Syrian anti-regime fighters in the mountains of the Latakia region. Credit Shelly Kittleson/IPS

By Shelly Kittleson
JABAL AL-AKRAD (SYRIA), May 20 2014 (IPS)

In the mountains east of the coastal port of government-held Latakia, three years of regime bombardment has left swaths of blackened stumps in the mountain forests and crumbling concrete structures in Sunni villages, most of whose inhabitants support opposition forces.

Efforts by an alliance between moderate rebel groups and Islamists essentially cleared the area of the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) in an operation launched in early January. ISIS, a brutal Al-Qaeda splinter group disavowed by the global jihadist conglomeration’s leader, still holds extensive territory in the eastern part of the country.

Many forced to flee the country told IPS that they would support a truce if it might stop the killing.
Several thousand inhabitants from the mountainous area near the Syrian coast have left for Turkey or other regions. Many have fled here from areas under government siege – the United Nations estimates that some 250,000 people across the country are trapped in besieged areas – or ones subject to more unrelenting regime air strikes. Others are Sunnis fleeing persecution from the nearby Alawite stronghold of Latakia.

Ideological tendencies vary among the remaining fighting groups, some of which voice views barely distinguishable from those of ISIS. No precise figures exist for specific groups, but nationwide, the Islamic Front – which rejects secularism and a civil state – is thought to have over 40,000 men and Al-Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra reportedly has some 6,000.

On the road to the highest peak in Jabal Al-Akrad, a building with armed fighters patrolling its balcony was pointed out to IPS as housing Moroccans from the jihadist Sham al-Islam, a small Islamist group established in August 2013 in the coastal area by a former Guantanamo detainee. The IPS correspondent was told that the North African jihadists are “just staying there, not doing anything at the moment.’’

Some heavily armed fighters from the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra are also present in the area.

The Farouq Brigades, which claims to directly control at least half of the roughly 50 villages in Jabal Al-Akrad and have 17,000 men nationwide, espouses a non-ideological stance and is one of the major rebel factions that continue to counter ISIS in other areas of the country.

It has lost men in clashes against Jabhat Al-Nusra in the past as well, but for the time being seems to coexist warily alongside it on this front for the purposes of fighting regime forces. The group’s leader, a former lawyer from Homs known as Abu Sayeh, stressed to IPS that the group was fighting solely for Syrians’ right to choose.

Farouq was created in 2011 in the flashpoint area of Homs, the country’s third largest city and ‘cradle of the revolution’. Some 140 kilometres northeast of Damascus, Homs is also known as the ‘Stalingrad of the 21^st century’ due to the massive destruction and devastating siege suffered at regime hands.

Relatively well-organised with a large number of defected officers, Farouq has lost ground over the years to the better-funded extremist factions. Its role in the recent months’ anti-ISIS campaign alongside the other largest group voicing a strictly non-religiously-affiliated agenda, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF), has enabled it to regain some ground. SRF, based in the Idlib region east of the Jabal Al-Akrad mountains, claims to have 18,000 fighters on call across the country.

Farouq’s leader told IPS that it relies exclusively on individual donations and weaponry and ammunition won in battle, unlike the regular support from Saudi Arabia that the SRF is said to receive.

Commanders are adamant that their fight is entirely non-sectarian and say Christian inhabitants of the area continue to be helped by the community. On the issue of Alawite hostages from villages in the mountains temporarily taken by rebel fighters and then lost again in the late summer of 2013, one local commander said they were being treated well.

A request by IPS to meet with the hostages was denied out of concern that “regime troops would target the location if they knew where it was and then say that we killed them.’’

IPS was told that ‘’even an Alawite sheikh’’ was among the hostages but that the regime had thus far refused to countenance an exchange, in marked contrast to those like the early 2013 exchange of over 2,000 rebel prisoners for 48 Iranians.

Many forced to flee the country told IPS that they would support a truce if it might stop the killing. The Assad regime continues to reject the idea and insists on calling all those in rebel areas “terrorists’’, subjecting vast areas to mass starvation and relentless bombing, and is continuing reportedly continuing chemical attacks with ammonia and chlorine. It also claims to be winning the war – albeit with ever more substantial support from Iraqi Shia militias, the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and Iran.

