peace. Combined, we can then begin to grasp all the elements that contribute to a cumulatively peaceful region.

So, where to from here?

Another tool is the Positive Peace Index which measures the ‘attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain and create peaceful societies’. It assesses socio-economic development, justice, good governance and effective institutions, inclusion, resilience and diplomacy. A Pacific Peace Index could adapt this to incorporate Pacific indigenous philosophies of peace and values of social cohesion, well-being and reconciliation that are absent from existing global indices, for example, and track the region’s journey, disaggregated by country.

Multi-country indices demand considerable capacity so a State of Pacific Peace assessment may instead offer a simpler option. This could entail a dedicated section in the existing Pacific Regional Security Outlook report produced by regional organisations. Alternatively, the region’s academic institutions (e.g. via Track 2 mechanisms) could be invited to assist. Investing in peace summits also provides the opportunity for ongoing regional peace dialogue.

The emphasis, however, must be on building, not duplicating, existing regional mechanisms.

The opportunity of a Pacific Peace Index would be in owning and telling a coherent peace narrative that: a) bridges security and development and, b) reflects how the peace interests and dignity of Pacific peoples are being upheld over time.

As political dialogue about a Pacific ‘Ocean of Peace’ evolves, Pacific peoples’ visions of peace must drive any framing and subsequent action. Professor Aqorau offers further wisdom: ” Our peace should not depend on choosing sides, but on asserting our needs, on our terms and on our collective aspirations.”

Related articles:
Peacebuilding: The Missing Peace in COP30 Climate Ambition

Climate Change in Pasifika Relational Itulagi

Anna Naupa is a ni-Vanuatu PhD candidate at the Australian National University.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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The Global South had little voice, let alone influence, in shaping the economically ‘neoliberal’ and politically ‘neoconservative’ globalisation leading to contemporary geopolitical economic conflicts. Pacifist non-aligned cooperation for sustainable development offers the best way forward.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by anti-communist governments of the region. In 1973, its leaders agreed the area should be a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

The world was deemed unipolar American discourse after the first Cold War. Meanwhile, most of the Global South remained non-aligned in what the Rest see as a multipolar world.

Despite critical dissent, the West seems to have lost interest in preserving peace. Unsurprisingly, the US and its NATO allies increasingly ignore the United Nations. Foreign military interventions since the first Cold War already exceed the many of that longer era.

During World War II, military production generated growth and employment in Germany, Japan and the US. But surely, development today is best achieved peacefully and cooperatively.

Pacifist non-alignment should cut unnecessary military spending. Although big powers compete for hegemony by weaponising international relations, they will still try to ‘buy’ support from the non-aligned.

Realistically, most small developing nations cannot lead international peace-making. But they can and should be a stronger moral force urging justice, peace, freedom, neutrality, development, and international cooperation.

Return of the Global South
The Group of 77 (G77) developing countries’ caucus and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) were both established in 1964. Headquartered in Geneva, UNCTAD is part of the UN Secretariat but has been steadily marginalised.

The G77 has a formal presence throughout the UN multilateral system. It now has over 130 members, including China, but its impact outside New York in recent decades has been limited.

Sustainability challenges and planetary heating are generally worse in the tropics, where most people in developing countries are. Meanwhile, hunger worldwide has worsened since 2014, while World Bank-reported income poverty has risen since the COVID-19 pandemic.

An inclusive and equitable multilateralism can better address the world’s challenges, especially peace and sustainable development – so crucial for progress in our dark times.

Global South needs better voice
While working for Goldman Sachs, Lord Jim O’Neill referred to Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the BRIC countries.

With South Africa joining, ostensibly representing Africa, they soon began meeting regularly. As members of the G20 group of the world’s twenty largest economies, the BRICS initially lobbied on financial issues.

They have since incorporated other large economies of the South, but also incurred the wrath of President Trump. While some nations have sought to join the enlarged BRICS plus (BRICS+), a few have hesitated after being invited.

BRICS has no record of strong and consistent advocacy of the interests of smaller developing economies. Most financially weak small nations doubt that BRICS+ will serve them well.

Higher US interest rates have triggered massive capital inflows, especially from the poorest countries, depriving them of finance at a time of greater need.

Meanwhile, aid levels have fallen tremendously, especially with Trump 2.0. Official development assistance (ODA) to the Global South is now below 0.3% of GDP, less than half the 0.7% commitment made in 1969.

Lowering tax rates has further squeezed the West’s already limited budgetary resources as stagnation deepens. Trump’s tariffs, US expenditure cuts, and greater Western military spending deepen worldwide economic contraction.

Non-alignment for our times
The Global South must urgently promote a new non-alignment for multilateral peace, development, and international cooperation to address Third World challenges better.

Even IMF number two, Gita Gopinath, agrees that developing countries should opt for non-alignment to benefit from not taking sides in the new Cold War.

With the exception of Brazil’s Lula, leadership by statesmen with international standing beyond their national stature largely passed with Nelson Mandela.

A few dynamic new leaders have emerged, but have not taken on the responsibilities of Global South leadership. Such leadership is in short supply despite the urgent need.

It is much easier to revive, reform, and reinvigorate NAM than to start from scratch. Although it has been less influential in recent decades, it can be revitalised.

Also, foreign policies are typically less subject to other typical national domestic policy considerations. Hence, they do not vary as much with the governments of the day.

Also, most developing country governments must appear to protect national interests to secure political support and legitimacy for survival.

