By Roberto Savio
ROME, Apr 27 2015 (IPS)

The results of a survey of what 3,500 young people between the ages of 18 and 24 – in all Arab countries except Syria – feel about the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa have just been released.

The report of the survey, which was carried out by international polling firm Penn Schoen Berland (PBS), is not a minority report given that 60 percent of the population of the Arab population is under the age of 25, which means 200 million people. Well, the outcome of the survey is that the large majority of them have no trust in democracy.

Roberto Savio

The word democracy does not exist in Arabic, being a concept totally alien to the era in which Muhammad created Islam. However, it is worth noting that the concept of democracy as it is known today is also relatively recent in the West, and we have to wait from its origins in the Greek era for it to make a comeback at the time of the French Revolution.

It became an accepted value just after the end of the Second World War, and the end of the Soviet, Nazi and Japanese regimes.

As a matter of fact, it is still not a reality in large parts of Asia (just think of China and North Korea) and Africa.

Then we have governments, as in Hungary where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is openly preaching a style of governance à la Russian President Vladimir Putin, followed by several of his esteemers, including the National Front party in France, and the Northern League in Italy. But few have such a negative view of democracy as young Arabs.After the Arab Spring revolutions in 2012, a massive 72 percent of young Arabs believed that the Arab world had improved. The figure dropped to 70 percent in 2013, then 54 percent in 2014, and now it stands at just 38 percent

After the Arab Spring revolutions in 2012, a massive 72 percent of young Arabs believed that the Arab world had improved. The figure dropped to 70 percent in 2013, then 54 percent in 2014, and now it stands at just 38 percent.

According to the survey, 39 percent of young Arabs agreed with the statement “democracy will never work in the region”, 36 percent thought it would work, while the remaining 25 percent expressed many doubts.

It is clear that the Arab Spring has been betrayed by the return of the army to power as in Egypt, or by the clinging of the old guard to power regardless of the costs, like Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

If you add to this the fact that 41 percent of young Arabs are unemployed (out of a total unemployment figure of 25 percent), and of those 31 percent have completed higher education and 17 percent have graduated from university, it is not difficult to understand that frustration and pessimism are running high among Arab youth.

It also contributes to explaining why so many young people feel attracted to the Islamic State (ISIS) which wants to topple all Arab governments, defined as corrupt and allied to the decadent West, and create a Caliphate as in Muhammad’s times, where wealth will be distributed among all, the dignity of Islam will be enhanced, and a world of purity and vision will substitute the materialistic one of today.

This is why ISIS is attracting youth from all over. Besides, according to experts, for the terrorist to have a geographical space and run it  as a state, where hospitals and schools function and there is a daily life to prove that the dream is possible, represents a great difference with previous terrorist movements like Al-Qaeda, which could only destroy, not really build.

But the survey also reveals something extremely important. To the question “which is the biggest obstacle for the Arab world?”, 37 percent indicated the expansion of ISIS and 32 percent the threat of terrorism. The problem of unemployment was mentioned by 29 percent and that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 23 percent.

It is worth noting that the threat of a nuclear Iran was mentioned by only 8 percent (contrary to the declarations of Arab governments), while 17 percent consider that the real problem is the lack of political leaders, while only 15 percent denounce the lack of democracy.

It is important to note that no interviews were carried out in Iran, which is not an Arab country but is a Muslim country. However Iranian Muslims are Shiites and not Sunnis, as in all Arab countries, except for Iraq and Bahrein, and perhaps Yemen, where Shiites are a majority. Of the world’s total Islamic population of 1.6 billion people, Shiites make up only 10 percent.

It is within Sunnite Islam that a dramatic conflict is going on, where Wahabism, a Sunni school born in Saudi Arabia and the official religion of the Saudi reigning house, has now split into those who want to return to the purity of the early times and those are considered “petrowahabists” because they have been corrupted by the wealth created by petrol (they are also called sheikh wahabists because they accept government by sheikhs).

Saudi Arabia has been spending an average of 3 billion dollars a year to promote Wahabism. It has built over 1,500 mosques throughout the world, where radical preachers have been asking the faithful to go back to the real and uncorrupted Islam.

It was with Osama Bin Laden that the Wahabist movement escaped from the control of Saudi Arabia, very much like the radical Hamas movement, originally supported by Israel to weaken the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Yasser Arafat, turned against the Israeli state. It is not possible to ride radicalism.

The survey also reveals that young Sunnis see ISIS and terrorism as their main threat, but we are talking here of a poll which should represent 200 million people between the ages of 18 and 25. Even if just one percent of them were to succumb to the call of the jihad, we are talking of a potential two million people … and this is now being felt acutely.

The polarisation inside Sunni society (Shiites are not part of that – there are no Shiite terrorists) is felt as the most important problem for the future.

In Europe and the United States, this should be the clearest of examples that ISIS and terrorism are first and foremost an internal problem of Islam and that to intervene in that problem will only unify the Arab world against the invader. (END/IPS COLUMNIST SERVICE)

Edited by Phil Harris   

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS – Inter Press Service. 

Excerpt:

Sanaa's walls profile people gone missing under the Saleh regime. Credit: Rebecca Murray/IPS.

By Rebecca Murray
SANAA, Apr 1 2013 (IPS)

Yemen has launched its six-month National Dialogue but creating a just law is proving a formidable task.

The debate is being conducted through a conference that finally kicked off in the capital on Mar. 18. The Dialogue is designed to unify the fractured country since ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s ouster.

Nasser Asbahi’s violent and meaningless death is one of hundreds to for such dialogue to address.

On the morning of Sep. 18, 2011, Asbahi, a 34-year-old father of three, left his construction job early to join the protests in downtown Sanaa against Saleh’s three-decades-old rule.

“That day Nasser walked at the back of the march, holding hands with an old man,” recalls his older sister Fikriah. “But when he heard bullets he told the man to take cover, and rushed to rescue those on the frontline.”

Nasser was shot at four times by government security forces, with a bullet to the head, two to the chest, and another to his stomach.

Abdullah Al Alafi, 17, a former student of Nasser’s and eyewitness to his death, said Nasser’s dying words were to urge him to leave the violent chaos, saying, ‘I think it’s too late for me’.

The same forces killed Al Alafi with six bullets the following day.

Over 2,000 people were killed, and an estimated 22,000 injured during the revolution.

Saleh’s resignation in February 2012, in exchange for immunity brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states with U.S. support, paved the way for President Abdurabu Hadi’s one-candidate election and the National Dialogue.

But there is widespread public outrage at Saleh’s status, which allows him to retain his Sanaa residence, his amassed wealth, and position as head of the long-standing political machine, the General People’s Congress (GPC). President Hadi is the party’s deputy.

“The Saleh immunity deal is a local political arrangement by the GCC,” says Human Rights Minister Hooria Mashhour. “At the international level it is not acknowledged. The UN Human Rights Council, even (UN Special Advisor to Yemen) Jamal Benomar has said, when asked on television, that this is not legal.”

Nasser’s sister Fikriah is adamant about her demands.

“What we want is justice,” she says. “We are not seeking revenge – we are seeking justice. Saleh is a billionaire with our money and killing us, and we can’t even question him. The moment we can question him as an equal – that’s when I would feel some justice.”

