Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey students stage a protest in support of Russia and the coup plotters. Credit: Abdoulaye Hali Aboubacar

By Promise Eze
SOKOTO, NIGERIA, Aug 7 2023 (IPS)

On July 26 2023 a man named Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, flanked by soldiers with military fatigues, appeared on Niger’s national television to announce the execution of a coup. It was the country’s fourth coup since it gained independence from France in 1960.

“The defence and security forces have decided to put an end to the regime you are familiar with. This follows the continuous deterioration of the security situation, the bad social and economic management,” he said.

The country’s president Mohamed Bazoum, who came to power in 2021 through Niger’s first democratic elections, was removed, and his government, including the constitution, was suspended.

Before the announcement of the coup, President Bazoum had been held captive in the presidential palace. This was unexpected, as earlier in the year, Bazoum had dismissed the possibility of a military coup during an interview. However, he was ultimately overthrown by the very people who were supposed to protect him—the Presidential Guard.

Two days later, the Presidential Guard commander General Abdourahamane Tchiani was proclaimed as the new leader of the country following the army’s support of the sudden military takeover.

The recent military takeover in Niger has reverberated through the international community, shocking those who regarded the country as a bulwark against the encroachment of democratic backsliding in the region.

Niger faced widespread international condemnation following the military coup. The European Union, the United States, France, and the West African regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), were among those who unequivocally condemned the coup. France issued a stern warning, threatening to respond firmly to any violence directed at its diplomatic mission in Niger or its citizens and interests.

While this may not be the first coup in Niger, and it certainly isn’t the first in the Sahel or West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed a series of coups where military officers have seized power from elected government officials, driven by their frustration with the increasing incidents of terrorism, corruption, and political instability in West Africa.

In January 2022, Burkina Faso witnessed two coups, which were triggered by the deteriorating security situation and the President’s perceived inability to effectively address challenges, notably the Islamist insurgency.

Similarly, Mali experienced coups in both 2020 and 2021, indicating the volatility of its political landscape. In 2021, President Alpha Condé of Guinea was overthrown in a coup d’état by the country’s armed forces following gunfire in the capital, Conakry.

These three nations share notable similarities: they are located in West Africa, have unstable political systems, face regular jihadist threats, and were once under French colonial rule.

Analysts argue that these coups represent direct threats to democracy in West Africa, undermining the principles of democratic governance in the region.

“The coup represents a significant setback for the small but crucial developmental strides made by West Africa and the entire African continent towards more people-oriented governance, even if not perfect. It’s disheartening to see these gains being nullified. This unsettling development raises concerns about the potential for more coups across Africa in the years to come, which is a distressing prospect. Moreover, it is likely to exacerbate insecurity, particularly terrorism, as violent non-state actors may seize the opportunity to emerge,” says Timothy Avele, a security expert, and Managing Director of Agent-X Security, based in Lagos, Nigeria.

Ibrahim Baba Shatambaya, a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, holds the view that the army’s actions in Niger were motivated by a desire to break free from France’s long-standing control and exploitation of its former colonial territories.

“The coup stands as evidence that democracy is facing challenges in Africa, and it reflects the inability of ECOWAS to ensure that leaders in the West African sub-region meet the expectations of their people,” he adds.

For the Love of Uranium

In French West Africa, there has been a significant rise in anti-French sentiments, which is considered a key factor driving the military coups in the region.

Many people hold France responsible for contributing to the region’s instability through military interventions.

Despite maintaining military bases and promising to combat Jihadism, violence and attacks persist, leading to suspicions that France might have a hand in terrorist activities.

Critics also argue that France has taken advantage of the region’s resources while failing to break colonial ties. For instance, Niger, the world’s fifth-largest uranium producer, supplies nearly a quarter of the European Union’s uranium, used for electricity production. However, despite its resource wealth, Niger remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with a poorly diversified economy heavily reliant on agriculture. More than 41% of the population lives in extreme poverty, according to the World Bank’s data from 2021.

Furthermore, Orano (formerly Areva), a French state-controlled nuclear fuel producer, faces accusations of leaving behind large amounts of radioactive waste in Niger, posing health risks to local communities. There are also concerns about insufficient protection for workers against radiation. Orano has also been embroiled in bribery allegations in Southern Africa.

The French-backed CFA currency, used by 14 nations in West and Central Africa, including Niger, has faced criticism for enabling France to maintain control over the economies of its former colonies. This currency system requires member countries to deposit 50% of their currency reserves with the Banque de France and is pegged to the euro.

French President Emmanuel Macron has made efforts to distance himself from France’s colonial past in Africa and advocate for a new approach based on partnership. However, deep-rooted suspicions and grievances persist.

Long Live Russia, Goodbye France 

About ten years ago, Mali sought military assistance from France when Islamic militants threatened the capital, Bamako. France’s arrival was initially hailed as heroic, but its presence in the West African nation did not yield long-term improvements. Instead, terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara carried out devastating attacks. Mali even blamed the French for arming terrorists.

Diplomatic relations between Paris and Bamako began to deteriorate following a coup in May 2021 and resistance against democratic elections in January 2022. Consequently, Mali expelled the French and embraced the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organisation, which has gained influence in Africa.

The Wagner Group has gained notoriety for its involvement in the internal affairs of multiple African nations, offering military and security assistance to advance Moscow’s influence across the continent. Disturbingly, it has faced accusations of perpetrating massacres and acts of rape. However, despite these alleged atrocities, many discontented young Africans harbour a sense of indifference towards Wagner’s actions, as their grievances with France and the West take precedence in their perspective.