The regime has called presidential elections on June 3, but a law requiring a registration card newly issued by the authorities makes voting virtually impossible for those in rebel-held areas and for the over nine million displaced out of a pre-war population of 22.4 million. Many residents of starved and besieged areas who have agreed to raise the Syrian regime flag in exchange for an alleviation of their circumstances have since been imprisoned.

Abu Jihad, a former regime officer who defected to return to his home territory in the mountains overlooking the Alawite homeland after ‘’seeing too much regime killing’’, told IPS that neither he nor his men would consider anything less than total victory.

As another bomb struck in the distance, he added that ‘’it just takes time.”

A member of the Free Syrian Army at the entrance to Sarmeen. Credit: Shelly Kittleson/IPS.

By Shelly Kittleson
SARMEEN, Syria, Dec 3 2012 (IPS)

As the death toll in Syria tops 40,000 and some 400,000 have taken refuge beyond the country’s borders, a dearth of funding for civilian projects in areas under Free Syrian control risks undermining efforts to keep inhabitants united and the limited lines of communication flowing.

A number of young Syrian activist groups travel between Istanbul and cities under Free Syrian Army (FSA) control to set up local administration councils, racing to provide essential services to the population before another winter arrives amid scant electricity, dwindling access to basic necessities and continued shelling of civilian areas. The groups coordinate with medical workers in the border area and FSA members, and maintain regular contact with embassies, individual donors and local populations.

Abdullah Labwani, 27-year-old nephew of well-known dissident and physician Kamal Labwani works with the Istanbul-based NGO Civil Administration Councils (CAC). In “another life”, as he called the period leading up to the revolution, he worked as an architect and taught at the University of Damascus.

From Istanbul he maintains contact with those inside Syria while trying to convince Western diplomatic representatives to send funds for medical, communications and food needs as managed by the councils.

This IPS correspondent travelled with Labwani to Sarmeen in the northwestern Syrian province Idlib in early November. With just over 20,000 inhabitants before the uprising, several thousand had fled the town amid continuing conflict in the area.

In March of this year, some 318 houses, 87 shops and numerous warehouses, pharmacies and mosques were destroyed in attacks by Syrian government forces on the town.

Human Rights Watch found that regime troops had killed at least 95 civilians, many by summary execution, in the assault on the eastern and southern parts of the province. Three brothers from Sarmeen’s Hajj Hussein family, for example, were taken out of their home, had their hands tied behind their backs and were killed and burned in front of their mother as a “lesson” to the town’s inhabitants.

Sarmeen has been under Free Syrian Army control since late March, but regime shelling near the town can be heard frequently. In the days spent there, helicopters were spotted flying overheard a number of times. The regime has reportedly engaged in extensive dropping of barrel bombs and cluster munitions on towns in the province.

Residents use flashlights, candles, oil lamps and generators, and are fortunate to get an hour or two of power a day – an hour when everyone hastens to turn on television sets to see the news and to recharge phone batteries.

To the background noise of generators whirling, a meeting was held on my first night there in the basement of a building by the members of the community selected to form the council.

The 20 to 25 local men who took part were enthusiastic over the possibility voiced by Labwani of sending some of them to Istanbul for training courses if CAC manages to raise funding. Sugary tea and Turkish-produced cola drinks were brought round whenever attention started to wane.

A few wore the traditional red and white keffiyeh, and an imam and a doctor were in long flowing robes, but most of those in their twenties sported jeans and the older men were dressed in more formal Western-style trousers and shirts. The ruddier, worn expressions of those with walkie-talkies by their sides marked those among them most heavily involved in the FSA.

The major point of contention was whether or not FSA members could be included in such initiatives and their role in the civil administration, as embassies potentially willing to put up the funds require a clear distinction between helping civilian initiatives and aiding military ones. FSA commanders feel they deserve the right to positions of authority in the town administration.