But what justice means to all Yemenis remains unclear.

Aziz Alsurmi, co-founder of the national Yemen Centre for Transitional Justice, explains. “People will not feel relief that a little justice has taken place unless we go through stages of transitional justice,” he says.

“First, we have to identify the acts. Then, we will find those who possibly committed those acts, and if they can be held in the court of law. And then they need to apologise. These violations have to be clear in the country’s history.”

Alsurmi agrees that the terms for immunity and reparations needs to be defined, as well as which time period the investigation should cover.

Transitional justice is intended to span civil wars, southern grievances of discrimination, land theft and a redundant workforce, as well as the forced disappearances and detention of political opponents, and massacres committed in 2011.

While some Yemenis argue for an inquiry to start at the end of British rule in 1967, others point to the beginning of Saleh’s rule in north Yemen in 1978, or from the unity of north and south Yemen in 1990.

“We will create unhappy people if we select a certain time frame,” Alsurmi says.

A damning report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) prompted a presidential decree signed on Sep. 22 last year, which established a Commission of Investigation focused on human rights violations committed in 2011. Seven months later, it is still not set up.

More far-reaching legislation, initially called the ‘Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation’ law was given to the president when the working inter-ministerial committee deadlocked.

Since then, the president’s office gutted the legislation and conspicuously renamed it the ‘National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice’ law. It is now stalled in parliament.

“The President and his regular advisors are from the ex-regime. They changed it,” says Minister of Human Rights Hooria Mashhour. “So me and the Legal Affairs Minister Mohammed Al Mekhlafi announced to the media that we were not responsible for this draft.”

“The title has also changed, which is significant,” says Anne Massagee from the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). “It is understandable that people are upset about reconciliation before the justice process.”

Alsurmi concurs. “It gives more immunity – we already have immunity,” he says. “It is limited to 2011. And it puts reconciliation first, which means forgiveness from the victims and reparations, perhaps, and then transitional justice. There is no apology from the perpetrators. You will not see Saleh go to the people and say he is sorry.”

The pressure is now on the National Dialogue’s transitional justice group, announced last week, to hammer out the scope and ramifications of a passable bill.

The broad National Dialogue is carved up between 565 seats, with the GPC claiming 112, followed by traditional opposition parties.

Those on the revolution’s frontlines – independent youth, women and civil society – are allotted 40 seats each, in addition to a 30 percent quota for women and 20 percent youth quota, across party lines.

Baraa Shiban was nominated to the Dialogue’s independent youth bloc, and is focused on transitional justice. He says it is difficult working alongside allies of the revolution’s violent perpetrators.

“We have to be very careful that when we talk about victims and families of victims that we pass a law that doesn’t look like immunity to these people, but instead looks towards the future,” he says.

“If the law is not passed, problems in the country will continue,” asserts Minister Mashhour.

“Revenge in the country is a widespread practice. If people do not get access to justice, they are going to take revenge in their own hands. We don’t want this bloody scenario. We want justice for all.”

Two years since the revolution, residents of low-income districts have little to celebrate. Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS.

By Cam McGrath
CAIRO, Feb 24 2013 (IPS)

On a recent Friday, coppersmith Alaa Moussa parked himself in the same spot where two years earlier he had stood defiantly with a handwritten banner addressed to then president Hosni Mubarak. His petition that cold February morning in 2011 had listed the key demands of Egypt’s 18-day uprising: “bread, freedom, dignity”.

His new message for President Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood reflected the growing desperation among the nation’s poor and unemployed. It simply stated: “bread, bread, bread.”

Moussa, a father of three from Cairo’s ramshackle Ramlet Boulaq district, says he joined the uprising against Mubarak because he believed the dictator’s fall would end the suffocating corruption and government repression that blocked all paths out of poverty.

It did not, and the disillusioned artisan says his hope of a better life for his family has been crushed by the stark economic realities of post-revolution Egypt.

“We hear promises every day, but we never see any improvement and things are much worse now than under Mubarak.”

In the two years since the uprising, Egypt’s battered economy has taken hit after hit. Political turmoil and labour unrest have shuttered factories, forced layoffs, and scared away tourists and investors. Economic growth has slowed to a crawl, while foreign reserves have withered to critically low levels.

The small workshop where Moussa once fashioned ornamental brass lamps is closed, its owner having absorbed months of losses before laying off his six employees. Some have found jobs in other workshops at a lower salary. Others are still looking.

But with the national unemployment rate at 13 percent, competition for jobs is fierce. Like many, Moussa’s only option was to seek work in the informal sector, where job security is absent.

“Since the revolution, employers are reluctant to hire,” he says. “You work for a few days, then get laid off, and start looking for work again.”

Twenty-seven year old Ramy Shahin was working in an American company before the 2011 uprising. He now drives a taxi, earning about 120 dollars a month after expenses. With his second child on the way, he worries about rising living costs.

“We’re already living hand to mouth,” says Shahin. “We have no savings, so our only choice is to borrow money and pray tomorrow will be better.”

Inflation has averaged nearly 10 percent in the two years since the uprising due to a surge in food prices. Currency depreciation and a proposed government plan for tax increases and subsidy cuts are expected to accelerate inflation in 2013.

The Egyptian Food Observatory, a quarterly government study prepared in cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP), found that 86 percent of Egyptian households surveyed in September 2012 were unable to meet their basic monthly needs – a 12 percent increase over the June figure. It noted that among vulnerable households, over 60 percent of income goes toward food.

Families surveyed reported a number of coping strategies, such as substituting cheaper food items, reducing portions, and borrowing to cover food expenses.

“At least a quarter of Egyptians live below the poverty line of two dollars a day,” says Cairo-based sociologist Madiha El-Safty. “You can imagine how dire their situation must be if they’ve resorted to borrowing to pay for meals.”

Across Egypt, rising prices and hoarding have created shortages of diesel, cooking gas, and food staples. Umm Farouk, a widow with four school-age children, queues for hours each day to buy subsidised bread made from low-grade flour pitted with pebbles and chaff.

“There were bread lines under Mubarak, there are bread lines under Morsi,” she says. “Nothing has changed. It’s a daily struggle.”

President Morsi has promised to solve the country’s economic problems and lure investors back. But his Islamist-led government has inherited corrosive bureaucracy and a crumbling infrastructure from decades of neglect and corruption.

The President’s supporters argue that it could take years to purge institutions and repair the economic damage from the Mubarak regime’s 29-year rule. Critics, however, accuse Morsi of mismanaging the economy and putting the Muslim Brotherhood’s political agenda ahead of fiscal prudence.

“The Muslim Brotherhood is only interested in the poor when they need votes,” says Shahin. “They have no experience running a country or setting economic policy, and their failures at both are destroying Egypt.”

Deteriorating economic conditions have created a backlash not just against the Islamists, but against the democratic process itself. Many Egyptians who supported the 2011 uprising have begun questioning its outcome.

