Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons

By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

 
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.

In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.

The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.

In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.

Lessons from the past

The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.

Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.

The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.

During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.

The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.

What are the implications?

The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.

Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.

Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.

Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.

Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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In mid-1971, US President Nixon ended the dollar’s gold peg at $35 per ounce, triggering de-dollarisation. The 2025 gold and silver rush followed private speculators trying to profit from central banks hedging against perceived new risks.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Many believe OPEC was allowed to raise oil prices from 1972, on condition petroleum purchases would be settled in dollars. ‘Petrodollars’ were thus believed to be the ‘black gold’ underlying the dollar system’s survival after 1971.

Although still the dominant world reserve currency, the dollar’s role has gradually declined over the decades. Trump 2.0’s rhetoric and actions appear to have accelerated de-dollarisation.

Trump’s 2 April 2025 ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs announcement triggered even greater uncertainty and volatility in foreign exchange and other markets worldwide.

Greater policy unpredictability has caused governments and investors to explore new options. Authorities worldwide are considering and developing alternatives to the dollar system.

Besides higher inflation, Trump’s threats and actions, particularly his tariffs, sanctions and wars, have pushed investors to sell dollar assets and seek alternatives.

Various factors have significantly accelerated de-dollarisation. In the first half of 2025, the dollar fell by over 10%, its sharpest fall since the 1973 oil crisis.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Geopolitical economy commentator Ben Norton highlighted an April 2025 note by the Deutsche Bank foreign exchange research head, noting:

“We are witnessing a simultaneous collapse in the price of all US assets [including stocks, foreign exchange, and bonds] … we are entering uncharted territory in the global financial system…

“The market is rapidly de-dollarising. In a typical crisis environment, the market would be hoarding dollar liquidity…The market has lost faith in US assets. They are actively selling down their US assets.

“US administration policy is encouraging a trend toward de-dollarisation to safeguard international investors from a weaponisation of dollar liquidity.”

Western confiscations
The weaponisation of central banks by the US, Europe, and their allies has caused other central banks to seek ‘safety’ by switching from dollar assets to gold.

Increased weaponisation of the dollar and Western confiscation of others’ assets under various pretexts have accelerated this trend.

Billions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan central bank gold, held at the Bank of England, was confiscated by the UK government during the 2019 Washington-instigated Caracas coup attempt.

After the coup failed, the Bank of England refused to return the gold to Venezuela. Trust in Western governments and central banks thus continued to erode.

Similarly, the US Fed and European Central Bank confiscated over $300 billion worth of Russian dollar-, euro- and sterling-denominated assets after it invaded Ukraine.

European authorities have since pledged to transfer these Russian assets to Ukraine rather than return them to their owners.

Western confiscations of the central bank reserves of Iran, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Russia and others have alarmed authorities and publics worldwide.

Central banks’ reserve managers have increasingly viewed gold as safe despite greater volatility. Besides serving as a hedge, the precious metal also offered lucrative speculative gains.

Mitigating risk
Many monetary authorities have reversed their earlier accumulation of dollar-denominated US Treasury bills and bonds in their official reserves.

While US government debt has continued growing, inflationary pressures have mounted, albeit episodically. Gold and silver holdings are believed to help hedge against inflation and fiat currency debasement.

Gold holdings in central bank reserves increased significantly after the 2008-09 global, actually Western, financial crisis, followed by the Western turn to ‘quantitative easing’.

For the first time in three decades, central banks’ total gold holdings in their international reserves exceeded their US Treasury bond holdings in 2025.

About 36,200 tons, or a fifth of all gold holdings, is now held by central banks, rising rapidly over two years from 15% at the end of 2023!

Meanwhile, rising gold prices drew more speculative investments for profit. But such price spikes are not sustainable indefinitely.

Once gold was seen as overpriced, investors turned to other precious metals, notably silver, and other financial assets.

BRICS’ golden hedge?
After Lord Jim O’Neill identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as significant new financial powers outside the Western sphere of influence, BRICS was formed in 2009 by adding South Africa.

BRICS now has ten members and ten partners. Together, they account for 44% of world income, measured by purchasing power parity, and 56% of its people.

Russia, China, and India have been among the largest recent buyers of gold. Other major purchasers include Uzbekistan and Thailand, both BRICS partners.

Trump 2.0 has generated significant apprehension internationally. Without BRICS’ help, his weaponisation of economic policies and agreements has accelerated de-dollarisation.

Although Trump accuses the BRICS of conspiring to accelerate de-dollarisation, their precious metal purchases make sense as a hedge for their reserves.

IPS UN Bureau

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At a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. Credit: EEAS

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Mar 20 2026 (IPS)

“Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return (…) we need a more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy.” These were some of the words pronounced one week ago by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, at the EU Ambassadors’ Conference in Brussels. A speech that sparked considerable controversy: an almost immediate rebuttal from the President of the Council, Antonio Costa; rumours of a motion of censure against Von der Leyen in the European Parliament; more or less public reproaches from several European leaders; and a swift and complete retraction by the President herself.

The question, however, remains: was this a miscalculation by a President known for always trying to swim with the current? Or do her words reflect a deeper alignment with the mindset of a new (dis)order defined by Trumpian chaos and the authoritarian impulses emanating from Beijing and Moscow, among others?

Multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

In the former case, despite its seriousness, the mistake would still be forgivable. In the latter, we would be facing a far more significant—and particularly dangerous—problem.

In Brussels, some interpret it as a clearly failed attempt by Von der Leyen to steer the Union’s position towards the theses defended at that time by the German Chancellor Merz—her compatriot and party colleague—on the need to adopt policies more aligned with Trump.

Position that Merz himself has changed in the last few years, taking into account his particularly weak position, with approval ratings plummeting to just 26% less than a year after taking office—figures as low as Trump’s.

Returning to the President of the Commission, it was indeed troubling to observe that -in a Europe already deeply divided over the major geopolitical challenges of our time (the war in Iran and across the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, the situation in Venezuela)- it was precisely the individual recognised globally as the face of the European Union who delivered a speech so starkly at odds with the Union’s founding principles.

For the European project, with all its strengths—and its shortcomings—was built precisely on the ashes of the Second World War, on the traumatic experience of the totalitarian regimes of the 1920s and 1930s, and in opposition to the Stalinist totalitarianism that developed beyond the Iron Curtain.

It was founded on the principles of humanism, on respect for and the promotion of human rights, and on the idea of shared social rights and values. It was also grounded in the need for a rules-based international order which, despite its many imperfections, remains the only real mechanism capable of steering us away from the chaos and the law of the jungle to which some of the world’s major powers seek to drag us.

Are the United Nations in crisis? Undoubtedly, and no one seriously disputes it. Is multilateralism in retreat, and is respect for international law at a low point? Another undeniable tragedy. However, does this mean that the response to such a bleak context should be—as I have suggested—to adopt the very mindset of those responsible for this deterioration? Put differently: have we lost all sense of reason?

We are living in turbulent times. Europe must indeed strive for greater strategic autonomy—but this autonomy cannot be confined solely to defence. It must also—and urgently—extend to genuine autonomy in the realm of technological goods and services, where dependence on the United States places Europe in a position bordering on vassalage.

Moreover, at a time when the traditional transatlantic relationship is more strained than ever—largely due to the almost compulsive stance of the current occupant of the White House and his circle—it is imperative for Europe to establish or strengthen strategic alliances in all domains, including in trade. This is already happening with India, and should be finalised as soon as possible with Mercosur.

However, to suggest that Europe’s future—or, in other words, the future of the Europe that truly matters—could lie in a further weakening of the international order and the system of international organisations is, I say this unequivocally, simply irresponsible.

For multilateralism is not only a matter of principles; it is also a matter of responsibility, and indeed of efficiency and effectiveness. Or does Europe truly believe it can tackle the major challenges it faces—from climate change and migration flows to global public health and the impact of AI—on its own?

Europe needs multilateralism, among other reasons, to remain being Europe. And for that reason, it must commit to it now more than ever—without naïveté, with realism, but fully aware of the interdependence between the future of the European project and the existence of a minimum level of order and cooperation among nations, including the major powers.

This requires defending and promoting—against the alternative of chaos—the very spaces and institutions that make such cooperation possible, rather than ignoring or sidelining them.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Munich speech last month seemed to seduce the European elite behind President Trump, against the ‘Rest’, especially the resource-rich Global South.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Billed as the world’s leading forum for international security, the conference programme made clear whose interests and security were prioritised.

In its first year, Trump 2.0 bombed ten nations, besides threatening aggression against four other Latin American nations, but none were represented at Munich!

The Munich conference shed all pretence of objectivity and diplomacy on Iran, applauding Israeli-led military intervention to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasised the world’s return to great power competition after the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’, making his loyalty clear.

At Davos in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney noted that Trump 2.0’s geopolitical “rupture” had forced many to abandon earlier illusions.

Dangerous new trends have been emerging, hardly any ‘order’. Trump insists US supremacy must be even more dominant, isolating rather than confronting rivals.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Trump’s predecessors’ ‘rules-based order’ had offered a legal and diplomatic fig leaf to subordinate other states to US supremacy.

Now, Washington repudiates the very framework it demanded others accept, instead of the ostensibly universal but sometimes inconvenient ‘rule of law’.

Instead of diplomatic and commercial negotiations, economic and military threats prevail. Without velvet gloves of soft power, the mailed fists of military force and economic weaponry are exposed.

Reuniting the West
Rubio welcomed this “new era in geopolitics”, urging better transatlantic relations while reiterating Trump 2.0’s demands for Europe to pay more, albeit more gently.

After the end of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations urged defending the ‘Judaeo-Christian’ West against the ‘Rest’, including Catholic Latin America.

In Munich, Cuban-American Rubio reinvented himself as a White Christian European, warning his European audience that the West is under threat.

For Rubio, “the West had been expanding” to “settle new continents, build vast empires extending out across the globe” over the last five centuries.

His history obscured Western imperialism’s dispossession, exploitation and slaughter of indigenous peoples worldwide, especially in the Global South.

Praising the superiority of European civilisation and values, he lamented setbacks to these “great Western empires” due to “godless communist” and “anti-colonial” uprisings after the Second World War.

Rather than progress inspired by the 1776 US Declaration and War of Independence, for Rubio, national self-determination was a civilisational setback.

“We in America have no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline”. For Rubio, no more ‘liberal’ human rights, freedom and democracy rhetoric.

He did not hesitate to invoke racist, white supremacist mythology and crusader ideology to demand stronger militaries to defend Western civilisation.

The renewed Western alliance will share their common civilisational identity, bound by “Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, ancestry”.

Ethno-chauvinistic beliefs about race, religion and culture are the new bases for solidarity and authority. ‘Defending Christians’ became the pretext for the US 2025 Christmas Day bombing of Nigeria.

Another Western century?
Rubio appealed for pan-European Western unity against multilateralism and other threats, calling for increased military spending and immigration controls.

He urged Europe to “take back control” of ‘Western’ industries and supply chains. After all, NATO allies have joined the US in seizing foreign assets at will.

Vassal-like and desperate for reassurance after a year of Trump’s blatant contempt and threats, the audience welcomed his speech with a standing ovation.

Fearing Washington might negotiate with Moscow over Ukraine without them, European leaders have intensified demands for all-out war against Russia.

Rubio is working to secure critical minerals supplies against “extortion from other powers”, including Europe, through opaque bilateral agreements secured with threats.

Trump 2.0 is making military threats for profit, including post-war ownership, mining and other rights. For many, NATO’s US-Europe divide is not over peace, but rather sharing Ukraine war costs and spoils.

While funding for European welfare states and other ‘social’ purposes continues to fall, military budgets continue to spike, as demanded by Trump.

Meanwhile, Merz has invoked military Keynesianism to justify Germany’s largest-ever military budget since the Cold War, aimed at strengthening NATO.

Ostensibly to strengthen national security, the Trump administration has cut social programmes. Instead, US military spending is being prioritised.

Meanwhile, the US Congress has shown support by approving a larger War Department budget than the Pentagon requested.

Armaments contracts have mainly benefited established companies, while the ‘tech bros’ increasingly supply newer weapons and related systems using artificial intelligence.

Following Trump, the European elites are strengthening their already powerful militaries and securing commercial deals for their own advantage, rather than defending the peaceful multilateral cooperation they once advocated.

IPS UN Bureau

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Credit: Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Feb 6 2026 (IPS)

In early January, an emergency UN Security Council meeting on Venezuela followed a familiar path of paralysis. Members clashed over the US government’s abduction of Nicolás Maduro, with many warning it set a dangerous precedent, but no resolution came.

This wasn’t exceptional. In 2024, permanent members cast eight vetoes, the highest since 1986. In 2025, the Council adopted only 44 resolutions, the lowest since 1991. Deep divisions prevented meaningful responses to Gaza and to conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine.

Designed in 1945, the Security Council is the UN’s most powerful body, tasked with maintaining international peace and security, but also crucially protecting the privileged position of the most powerful states following the Second World War. Of its 15 members, 10 are elected for two-year terms, but five – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – are permanent and have veto powers. A single veto can block any resolution, regardless of global support. The Council’s anachronistic structure reflects and reproduces outdated power dynamics.

Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has continually used its veto despite breaching the UN Charter. On Gaza, the USA vetoed four ceasefire proposals before the Council passed Resolution 2728 in March 2024, 171 days into Israel’s assault. By then over 10,000 people had been killed.

When the Council is gridlocked, it means more suffering on the ground. Civilian protection fails, peace processes stall and human rights crimes go unpunished.

The case for reform

Since the UN was established, the number of member states has quadrupled and the global population has grown from 2.5 to 8 billion. But former colonial powers that represent a minority of the world’s population still hold permanent seats while entire continents remain unrepresented.

Calls for reform have been made for decades, but they face a formidable challenge: reform requires amendment of the UN Charter, a process that needs a favourable two-thirds General Assembly vote, ratification by two-thirds of member states and approval from all five permanent Council members.

The African Union has advanced the clearest demand. Emphasising historical justice and equal power for the global south, it calls for the Council to be expanded to 26 members, with Africa holding two permanent seats with full veto rights and five non-permanent seats.

India has been particularly vocal in demanding a greater role on a reformed Council. The G4 – Brazil, Germany, India and Japan – has proposed expansion to 25 or 26 members with six new permanent seats: two for Africa, two for Asia and the Pacific, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe. New permanent members would gain veto powers after a 10-to-15-year review period.

Uniting for Consensus, a group led by Italy that includes Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan and South Korea, opposes the creation of new permanent seats, arguing this would simply expand an existing oligarchy. Instead, they propose longer rotating terms and greater representation for underrepresented regions.

The five permanent members show varying degrees of openness to reform. France and the UK support expansion with veto powers, while the USA supports adding permanent African seats but without a veto. China backs new African seats, but virulently opposes Japan’s permanent membership, while Russia supports reform in principle but warns against making the Council ‘too broad’.

These positions reflect competition and a desire to prevent rivals gaining power. Current permanent members fear diluted influence, while states that see themselves as rising powers want the status and sway that comes with Council membership.

Adding new members could help redress the imbalance against the global south, but wouldn’t necessarily make the Council more effective, accountable and committed to protecting human lives and human rights, particularly if more states get veto powers.

A French-Mexican initiative from 2015 offers a more modest path: voluntary veto restraint in mass atrocity situations. The proposal asks permanent members to refrain from vetoes in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. This complements efforts to increase the political costs of vetoes, including the Code of Conduct signed by 121 states and General Assembly Resolution 76/262, which requires debate whenever a veto is cast.

New challenges

Now a new challenge has emerged from the Trump administration, which recently launched the Board of Peace at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This has mutated from a temporary institution set up by a Security Council resolution to govern over Gaza into a seemingly permanent one that envisages a broader global role under Trump’s personal control. Its membership skews toward authoritarian regimes, and human rights don’t get a mention in its draft charter.

Instead of legitimising the Board of Peace, efforts should focus on Security Council reform to address the two fundamental flaws of representation and veto power. Accountability and transparency must also be enhanced. Civil society must have space to engage with the Council and urge states to prioritise the UN Charter over self-interest.

Some momentum exists. The September 2024 Pact for the Future committed leaders to developing a consolidated reform model. Since 2008, formal intergovernmental negotiations have addressed membership expansion, regional representation, veto reform and working methods. These became more transparent in 2023, with sessions recorded online, allowing civil society to track proceedings and challenge blocking states.

However, reform efforts faced entrenched interests, geopolitical rivalries and institutional inertia even before Trump started causing chaos. The UN faces a demanding 2026, forced to make funding cuts amid a liquidity crisis while choosing the next secretary-general. In such circumstances, it’s tempting to defer difficult decisions.

But the reform case is clear, as is the choice: act to make the Council fit for purpose or accept continuing paralysis and irrelevance, allowing it to be supplanted by Trump’s Board of Peace.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Image: AI generated / shutterstock.com

By Jordan Ryan
Jan 19 2026 (IPS)

 
The Trump administration’s recent announcement of its withdrawal from 66 international organisations has been met with a mixture of alarm and applause. While the headline number suggests a dramatic retreat from the world stage, a closer look reveals a more nuanced, and perhaps more insidious, strategy. The move is less a wholesale abandonment of the United Nations system and more a targeted pruning of the multilateral vine, aimed at withering specific branches of global cooperation that the administration deems contrary to its interests. While the immediate financial impact may be less than feared, the long-term consequences for the UN and the rules-based international order are profound.

At first glance, the withdrawal appears to be a sweeping rejection of global engagement. The list of targeted entities is long and diverse, ranging from the well-known UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to more obscure bodies like the International Lead and Zinc Study Group. However, as Eugene Chen has astutely observed, the reality is more complex. The vast majority of the UN-related entities on the list are not independent international organisations, but rather subsidiary bodies, funds, and programmes of the UN itself. The administration is not, for now, withdrawing from the UN Charter, but rather selectively defunding and disengaging from the parts of the UN system it finds objectionable.

This selective approach reveals a clear ideological agenda. The targeted entities are overwhelmingly focused on issues that the Trump administration has long disdained: climate change, sustainable development, gender equality, and human rights. The list includes the UN’s main development arm, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs; its primary gender entity, UN Women; and a host of bodies dedicated to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The inclusion of the UN’s regional economic commissions, which play a vital role in promoting regional cooperation and development, is particularly telling. This is not simply a cost-cutting exercise; it is a deliberate attempt to dismantle the architecture of global cooperation in areas that do not align with the administration’s narrow, nationalist worldview.

The decision to remain a member of the UN’s specialised agencies, such as the World Health Organization (from which the administration has already announced its withdrawal in a separate action) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, is equally revealing. This is not a sign of a renewed commitment to multilateralism, but rather a cold, calculated decision based on a narrow definition of US national security interests. The administration has made it clear that it sees these agencies as useful tools to counter the influence of a rising China. This ‘à la carte’ approach to multilateralism, where the US picks and chooses which parts of the system to support based on its own geopolitical interests, is deeply corrosive to the principles of collective security and universal values that underpin the UN Charter.

What, then, should be done? The international community cannot afford to simply stand by and watch as the UN system is hollowed out from within. A concerted effort is needed to mitigate the damage and reaffirm the importance of multilateral cooperation.

First, other member states must step up to fill the financial and leadership void left by the United States. This will require not only increased financial contributions, but also a renewed political commitment to the UN’s work in the areas of sustainable development, climate action, and human rights. Second, civil society organisations and the academic community have a crucial role to play in monitoring the impact of the US withdrawal and advocating for the continued relevance of the affected UN entities. Finally, the UN itself must do a better job of communicating its value to a sceptical public. The organisation must move beyond bureaucratic jargon and technical reports to tell a compelling story about how its work makes a real difference in the lives of people around the world.