Burkina Faso also expelled the French, with thousands of people rallying in the capital, Ouagadougou, in support of a military takeover that ousted President Roch Kabore. Russian flags were displayed in the streets, and some demonstrators urged Moscow to replace France in the fight against jihadists.

Even in Niger, celebrations backing the coup plotters have swept across the country, gaining momentum despite calls for a return to democracy. There are also reports of the Niger junta meeting with the Wagner Group in Mali to seek military support.

“Nigeriens harbour deep grievances against France for various reasons, primarily due to the exploitation of our resources, which disproportionately benefits France. An evident illustration of this disparity is the supply of French electricity sourced from our uranium, while we remain 80% dependent on another country (Nigeria) for our energy needs.

“Another major concern is the issue of terrorism. Despite the presence of over a thousand French soldiers in the country with the stated objective of combating terrorists, they seem unable to effectively confront the threat. Instead, our population and soldiers bear the brunt of the attacks, leaving us vulnerable and disheartened.

“As an alternative, many Nigeriens view Russia as a potential saviour in the face of their escalating tensions with France and the rest of the world. Russia’s involvement in the terrorist conflict in Mali, particularly through the actions of the Wagner Group, has further fueled this perception,’’ Abdoulaye Hali Aboubacar, a student at the Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey, tells IPS.

ECOWAS Versus Niger

The growing presence of the Wagner group is clear evidence that ECOWAS has failed to do its homework. However, the new government of ECOWAS is poised to make a difference.

After taking over as the Chairman of ECOWAS on July 9, President Bola Tinubu made a firm statement, stating that the region would not accept any more successful coups, as it had experienced five of them since 2020.

A mere 15 days after Tinubu’s resolute speech, the government in Niger was overthrown by officers.

In response to the crisis, Tinubu took immediate action and presided over an emergency ECOWAS summit in Abuja. Several sanctions were implemented, and notably, for the first time in the bloc’s history, it demanded that the putschists restore constitutional order under the risk of facing the potential use of force.

However, there are apprehensions regarding ECOWAS, which has faced criticism for its limited ability to address coup regimes and its alleged neglect of crucial underlying issues like corruption and poverty. Some argue that ECOWAS’s response to the coup might be influenced by how the news of it was received in the Western world.

“It is advisable for Nigeria-led ECOWAS to introspect before escalating the already precarious situation in Niger. The current trajectory could turn Niger into a battleground for foreign powers to settle scores, leading to a dangerous quagmire if not handled carefully by the authorities, especially Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu and his advisers,” Avele cautions.

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Zambian cotton grower sitting on his bales. Some African governments and local cotton producers have high hopes that GM technology will boost African competitiveness in the dog-eat-dog world that characterises the global cotton market. Credit: Nebert Mulenga/IPS

By Haidee Swanby
MELVILLE, South Africa, Jun 15 2015 (IPS)

Genetically modified (GM) cotton has been produced globally for almost two decades, yet to date only three African countries have grown GM cotton on a commercial basis – South Africa, Burkina Faso and Sudan.

African governments have been sceptical of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for decades and have played a key role historically in ensuring that international law – the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – takes a precautionary stance towards genetic engineering in food and agriculture.

They have also imposed various restrictions and bans on the cultivation and importation of GMOs, including on genetically modified (GM) food aid.

But now resistance to GM cultivation is crumbling as a number of other African countries such as Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland and Cameroon appear to be on the verge of allowing their first cultivation of GM cotton, with Nigeria and Ethiopia planning to follow suit in the next two to three years.“Scrutiny of actual experiences [with GM cotton] reveals a tragic tale of crippling debt, appalling market prices and a technology prone to failure in the absence of very specific and onerous management techniques, which are not suited to smallholder production”

Some African governments and local cotton producers have high hopes that GM technology will boost African competitiveness in the dog-eat-dog world that characterises the global cotton market.

At the moment African cotton productivity is declining – it now stands at only half the world average – while global productivity is increasing. The promise of improving productivity and reducing pesticide use through the adoption of GM cotton is thus compelling.

However, African leaders and cotton producers need to take a close look at how GM cotton has fared in South Africa and Burkina Faso to date, particularly its socioeconomic impact on smallholder farmers.

Scrutiny of actual experiences reveals a tragic tale of crippling debt, appalling market prices and a technology prone to failure in the absence of very specific and onerous management techniques, which are not suited to smallholder production.

As stated by a farmer during a Malian public consultation on GMOs, “What’s the point of encouraging us to increase yields with GMOs when we can’t get a decent price for what we already produce?”

In Burkina Faso, the tide turned against GM cotton after just five seasons as low yields and low quality fibres persisted. In South Africa, GM cotton brought devastating debts to smallholders and the local credit institution went bust. Last season, smallholders contributed to less than three percent of South Africa’s total production.

In Malawi, Monsanto has already applied to the government for a permit to commercialise Bollgard II, its GM pest resistant cotton, to which there has been a strong reaction from civil society and an alliance of organisations has submitted substantive objections.

Even Malawi’s cotton industry, the Cotton Development Trust (CDT), has publically voiced its concerns over a number of issues, including inadequate field trials, the high cost of GM seed and related inputs, and blurred intellectual property arrangements.

In addition, CDT has expressed unease over the potential development of pest resistance and the inevitable applications of herbicide chemicals.