“Of course I’m disappointed,” says Umm Farouk. “The revolution was supposed to make our lives easier. Everything is going backwards.” [END]

Rafael Correa celebrates his re-election at the Palacio de Carondelet, in Quito, cheered by a crowd of supporters. Credit: Martín Sánchez/IPS

By Leisa Sánchez and Ángela Meléndez
QUITO, Feb 18 2013 (IPS)

Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa secured yesterday his third term in office by a landslide, after vowing to radically deepen his project of citizens’ revolution by making the changes achieved thus far “irreversible”, fully achieving the goals of eradicating poverty, transforming the model of production and consolidating the “rule of the people”.

Initial data from the National Electoral Council give the centre-left candidate 56.7 percent of the votes in the national elections held this Sunday, Feb. 17, putting him well ahead of his greatest challenger, right-wing candidate Guillermo Lasso, with 23.3 percent.

This ample margin means Correa can begin his third consecutive term since 2007 without the need for the runoff required under the constitution unless the leading candidate obtains either 50 percent of the valid vote or 40 percent with a 10-point advantage over the nearest contender.

While Correa maintains that his government will continue to focus on social transformation, he noted that a change in the model of production and job creation would be the priorities this term.

This strategy is reflected in his choice of running mate, as the profile of vice president-elect Jorge Glas is more technical than political, and in Correa’s agenda, which involves promoting change through projects in the fields of oil production, energy resources, water, electricity and information and telecommunication technologies.

This transformation, which had already begun with restrictions on imports of consumer goods and higher tariffs for luxury items, will demand more value added on national products and strengthening popular and solidarity economy schemes, but without excluding private capital involvement.

Oil, Ecuador’s largest source of foreign revenue, with a record 98 dollars per 159-litre barrel in 2012, will continue to underpin the government’s investment in social programmes, which last year absorbed 15.3 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and are projected to require 16.6 percent in 2013.

According to the National Planning and Development Secretariat, public investment grew six-fold in the last six years, standing at 6.29 billion dollars in 2012.

Speaking to the press following his second re-election, the leader of the governing Alianza País (AP) party said that the chief goal for the next four years would be to make “irreversible the shift in power relations in favour of the people and the great majorities” through the implementation of “solid economic policies, prioritising the ‘social debt’ (over debt to foreign creditors), but without neglecting efficiency”.

Correa stressed that “the challenge is to move more quickly but in the same direction”, adding that the people have confirmed at the polls their desire to “bury once and for all the ‘partocracy’ that has inflicted so much damage” on the country, in reference to the monopoly of power held by political parties.

Correa is confident that the massive support he received from voters will give him a large majority in parliament, which will thus be able to pass key bills on issues such as communications, water, land and criminal code reform, which had been stalled until now.

On Feb. 17, Ecuadorians also elected 137 members of the National Legislative Assembly and five Andean Parliament representatives.

Legislator Virgilio Hernández, re-elected under the AP ticket, told IPS that one of the great tasks ahead is to “build a post-oil Ecuador, going beyond a commodity-based economy”, while “making major changes to achieve energy sovereignty, continue developing the country’s road system and implementing large infrastructure works”.

He also spoke of the need to advance towards “a true and radical agrarian revolution” and implement credit and technology policies that will guarantee food sovereignty and security.

Hernández noted that significant progress has already been made, but social welfare, health and education are permanent issues on the government’s agenda. Work is needed to “ensure the full enjoyment of rights and social welfare” by all Ecuadorians, and achieve greater wealth distribution, with “more equality and social justice”.

Nonetheless, economic performance will be decisive in determining whether the Correa administration will retain its level of popularity, Hernán Ramos, a political and economic analyst, told IPS.

Ramos believes that one of the key factors of the president’s stability is the steady growth of GDP, fuelled by favourable oil prices, increasing government revenue and a high level of domestic consumption.

The government’s “project would suffer if the economy’s stability were to waver” for any reason, even an international crisis, Ramos cautioned.

In terms of politics, the analyst observed that Correa’s three victories at the polls had succeeded in dealing a mortal blow to a political leadership that was “historically responsible for the crises that dragged the country down”, as with this new win “the opposition has been broken”.

Unlike in 2007, when he took office for the first time, Correa now has several advantages. Firstly, the political experience gained after six years at the country’s helm; secondly, the strength gathered by his movement; and thirdly, ironclad media protection (in the form of a media regulatory body created in a 2011 referendum to stop media excesses), Ramos explained.

The president had promised that this would be the last time he ran, as he considered it in the country’s “best interest”. However, his movement lacks a figure strong enough to replace him after this term, a political weakness that could be overcome by AP if “it succeeds in grooming new leaders that can at least consolidate its political leadership in the country”, Ramos said.

Counting elections and referendums, Correa achieved his ninth victory at the polls on Sunday and holds an indisputable leadership after six years in which, in his own words, he “re-founded the nation” with a new constitution in 2008 that launched an era of good living and turned the state into the leading economic and political agent.

When his third term is up in 2017, Correa will have completed a decade in power.

Some protesters still remain hopeful on the anniversary of the revolution in Yemen. Credit: Rebecca Murray/IPS.

By Rebecca Murray
SANA'A, Feb 16 2013 (IPS)

This week in Sana’a thousands of Yemenis – mostly youth – crowded the highway near the landmark ‘Change Square’ to celebrate the second anniversary of the revolution. Adjacent to the university, this was the site of a tented encampment that drew tens of thousands of demonstrators throughout 2011.

But in contrast to the violence between Islamists and southern separatists that marred a similar gathering in Yemen’s port city of Aden, the capital’s parade was subdued and brief.

“The revolution is only half done,” sighed Ziad, a Sana’a university student as he headed home after the parade. “The most important thing we are calling for is justice.”

Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian protests, Yemen’s youth were at the forefront of the 2011 uprising. They were united by a common cause to end former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 33-year dictatorial rule.

“In the revolution’s first few months youth felt they had the power, that they were shaping the situation, and that their voices were the most important – without the need to go to the political parties,” says youth activist Bara’a Shaiban.

But two years later, many of those youth are disillusioned.

“Sometimes I regret we had the revolution – like we fooled ourselves,” says Shatha Al-Harazi, a 27-year old journalist. “But at least he is out and we are forced into a new era. If it were not for us we would be voting (Saleh’s son) Ahmed Ali into office. But if we are realistic we know he still has power…”

Many believe their revolution was hijacked when longtime government allies, like former General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar of the powerful First Armoured Division swapped sides in what was deemed a cynical move for self-preservation, after the definitive Juma’at al-Karama (Friday of Dignity) massacre on Mar. 18, 2011.

That day an estimated 52 peaceful protestors were killed and hundreds injured at Change Square by thugs while the robust Central Security Forces, led by Saleh’s nephew, Yahya Saleh, stood idly by.

Although Saleh was forced to step down in November 2011, he still resides in the heart of Sana’a, protected by an immunity deal hammered out by the U.S. and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

Amnesty International described the deal as “a smack in the face for justice,” and angry protestors took to the streets during the brief United Nations Security Council visit last month, demanding a trial for Saleh.

President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi, ushered in through a one-candidate presidential election last February, now faces the formidable challenge of rooting out the elite old guard entrenched in the government and military.

Yemen’s problems are many. The security and economic outlook has deteriorated and the youth face bleak education and employment prospects, as the country remains shackled to a corrupt system based on tribal networks and nepotism.