Hence, conservative, even reactionary governments may take otherwise surprising anti-hegemonic positions in multilateral fora, especially with growing widespread resentment of bullying for extortion.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses autonomous weapons systems and the campaign for regulation with Nicole van Rooijen, Executive Director of Stop Killer Robots, a global civil society coalition of over 270 organisations that campaigns for a new international treaty on autonomous weapons systems.

Nicole van Rooijen

What are autonomous weapons systems and why do they pose unprecedented challenges?

Autonomous weapons systems, or ‘killer robots’, are weapons that, once activated by a human, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. These systems make independent decisions – without the intervention of a human operator – about when, how, where and against whom to use force, processing sensor data or following pre-programmed ‘target profiles’. Rather than using the term ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’, our campaign refers to ‘autonomous weapons systems’ to emphasise that any such system, lethal or not, can inflict serious harm.

The implications are staggering. These weapons could operate across all domains – air, land, sea and space – during armed conflicts and law enforcement or border control operations. They raise numerous ethical, humanitarian, legal and security concerns.

The most troubling variant involves anti-personnel systems triggered by human presence or individuals or groups who meet pre-programmed target profiles. By reducing people to data points for algorithmic targeting, these weapons are dehumanising. They strip away our inherent rights and dignity, dramatically increasing the risk of unjust harm or death. No machine, computer or algorithm can recognise a human as a human being, nor respect humans as inherent bearers of rights and dignity. Autonomous weapons cannot comprehend what it means to be in a state of war, much less what it means to have – or to end – a human life. Enabling machines to make life and death decisions is morally unjustifiable.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted it is ‘difficult to envisage’ scenarios where autonomous weapons wouldn’t pose significant risks of violating international humanitarian law, given the inevitable presence of civilians and non-combatants in conflict zones.

Currently, no international law governs these weapons’ development or use. As the technology advances rapidly, this legal vacuum creates a dangerous environment where autonomous weapons could be deployed in ways that violate existing international law while escalating conflicts, enabling unaccountable violence and harming civilians. This is what prompted the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC president to jointly call for urgent negotiations on a legally binding international instrument on autonomous weapons systems by 2026.

How have recent consultations advanced the regulatory agenda?

The informal consultations held in New York in May, mandated by UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 79/62, focused on issues raised in the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 report on autonomous weapons systems. They sought to broaden awareness among the diplomatic community and complement the work around the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), emphasising risks that extend far beyond international humanitarian law.

The UNGA offers a crucial advantage: universal participation. Unlike the CCW process in Geneva, it includes all states. This is particularly important for global south states, many of which are not a party to the CCW.

Over two days, states and civil society explored human rights implications, humanitarian consequences, ethical dilemmas, technological risks and security threats. Rich discussions emerged around regional dynamics and practical scenarios, examining how these weapons might be used in policing, border control and by non-state actors or criminal groups. While time constraints prevented exhaustive exploration of all issues, the breadth of engagement was unprecedented.

The Stop Killer Robots campaign found these consultations energising and strategically valuable. They demonstrated how UN processes in Geneva and New York can reinforce each other: while one forum provides detailed technical groundwork, particularly in developing treaty language, the other fosters inclusive political leadership and momentum. Both forums should work in tandem to maximise global efforts to achieve an international legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.

What explains the global divide on regulation?

The vast majority of states support a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems, favouring a two-tier approach that combines prohibitions with positive obligations.

However, roughly a dozen states oppose any form of regulation. Among them are some of the world’s most heavily militarised states and the primary developers, producers and likely users of autonomous weapons systems. Their resistance likely stems from the desire to preserve military superiority and protect economic interests, and the belief in inflated claims about these weapons’ supposed benefits promoted by big tech and arms industries. Or perhaps they simply favour force over diplomacy.

Whatever their motivations, this opposition underscores the urgent need for the international community to reinforce a rules-based global order that prioritises dialogue, multilateralism and responsible governance over unchecked technological ambition.

How do geopolitical tensions and corporate influence complicate international regulation efforts?

It is undeniable that geopolitical tensions and corporate influence are challenging the development of regulations for emerging technologies.

A handful of powerful states are prioritising narrow military and economic advantages over collective security, undermining the multilateral cooperation that has traditionally governed arms control. Equally troubling is the expanding influence of the private sector, particularly large tech companies that operate largely outside established accountability frameworks while wielding significant sway over political leaders.

This dual pressure is undermining the international rules-based order precisely when we most need stronger multilateral governance. Without robust regulatory frameworks that can withstand these pressures, development of autonomous weapons risks accelerating unchecked, with profound implications for global security and human rights.

How is civil society shaping this debate and advocating for regulation?

Anticipating the challenges autonomous weapons systems would pose, leading human rights organisations and humanitarian disarmament experts founded the Stop Killer Robots campaign in 2012. Today, our coalition spans over 270 organisations across more than 70 countries, working at national, regional and global levels to build political support for legally binding regulation.

We’ve played a leading role in shaping global discourse by highlighting the wide-ranging risks these technologies pose and producing timely research on weapons systems evolution and shifting state positions.

Our multi-level strategy targets all decision-makers who can influence this agenda, at local, regional and global levels. It’s crucial that political leaders understand how autonomous weapons might be used in warfare and other contexts, enabling them to advocate effectively within their spheres of influence for the treaty we urgently need.