Regional economic communities (RECs), such as the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), are also key players in readying their member states for the commercialisation of and trade in GM cotton, through harmonised biosafety policies. Together COMESA and ECOWAS incorporate 34 countries in Africa.

The COMESA Policy on Biotechnology and Biosafety was adopted in February 2014 and member states validated the implementation plan in March 2015.

The ECOWAS Biosafety Policy has been through an arduous process for more than a decade now and pronounced conflicts between trade imperatives and safety checks have stalled agreement between stakeholders. However, recent reports indicate that agreement between member states and donor parties has been reached and a final draft of the Biosafety Policy will soon be published.

Experiments and open field trials with GM cotton have been running for many years in a number of African countries and are increasingly at a stage where applications for commercial release are imminent.

However, there are many obstacles to the birth of a new GM era in Africa, chief among them the fact that this high-end technology is simply not appropriate to resource-poor farmers operating on tiny pieces of land, together with fierce opposition from civil society and sometimes also from governments.

Attempts by the biotech industry to impose policies that pander to investors’ desires at the expense of environmental and human safety may be easier to realise at the regional level, through the trade-friendly RECs. This is where many biotech industry resources and efforts are currently being channelled.

Despite whatever legal environments may be implemented to enable the introduction of GM cotton regionally or nationally, the fact remains that Africa’s cotton farmers are operating in a difficult global sector – prices are erratic and distorted by unfair subsidies in the North, institutional support for their activities is often lacking, and high input costs are already annihilating profit margins.

Fighting for the introduction of more expensive technologies that have already proven themselves technologically unsound in a smallholder environment is deeply irresponsible and short-sighted.

It is time that African governments turn their resources to improving the local environments in which cotton producers operate, including institutional and infrastructural support that can bring long-term sustainability to the sector, without placing further burdens and vulnerability on some of the most marginalised people in the world.

Civil society actions will continue to vehemently oppose and challenge the false solutions promised by GM cotton and will insist on just trading environments and true and sustainable upliftment for African cotton producers.

Edited by Phil Harris   

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS – Inter Press Service. 

* This opinion piece is based on the author’s more extensive paper titled Cottoning on to the Lie, published by the African Centre for Biodiversity, June 2015

Excerpt:

General Muhammadu Buhari holding a broom at a campaign rally. Photo credit: By Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Flickr: Wahlkampf in Nigeria 2015)/CC BY-SA 2.0

By Lisa Vives
NEW YORK/ABUJA, Apr 2 2015 (IPS)

After several tension-filled months, a majority of Nigerians swept in an opposition leader and former military man, Muhammadu Buhari, to succeed incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, whose failure to contain a terrorist wave in the northern states doomed his re-election chances.

Buhari had previously ruled Nigeria from January 1984 until August 1985 – a period in which there were widespread accusations of human rights abuses – after taking charge following a military coup in December 1983.

The Mar. 28 elections were observed by teams from the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. Carl LeVan, an assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University in Washington, DC, took part in the National Democratic Institute’s election observation mission from the United States.“[President Muhammadu] Buhari has an unprecedented opportunity to recast the Muslim face of Africa at a time when violent terrorist movements have both perverted Islam and distorted Western foreign policies meant to be more multifaceted” – Carl LeVan, member of a U.S. observation mission for the Mar. 28 presidential election in Nigeria

Speaking with IPS, LeVan, author of Dictators and Democracy in African Development (2015), remarked on the surprise success of Buhari’s All Progressives Congress (APC) party that was only formed in February 2013.

“The defeat of Africa’s largest political party, the People’s Democratic Party, will bring the All Progressives Congress (APC) into power after barely two years of organising, mobilising and coalition building. (Muhammadu) Buhari will enter office with a strong mandate from the voters, having won four out of the country’s six geopolitical zones, and the APC will enjoy a comfortable majority in the Senate.

“Though a northern Muslim from Katsina, his support included the predominantly Yoruba southwest, where President Goodluck Jonathan recent delivered bags of cash to traditional rulers according to news reports and where the militant Odudwa Peoples’ Congress launched a wave of thuggery in recent weeks.”

The election upset was especially poignant for Nigerians of the northern states, the area most devastated by Boko Haram terror attacks. While some of the vote counting was impeccable, not all of the voting went smoothly. Observers told of protestors objecting to perceived rigging, harassment, ballot boxes snatched and over-voting.

“Even before the results were announced,” said LeVan, “voters in the north reacted with jubilation, and militant groups, including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, began surreptitiously re-arming in the creeks of the south. Sources I met with over the weekend in Rivers State say they have seen caches of weapons in camps backed by militants such Ateke Tom and others.

“In addition to such seemingly minor procedural problems, the public was locked out of some collation (vote counting) centres. We also received credible reports of serious harassment. A soldier was killed in some of the violence in Port Harcourt, and a large protest took the state electoral commission by storm on Sunday.”

The opposition victory has been achieved but some are already wondering what the new leader, not known for his adherence to human rights, will prioritise.

According to LeVan, “Buhari has a mandate, and his most urgent challenge is to neither misinterpret nor abuse it.

“According to an Afrobarometer poll released on Mar. 23, 40 percent of Nigerians say the president ‘should be allowed to govern freely without wasting time to justify expenses’, and 25 percent say the president should ‘pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks’. Sixty-eight percent are not very or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is working.”

Recalling a recent national election won by a former dictator, LeVan said that “the last time Nigeria elected a former dictator, Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, he spent his first term battling the National Assembly and quelling violence in the region that largely voted against him. But he also began building institutions and establishing trust with his sceptics.