The troubled National Dialogue process has been pushed back to Mar. 18. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered it in an attempt to unify disparate interests – including civil rights issues, transitional justice, and the demands of northern Houthi and southerners calling for federalism or a separate state.

“The problem with delays is that it pulls people further apart and we lose momentum,” says Nadia Abdulaziz Al-Sakkaf, member of the National Dialogue Preparatory Committee.

“Saleh has gradually become stronger and I think he feels he is coming back. He is gaining strength, and his strength is relative to the National Dialogue’s weakness. I don’t see his immunity revoked, there is pressure for him to leave politics… In Yemen we do things that save face, and we don’t want to create enemies.”

Yemen’s venerable political parties dominate the National Dialogue’s 565 seats, with only 40 seats allocated to ‘independent’ youth and a 20 percent youth quota across party lines. Independent women and civil society claim another 40 seats each.

Outraged by this marginalisation, Nobel Peace Prize winner and revolutionary youth leader Tawakkol Karman says she will boycott the six-month National Dialogue, and will instead work outside the conference to bring change.

‘Youth’ is defined by the National Dialogue as those between 18 to 40 years old, and make up the majority of Yemen’s mostly rural population of 24 million. But those in rural areas – with scant access to electricity, Internet and social media – have largely been left out of the process.

“When the GCC agreement was signed in November, there was huge resistance to it,” says Bara’a Shaiban. “We should have then realised that a political process would start, and we should start reacting to it.”

Shaiban believes they need to nurture new advocacy methods to combat challenges in the National Dialogue. Powerful political parties and endemic corruption threaten to drown out the voices of the less experienced, and more divided, youth delegation.

Illustrative of the country’s predicament are the findings of the Human Rights Watch investigation into the stalled trial process around the Juma’at al-Karama killings. More than half of 78 men indicted for the crime remain at large, and only eight are in jail.

“Our research found the prosecutor’s investigations were deeply flawed and marred by political meddling,” Human Rights Watch researcher Letta Taylor tells IPS.

“Nearly two years later justice is still nowhere in sight for this crime,” she says. “If the government can’t properly prosecute this emblematic attack, it doesn’t bode well, and raises serious questions about its ability to bring the significant change that protestors sought, and in some cases died for.”

Shatha Al-Harazi now holds television debates with youth activists nationwide to raise awareness about the National Dialogue. What she discovered was that very few activists themselves understand the process.

“There is a very big gap between urban and rural areas,” Al-Harazi says. “The National Dialogue means a lot to the political elites. But it doesn’t mean much to the larger crowd because they don’t know much about it.

“When I saw the list of the National Conference names I was depressed. They were those who were against youth and killed youth. And the leaders of parties didn’t give the chance for youth to lead. But the youth have the power and will continue to fight.”

Tahrir Square in Cairo is now witnessing protests against Egypt’s new constitution. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS.

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani
CAIRO, Jan 27 2013 (IPS)

Hundreds of thousands hit the streets countrywide on and after the second anniversary of Egypt’s Tahrir Square uprising Jan. 25 to protest the policies of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from which he hails. A chief demand was the abrogation – or modification at least – of Egypt’s newly-approved constitution.

“The amendment of the new constitution is one of the primary demands of the people and parties taking part in anniversary rallies,” Magdi Sherif, head of the centrist Guardians of the Revolution Party told IPS from Cairo’s Tahrir Square. “President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood must heed the voice of the opposition.”

Egypt’s new national charter was approved last month in a contentious popular referendum – although not by the wide margin its mostly Islamist authors had hoped for. Despite its tepid reception by voters, only 64 percent of whom voted in favour, the new constitution formally went into effect immediately following the referendum.

According to Egypt’s secular opposition, the charter is deeply flawed. The six-month drafting process that preceded the referendum was dogged by controversy, culminating in the last-minute withdrawal of most non-Islamist members of the 100-member drafting committee.

Critics say the document fails to guarantee press freedom and free expression and concentrates too much power in the hands of the presidency. Nor, they say, does the charter adequately safeguard judicial independence or do away with Egypt’s longstanding practice of trying civilians in military courts.

“The new constitution employs very broadly-defined terms that could lead to restrictions on freedoms and the violation of basic rights,” Gaber Gad Nassar, constitutional law professor at Cairo University told IPS. “It also contains several articles that could theoretically allow the president to assume dictatorial powers.

“By broadening presidential authority, the charter allows the executive to dominate other branches of government,” Nassar added. He pointed to one article in particular granting the president the right to appoint members of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court (HCC).

Last summer, the HCC ruled Egypt’s first post-Mubarak parliament ‘unconstitutional’ on a technicality. The ruling led to the dissolution of the assembly – three quarters of which had been held by Islamist parties, chief among them the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to the Brotherhood and Morsi supporters, the HCC remains stocked with judges appointed by – and therefore loyal to – the ousted Mubarak regime.

Nassar also blasted the new constitution for allowing journalists to be arrested for certain press-related offences, and for allowing civilians to be tried by military tribunals if they are charged with “violations against Egypt’s armed forces.”

In a reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, Nassar (who says he is unaffiliated with any political parties or groups) added: “Those currently governing the country are carrying out their own agenda. Their lack of vision is deepening the political divide and they refuse to heed the opposition’s objections to the new constitution.”

Yet Murad Ali, official spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), insists that the FJP is – despite accusations to the contrary – “entirely prepared to hear and respond to other political forces’ reservations about certain constitutional articles.”

According to Ali, opposition forces currently in talks with the presidency are demanding the amendment of 15 articles. “And while some of the requested changes are reasonable, others are not,” he said.

For example, he said, certain political forces were demanding the elimination of an article barring former leading members of Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party from political participation. “But this is unreasonable,” Ali asserted. “Neither the Egyptian people nor the FJP will allow former NDP bigwigs to re-enter politics.”

Ali went on to say that the opposition had exaggerated the “expanded powers” allegedly given the president in the new constitution. “A careful reading of the charter will reveal that presidential authority has actually been reduced from the previous 1971 constitution.”

He added, however, that all other contentious constitutional articles – such as those dealing with personal freedoms, judicial independence and presidential oversight – “remain open to debate with other political forces with a view to reaching a compromise.”

The anti-constitution camp has coalesced around the National Salvation Front (NSF) led by former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei and presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabbahi. In its opposition to Morsi, the Brotherhood and the new constitution, the NSF has produced strange bedfellows, uniting liberal, leftist and ‘revolutionary’ groups with supporters of the former regime.

On Monday (Jan. 21), the presidency invited opposition representatives to a ‘national dialogue’ to discuss their proposals for constitutional amendments. Although shunned by the NSF, the dialogue was attended by representatives of certain opposition parties, civil society and Egypt’s three main Christian churches (Coptic Orthodox, Catholic and Evangelical).

Two days later, church representatives – along with those of some political parties – withdrew from the initiative, saying discussions had been “unproductive” and had “failed to yield the desired results.”

For Nassar, the walkout came as no surprise.

“Why should they stay? Conclusions reached by the so-called dialogue committee aren’t binding,” he said. The Shura Council, the upper house of Egypt’s parliament (currently endowed with legislative authority), he noted, “isn’t obliged to implement the committee’s recommendations.”

