Baloch youngsters ride their motorbikes along the dry bed of the Helmand River. The total lack of economic and social opportunities pushes them to illegally migrate to neighbouring Iran, seeking a better life. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ZARANJ, Afghanistan, Mar 18 2015 (IPS)

Balochistan, divided by the borders of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a vast swathe of land the size of France. It boasts enormous deposits of gas, gold and copper, untapped sources of oil and uranium, as well as a thousand kilometres of coastline near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the wealth under their sandals, the Baloch people inhabit the most underdeveloped regions of their respective countries; Afghanistan is no exception.

“Against all odds, our national identity is [growing]. We just need the rest of the world to know about us.” -- Baloch intellectual and historian Abdul Sattar Purdely
Often overlooked, the Afghan Baloch count as just one among the many groups that make up the colourful ethnic mosaic of Afghanistan. And like the Pashtuns, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, they have also seen their land divided by the arbitrary boundaries in Central Asia.

Baloch historian and intellectual Abdul Sattar Purdely tells IPS there are “about two million of us in Afghanistan, but only those living in the southern provinces of Nimroz and Helmand speak Balochi.”

In his late sixties, this former MP during the rule of Mohammad Najibullah (1987-1992) is today a professor, writer, and a leading advocate for the preservation of the Baloch language and culture in Afghanistan.

In coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Education, Purdely has written textbooks in Balochi that go as far as the 8th grade, which are already being used in three schools.

The Baloch in Afghanistan make up just a tiny portion of a people scattered throughout the Iranian Plateau, but they are united by the experience of religious, linguistic and ethnic persecution in a region increasingly marked by Islamic extremism.

A shepherd and his family walk their sheep in Zaranj, capital of Afghanistan’s Nimroz Province. In the absence of comprehensive census data, the Baloch intellectual Abdul Sattar Purdely tells IPS that Afghan Balochs number about two million, though not all speak the Balochi language. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

The Baloch people, who hail from the Iranian plateau, have settled for centuries alongside the banks of the Helmand River in Afghanistan. But severe droughts and the excessive use of the river’s water for opium cultivation in Nimroz have lead to the collapse of agriculture in the province, affecting scores of Baloch families. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

The majority of the Baloch people are Sunni Muslims but their moderate vision of Islam has turned them into victims of growing Islamic extremism in the region. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

The neglected village of Haji Abdurrahman, in Afghanistan’s Nimroz province, is a hub for Afghan and Pakistani Baloch people, the latter seeking shelter in Afghanistan. Dozens of families struggle to survive in this cluster of mud houses without electricity or running water.

Baloch youngsters ride their motorbikes along the dry bed of the Helmand River. The total lack of economic and social opportunities pushes them to illegally migrate to neighbouring Iran, seeking a better life. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

A Baloch teenager poses next to his portrait inside his house in Nasirabad, another mud-hut village in Afghanistan’s Nimroz province. Like the majority of the local population, he is also illiterate. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

In Pakistan, for instance, the Baloch people have long weathered a crackdown against what the government calls an insurgency, while “Tehran is constantly trying to quell any Baloch initiative in Nimroz [a province in southwest Afghanistan] as they consider it a potential threat to their security,” according to Mir Mohamad Baloch, a political and cultural activist.

This Afghan-born Baloch tells IPS that an independent Balochistan is a “life dream” for him – but under current political conditions in the region, this dream is a long way from reality.

Currently, Zaranj hosts the only TV programme in Balochi in Afghanistan for one hour a day between five and six pm. Although the first TV channel in Balochi was set up in 1978 preceding the printing of the community’s first books and newspapers, the fall of the Communist government led to a sharp cultural decline in Afghanistan.

Historically a nomadic group, the Baloch people have endured years of brutal repression for their moderate vision of Islam. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, even issued a fatwa, an Islamic edict, against the people of Nimroz, calling for the ethnic cleansing of the Baloch and Shia population.