Public pressure is key to our approach. Recent years have seen growing weapons systems autonomy and military applications, particularly in ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, alongside rising use of technologies such as facial recognition in civilian contexts. Public concern about the dehumanising nature of these technologies and the lack of regulation has grown online and offline. We frame these concerns along the whole spectrum of automated harm, with autonomous weapons representing the extreme, and highlight the critical need to close the gap between innovation and regulation.

We also collaborate with experts from arms, military and technology sectors to bring real-world knowledge and credibility to our treaty advocacy. It is crucial to involve those who develop and deploy autonomous weapons to demonstrate the gravity of current circumstances and the urgent need for regulation.

We encourage people to take action by signing our petition, asking their local political representatives to sign our Parliamentary Pledge or just spreading the word about our campaign on social media. This ultimately puts pressure on diplomats and other decision-makers to advance the legal safeguards we desperately need.

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By Sania Farooqui
BENGALURU, India, Jun 25 2025 (IPS)

It has been 33 years since peacebuilding was formally recognized within the United Nations system, by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who defined it as a long-term structural work aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence, setting the stage for the UN’s ongoing efforts to address the root cause of conflict and not just its consequences. “Post-conflict peacebuilding is the action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict,” Boutros-Ghali said.

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Founder of International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)

“Our entire system for peace and security was designed for interstate war. Wars today are often internal, asymmetrical, and increasingly state-non-state indistinct,” Sanam says. The change has outpaced mechanisms meant to manage it.

While the UN and the other multilateral institutions are still at the center, Sanam points out their shortcomings. “When great powers violate the rules, no one can hold them back,” she states. The fragility of international standards has been made clear by the immobility of international institutions in the face of aggression by the great powers, and that has has exposed the weakness of international norms.

“If we did not have the UN, we’d need one now”, Sanam says. However, she stresses that transformation is desperately needed, not just for institutions but also for mentality.

She argues that there is a clear choice: adopt inclusive, people-centered peacebuilding that leverages the legitimacy and abilities of actors closest to the ground or stick with a top-down, formulaic approach that hasn’t worked to address current crises.

“Today’s challenges include but are not limited to rising geopolitical tensions among nuclear-armed major powers, a seemingly inevitable climate catastrophe, technological changes that have the potential to remake every aspect of life, and the increasing powers and capabilities of non-state actors to reshape sub-national, national, and international affairs,” states this research by the Atlantic council.

The 2024 Multilateralism Index Report by International Peace Institute states that it is widely acknowledged that the multilateral systems are facing a series of crisis, and that international action in response to the wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan and Myanmar, and beyond has been largely confined to humanitarian assistance rather than peacemaking.

According to the report, and the surveys it conducted, majorities of people in most countries still have favourable views of the UN, want their country to be more involved in the UN, and believe the UN has made the world a better place. Majorities also agree that the UN promotes human rights, peace, democracy, action on infectious diseases and climate action. At the same time, perceptions of the UN varied widely by region, from strong support in Northern Europe and southeast Asia to low levels of trust across much of Latin America and the Middle East.

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the former president of Liberia, spoke about “Liberia’s story” in a video message during a recent event at the UN Headquarters commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). She said that it was a story of suffering, but also of hope.

The former president and Nobel Peace Prize winner stated, “a country that was once brought to its knees by a protracted struggle now stands as a testament to what is achievable when national will is matched by international solidarity.” “Liberia’s journey to peace could not be walked alone,” she stated, highlighting the role played by the international community through the UN and its peacekeeping Mission UNMIL, the African Union, the European Union, the regional bloc ECOWAS, and other organizations.

The United Nations peacebuilding architecture – which comprises of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) marks its fourth review this year which is mandated by general Assembly resolution 75/201 and Security Council Resolution 2558. This review comes at a time of significant geopolitical divisions and escalating risks of conflict in many parts of the world, underscoring the urgent need to act on recommendations from current and past reviews.

“If I were in charge, I’d take this moment of UN reform as a real opportunity,” says Sanam. The opening line of the UN Charter, “We the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, holds immense power. She argues that now is the time to put women, peace and security at the center of global peacemaking. “These agendas came from war zones. Women and youth are the most affected and also the most active in peacebuilding.” Sanam envisions peacebuilding as an ecosystem where the UN, states, international players, and local actors are all necessary, as each has a specific role to play. “Peace is a choice, but it’s a choice that takes courage, commitment, and creativity. It takes hearing from those too often ignored and believing in the ability of local actors to drive change,” Sanam says.

With more conflicts than any time in the last 30 years, and a record number of displaced persons worldwide, the stakes could not be higher. This conversation is not merely a breakdown of what is wrong – it’s a call to reimagine what peace could be, and who gets to build it.

Sania Farooqui is an independent journalist and host of The Sania Farooqui Show, a platform dedicated to amplifying the voices of women in peacebuilding and human rights.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

US President Donald Trump has deliberately sown discord worldwide in attempting to remake the world to serve supposed American interests better. He will not cede influence, let alone power and control, to other nations, let alone people.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

For Miran, Trump is reshaping the US-led unipolar world more equitably by getting others to bear more of the costs of ‘global public goods’ that the US ostensibly provides.

As geopolitical economist Ben Norton has noted, the US spends trillions on its global empire, with around 800 military bases abroad! While influential US corporate interests have benefited most, others have also gained.

The US contributed to the Global North’s reconstruction boom after World War II (WW2). After pre-empting growing Soviet influence from the last year of WW2, the US enhanced its hegemony by strengthening allies during the first Cold War.