Nassar added: “Popular pressure and demonstrations are the only means of obtaining a balanced, democratic constitution that reflects the will of the people and the goals of the revolution.”

The FJP’s Ali criticised those who withdrew from the dialogue session, describing the move as “dictatorship by the minority.”

“Parties and groups that represent the 36 percent of the public that voted against the constitution cannot simply walk out when all their demands aren’t met,” he said. “Dialogue is intended to lead to compromise; it’s not a matter of one side making all-or-nothing demands of the other.

“The majority of Egyptian voters approved the national charter. And the choice of the majority must be accepted.”

Morsi, for his part, has repeatedly promised to reopen debate on proposed constitutional amendments in the first session of parliament’s lower house, following legislative elections expected some time in April. The offer, however, appears to have been forgotten in the violence and chaos witnessed on the revolution’s second anniversary. (END)

Egypt is facing its worst political crisis since the January 2011 revolution ousted former dictator Hosni Mubarak, with analysts warning of a possible civil war. Furthermore, unlike during the revolution, opposition to the current regime is bitterly divided between Islamists and more secular Egyptians.

The inability of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) supporters and their Islamist allies to find common ground with opponents of President Mohamed Mursi is exacerbated by deep divisions within the revolutionary opposition as they struggle to formulate a strategy forward. Another crucial factor is the uncertain role of Egypt’s military in forthcoming political developments

“Egypt is in for a protracted and prolonged political struggle ahead. The current situation is untenable. It looks like we could be heading towards civil war. The wild card on the table is the military, as it is uncertain which side it will take,” Gamal Nkrumah, a political analyst and the international affairs editor at Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, told IPS.

Weeks of protest, sparked by a Nov. 22 decree issued by Mursi which would have granted him sweeping powers beyond judiciary mediation, forced the Brotherhood-affiliated Mursi to cancel the decree on Dec. 7 after the violence, which inflamed Egyptian cities and towns, threatened to spiral out of control.

However, a new modified decree will still afford the president enormous powers with minimal judicial oversight. Furthermore, Mursi’s decision to rush through a referendum on an Islamist-dominated constitution on Dec. 15, despite limited consultation with minority groups, including Coptic Christians, women and liberal politicians, has further enraged the opposition.

“Four of Mursi’s non-Islamist advisors resigned after they tried to persuade him to be more inclusive with the new constitution. They even postponed their resignation for a week, but when Mursi showed no signs of backing down they eventually left,” Nkrumah said.

Bloody street battles between MB supporters and revolutionary opposition members culminated in the deaths of at least seven people, and hundreds were arrested and wounded, as the presidential palace was stormed by opposition members over the weekend of Dec. 8-9 despite the presence of tanks and revolutionary guards. Six people were killed in previous weeks of violence.

During the bloody nights and days of fighting, journalists and doctors were assaulted and shot at, resulting in the death of a doctor and a reporter left with serious brain damage. The role of Egypt’s military was brought into question, with some reports of soldiers siding with Brotherhood members and others of military members sympathising and encouraging the revolutionaries.

So far the military has officially stayed on the sidelines. But on Saturday Dec. 8 it issued a statement warning of impending action if the warring factions failed to resolve their differences through dialogue.

“Anything other than dialogue will force us into a dark tunnel with disastrous consequences. The nation as a whole will pay the price, something which we won’t allow,” the statement said.

“Which way the military dice will fall is the big question,” said Nkrumah, the son of Ghana’s late president Kwame Nkrumah and an Egyptian Coptic mother.

“While high-ranking military officers traditionally sided with the former regime of Mubarak, it is uncertain where the loyalty of the second tier of the army now lies and how far their ranks have been infiltrated by the Brotherhood. Many of the poorer, less educated lower-ranking soldiers are probably MB sympathisers.”

Another part of the equation is whether the powerful judiciary will throw its weight behind the Islamists or behind the revolutionaries, although indications so far are that it is hostile to Mursi’s government.

“Traditionally many in the judiciary were also supporters of Mubarak. But like the military, both institutions have been infiltrated by the MB and both sides have their sympathisers,” Nkrumah said.

What does appear certain, however, is that neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor their opponents are prepared to compromise.

“The Brotherhood is consolidating its power on the ground with the Salafists. They believe they have God on their side and are fighting for the survival of and further implementation of Sharia law,” Nkrumah said.

For their part, the secular parties, unlike the Islamists, have limited electoral support, no message with widespread appeal and no apparatus to reach deeply into society in order to drum up support.

“They have been weak and divided in the past and it remains to be seen whether they can unite, put their differences aside and formulate a path ahead,” Nkrumah added.

“The standoff is the unavoidable consequence of a struggle for power between two political forces that have no incentive to compete in the same political arena on the basis of accepted rules of the game,” says Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“One side (MB) fights through the vote, and the other (pro-Mubarak elite) through the courts—and both appeal to the streets to bypass the official political process,” she wrote in a late November article, “A Choice of Two Tyrannies”.

“The confrontation increasingly is taking on the character of a Greek tragedy, with Egypt hurtling toward authoritarianism no matter which side prevails. The only question is whether it will be the tyranny of the Islamist majority or that of the secular minority.

“Either way, the prospects for a democratic denouement to the uprising…are dim—non-existent in the short-run and questionable at best in the medium-run, with the long run too distant to hazard predictions.”

Egyptian protesters demonstrate against President Mursi and the new draft constitution outside the presidential palace in Cairo. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS

By Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani
CAIRO, Dec 13 2012 (IPS)

This Saturday, Egyptians will head to the polls to vote on a controversial draft constitution. The referendum has divided this nation – still pulsing with the revolutionary fervour that toppled former dictator Hosni Mubarak in early 2011 – with most Islamist parties and groups supporting the proposed national charter, while liberal, leftist and ‘revolutionary’ groups, in addition to Egypt’s sizable pro-Mubarak demographic, are opposed to it.

“The crisis over Egypt’s post-revolution constitution has led to unprecedented degrees of polarisation, which has already (sparked) violence,” prominent political analyst Tawfiq Ghanem told IPS. “It’s very precarious. Both camps are able to mobilise vast numbers, which has allowed both sides to claim popular legitimacy.”

Tuesday saw competing mass rallies in Cairo: one in support of the draft constitution, and another, held outside the presidential palace, at which protesters demanded the referendum be postponed. Both demonstrations drew tens of thousands.

Opponents of the proposed constitution say the document doesn’t do enough to curb presidential powers and guarantee personal freedoms. They also complain that the 100-member constituent assembly that drafted the charter was dominated by Islamist-leaning members.

“Egypt’s earlier (1971) constitution was much better than the document that will be put to a vote this Saturday,” Gaber Gad Nassar, constitutional law professor and former constituent assembly member, told IPS. “The draft charter fails to reflect the demands of last year’s popular uprising, which ended 30 years of corruption and dictatorship” under the now-deposed president Hosni Mubarak.

Last month, Nassar – along with most other non-Islamist members – quit the assembly to object to what they saw as ‘Islamist domination’ of the charter-drafting body. Seemingly unfazed, remaining members – roughly two thirds of the assembly – approved the final draft constitution following a 20-hour marathon session.