“Against all odds, our national identity is [growing] bigger despite the ongoing chaos in the country,” proclaims Abdul Sattar Purdely from his office in downtown Kabul. “We just need the rest of the world to know about us.”

A Baloch family from the Taliban-stronghold of Kandahar stand for a photograph. While millions of Afghans have fled to Pakistan over the past four decades, Pakistani Balochs are taking the opposite route, fleeing to Afghanistan to avoid repression by the Pakistani government. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

This Pakistani Baloch elder and his two sons are today hiding in Afghanistan. Rights groups have criticised the Pakistan government’s crackdown on the Baloch people. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Baloch fighters from the Balochistan Liberation Army crouch at an undisclosed location along the Afghan-Pakistan border. There are several Baloch insurgent groups fighting for independence in Pakistan. Some of their fighters often cross the border to evacuate the wounded and treat them in Afghan hospitals. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Karim and Sharif Baloch, both of them from Pakistan, show the portraits of their lost brother and father at their current residence in Zaranj. They tell IPS their relatives were killed in 2011 during a Pakistani military operation. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

A truck travels down a lost road in Nimroz, the only Afghan province where the Baloch minority form a majority. In the country’s remote southwest, Nimroz shares a 500-kilometre border with both Iran and Pakistan. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

A truck pauses at the Afghan-Iranian border in Zaranj, the administrative capital of Afghanistan’s Nimroz Province. Pakistani writer Amhed Rashid tells IPS this province is a smuggling hub through which heroin goes out and weapons come in. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Edited by Kanya D’Almeida

This Pakistani Baloch elder and his two sons are today hiding in Afghanistan. Rights groups have criticised the Pakistan government’s crackdown on the Baloch people. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ZARANJ, Afghanistan, Mar 18 2015 (IPS)

Balochistan, divided by the borders of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a vast swathe of land the size of France. It boasts enormous deposits of gas, gold and copper, untapped sources of oil and uranium, as well as a thousand kilometres of coastline near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the wealth under their sandals, the Baloch people inhabit the most underdeveloped regions of their respective countries; Afghanistan is no exception.

Often overlooked, the Afghan Baloch count as just one among the many groups that make up the colourful ethnic mosaic of Afghanistan. And like the Pashtuns, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, they have also seen their land divided by the arbitrary boundaries in Central Asia.

In his late sixties, this former MP during the rule of Mohammad Najibullah (1987-1992) is today a professor, writer, and a leading advocate for the preservation of the Baloch language and culture in Afghanistan.

In coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Education, Purdely has written textbooks in Balochi that go as far as the 8th grade, which are already being used in three schools.

The Baloch in Afghanistan make up just a tiny portion of a people scattered throughout the Iranian Plateau, but they are united by the experience of religious, linguistic and ethnic persecution in a region increasingly marked by Islamic extremism.

In Pakistan, for instance, the Baloch people have long weathered a crackdown against what the government calls an insurgency, while “Tehran is constantly trying to quell any Baloch initiative in Nimroz [a province in southwest Afghanistan] as they consider it a potential threat to their security,” according to Mir Mohamad Baloch, a political and cultural activist.

This Afghan-born Baloch tells IPS that an independent Balochistan is a “life dream” for him – but under current political conditions in the region, this dream is a long way from reality.

Currently, Zaranj hosts the only TV programme in Balochi in Afghanistan for one hour a day between five and six pm. Although the first TV channel in Balochi was set up in 1978 preceding the printing of the community’s first books and newspapers, the fall of the Communist government led to a sharp cultural decline in Afghanistan.

Historically a nomadic group, the Baloch people have endured years of brutal repression for their moderate vision of Islam. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, even issued a fatwa, an Islamic edict, against the people of Nimroz, calling for the ethnic cleansing of the Baloch and Shia population.

“Against all odds, our national identity is [growing] bigger despite the ongoing chaos in the country,” proclaims Abdul Sattar Purdely from his office in downtown Kabul. “We just need the rest of the world to know about us.”