However, Miran complains it is too “costly” to maintain the post-Cold War unipolar order without others bearing their “fair share” of the US costs of providing a “global security umbrella” and international dollar liquidity.

1985 Plaza Accord
In the 1980s, many complained about how Japan and Germany, which had lost WW2, had benefited from imposed military spending constraints and US occupation to gain industrial leadership worldwide.

At its second meeting at New York’s Plaza Hotel, the US-led Group of Five (G5), of the largest Western economies, agreed that the yen and Deutschemark should greatly appreciate against the US dollar.

This would ensure US recovery from its slowdown following dollar strengthening due to the Fed’s high-interest rate policy to quell inflation after the second oil price hike.

As the yen appreciated, Japan’s 1989 ‘Big Bang’ financial reforms sealed its fate. Its asset price bubble burst, also ending the post-war Japanese miracle boom.

Miran acknowledges US dollar “overvaluation has weighed heavily on the American manufacturing sector while benefiting financialised sectors of the economy in manners that benefit wealthy Americans”.

From Plaza to Mar-a-Lago
Unlike Plaza, Miran’s proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord, named for Trump’s private Florida retreat, will be imposed on all, especially allies in the Global North.

The Global North must improve the US trade balance by deterring imports and increasing exports by letting the dollar depreciate. Allies have been threatened with tariffs and unilateral withdrawal of the US security umbrella.

Miran’s proposal also envisions foreign governments holding 100-year US Treasury bonds. This should transfer long-term losses due to inflation to bondholders abroad.

He also wants a US sovereign wealth fund financed by revaluing US gold reserves to market prices. Meanwhile, his proposed cryptocurrency stabilisation fund already threatens to disrupt international finance.

His plan claims to reduce US trade deficits and bring back good jobs. Miran expects it will significantly shrink the US current account and fiscal deficits without requiring more tax revenue or spending cuts.

Weaker dollar not enough
Jenny Gordon has challenged Miran’s argument. She reasons that his plan is unrealisable without significantly shifting US resources from non-tradables to tradables.

Manufacturing investments needed to substitute imports and increase exports have to be financed. But the US has been a net borrower for almost half a century!

Its current account deficit reflects these savings-investment imbalances. The US would have to cut its capital account surplus by borrowing much less from others to reduce its current account deficit.

Making manufacturing more competitive requires a weaker dollar and new investment. The US must encourage Americans to save more, consume less, divert investment from elsewhere, and cut its fiscal deficit.

Otherwise, foreign borrowings financing manufacturing investments will strengthen the US dollar. Worse, a weaker greenback is needed to boost US competitiveness.

Miran may prevail
Even if US manufacturing recovers, well-paid jobs in depressed areas remain unlikely. Besides ageing, changing technology, consumption, and incomes have adversely affected prospects for reviving US manufacturing.

Government spending cuts have hurt state-sponsored research, which enabled the US to lead technological innovation worldwide until early this century.

Miran’s proposed forced conversion of US Treasury bonds held in official reserves to ‘century bonds’ will reduce confidence in the dollar and its liquidity value.

Besides lowering US borrowing costs, it would undermine the deep secondary market for US T-bills and dollar-denominated trade and financial flows—all key to dollar privilege.

The dollar’s status as a reserve currency has enabled the US to maintain massive fiscal deficits without high interest rates or the threat of currency collapse. But it has also constrained US economic options, favouring finance and other modern services.

Trump does not want to lose the dollar’s status as a reserve currency. His threat to the BRICS suggests likely harsh retaliation against efforts to reduce reliance on the US dollar.

The dollar’s status in international finance also enables the US to threaten others credibly. However, Trump’s treatment of allies reminds us that compliance does not ensure stability.

Miran presumes that trade and investment partner countries will do as he wants. While few may agree to his proposal, which will not work, not many may stand up to Trump. Worse, some are already giving lip service to the proposal.

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Donald Trump’s top economic advisor claims the President has weaponised tariffs to ‘persuade’ other nations to pay the US to maintain its supposedly mutually beneficial global empire.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The Institute is funded by financiers such as media czar Rupert Murdoch, who controls Fox News, The Wall Street Journal, and other conservative media.

Miran made his case just after Trump’s electoral victory in A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System. Miran attempts to rationalise Trump’s economic policies, which are widely seen as at odds with conventional wisdom and reason.

Enhancing US dominance
Miran defends Trump’s tariffs as part of an ambitious economic strategy to strengthen US interests internationally with a “generational change in the international trade and financial systems”.

“Our military and financial dominance cannot be taken for granted, and the Trump administration is determined to preserve them”. Miran claims the US provides two major ‘global public goods’, both “costly to us to provide”.

First, Miran claims US military spending provides the world a ‘security umbrella’ that others should also pay for. Second, the US issues the dollar and Treasury bonds, the main reserve assets for the liquidity of the international monetary and financial system.

Miran seems blissfully unaware of longstanding complaints of US ‘exorbitant privilege’. The dollar’s reserve currency status has provided seigniorage income to the US while Treasury bond sales have long financed US debt at very low cost.

Miran’s case for Trump
The White House has threatened others with high tariffs unless they make concessions, at their own expense, benefiting the US. Miran’s defence of tariffs is indirect, as part of an ostensible grand strategy.

“The President has been clear that the United States is committed to remaining the reserve [currency] provider”, Miran added. He claims US dollar hegemony is “great” and denies “dollar dominance is a problem”.