“The last time Nigerians had Buhari at the helm, the jubilation quickly gave way to frustration, repression, and economic failure.

“Buhari’s ‘honeymoon’ will therefore be critical, and probably even shorter lived than his memories of 1984. He will need to do more than make grand rhetorical gestures to democracy; he’ll need to practice it and educate his own supporters about the advantages of the justice and fairness it offers, even where the cost may be the kind of efficiency the Afrobarometer respondents appear to be longing for.”

LeVan also urged the new president to “go south” in view of the fact that Nigeria has often been a divided country with loyalties to different regional centres and different religious and ethnic affiliations, because this would send a “valuable message to northerners that he is everyone’s president.”

By “going south”, he said, the newly-elected president “could also include a clear transition plan or policy for the status of the ongoing amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants, who need reassurance that they do not need an Ijaw president [like President Goodluck Jonathan] in order to have “resource control” taken seriously, or to have environmental clean-up and developmental needs addressed.

“The sooner and more clearly they hear this message, the less likely will be the re-ignition of the Delta rebellions … This is also important because in a country partly divided along religious lines between north and south, Afrobarometer reports that trust in religious leaders at 29 percent is higher than in the National Assembly, governors, local governments, or even traditional rulers (16 percent).

“Christian Igbos in the east (who overwhelmingly rejected the APC) and minorities in the south need to know they can trust Buhari, and he needs their cooperation to govern peacefully and practically.”

LeVan also suggested that Buhari should “reset” national security strategy, perhaps by ”replacing key members of the national security establishment.

“While some continuity may help preserve institutionalised knowledge, particularly with regard to the recent ‘surge’ against Boko Haram, the mishandling of the Chibok girls’ kidnapping reduced confidence in the national security team, and the pressure applied to the electoral commission prior to the election delay has contributed to the perception that some soldiers and many advisers are partisan.”

Boko Haram has been displaced but not defeated, LeVan warned, and this means creating a “credible counter-insurgency strategy”.

Among others, such a strategy would include “sustained high-level interactions with the multinational coalition partners, and a repairing of bridges to the United States, United Kingdom and other allies with a stake in Nigeria’s peaceful prosperity.”

In this context, said LeVan, a visit to the United States and the United Kingdom would be beneficial to reconnect with a disenchanted diaspora. “This will be important in the United States, where leadership in Congress has interpreted Boko Haram as a war against Christians, rather than a complex insurgency with many different victims and deep historical and socio-economic roots.

“Buhari has an unprecedented opportunity to recast the Muslim face of Africa at a time when violent terrorist movements have both perverted Islam and distorted Western foreign policies meant to be more multifaceted.”

LeVan also advised Buhari to pick a “credible, competent and diverse economic team”, noting that “in early 2014, the government of Nigeria (along with the World Bank and others) highlighted trends in economic diversification. The near crisis triggered by the decline in oil prices since then suggests either these claims were overstated or much more work needs to be done.

Buhari could reform the refinery and oil importation mechanisms, commit to publishing all of the federal governments revenue transfers to subnational units each month (like it used to), and pick a combination of experts from academia, the private sector and the bureaucracy to get the economy back on track.”

“A few obvious steps,” concluded LeVan, “would go a long way: reaffirm the independence of the Central Bank (whose governor was replaced last year), stabilise the currency, and consult the National Assembly about budget plans and fiscal crises … The rest is up to the Nigerian people, who spoke on Mar. 28. Voting was just the beginning.”

Edited by Phil Harris    

Any views expressed by persons cited in this article do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS – Inter Press Service. 

“Insisting on an ethnic balance in the armed forces of Guinea Bissau is not at all realistic,” says José Manuel Ramos-Horta. Credit: Katalin Muharay/IPS

By Mario Queiroz
LISBON, Oct 2 2013 (IPS)

Guinea Bissau is “close to becoming a failed state,” but not due to ethnic or religious violence, which has never existed in that small West African nation, argues Nobel Peace laureate and United Nations envoy José Manuel Ramos-Horta.

“The Guinea Bissau political leadership has never managed to have good relations with the military and vice versa, and it could be said that today the country is dangerously close to becoming a failed state,” Ramos-Horta, a former president, prime minister and foreign minister of East Timor, said in this interview with IPS during a recent visit to Lisbon.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named Ramos-Horta as his representative to mediate in Guinea Bissau – which experienced its latest coup in April 2012 – taking into account the East Timor leader’s personal and political credentials in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).

But the initial timetable outlined for the country’s return to the path of democracy, which included elections slated for Nov. 24, will not be met due to political and organisational problems, the foreign ministers of seven of the eight CPLP countries acknowledged on Sept. 25.

The seven countries were Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe (Guinea Bissau is the eighth member of the CPLP).

The CPLP has cut off dialogue with the regime in Guinea Bissau.

Q: Is there a real possibility of peace in that country?

A: I’m realistic and optimistic. To the contrary of what has happened in other parts of the world, including Europe, there has never been ethnic or religious violence in Guinea Bissau.

Churches or mosques have never been set on fire or destroyed and cemeteries have never been desecrated, as has occurred even in the European Union. To guarantee peace and establish democracy, what is urgently needed is for politicians and the military not to push the people too much.

Q: It would seem like the latest coup was the straw that broke the patience of the international community.