Scene from an Ebola treatment facility run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Guéckédou, Guinea. Credit: UN Photo/Ari Gaitanis

By Azza Karam
NEW YORK, Nov 13 2014 (IPS)

The simultaneity presented by the outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus on one hand and militant barbarism ostensibly in the name of Islam on the other present the international development community – particularly the United Nations and international NGOs – with challenges, as well as opportunities.

At first sight, the two are unrelated phenomena. One appears to be largely focused on the collapse of health services in three countries, and to a lesser extent, on economic and political ramifications thereof.ISIS claims religion in its very name, ethos and gruesome actions. Can the international humanitarian and development worlds afford to continue to ignore religious dynamics – precisely because of the extent to which their actions challenge human rights-based actions?

The other, i.e., ISIS/ISIL/IS, appears to be a complex basket of geopolitical conflagrations involving a violently militant political Islam, weak governance dynamics, botched uprisings, transnational youth disaffection, arms proliferation — all to name but a few.

So what is the connection and why is this relevant to international development and humanitarian engagement?

In a Strategic Learning Exchange organised by several United Nations bodies, and attended by U.N. development and humanitarian staff, and their counterparts from a number of international faith-based development NGOs, which took place in Turin, Italy last week, the confluence of these challenges was tackled head-on.

The U.N. and faith-based NGO staff present work both in their headquarter organisations as well as on the ground in countries in Africa, Asia, and the Arab region.

In both sets of cases, there are realties of overstretched service providers seeking to respond, in real time, to rising death tolls, collapsing state-run services, and the actual inability to deliver basic necessities to communities struggling to stay alive because of diverse, but nevertheless man-made, barriers.

Some of these are run by those carrying arms and demarcating territories as off limits while those within them are imprisoned, tortured, killed, terrorized, and starved. Other barriers are made of communities hiding their ill and their dead, distrusting and fearing those seeking to help, and anguished over the loss not just of loved ones, but also of care-takers, sources of income, and means of protection.

But there are other barriers which the last few weeks and months have revealed as well, some of which present long-term challenges to institutional and organisational cultures, as well as to the entire ethos of international humanitarianism and development as we know it today.

The response to the Ebola virus, first and foremost, focused on the medical aspects – which was/is urgent and unquestionable.

But it took months before international aid workers realised one of many tipping points in the equation of death and disease transmission: that burial methods were key, and that even though there are manuals which seek to regulate those methods so as to ensure medical safety, there was relatively less attention paid to the combined matter of values, dignity and local cultural practices in such crisis contexts.

Burying the dead in a community touches the very belief systems which give value and meaning to life. How those infected with Ebola were buried had to be tackled in a way that bridged the very legitimate medical health concerns, but also enabled the family and community members to go on living – with some shred of meaningfulness to their already traumatised selves – while not getting infected.

When this particular dilemma was noted, faith leaders have been hastily assembled to advise on burial methods which bridge dignity with safety in these particular circumstances. But the broader and more long-term roles of ‘sensitising’ and bridging the medical-cultural gap between international aid workers, local medical personnel and over-wrought communities have yet to be worked out.

And the opportunity to address this medical-cultural gap (which is not new to development or humanitarian work) extends beyond burials of the dead and medical care for the living, to providing psycho-social support, and ensuring economic livelihoods. In these areas, too, faith-based NGOs have roles to play.

The militancy of ISIS and the repercussions of the war currently being waged both with and against them presents a similar set of cultural challenges to national and international actors.

This cultural feature was reiterated with cases from the same Arab region involving Hizbullah, Hamas, and now ISIS. How to navigate practical roadblocks controlled by parties you are not supposed to be talking to as a matter of principle, and who question the very legitimacy of your mandate, as a matter of practice – precisely because it does not ‘do religion’ and is part of a ‘Western secular agenda’?

Yes, there are manuals and protocols and procedures governing the provision of services and rules of engagement – in compliance with international human rights obligations. Yet, some hard questions are now glaring: should any form of ‘dialogue’ or outreach be possible between those who speak human rights law, and those who wish to speak only of “God’s laws”?