While this “has some side effects, which can be problematic”, Miran “would like to … ameliorate the side effects, so that dollar dominance can continue for decades, in perpetuity”.

For Miran, these side effects are supposedly largely adverse while ignoring the benefits to the US. Chronic US trade deficits have been possible and financed by mounting US debt, enabling the dollar to serve as a global reserve currency.

Hence, US trade deficits have been sustained since the 1960s, rather than “unsustainable”, as he alleges. US manufacturing has been “decimated” by its consumers and transnational corporations, not by an extensive foreign conspiracy.

Miran’s Guide acknowledged the ‘Triffin dilemma’. In 1960, Robert Triffin warned that the dollar’s status as global reserve currency posed problems and risks for US monetary policy.

He invokes Triffin to argue that the US must import more than it exports to provide liquidity to the world, which needs dollars for international trade and to hold as reserves.

Miran adopts the Trumpian narrative of only blaming others. However, the US expected to benefit from continuing trade surpluses at Bretton Woods. In 1944, it opposed alternative payments arrangements to deter excessive trade surpluses.

US trade deficits have grown since the 1960s with post-World War II reconstruction of the Global North and uneven ‘late industrialisation’ in the Global South.

The empire must pay
The Trump administration wants to eat its cake and still have it. It intends to strengthen US empire while minimising adverse side effects and costs.

Miran wants foreign nations to “pay their fair share” in five ways. First, “countries should accept tariffs on their exports to the US without retaliation”. Tariffs provide revenue, which has financed its global public goods provision. Second, they should buy “more US-made goods”.

Third, they should “boost defense spending and procurement from the US”. Fourth, they should “invest in and install factories in America”. Fifth, they should “simply … help us finance global public goods”, i.e., foreign aid should go to or via the US.

Miran then emphasises that Trump “will no longer stand for other nations free-riding”, and calls for “improved burden-sharing at the global level”.

“If other nations want to benefit from the US geopolitical and financial umbrella, then they need to … pay their fair share”, i.e., the world must “bear the costs” of maintaining US empire.

Trump dilemmas 2.0
Trump wants to use tariffs to force countries with trade surpluses with the US to buy more from the US. Ending these deficits would undermine dollar hegemony, which, paradoxically, Trump obsessively wants to preserve.

Miran wants other countries to convert their US Treasury bills into 100-year bonds at very low interest rates, effectively subsidising the US over the long term. He also wants nations running trade surpluses with the US to buy more long-term US Treasury securities.

Trump has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS members and all countries promoting de-dollarisation or undermining dollar hegemony in the international monetary system.

During his first term, Trump wanted to do the near-impossible by boosting exports while preserving a strong dollar!

Miran acknowledges that the “root of the economic imbalances lies in persistent dollar overvaluation that prevents international trade balancing”. But he also insists that dollar “overvaluation is driven by inelastic demand for reserve assets”.

Trump now hopes to kill both US trade and fiscal deficit birds by cutting imports and raising revenue with higher tariffs. He also wants the world to continue using dollars despite the US budget and trade deficits and policy uncertainties.

Meanwhile, official US debt, financed by selling Treasury bonds, continues to grow. Trump has to deliver his promised tax cuts soon before his earlier measures run out. Trump is falling foul of his bluster and may have to revert to the status quo ante while denying it.

Despite Miran’s best efforts, he cannot provide a coherent rationale for Trump’s rhetoric. But dismissing Trump as ‘mad’ or ‘stupid’ obscures the impossible dilemma due to and obscured by post-war US dominance.

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US President Donald Trump has again seized global attention by arbitrarily imposing sweeping tariffs on the rest of the world. He reminds us America is still boss, claiming to ‘make America great again’ (MAGA) by ensuring ‘America first’ at everyone else’s expense.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Since then, the world has been scrambling to understand better the president’s intentions to protect their interests. This has also triggered much talk about managing adjustment and enhancing resilience.

Shocked by his unilateral abandonment of the revised free trade agreement renegotiated during Trump 1.0, its North American neighbours were the first to engage publicly.

More recently, China’s ironically reciprocal response gave Trump another excuse for more punitively escalating his ‘reciprocal tariffs’. With little left to lose even before Trump’s latest tariffs against China, it said No to the Orange Emperor, switching the impact from manufacturing to agriculture.

Only major economies dare to retaliate. However, due to its geopolitics, including Trump’s demands for more ‘equitable’ NATO cost-sharing, an appropriately strong European response seems unlikely.

Many prioritise the Western alliance, while a few prefer other options. Sensing the ‘silence of the lambs’, the president has gloated over the steady stream of foreign leaders coming to ‘kiss my arse’.

Trump’s tariff fetish
The tariff announcement was not set in stone. It remains to be seen how much Trump’s support base, especially from the US corporate elite, will succeed in revising his measures.

He is unlikely to respond positively to opposition from abroad or even within the US. The tariffs will be tied up in legal and legislative procedures for some time, even after they go into effect.

The dissent of some Senate Republicans suggests the US Congress may reject the tariffs as a significant infringement on their Constitutional prerogatives.

Announced as executive orders, they are subject to judicial scrutiny. Of course, the White House will have to reconsider which battles to fight and which to concede without appearing to do so.

A face-saving compromise between the Republican-controlled Congress and the White House is increasingly likely. Attention can thus be diverted abroad to preferred targets such as China and Iran.