A: It’s true. There was not the slightest indication of why that last coup happened, except for the responsibility of these two elites, the political and political-military, for the sequence of violence initiated by João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira in 1980, when he overthrew President Luís Cabral, annulling six years of success in Guinea Bissau after its independence from Portugal.

Some 20 or 30 years ago, coups were routine in Africa. Today, the African Union takes even more radical stances on the defence of democracy than the EU. However, it is necessary to engage in dialogue, pragmatically, with those who have the weapons.

If there is no dialogue, what good is democracy?

It was precisely to have channels of understanding and negotiation that the U.N. secretary-general named me as his representative, and results have already been seen.

Q: Shortly after the coup, the AU, CPLP, EU, United States and United Nations indicated that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reacted too mildly to the military’s seizure of power. After nine months in your mission, how do you see things?

A: The positions taken by those institutions and countries were totally correct. And it is also necessary to stress that ECOWAS intervened pragmatically to keep the situation from being further aggravated, and prevented the dissolution of parliament and the elimination of the constitution.

They have invested a great deal of money, but this situation is unsustainable. The important thing at this stage is to hold elections as early as possible, within five or six months I hope, to re-establish the democratic order and to put in place a strategy to help the country recover.

Q: Who is engaged in the dialogue today with the Guinea Bissau regime?

A: There has been no recognition from important governments or organisations, but there is a day-to-day relationship with the United States and Great Britain, which are in dialogue with the regime. Spain kept its ambassador there and France has always been active through its business attaché.

The EU imposed some sanctions, but it maintained its social and humanitarian programmes. Portuguese aid is channeled through non-governmental organisations and churches. Portugal’s position is due to something very simple: its long-standing relationship with the people of Guinea Bissau, who are and will still be there, independently of the regime that is in power.

Q: Besides the enormous fragility of the state, what are Guinea Bissau’s biggest problems?

A: Extreme poverty, with very poor social indicators, persistent political instability, the weaknesses and fissures in the army, the military’s frequent intervention in politics, and in the last few years, the penetration of Latin American drug cartels, in Guinea Bissau as well as many other states in the region, which exacerbates the difficulties in those countries because of the creation of new areas of crime and new tensions and dangers.

Q: With regard to this last problem, it has been said that Guinea Bissau is becoming a “narco-state”.

A: That is nonsense expressed by some academics who write reports that don’t have a strong foundation in reality, which have been repeated by the media without the slightest regard for intellectual rigour.

An academic makes an analysis, a news agency from a big country in the North picks it up, and after that all of the newspapers go to the same source, which may or may not be objective and impartial, since no one has carried out an exhaustive investigation.

Guinea Bissau is just a small country, victim of the drug cartels of Latin America and the mafias of the EU and Russia. They are the ones who are really responsible.

As a representative of the U.N. secretary-general, I cannot give the names of cities that are real centres of drug money laundering, where what you see is great opulence, with mansions, fancy buildings and luxury cars, while in Bissau all you see in the streets are goats and cows.

Q: Another frequently mentioned problem are the supposed “ethnic quotas” within the armed forces, where the Balanta people [the largest ethnic group, making up over one-quarter of the population] are clearly predominant in the leadership.

A: When false problems are raised, big difficulties are created. Guinea Bissau is multiethnic and multicultural, and has several religions. That is a wealth, not a disadvantage.

The Balanta were historically dedicated to agriculture and livestock-raising. But they are also a people with a strong warrior tradition…which forms part of their history.

There are other groups that prefer trade over weapons, and others that prefer to be government officials.

However, Western experts, unfamiliar with the situation there, often say ethnic balance in the armed forces is necessary. This is not at all realistic, because you can’t insist that a merchant become a soldier.

Excerpt:

Malian troops stand guard outside Kati Barracks in Bamako, the headquarters of coup leader Amadou Sanogo. Credit: Magharebia/CC by 2.0

By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON, Nov 2 2012 (IPS)

Despite growing western concerns about the continuing reign in northern Mali by an Al Qaeda-linked group, analysts here say it will take months before conditions could be ripe to oust it from the region, by military force if necessary.

The United States and the European Union (EU), which have held a series of meetings about the situation, are hoping that the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will soon come up with a viable plan to reclaim the area, which has been in the hands of the group Ansar al-Din since last spring.

They are also trying to enlist the support of a somewhat ambivalent Algeria, which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited earlier this week. Given its 1,400-kilometre border with northern Mali, as well as its formidable counter-terrorist and military capabilities, Algeria’s cooperation with any western-backed ECOWAS force is seen as indispensable to any campaign to remove Ansar al-Din.

ECOWAS has so far proposed a force of only 3,300 troops, recruited from member nations, as the military component of a larger strategy to wrest control of territory that is roughly the size of France. Meeting in mid-October, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council dismissed ECOWAS’s proposal as unrealistic and called for the group to come up a viable intervention plan by the end of this month.

“We have to wait and see if ECOWAS is serious,” J. Peter Pham of the Atlantic Council here in Washington told IPS. “3,300 troops is not serious; in fact, it’s a sick joke, especially for the 3,300 soldiers who will be coming from the tropical belt of West Africa and who will be swallowed up by the desert where they’ve never been before.”

U.N. specialists say that at the very least twice that number of troops will be needed to take on Ansar, whose members are reportedly imposing their Taliban-like version of Shariah law with considerable brutality throughout the region, including in the storied city of Timbuktu.

Both the United States and the EU have suggested they are willing to provide any African operation with training, equipment, and logistical and intelligence support, and the Washington Post reported in June that the U.S. is flying surveillance flights over northern Mali from a small base in Burkina Faso. But so far the U.S. and EU have not offered to put “boots on the ground”, at least in a combat role.