In the following days this correspondent visited the nearby village Ta’um, not far from the military base in Taftanaz. Of some 7,000 inhabitants before the conflict, less than 2,000 are said to remain.

Mostly only FSA members have chosen to stay on in this village filled with rubble, the remains of exploded and unexploded ordnance, and a few stray cats. It continues to be bombed, as do approximately 60 to 200 other towns across Syria every day.

FSA fighters repeatedly call for more weapons, and claim that if they get them soon enough they could “prevent the need for large amounts of food aid and other assistance,” one of them, Abu Yassir, told IPS.

Given the fallout resulting from funneling weapons to non-state actors in recent decades, though, it is unlikely that arms will be supplied in any substantial amounts directly to the FSA by Western nations unless the Syrian National Coalition receives recognition as a government in exile, and until the FSA is seen as being under its command structure.

The Syrian National Coalition was founded in Doha on Nov. 11 to replace the Syrian National Council, and has thus far been recognized as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Syrian people by the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, France, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Whether those doing the fighting will be willing to relinquish control to those who are not remains to be seen. That said, with the exception of the commanders, all of the FSA members IPS spoke to had other hopes for the future – to return to their studies, to open a business, or attend a military academy “to get some real training”, as the fighter and former university student Abu Yahia put it.

In the meantime, civil administration councils seem one of the few ways to keep communities organised, make sure outside funding goes towards providing essential services, and establish a structured channel for communication and coordination between those inside and those outside the conflict area. (End)

Ishmael Beah, UNICEF Advocate for Children Affected by War, visits Central African Republic and talks to released child soldiers in Akroussoulback. Courtesy: Brian Sokol/UNICEF

By Kristin Palitza
CAPE TOWN, South Africa, Aug 28 2012 (IPS)

The protection of children remains critical in the Central African Republic, where parents willingly give their children to armed groups in exchange for protection and services.

This is according to United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF) ambassador Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier from Sierra Leone, who spoke to IPS during his visit to South Africa.

Beah had just returned from a trip to CAR where he witnessed the release of 10 child soldiers in the conflict-ridden, northeastern town of N’dele by the rebel group the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP).

The move comes after the CPJP signed a peace accord with the government on Aug. 25 – yet another small step towards ending years of violence in the country. The release of the children was the group’s show of commitment towards peace. However, more than 2,500 boys and girls are thought to still work for various armed groups in the Central African nation.

Seven years of civil war have led to food scarcity, a collapsed economy and limited access to healthcare and education. Despite its mineral wealth, CAR remains one of the world’s least-developed countries. In 2011, CAR ranked 179 out of 186 countries in the U.N. Human Development Index.

“In CAR, parents willingly give their children to armed groups in exchange for protection and services, even though it’s against the children’s human rights. That makes it very difficult to negotiate the release of children,” Beah told IPS.

One of the armed groups operating in CAR is the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by internationally hunted Joseph Kony. Two LRA leaders under Kony, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, who are sought by the International Criminal Court, are reportedly hiding in CAR.

The LRA has increased its attacks in the country since early 2012 and continues to abduct children as fighters.

Beah was himself forcibly recruited into Sierra Leone’s civil war, in which his parents and two brothers were killed, when he was 13. He fought alongside rebel groups for two years until he was removed from the army and placed in a rehabilitation home.

He now lives in New York, where he works as a human rights activist. His book “A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier” has been translated into 35 languages and was on the New York Times bestseller list for more than 50 weeks.

Excerpts of the interview follow:

Q: You witnessed the release of 10 child soldiers in CAR, one of the world’s poorest nations. What is life like there?

A: The government of CAR only has control over the capital city, Bangui. When you arrive in N’dele you understand how it is possible for an armed group to operate there; it is because the government is not providing social and economic services. Poverty is very stark, there are no resources or opportunities.

So it’s the armed group there, the CPJP, which provides some services. That’s why the group is very entrenched in the community. You see them walk around with weapons everywhere.

Q: Armed groups are part of the social fabric?