Some other countries, especially the BRICS, may also be hit to ‘save face’. The president can then claim he tried his best to MAGA but was foiled by foreign-connected opponents.

While Trump critics are making much of his subsequent revisions, concessions, amendments and postponements, the greater significance of his announcement lies elsewhere.

Divided we fall
Trump 2.0 will dictate the terms of US engagement with the world. He has already reminded everyone he is The Great Disruptor. Dismissing cooperation as for losers, his team’s purpose is to put others down.

Trump has subverted the World Trade Organization and all US-negotiated trade agreements except when it best serves its interests. He has given notice of selectively invoking multilateralism and the rule of law to serve his preferred interests best.

Although all European countries will be affected by Trump’s tariffs, each will be hit differently. Hence, developing a strong, unified European position will be difficult. This will deter other regional and plurilateral groupings from collective action.

In one stroke, Trump reminded the world that America remains number one and that he means business. Critics overlook his purpose and strategy by dismissing his methods and tactics as transactional, stupid or irrational.

Method to the madness?
Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors chairman, Stephen Miran, has offered an economic rationale for Trumponomics 2.0. He argues the world must pay for the ‘global public goods’ the US ostensibly provides, especially US military spending.

He also insists the US is doing the world a favour by allowing the US dollar to serve as the world’s reserve currency. He ignores how it earns seigniorage and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of being able to issue debt to the rest of the world without having to repay.

His so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord purports to offer more financial stability through US dollar currency pegs and related digital currency arrangements, requiring payment flows to the US Treasury and Federal Reserve.

Trump has promised even more regressive tax reforms for the super-rich who generously funded his re-election campaign. As before, this will be obscured by some tax relief for the ‘middle class’.

The shift from potentially progressive direct taxation to more indirect taxation has already begun, with the proposed tariffs impacting purchases of merchandise imports.

Industrial policy redux?
Tariffs cannot simply restart long-abandoned production overnight. Earlier manufacturing jobs were lost to imports and the automation of production processes.

Reviving abandoned productive capacities and capabilities will mainly create poor jobs. ‘Fortress USA will attract some investments, mainly for the limited US market, but it cannot transform itself into the world’s manufacturing powerhouse it once was.

Recent reshoring efforts have proved embarrassingly unsuccessful. This has been evident with the difficulties of the forced relocation of the world’s leading (Taiwanese) semiconductor manufacturer to the US.

Trump’s turn to industrial policy is more backward-looking than progressive. It seeks to save uncompetitive old capacities rather than advance potentially competitive new investments, technology, productive capacities, and capabilities.

Also, investment and technology promotion need supportive policies, especially in human resources, research, and development, which are increasingly undermined by Musk-led government spending cuts.

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Prayers for peace at the Korean border.Credit: Greenburd/shutterstock.com

By Stein Tønnesson
Apr 7 2025 (IPS)

 
The armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953 has been mentioned as a possible model for how to end the fighting in Ukraine. This makes sense. The Trump administration, however, seems to opt for a quick deal like the 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam or the Minsk agreements of 2014–15, combining “ceasefires in place” with vain prospects of subsequently reaching a genuine peace agreement.

One lesson from the negotiations that led to the Korean armistice is that patient diplomacy is needed to end a stalemated war. When talks began in July 1951, the impatient Mao Zedong estimated that two weeks would be enough to conclude. The negotiations instead took two years. The result was a long text, detailing the exact border line and establish a demilitarized zone across the peninsula under UN supervision. The stated intention was to follow up with a peace agreement. This came to nothing. The conference established for the purpose in Geneva decided instead to reach an agreement on Indochina, dividing Vietnam for the next 21 years and replacing the French with American military forces.

The biggest difference between the Korea and Ukraine wars is that the Ukrainians are fighting alone, with only external military support, while the Korean War was primarily fought by American and Chinese forces on Korean soil. Back then, the armistice agreement was concluded by the commanders of the US-dominated UN forces, the Chinese “volunteers”, and the North Korean army, against the wish of Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul. He wanted to continue the fight for national reunification. Only after being offered a defence pact with the US did he accept the negotiated outcome, yet did not sign the agreement. South Korea has never signed the armistice that has prevented new outbreaks of war.

The key similarity between the Korean and Ukrainian wars is the prominent role of the USA as a supporter of the governments in Seoul and Kyiv. In both cases a condition for ensuring that an armistice can hold is that the US take responsibility for any agreement and joins up with others in providing security guarantees. A key reason why war has not resumed in Korea for the last 72 years is the continued US presence in the south. American troops act as a “tripwire,” ensuring that any North Korean invasion would lead to a war it would surely lose. For the same reason, the US needs to have boots on the ground in Ukraine.

Another similarity is that any attempt to conclude a genuine peace agreement is futile. A genuine peace in Korea would require that North and South agree either on national reunification or on recognizing each other as independent states, just as East and West Germany did in 1973. A peace agreement was even more unthinkable for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung in 1953–54 than it is for Seoul and Pyongyang today. It is just as inconceivable that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw voluntarily from Donbas and Krym as it is for President Volodymyr Zelensky to conclude a definitive peace agreement that does not recognize Ukrainian sovereignty to its entire territory. To maintain the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also crucial for Europe and the UN that Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty is not internationally recognized. Therefore, just as the two Koreas, Russia and Ukraine must settle for something less than a peace treaty, namely an armistice. This may end the fighting and could save hundreds of thousands of lives but will not establish peace.