Are there lessons to be learned from prior engagement with (now relatively more mainstream) Hizbullah and Hamas, which may have resulted in a different trajectory for the engagement with ISIS today, perhaps?

Boko Haram’s actions in Nigeria and al-Qaeda’s presence (and elimination of Bin Laden) in Afghanistan have highlighted a link between religious dogma and critical health implications. Unlike with Ebola however, a possible role for faith leaders – and other faith-based humanitarian and development actors – has not been solicited. At least, not openly so.

And yet, could these roles shed some light on the particular ability of some religious actors to maneuver within humanitarian emergencies in these specific circumstances?

Could a clearer appreciation of the potential value-added of faith-based interventions – which have to be distinguished from those of ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, etc. – increase understanding of and dealing with a world view that is costing lives, now and in the future?

ISIS claims religion in its very name, ethos and gruesome actions. Can the international humanitarian and development worlds afford to continue to ignore religious dynamics – precisely because of the extent to which their actions challenge human rights-based actions?

And if the international community makes a choice to deal with any religious overtones – and is not capacitated in its current frameworks to do so – whose assistance will be needed to call upon, in which fora and with what means?

There are answers to some of these questions already percolating in several policy-making corridors, inherent in the experience of many cadres working with faith-based/ faith-inspired development NGOs, and academics who have devoted decades of research.

What was clear from the discussions in Turin, and other roundtables on religion and development, is that these questions have to be posed, because the answers belie multiple opportunities.

All opinions expressed belong to the author, and are not representative or descriptive of the positions of any organisation, Member State, Board, staff member or territorial entity.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

Abu Mohammed, whose family of 15 lost their home after an Israeli bomb attack, unearths papers from the rubble of a civil government office building in Gaza. Credit: Eva Bartlett/IPS

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 26 2014 (IPS)

When U.S. President Barack Obama addressed the U.N. General Assembly Wednesday, he was outspoken in his criticism of Russia for bullying Ukraine, Syria for its brutality towards its own people, and terrorists of all political stripes for the death and destruction plaguing Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia.

But as the New York Times rightly pointed out, Obama made only a “fleeting” reference to Israel and Palestine in his 40-minute speech to the world body.

Nadia Hijab, executive director of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, told IPS much of what Obama said about the “brutality” of the Assad regime in Syria and his criticism of “a world in which one nation’s borders can be redrawn by another” applies directly to Israel.

"What is remarkable and [bears] mentioning is that despite the tension in the region, despite the Israeli bombardment of Gaza, despite the long and forbidding occupation, despite all this, the Palestinians are yet reasonable and willing to sit and have a debate." -- Vijay Prashad, author of 'Arab Spring, Libyan Winter'
But he simply paid lip service to “the principle” that two states would make the region and the world more just without any indication of what the U.S. might do – or stop doing, she added.

Addressing the U.S. president directly, Hijab said: “Mr. Obama, the world would be a lot more just, if the U.S. just stopped footing the bill for Israel’s gross violations of human rights and international law.”

In his speech, replete with political double standards and hypocrisy, Obama avoided mentioning the killings and devastation caused by Israel with its relentless bombings and air strikes in Gaza – deploying weapons provided mostly by the United States.

“Russian aggression in Europe”, he said, “recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition” (reality check: Israel and its illegal settlements in the occupied territories).

“The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness” (reality check: the brutality of Israel in Gaza in 2014 and the killings of over 2,100 Palestinians, mostly civilians).

Each of these problems demands urgent attention. But they are also symptoms of a broader problem – the failure of our international system to keep pace with an interconnected world, he added.

Obama also told delegates there is a vision of the world in which might makes right – a world in which one nation’s borders can be redrawn by another (reality check: Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War and its determination to hold onto the spoils of war despite Security Council resolutions to the contrary.)

Obama said: “America stands for something different. We believe that right makes might — that bigger nations should not be able to bully smaller ones, and that people should be able to choose their own future” (reality check: a U.S.-armed Israel, which used its prodigious military strength to prove might is right).