The Trump administration’s latest move is a stark reminder that the post-war international order can no longer be taken for granted. It is a call to action for all who believe in the power of multilateralism to address our shared global challenges. The UN may be a flawed and imperfect institution, but it remains our best hope for a more peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world. We must not allow it to wither on the vine.

Related articles by this author:
Venezuela and the UN’s Proxy War Moment
The Danger of a Transactional Worldview
The Choice Is Still Clear: Renewing the UN Charter at 80

Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Quietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.

Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.

It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.

New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.

It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.

Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.

They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.

Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.

MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.

White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.

MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.

For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.

Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.

Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.

Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.

Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.

Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.

China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.

Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.

The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.

Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.

The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.

With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.

The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.

Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.

The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.

Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.

As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.

Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.

While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.

IPS UN Bureau

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General Plenary Session of Leaders at the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 30. Credit: Ueslei Marcelino/COP3

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Nov 12 2025 (IPS)

COP30 Brazil, though shadowed by the absence of many world leaders, remains a pivotal milestone in the global fight against climate change, tasked with building on the Paris Agreement’s momentum. Yet the glaring lack of commitment, coupled with withdrawals from the accord, casts a grim shadow over the future. The planet continues to warm, and scientists warn that current targets may not prevent a catastrophic temperature spike. While the summit’s focus on implementation not just new promises—is a welcome shift, it’s clear: words alone won’t cool the Earth.

James Alix Michel

Brazil’s leadership in championing nature-based solutions, like safeguarding the Amazon rainforest, is a beacon of hope. The conference ignited critical discussions on climate finance, adaptation, and resilience for vulnerable nations. The Baku-to-Belem Roadmap’s goal of mobilizing $1.3 trillion annually for developing countries is ambitious but necessary. Yet challenges loom large: wealthy nations’ apathy, geopolitical fractures, and the lingering impact of the U.S. withdrawal from Paris. COP30’s success hinges on action.

The Stakes Are Dire

The IPCC warns: we’re on track for 2.5–3°C warming by 2100 if pledges are not met. This spells ruin: crippling droughts, unlivable cities, mass migration, and ecosystems collapsing. The Amazon, a vital carbon sink, is nearing a ‘tipping point’ of irreversible dieback. Island nations face existential threats. The climate crisis is not a distant threat—it’s here.

Why COP30 Matters

1. Implementation Over Pledges: Past summits yielded lofty goals, but delivery has lagged. COP30 must hold nations accountable. No more empty vows.

2. Climate Finance: Developing countries need predictable funding, not charity. The $100 billion/year promise remains unfulfilled. Wealthy nations must pay their share.

3. Adaptation and Resilience: Frontline communities in Africa, Small Island States, and the Global South can’t wait. Funding for early warnings, flood defenses, and drought-resistant crops isn’t a favor; it’s justice.

4. Global Unity: Geopolitics must not derail progress. The world needs cooperation, not competition.

The Human Cost:

Millions already suffer. Cyclones, wildfires, famine, mass migration, and sea-level rise. This isn’t ‘someday’; it’s now. Indigenous groups, youth activists, and scientists plead: stop debating. Act.

Yet amid the urgency, COP30 saw glimmers. Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pushed for Amazon protection. African nations demanded reparations for historical emissions. The Global South called for “Equity first.”

The Road Ahead: COP31 and Beyond.

Future summits must:

• • Enforce transparency: Track emissions cuts, not just promises.
  • Prioritize loss & damage: Compensate those already paying the price.
  • Work towards ending fossil fuels: No new coal projects.
  • Empower youth: Include communities, not just politicians.

A Call to Leaders: Pledges Aren’t Leadership

When leaders make commitments, they bind their nations to honor them. Empty promises are not leadership. The world isn’t a battleground for wars—it’s our only home. We’re all in this together. No more excuses. Action isn’t optional.

The clock ticks. The Amazon burns. The oceans rise. We need solutions. And we know what the solutions are. Now we need action.

Let’s choose life. For the planet and for ourselves.

James Alix Michel, Former President Republic of Seychelles, Member Club de Madrid, Founder James Michel Foundation.

IPS UN Bureau

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Ahmed Salem Lebsir, battalion chief and director of the Polisario Front Military School, stands beside an installation marking Morocco’s invasion of the territory 50 years ago. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ROME, Nov 5 2025 (IPS)

Ehmudi Lebsir was 17 when he trudged more than 50 kilometres across the desert to stay alive. Half a century on, the Sahrawi refugee still has not gone home to what was then Spanish province of Western Sahara.

On 6 November 1975, six days after Moroccan troops pushed into the territory, hundreds of thousands of Moroccan civilians streamed south under military escort. Branded the “Green March”, it was, in effect, an invasion and the start of a military occupation of Sahrawi land.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades

Dubbed “Africa’s last colony,” Western Sahara is roughly the size of the United Kingdom and remains the continent’s only territory still awaiting decolonisation. Yet on 31 October this year, that goal slipped further from reach.

Marking the 50th anniversary of Morocco’s incursion, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that, by endorsing Rabat’s autonomy plan, lent weight to Morocco’s sovereignty claim over the territory.

The UN has now set aside a principle it has long held sacrosanct: the right of peoples to self-determination. That was the framework that had guided its approach to the Sahrawis for more than three decades.

Lebsir speaks to IPS by videoconference from the Tindouf camps in western Algeria. Nearly 2,000 kilometres southwest of Algiers, this harsh desert where summer temperatures can touch 60C has been the closest thing to home the Sahrawi people have known for 50 years.

“We faced a choice: remain in Algeria as refugees, or build the machinery of a state, with its ministries and a parliament,” recalls Lebsir, now a senior representative of the Polisario Front. Founded in 1973, it is recognised by the United Nations as the “legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people”.

A man walks past a mural in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, where the Polisario Front has managed life in exile while building state institutions. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

On arriving in Tindouf in 1975, Lebsir was tasked with setting up schools in the camps. He later oversaw cohorts of Sahrawi students in Cuba, spent a decade in the Sahrawi Parliament and served in the SADR’s Ministries of Justice and Culture.

It was in that parliament that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was proclaimed in February 1976.

“After a century of Spanish presence, we never imagined Madrid would leave and abandon us to our fate,” he says. “There’s no going back: either we have an independent state, or our people will be buried.”

After the Polisario declared independence in 1976, the UN reaffirmed the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination. But the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), created in 1991, has never delivered the vote it was set up to hold.

Tomás Bárbulo was also 17 when Moroccan forces moved in. The son of a Spanish soldier based in Laayoune —Western Sahara’s capital, 1,100 kilometres south of Rabat—, he had returned to Madrid three months before that 6 November.

“The Sahrawis have survived napalm and white phosphorus, persecution, exile, the systematic plunder of their natural resources, and attempts to erase their identity through the influx of hundreds of thousands of settlers,” the journalist and author tells IPS by phone from Madrid.

Bárbulo, whose La Historia Prohibida del Sahara Español (Destino, 2002) is a standard work on the conflict, lays the stalemate chiefly at the door of “Morocco’s unyielding position, often blessed by the Security Council’s major powers.” The UN, he says, “has capitulated to Rabat”.

Ironically, even the UN does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The occupied territory has been on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1963. In legal terms, the decolonisation of Western Sahara remains “unfinished.”

Mohamed Dadach in Laayoune, the capital of occupied Western Sahara. Released in 1999 after 24 years in prison, he is known as the “Sahrawi Nelson Mandela.” Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Open-air prison’

The UNHCR estimates that between 170,000 and 200,000 Sahrawis live in Algeria’s desert camps. However, life inside the Moroccan-held territory itself is harder to gauge, since Rabat does not even acknowledge the Sahrawi people exist.

Understanding living conditions there is equally difficult. Senior observers such as Noam Chomsky have labelled the territory as a “vast open-air prison”.

In a report released last July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that Morocco has blocked visits by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) since 2015.

“OHCHR continues to receive allegations of human rights violations, including intimidation, surveillance and discrimination against Sahrawi individuals, particularly those advocating for self-determination,” he wrote.

Despite restrictions, international rights groups continue to document abuses. Amnesty International’s 2024 report says Rabat curtails “dissent and the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Western Sahara” and “violently represses peaceful protests”.

Human Rights Watch denounced that courts hand down long sentences based “almost entirely” on activists’ confessions, without probing claims they were extracted under police torture.

At 36, Ahmed Ettanji is one of the most prominent Sahrawi activists in the occupied zone, something he has paid for with 18 arrests and repeated torture.

Speaking by phone from Laayoune, he says the visibility afforded by international NGOs is the only thing keeping him out of prison, or worse.

“We are marking fifty years of a harsh military blockade, extrajudicial killings and every kind of abuse,” he says. “There are thousands of disappeared and tens of thousands of arrests. The economic interests of world powers always trump human rights.”

After five decades, entire generations have been born in the Algerian desert, many families knowing each other only through video calls. Yet Ettanji insists not all is bleak.

“Born under occupation, people my age were expected to be the most assimilated, the most pro-Moroccan. That has not happened. The desire for self-determination is very much alive among the young.”

Sunset on a beach in occupied Western Sahara. In addition to a coastline rich in fishing resources, Sahrawis watch helplessly as Rabat exploits the rest of their natural wealth with the complicity of powers like the US, France, and Spain. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza / IPS

‘Autonomous Region of the Sahara’

The autonomy plan that the UN has now effectively endorsed is Rabat’s sole political offer in five decades. First floated in 2007, it was backed by the Trump administration in 2020.

How this “Autonomous Region of the Sahara” would actually work is left largely undefined, beyond talk of local administrative, judicial and economic powers.

Polisario rejects the scheme, but rejection has not brought the Sahrawis any closer to deciding their own future.

For many Sahrawis, the timing of the Security Council’s move, on the very anniversary of Morocco’s 1975 incursion, felt less like coincidence than calculated cruelty.

People like Garazi Hach Embarek, daughter of a Basque nurse who treated the first displaced families half a century ago and a founding member of the Polisario Front. The 47-year-old has spent years taking the cause into classrooms, universities, town halls and any forum that will listen.

In an interview with IPS in Urretxu, 400 kilometres north of Madrid, Hach Embarek does not hide her dismay. “Active resistance is extremely difficult, and the Moroccan lobby remains highly influential,” laments the Sahrawi activist.

“We live in turbulent times, where anything seems to go, but this is neither just nor legal. Under the guise of peace, the real aim is simply to legitimise injustice,” she adds, before stressing the need “to forge new alliances.”

“Colonialism is far from over, and we’re merely the casualties of continued misgovernance in Africa’s last colony.”

Credit: Forus - UN High-Level Political Forum 2025

By Sarah Strack and Christelle Kalhoulé
NEW YORK, Sep 26 2025 (IPS)

This September the UN turns 80, but the lessons of peace, justice, and cooperation are still unfinished. The world today faces the flames of inequality, conflict, ecological collapse and growing digital threats. In short, the very problems the UN was created to solve are once again staring us in the face.

That’s why the UN’s latest reform push, “UN80,” matters. Launched this spring, it promises to make the multilateral system more inclusive and accountable. But here’s the real question: can it align with 21st century’s needs? Will it be remembered as a budget drill or the start of a renewal that truly delivers for people where they live?

If this moment is going to count, three things must happen.

First, reforms must put people at the center, and we must avoid a reform by spreadsheet.

The UN is under financial strain. Geopolitical tensions are sky-high, negotiations are gridlocked, Member States are late on dues and membership fees, arrears run into the billions, and the UN’s mandate, efficiency, and effectiveness are under question.

“In a polycrisis world, shrinking the UN’s capacity is like cutting the fire brigade during wildfire season,” warns Christelle Kalhoulé, Forus Chair and civil society leader in Burkina Faso. “Reform cannot be about cutting corners. It must be about giving people the protection, rights, and solidarity they are being denied today.”

The UN80 Initiative marks the most sweeping reform effort in decades, with three tracks: streamlining services and consolidating IT and HR systems, reviewing outdated mandates, and exploring the consolidation of UN agencies into seven thematic “clusters.”

On paper, these reforms could bring overdue coherence. But the process has too often felt opaque, with key documents surfacing via leaks and staff unions flagging limited transparency and consultation.

Increasing the use of tools like AI is among the “solutions” being floated to “flag potential duplication” and shorten resolutions — yet without clear guardrails, there’s a risk of automating cuts and reinforcing bias rather than empowering people-first innovation. And the debate has too often been framed around cash flow, back payments, and cuts. The United States alone owes $1.5 billion in dues. Major donors are cutting ODA, and several UN humanitarian agencies are planning double-digit reductions in 2025 in their budgets.

As Arjun Bhattarai, Executive Director of the NGO Federation of Nepal warns: “Reform cannot be a synonym for austerity. Cutting budgets may make spreadsheets look tidy in New York, but it leaves communities in Kathmandu, Kampala, Khartoum, or Kyiv without support when they need it most.”

The danger is a reform focused on management efficiencies instead of reimagining what the UN must be to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Second, a better compass exists.

Despite its flaws, multilateralism remains indispensable. Without the UN, the world would be poorer when it comes to peace, cooperation, and collective problem-solving.

What makes the UN matter most, however, are not the halls of New York or Geneva, but the people and communities it exists to serve.

The UN was created “for the people and by the people”. Protecting, safeguarding and promoting healthy sustainable lives for communities must remain the core priority.

Our measure for reform is simple: a transformed UN must reduce inequalities, ensure fairer and more inclusive representation across its governance structures, deliver public goods fairly with accountability, and protect people better, faster, while safeguarding rights.

As Moses Isooba, Executive Director of the Uganda National NGO Forum, puts it: “A reformed UN must stand closer to the people than to the corridors of power. It must be measured not by the length of resolutions, but by the depth of hope it restores and the changes it makes for communities worldwide.”

If UN80 becomes a technocratic exercise in “doing less with less,” we will emerge with a smaller, weaker UN at precisely the moment we need it most.

If instead it becomes a justice-driven reimagining — linking architecture and finance to a clear vision of protection, equity, participation, and decentralization — it could renew the UN’s capacity to act as a backbone of international cooperation.

As Justina Kaluinaite, Policy and advocacy expert at the Lithuanian NGDO Platform, stresses: “The UN will survive another 80 years only if it learns to listen. True reform is not about doing more with less, but about doing better with those who have been left out.”

Third, put reforms through three simple tests.

When leaders meet in New York, we challenge them to have every reform proposal answering three questions:

1. The Inequality Question: Does this reform measurably narrow gaps — by income, gender, geography, or status — in who is protected and who benefits?

2. The Localisation Question: Does it move money, decisions, and accountability closer to communities, with transparent targets and timelines?

3. The Rights Question: Does it strengthen — not dilute — protection, gender equality, and human rights?

As Christelle Kalhoulé, sums it up: “The measure of UN80 should not be how much paper it saves, but how many lives it protects. History and the legacy we leave to future generations will not ask whether the UN balanced its budget in 2025; it will ask whether it stood with people.”

If leaders embrace this moment, the UN can emerge sharper, stronger, and more inclusive, with a justice-driven renewal of multilateralism, reclaiming its place as the backbone of global cooperation. If not, UN80 may go down in history as the moment when multilateralism chose retreat over renewal.

If UN80 is going to matter, it must prevent crises before they explode, deliver for both people and planet, give underrepresented countries and communities a real voice, keep civil society free and strong, and fix financing so money reaches those on the frontlines. The real test isn’t how tidy the org chart looks, it’s whether lives are saved, trust is rebuilt, and the UN proves it can still rise to the moment and be fit to serve this 21st century world.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

Credit: Suriya Phosri/Getty Images via Gallo Images

By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)

Algorithms decide who lives and dies in Gaza. AI-powered surveillance tracks journalists in Serbia. Autonomous weapons are paraded through Beijing’s streets in displays of technological might. This isn’t dystopian fiction – it’s today’s reality. As AI reshapes the world, the question of who controls this technology and how it’s governed has become an urgent priority.

AI’s reach extends into surveillance systems that can track protesters, disinformation campaigns that can destabilise democracies and military applications that dehumanise conflict by removing human agency from life-and-death decisions. This is enabled by an absence of adequate safeguards.

Governance failings

Last month, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish the first international mechanisms – an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance – meant to govern the technology, agreed as part of the Global Digital Compact at the Summit of the Future in September. This non-binding resolution marked a first positive step towards potential stronger regulations. But its negotiation process revealed deep geopolitical fractures.

Through its Global AI Governance Initiative, China champions a state-led approach that entirely excludes civil society from governance discussions, while positioning itself as a leader of the global south. It frames AI development as a tool for economic advancement and social objectives, presenting this vision as an alternative to western technological dominance.

Meanwhile, the USA under Donald Trump has embraced technonationalism, treating AI as a tool for economic and geopolitical leverage. Recent decisions, including a 100 per cent tariff on imported AI chips and purchase of a 10 per cent stake in chipmaker Intel, signal a retreat from multilateral cooperation in favour of transactional bilateral arrangements.

The European Union (EU) has taken a different approach, implementing the world’s first comprehensive AI Act, which comes into force in August 2026. Its risk-based regulatory framework represents progress, banning AI systems deemed to present ‘unacceptable’ risks while requiring transparency measures for others. Yet the legislation contains troubling gaps.

While initially proposing to ban live facial recognition technology unconditionally, the AI Act’s final version permits limited use with safeguards that human rights groups argue are inadequate. Further, while emotion recognition technologies are banned in schools and workplaces, they remain permitted for law enforcement and immigration control, a particularly concerning decision given existing systems’ documented racial bias. The ProtectNotSurveil coalition has warned that migrants and Europe’s racial minorities are serving as testing grounds for AI-powered surveillance and tracking tools. Most critically, the AI Act exempts systems used for national security purposes and autonomous drones used in warfare.

The growing climate and environmental impacts of AI development adds another layer of urgency to governance questions. Interactions with AI chatbots consume roughly 10 times more electricity than standard internet searches. The International Energy Agency projects that global data centre electricity consumption will more than double by 2030, with AI driving most of this increase. Microsoft’s emissions have grown by 29 per cent since 2020 due to AI-related infrastructure, while Google quietly removed its net-zero emissions pledge from its website as AI operations pushed its carbon footprint up 48 per cent between 2019 and 2023. AI expansion is driving construction of new gas-powered plants and delaying plans to decommission coal facilities, in direct contradiction to the need to end fossil fuel use to limit global temperature rises.

Champions needed

The current patchwork of regional regulations, non-binding international resolutions and lax industry self-regulation falls far short of what’s needed to govern a technology with such profound global implications. State self-interest continues to prevail over collective human needs and universal rights, while the companies that own AI systems accumulate immense power largely unchecked.

The path forward requires an acknowledgment that AI governance isn’t merely a technical or economic issue – it’s about power distribution and accountability. Any regulatory framework that fails to confront the concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a few tech giants will inevitably fall short. Approaches that exclude civil society voices or prioritise national competitive advantage over human rights protections will prove inadequate to the challenge.

The international community must urgently strengthen AI governance mechanisms, starting with binding agreements on lethal autonomous weapons systems that have stalled in UN discussions for over a decade. The EU should close the loopholes in its AI Act, particularly regarding military applications and surveillance technologies. Governments worldwide need to establish coordination mechanisms that can effectively counter tech giants’ control over AI development and deployment.

Civil society must not stand alone in this fight. Any hopes of a shift towards human rights-centred AI governance depend on champions emerging within the international system to prioritise human rights over narrowly defined national interests and corporate profits. With AI development accelerating rapidly, there’s no time to waste.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Credit: brutto film / shutterstock.com

By Anna Naupa
Sep 8 2025 (IPS)

 
Globally, there is a 0.36% deterioration in average levels of peacefulness, as more countries are increasing their levels of militarisation against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, increasing conflict, and rising economic uncertainty.

But this statistic omits most Pacific island countries. In 2025, only three are ranked by the Global Peace Index (GPI): New Zealand in 3rd place, Australia in18th and Papua New Guinea ranking 116th out of 163 nations.