An armistice is not a simple ceasefire, where military forces are supposed to remain where they happen to be situated when the agreement is made. For a Ukrainian armistice to be respected, the Russian and Ukrainian forces must withdraw to either side of a clearly delineated demilitarized zone. This is complicated by the fact that the front lines are so long. The easiest compromise would be for Ukraine to let Russia retain control over Krym, while Russia withdraws from Donbas. Third parties should put pressure on Moscow and Kyiv to accept that neat solution. To soften the pill, Ukraine could guarantee a high degree of local autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk. International monitoring with the use of satellite surveillance along the entire border would be needed. If one or both parties were to mobilize combat forces, launch drone attacks, or place rocket launchers on alert, warning signals should be triggered and international security guarantees enforced by robust multi-national forces.

A final similarity between Korea 1953 and Ukraine 2025 armistice is that both sides must abstain from any political interference at the other side of the agreed boundary. Russia and Ukraine must remain fully sovereign and independent states. Any rapprochement between the two Korean states continues to depend on Seoul’s ability to convince Pyongyang that it does not seek regime change in the north and on the willingness of Kim Jong Un to abstain from provocative missile tests and vocal threats. Putin apparently wants an agreement to include a provision for new elections in Ukraine, so he can interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs and remove Zelensky from power. This is a destructive demand that should be consistently rejected by any mediating or facilitating party to talks. The Ukrainians must decide for themselves when to lift their state of emergency and hold democratic elections.

President Trump has put pressure on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and has conceded on Ukraine’s behalf that it cannot get back all its lost territory or obtain NATO membership. He should now concentrate his efforts on convincing both sides to engage in negotiations for a strongly guaranteed and highly monitored armistice rather than a quick and fragile ceasefire or a dodgy settlement allowing one side to interfere in the other.

Related articles:

Korea Will Soon Face a Security Dilemma Like Europe’s
First Vietnam, Then Afghanistan: Is Ukraine Next?
Is the Time Ripe for an End to the Ukraine War?

Stein Tønnesson is Senior Research Fellow (Peace and Security in Northeast Asia) at the Toda Peace Institute and Research Professor Emeritus, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Panoramic view of the colorful village of Kulusuk in eastern Greenland – Kulusuk, Greenland – Melting iceberg releasing water into the sea. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Apr 1 2025 (IPS)

“…I am convinced that Greenland’s importance to U.S. interests will grow. Thanks to geography, historical ties (…), the United States has the inside track when competing for influence in Greenland (even as the Chinese have now started making regular visits)…” This quote from a diplomatic cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to Washington might seem recent, perhaps just before President Trump’s abrupt announcement of his intentions to “buy” or “annex” Greenland from Denmark, but that is not the case.

This message is actually seventeen years old, dating back to May 16, 2008. It is one of several Greenland-related cables that came to light with WikiLeaks, highlighting the fact that U.S. interest in Greenland is nothing new. It has been a consistent theme in U.S. foreign policy for at least the last 150 years.

The first documented discussion within the U.S. Government about acquiring Greenland dates back to 1867, the same year the U.S. purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire for $7.7M.

After so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland?

Around that time, internal consultations took place in the U.S. Federal Government regarding the possibility of buying Greenland (along with Iceland) for around $5.5M. In fact, the State Department even published a report on the matter in 1868. However, as we know, this proposal never materialized.

More fruitless discussions followed in 1910, and then, suddenly, another purchase occurred in 1916. This time, the U.S. government bought not Greenland but the Danish West Indies in the Caribbean (now known as the U.S. Virgin Islands) from Denmark for $25M.

The relevance of this purchase in the Greenland case is substantive because one provision in the international treaty that formalized the deal—known as the Treaty of the Danish West Indies—stated that the U.S. Government “will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.”

Because in 1916 Denmark controlled significant portions of Greenland but not the entire island. However, following the West Indies deal with the U.S., and with Washington’s consent, Denmark began a series of diplomatic movements that eventually allowed it to declare full sovereignty over all of Greenland. Only Norway contested this claim but lost in the International Court of Justice in 1933.

In April 1940, Nazi Germany occupied Denmark, and following that, the U.S. occupied Greenland, in order to prevent its seizure by Germany or eventually by Canada or even by the UK.

After WWII, the Danish government expected the U.S. to withdraw its troops. However, to their surprise, in 1946, the U.S. made a new proposal to purchase Greenland, this time offering $100M. Once again, the deal did not go through, and despite Copenhagen’s diplomatic efforts, the U.S. military stayed.

With the creation of NATO—and Denmark being one of its founding members—Copenhagen changed its policy, accepting the status quo. In 1951, Denmark signed an agreement allowing the U.S. to continue its military and defense activities in Greenland. In 1955, new serious discussions within the U.S. government about another potential offer emerged, and there is evidence that Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was behind another unsuccessful attempt in 1970.

With the end of the Cold War, U.S. interest in Greenland dramatically decreased, and most U.S. military bases on the island were dismantled, except for the one in Pituffik (then known by the Danish name of Thule).

With the start of the new millennium, the increasing effects of climate change and the escalation of geostrategic interest in the Arctic region, Washington reactivated its interest in the largest island on the planet.

However, this time rather than proposing another purchase to Denmark—after so many failed attempts—the U.S. opted for a more subtle policy, indirectly supporting Greenland’s pro-independence movement. The idea was that a newly independent and potentially weak Greenland could be more easily influenced by the U.S.