And these are simple truths, but they must be defended, he added.

Obama also said America is pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as part of its commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and pursue the peace and security of a world without them (reality check: Israel, the only country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons and the U.S.’ refusal or reluctance to push for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.).

Vijay Prashad, professor of international studies at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, told IPS it is interesting that Obama wants to insulate the Israel-Palestine conflict from the recent crises in the Middle East.

“Is that possible?” he asked.

“Has Israeli occupation of Palestine not been one of the main points of radicalisation of young people in the region?” asked Prashad, referring to Obama’s concern over the rise in radicalism among youth, specifically in the Middle East.

“What is remarkable and [bears] mentioning is that despite the tension in the region, despite the Israeli bombardment of Gaza, despite the long and forbidding occupation, despite all this, the Palestinians are yet reasonable and willing to sit and have a debate,” said Prashad, author of ‘Arab Spring, Libyan Winter’.

He said there remains, even in psycho-socially battered Gaza, a consensus for a political solution. This the President should have mentioned, he added.

At the conclusion of his speech, Obama said the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza is not sustainable.

“We cannot afford to turn away from this effort – not when rockets are fired at innocent Israelis, or the lives of so many Palestinian children are taken from us in Gaza.”

“So long as I am President, we will stand up for the principle that Israelis, Palestinians, the region and the world will be more just and more safe with two states living side by side, in peace and security,” he added.

Prashad told IPS Obama addressed the rightward turn in Israeli society, and spoke to this toxic social agenda that is against peace and against negotiations.

This second part, which he did say, is very important.

“But it is lessened by the lack of the first point: that the Palestinians remain reasonable despite the war that batters them and the crises around them.”

Edited by Kanya D’Almeida

The writer can be contacted at: thalifdeen@aol.com

Kenya’s government was warned by Muslim clerics about the radicalisation and recruitment of youths by Al-Shabaab six years ago but did not take action, says Sheikh Ahmed, a management committee member of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya.

The state, he told IPS, dismissed the reports as a rift between Muslim clerics and failed to arrest senior preachers who openly give sermons calling on youths to fight believers of other religions and attack places of worship.

“At the beginning it was our problem but not now. This group [of extremists] has taken over the management of mosques. In Mombasa, the police are helping us repossess two mosques seized by the radical agents of violence,” said Ahmed.

On Wednesday Apr. 23, four people, including two policemen, died in a terror attack on Kenya when bombers drove a vehicle into a police station in the capital, Nairobi."This operation strategy is counter productive. The government’s decision to take this route has provoked anger." -- Nuur Sheikh, conflict expert

It was the latest in a spate of terror attacks in this East African nation. Last September, Kenya experienced the worst terror attack in years when gunmen from the Somali extremist group, Al-Shabaab, attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing at least 67 people.

But the Apr. 23 attack was seen as retaliation against the ongoing countrywide crackdown on illegal immigrants and refugees suspected of being affiliated with Al-Shabaab.

Nuur Sheikh, an expert on conflict in the Horn of Africa, believes harassment and forced repatriation is likely to incite acute hatred against Kenya and entice more youth to join the Al-Qaeda-linked extremist group.

“This operation strategy is counter-productive. The government’s decision to take this route has provoked anger. Somalis, whether from Kenya or from Somalia, and the Muslim community have suffered brutal police actions.

“This suits Al-Shabaab propaganda and alienates a community that can help fight terrorism,” Sheikh said in a phone interview with IPS.

Tensions have flared between Kenya and Somalia after Kenyan police arrested a Somali diplomat on Friday, Apr. 25. Somalia’s Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed said in a statement that his government was concerned about the arrest of law-abiding Somalis. Somalia has reportedly recalled its ambassador to Kenya.

According to local reports, police have arrested more than 4,000 Somalis and deported some 200 illegal immigrants. On Apr. 9 the first group of arrestees, consisting of 82 Somalis without legal refugee status, were deported. Last week, 91 more Somalis without valid documents were repatriated.