As regional dialogue about an ‘Ocean of Peace’ concept advances, a dedicated Pacific Peace Index—as suggested by Solomon Islands’ Professor Transform Aqorau at the July 2025 Pacific Regional and National Security Conference—might provide additional form to an evolving political dialogue amongst Pacific Islands Forum member states.

But, how is Pacific peace defined? How might our own Pacific measure of peacefulness complement existing efforts to safeguard peace and security in the region?

What is Pacific Peace?

Peace is more than the absence of conflict or violence; it is a global public good that enables people to live full, healthy and prosperous lives without fear.

“Peace must serve the people, not geopolitics, not elites in the region, not distant interests,” Professor Aqorau says, in articulating a vision for Pacific peace. Peace must also tackle broader factors affecting safety and wellbeing across the Pacific, particularly for women and vulnerable populations, says Fiji’s Shamima Ali.

Peace and development are two sides of the same coin. The Pacific 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent places peace alongside harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, as a key element for attaining free, healthy, and productive lives for Pacific peoples. Delivering Pacific peace, therefore, entails securing well-being; protecting people, place and environment; advancing development; and securing futures for present and future generations, the latter efforts entailing climate action and protection of sovereignty.

While global indices are variably critiqued for omissions of Pacific Islands data, unilateral development and indicator bias, poorly contextualized methodologies, or the significant resourcing required to produce Pacific datasets, indices can nonetheless usefully inform policy-makers.

What could a Pacific Peace Index measure?

The current starting point for measuring and monitoring peace in the region is found in the form of existing country commitments to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 (the ‘Peace Goal’).

The Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development has contextualised eight SDG 16 indicators for regional reporting that address experiences of violence, access to justice, civil registration and legal identity, transparency of public expenditure, and public access to information and views on participation in decision-making processes.

In 2022, a regional monitoring report led by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat found that limited data availability for SDG16 hampered measurement of progress in the Pacific. This is broadly reflective of global trends, where investment is needed in further data generation efforts and statistical capacity to measure SDG 16.

The report also found that the Pacific was regressing on advancing effective institutions, transparency, and accountability.

But are SDG16’s Pacific contextualised indicators sufficient to meet the expectations of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the Pacific 2050 Strategy’s Peace and Security pillar? Can this type of reporting serve as a potential proxy ‘Pacific Peace Index’?

While answers to these questions are both technical and political in nature, there are two things to keep in mind:

1) Peace has deep roots in Pacific social and cultural structures

Despite close alignment with regional strategies, the current SDG 16 contextualised indicators do not encapsulate the depth of a Pacific vision for peace.

Pacific Islands Countries’ policy commitments to aspects of peace are well-documented. Each year new initiatives are announced that respond to an expanded concept of security, ranging from traditional security cooperation to tackling gender-based violence, climate mitigation and humanitarian assistance or investing in democratic processes.

But, knowledge gaps remain about the contribution of locally driven peace initiatives to national and regional efforts, and how these contribute to overall Pacific well-being. Addressing these gaps allows for a more comprehensive telling of an aggregated Pacific narrative of peace, which could be factored into a Pacific Peace Index. For example, peace-building dialogues following the Bougainville crisis, Solomon Islands’ ethnic tensions, and series of Fiji coups have highlighted the important contributions of locally-driven approaches, including drawing on traditional dispute resolution.

2) Telling a story of purposeful peace

Yet, Pacific peace is more than a collection of discrete data points and time-bound security-related projects. Peace is an evolving process, it is future-oriented and a proactive, purposeful exercise.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Baron Waqa has stressed that peace must be “anchored in sovereignty, resilience, inclusion and regional solidarity.” Many Pacific scholars agree, arguing that there is no real peace without addressing longstanding issues of colonisation, militarisation, restricted sovereignty and justice, which continue to bear on many Pacific islanders.

To tell a regional story means connecting, for example, Tuvalu’s international statehood recognition, the recent landmark ICJ advisory opinion on climate change, the nuclear legacies in the region, political instability, elections, and well-being measures, to the region’s vision of peace. Combined, we can then begin to grasp all the elements that contribute to a cumulatively peaceful region.

So, where to from here?

Another tool is the Positive Peace Index which measures the ‘attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain and create peaceful societies’. It assesses socio-economic development, justice, good governance and effective institutions, inclusion, resilience and diplomacy. A Pacific Peace Index could adapt this to incorporate Pacific indigenous philosophies of peace and values of social cohesion, well-being and reconciliation that are absent from existing global indices, for example, and track the region’s journey, disaggregated by country.

Multi-country indices demand considerable capacity so a State of Pacific Peace assessment may instead offer a simpler option. This could entail a dedicated section in the existing Pacific Regional Security Outlook report produced by regional organisations. Alternatively, the region’s academic institutions (e.g. via Track 2 mechanisms) could be invited to assist. Investing in peace summits also provides the opportunity for ongoing regional peace dialogue.

The emphasis, however, must be on building, not duplicating, existing regional mechanisms.

The opportunity of a Pacific Peace Index would be in owning and telling a coherent peace narrative that: a) bridges security and development and, b) reflects how the peace interests and dignity of Pacific peoples are being upheld over time.

As political dialogue about a Pacific ‘Ocean of Peace’ evolves, Pacific peoples’ visions of peace must drive any framing and subsequent action. Professor Aqorau offers further wisdom: ” Our peace should not depend on choosing sides, but on asserting our needs, on our terms and on our collective aspirations.”

Related articles:
Peacebuilding: The Missing Peace in COP30 Climate Ambition

Climate Change in Pasifika Relational Itulagi

Anna Naupa is a ni-Vanuatu PhD candidate at the Australian National University.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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The Global South had little voice, let alone influence, in shaping the economically ‘neoliberal’ and politically ‘neoconservative’ globalisation leading to contemporary geopolitical economic conflicts. Pacifist non-aligned cooperation for sustainable development offers the best way forward.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by anti-communist governments of the region. In 1973, its leaders agreed the area should be a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).

The world was deemed unipolar American discourse after the first Cold War. Meanwhile, most of the Global South remained non-aligned in what the Rest see as a multipolar world.

Despite critical dissent, the West seems to have lost interest in preserving peace. Unsurprisingly, the US and its NATO allies increasingly ignore the United Nations. Foreign military interventions since the first Cold War already exceed the many of that longer era.

During World War II, military production generated growth and employment in Germany, Japan and the US. But surely, development today is best achieved peacefully and cooperatively.

Pacifist non-alignment should cut unnecessary military spending. Although big powers compete for hegemony by weaponising international relations, they will still try to ‘buy’ support from the non-aligned.

Realistically, most small developing nations cannot lead international peace-making. But they can and should be a stronger moral force urging justice, peace, freedom, neutrality, development, and international cooperation.

Return of the Global South
The Group of 77 (G77) developing countries’ caucus and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) were both established in 1964. Headquartered in Geneva, UNCTAD is part of the UN Secretariat but has been steadily marginalised.

The G77 has a formal presence throughout the UN multilateral system. It now has over 130 members, including China, but its impact outside New York in recent decades has been limited.

Sustainability challenges and planetary heating are generally worse in the tropics, where most people in developing countries are. Meanwhile, hunger worldwide has worsened since 2014, while World Bank-reported income poverty has risen since the COVID-19 pandemic.

An inclusive and equitable multilateralism can better address the world’s challenges, especially peace and sustainable development – so crucial for progress in our dark times.

Global South needs better voice
While working for Goldman Sachs, Lord Jim O’Neill referred to Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the BRIC countries.

With South Africa joining, ostensibly representing Africa, they soon began meeting regularly. As members of the G20 group of the world’s twenty largest economies, the BRICS initially lobbied on financial issues.

They have since incorporated other large economies of the South, but also incurred the wrath of President Trump. While some nations have sought to join the enlarged BRICS plus (BRICS+), a few have hesitated after being invited.

BRICS has no record of strong and consistent advocacy of the interests of smaller developing economies. Most financially weak small nations doubt that BRICS+ will serve them well.

Higher US interest rates have triggered massive capital inflows, especially from the poorest countries, depriving them of finance at a time of greater need.

Meanwhile, aid levels have fallen tremendously, especially with Trump 2.0. Official development assistance (ODA) to the Global South is now below 0.3% of GDP, less than half the 0.7% commitment made in 1969.

Lowering tax rates has further squeezed the West’s already limited budgetary resources as stagnation deepens. Trump’s tariffs, US expenditure cuts, and greater Western military spending deepen worldwide economic contraction.

Non-alignment for our times
The Global South must urgently promote a new non-alignment for multilateral peace, development, and international cooperation to address Third World challenges better.

Even IMF number two, Gita Gopinath, agrees that developing countries should opt for non-alignment to benefit from not taking sides in the new Cold War.

With the exception of Brazil’s Lula, leadership by statesmen with international standing beyond their national stature largely passed with Nelson Mandela.

A few dynamic new leaders have emerged, but have not taken on the responsibilities of Global South leadership. Such leadership is in short supply despite the urgent need.

It is much easier to revive, reform, and reinvigorate NAM than to start from scratch. Although it has been less influential in recent decades, it can be revitalised.

Also, foreign policies are typically less subject to other typical national domestic policy considerations. Hence, they do not vary as much with the governments of the day.

Also, most developing country governments must appear to protect national interests to secure political support and legitimacy for survival.

Hence, conservative, even reactionary governments may take otherwise surprising anti-hegemonic positions in multilateral fora, especially with growing widespread resentment of bullying for extortion.

IPS UN Bureau

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CIVICUS discusses autonomous weapons systems and the campaign for regulation with Nicole van Rooijen, Executive Director of Stop Killer Robots, a global civil society coalition of over 270 organisations that campaigns for a new international treaty on autonomous weapons systems.

Nicole van Rooijen

What are autonomous weapons systems and why do they pose unprecedented challenges?

Autonomous weapons systems, or ‘killer robots’, are weapons that, once activated by a human, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. These systems make independent decisions – without the intervention of a human operator – about when, how, where and against whom to use force, processing sensor data or following pre-programmed ‘target profiles’. Rather than using the term ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’, our campaign refers to ‘autonomous weapons systems’ to emphasise that any such system, lethal or not, can inflict serious harm.

The implications are staggering. These weapons could operate across all domains – air, land, sea and space – during armed conflicts and law enforcement or border control operations. They raise numerous ethical, humanitarian, legal and security concerns.

The most troubling variant involves anti-personnel systems triggered by human presence or individuals or groups who meet pre-programmed target profiles. By reducing people to data points for algorithmic targeting, these weapons are dehumanising. They strip away our inherent rights and dignity, dramatically increasing the risk of unjust harm or death. No machine, computer or algorithm can recognise a human as a human being, nor respect humans as inherent bearers of rights and dignity. Autonomous weapons cannot comprehend what it means to be in a state of war, much less what it means to have – or to end – a human life. Enabling machines to make life and death decisions is morally unjustifiable.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted it is ‘difficult to envisage’ scenarios where autonomous weapons wouldn’t pose significant risks of violating international humanitarian law, given the inevitable presence of civilians and non-combatants in conflict zones.

Currently, no international law governs these weapons’ development or use. As the technology advances rapidly, this legal vacuum creates a dangerous environment where autonomous weapons could be deployed in ways that violate existing international law while escalating conflicts, enabling unaccountable violence and harming civilians. This is what prompted the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC president to jointly call for urgent negotiations on a legally binding international instrument on autonomous weapons systems by 2026.

How have recent consultations advanced the regulatory agenda?

The informal consultations held in New York in May, mandated by UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 79/62, focused on issues raised in the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 report on autonomous weapons systems. They sought to broaden awareness among the diplomatic community and complement the work around the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), emphasising risks that extend far beyond international humanitarian law.

The UNGA offers a crucial advantage: universal participation. Unlike the CCW process in Geneva, it includes all states. This is particularly important for global south states, many of which are not a party to the CCW.

Over two days, states and civil society explored human rights implications, humanitarian consequences, ethical dilemmas, technological risks and security threats. Rich discussions emerged around regional dynamics and practical scenarios, examining how these weapons might be used in policing, border control and by non-state actors or criminal groups. While time constraints prevented exhaustive exploration of all issues, the breadth of engagement was unprecedented.

The Stop Killer Robots campaign found these consultations energising and strategically valuable. They demonstrated how UN processes in Geneva and New York can reinforce each other: while one forum provides detailed technical groundwork, particularly in developing treaty language, the other fosters inclusive political leadership and momentum. Both forums should work in tandem to maximise global efforts to achieve an international legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.

What explains the global divide on regulation?

The vast majority of states support a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems, favouring a two-tier approach that combines prohibitions with positive obligations.

However, roughly a dozen states oppose any form of regulation. Among them are some of the world’s most heavily militarised states and the primary developers, producers and likely users of autonomous weapons systems. Their resistance likely stems from the desire to preserve military superiority and protect economic interests, and the belief in inflated claims about these weapons’ supposed benefits promoted by big tech and arms industries. Or perhaps they simply favour force over diplomacy.

Whatever their motivations, this opposition underscores the urgent need for the international community to reinforce a rules-based global order that prioritises dialogue, multilateralism and responsible governance over unchecked technological ambition.

How do geopolitical tensions and corporate influence complicate international regulation efforts?

It is undeniable that geopolitical tensions and corporate influence are challenging the development of regulations for emerging technologies.

A handful of powerful states are prioritising narrow military and economic advantages over collective security, undermining the multilateral cooperation that has traditionally governed arms control. Equally troubling is the expanding influence of the private sector, particularly large tech companies that operate largely outside established accountability frameworks while wielding significant sway over political leaders.

This dual pressure is undermining the international rules-based order precisely when we most need stronger multilateral governance. Without robust regulatory frameworks that can withstand these pressures, development of autonomous weapons risks accelerating unchecked, with profound implications for global security and human rights.

How is civil society shaping this debate and advocating for regulation?

Anticipating the challenges autonomous weapons systems would pose, leading human rights organisations and humanitarian disarmament experts founded the Stop Killer Robots campaign in 2012. Today, our coalition spans over 270 organisations across more than 70 countries, working at national, regional and global levels to build political support for legally binding regulation.

We’ve played a leading role in shaping global discourse by highlighting the wide-ranging risks these technologies pose and producing timely research on weapons systems evolution and shifting state positions.

Our multi-level strategy targets all decision-makers who can influence this agenda, at local, regional and global levels. It’s crucial that political leaders understand how autonomous weapons might be used in warfare and other contexts, enabling them to advocate effectively within their spheres of influence for the treaty we urgently need.

Public pressure is key to our approach. Recent years have seen growing weapons systems autonomy and military applications, particularly in ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, alongside rising use of technologies such as facial recognition in civilian contexts. Public concern about the dehumanising nature of these technologies and the lack of regulation has grown online and offline. We frame these concerns along the whole spectrum of automated harm, with autonomous weapons representing the extreme, and highlight the critical need to close the gap between innovation and regulation.

We also collaborate with experts from arms, military and technology sectors to bring real-world knowledge and credibility to our treaty advocacy. It is crucial to involve those who develop and deploy autonomous weapons to demonstrate the gravity of current circumstances and the urgent need for regulation.

We encourage people to take action by signing our petition, asking their local political representatives to sign our Parliamentary Pledge or just spreading the word about our campaign on social media. This ultimately puts pressure on diplomats and other decision-makers to advance the legal safeguards we desperately need.

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By Sania Farooqui
BENGALURU, India, Jun 25 2025 (IPS)

It has been 33 years since peacebuilding was formally recognized within the United Nations system, by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who defined it as a long-term structural work aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence, setting the stage for the UN’s ongoing efforts to address the root cause of conflict and not just its consequences. “Post-conflict peacebuilding is the action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict,” Boutros-Ghali said.

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Founder of International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)

“Our entire system for peace and security was designed for interstate war. Wars today are often internal, asymmetrical, and increasingly state-non-state indistinct,” Sanam says. The change has outpaced mechanisms meant to manage it.

While the UN and the other multilateral institutions are still at the center, Sanam points out their shortcomings. “When great powers violate the rules, no one can hold them back,” she states. The fragility of international standards has been made clear by the immobility of international institutions in the face of aggression by the great powers, and that has has exposed the weakness of international norms.

“If we did not have the UN, we’d need one now”, Sanam says. However, she stresses that transformation is desperately needed, not just for institutions but also for mentality.

She argues that there is a clear choice: adopt inclusive, people-centered peacebuilding that leverages the legitimacy and abilities of actors closest to the ground or stick with a top-down, formulaic approach that hasn’t worked to address current crises.

“Today’s challenges include but are not limited to rising geopolitical tensions among nuclear-armed major powers, a seemingly inevitable climate catastrophe, technological changes that have the potential to remake every aspect of life, and the increasing powers and capabilities of non-state actors to reshape sub-national, national, and international affairs,” states this research by the Atlantic council.

The 2024 Multilateralism Index Report by International Peace Institute states that it is widely acknowledged that the multilateral systems are facing a series of crisis, and that international action in response to the wars in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan and Myanmar, and beyond has been largely confined to humanitarian assistance rather than peacemaking.

According to the report, and the surveys it conducted, majorities of people in most countries still have favourable views of the UN, want their country to be more involved in the UN, and believe the UN has made the world a better place. Majorities also agree that the UN promotes human rights, peace, democracy, action on infectious diseases and climate action. At the same time, perceptions of the UN varied widely by region, from strong support in Northern Europe and southeast Asia to low levels of trust across much of Latin America and the Middle East.

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the former president of Liberia, spoke about “Liberia’s story” in a video message during a recent event at the UN Headquarters commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). She said that it was a story of suffering, but also of hope.

The former president and Nobel Peace Prize winner stated, “a country that was once brought to its knees by a protracted struggle now stands as a testament to what is achievable when national will is matched by international solidarity.” “Liberia’s journey to peace could not be walked alone,” she stated, highlighting the role played by the international community through the UN and its peacekeeping Mission UNMIL, the African Union, the European Union, the regional bloc ECOWAS, and other organizations.

The United Nations peacebuilding architecture – which comprises of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) marks its fourth review this year which is mandated by general Assembly resolution 75/201 and Security Council Resolution 2558. This review comes at a time of significant geopolitical divisions and escalating risks of conflict in many parts of the world, underscoring the urgent need to act on recommendations from current and past reviews.

“If I were in charge, I’d take this moment of UN reform as a real opportunity,” says Sanam. The opening line of the UN Charter, “We the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, holds immense power. She argues that now is the time to put women, peace and security at the center of global peacemaking. “These agendas came from war zones. Women and youth are the most affected and also the most active in peacebuilding.” Sanam envisions peacebuilding as an ecosystem where the UN, states, international players, and local actors are all necessary, as each has a specific role to play. “Peace is a choice, but it’s a choice that takes courage, commitment, and creativity. It takes hearing from those too often ignored and believing in the ability of local actors to drive change,” Sanam says.

With more conflicts than any time in the last 30 years, and a record number of displaced persons worldwide, the stakes could not be higher. This conversation is not merely a breakdown of what is wrong – it’s a call to reimagine what peace could be, and who gets to build it.

Sania Farooqui is an independent journalist and host of The Sania Farooqui Show, a platform dedicated to amplifying the voices of women in peacebuilding and human rights.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excerpt:

US President Donald Trump has deliberately sown discord worldwide in attempting to remake the world to serve supposed American interests better. He will not cede influence, let alone power and control, to other nations, let alone people.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

For Miran, Trump is reshaping the US-led unipolar world more equitably by getting others to bear more of the costs of ‘global public goods’ that the US ostensibly provides.

As geopolitical economist Ben Norton has noted, the US spends trillions on its global empire, with around 800 military bases abroad! While influential US corporate interests have benefited most, others have also gained.

The US contributed to the Global North’s reconstruction boom after World War II (WW2). After pre-empting growing Soviet influence from the last year of WW2, the US enhanced its hegemony by strengthening allies during the first Cold War.