A: Yes, exactly. Still, the kids don’t want to fight. Once you take them away from the commanders, they tell you “I don’t want to do this.” But there are no alternatives beyond joining the armed group. The community relies on them. And the rebels have all the opportunities.

Q: How does a release operation happen?

A: The military doesn’t want to release the kids. They hide them. When you arrive at a military camp, the children who were identified are nowhere to be found. There are negotiations with the commanders until, slowly, they bring the kids out. After that, you have to leave immediately, because some of the children’s families live within the communities (and belong to the rebels).

The children are brought to a transit and rehabilitation centre in N’dele, where they receive psycho-social therapy as well as vocational training or are sent back to school.

Q: It sounds like a long, difficult process.

A: Yes. Added to that is that the rebels have weapons and ammunition, while you don’t have any protection. You rely on them keeping their promises. Everything about the situation is dangerous. When we landed in N’dele, the whole airport was surrounded by rebels with brand-new, sophisticated weapons, guarding the place. You are very exposed.

Q: What will happen to the rest of the estimated 2,500 child soldiers in CAR?

A: Right now, the rehabilitation centre takes care of 35 kids, and I witnessed the release of 10 more. Slowly, more and more are being released. All (three) rebel groups in the country have signed action plans to release children. But if nobody forces them, they will not do it.

Q: Visiting N’dele was to some degree a return to your past. How did that feel?

A: It brought up a lot of memories. I was driving in the car with the child soldiers who had just been released and could feel their uncertainty about being removed from what they know. I was in that same position (when I was a child soldier). I told them: “Things will be difficult, but you’re going to get through this.”

Once they understood that I had the same experience, there was a kinship that helped ease the situation a little. It’s such a daunting situation. You had this power of the weapon – some of them were lieutenants – and all of a sudden you’re just a child again, trying to figure out what to do with your life.

Q: How did they react when they heard your story?

A: They asked me questions repetitively. “Is it really possible to get through this? Can we actually have another life after this?” I was very honest with them. “It’s possible but it’s not easy. You’re going to be frustrated a lot. It’s not going to be as fast as you like.”

They are coming from an experience where they get things as fast as they like because they have a weapon. They understand these things when they come from someone like me.

Q: Are there viable alternatives for children in a poverty-stricken country like CAR?

A: There are viable alternatives, but they require long-term investment. If you want successful rehabilitation, you have to be willing to look beyond one year.

Q: What are the core demands of the CPJP and other armed groups?

A: During my visit, I talked to CPJP leader Abdoulaye Hissene. He said he started his group because of social-economic inequalities in the country. The official demand is for the government to provide services. Of course he is right, but he is using the argument to pursue his own, personal agenda. He is tapping into people’s needs, so they buy into his ideology. But then the only option he provides is armed struggle, which doesn’t solve people’s problems.

Q: What is Hissene’s hidden agenda?

A: He will not tell you, but from close observation you can tell that he wants to benefit from the natural resources in the area, the diamonds, the gold, and so on. In the end, all natural resource wealth goes to the armed groups or the government, but never reaches the people. That’s the problem.

Q: What presence does the LRA have in CAR?

A: The LRA is very strong in the southeast of the country. A lot of work needs to be done in that area to protect children. Since the beginning of this year, there have been frequent attacks and abductions (of children) by the LRA. Already, the government has no capacity to fight the armed groups in the country. Now there is this foreign group that has come in that is even stronger.

Q: Do you see any chance of the LRA agreeing to peace in CAR as well?

A: I am not sure. The LRA is very unpredictable. But what I do know is that many young people from this group would run away if they had a secure place to go to, instead of being arrested by authorities that try to get information out of them.

If there were a place that took them back as children and rehabilitated them, they would find a way to escape. You can’t just tell someone to put down a gun and then leave him out in the cold or throw him into prison. Structures need to be put into place for these children to leave. To get to the heart of the LRA or any other armed group you need to make sure that the candidates who can be recruited are not available.