Executive director of the Muslim for Human Rights Forum, Al-Amin Kimathi, told IPS that the current operation was discriminatory and punished communities who have suffered the brunt of Al-Shabaab’s terrorism. He said it disrupted livelihoods, instilled fear and demonised the Somali and Muslim communities.

Police spokesperson Masood Mwinyi denied this.

“Its wrong and misleading to suggest only one community or one religious group is being targeted, we have also arrested Pakistani, Chinese and Indians and other illegal aliens from neighbouring states,” Mwinyi told IPS.

Ahmed Mohamed, secretary general of the Eastleigh business community, told IPS more than 75 percent of major businesses selling textiles, electronics, money transactions, restaurants and guest houses have been closed. The operation is mostly focused on Nairobi’s Eastleigh suburb, where a large population of Somalis reside.

An official from the Ethiopia Ogaden Refugees Association said on condition of anonymity that 14 people from Ogaden region in Ethiopia have been deported.

They all requested deportation to Somalia and not Ethiopia. Since the 1991 fall from power of Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ogaden National Liberation Front  intellectuals have fought for an independent state there and tensions remain between the Ogaden and Ethiopia.

“We must be exempted, our case, our status is different. We are Somalis but from Ethiopia. Any Ogaden deported to Ethiopia will be killed. No doubt, repatriating our people to a foreign country is terrible, wrong,” he said in an interview with IPS.

An Ethiopian who escaped his country after a series of arrests and threats on his life vowed he would never return home or to the camps of Somali refugees.

“We have suffered, we have been harassed here by police, the camps are not safe for us either. We are always threatened because Ethiopia’s troops are in Somalia and they are blamed for killing innocent Somalis,” he told IPS on the condition of anonymity.

The Kenya National Human Rights commission said the government acts constituted a serious violation of the constitution and of international human rights standards. Commissioner Suzanne Chivusia said in a statement that hundreds of detainees have been held under inhuman and deplorable conditions and with limited access to basic provision like food, water and sanitation.

Mwinyi called on civilians with claims of human rights violations by the police force to record their cases with the police.

“We are ready, looking forward to receive and investigate and punish any officer who will be implicated in any illegal act in the operation,” he said.

Independent Police Oversight Authority chairman Macharia Njeru said in a statement that the body has launched investigations over claims of illegal detentions, ethnic profiling and the holding of suspects incommunicado.

Meanwhile, the association of Muslims Organisation in Kenya chairperson, Fazul Mohamed, told IPS that his organisation would pursue an ideological approach to counter misleading interpretations of the Koran by clerics allied to terrorists. He said the organisation has enlisted a strong team of clerics, scholars, politicians and experts to do this. He called it a genuine Jihad or religious war against a section of religious leaders who are undermining Islam and posing a threat to national cohesion.

“We have set the stage for a radical, multifaceted approach that explores all avenues of countering the radicalisation of youths in Kenya, including community policing and rehabilitation of youths who deserted the group or are willing to abandon Al-Shabaab,” Mohamed told IPS.

Islamic studies curriculum in Somalia’s schools is a radical form of Islam that analysts say is contributing to the growing militancy of the country’s youth. Credit: Ahmed Osman/IPS

By Ahmed Osman
MOGADISHU, Oct 4 2013 (IPS)

Mukhatar Jama has been teaching at a secondary school in Mogadishu for the past decade. Religious education is part and parcel of the curriculum of all schools in Somalia, but he says most parents are unaware of exactly what their children are being taught – a radical form of Islam.

“The Islamic studies curriculum you hear is the pure Wahhabism, exported from Saudi Arabia, that teaches children that all those who are not Wahhabi are non-believers, including the children’s parents, and that it is ok to kill non-Muslims,” Jama told IPS.

While there are no statistics on how many schools there are in Somalia, most here follow the Saudi curriculum, which advocates and inculcates Wahhabism. This is a far more radical interpretation of Islam than the moderate Sufi school that older generation of Somalis follows.