However, Miran complains it is too “costly” to maintain the post-Cold War unipolar order without others bearing their “fair share” of the US costs of providing a “global security umbrella” and international dollar liquidity.

1985 Plaza Accord
In the 1980s, many complained about how Japan and Germany, which had lost WW2, had benefited from imposed military spending constraints and US occupation to gain industrial leadership worldwide.

At its second meeting at New York’s Plaza Hotel, the US-led Group of Five (G5), of the largest Western economies, agreed that the yen and Deutschemark should greatly appreciate against the US dollar.

This would ensure US recovery from its slowdown following dollar strengthening due to the Fed’s high-interest rate policy to quell inflation after the second oil price hike.

As the yen appreciated, Japan’s 1989 ‘Big Bang’ financial reforms sealed its fate. Its asset price bubble burst, also ending the post-war Japanese miracle boom.

Miran acknowledges US dollar “overvaluation has weighed heavily on the American manufacturing sector while benefiting financialised sectors of the economy in manners that benefit wealthy Americans”.

From Plaza to Mar-a-Lago
Unlike Plaza, Miran’s proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord, named for Trump’s private Florida retreat, will be imposed on all, especially allies in the Global North.

The Global North must improve the US trade balance by deterring imports and increasing exports by letting the dollar depreciate. Allies have been threatened with tariffs and unilateral withdrawal of the US security umbrella.

Miran’s proposal also envisions foreign governments holding 100-year US Treasury bonds. This should transfer long-term losses due to inflation to bondholders abroad.

He also wants a US sovereign wealth fund financed by revaluing US gold reserves to market prices. Meanwhile, his proposed cryptocurrency stabilisation fund already threatens to disrupt international finance.

His plan claims to reduce US trade deficits and bring back good jobs. Miran expects it will significantly shrink the US current account and fiscal deficits without requiring more tax revenue or spending cuts.

Weaker dollar not enough
Jenny Gordon has challenged Miran’s argument. She reasons that his plan is unrealisable without significantly shifting US resources from non-tradables to tradables.

Manufacturing investments needed to substitute imports and increase exports have to be financed. But the US has been a net borrower for almost half a century!

Its current account deficit reflects these savings-investment imbalances. The US would have to cut its capital account surplus by borrowing much less from others to reduce its current account deficit.

Making manufacturing more competitive requires a weaker dollar and new investment. The US must encourage Americans to save more, consume less, divert investment from elsewhere, and cut its fiscal deficit.

Otherwise, foreign borrowings financing manufacturing investments will strengthen the US dollar. Worse, a weaker greenback is needed to boost US competitiveness.

Miran may prevail
Even if US manufacturing recovers, well-paid jobs in depressed areas remain unlikely. Besides ageing, changing technology, consumption, and incomes have adversely affected prospects for reviving US manufacturing.

Government spending cuts have hurt state-sponsored research, which enabled the US to lead technological innovation worldwide until early this century.

Miran’s proposed forced conversion of US Treasury bonds held in official reserves to ‘century bonds’ will reduce confidence in the dollar and its liquidity value.

Besides lowering US borrowing costs, it would undermine the deep secondary market for US T-bills and dollar-denominated trade and financial flows—all key to dollar privilege.

The dollar’s status as a reserve currency has enabled the US to maintain massive fiscal deficits without high interest rates or the threat of currency collapse. But it has also constrained US economic options, favouring finance and other modern services.

Trump does not want to lose the dollar’s status as a reserve currency. His threat to the BRICS suggests likely harsh retaliation against efforts to reduce reliance on the US dollar.

The dollar’s status in international finance also enables the US to threaten others credibly. However, Trump’s treatment of allies reminds us that compliance does not ensure stability.

Miran presumes that trade and investment partner countries will do as he wants. While few may agree to his proposal, which will not work, not many may stand up to Trump. Worse, some are already giving lip service to the proposal.

IPS UN Bureau

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Donald Trump’s top economic advisor claims the President has weaponised tariffs to ‘persuade’ other nations to pay the US to maintain its supposedly mutually beneficial global empire.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

The Institute is funded by financiers such as media czar Rupert Murdoch, who controls Fox News, The Wall Street Journal, and other conservative media.

Miran made his case just after Trump’s electoral victory in A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System. Miran attempts to rationalise Trump’s economic policies, which are widely seen as at odds with conventional wisdom and reason.

Enhancing US dominance
Miran defends Trump’s tariffs as part of an ambitious economic strategy to strengthen US interests internationally with a “generational change in the international trade and financial systems”.

“Our military and financial dominance cannot be taken for granted, and the Trump administration is determined to preserve them”. Miran claims the US provides two major ‘global public goods’, both “costly to us to provide”.

First, Miran claims US military spending provides the world a ‘security umbrella’ that others should also pay for. Second, the US issues the dollar and Treasury bonds, the main reserve assets for the liquidity of the international monetary and financial system.

Miran seems blissfully unaware of longstanding complaints of US ‘exorbitant privilege’. The dollar’s reserve currency status has provided seigniorage income to the US while Treasury bond sales have long financed US debt at very low cost.

Miran’s case for Trump
The White House has threatened others with high tariffs unless they make concessions, at their own expense, benefiting the US. Miran’s defence of tariffs is indirect, as part of an ostensible grand strategy.

“The President has been clear that the United States is committed to remaining the reserve [currency] provider”, Miran added. He claims US dollar hegemony is “great” and denies “dollar dominance is a problem”.

While this “has some side effects, which can be problematic”, Miran “would like to … ameliorate the side effects, so that dollar dominance can continue for decades, in perpetuity”.

For Miran, these side effects are supposedly largely adverse while ignoring the benefits to the US. Chronic US trade deficits have been possible and financed by mounting US debt, enabling the dollar to serve as a global reserve currency.

Hence, US trade deficits have been sustained since the 1960s, rather than “unsustainable”, as he alleges. US manufacturing has been “decimated” by its consumers and transnational corporations, not by an extensive foreign conspiracy.

Miran’s Guide acknowledged the ‘Triffin dilemma’. In 1960, Robert Triffin warned that the dollar’s status as global reserve currency posed problems and risks for US monetary policy.

He invokes Triffin to argue that the US must import more than it exports to provide liquidity to the world, which needs dollars for international trade and to hold as reserves.

Miran adopts the Trumpian narrative of only blaming others. However, the US expected to benefit from continuing trade surpluses at Bretton Woods. In 1944, it opposed alternative payments arrangements to deter excessive trade surpluses.

US trade deficits have grown since the 1960s with post-World War II reconstruction of the Global North and uneven ‘late industrialisation’ in the Global South.

The empire must pay
The Trump administration wants to eat its cake and still have it. It intends to strengthen US empire while minimising adverse side effects and costs.

Miran wants foreign nations to “pay their fair share” in five ways. First, “countries should accept tariffs on their exports to the US without retaliation”. Tariffs provide revenue, which has financed its global public goods provision. Second, they should buy “more US-made goods”.

Third, they should “boost defense spending and procurement from the US”. Fourth, they should “invest in and install factories in America”. Fifth, they should “simply … help us finance global public goods”, i.e., foreign aid should go to or via the US.

Miran then emphasises that Trump “will no longer stand for other nations free-riding”, and calls for “improved burden-sharing at the global level”.

“If other nations want to benefit from the US geopolitical and financial umbrella, then they need to … pay their fair share”, i.e., the world must “bear the costs” of maintaining US empire.

Trump dilemmas 2.0
Trump wants to use tariffs to force countries with trade surpluses with the US to buy more from the US. Ending these deficits would undermine dollar hegemony, which, paradoxically, Trump obsessively wants to preserve.

Miran wants other countries to convert their US Treasury bills into 100-year bonds at very low interest rates, effectively subsidising the US over the long term. He also wants nations running trade surpluses with the US to buy more long-term US Treasury securities.

Trump has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS members and all countries promoting de-dollarisation or undermining dollar hegemony in the international monetary system.

During his first term, Trump wanted to do the near-impossible by boosting exports while preserving a strong dollar!

Miran acknowledges that the “root of the economic imbalances lies in persistent dollar overvaluation that prevents international trade balancing”. But he also insists that dollar “overvaluation is driven by inelastic demand for reserve assets”.

Trump now hopes to kill both US trade and fiscal deficit birds by cutting imports and raising revenue with higher tariffs. He also wants the world to continue using dollars despite the US budget and trade deficits and policy uncertainties.

Meanwhile, official US debt, financed by selling Treasury bonds, continues to grow. Trump has to deliver his promised tax cuts soon before his earlier measures run out. Trump is falling foul of his bluster and may have to revert to the status quo ante while denying it.

Despite Miran’s best efforts, he cannot provide a coherent rationale for Trump’s rhetoric. But dismissing Trump as ‘mad’ or ‘stupid’ obscures the impossible dilemma due to and obscured by post-war US dominance.

IPS UN Bureau

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US President Donald Trump has again seized global attention by arbitrarily imposing sweeping tariffs on the rest of the world. He reminds us America is still boss, claiming to ‘make America great again’ (MAGA) by ensuring ‘America first’ at everyone else’s expense.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Since then, the world has been scrambling to understand better the president’s intentions to protect their interests. This has also triggered much talk about managing adjustment and enhancing resilience.

Shocked by his unilateral abandonment of the revised free trade agreement renegotiated during Trump 1.0, its North American neighbours were the first to engage publicly.

More recently, China’s ironically reciprocal response gave Trump another excuse for more punitively escalating his ‘reciprocal tariffs’. With little left to lose even before Trump’s latest tariffs against China, it said No to the Orange Emperor, switching the impact from manufacturing to agriculture.

Only major economies dare to retaliate. However, due to its geopolitics, including Trump’s demands for more ‘equitable’ NATO cost-sharing, an appropriately strong European response seems unlikely.

Many prioritise the Western alliance, while a few prefer other options. Sensing the ‘silence of the lambs’, the president has gloated over the steady stream of foreign leaders coming to ‘kiss my arse’.

Trump’s tariff fetish
The tariff announcement was not set in stone. It remains to be seen how much Trump’s support base, especially from the US corporate elite, will succeed in revising his measures.

He is unlikely to respond positively to opposition from abroad or even within the US. The tariffs will be tied up in legal and legislative procedures for some time, even after they go into effect.

The dissent of some Senate Republicans suggests the US Congress may reject the tariffs as a significant infringement on their Constitutional prerogatives.

Announced as executive orders, they are subject to judicial scrutiny. Of course, the White House will have to reconsider which battles to fight and which to concede without appearing to do so.

A face-saving compromise between the Republican-controlled Congress and the White House is increasingly likely. Attention can thus be diverted abroad to preferred targets such as China and Iran.

Some other countries, especially the BRICS, may also be hit to ‘save face’. The president can then claim he tried his best to MAGA but was foiled by foreign-connected opponents.

While Trump critics are making much of his subsequent revisions, concessions, amendments and postponements, the greater significance of his announcement lies elsewhere.

Divided we fall
Trump 2.0 will dictate the terms of US engagement with the world. He has already reminded everyone he is The Great Disruptor. Dismissing cooperation as for losers, his team’s purpose is to put others down.

Trump has subverted the World Trade Organization and all US-negotiated trade agreements except when it best serves its interests. He has given notice of selectively invoking multilateralism and the rule of law to serve his preferred interests best.

Although all European countries will be affected by Trump’s tariffs, each will be hit differently. Hence, developing a strong, unified European position will be difficult. This will deter other regional and plurilateral groupings from collective action.

In one stroke, Trump reminded the world that America remains number one and that he means business. Critics overlook his purpose and strategy by dismissing his methods and tactics as transactional, stupid or irrational.

Method to the madness?
Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors chairman, Stephen Miran, has offered an economic rationale for Trumponomics 2.0. He argues the world must pay for the ‘global public goods’ the US ostensibly provides, especially US military spending.

He also insists the US is doing the world a favour by allowing the US dollar to serve as the world’s reserve currency. He ignores how it earns seigniorage and the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of being able to issue debt to the rest of the world without having to repay.

His so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord purports to offer more financial stability through US dollar currency pegs and related digital currency arrangements, requiring payment flows to the US Treasury and Federal Reserve.

Trump has promised even more regressive tax reforms for the super-rich who generously funded his re-election campaign. As before, this will be obscured by some tax relief for the ‘middle class’.

The shift from potentially progressive direct taxation to more indirect taxation has already begun, with the proposed tariffs impacting purchases of merchandise imports.

Industrial policy redux?
Tariffs cannot simply restart long-abandoned production overnight. Earlier manufacturing jobs were lost to imports and the automation of production processes.

Reviving abandoned productive capacities and capabilities will mainly create poor jobs. ‘Fortress USA will attract some investments, mainly for the limited US market, but it cannot transform itself into the world’s manufacturing powerhouse it once was.

Recent reshoring efforts have proved embarrassingly unsuccessful. This has been evident with the difficulties of the forced relocation of the world’s leading (Taiwanese) semiconductor manufacturer to the US.

Trump’s turn to industrial policy is more backward-looking than progressive. It seeks to save uncompetitive old capacities rather than advance potentially competitive new investments, technology, productive capacities, and capabilities.

Also, investment and technology promotion need supportive policies, especially in human resources, research, and development, which are increasingly undermined by Musk-led government spending cuts.

IPS UN Bureau

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Prayers for peace at the Korean border.Credit: Greenburd/shutterstock.com

By Stein Tønnesson
Apr 7 2025 (IPS)

 
The armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953 has been mentioned as a possible model for how to end the fighting in Ukraine. This makes sense. The Trump administration, however, seems to opt for a quick deal like the 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam or the Minsk agreements of 2014–15, combining “ceasefires in place” with vain prospects of subsequently reaching a genuine peace agreement.

One lesson from the negotiations that led to the Korean armistice is that patient diplomacy is needed to end a stalemated war. When talks began in July 1951, the impatient Mao Zedong estimated that two weeks would be enough to conclude. The negotiations instead took two years. The result was a long text, detailing the exact border line and establish a demilitarized zone across the peninsula under UN supervision. The stated intention was to follow up with a peace agreement. This came to nothing. The conference established for the purpose in Geneva decided instead to reach an agreement on Indochina, dividing Vietnam for the next 21 years and replacing the French with American military forces.

The biggest difference between the Korea and Ukraine wars is that the Ukrainians are fighting alone, with only external military support, while the Korean War was primarily fought by American and Chinese forces on Korean soil. Back then, the armistice agreement was concluded by the commanders of the US-dominated UN forces, the Chinese “volunteers”, and the North Korean army, against the wish of Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul. He wanted to continue the fight for national reunification. Only after being offered a defence pact with the US did he accept the negotiated outcome, yet did not sign the agreement. South Korea has never signed the armistice that has prevented new outbreaks of war.

The key similarity between the Korean and Ukrainian wars is the prominent role of the USA as a supporter of the governments in Seoul and Kyiv. In both cases a condition for ensuring that an armistice can hold is that the US take responsibility for any agreement and joins up with others in providing security guarantees. A key reason why war has not resumed in Korea for the last 72 years is the continued US presence in the south. American troops act as a “tripwire,” ensuring that any North Korean invasion would lead to a war it would surely lose. For the same reason, the US needs to have boots on the ground in Ukraine.

Another similarity is that any attempt to conclude a genuine peace agreement is futile. A genuine peace in Korea would require that North and South agree either on national reunification or on recognizing each other as independent states, just as East and West Germany did in 1973. A peace agreement was even more unthinkable for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung in 1953–54 than it is for Seoul and Pyongyang today. It is just as inconceivable that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw voluntarily from Donbas and Krym as it is for President Volodymyr Zelensky to conclude a definitive peace agreement that does not recognize Ukrainian sovereignty to its entire territory. To maintain the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also crucial for Europe and the UN that Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty is not internationally recognized. Therefore, just as the two Koreas, Russia and Ukraine must settle for something less than a peace treaty, namely an armistice. This may end the fighting and could save hundreds of thousands of lives but will not establish peace.

An armistice is not a simple ceasefire, where military forces are supposed to remain where they happen to be situated when the agreement is made. For a Ukrainian armistice to be respected, the Russian and Ukrainian forces must withdraw to either side of a clearly delineated demilitarized zone. This is complicated by the fact that the front lines are so long. The easiest compromise would be for Ukraine to let Russia retain control over Krym, while Russia withdraws from Donbas. Third parties should put pressure on Moscow and Kyiv to accept that neat solution. To soften the pill, Ukraine could guarantee a high degree of local autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk. International monitoring with the use of satellite surveillance along the entire border would be needed. If one or both parties were to mobilize combat forces, launch drone attacks, or place rocket launchers on alert, warning signals should be triggered and international security guarantees enforced by robust multi-national forces.

A final similarity between Korea 1953 and Ukraine 2025 armistice is that both sides must abstain from any political interference at the other side of the agreed boundary. Russia and Ukraine must remain fully sovereign and independent states. Any rapprochement between the two Korean states continues to depend on Seoul’s ability to convince Pyongyang that it does not seek regime change in the north and on the willingness of Kim Jong Un to abstain from provocative missile tests and vocal threats. Putin apparently wants an agreement to include a provision for new elections in Ukraine, so he can interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs and remove Zelensky from power. This is a destructive demand that should be consistently rejected by any mediating or facilitating party to talks. The Ukrainians must decide for themselves when to lift their state of emergency and hold democratic elections.

President Trump has put pressure on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and has conceded on Ukraine’s behalf that it cannot get back all its lost territory or obtain NATO membership. He should now concentrate his efforts on convincing both sides to engage in negotiations for a strongly guaranteed and highly monitored armistice rather than a quick and fragile ceasefire or a dodgy settlement allowing one side to interfere in the other.

Related articles:

Korea Will Soon Face a Security Dilemma Like Europe’s
First Vietnam, Then Afghanistan: Is Ukraine Next?
Is the Time Ripe for an End to the Ukraine War?

Stein Tønnesson is Senior Research Fellow (Peace and Security in Northeast Asia) at the Toda Peace Institute and Research Professor Emeritus, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

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Panoramic view of the colorful village of Kulusuk in eastern Greenland – Kulusuk, Greenland – Melting iceberg releasing water into the sea. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Manuel Manonelles
BARCELONA, Spain, Apr 1 2025 (IPS)

“…I am convinced that Greenland’s importance to U.S. interests will grow. Thanks to geography, historical ties (…), the United States has the inside track when competing for influence in Greenland (even as the Chinese have now started making regular visits)…” This quote from a diplomatic cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Copenhagen to Washington might seem recent, perhaps just before President Trump’s abrupt announcement of his intentions to “buy” or “annex” Greenland from Denmark, but that is not the case.

This message is actually seventeen years old, dating back to May 16, 2008. It is one of several Greenland-related cables that came to light with WikiLeaks, highlighting the fact that U.S. interest in Greenland is nothing new. It has been a consistent theme in U.S. foreign policy for at least the last 150 years.

The first documented discussion within the U.S. Government about acquiring Greenland dates back to 1867, the same year the U.S. purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire for $7.7M.

After so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland?

Around that time, internal consultations took place in the U.S. Federal Government regarding the possibility of buying Greenland (along with Iceland) for around $5.5M. In fact, the State Department even published a report on the matter in 1868. However, as we know, this proposal never materialized.

More fruitless discussions followed in 1910, and then, suddenly, another purchase occurred in 1916. This time, the U.S. government bought not Greenland but the Danish West Indies in the Caribbean (now known as the U.S. Virgin Islands) from Denmark for $25M.

The relevance of this purchase in the Greenland case is substantive because one provision in the international treaty that formalized the deal—known as the Treaty of the Danish West Indies—stated that the U.S. Government “will not object to the Danish Government extending their political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.”