Excerpt:

Nearly 270,000 refugees have had to flee their homes since January, when conflict erupted in northern Mali. Credit: William Lloyd-George/IPS

By Souleymane Faye
DAKAR, Aug 14 2012 (IPS)

Military action by West African states against the insurrection in northern Mali would be extremely risky without diplomatic support from neighbouring Algeria and Mauritania, according to International Crisis Group researcher Gilles Yabi.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has said it is ready to deploy troops to help Mali’s interim government fight rebels who seized the northern part of the country in March. However, Yabi says it is essential that Mali’s non-ECOWAS neighbours, who have a degree of influence over the armed groups in Mali, offer diplomatic support.

Yabi, West Africa Project Director for the Brussels-based Crisis Group, also told IPS that reintegrating northern Mali with the rest of the country could not be accomplished in the short term. Excerpts of the interview follow:

Q: In a recent report, ICG said that an armed intervention by ECOWAS carries risks, including that of widening the crisis into other countries. What is the nature of this risk?

A: Our report warned that an external military intervention would have to be carried out jointly with the Malian army, which is presently not fully under control. An intervention risks seeing the conflict spill over into neighbouring countries, which all have links with armed groups or communities originally from northern Mali. The risk of triggering conflict between ethnic communities will be high, and this would have repercussions in neighbouring countries.

There are also major risks in abandoning large areas to Islamist groups linked to terrorism. These include an increase in brutal practices such as stoning as well as seeing fresh recruitment into the ranks of the jihadist armed groups.

But this doesn’t justify a rush to armed intervention by ECOWAS countries, which are themselves fragile in political and military terms.

Q: Do you think that the ECOWAS initiatives could lead to Mali’s government recovering control of the north of the country from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist group Ansar Dine? Will Mali get U.N. approval for a military intervention?

A: The north has largely passed into the control of the Islamist movements, particularly Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which are both linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The MNLA is no longer a significant military force on the ground.

I believe we must accept that the reintegration of the north into the Malian state will not happen in the short term.

Despite its willingness to act, ECOWAS does not have the means to help the Malian government – which is itself being restructured – to recover the territory captured by the Islamist forces. The political conditions in Bamako and the disarray of the Malian armed forces sharply limit the options. A military intervention in these conditions would be dangerous.

Once a new government is formed, the transitional institutions announced by interim president Dioncounda Traoré are put in place, and the real work of coordinating political, diplomatic and military actions between the Malian government, ECOWAS, and non-ECOWAS neighbours Algeria and Mauritania is accomplished… then we can expect a review of the issue of seeking authorisation from the U.N. Security Council for an external military deployment…

Mali can only have a clear position on this question when the battle for control of the transition in Bamako is finished.

Q: Do you think that a massive infiltration of Mali’s neighbours by elements of Ansar Dine and AQMI could take place?

A: That depends on what you mean by “massive”. That elements linked to Ansar Dine, MUJWA or AQMI could cross into Mali’s neighbours – or even that they already have – would not be surprising.

For Algeria and Mauritania, we can’t talk about infiltration. AQMI is originally a product of Algeria’s history and its principal leaders are still Algerians. And Mauritania has suffered several terrorist attacks in the last few years which were carried out by Islamists, directly linked to AQMI or not.

We can only talk about the risk of infiltration with regard to Mali’s neighbours in the south. There too, we can’t exclude the possibility, as it is easy to cross the borders in these areas. But the fear of an invasion of these southern neighbours by jihadists doesn’t seem reasonable to me.

Still, a handful of motivated and trained operatives could be enough to destabilise a country with terror attacks. So we can’t underestimate the threat.

Q: What’s your overall assessment of diplomatic and political initiatives by ECOWAS to resolve the political crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau?

A: You can’t accuse ECOWAS of being unresponsive or lacking initiative in either Mali or Guinea-Bissau. The organisation has held several summits of heads of state and adopted strong resolutions on paper.

In the case of Mali, it even called for strong economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions to force a return to formal constitutional order following the coup (in March). But the framework agreement that Burkinabè mediators signed with the junta on ECOWAS’s behalf also sent mixed, even contradictory, signals to the country’s military and political actors.