Earlier this week, the EU said it was also considering sending about 200 troops to train Mali’s poorly equipped and largely demoralised 6,000-man army, whose overthrow of the democratically elected government helped precipitate the current crisis. At an Oct. 19 summit, EU ministers said Ansar’s control of northern Mali posed an “immediate threat” to Europe.

For its part, the United States, in particular its State Department, has expressed growing impatience, in part due to reports that the Islamist forces believed responsible for the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya and three of his staff in Benghazi in September may have included individuals associated with Ansar or with the wider group Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

During last month’s debate on foreign policy, U.S. President Barack Obama’s Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, mentioned the situation in northern Mali four times in an apparent effort to cast doubt on the Obama campaign’s claims that Al Qaeda has been decisively defeated.

Indeed, shortly after the killings in Benghazi, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson stressed the urgency of putting together an ECOWAS-led force. Any solution “must be dealt with through security and military means”, he said.

But the Pentagon, including its five-year-old Africa Command (AfriCom), is reportedly somewhat less gung-ho, according to Pham and other analysts who stressed that many more steps, including the creation of a popularly supported government in Bamako and the reconstruction of the army, must be taken before any military intervention is attempted.

In many ways, Mali and its once thriving, albeit clearly fragile, democracy were collateral damage resulting from last year’s western-backed overthrow of Libya’s leader Moammar Gadhafi.

Tuareg fighters employed as mercenaries by the fallen dictator returned home in northern Mali with sophisticated weaponry and, backed by Ansar and AQIM, soon overwhelmed Mali’s army and triggered the coup d’etat in Bamako by a U.S.-trained officer, Captain Amadou Haya Sanoga. Ansar and AQIM then turned against those of their Tuareg allies who did not share their Islamist agenda.

More than 300,000 people have fled their harsh rule, which has reportedly included the forced recruitment of children into their armed militias, according to the U.N. and human rights groups.

While the vast region they control is mostly desert, it includes lucrative smuggling routes for everything from tobacco and narcotics to arms and sub-Saharan African migrants hoping to reach Europe.

As a result, the region offers not only a potential safe haven and training ground for militant Islamists, but also one that can sustain itself economically. U.S. officials are particularly worried about reports that members of the Nigerian group Boko Haram are travelling to northern Mali for training.

The Nigerian army, which has accumulated considerable peacekeeping experience, is regarded as critical to an effective ECOWAS force that is expected to also include troops from Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Some officials here are touting a so-called “Somalia model” in which U.S.- and western-backed troops from nearby African states, combined with a weak Somali army, effectively wrested control of most of the country from another Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabab, earlier this year.

But that parallel strikes some experts as far fetched, at least in the short to medium term. “Look at how long that Somalia effort went before there was any progress at all,” noted David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia who now teaches at George Washington University.

The U.N.-authorised operation took more than five years to gain control of key cities and parts of the countryside, Shinn pointed out.”I can understand the general concept that must be the same, but keep in mind it took a heck of a long time in Somalia, and that could be the same result in Mali,” he told IPS.

Nearly 270,000 refugees have had to flee their homes since January, when conflict erupted in northern Mali. Credit: William Lloyd-George/IPS

By Souleymane Faye
DAKAR, Aug 14 2012 (IPS)

Military action by West African states against the insurrection in northern Mali would be extremely risky without diplomatic support from neighbouring Algeria and Mauritania, according to International Crisis Group researcher Gilles Yabi.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has said it is ready to deploy troops to help Mali’s interim government fight rebels who seized the northern part of the country in March. However, Yabi says it is essential that Mali’s non-ECOWAS neighbours, who have a degree of influence over the armed groups in Mali, offer diplomatic support.

Yabi, West Africa Project Director for the Brussels-based Crisis Group, also told IPS that reintegrating northern Mali with the rest of the country could not be accomplished in the short term. Excerpts of the interview follow:

Q: In a recent report, ICG said that an armed intervention by ECOWAS carries risks, including that of widening the crisis into other countries. What is the nature of this risk?

A: Our report warned that an external military intervention would have to be carried out jointly with the Malian army, which is presently not fully under control. An intervention risks seeing the conflict spill over into neighbouring countries, which all have links with armed groups or communities originally from northern Mali. The risk of triggering conflict between ethnic communities will be high, and this would have repercussions in neighbouring countries.

There are also major risks in abandoning large areas to Islamist groups linked to terrorism. These include an increase in brutal practices such as stoning as well as seeing fresh recruitment into the ranks of the jihadist armed groups.

But this doesn’t justify a rush to armed intervention by ECOWAS countries, which are themselves fragile in political and military terms.

Q: Do you think that the ECOWAS initiatives could lead to Mali’s government recovering control of the north of the country from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist group Ansar Dine? Will Mali get U.N. approval for a military intervention?

A: The north has largely passed into the control of the Islamist movements, particularly Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which are both linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The MNLA is no longer a significant military force on the ground.

I believe we must accept that the reintegration of the north into the Malian state will not happen in the short term.

Despite its willingness to act, ECOWAS does not have the means to help the Malian government – which is itself being restructured – to recover the territory captured by the Islamist forces. The political conditions in Bamako and the disarray of the Malian armed forces sharply limit the options. A military intervention in these conditions would be dangerous.