Because in 1916 Denmark controlled significant portions of Greenland but not the entire island. However, following the West Indies deal with the U.S., and with Washington’s consent, Denmark began a series of diplomatic movements that eventually allowed it to declare full sovereignty over all of Greenland. Only Norway contested this claim but lost in the International Court of Justice in 1933.

In April 1940, Nazi Germany occupied Denmark, and following that, the U.S. occupied Greenland, in order to prevent its seizure by Germany or eventually by Canada or even by the UK.

After WWII, the Danish government expected the U.S. to withdraw its troops. However, to their surprise, in 1946, the U.S. made a new proposal to purchase Greenland, this time offering $100M. Once again, the deal did not go through, and despite Copenhagen’s diplomatic efforts, the U.S. military stayed.

With the creation of NATO—and Denmark being one of its founding members—Copenhagen changed its policy, accepting the status quo. In 1951, Denmark signed an agreement allowing the U.S. to continue its military and defense activities in Greenland. In 1955, new serious discussions within the U.S. government about another potential offer emerged, and there is evidence that Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was behind another unsuccessful attempt in 1970.

With the end of the Cold War, U.S. interest in Greenland dramatically decreased, and most U.S. military bases on the island were dismantled, except for the one in Pituffik (then known by the Danish name of Thule).

With the start of the new millennium, the increasing effects of climate change and the escalation of geostrategic interest in the Arctic region, Washington reactivated its interest in the largest island on the planet.

However, this time rather than proposing another purchase to Denmark—after so many failed attempts—the U.S. opted for a more subtle policy, indirectly supporting Greenland’s pro-independence movement. The idea was that a newly independent and potentially weak Greenland could be more easily influenced by the U.S.

The surprise came in 2019 when President Trump reignited public debate on the issue and even cancelled an official trip to Copenhagen at the last minute after the Danish Prime Minister publicly rejected the possibility of selling Greenland.

With Biden in office, the issue was largely forgotten—until recently, when Trump brought it back, adopting an even more aggressive approach. It is no coincidence, then, that the U.S. opened a Consulate in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, in 2020, despite the country’s small population of around 50,000 people and a negligible number of U.S. residents, aside from the few U.S. military personnel stationed at Pituffik.

The key questions here are: after so many failed attempts by the U.S. to purchase Greenland over the past 150 years, what makes Trump believe that he will succeed? Is the current White House policy—so aggressive and public—really the best way for the U.S. to regain influence, or even secure a new role in Greenland? Could this approach, in fact, jeopardize U.S. interests in the region in the long term? And last but not least, beyond the Danish Government, the Greenlanders may have something to say, and judging by the results of the recent elections, it seems they are not really in the mood to accept Trump’s expansionism.

Manuel Manonelles is Associate Professor of International Relations at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University in Spain

NATO geopolitical strategy has now joined the ‘coalition’ of Western geoeconomic forces accelerating planetary heating, now led again by re-elected US President Donald Trump.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Burning biomass and fossil fuels greatly expanded mechanical energy generation. The age of industry in the last two centuries has thus involved more hydrocarbon combustion to increase output.

Uneven development has also transformed population geography. Tropical soils were far more productive, enabling higher population-carrying capacities. Hence, during the Anthropocene over the last six millennia, human settlement was denser around the tropics.

Greater water availability enabled more botanical growth, supporting more fauna that was less subject to seasonal vicissitudes. If not undermined by aridification and desertification, much denser human settlements and populations became more viable in and near the tropics.

Meanwhile, industrialisation has been uneven. It was initially mainly located in the temperate West until after decolonisation following the Second World War (WW2).

However, post-WW2 industrialisation in the Global South was largely denounced as protectionist and inefficient until the East Asian miracles were better understood.

Sustainable development goals
The 1972 Stockholm Environment Summit helped catalyse public awareness of ecological and related vulnerabilities. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit promoted a more comprehensive approach centred on sustainable development.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were drafted in 2001 by a small group appointed by the UN Secretary-General. In sharp contrast, the formulation and greater legitimacy of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) required time-consuming widespread consultations.

Undoubtedly, many SDGs contain apparent contradictions, omissions, and unnecessary inclusions. While participatory processes tend to be messy and slow, genuine cooperation is impossible without inclusive consultation.

After decades, developing countries successfully secured recognition for the need to compensate for losses and damages, i.e., provide climate reparations, yet most prosperous countries have given nothing so far.

While mitigation is undoubtedly crucial for slowing planetary heating, resources for adaptation are urgently needed by all developing countries. Those located in the tropics have been more adversely affected.

Sustainable development should sustain ecology and human progress. Planetary heating should be curbed fairly to ensure those living precariously are not worse off.

Planetary heating
Thus, the neoliberal – and neocolonial – counter-revolution against development economics from the 1980s, with its insistence on trade liberalisation, deprived much of recently independent Africa and others of industry and food security.

The worst consequences of planetary heating are in the tropics, where populations are generally denser but poorer. European settler colonialism in temperate regions exacerbated this, blocking later immigration from the tropics.

Economic growth, higher productivity and living standards have been closely associated with more greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the last two centuries. Historical GHG accumulation now exacerbates planetary heating.

The New York Times has identified significant benefits of planetary heating for the US and, by extension, the Global North. Thus, the commitment of the temperate West to urgently address planetary heating remains suspect.

It claimed the melting Arctic ice cap would eventually allow inter-ocean shipping, even during winter, without using the Panama Canal, thus cutting marine transport costs. Planetary warming would also extend temperate zone summers, increasing plant and animal growth.

Sad tropics
Former central banker Mark Carney, then UN Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, has warned that average planetary temperatures will exceed the 1.5oC (degrees Celsius) threshold over pre-industrial levels in less than a decade.

This threshold was mainly demanded by tropical developing countries but opposed by the Global North, especially temperate European countries, who wanted it higher at 2oC. Planetary heating exacerbates poverty, with most of the world’s poor living in the tropics.

Adaptation to planetary warming is thus very urgent for developing nations. But most concessionary climate finance is earmarked for mitigation, ignoring urgent adaptation needs. Meanwhile, extreme weather events have become more common.

At least ten provinces in Vietnam now have seawater seeping into rice fields, reducing production. As rice is the main staple in Asia, higher prices will reduce its affordability, undermining the region’s food security.

War worsens planetary heating
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to the Ukraine invasion has blocked Russian exports of oil and gas, strengthening the US monopoly of European fossil fuel imports.

With higher oil and gas prices, Europe has provided various energy price subsidies to ensure public support for the NATO war against Russia. The UK host secured a commitment to abandon coal at the Glasgow 26th UN climate Conference of Parties at the end of 2021.

As Mrs Thatcher had crushed the militant British coal mineworkers’ trade union in the 1980s, abandoning was easier for UK Conservatives. But the vow was soon abandoned, and coal mining in Europe revived to block cheap Russian oil and gas imports.

Thus, NATO’s energy strategy has exposed European climate hypocrisy, with the West abandoning its coal pledge for geopolitical and geoeconomic advantage. Such considerations have also undermined carbon markets’ ability to mitigate planetary heating.

Last year, the European Parliament voted to give Ukraine 0.25% of their national incomes while official OECD development assistance to the entire Global South has fallen to 0.3%! Burn, tropics, burn!

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US and Taliban representatives sign the agreement in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020. Credit: US Department of State/Wikicommons

By Bashir Mobasher
Mar 10 2025 (IPS)

 
The ongoing war in Ukraine has raised difficult questions for U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. and Russian leaders engaged in direct talks in Saudi Arabia over the future of the conflict, many are left wondering whether the Ukraine crisis could become another Afghanistan or Vietnam—two conflicts where the U.S. pursued peace talks with its adversaries while sidelining local governments, leading to catastrophic outcomes. Drawing lessons from these past negotiations and the eventual collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and the Republic regime in Afghanistan in 2021, one cannot help but wonder whether Ukraine could face a similar fate unless the U.S. carefully navigates these talks with a more inclusive approach.

Ukraine’s situation is distinct in many ways from Afghanistan and Vietnam, including the fact that Ukraine is located in Europe, which has a vested interest in its security and sovereignty, and that Ukraine is under a direct invasion by a foreign country and so its leader has broader national support—South Vietnam and Afghan Republic were dealing with proxies. The question, however, is whether these differences set Ukraine off the course that Afghanistan and Vietnam journeyed. Bear in mind that Afghanistan’s war differed from Vietnam’s, as much as Ukraine’s case differed from both. Therefore, what makes the three cases similar is not necessarily their socio-political settings or geopolitics but how peace settlements are handled regarding these countries. Seemingly, the ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are following the same pattern as those that sealed the fate of Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021. These patterns include the following:

• The absence of the legitimate governments of the negotiated states from the peace talks
• The rise of a new narrative that delegitimizes local governments as weak, corrupt, and anti-peace, elevating adversaries as reliable negotiating partners.
• A pledge that the local governments will get their turn in Peace Talks down the road, a promise that did not materialize in at least the two cases of Vietnam and Afghanistan.

These deals usually involve or accompany a swap of prisoners against the wishes of the local government and the end of financial and military support to the same regime. While labeled peace deals, these accords did not prevent local governments’ collapse after the U.S. withdrawal and instead created power vacuums that the adversaries quickly exploited. Could Ukraine, with its sovereignty at stake, face a similar outcome?

Crossed-lateral peace deals: A pattern of excluding the most legitimate stakeholders of peace

These usually bilateral deals can better be termed crossed-lateral peace agreements as they are negotiated and concluded in the absence and defiance of the most legitimate stakeholder. For example, the Paris Peace Accord in 1973 was primarily between the U.S. and North Vietnam, with the South Vietnamese government largely excluded from direct talks. The Nixon administration justified this exclusion under the belief that South Vietnam was the primary obstacle to peace and that bypassing the South Vietnamese government would expedite a resolution. The administration pledged that they would ensure that an intra-Vietnam peace talk would take place. However, the exclusion of South Vietnam from the main accord ultimately contributed to the fall of Saigon in 1975, as the North Vietnamese took control after the U.S. withdrawal.

In Afghanistan, the Doha Peace Agreement in 2020 followed a similar pattern. The U.S. negotiated directly with the Taliban, sidelining the Afghan government in peace talks. The agreement promised a U.S. troop withdrawal in exchange for the Taliban’s commitment to preventing terrorism from Afghan soil. While it was framed as a path to peace, the Afghan government, led by President Ashraf Ghani, was not involved at all. The resulting agreement failed to prevent the collapse of the Afghan government, which fell to the Taliban in 2021, just months after the U.S. withdrawal.

One of the striking aspects of both the Paris Peace Accords and the Doha Peace Agreement was the protest and outright rejection of the peace deals by the local governments of South Vietnam and Afghanistan. South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu rejected the Paris Peace Accords, feeling that the agreement compromised his government’s position and led to an unfavorable peace. Similarly, in Afghanistan, President Ashraf Ghani was deeply critical of the Doha Peace Agreement for excluding his government and undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan leadership. These protests highlighted how the local governments felt abandoned by the U.S. and viewed the negotiations as leading to unjust compromises that did not consider their legitimate needs. In both cases, U.S. officials accused the local governments of corruption, divisiveness, and incompetence to justify their direct negotiation with the enemy. Sounds familiar?

As the U.S. seeks to negotiate with Russia over Ukraine, it is crucial to note the dangers of accusing the Ukrainian government of incompetence or corruption and bypassing its authority. These accusations further elevate the adversaries’ assertions that the local governments lacked legitimacy from the outset. In both the Vietnam and Afghanistan cases, the local governments were left vulnerable, delegitimized, and unsupported before the onslaught of adversaries who could not care less about the peace deals. Interestingly, after the collapse of the allied power, the administrations blamed the opposition party at home and the sidelined government abroad, absolving themselves of any wrongdoing.

Is Ukraine the next episode in the same drama?

The U.S. and Russia have already begun rounds of talks, with the Ukrainian government sidelined. This dynamic bears some resemblance to the earlier peace talks with North Vietnam and the Taliban, where the U.S. preferred negotiating with adversaries in the absence of a legitimate government.

Will Ukraine be the next episode in this tragic drama? The answer lies in two factors, perhaps. First, is Ukraine psychologically and militarily prepared to continue its struggle without the United States’ support? Second, whether Europe proactively seeks to maintain its vested interest in Ukraine, which increasingly diverges from the U.S., or follows the U.S.’s lead as they did in Vietnam and Afghanistan’s cases.

Ukraine is the doorstep between Russia and Europe, and Russia’s entry—even with a warrant from the U.S.—is an alarm bell to the rest of Europe. Europe was never concerned about the adverse consequences of negotiation deals in Vietnam and Afghanistan. However, they do not seem to have the same feelings toward U.S.-Russia negotiations on Ukraine. The stability of the region is a matter of direct concern to Europe. For Europe, ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is not just a matter of geopolitical interest but crucial to European security. Their recent summit in Paris indicates that.

Other articles by this author:

Dr. Bashir Mobasher teaches at the American University (DC) Department of Sociology, New York University DC, and the American University of Afghanistan Departments of Political Science. Dr. Bashir is the current President of Afghanistan Law and Political Science Association (in Exile). He is an expert in comparative constitutional law, identity politics, and human rights. He has authored, reviewed, and supervised numerous research projects on constitutional law, electoral systems, and identity politics. His recent research projects are centered around decentralization, social justice, and orientalism. Bashir obtained his B.A. (2007) from the School of Law and Political Science at Kabul University and his LLM (2010) and PhD (2017) from the University of Washington School of Law.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) appeal captured US mass discontent against globalisation. In recent decades, variations of America First have reflected growing ethnonationalism in the world’s presumptive hegemon.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

With deindustrialisation in the North blamed on globalisation, their governments gradually abandoned trade liberalisation, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis.

Free trade mahaguru Jagdish Bhagwati has long complained of the weak commitment to multilateral trade liberalisation. Most recent supposed free trade agreements (FTAs) have been plurilateral or bilateral, undermining multilateralism while promoting non-trade measures.

The new geoeconomics and geopolitics have undermined the rules and norms supporting multilateralism. This has undermined confidence in the rules of the game, encouraging individualistic opportunism and subverting collective action.

Policymaking has become more problematic as it can no longer count on agreed-shared rules and norms, undermining sustained international cooperation. Biased and often inappropriate economic policies and institutions have only made things worse.

Successive Washington administrations’ unilateral changes in policies, rules and conventions have also undermined confidence in US-dominated international economic arrangements, including the Bretton Woods institutions.

Deliberate contraction
Although recent inflation has been mainly due to supply-side disruptions, Western central banks have imposed contractionary demand-side macroeconomic policies by raising interest rates and pursuing fiscal austerity.

US Federal Reserve interest rate hikes from early 2022 have been unnecessary and inappropriate. Squeezing consumption and investment demand with higher interest rates cannot and does not address supply-side disruptions and contractions.

After earlier ‘quantitative easing’ encouraged much more commercial borrowing, higher Western central bank interest rates were contractionary and regressive. Hence, much of world economic stagnation now is due to Western policies.

Developing countries have long known that international economic institutions and arrangements are biased against them. Believing they have no opportunity for wide-ranging reform, most authorities are resigned to only using available macroeconomic policy space.

Nevertheless, national authorities have become more willing to undertake previously unacceptable measures. For example, several conservative central banks deployed ‘monetary financing’ of government spending to cope with the pandemic, lending directly to government treasuries without market intermediation.

More recently, central banks in Japan, China, and some Southeast Asian countries refused to raise interest rates in concert with the West. Instead, they sought and found new policy space, helping to mitigate contractionary international economic pressures.

Nonetheless, many economists piously urged central banks worldwide to raise interest rates until mid-2024. Meanwhile, policy pressures for fiscal austerity continue, worsening conditions for billions.

Neoliberal?
To secure support for neoliberal reforms from the late 20th century, the Global North promised developing countries greater market access and export opportunities.

However, trade liberalisation has slowly reversed since the World Trade Organization (WTO) creation in 1995. Policy reversals have become more blatant since the 2008 global financial crisis with geopolitically driven sanctions and weaponisation of trade.

But ‘neoliberal’ globalisation was a misnomer, as there was little liberal about it beyond selective trade liberalisation. Instead, FTAs have mainly strengthened and extended property and contract rights, i.e., selectively interpreting and enforcing international law.

Trade liberalisation undermined earlier selective protectionism, which promoted food security and industrialisation in developing countries. Tariffs have also been crucial revenue sources, especially for the poorest countries.

Intellectual property
Strengthening the rule of law has rarely fostered liberal markets. Even 19th-century economic liberals recognise the inevitable wealth concentration due to selective and partial neoliberalism.

Property rights invariably strengthen monopoly privileges under various pretexts. Global North governments now believe control of technology is key to world dominance. The WTO’s trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) have greatly strengthened IP enforcement.

With IP more lucrative, corporations have less incentive to share or transfer technology. With TRIPS enforced from 1995, technology transfer to developing countries has declined, further undermining development prospects.

The 2001 public health exception to TRIPS could not overcome IP obstacles to ensure affordable COVID-19 tests, protective equipment, vaccines and therapies during the COVID-19 pandemic, even triggering criticisms of ‘vaccine apartheid’.

Weaponising economics
The West has increasingly deployed economic sanctions, which are illegal without UN Security Council mandates. Meanwhile, access to trade, investment, finance and technology has become increasingly weaponised.

Foreign direct investment was supposed to sustain growth in developing countries. Intensifying Obama-initiated efforts to undermine China, then-President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo urged ‘reshoring’, i.e., investing in investors’ own countries instead.

Initial attempts to invest in their own economies instead of China largely failed. However, later efforts to undermine China have been more successful, notably ‘friend-shoring’, which urges companies to invest in politically allied or friendly countries instead.

With more economic stagnation, geopolitical strategic considerations and weaponisation of economic policies, cooperation and institutions, fewer resources are available for growth, equity and sustainability. Thus, the new geopolitics has jeopardised prospects for sustainable development.

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Many in the West, of the political right and left, now deny imperialism. For Josef Schumpeter, empires were pre-capitalist atavisms that would not survive the spread of capitalism. But even the conservative Economist notes President Trump’s revival of this US legacy.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

A century and a half ago, Dadabhai Naoroji, from India, became a Liberal Party Member of the UK Parliament. In his drainage theory, colonialism and imperial power enabled surplus extraction.

As the Anglo-Boer war drew to a close in 1902, another English liberal, John Hobson, published his study of economic imperialism, drawing heavily on the South African experience.

Later, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin cited Hobson, his comrade Nikolai Bukharin and Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital for his famous 1916 imperialism booklet urging comrades not to take sides in the European inter-imperialist First World War (WW1).

Three pre-capitalist empires – Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman – ended at the start of the 20th century. Their collapse spawned new Western nationalisms, which contributed to both world wars.

Germany lost its empire at Versailles after WW1, while Italian forays into Africa were successfully rebuffed. Western powers did little to check Japanese militaristic expansion from the late 19th century until the outbreak of World War Two (WW2) in Europe.

Imperialism and capitalism
Economists Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik argue that the primary accumulation of economic surplus – not involving the exploitation of free wage labour – was necessary for capitalism’s emergence.

Drawing on economic history, they clarify that primary accumulation has been crucial for capitalism’s ascendance. Thus, imperialism was a condition for capitalism’s emergence and rapid early development. Ensuring continued imperial dominance has sustained capitalist accumulation since.

The 1910s and 1920s debates between the Second and Third Internationals of Social Democrats and allied movements in Europe and beyond involved contrasting positions on WW1 and imperialism.

For most of humanity in emerging nations, now termed developing countries, imperialism and capital accumulation did not ‘generalise’ the exploitation of free wage labour, spreading capitalist relations of production, as in ‘developed’ Western economies.

Due to capitalism’s uneven development worldwide, the Third International maintained the struggle against imperialism was foremost for the Global South or Third World of ‘emerging nations’, not the class struggle against capitalism, as in developed capitalist economies.