Here once again, ECOWAS has shown its limitations when it comes to moving from affirming its principles to making decisions. ECOWAS is partly responsible for the weaknesses of the framework agreement and the conditions of implementation for the transitional government that it is today trying to reconstitute.

With respect to Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS was very firm and did not hesitate once it chose a course of action, even if this left it open to criticism. The organisation condemned the April coup and worked with the military junta to set up a transitional government that was not truly legitimate, but was judged acceptable by a wide spectrum of political and military actors united against the former prime minister and favoured candidate in the presidential election, Carlos Gomes Junior.

ECOWAS sent a military mission to Guinea-Bissau which we have heard very little about. The problem is that no one really knows just what this force’s mandate is and how military and diplomatic action by ECOWAS would help the country to finally address the crucial reforms which now seem indefinitely postponed, beginning with reform of the armed forces.

This will be an important test of the capacity of the organisation to show coherence between its positions and its actions over time.

Q: Would the contribution of non-ECOWAS members such as Algeria or Mauritania be effective in resolving the Mali crisis? Is the “wait-and-see” approach of Algeria realistic and positive when the Islamist groups actually originated there?

A: All the so-called “pays du champ” (Niger, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali) are affected by the Mali crisis. They can’t be indifferent. If ECOWAS takes the military route without significant diplomatic backing from Mali’s neighbours – who can potentially influence the armed groups – then the organisation will be taking a big risk.

Diplomatic efforts in the past few weeks, especially towards Algeria, show that no one actively engaged with the Mali crisis is ignoring the importance of ECOWAS’s neighbours. That includes France, whose foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, toured several capitals in the region recently.

Algeria knows what is expected of it in this crisis, given its status as the region’s military power, as intermediary or mediator in many previous crises in northern Mali, and as the original home of AQIM.

The country’s attitude is no longer necessarily to wait and see: Algeria has expressed its preference for a political situation in northern Mali. ECOWAS and Mali’s transitional authorities must ask Algiers to say more about what it can contribute to a negotiation process with the armed groups, particularly Ansar Dine, whose leader Iyad Ag Ghali is well known in Algeria.

Excerpt:

Voters in Sabha want peace in a new Libya. Credit: Rebecca Murray/IPS.

By Rebecca Murray
SABHA, Libya, Jul 12 2012 (IPS)

On election day long lines of people from Sabha’s impoverished community of Tayuri waited to vote under the harsh Saharan sun. Four hundred miles from the Mediterranean coast, Sabha is tucked into the volatile southwest bordering Algeria, Niger and Chad.

Tayuri’s non-Arab Tabu and Tuareg excitedly voiced hope to validate their Libyan status, and live a better life. Systematically discriminated against by the Gaddafi regime which promoted an ‘Arabisation’ campaign in Libya, the majority of voters interviewed by IPS said Mahmoud Jibril’s winning liberal National Forces Alliance (NFA) party best represented their interests. Voting began last weekend and was only completed Wednesday.

“I want equal rights between people, identification papers and education,” says Mohammed Lakba, 35, an unemployed Tuareg family man. “I hope our situation gets better. There is no opportunity. There are tribal problems, and we need security and stability.”

In a last minute controversial twist to appease Libya’s east, the National Transitional Council (NTC) stripped the new National Congress’s power to appoint a 60-member constitutional committee proportionally from each of Libya’s three regions. Instead they say Libyans will vote for the committee members directly.

Of the 90,000 Libyans registered in the sixth electoral district of Sabha and Al Shati, nearly half are female. The area’s total population is an estimated 150,000, with seats allotted for seven independent candidates and nine political parties.

Libya’s total population is an estimated six million – most residing along the coast – with 2.8 million registered voters nationwide.

The country’s vast southern desert swathe – with Sabha to the west and Kufra’s oasis in the east – is where Gaddafi’s ambitious ‘man-made river project’ pipes underground water to the thirsty, populous north. It is also home to huge oil reserves, rare minerals, and lucrative cross-border trafficking of weapons, gasoline and goods out of Libya, and drugs, alcohol, and sub-Saharan migrants into the country.