“I left the assembly to protest draft articles concerning the president’s powers, as well as last-minute changes made to articles relating to civil liberties,” said Nassar. “I also objected to how the Islamist members who dominated the assembly had ignored proposals put forward by non-Islamist members.”

Magdi Hussein, a prominent Islamist-leaning political analyst, defends the draft, saying that non-Islamist members withdrew en masse, just before a final assembly vote on the document, in order to derail the drafting process.

“Besides, there can never be total consensus on any constitution anywhere in the world,” Hussein told IPS. “A certain degree of dissent is inevitable.”

“The only way out of the current crisis (that will also) realise the goals of last year’s revolution – namely, democratic transition – is to put the proposed constitution to a popular vote,” he added. “The opposition is welcome to vote ‘no’ if it wants to.”

If more than half of Egypt’s registered voters vote ‘yes,’ fresh parliamentary elections will be held within 60 days. If the draft is rejected, a new constituent assembly will be drawn up – members of which will be selected via direct elections – and tasked with drafting a brand new charter within six months.

On Dec. 8, President Mohamed Mursi – who, along with the Muslim Brotherhood group from which he hails, supports the draft charter – called on the opposition to list the draft articles they found objectionable. He went on to promise that said articles would be raised for discussion in the next parliament’s opening session.

On the same day, Mursi – despite opposition demands that the referendum be delayed – issued a presidential decree stating that the poll would go ahead as scheduled. The decree replaced an earlier, highly controversial Nov. 21 decree that had made the president’s decisions impervious to judicial challenge.

It was this latter decree that triggered the latest crisis, bringing hundreds of thousands onto the streets nationwide to protest the president’s bold move against the judiciary.

Mursi’s critics portrayed the decree, which also protected the constituent assembly and Shura Council (the parliament’s upper house) from dissolution by court order, as ‘dictatorial’ and a ‘naked power-grab.’

The president’s supporters, however, saw the move as a means of reigning in a hostile judiciary that had served the Mubarak regime, especially Egypt’s High Constitutional Court (HCC).

Supporters of President Mursi rally outside Cairo Universtiy. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS

The HCC played a pivotal role in the dissolution this summer of Egypt’s freely-elected People’s Assembly (parliament’s lower house), roughly three quarters of which had been won by Islamist candidates. It was an HCC verdict deeming the elected assembly ‘unconstitutional’ (based on a legal technicality) that allowed Egypt’s then-ruling Supreme Military Council to order its dissolution.

“Mursi and his supporters view the judiciary, especially the HCC, as trying to undermine the president’s decisions at every turn and threatening democratically-elected bodies with dissolution,” said Ghanem, adding that the controversial ‘November 21’ decree “was intended to pre-empt anticipated HCC rulings against the constituent assembly and Shura Council”.

The anti-constitution camp, meanwhile, has coalesced around a recently-formed National Salvation Front (NSF), led by prominent reform campaigner Mohamed ElBaradei and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabbahi.

This camp has produced unexpected bedfellows, uniting liberal, leftist and ‘revolutionary’ groups with supporters of the ousted Mubarak regime.

“Ironically, the revolutionaries who got rid of Mubarak are now supported by members of his old party,” ElBaradei himself conceded in a Dec. 3 editorial in the Financial Times.

Mursi supporters, for their part, accuse the NSF of spearheading a “coup” against the elected president’s democratic legitimacy. They see Moussa and Sabbahi as failed presidential contenders who lost to Mursi in fair elections this summer and who now simply want to trip up Egypt’s democratic transition.

“Egypt’s liberal, secular elite has openly thrown in its lot with remnants of the Mubarak regime against Egypt’s democratically-elected president in hopes of derailing the formation of functioning state institutions,” said Hussein. He described the NSF as “counter-revolutionary.”

According to Hussein, the true aim of the opposition’s recent mobilisation against the constitutional poll – which has moved its main protest venue from Tahrir Square to the presidential palace – is nothing less than Mursi’s ouster.

“The political opposition doesn’t want reconciliation,” he said. “They are using the current constitutional crisis to attempt to unseat the elected president.”

The issue has already led to several incidents of violence. At least ten people were killed last week in clashes between supporters and opponents of the president, after the latter surrounded the presidential palace in Cairo.

At around the same time, unknown assailants attacked several of the Muslim Brotherhood’s provincial offices as well as Mursi’s private residence.

“Everyone has the right to peaceful protest to express their views,” said Hussein. “But threatening state institutions, including the presidential palace itself, is totally unacceptable and will simply lead to further chaos and bloodshed.”

He added: “Opposition to the policies of Egypt’s democratically-elected head of state should be settled at the ballot box, be they presidential and parliamentary polls or the upcoming constitutional referendum.”

(END)

An Ennahda poster in Tunis. Credit: Jake Lippincott/IPS.

By Justin Hyatt
TUNIS, Nov 26 2012 (IPS)

A year has passed since the provisional government assumed power in Tunisia. Following in the wake of the revolutionary changes brought on by the Arab Spring, the moderate Islamic Ennahda party won the majority and formed a coalition with the two secular parties Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol in October last year.

With the promise to hold new elections a year later, the country waited as Oct. 23 approached.

The day came and went, without the ruling government stepping down. Small protests erupted in the streets of the capital and later elsewhere but there were no large-scale rallies.

“I experienced the greatest deception of my life, “a young psychologist and actress from Tunis who gave her name only as Meriem told IPS. Even if the ruling government did not immediately step down, she said, people were hoping for some sign that change was in the works.

“I don’t care who is in power, but I want to see action, see something happening,” she said. “But after such a let-down, I was crying like a fool.”

The ruling coalition has claimed that more time is needed to prepare elections, and has instead pegged Jun. 23, 2013 as the next election date.

Usama Zekri, a blogger, stressed that more time is indeed needed to fully prepare for the elections that will usher in the first four-year political cycle.

“While the National Assembly is perhaps slow,” Zekri told IPS, “Tunisians are not used to open debates and talking with each other, thus we need time to learn and also to make mistakes.”

Nidaa Tounes (‘Call of Tunisia’) has generated some of the strongest opposition support recently. The party is led by octogenarian former prime minister Beji Caid Essebsi, and holds to a strict secular line.

Nesrine Dridi, a dentist, claims that the best solution for Tunisia would be a secular power structure as envisioned by Nidaa Tounes, leaving religion as a matter of choice.

“We used to be a tolerant society, but now religion is forming dividing lines,” says Dridi. “What we need is for people of all stripes to work hand in hand to promote our country and establish a free society.”

Many in the opposition are worried that while Ennahda espouses moderate Islam, it is actually keen on promoting religion throughout all areas of government and public life.

The Salafist movement represents the hardline ultraconservative branch of Islam, but Ennahda can position itself as a moderate strain, needed by all to preserve a balance in the style of governance.

In forming the new constitution, Ennahda seemed open to Salafist demands for greater inclusion of Sharia law. But this was quelled by opposition groups and secular parties.

This was seen as a warning sign for those who are worried that liberal democratic values might draw the shorter straw. Yet, according to Zekri, the opposition has been too preoccupied attacking Ennahda on the religious front, and could do more to propose an alternative economic programme.

In order to fully reassure the country that the democratic evolution is on the right track, the ruling coalition will have to prove that proper steps are being taken.