After decades of uneven international economic integration, including globalisation, the struggle against imperialism continues to be foremost a century later. Imperialism has reshaped colonial and now national economies but has also united the Global South, even if only in opposition to it.

Blinkers at Versailles
After observing the peace negotiations after WWI, John Maynard Keynes presciently criticised the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, warning of likely consequences. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, he warned that its treatment of the defeated Germany would have dangerous consequences.

But Keynes failed to consider some of the Treaty’s other consequences. Newly Republican China had contributed the most troops to the Allied forces in WW1, as India did in WW2.

Germany was forced to surrender the Shantung peninsula, which it had dominated since before WW1. But instead of China’s significant contributions to the war effort being appreciated at Versailles with the peninsula’s return, Shantung was given to imperial Japan!

Unsurprisingly, the Versailles Treaty’s terms triggered the May Fourth movement against imperialism in China, culminating in the communist-led revolution that eventually took over most of China in October 1949.

Even today, popular culture, especially Western narratives, largely ignores the role and effects of war on these ‘coloured peoples’. By contrast, understating the Soviet contributions to and sacrifices in WW2 was probably primarily politically motivated.

Another counter-revolution
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected US president in 1932. He announced the New Deal in early 1933, years before Keynes published his General Theory in 1936.

Many policies have been introduced and implemented well before they were theorised. Unsurprisingly, it is often joked that economic theory rationalises actual economic conditions and policies already implemented.

Keynesian economic thinking inspired much economic policymaking before, during, and after WW2. Both Allied and Axis powers adopted various state-led policies. Keynesian economics remained influential worldwide until the 1960s and arguably to this day.

The counter-revolution against Keynesian economics from the late 1970s saw a parallel opposition movement against development economics, which had legitimised more pragmatic and unconventional policy thinking. From the 1980s, neoliberal economics spread with a vengeance and much encouragement from Washington, DC.

This Washington Consensus – the shared ‘neoliberal’ views of the US capital’s economic establishment, including its Treasury, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund – has since been replaced by brazenly ethno-nationalist ‘geoeconomic’ and ‘geopolitical’ responses to unipolar globalisation.

IPS UN Bureau

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The United Nations Security Council met on December 17 to discuss Syria’s transitional period following the end of Assad’s regime. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 19 2024 (IPS)

The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad came about following a series of coordinated offensive missions spearheaded by the Syrian opposition which resulted in the seizure of the capital city Damascus. In the days following the fall of Assad’s government, the Syrian Civil War has reached a phase of heightened insecurity, plunging Syria into a state of nationwide insecurity.

On December 7, the Syrian opposition, also known as the Southern Operation Room , led by the Islamic political organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, coordinated an offensive mission in the Rif Dimashq region of Syria, resulting in the Syrian Arab Army withdrawing their forces from Damascus. This, coupled with a concurrent offensive mission, led by the opposition and the Syrian National Army, resulted in the rebels seizing control of Damascus and Homs, marking the end of Assad’s regime in Syria.

For approximately 53 years, the Assad clan has exercised authoritarian rule over Syria, with an extensively documented history of mass incarcerations, executions, and violations of international humanitarian law.

According to a press release from the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRC), during Assad’s 13 year rule over Syria, there have been 35,000 documented cases of enforced disappearances, with accurate numbers likely being far larger.

In a press release issued by Amnesty International, Secretary General Agnès Callamard emphasized the brutality of the Assad family’s rule, saying, “Under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, and before him his father Hafez al-Assad, Syrians have been subjected to a horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale. This included attacks with chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and other war crimes, as well as murder, torture, enforced disappearance and extermination that amount to crimes against humanity.”

Following Assad’s departure, thousands of Syrian civilians flooded the streets to celebrate. World leaders also expressed their satisfaction with the end of Assad’s regime. In a televised speech, U.S. president Joe Biden said “At long last, the Assad regime has fallen. This regime brutalized, tortured, and killed hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians. The fall of the regime is a fundamental act of justice.”

“The Syrian people have suffered under Assad’s barbaric regime for too long and we welcome his departure. Our focus is now on ensuring a political solution prevails, and peace and stability is restored,” said United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Other nations such as France, Canada, and Germany, have indicated relief after Assad’s fall.

The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have reported plans to further monitor the developing situation in Syria and facilitate a peaceful transition of power. “Our priority is to ensure security in the region. I will work with all the constructive partners, in Syria and in the region. The process of rebuilding Syria will be long and complicated and all parties must be ready to engage constructively,” said EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas in a social media statement posted to X (formerly known as Twitter). The UN’s special envoy for Syria, Geir Pederson, called for urgent talks in Geneva to discuss measures that will be taken to achieve an “orderly political transition.”

Following Assad’s removal from office, the overall security situation in Syria has become increasingly volatile. According to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), clashes between armed coalitions remain regular in Syria, particularly in Aleppo and Al-Raqqa. Since the escalation of hostilities in late November, an estimated 1.1 million people in Syria have been internally displaced, particularly in Aleppo, Idleb, Hama and Homs.

According to a report from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), civilian casualties in Syria have risen significantly since the escalation of hostilities, with hundreds having been killed or injured from November to December 8. North-west Syria has seen the most violence, with over 75 civilians having been killed, including 28 children and 11 women. At least 282 others have sustained critical injuries as well, including 106 children and 56 women.

Partners of the UN have discovered at least 52 minefields scattered across Syria in the first ten days of December. Syria’s healthcare system has seen considerable disruptions due to damage from warfare and looting. Hospitals have become overwhelmed due to the sheer influx of injured persons, with psychological distress and trauma being widespread, particularly in children. Movement restrictions and curfews have significantly hampered humanitarian missions.

Additionally, Israel has capitalized on the chaos in Syria, targeting the nation’s military assets. Syria has long been recognized as an ally of Iran, an enemy of Israel. On December 10, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched 480 airstrikes on military operations and equipment in Damascus, Homs, Tartus, Latakia and Palmyra.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that these attacks were to guarantee the security of Israel as well as to achieve a “security zone free of heavy strategic weapons and terrorist infrastructures” in southern Syria. Despite the absence of Irani forces in Syria, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that these attacks were to guarantee a “security zone free of heavy strategic weapons and terrorist infrastructures” in southern Syria.

Nadav Shoshani, a spokesperson for the IDF, denied reports that Israeli forces are to head toward Damascus, but confirmed that they were operating beyond the buffer zone in Syria. However, Shoshani stated that Israel will not interfere with the “internal events” occurring in Syria.

Political analysts have expressed concern for the future of the Middle East following the toppling of Assad’s regime. Marco Carnelos, the former Middle East peace process coordinator special envoy for Syria for the Italian government, described Assad’s ousting as “one of the biggest geopolitical tectonic shifts since the Sykes-Picot agreements in 1916 and the understandings reached at the end of the First World War,” adding that certain nations, such as Iraq and Algeria will have a mixed reaction, while others “will breathe a sigh of relief.”

Arab states, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will be particularly sensitive to further developments in Syria that are motivated by civilian dissidence, fearing that Syria could inspire similar reactions in other Middle Eastern sovereignties.

Sarah Leah Whitson, the Executive Director of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), informed reporters that Arab states will “make efforts to contain HTS and build alliances with an HTS-government primarily guided by the hope that what emerges will be friendly to them and their interests” in the wake of this major transitional period of Syrian history.

Barbara Slavin, a fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center and a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University, states that the success of the Syrian opposition will likely “inspire jihadis in their own countries” to commit similar acts of rebellion and will also shine a light on the injustices committed by their governments.

The international community remains hopeful that the demise of Assad’s regime will bring forth an opportunity for positive development in Syria. Rima Farah, a lecturer at Northeastern University who studies the cultural and political history of the Middle East, opines that the end of Assad’s dictatorship provides the Syrian people with an indispensable opportunity to construct “a (democratic) state with a constitution that protects everyone.”

Political analysts have noted numerous parallels in the Syria situation and the protests that resulted in Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fleeing from Bangladesh to India. Both the Syria and Bangladesh situations were born of civilian discontent with their governments, resulting in protests and acts of rebellion, causing the incumbent leader to abandon their offices and flee to another country.

This is a testament to the importance of the civilian role in policy and decision-making processes. Furthermore, these two developments show that the government must be held accountable for measures that do not serve everyone equally.

Thameen Al-Kheetan, a spokesperson for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), told our correspondent that accountability is crucial in rebuilding Syria after 14 years of political instability. “This moment carries great hope as much as it raises huge challenges and legitimate uncertainty for Syrians. Accountability is one of the most important issues. Any transitional justice initiative should be inclusive, involve victims and ensure accountability for all past violations and abuses, those committed by the previous government and by all other parties to the conflict. To that end, the current authorities should ensure the preservation of evidence and facilitate the work of our Office as well as international mechanisms,” said Al-Kheetan.

Special Envoy Pederson added that it is imperative for Israeli bombardment and clashes between armed groups in Syria to stop to achieve substantial progress. “There is a real opportunity for change, but this opportunity needs to be grasped by the Syrians themselves and supported by the UN and the international community,” Pederson said.

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The new geopolitics after the first Cold War undermines peace, sustainability, and human development. Hegemonic priorities continue to threaten humanity’s well-being and prospects for progress.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and allied regimes, the US seemed unchallenged and unchallengeable in the new ‘unipolar’ world. The influential US journal Foreign Affairs termed ensuing US foreign policy ‘sovereigntist’.

But the new order also triggered fresh discontent. Caricaturing cultural differences, Samuel Huntington blamed a ‘clash of civilisations’. His contrived cultural categories serve a new ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy.

Today’s geopolitics often associates geographic and cultural differences with supposed ideological, systemic and other political divides. Such purported fault lines have also fed ‘identity politics’.

The new Cold War is hot and bloody in parts of the world, sometimes spreading quickly. As bellicosity is increasingly normalised, hostilities have grown dangerously.

Economic liberalisation, including globalisation, has been unevenly reversed since the turn of the century. Meanwhile, financialization has undermined the real economy, especially industry.

The G20 finance ministers, representing the world’s twenty largest economies, including several from the Global South, began meeting after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

The G20 began meeting at the heads of government level following the 2008 global financial crisis, which was seen as a G7 failure. However, the G20’s relevance has declined again as the North reasserted G7 centrality with the new Cold War.

NATO rules
The ostensible raison d’être of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has gone with the end of the first Cold War and the Soviet Union.

The faces of Western powers have also changed. For example, the G5 grew to become the G7 in 1976. US infatuation with the post-Soviet Russia of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin even brought it into the G8 for some years!

Following the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the sovereigntist Wolfowitz doctrine of 2007 redefined its foreign policy priorities to strengthen NATO and start a new Cold War. NATO mobilisation of Europe – behind the US against Russia – now supports Israel targeting China, Iran and others.

Violating the UN Charter, the 2022 Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine united and strengthened NATO and Europe behind the US. Despite earlier tensions across the north Atlantic, Europe rallied behind Biden against Russia despite its high costs.

International law has also not stopped NATO expansion east to the Russian border. The US unilaterally defines new international norms, often ignoring others, even allies. But Trump’s re-election has raised ‘centrist’ European apprehensions.

Developing countries were often forced to take sides in the first Cold War, ostensibly waged on political and ideological grounds. With mixed economies now ubiquitous, the new Cold War is certainly not over capitalism.

Instead, rivalrous capitalist variants shape the new geoeconomics as state variations underlie geopolitics. Authoritarianism, communist parties and other liberal dirty words are often invoked for effect.

New Europe
Despite her controversial track record during her first term as the European Commission (EC) president, Ursula von der Leyen is now more powerful and belligerent in her second term.

She quickly replaced Joseph Borrell, her previous EC Vice President and High Representative in charge of international relations. Borrell described Europe as a garden that the Global South, the surrounding jungle, wants to invade.

For Borrell, Europe cannot wait for the jungle to invade. Instead, it must pre-emptively attack the jungle to contain the threat. Since the first Cold War, NATO has made more, mainly illegal military interventions, increasingly outside Europe!

The US, UK, German, French and Australian navies are now in the South China Sea despite the 1973 ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) commitment to a ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality) and no request from any government in the region.

Cold War nostalgia
The first Cold War also saw bloody wars involving alleged ‘proxies’ in southwestern Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. Yet, despite often severe Cold War hostilities, there were also rare instances of cooperation.

In 1979, the Soviet Union challenged the US to eradicate smallpox within a decade. US President Jimmy Carter accepted the challenge. In less than ten years, smallpox was eradicated worldwide, underscoring the benefits of cooperation.

Official development assistance (ODA) currently amounts to around 0.3% of rich countries’ national incomes. This is less than half the 0.7% promised by wealthy nations at the UN in 1970.

The end of the first Cold War led to ODA cuts. Levels now are below those after Thatcher and Reagan were in power in the 1980s. Trump’s views and famed ‘transactional approach’ to international relations are expected to cut aid further.

The economic case against the second Cold War is clear. Instead of devoting more to sustainable development, scarce resources go to military spending and related ‘strategic’ priorities.

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Samira, a mother of five, was forced to leave her home following bombardment and is now living with her children in the streets of Martyrs Square in Beirut. Credit: UNICEF/Fouad Choufany

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 27 2024 (IPS)

A ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah comes into effect early on Wednesday morning (November 27). It is hoped that this will mark an end to a 13-month-long period of hostilities between the two parties in Lebanon.

News of the ceasefire came from United States President Joe Biden, who made a televised announcement on Tuesday afternoon that an agreement had been reached between the Israeli and Lebanese governments. Biden remarked that the ceasefire was expected to be a “permanent cessation of hostilities” from both sides of the conflict.

“Civilians on both sides will soon be able to safely return to their communities and begin to rebuild their homes, their schools, their farms, their businesses, and their very lives,” said Biden. “We are determined that this conflict will not just be another cycle of violence.”

Under the ceasefire agreements, which will initially last for sixty days, fighting at the Israel-Lebanon border will come to an end, and Israeli troops are expected to gradually withdraw from south Lebanon. Hezbollah is expected to pull back north of the Litani river, ending their presence in southern Lebanon.

The implementation of this ceasefire will be overseen by the United States, France, and the United Nations through the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The UN has made repeated calls for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), which calls for an end to the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and the need for Lebanon to exert government control.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati welcomed the ceasefire deal, noting that it would be an “essential step towards restoring calm and stability in Lebanon,” while also warning that Israel must commit to the agreement and abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shared in a video statement shortly before the ceasefire deal was reached that Israel would retaliate if Hezbollah made any moves that violated the terms of the ceasefire.

Senior leaders in the UN, including Secretary-General António Guterres, welcomed the ceasefire announcement. In an official statement from his office, Guterres urges the parties to “fully respect and swiftly implement all of their commitments made under this agreement.”

UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, also released a statement where she welcomed the ceasefire agreement. She went on to remark that this would signify the start of a critical process, “anchored in the full implementation” of the Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), to go forward in restoring the safety and security of civilians on both sides of the Blue Line.

“Considerable work lies ahead to ensure that the agreement endures. Nothing less than the full and unwavering commitment of both parties is required,” Hennis-Plasschaert said. “It is clear that the status quo of implementing only select provisions of Resolution 1701 (2006) while paying lip service to others will not suffice. Neither side can afford another period of disingenuous implementation under the guise of ostensible calm.”

The ceasefire agreement comes after a year-long period of escalating tensions and fighting, which began shortly after the October 7 Hamas terror attacks in Israel. Hostilities ramped up in September of this year when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) made repeated attacks on southern Lebanon. The fallout of the humanitarian situation has seen the displacement of over 900,000 civilians since October 2023, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Over 3823 civilian casualties have been confirmed within Lebanon and Israel. Of those casualties, at least 1356 civilians have been killed since October 8, 2023.

UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell said that the work must begin to sustain this peace and that children and families, including those displaced and in host communities, need to be ensured a safe return. Humanitarian organizations need to be “granted safe, timely, and unimpeded access to deliver lifesaving aid and services to all affected areas.”

“We call on all parties to uphold their commitments, respect international law, and work with the international community to sustain peace and ensure a brighter future for children,” said Russell. “Children deserve stability, hope, and a chance to rebuild their futures. UNICEF will continue to stand with them every step of the way.”

Even as a ceasefire seemed imminent, on Tuesday Israeli warplanes bombarded Beirut’s southern neighborhoods. These attacks have resulted in the deaths of 24 civilians. Al Jazeera reported that even amidst Biden’s announcement, the war in Lebanon was “still very much going.”

In recent months, UNIFIL forces have been caught in the crossfires and have faced challenges in fulfilling their mandate. Most recently, four Italian peacekeepers were injured when rockets hit the headquarters in Shama, though they did not sustain life-threatening injuries.

On this incident, UNIFIL stated: “The deliberate or accidental targeting of peacekeepers serving in south Lebanon must cease immediately to ensure their safety and uphold international law.” Earlier this month, UNIFIL released a statement detailing the actions the IDF took against the peacekeepers, including the “deliberate and direct destruction” of UNIFIL property.

During his address on Tuesday, Biden acknowledged Gaza and the lack of a ceasefire for the ongoing war. “Just as the people of Lebanon deserve a future of security and prosperity, so do the people of Gaza,” Biden said. “They too deserve an end to the fighting and the displacement. The people of Gaza have been through hell. Their world is absolutely shattered. Far too many civilians in Gaza have suffered far too much.”

Biden pledged that the United States would make another push to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza, along with Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and Israel; one that would see an end to the violence and the release of all hostages. The United States has vetoed Security Council resolutions that would have called for a ceasefire in Gaza on four separate occasions, most recently this November.

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Western financial policies have been squeezing economies worldwide. After being urged to borrow commercial finance heavily, developing countries now struggle with contractionary Western monetary policies.

Central banks
‘Unconventional monetary measures’ in the West helped offset the world economic slowdown after the 2008 global financial crisis.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Western central bank efforts have tried to check inflation by curbing demand and raising interest rates. Higher interest rates have worsened contractionary tendencies, exacerbating world stagnation.

Despite major supply-side disruptions and inappropriate policy responses since 2022, energy and food prices have not risen correspondingly. But interest rates have remained high, ostensibly to achieve the 2% inflation target.

Although it has no rigorous basis in either theory or experience, this 2% inflation target – arbitrarily set by the New Zealand Finance Minister in 1989 to realise his “2[%] by ’92” slogan – is still embraced by most rich nations’ monetary authorities!

For over three decades, ‘independent’ central banks have dogmatically pursued this monetary policy target. Once raised, Western central banks have not lowered interest rates, ostensibly because the inflation target has not been achieved.

Independent fiscal boards and other pressures for budgetary austerity in many countries have further reduced fiscal policy space, suppressing demand, investments, growth, jobs, and incomes in vicious cycles.

Debt crises
Before 2022, contractionary tendencies were mitigated by unconventional monetary policies. ‘Quantitative easing’ (QE) provided easy credit, leading to more financialization and indebtedness.

QE also made finance more readily available to the South until interest rates were increased in 2022. As interest rates rose, pressures for fiscal austerity mounted, ostensibly to improve public finances.

Policy space and options have declined, including efforts to undertake developmental and expansionary interventions. Less government spending capacity to act counter-cyclically has worsened economic stagnation.

Comparing the current situation with the 1980s is instructive. The eighties began with fiscal and debt crises, which caused Latin America to lose at least a decade of growth, while Africa was set back for almost a quarter century.

The situation is more dire now, as debt volumes are much higher, while government debt is increasingly from commercial sources. Debt resolution is also much more difficult due to the variety of creditors and loan conditions involved.

Different concerns
With full employment largely achieved with fiscal policy after the global financial crisis, US policymakers are less preoccupied with creating employment.

Meanwhile, the US’s ‘exorbitant privilege’ enables its Treasury to borrow from the rest of the world by selling bonds. Hence, the US Fed’s higher interest rates from 2022 have had contractionary effects worldwide.