Libya’s long, porous border has attracted the attention of Europe and the United States’ African military command, AFRICOM, which hopes to prevent migrants reaching European shores, and stop the spread of Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’.

Yet many Sabha residents complain that the NTC in Tripoli has largely neglected their tattered city and southern borders, with loud Federalist proponents from Benghazi dominating Libya’s media landscape and political discourse.

“We understand the NTC is very busy in Tripoli,” says Ayoub Alzaroug, head of Sabha’s local council. “But we urgently need security. And we want stronger border security and we want the world to stand with us.”

Once a hub for international tourists venturing into the Sahara, Sabha’s shabby housing estates, destroyed hotels and piles of garbage are a picture of neglect. Hundreds of sub-Saharan Africans rest in groups on broken sidewalks after an arduous desert trek into Libya. Gun battles are heard at night, and security, jobs, health and education are the priorities here.

Fada Hassan, 25, dressed in a colorful abaya, sleepily mans a rudimentary kiosk filled with tinned goods in the Tayuri neighbourhood. She is Tabu; a traditionally semi-nomadic, darker-skinned indigenous tribe with ties to southern Libya, Sudan, Chad and Niger.

The Tabu endured decades of harsh discrimination under the Gaddafi regime, especially during Libya’s losing war for Chadian territory in the 1980s. According to a United Nations Human Rights Council report in July 2010, the government revoked many Tabu citizenships in 2007.

This has exacerbated confusion over which of the Tabu are from Libya, and who is ‘foreign’, and contributed to the delay of Kufra’s Tabu vote, which was completed Wednesday.

The Tabu were one of the first to join the revolution against the Gaddafi regime last year, utilising their desert networks to block the southern borders against sub-Saharan mercenaries aiding the loyalists.

Fada’s husband Othman Suleiman is Tuareg. Nomadic pastoralists who also live in Algeria, Niger and Mali, the Tuareg too are marginalised, with generations born in Libya discounted by the government. Gaddafi often deployed the Tuareg as fighters, including during the revolution, by promising citizenship documents in return.

Last year Fada and Othman fled to the south from Benghazi, fearing revolutionaries who suspected most black people of being Gaddafi loyalists or mercenaries.

Tayuri’s estimated 15,000 families live in illegal, ramshackle houses. Rubbish lines the unpaved roads, pipes lead to makeshift water wells, and sewage is stored in septic tanks. The area’s dilapidated school holds 50 students to a class, and the clinic was converted from a livestock barn. There are scant jobs for residents besides the illicit jobs in cross-border trade.

Without identification, residents are denied access to free education and healthcare, legal housing and formal jobs. They are unable to move through checkpoints.

Ironically, Tabu and Tuareg live peacefully together in Tayuri although many fought on opposing sides of the revolution.

“Gaddafi used the Tuareg to fight to get identification,” says Adoum Ahmad, the Tabu local council head for Tayuri. “The Tabu understood this, and how their life was miserable. They have no fight with the Tuareg.”

In late March, during ferocious clashes between Tabu and the Arab tribe, Abu Seif over a payment dispute, heavy weapons leveled houses in the poverty-stricken Tabu neighbourhood of Hajara.

Only when Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib and the national military leadership visited did an uneasy ceasefire take hold. In total 147 people were killed, with an estimated 400 injured from the fighting.

Popular independent candidate Abdul Ghader Swilhi explains. “First we didn’t know what was happening. There was a dispute over money and some Tabu were killed. But the Tabu made a mistake and attacked the airport, the hospital and the army headquarters. So we all came out to defend the city. When we realised it was about money, and not about the Tabu taking over Sabha, we withdrew.

“We have to sort out the disenfranchised,” he says adamantly. “In the future we need to put people in mixed neighbourhoods to avoid creating anger. Those living here for ten years should get Libyan identification, and eventually citizenship. And those who entered illegally should be returned.”

Striking a conciliatory note, another of Sabha’s candidates for the National Congress, Abdul Jalil Seif Nasser, agrees. He is a member of a tribe that was involved in the fighting. “We need peace for all Libya by talk, not guns.”