The establishment of the independent Committee on Elections is seen as such a sign, but many have still to be convinced of its impartiality and readiness to get to work.

Beyond this, serious progress will need to become evident elsewhere. Among the greatest tasks facing the government are high unemployment and the rising cost of living.

In October the Swiss government and the International Finance Corporation granted Tunisia a million dollars to implement business procedural reform. An Austrian trade delegation has visited Tunisia to explore possibilities for Tunisian-Austrian relations.

These are just a few of many overtures currently, but it is not clear how all this will translate into jobs and putting more people to work.

Tunisians remain in a state of uncertainty, eager for signs that the country is headed in the right direction, and that the blood and sweat of the Jasmine revolution will help cement Tunisia’s place as the best-transitioned democracy in North Africa.

For now, the streets remain relatively calm, without large-scale protests taking place, yet President Moncef Marzouki recently admitted to having nightmares of a second revolution.

Activists like Meriem are poised to jump into action, if the need arises.

“I don’t want to be an activist, I’d like to get on with my life,” stresses the actress, “but if I feel like my voice needs to be heard again, I won’t wait for a minute to get out on the street.”

A protester rests during a day of clashes after President Mursi expands his powers. Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS.

By Cam McGrath
CAIRO, Nov 24 2012 (IPS)

When Mohamed Mursi was sworn in as president in June there were concerns that the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history would be subservient to the military council that had ruled the country since dictator Hosni Mubarak was toppled in early 2011.

But by August, Mursi had pulled off a political coup, issuing a decree that purged the military of its leadership and left him in sole control of the government, with full executive and legislative authority. A decree issued Thursday expanded Mursi’s power even further, putting his decisions beyond dispute and neutralising the judiciary that was one of the last institutions challenging his Islamist government.

“Not since the days of the pharaohs has an Egyptian leader amassed so much power,” says Ahmed Hamid, an activist protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. “Even Mubarak never dared to go this far, and you saw what happened to him.”

Mursi’s decision to expand his own powers set off a political firestorm, exposing deep rifts between his supporters – predominantly members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other conservative Islamic groups – and the liberal and secular Egyptians who are his main opponents. Clashes erupted as the rival camps held demonstrations in cities across Egypt on Friday.

In a seven-article declaration, Mursi sacked the Mubarak-era prosecutor general and ordered new investigations and trials of all those accused of killing or injuring protesters since the start of last year’s uprising – a decision that could see Mubarak retried.

More contentiously, he declared the upper house of parliament and the constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution immune from dissolution by any court. The move appears aimed at pre-empting the verdicts of ongoing legal challenges that could see either body declared unconstitutional.

Mursi gave the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly an extra two months to draft a new constitution to replace the one suspended after Mubarak’s ouster. He ordered work to continue despite resignations by almost all of the assembly’s secular and Christian representatives, which have cost it much of its legitimacy.

Presidential spokesman Yasser Ali announced on national television that Mursi’s expanded powers were necessary to “protect the revolution’s gains” and end the stalemate with the judiciary that has stalled Egypt’s democratic transition. He said the presidential decree was aimed at “cleansing state institutions” and “destroying the infrastructure of the former regime.”

Egyptians who fought to bring down Mubarak’s authoritarian regime were particularly alarmed by a clause in the decree that states the president’s decisions cannot be suspended or revoked by any authority. Banners carried by protesters warned that Mursi had become “the new pharaoh.”

“The decree effectively renders presidential decisions final and not subject to the review of judicial authorities, which may mark the return to Mubarak-style presidency, without even the legal cosmetics that the previous regime employed to justify its authoritarian ways,” journalist Hesham Sallam wrote in an op-ed piece.

Mursi also granted himself the authority to take “any measures he sees fit in order to preserve and safeguard the revolution, national unity or national security.”

The clause assigns the president broad and only vaguely defined powers. Some activists drew comparisons to emergency laws under Mubarak that allowed security forces to arbitrarily arrest, torture and imprison political dissidents with impunity.

“Protesting here today against Mursi could be viewed as a ‘threat’ to the revolution or national unity,” says protester Mustafa Abbas, a primary school teacher. “This is a dangerous article that opens the door for witch hunts of the president’s opponents.”

Mursi’s declaration evoked strong reactions across Egypt, filling squares with demonstrators and reviving the spirit and slogans of the uprising last year that toppled Mubarak.

“The people want the downfall of the regime,” protesters chanted in Cairo.

And in a scene reminiscent of the heady days of the revolution, television stations used split screens to cover Friday’s pro- and anti-government rallies. As riot police rained tear gas down on his critics in Tahrir Square, Mursi triumphantly took the stage at a rally organised by the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming the mantle of the revolution.
“I never sought legislative authority and I would never use it to settle scores, but if my people, my nation, or Egypt’s revolution are in danger then I must,” he said.

Hoping to assuage fears, Mursi promised to relinquish his supplementary powers once a new constitution is adopted and a new parliament elected.

Nathan J. Brown, an expert on Egyptian law and politics at George Washington University, interpreted the underlying message: “I, Mursi, am all powerful. And in my first act as being all powerful, I declare myself more powerful still. But don’t worry – it’s just for a little while.” (END)

Women demonstrating to demand equality with men. The big banner says "No to child marriage". Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS.

By Cam McGrath
CAIRO, Oct 25 2012 (IPS)

During the uprising that toppled Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak women stood shoulder to shoulder with men in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, pressing the revolution’s demands for freedom, justice and dignity. But those who hoped the revolution would make them equal partners in Egypt’s future claim they may be worse off now than under Mubarak’s authoritarian rule.

“After the revolution, most of Egyptian society – and especially the Islamists – began attacking women’s rights,” says Azza Kamel, a prominent women’s rights activist. “They started to claw back rights that women had fought for and gained before the revolution, and are trying to change divorce and custody laws, push FGM (female genital mutilation), and reduce the age of marriage from 18 to nine years old.”

Kamel says women have been almost entirely excluded from leadership and decision-making positions since Mubarak’s ouster. The Committee of Wise Men, an advisory panel formed during the uprising, included just one woman among its 30 members. There have been no women appointed as governors, no women allowed in the authoritative State Council, and weak female representation in all post-Mubarak governments.

“We expected more,” Kamel laments. “There can be no democracy without equality, yet women are being excluded at every step.”

Women were granted the right to vote in 1956, but have historically been underrepresented in Egyptian political life. The country’s first free and fair parliamentary elections resulted in further setbacks. Women won just eight of the 508 seats in the now dissolved lower house of parliament, down from over 60 in the 2010 parliamentary elections when a quota was in place.

Political parties established since Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011 welcomed women as members, but appeared unwilling to gamble on them as candidates when it came time for elections. Electoral laws required all parties to field at least one female parliamentary candidate, but even liberal parties placed the women far down their candidate lists, weakening their chance of success.

Kamel accuses political movements, particularly the conservative Muslim Brotherhood, of disingenuously supporting calls for enhancing women’s rights and political standing in order to secure female participation in public demonstrations and at the ballot box.

“All of the political parties are using women for political leverage,” Kamel told IPS. “This has always been the case in Egypt.”