The surprise came in 2019 when President Trump reignited public debate on the issue and even cancelled an official trip to Copenhagen at the last minute after the Danish Prime Minister publicly rejected the possibility of selling Greenland.

With Biden in office, the issue was largely forgotten—until recently, when Trump brought it back, adopting an even more aggressive approach. It is no coincidence, then, that the U.S. opened a Consulate in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, in 2020, despite the country’s small population of around 50,000 people and a negligible number of U.S. residents, aside from the few U.S. military personnel stationed at Pituffik.

The key questions here are: after so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland? Could this approach, in fact, jeopardize U.S. interests in the region in the long term? And last but not least, beyond the Danish Government, the Greenlanders may have something to say, and judging by the results of the recent elections, it seems they are not really in the mood to accept Trump’s expansionism.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

NATO geopolitical strategy has now joined the ‘coalition’ of Western geoeconomic forces accelerating planetary heating, now led again by re-elected US President Donald Trump.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Burning biomass and fossil fuels greatly expanded mechanical energy generation. The age of industry in the last two centuries has thus involved more hydrocarbon combustion to increase output.

Uneven development has also transformed population geography. Tropical soils were far more productive, enabling higher population-carrying capacities. Hence, during the Anthropocene over the last six millennia, human settlement was denser around the tropics.

Greater water availability enabled more botanical growth, supporting more fauna that was less subject to seasonal vicissitudes. If not undermined by aridification and desertification, much denser human settlements and populations became more viable in and near the tropics.

Meanwhile, industrialisation has been uneven. It was initially mainly located in the temperate West until after decolonisation following the Second World War (WW2).

However, post-WW2 industrialisation in the Global South was largely denounced as protectionist and inefficient until the East Asian miracles were better understood.

Sustainable development goals
The 1972 Stockholm Environment Summit helped catalyse public awareness of ecological and related vulnerabilities. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit promoted a more comprehensive approach centred on sustainable development.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were drafted in 2001 by a small group appointed by the UN Secretary-General. In sharp contrast, the formulation and greater legitimacy of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) required time-consuming widespread consultations.

Undoubtedly, many SDGs contain apparent contradictions, omissions, and unnecessary inclusions. While participatory processes tend to be messy and slow, genuine cooperation is impossible without inclusive consultation.

After decades, developing countries successfully secured recognition for the need to compensate for losses and damages, i.e., provide climate reparations, yet most prosperous countries have given nothing so far.

While mitigation is undoubtedly crucial for slowing planetary heating, resources for adaptation are urgently needed by all developing countries. Those located in the tropics have been more adversely affected.

Sustainable development should sustain ecology and human progress. Planetary heating should be curbed fairly to ensure those living precariously are not worse off.

Planetary heating
Thus, the neoliberal – and neocolonial – counter-revolution against development economics from the 1980s, with its insistence on trade liberalisation, deprived much of recently independent Africa and others of industry and food security.

The worst consequences of planetary heating are in the tropics, where populations are generally denser but poorer. European settler colonialism in temperate regions exacerbated this, blocking later immigration from the tropics.

Economic growth, higher productivity and living standards have been closely associated with more greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the last two centuries. Historical GHG accumulation now exacerbates planetary heating.

The New York Times has identified significant benefits of planetary heating for the US and, by extension, the Global North. Thus, the commitment of the temperate West to urgently address planetary heating remains suspect.

It claimed the melting Arctic ice cap would eventually allow inter-ocean shipping, even during winter, without using the Panama Canal, thus cutting marine transport costs. Planetary warming would also extend temperate zone summers, increasing plant and animal growth.

Sad tropics
Former central banker Mark Carney, then UN Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, has warned that average planetary temperatures will exceed the 1.5oC (degrees Celsius) threshold over pre-industrial levels in less than a decade.

This threshold was mainly demanded by tropical developing countries but opposed by the Global North, especially temperate European countries, who wanted it higher at 2oC. Planetary heating exacerbates poverty, with most of the world’s poor living in the tropics.

Adaptation to planetary warming is thus very urgent for developing nations. But most concessionary climate finance is earmarked for mitigation, ignoring urgent adaptation needs. Meanwhile, extreme weather events have become more common.

At least ten provinces in Vietnam now have seawater seeping into rice fields, reducing production. As rice is the main staple in Asia, higher prices will reduce its affordability, undermining the region’s food security.

War worsens planetary heating
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to the Ukraine invasion has blocked Russian exports of oil and gas, strengthening the US monopoly of European fossil fuel imports.

With higher oil and gas prices, Europe has provided various energy price subsidies to ensure public support for the NATO war against Russia. The UK host secured a commitment to abandon coal at the Glasgow 26th UN climate Conference of Parties at the end of 2021.

As Mrs Thatcher had crushed the militant British coal mineworkers’ trade union in the 1980s, abandoning was easier for UK Conservatives. But the vow was soon abandoned, and coal mining in Europe revived to block cheap Russian oil and gas imports.

Thus, NATO’s energy strategy has exposed European climate hypocrisy, with the West abandoning its coal pledge for geopolitical and geoeconomic advantage. Such considerations have also undermined carbon markets’ ability to mitigate planetary heating.

Last year, the European Parliament voted to give Ukraine 0.25% of their national incomes while official OECD development assistance to the entire Global South has fallen to 0.3%! Burn, tropics, burn!

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