As the European Central Bank (ECB) followed the Fed’s lead, concerted increases in Western interest rates attracted funds worldwide.

Western interest rates remained high until they turned around in August 2024. Developing countries have long paid huge premiums well above interest rates in the West.

However, higher interest rates due to US Fed and ECB policies caused funds to flow West, mainly fleeing low-income countries since 2022.

However, growth and job creation remain policy priorities worldwide, especially for governments in the Global South.

Protracted stagnation
Why has world stagnation been so protracted? Although urgently needed, multilateral cooperation is declining.

Meanwhile, international conflicts have been increasingly exacerbated by geopolitical considerations. Increased unilateral sanctions driven by geopolitics have also disrupted international economic relations.

Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ started the new Cold War to isolate and surround China. National responses to the COVID-19 pandemic worsened supply-side disruptions.

Meanwhile, the weaponisation of economic policy against geopolitical enemies has been increasingly normalised, often contravening international treaties and agreements.

Such new forms of economic warfare include denying market access despite commitments made with the 1995 establishment of the World Trade Organization.

Trade liberalisation has been in reverse gear since rich nations’ protectionist responses to the 2008 global financial crisis. Globalisation’s promise that trade integration would ensure peace among economic partners was thus betrayed.

Since the first Trump presidency, geopolitical considerations have increasingly influenced foreign direct investments and international trade.

US and Japanese investors were urged to ‘reshore’ from China with limited success, but appeals to ‘friend-shore’ outside China have been more successful.

Property and contractual rights were long deemed almost sacred. However, geopolitically driven asset confiscations have spread quickly.

Financial warfare has also ended Russian access to SWIFT financial transaction facilities and the confiscation of Russian assets by NATO allies.

The Biden administration has extended such efforts by weaponizing US industrial policy to limit ‘enemy’ access to strategic technologies.

It forcibly relocated some Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation operations to the US, albeit with little success.

Canada’s protracted detention of 5G pioneer Huawei founder’s daughter – at US behest – highlighted the West’s growing technology war against China.

Unsurprisingly, inequalities – both intranational and international – continue to deepen. Two-thirds of overall income inequality is international, exacerbating the North-South divide.

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The two White House hopefuls debated on ABC television on September 10, 2024, but their mentions of Latin America were mainly dedicated to the issue of migration. Credit: Michael Le Brecht II / ABC

By Humberto Márquez
CARACAS, Oct 24 2024 (IPS)

Migration, trade, the defence of democracy, the confrontation with China and the collapse of multilateralism are issues that shed more doubts than certainties on Latin America’s expectations of the imminent presidential elections in the United States.

Interest and tension have grown after dozens of polls and bookmakers have shown similar chances of victory for Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump, particularly in a few decisive states.“After Washington's retreat from the wars it got into in the Middle East, there is resistance among people to getting involved in the world's problems, which weakens the liberal democratic order”: Vilma Petrash.

Latin America has been treated by many US administrations as its ‘backyard’, but it is now commonplace that Washington’s international priority lies far from the region.

Nevertheless, “we should not underestimate the ways in which Democrats and Republicans are different”, warned Tullo Vigevani, former professor of international relations at Brazil’s Paulista State University.

“For example, their proposals and policies are very different on the environment, in general and in relation to Latin America; on renewable energy and biofuels – particularly in the case of Brazil – and regarding human rights and some authoritarian trends in the region”, Vigevani told IPS from Sao Paulo.

Even if some governments are more sympathetic to Harris or Trump, Vigevani believes that both Washington and the region’s capitals will seek understandings and a relationship as normal as possible, after the 5 November election.

Migrants in the Mexican border city of Tijuana approach the barrier that closes access to the United States. Credit: Alejandro Cartagena / IOM

Migration rules

Among the campaign issues, such as economy and employment, taxes, health, wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and the opposing personalities of both candidates, migration stands out, with Latin American countries being the main expellers of migrants to the United States.

“It is a sensitive issue for Americans, whether they are Democrats, Republicans or independents. It affects the immigrant population, the millions of refugees, and therefore the countries of Latin America,” Vilma Petrash, a Venezuelan professor of political science and international relations at Miami Dade College, told IPS.

Of the 336 million people living in the United States, 46.2 million were of foreign origin in 2022, according to the non-governmental Pew Research Center; 49% are already U.S. citizens, 24% are legal permanent residents, and the rest, more than 11 million people, are unauthorised immigrants, eight million of whom are from Latin American and Caribbean countries.

In fact, the United States is currently home to 65 million ‘Hispanics’, as Latin Americans are called in the country, according to different reports, and they have become a desired prize for the two candidates.

Trump, who pushed for the construction of a wall on the southern border during his presidency (2017-2021), now offers massive deportations of illegals – one million immediately, according to his vice-presidential candidate, James Vance -, and to contain irregular border immigration even by using the military.

They are “the enemy within”, Trump has said, and has stigmatised migrants: he said that criminals from Venezuela have left their country for the United States, “leaving Caracas as one of the safest cities in the world”, or that Haitians “are eating the pets” in the northern industrial state of Ohio.

Harris, who is the current vice-president and lead programmes with which president Joe Biden also tried to address causes of migration, such as poverty in Central America, has said that the immigration system “needs reform”, without going into details.

Whichever side wins, the controls will predictably increase, and Washington’s announcement that it will not renew in 2025 the temporary stay permits (parole), which allow Venezuelans, Haitians, Cubans and Nicaraguans to enter and remain in the United States for two years, was a warning sign.

The US aircraft carrier USS Nimitz sails through the Arabian Gulf. Credit: US Army

The United States isolates itself

The migration issue shows the United States’ willingness to isolate itself, to withdraw, instead of taking a proactive approach, as a great global power, to solving problems in the region and the world.

According to Petrash, “after Washington’s retreat from the wars it got into in the Middle East, there is resistance among people to getting involved in the world’s problems, which weakens the liberal democratic order. Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policies are a case in point”.

The expert said from Miami, in the southeastern state of Florida, that there is also a lack of consensus over foreign policy, and in general over governance, to the point that a part of the population still, countering evidence, supports the version that it was Trump and not Biden who won the election four years ago.

While Biden has consistently supported Ukraine in the war against Russia, and Israel’s current military offensive in the Middle East, his political action in favour of democracy in Latin America has been weaker, and Harris would continue this, although with revisions, according to Petrash.

This is despite the certainty that, for example, among the alternatives for containing regional migration, in which the exodus of more than seven million Venezuelans in the last decade stands out, is to promote a solution to the democratic crisis in that country.

As a result of its policies and omissions, its polarised political confrontation and doubts about its electoral system, and the rise of isolationism, the United States “would have to regain the moral stature necessary to help stem democratic backsliding in the region”, says Petrash.

These setbacks are expressed in left-wing governments with authoritarian tendencies, such as those in Nicaragua and Venezuela, but also in sectors that have backed right-wing presidencies such as those of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) in Brazil and the current administrations of Javier Milei in Argentina and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador.

Bolsonaro, Milei and Bukele have openly identified with Trump, whose sector harbours a far-right conservative current. For Petrash, this could favour a rapprochement with Latin American countries where there is a democratic backlash.

Unloading wind turbines from China at the port of Bahía Blanca, Argentina. It shows China’s penetration into the renewable energy sector in the Southern Cone, where it is already a major trading partner. Credit: Port of Bahía Blanca

China moves forward

Petrash points out that the United States’s international retreat was acute in Latin America, “its natural strategic zone”, after the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative in 2005. “It abandoned its vision of free trade in the region and let China move forward with its enclaves,” she said.

China, “an economic, political and ideological rival, has sold itself as successful authoritarianism, and has taken advantage of Washington’s absences in Latin America to advance its quiet, pragmatic diplomacy,” says Petrash.

Trade between China and Latin America reached US$480 billion in 2023 after increasing 35-fold in 2000-2022, while the region’s total trade with the world increased four-fold, according to the  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Nevertheless, trade with the Asian giant is still far from the region’s trade with the United States, which in the same year amounted to US$1.14 trillion.

Relations between Latin America and China “have grown and even strengthened in strategic areas such as new materials for energy production, lithium batteries -South America has large reserves of the mineral-, or artificial intelligence”, Vigevani states.

Certification of Brazilian meat for export. Brazil is the largest exporter of beef and poultry, and very active in the World Trade Organization. Credit: Abrafrigo

Brazil and Mexico

Meanwhile, Brazil is concerned about Washington’s disdain – which will be evident if Trump wins – for multilateral institutions, starting with the United Nations and the proposed renewal of its Security Council in order to make it effective.

For Vigevani, this distancing from multilateralism is illustrated by the blockade, which Washington has maintained since 2020, on the appointment of new members to the dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), initiated by Trump and continued by Biden.

“Even if relations with Brazil and Latin America in general look normal, this United States refusal raises doubts for the future, because it is saying it is not interested in multilateral organisations,” said Vigevani.

In the case of a Trump victory, the Brazilian professor points out, there are also unanswered questions about what his war and peace policies will be.

An example is the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Trump has said that “ending this war quickly is in the best interest of the United States” and that he can achieve “a peace agreement in one day”, without offering further details, said Vigevani.

“It is important because, despite the war, Brazil has a strong relationship with Russia, and a very active participation in the Brics group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa),” Vigevani recalled.

According to Petrash, with Trump’s international policy, “the great power can be the bull in the china shop, and even more, the bull isolating itself in the china shop”.

At the other end of the region is Mexico, a partner of Canada and the United States in the trade agreement known as USMCA, which replaced in 2020 the North American Free Trade Agreement that has existed since 1994.

Along with maintaining the 3150-kilometre southern border of the United States, a destination for hundreds of thousands of migrants who cross the region each year, Mexico faces the campaign promise from both Harris and Trump that they intend to revise the USMCA as soon as they reach the White House.

Trump is expected to introduce tariffs and protectionist barriers, for example on Mexican production involving Chinese parts or technologies, and Harris is expected to increase environmental and labour requirements that favour industries with United States labour.

Whichever side wins, “with the new American policy of bringing companies back to the United States or to its partners in the USMCA, possibly the biggest issue now is the end of globalisation and the return to a developmentalist nationalism”, summarised Vigevani.

Secretary-General António Guterres briefs reporters ahead of the opening of the 79th high-level session of the UN General Assembly and the Summit of the Future. Credit: Mark Gaten/UN

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 19 2024 (IPS)

As the United Nations gears up to host the international community for the high-level meeting week, the UN chief appeals to world leaders to commit to universal agreements to work towards solutions.

On Wednesday, Secretary-General António Guterres spoke to reporters ahead of the upcoming 79^th high-level session of the UN General Assembly and the Summit of the Future. This year’s General Debate and the upcoming Summit will strive to seek solutions towards institutional reforms and resolving wide-ranging and interconnected issues, including climate, forced displacement, and conflict.

“Crises are interacting and feeding off each other—for example, as digital technologies spread climate disinformation that deepens distrust and fuels polarization,” Guterres said. “Global institutions and frameworks are today totally inadequate to deal with these complex and even existential challenges.”

For Guterres and the UN, the upcoming Summit of the Future will set out to address the deeper issue of reforming the multilateral systems that have been in place from the organization’s inception.  “So many of the challenges that we face today were not on the radar 80 years ago when our multilateral institutions were born,” he said. “Our founders understood that times would change. They understood that the values that underpin our global institutions are timeless—but the institutions themselves cannot be frozen in time.”

What will differentiate the Summit of the Future from previous high-level meetings, such as the SDG Summit of 2016, is its focus on the proposed solutions that need to be taken towards the greater issues affecting the world and its institutions today. According to Guterres, this is supposed to contrast with the Sustainable Development Goals and their focus on the specific issues that need to be addressed.

“One of the very important aspects that is in the Summit of the Future is the recognition that our institutions need to be reformed,” said Guterres. “The Summit of the Future takes into account the fact that to be able to implement the SDGs… all the extraordinary declarations, we need to reform institutions.”

One of the most significant calls to reform has been for the Security Council. This includes the demand to improve representation of the member states from Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Guterres remarked that the Council’s formation was in a post-war world, during a period where many nations, such as those in Africa, were still under colonial rule. In the case of Africa, they have been underrepresented with reduced influence.

“In no place is this inequality more obvious and more, I would say, unacceptable than in the Security Council of United Nations, where you have, for instance, three European permanent members and no African permanent member, which, of course, doesn’t correspond at all to the present situation of the world,” he said.

Guterres did not indicate if there was a timeline for reform implementation, noting that the member states must first adopt the Pact for the Future, one of the key documents currently in the works, in order to move forward. He suggested that there would be agreement on improving transparency and procedure within the council, but also expressed skepticism that certain aspects, such as the veto, would be outright abolished.

As world leaders and stakeholders across the international community convene in New York for the High-Level Meeting week, the spirit of cooperation and shared solidarity is more crucial than ever. Guterres stressed the need for the member states to finalize the conditions in the outcome documents in time for the first day of the Summit.

The UN and its partners seek to strengthen multilateral systems during a time of increasing hostility and conflicts breaking out around the world, including the most recent news of explosions across Lebanon. When asked if it seemed like the world was heading towards a global conflict like a third world war, Guterres said: “I think we are perfectly on time to avoid the move into World War III.”

He added: “What we are witnessing is a multiplication of conflicts and the sense of impunity… It’s a sense of impunity everywhere. I mean, any country or any military entity, militias… feel that they can do whatever they want because nothing will happen to them… And the fact that nobody takes even seriously the capacity of the [global] powers to solve problems on the ground makes the level of impunity an enormous level.”

“I’m much more worried with the dramatic impact in the life of civilians, women, children, and elderly people, everywhere. From Sudan, from Myanmar, from Gaza, than of the risk of the second World War… the third World War, that I still believe we have all the conditions to avoid.”

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 19 2024 (IPS)

The United Nations, over the last year, has been relentlessly promoting the upcoming Summit of the Future – scheduled for September 22-23—as a landmark event.

And rightly so.

But, surprisingly, the provisional list of speakers, released early this week, reflects notable absentees for a high-level summit– the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council — whose representatives do not include any head of state (HS) or head of government (HG).

The US, UK, France and Russia will be represented by “ministers” (the US probably represented by the secretary of state or the UN ambassador), while China is to be represented by a deputy prime minister (DPM), ranking still below a HS or a HG.

Does the absence of high-level political leaders from the P5 downgrade the significance of this much-ballyhooed summit meeting focusing on a “better future for humanity”?

The only HS and HGs are largely from the global South, including India, Brazil, Bangladesh, Chile, Iran, Peru, Pakistan, South Africa, Qatar and Costa Rica, among others– plus the Scandinavian countries.

At a press briefing September 18, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said one of issues before the summit is a longstanding proposal for the reform of the Security Council.

“One of the very important aspects in the Summit of The Future is the recognition that our institutions need to be reformed. And one of the institutions that needs that reform is the Security Council,” he pointed out.

He said one of the questions that is important in relation to the future relates exactly to the role of the P5 and the need to have a certain redistribution of power to make things more fair and more effective.

The Summit of the Future is about the need to have effective governance of artificial intelligence; about accelerating the fight against climate chaos; about the reform of the Security Council under the international financial architecture; about all the questions related to debt, and the lack of financial resources that are undermining the development of developing countries around the world.

The Summit of the Future is also about the questions of disarmament and especially, the problems of weaponization of new kinds of technological devices, including the use of autonomous weapons.

“So, I believe that if there is something today that addresses the real challenges that we face or tries to address, it is the Summit of the Future,” Guterres declared.

So, why are the P5 leaders skipping the summit? Is it for personal or political reasons?

Mandeep Tiwana, Chief Officer, Evidence and Engagement, at CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists, told IPS whether P-5 leaders attend the Summit or not is immaterial.

Their bickering and unwillingness to act to stop the atrocities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Ukraine show they are not credible actors in securing a better future for humanity, he said.

“With P-5 states presently preoccupied with pursuing their narrowly defined national interests, meaningful progress on peace, sustainable development and human rights for future generations is likely to come from smaller less powerful states that still believe in the power of international solidarity and cooperation. The world’s problems are too complex to be managed by the P-5 or by governments alone.”

So far, he said, the Pact for the Future – a key outcome document – offers little in terms of innovation to enhance people’s and civil society participation at the UN.

“If the current situation persists it would be a missed opportunity for the international community to advance the aspiration of a people’s United Nations that is fit for purpose to address present and future challenges. Already, intersecting global crises, political rivalries between countries, and limitations of heavily state-centric approaches are causing diplomatic impasses and hampering the UN’s effectiveness,” he declared.

Brenda Mofya, Oxfam International’s UN Representative, told IPS: “We need all nations to take this Summit — and the opportunity for sweeping reform it brings — seriously.”

“The P5 hold outsize power in the Security Council and throughout the multilateral system and their level of representation at such an event does send a message. This Summit is not the end – it is the beginning. As we see inequality, conflict and the climate crisis only deepen, leaders must redouble their efforts and restore people’s faith in the UN as the home for peace, security and cooperation,” said Mofya.

Andreas Bummel, co-Founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders, told IPS the Summit of the Future was promoted as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to revamp the UN and multilateralism.

In some areas the outcome document represents a step forward but the Summit overall is not a breakthrough moment. This does not come as a surprise. The political landscape at the UN is contentious and consensus on far-reaching ideas is impossible to achieve, he argued.

Authoritarian governments, in particular, he pointed out, are not interested in strengthening the UN or transforming global governance.

“The absence of many heads of state from the Summit nonetheless is unfortunate. It certainly limits the significance of the event even further,” he said.

Purnima Mane, former President and CEO of Pathfinder International and former Deputy Executive Director (Programme) and UN Assistant-Secretary-General (ASG) at the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), told IPS the Summit of the Future is theoretically an important landmark UN event as promoted by the UN.

“But it can only be so, if all governments including the P-5 are represented at its highest or very senior levels i.e. Head of State or Head of Government.”

The provisional list of speakers suggests that this is not likely to be so for the P-5 countries. It is significant that representation at the senior most levels is largely from the South, from countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

With the themes of the Summit focusing on areas vital to the world’s future like sustainable development, international peace and security, science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance, the Summit surely carries the potential of invigorating global commitment to these key issues vital for global development today and more so, tomorrow.

While the absence of the senior-most leadership from the P5 countries at the Summit is disheartening, she said, this can also be seen as a key opportunity for other countries to share their vision and express their willingness and capacity to engage with the issues being discussed, and thereby, step up and take on a much larger leadership role on these issues.

This might result in a transformation of the leadership of the future in its truest sense – a potential result that could be seen as much needed, declared Mane.

Meanwhile, when the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly took place last September, there were also several key world leaders missing—including, most importantly, leaders of the four of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the most powerful political body at the United Nations.

Only US President Joe Biden was there –while Emmanuel Macron of France, Xi Jinping of China, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Rishi Sunak of UK skipped the UN sessions.

As an article in Le Monde pointed out: “Such notable absences reflect the crisis affecting UN bodies, against a backdrop of an international stage that is crumbling.”

A former diplomat Gérard Araud, a one-time French ambassador to the United Nations, said, “Multilateralism is seriously compromised in an increasingly multipolar world.”

“The absence of Security Council leaders is yet another symptom, but not the only one, of a powerless UN, caused by the war in Ukraine and the rivalry between the United States and China.

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People in Gaza are living in increasingly unsanitary conditions, amid the looming threat of deadly diseases. Credit: UNRWA
 
"Apartheid Israel is targeting Gaza and the West Bank simultaneously, as part of an overall process of elimination, replacement, and territorial expansion," said United Nations special rapporteur Francesca Albanese.