Many women saw the writing on the wall when President Mohamed Morsi reneged on his grandstand promise to appoint a female vice-president. The former Muslim Brotherhood leader has so far surrounded himself with an almost exclusively male corps of advisors, while the only two women in his 35-member cabinet are holdovers from the previous government.

But more worrying, says Kamel, is that the Muslim male-dominated constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution for Egypt is in a position to enshrine discriminatory limitations on women in the national charter. Not only are women almost entirely excluded from the constitution writing process, the assembly is stacked with Islamist figures who activists claim are attempting to impose their conservative religious values on all Egyptian society.

Many of the constituent assembly’s liberal and secular members resigned in objection to what one described as “a set will to produce a constitution that would be the cornerstone of a religious state, which will preserve the principles of the fallen regime and ignore the pillars of the Egyptian uprising of freedom, dignity and social justice.”

One particular point of contention is the wording of Article 68 in the draft constitution, which states that women are equal to men in political, economic, and social life provided that equality does not contradict the provisions of Sharia (Islamic law). Rights groups have opposed the article’s ambiguous religious framing.

Nehad Abu Komsan, director of the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR), explains that Sharia has in many instances been used to reinforce negative social attitudes towards women and impose restrictions on their freedom. Linking women’s rights to undefined provisions of Islamic law “opens the door to radical interpretations that can be used against women.”

“Sharia can be interpreted in many different ways,” says Abu Komsan. “Saudi Arabia considers Sharia as a reference (in its constitution) and prohibits women from driving a car, while Pakistan considers it a reference and had a woman leading the country.”

Although Egypt’s Islamist-led government has not completely ignored women, its policy changes have focused on paving the way towards a more conservative, patriarchal society. A recent ministerial decree allowed female flight attendants of state-owned EgyptAir to wear hijab (Islamic veil) for the first time, while new rules have extended the option to female television presenters.

“This is good, as wearing the veil is a personal right,” says domestic worker Umm Gamal, who is veiled herself. “But what we really need is to see more effort toward protecting the right of women to full participation in society. We should be 50 percent (in all leadership positions), not just a quota or novelty.”

A crowd of police at street demonstrations in Algiers on Feb. 19, 2011. Credit: Giuliana Sgrena/IPS

By Giuliana Sgrena
ALGIERS, Jun 20 2012 (IPS)

The on-going hunger strike of nine Algerian court clerks, coupled with the government’s indifference to their demands for an independent labour union, have stirred debate about Algeria’s role in the Arab Spring, which many see as an incomplete attempt to overturn a deeply flawed political and economic system.

Despite the fact that the health of the six women and three men, who have been fasting for over a month now, are deteriorating rapidly, neither the government nor the justice ministry has shown any indication that they will meet the workers’ demands.

“The health conditions are getting worse every day, three women are now in the Rouiba hospital; all of them have lost ten percent of their weight, and suffer from pain in their muscles and bones,” Nassira Ghozlane, chairwomen of the Autonomous National Trade Union of Public Administrations Workers (SNAPAP), told IPS.

“Also doctors are being pressured by authorities (the government) that want to minimise the impact of the hunger strike,” she added.

The justice workers started their protest last February, after the Minister of Justice failed to implement an agreement to improve working conditions. To make matters worse, the government still prevents workers from organising independent unions to advocate for their rights.

Nevertheless the clerks decided to create their own trade union affiliated to the independent SNAPAP.

These striking clerks are just one example of nation-wide discontent, that is daily manifest in strikes and protests around the country.

Thus many are curious as to why the wave of dissent, which began in earnest early last year, has failed to yield results in a country that offers fertile ground for resistance.

Following the now landmark act of self-immolation that sparked the Arab Spring in Tunisia, the practice spread through Algeria as well. Meanwhile opposition parties, unions, human rights organisations and bloggers united to form the National Coordination for Democracy and Change (NCDC) to organise rallies every Saturday.

“The slogan under which protesters rallied was ‘Systeme Dégage’ (System Go Away) not only ‘Bouteflika (referring to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika) Dégage’, because people knew that even if the president were to leave, nothing will change as the whole system is corrupted,” Nadjet Rahmani, one of the protesters, told IPS.

But protesters suffered a brutal crackdown, with 30,000 policemen and riot police surrounding the location of a May 1 demonstration and arresting numerous people last year.

Though government repression was swift, some observers believe the failure of the Algerian Spring is due more to memories of terror that still haunt the masses.

“We already had our revolution back in 1988. Although it was called the ‘couscous revolt’ (in reference to critical food shortages at the time) it was also a revolution for social justice, against the one party system, for democracy,” Cherifa Kheddar, chairwoman of Djazairouna (Our Algeria), an association of families of terrorism victims, told IPS.

“It was organised by trade unionists and activists, who were all put in jail and tortured. So the streets were occupied by Islamists, as (was the case) with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts,” she added.

Elections following the 1988 revolt resulted in the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front. The Algerian army, supported at the time by large swathes of the population including women’s groups who rightly feared the outcome of an Islamic party victory, interrupted the election and opened the floodgates to a period of bloodshed in the country that claimed 200,000 lives.

Both the army and the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) were responsible for the massive human rights violations that marked this dark period of Algeria’s history, in which 40,000 people were disappeared.

The Islamists clung to power for a year but even after they were ousted in 1992 they continued to threaten and kill anyone considered to be a non-believer – soldiers, politicians, women, intellectuals, teachers, hairdressers.

The period of terror only ended when then-president Bouteflika declared a national reconciliation programme that failed to persecute human rights violators or bring perpetrators of grave crimes to justice.

Exhausted by the wave of bloodletting, a majority of Algerians supported the presidential proposal, which effectively destroyed any substantial opposition for years to come.

As a result, the same tensions that plagued the country a decade ago are still very much alive today, with Islamists and secular people living side by side in simmering hostility.

Added to these old wounds are the issues of corruption, low salaries, inadequate housing and unemployment, which is particularly high among the country’s youth.

“People are still afraid of what happened in the 90s and they do not want to risk going back to that period, so they do not want to go to the street to protest,” Karima Moali, a secondary school teacher, told IPS.

Meanwhile, the Algeria government is using covert methods of warding off dissent, particularly the kind aroused by economic dissatisfaction.

Consistently high oil revenues suggest that by the close 2012 the foreign revenues fund will amount to some 205.2 billion dollars.

Currently, Algeria is producing 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, but “our capacity is 1.4 million barrels, and (could) reach 1.5 million in a few months,” said Algerian Energy Minister, Youcef Yousfi, in a summit in Kuala Lumpur on Jun. 7.

Thus the government has been able to allocate enough money towards employment-generating schemes, better housing, and social services in an effort to ward off social unrest.

State-owned companies have created enough new opportunities to bring unemployment down to 9.8 percent from 11.3 percent in 2008, according to national statistics, though the youth unemployment rate stands stubbornly at 20 percent.

The government also allocated funds towards new public housing and increased state salaries across the board, just prior to the May 10 elections.

“Of course there is not a fair redistribution of the oil revenue, as we asked for in the demonstrations; rather, (national) wealth is being used to avoid a worse situation that could provoke a revolution or a revolt,” Djamal Hammoune, a human rights activist, told IPS.

(END)