Once a new government is formed, the transitional institutions announced by interim president Dioncounda Traoré are put in place, and the real work of coordinating political, diplomatic and military actions between the Malian government, ECOWAS, and non-ECOWAS neighbours Algeria and Mauritania is accomplished… then we can expect a review of the issue of seeking authorisation from the U.N. Security Council for an external military deployment…

Mali can only have a clear position on this question when the battle for control of the transition in Bamako is finished.

Q: Do you think that a massive infiltration of Mali’s neighbours by elements of Ansar Dine and AQMI could take place?

A: That depends on what you mean by “massive”. That elements linked to Ansar Dine, MUJWA or AQMI could cross into Mali’s neighbours – or even that they already have – would not be surprising.

For Algeria and Mauritania, we can’t talk about infiltration. AQMI is originally a product of Algeria’s history and its principal leaders are still Algerians. And Mauritania has suffered several terrorist attacks in the last few years which were carried out by Islamists, directly linked to AQMI or not.

We can only talk about the risk of infiltration with regard to Mali’s neighbours in the south. There too, we can’t exclude the possibility, as it is easy to cross the borders in these areas. But the fear of an invasion of these southern neighbours by jihadists doesn’t seem reasonable to me.

Still, a handful of motivated and trained operatives could be enough to destabilise a country with terror attacks. So we can’t underestimate the threat.

Q: What’s your overall assessment of diplomatic and political initiatives by ECOWAS to resolve the political crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau?

A: You can’t accuse ECOWAS of being unresponsive or lacking initiative in either Mali or Guinea-Bissau. The organisation has held several summits of heads of state and adopted strong resolutions on paper.

In the case of Mali, it even called for strong economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions to force a return to formal constitutional order following the coup (in March). But the framework agreement that Burkinabè mediators signed with the junta on ECOWAS’s behalf also sent mixed, even contradictory, signals to the country’s military and political actors.

Here once again, ECOWAS has shown its limitations when it comes to moving from affirming its principles to making decisions. ECOWAS is partly responsible for the weaknesses of the framework agreement and the conditions of implementation for the transitional government that it is today trying to reconstitute.

With respect to Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS was very firm and did not hesitate once it chose a course of action, even if this left it open to criticism. The organisation condemned the April coup and worked with the military junta to set up a transitional government that was not truly legitimate, but was judged acceptable by a wide spectrum of political and military actors united against the former prime minister and favoured candidate in the presidential election, Carlos Gomes Junior.

ECOWAS sent a military mission to Guinea-Bissau which we have heard very little about. The problem is that no one really knows just what this force’s mandate is and how military and diplomatic action by ECOWAS would help the country to finally address the crucial reforms which now seem indefinitely postponed, beginning with reform of the armed forces.

This will be an important test of the capacity of the organisation to show coherence between its positions and its actions over time.

Q: Would the contribution of non-ECOWAS members such as Algeria or Mauritania be effective in resolving the Mali crisis? Is the “wait-and-see” approach of Algeria realistic and positive when the Islamist groups actually originated there?

A: All the so-called “pays du champ” (Niger, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali) are affected by the Mali crisis. They can’t be indifferent. If ECOWAS takes the military route without significant diplomatic backing from Mali’s neighbours – who can potentially influence the armed groups – then the organisation will be taking a big risk.

Diplomatic efforts in the past few weeks, especially towards Algeria, show that no one actively engaged with the Mali crisis is ignoring the importance of ECOWAS’s neighbours. That includes France, whose foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, toured several capitals in the region recently.

Algeria knows what is expected of it in this crisis, given its status as the region’s military power, as intermediary or mediator in many previous crises in northern Mali, and as the original home of AQIM.

The country’s attitude is no longer necessarily to wait and see: Algeria has expressed its preference for a political situation in northern Mali. ECOWAS and Mali’s transitional authorities must ask Algiers to say more about what it can contribute to a negotiation process with the armed groups, particularly Ansar Dine, whose leader Iyad Ag Ghali is well known in Algeria.

Excerpt:

Members of a visit, board, search, and seizure team from USS Anzio intercept a skiff containing a group of suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Credit: US Navy

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 9 2012 (IPS)

When the United Nations advocates the protection of the world’s oceans, its political agenda transcends the battle against marine pollution, global warming, overfishing, greenhouse gases and sea-level rise.

“We are also talking of high seas piracy and growing conflicts over maritime boundaries,” says one U.N. official.

And as piracy continues to be on the rise, the United Nations is now pushing for a summit meeting of West African leaders aimed at thwarting high seas crimes in the Gulf of Guinea.

Supported by the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the meeting is to take place before the end of this year.

A U.N. assessment mission on piracy, whose members visited Benin, Nigeria, Gabon and Angola late last year, recommended that a summit meeting on maritime security be convened “as soon as possible to develop a comprehensive strategy” against high seas crimes.

According to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), incidents of piracy rose from 45 in 2010 to 64 last year.

The concern over maritime security comes amid a growing dispute between China and its neighbours over claims in the South China Sea involving the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Abdel Fatau Musah, director of political affairs at ECOWAS, points out that the decline in piracy in Benin, the most affected in ECOWAS, doesn’t mean high seas crimes have peaked.

But there has been a rapid spread of the phenomenon to other states in the region, including 18 attacks last year alone in Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire.

Musah told a recent meeting of the U.N. Security Council that piracy was increasingly dovetailing into other forms of transnational organised crime, including oil bunkering, robbery at sea, hostage-taking, human and drug trafficking and terrorism.