By Jake Johnson
NEW YORK, Sep 4 2024 (IPS)

An independent United Nations expert has warned that “Israel’s genocidal violence risks leaking out of Gaza and into the occupied Palestinian territory as a whole” as Western governments, corporations, and other institutions keep up their support for the Israeli military, which stands accused of grave war crimes in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Francesca Albanese, the U.N. special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the illegally occupied Palestinian territories, said in a statement September 2 that “there is mounting evidence that no Palestinian is safe under Israel’s unfettered control.”

“The writing is on the wall, and we cannot continue to ignore it,” said Albanese, who released a detailed report in May concluding that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” Israel is guilty of genocide in Gaza.

Albanese’s new statement came as the Israeli military’s largest assault on the West Bank in decades continued into its second week. At least 29 Palestinians have been killed during the series of military raids, according to Al Jazeera, including at least five children.

“Apartheid Israel is targeting Gaza and the West Bank simultaneously, as part of an overall process of elimination, replacement, and territorial expansion,” Albanese said.

“The longstanding impunity granted to Israel is enabling the de-Palestinization of the occupied territory, leaving Palestinians at the mercy of the forces pursuing their elimination as a national group.”

“The international community, made of both states and non-state actors, including companies and financial institutions, must do everything it can to immediately end the risk of genocide against the Palestinian people under Israel’s occupation, ensure accountability, and ultimately end Israel’s colonization of Palestinian territory,” Albanese added.

Defense for Children International–Palestine noted that “dozens of Israeli military vehicles” have “stormed” the West Bank city of Jenin over the past week as “Israeli forces deployed across the targeted refugee camps, seizing Palestinian homes to use as military bases and stationing snipers on the roofs of buildings, subjecting their residents to field investigations.”

“The military bulldozers began destroying the civil infrastructure in Jenin city and camp, which led to the destruction of the main water networks and power outage in several neighborhoods in Jenin and surrounding villages,” the group said. “Israeli forces besieged several hospitals in Jenin and impeded the movement of ambulances and paramedics.”

Israeli soldiers and settlers have killed more than 620 people in the occupied West Bank since October 7, on top of the roughly 40,800 killed by the Israeli military in Gaza.

Unlawful Israeli land seizures have also surged in the West Bank as settlers and soldiers wipe out entire Palestinian communities. The BBC reported that, according to its own analysis, there are “currently at least 196 across the West Bank, and 29 were set up last year—more than in any previous year.”

Israel’s multi-day attack on the West Bank that began last week has intensified fears that unless there’s a permanent cease-fire, the assault on Gaza could expand to the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories and throughout the Middle East.

David Hearst, co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye, wrote that “even with the obvious reluctance of Hezbollah and Iran to get involved, all the ingredients are there for. a much larger conflagration.”

“An Israel in the grip of an ultra-nationalist, religious, settler insurgency; a U.S. president who allows his signature policy to be flouted by his chief ally, even at the risk of losing a crucial election; resistance that will not surrender; Palestinians in Gaza who will not flee; Palestinians in the West Bank who are now stepping up to the front line; Jordan, the second country to recognize Israel, feeling under existential threat,” Hearst wrote on September 2

For U.S. President Joe Biden or Democratic nominee Kamala Harris, he added, “the message is so clear, it is flashing in neon lights: The regional costs of not standing up to Netanyahu could rapidly outweigh the domestic benefits of being dragged along by him.”

James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, similarly argued that “the U.S. must reverse course—and do so dramatically.”

“A long-overdue cut-off of U.S. arms to Israel and recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination would provide exactly the shock to the system that is needed,” Zogby wrote. “It would force an internal debate in Israel, empowering those who want peace. It might also serve to send a message to the Palestinian people that their plight and rights are understood.”

These actions, especially if followed up with determination and concrete steps, won’t end the conflict tomorrow,” Zogby continued, “but they would surely put the region on a more productive path towards peace than the one it is on now.”

Jake Johnson is a senior editor and staff writer for Common Dreams.

Source: Common Dreams

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Credit: UNRWA

By James E. Jennings
ATLANTA, Georgia, Sep 3 2024 (IPS)

Most people think that Israel’s main goal in Gaza is to recover the hostages seized by HAMAS on October 7, 2023 with an announced follow-up mission to eliminate HAMAS as a threat. If you thought that, you would be wrong. Substantial evidence reveals a different strategic aim—destroying every shred of Palestinian legitimacy as a nation.

Inspite of continual pleas from the weak Biden-Harris-Blinken White House to stop bombing civilians in Gaza, Israel refuses to end the carnage. What’s going on? As usual in the Middle East, the obvious plot has at least one hidden sub-plot.

Israel’s most important strategic goal throughout the more than ten months of its senseless, horrifically devastating campaign in Gaza has been, not only to kill HAMAS militants and tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, but instead to kill the widely trumpeted “Two-State Solution.”

The ongoing carnage on the West Bank aims to destroy, not just Palestinian infrastructure or hopeless young “Lions Den” resistance, but the very idea that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination, or any legitimacy at all as a state. With most of the world decrying the genocide in Gaza, the full-blown war on cities and civilians in the West Bank has escaped scrutiny.

The most obvious proof of that is the fact that Netanyahu’s extremist Likud government continues its gratuitous bombing campaign in Gaza, and continues to refuse HAMAS’ offers for releasing hostages in return for even a temporary cease-fire. Like most American intelligence experts, Israel’s own military leaders have admitted that HAMAS cannot be completely eliminated.

Sadly, the horrific loss of life in Gaza is not at this point really about Gaza. It’s a distraction from a land grab for the West Bank of the Jordan River, what the Israelis call their very own territories of “Judea and Samaria.” Netanyahu has echoed the settlers’ claim that Israel cannot be accused of being illegal military occupiers of what is “our own land.”

One of the first shibboleths from the mouth of President Biden following HAMAS’ obscene war crimes on October 7 and just before he got on Air Force One to make humiliating obeisance to the indicted war criminal Netanyahu, was to offer the meaningless words, “Two-State Solution.”

But surely the man who had for years been Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee must have known that the “Two-State Solution” was already on its last legs and unlikely to be revived. Now Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris is echoing “Genocide Joe,” not so much by offering a formula for peace as simply parroting an empty phrase.

Lesson number one in international diplomacy on the macro scale is that a regime must have legitimacy as a people group before it can achieve any kind of concrete reality as a nation. The birth of the United States is an example. The Boston Tea Party, Patrick Henry’s speech, and Paul Revere’s ride coalesced America’s popular identity.

Washington at Valley Forge and at Yorktown actually birthed the nation. Achieving legitimacy, the unquestionable right to exist as an organized political entity, is how a population or insurgent movement becomes a state.

By smashing peaceful West Bank towns with tanks and jet bombers, bulldozing their streets and tagging all Palestinians as terrorists, the native community is being robbed of its heritage as well as its current and future legitimacy. Any chance for statehood is being obliterated by Israel’s “over the top” ravages on civilian life and infrastructure in Gaza and throughout the West Bank.

Meanwhile, the political class’s pretense of being pro-peace is a sick charade. Let’s stop saying “Genocide is bad” and “Killing people is bad,” without also saying “Killing civil society is a positive evil as well,” because it kills the future of an entire people group.

James E. Jennings, PhD is President of Conscience International www.conscienceinternational.org and Executive Director of US Academics for Peace. He delivered aid to Gaza’s hospitals from 1987-2014, including during the 2009 “Cast Lead” bombing and periods of Israeli, PLO, and HAMAS control.

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Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 3 2024 (IPS)

When the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly took place last September, there were several key world leaders missing in action (MIAs)—including, most importantly, leaders of the four of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the most powerful political body at the United Nations.

Only US President Joe Biden was there –while Emmanuel Macron of France, Xi Jinping of China, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Rishi Sunak of UK skipped the UN sessions- either for personal or political reasons.

As an article in Le Monde pointed out: “Such notable absences reflect the crisis affecting UN bodies, against a backdrop of an international stage that is crumbling.”

A former diplomat Gérard Araud, a one-time French ambassador to the United Nations, said, “Multilateralism is seriously compromised in an increasingly multipolar world.”

“The absence of Security Council leaders is yet another symptom, but not the only one, of a powerless UN, caused by the war in Ukraine and the rivalry between the United States and China.”

Will history repeat itself this year when the high-level segment of the 79th session of the General Assembly begins mid-September?

With the UN remaining powerless in the context of a continuing Russian carnage in Ukraine and with over 40,000 mostly civilian killings in Gaza, is the world beginning to lose confidence in the United Nations as the world’s pre-eminent peace maker?

Asked for his comments, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters last month: “We very much hope that every Member State will be represented at the highest possible level, especially given not only what’s going on in the world today, but the fact that we have the Summit of the Future, (scheduled for September 22-23) which is critical to how this organization will function in the decades ahead.”

And these are issues that often come up in the Secretary-General’s bilateral meetings, he pointed out.

Andreas Bummel, co-founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders, told IPS the highest level of participation from Member States at the general debate of the United Nations each September sends a signal that the UN is valued as the world’s most important multilateral venue.

A presence this year at the Summit of the Future is crucial. “We hope that the summit will be an opportunity for world leaders to listen to ideas and proposals of civil society which has strongly engaged with the summit process.”

Among world leaders, he pointed out, are aggressors, autocrats, dictators and mass murderers. They are neither interested in strengthening the UN and even less in what civil society has to say. If they come, they should be confronted with their crimes, said Bummel.

Meanwhile, although Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) made it to the UN, some of the world’s authoritarian leaders, including Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad, and North Korea’s Kim il Sung and his grandson Kim Jong-un, never made it to the UN.

Dr Palitha Kohona, former Chief of the UN Treaty Section and one-time Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the Unted Nations told IPS: It is indeed a matter of serious concern that certain world leaders choose not to attend the Un General Assembly (UNGA).

It is understood that other matters may demand their attention at the same time, especially critical domestic issues. Some are facing elections or seeking to get reelected, he said.

“But at a time when the world, humanity itself– is confronted by a myriad of urgent challenges, many of them man-made or resulting from human actions, like the existential threat of climate change, the flood of over 160 million refugees, the indiscriminate slaughter that is happening in Gaza, the shaky progress with the SDGs, the worrying signs of an intensifying arms race, etc– the moral impact of the presence of world leaders, in particular the leaders of key powers, at the UNGA cannot be under estimated”.

The UNGA, he pointed out, is the only global forum that we have. Instead of contributing to the wishes of those who seek to denigrate this single world body that we have, and dilute its importance, which has many successes to justify its existence, we should exert ourselves to strengthen it.

This is certainly not the time to dismiss the value of the UN, declared Dr Kohona, who until recently was Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to China.

When global leaders meet at the UN, they will confront yet another year of complex crises and conflicts — as a deeply divided world watches, according to the UN Foundation.

“The UN is the only place on Earth where countries — whether big or small — have a say. The debates and conversations that will unfold during UNGA 79 will shape the solutions that can redefine our future”.

Navigating the 2024 United Nations General Assembly | unfoundation.org

Progress hinges on leaders taking accountability and correcting course. But it also depends on people — especially young people — having a say in the decisions that will affect our future.

And the future depends on everyone’s participation — decision-makers and everyday citizens alike. It’s up to all of us to act now for people, for planet, and for our common future.

But one lingering question remains: how effective is the UN, where the 15-member Security Council, remains deadlocked reminiscent of the Cold War era?

When he addressed the UN Security Council via video-conferencing on April 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine did not pull his punches when he told delegates the purposes of the UN Charter, especially Article I — to maintain international peace and security — are being blatantly violated by Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

“What is the point of all other Articles (in the UN charter)? Are you ready to close the United Nations? Do you think that the time for international law is gone?” If not, “you need to act immediately,” he told delegates.

To support peace in Ukraine, he argued, the Security Council must either remove the Russian Federation from the UN, both as an aggressor and a source of war, so it cannot block decisions made about its own war, or the Council can “dissolve yourselves altogether” if there is nothing it can do other than engage in conversation.

“Ukraine needs peace. Europe needs peace. The world needs peace,” he insisted.

Meanwhile, when the United Nations decided to locate its 39-storeyed Secretariat in New York city, the United States, as host nation, signed a “headquarters agreement” in 1947 not only ensuring diplomatic immunity to foreign diplomats but also pledging to facilitate the day-to-day activities of member states without any hindrance, including the issuance of US visas to enter the country.

But there were several instances of open violation of this agreement by successive US administrations.

The United States, which is legally obliged to respect international diplomatic norms as host country to the United Nations, has been accused of imposing unfair travel restrictions on U.N. diplomats in the country. Back in August 2000, the Russian Federation, Iraq and Cuba protested the “discriminatory” treatment, which they say targets countries that displease the U.S.

Pleading national security concerns, Washington has long placed tight restrictions on diplomats from several “unfriendly” nations, including those deemed “terrorist states,” particularly Cuba, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria and Libya. U.N. diplomats from these countries have to obtain permission from the U.S. State Department to travel outside a 25-mile radius from New York City.

When former Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, accused of war crimes, was refused a US visa to attend the high-level segment of the General Assembly sessions in September 2013, Hassan Ali, a senior Sudanese diplomat, registered a strong protest with the UN’s Legal Committee.

“The democratically-elected president of Sudan had been deprived of the opportunity to participate in the General Assembly because the host country, the United States, had denied him a visa, in violation of the U.N.-U.S. Headquarters Agreement. It was a great and deliberate violation of the Headquarters Agreement,” he said.

The refusal of a visa for the Sudanese president was also a political landmine because al-Bashir had been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

But one question remained unanswered: Does the United States have a right to implicitly act on an ICC ruling when Washington is not a party to the Rome Statute that created the ICC?

When Yasser Arafat was denied a US visa to visit New York to address the United Nations back in 1988, the General Assembly defied the United States by temporarily moving the UN’s highest policy making body to Geneva– perhaps for the first time in UN history– providing a less-hostile political environment for the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Arafat, who first addressed the UN in 1974, took a swipe at Washington when he prefaced his statement by saying “it never occurred to me that my second meeting with this honorable Assembly, since 1974, would take place in the hospitable city of Geneva”.

On his 1974 visit, he avoided the hundreds of pro and anti-Arafat demonstrators outside the UN building by arriving in a helicopter which landed on the North Lawn of the UN campus adjoining the East River.

When he addressed the General Assembly, there were confusing reports whether or not Arafat carried a gun in his holster—“in a house of peace” — which was apparently not visible to delegates.

One news story said Arafat was seen “wearing his gun belt and holster and reluctantly removing his pistol before mounting the rostrum.” “Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand,” he told the Assembly. But there were some delegates who denied Arafat carried a weapon.

Setting the record straight, Samir Sanbar, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General and head of the Department of Public Information told IPS it was discreetly agreed that Arafat would keep the holster while the gun was to be handed over to Abdelaziz Bouteflika, later Foreign Minister and President of Algeria (1999-2019).

The speech, drafted in Arabic by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, stressed the spelling in formal Arabic of the “green branch” which the PLO Chairman still misspelled.

Incidentally, when anti-Arafat New York protesters on First Avenue shouted: “Arafat Go Home”, his supporters responded that was precisely what he wanted—a home for the Palestinians to go to.

But that dream has still not been realized—as thousands of Palestinians continue to be killed since last October by Israel, using largely American-supplied weapons.

This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment –and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at the UN Bureau of Inter Press Service (IPS) news agency, and available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/

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US financial support of various UN organizations is critical not only for the fulfillment of their humanitarian causes but also to serve America’s best national interests. Such support bolsters its global leadership role and influence, enabling it to walk on high moral ground. Credit: United Nations, New York

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Sep 2 2024 (IPS)

During Donald Trump’s presidency, the United States withdrew from several international organizations. These include the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

Trump’s actions were partly motivated by a broader strategy, presumably prioritizing “America First” policies. Trump often cited perceived prejudices or inefficiencies within these organizations.

If Trump were to be reelected, he should be persuaded not to take similar actions as that would diminish rather than serve America’s leadership role and its influence on these organizations and prevent it from leading by example and walking the high moral ground.

Although Trump, if reelected, will more than likely withdraw from many of these organizations, when and how he will act would depend on several factors.

Strategic Interests

Trump’s foreign policy has often been transactional. He was guided by what he thought best served America’s interests. If staying in these organizations is inconsistent with his perceived strategic interests, however misguided that might be, he will undoubtedly consider withdrawing again from these and other UN organizations.

Political Climate

The domestic and international political climate could influence his decisions. For example, if Trump enjoyed solid domestic support for disengaging from international organizations or if geopolitical tensions required a reevaluation of alliances, he might pursue similar actions.

Policy Continuity

Trump’s previous withdrawals were propelled by his critiques of many of these organizations, such as suspected mismanagement, prejudice against specific states, or inadequacies in dealing with global issues. Similar actions could be expected if his views on these “concerns” remain unchanged.

That said, given what Trump has been saying and advocating as he campaigns for reelection, he remains committed to his misguided notion of “America First” when, in fact, America’s best interest is served by staying in rather than withdrawing from these international organizations.

Nevertheless, should he still take similar action, it could create significant financial gaps at these organizations, given the US’s role as the largest contributor to the UN.

In 2022, the US contributed over $18 billion, accounting for about one-third of the UN’s overall funding. This substantial financial support is crucial for various UN operations, including peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and health initiatives.

In the event of a US withdrawal, the UN should be prepared to take several measures to mitigate the adverse impact on these organizations.

Bolstering Alliances

The UN Secretary-General should seek to build stronger coalitions with other countries to step up to fill the financial void and assist in mitigating the impact of a US withdrawal, including nurturing relationships with emerging economies and regional powers. These powers include:

• China: As the second-largest contributor to the UN, China has already increased its financial commitments in recent years. In 2022, China contributed approximately 16 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget and 15 percent to the UN’s regular budget, making it a significant player.

• Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom: These countries are among the top contributors to the UN budget, with Japan contributing about 8 percent, Germany contributing around 6 percent, and the United Kingdom contributing around 4 percent. While these nations might struggle to fill the gap left by the US entirely, they could increase their contributions to mitigate the adverse impact.

• The EU: Given its commitment to multilateralism and global cooperation, the EU could collectively increase its contributions to the UN, which would offer the block an opportunity to assert its leadership on the world stage.

• Emerging Powers like India and Brazil, which are growing economically, might also be encouraged to increase their contributions. This could allow these nations to gain more influence in international affairs.

While these countries and groups might increase their contributions, it is important to note that the financial gap left by the US would be challenging to fill completely. The UN will have to prioritize its programs and seek efficiencies to cope with reduced funding. Additionally, the loss of US support could lead to strategic shifts within the UN, affecting its operations and influence.

Broadening of Funding Resources

Organizations such as UNRWA should diversify their funding sources to reduce their dependence on any single country, especially the US, which is the largest contributor. This could involve increasing contributions from other member UN states, private donors, and charitable organizations specifically concerned about the plight of the Palestinians.

Such countries may include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and other oil-rich Arab states.

Involving US policymakers

The UN should engage privately with many US policymakers to address its concerns and demonstrate the benefits of membership in these organizations, which could avert future withdrawals by the new Trump administration. This could entail stressing the importance and the strategic advantages of multilateral collaboration in addressing international challenges.

Reform Initiatives

Addressing criticisms that led to previous withdrawals, such as perceived biases or inefficiencies, could help prevent future disengagements. Moreover, transparent reforms and accountability measures might reassure skeptical member states of the organizations’ importance and effectiveness.

US financial support of many UN organizations must remain unabated. Those who can exert any influence on Trump should point out to him, should he be reelected, how critical US support is for the functioning of these organizations, as well as for the US’s self-interest, which is consistent with Trump’s notion of “America First.”

Given, however, what we know about Trump, the likelihood is that he will not change his ways and may well pursue the same shortsighted policies.

Thus, by preparing and adopting the above strategic measures, the UN and its agencies will be in a much stronger position to survive potential shifts in the US treatment of these organizations and its foreign policy in general under Trump and proceed with their important missions efficiently.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

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