And when the United Nations hosts an international conference to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Law of Sea later this week, piracy will be the subtext of the discussions to be presided over by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Scheduled to take place Aug. 12, the conference will coincide with the closing ceremonies of the international exhibition Expo 2012, currently underway in the coastal town of Yeosu in South Korea.

The theme of Expo 2012 is the protection of the world’s oceans and maritime resources.

Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, India’s permanent representative to the United Nations, told IPS his country had been at the forefront of highlighting “the menace off the Somalia coast”, and was also concerned about the surge in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

“While the two situations were quite different in proportion at present, the failure of the international community to act decisively against piracy off the Somali coast could have spawned the new surge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” he said.

Addressing a Security Council meeting, the Indian envoy also said, “The time has come for the attention being paid by the Council to translate into a concrete plan of action.”

He pointed out that piracy off the African coasts reflected the instability prevalent in the region and the reach of organised terrorist and criminal groups.

The perpetrators, he said, were targeting oil and chemical vessels, as well as oil-drilling platforms in the Gulf, and employing severe violence against their captives.

The region, he said, produced more than five million barrels of oil daily and three-quarters of the world’s cocoa supply.

Pirate attacks were thus adversely affecting the emerging oil industry of the region, as well as commercial shipping and marine traffic.

In a resolution adopted last December, the General Assembly recognised the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels in combating threats to maritime security, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, in accordance with international law.

The resolution also recognised that bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms are necessary to monitor, prevent and respond to such threats, and enhance the sharing of information among member states to better detect, prevent and suppress such threats, and to prosecute offenders with due regard to national legislation.

Lynn Pascoe, the outgoing under-secretary-general for political affairs, told a meeting of the Security Council last February, “We must take further concrete steps designed to eradicate piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which constitutes a clear threat to the security and economic development of the states in the region.”

Currently, at least three organisations, the International Maritime Organisation, the International Maritime Bureau and the Bureau overseeing the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, are coordinating efforts to collect and share accurate information.

Malian rebels do not have the support of most ethnic groups in the north of the country. / William Lloyd-George/IPS

By Soumaila T. Diarra
BAMAKO, Jun 12 2012 (IPS)

Tuareg and Islamist rebel groups which seized control of northern Mali in March are trying to find common ground for the joint administration of the territory. Residents of the region fear that individual and collective freedoms will not be respected if such an alliance sets up an Islamic state.

Ansar Dine, which is linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) captured the northern part of this West African country in the power vacuum following a March coup.

Abdoul Maïga, director of the Ahmed Baba Centre for Islamic Studies in Timbuktu, one of the main cities under rebel control, says the two groups have widely differing outlooks.

“The MNLA wants to be closer to Europe where it has contacts. In contrast, Ansar Dine is oriented towards the Arab world where it has found support. I don’t know if this support comes from governments or from specific groups, but it’s certain that Ansar Dine’s funding comes from the Middle East, particularly Qatar,” Maïga told IPS over the phone.

An accord between the Islamists and the MNLA was announced on May 26, in which they agreed to merge their armed forces and create an Islamic state in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. But five days later, the Tuareg rebels backed out of the agreement, stating their preference for an independent, secular state.

“The failure of the merger announced by Ansar Dine and the MNLA did not surprise me at all,” said Maïga. “The people in the northern regions of Mali – given the choice – will never agree to live in an Islamic state.”

An estimated 90 percent of Malians are Muslim, according to the country’s High Islamic Council. The northern regions, and Timbuktu in particular, have played a historically important role in the spread of Islam throughout West Africa.

“But people don’t understand what is going on now. Here, Islam has never expanded by means of jihad or any other form of violence,” said Maïga.

Negotiations between the rebel factions over the application of shari’a, Islamic law, have continued into June.

Some northern residents see the failure of the merger as proof that shari’a can’t be applied in this region, particularly in cities like Timbuktu, which must preserve their reputation of openness to continue to attract tourists.

“The northerner is by nature a free thinker. Liberty is very important to him, and that’s why 90 percent of the population doesn’t want these people in charge,” Sado Diallo, mayor of Gao, told IPS.

Ansar Dine has begun applying Islamic law in the city, including cutting off thieves’ hands and flogging smokers, according to the mayor – who at the same time lamented the increase of auto theft and other banditry. “Every day I receive SMS messages from people who complain about acts committed by militias,” Diallo said.

Far to the south, in the Malian capital, Bamako, the transitional government says that whether or not the rebels merge is immaterial. Government spokesperson Hamadoun Touré told state radio that the priority for the authorities is to relieve the suffering of residents of the north.

Outside Mali, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union are both worried by the possibility of a well-armed Islamic state being established in the north. During a recent visit to France, the Beninois head of state, Boni Yayi, who is also currently president of the AU, raised the possibility of an intervention by an African military force in Mali, under the aegis of the United Nations.

Mali’s three northern neighbours, Algeria, Niger and Mauritania, are also concerned. Following the unilateral declaration of independence of Azawad on Apr. 6, these countries, who in 2010 set up a joint committee to fight against terrorism and drugs smuggling in the region, met in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, to support ECOWAS initiatives in Mali.

But while waiting for outside help, people in northern Mali have begun to lose patience.

Seydou Cissé, a member of the Peul militia “Ganda Iso”, in the Gao region, told IPS that the population intends to fight.

“All we want from the international community is support for the national army in the form of air strikes against Islamists who seized sophisticated weapons from Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi,” he said.

“We will do the rest to liberate our land,” he said.

(END)