The radicalisation of Somalia’s youth has already started spilling over the war-torn country’s borders to its neighbours, influencing the region’s fragile security situation."Al-Shabaab, which means youth in Arabic, has realised the potential of Somalia’s young and are working to capitalise on it in our schools." -- analyst Omar Yusuf

It has taken root not only in Somalia and Kenya, but in the whole sub-region, Omar Yusuf, an analyst in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, told IPS.

“The event of Westgate is perhaps one of many wake-up calls for governments in the region to tackle the growing radicalisation and the logical next step of deadly militancy in the youth of the region,” Yusuf said.

The Sep. 21 attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi by the Somali Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab left more than 70 dead and dozens injured.

The Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab had repeatedly vowed to target Kenya after the country’s troops crossed over the border into Somalia in 2011 and ousted the radical group’s fighters from key areas in southern Somalia, including Kismayo.

Al-Shabaab advocates the establishment of an Islamic State not only in Somalia, but in East Africa. It adheres to the fundamentalist Wahhabi school of Islam. The extremist group’s ideology seems to be gaining ground in Somalia due to a number of factors.

“Think about it, schools in Somalia provide Al-Shabaab with the radical ideological teaching for the youth and when they graduate what they just need is to give [them] military training and there you have a qualified Al-Shabaab fighter,” Yusuf said.

Both teachers and parents seem divided over what is being taught at Somali schools, with some accepting it as part of the children’s religious education, and others expressing concern that their children are being indoctrinated to be Wahhabists without their consent.

“I came to know that my son gets indoctrinated with extremist views at school. He had to change schools a number of times but all schools in Mogadishu use the same Wahhabi books that we took from Saudi Arabia. The whole country will covert to Wahhabism in no time,” one parent, who sought anonymity for fear of reprisals, told IPS.

Another parent, Omar Kulmiye, disagreed that his children were being radicalised by this teaching. “I don’t [know] much about religion but I think since they are learning Islam it is ok with me and I have not sensed anything different in my children since they started school five years ago,” he told IPS.

Hussen said three factors have contributed to radicalisation and militancy among Somali youths. Lack of political participation, and of employment and education opportunities draws youth to militant groups, she said.

“The search for a ‘second family’ and a sense of belonging offered by militant groups…has attracted many youths,” Hussen said. “Young recruits are offered a group to belong to, a job with salary as well as marriage – things that are otherwise hard for them to obtain in Somali society.”

The unemployment rate for youth aged 14 to 29 is 67 percent — one of the highest in the world. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s “Somalia Human Development Report 2012”, 70 percent of Somalia’s 10.2 million people are under the age of 30.

The attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall comes as no surprise as Al-Shabaab has been spreading its radicalising tentacles in the region, local security expert Muhumed Abdi told IPS.

“This was a crisis that has been simmering for years because the radical groups have found not only Somalia but neighbouring countries fertile ground to grow and recruit, with governments in the region seemingly unprepared,” Abdi said.

However, the Somali government, along with the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and international partners, is currently trying to implement an ambitious initiative to put one million children to school. Through this Go 2 School Initiative the government has also proposed changes to the curriculum in the hope that this will help fight radicalism. According to UNICEF, enrolment rates here are among the lowest in the world with only four out of every 10 children attending school.

But the government faces huge resistance from private school administrators and parents who fear the changes would make education devoid of religious moral teaching for the young.

Islamist groups have condemned the campaign as an attempt by the government to westernise Somali education and sideline religious studies.

Numerous calls by IPS to Somalia’s ministry of education remained unanswered while one official declined to comment on the allegations that schools are used as breeding grounds for militancy in Somalia.

But Hussen said the Somali government recognised that youth are the “future of Somalia” and need empowerment.

“However, the government has not been very forthcoming in the implementation of this … as youth are still very much marginalised from the political arena,” she explained.

Yusuf agreed, but said the approach needs to be far more radical and start with a critical look at the kind of education Somali children receive in school during their formative years.

“There is a need for holistic approach to youth problems in Somalia because Al-Shabaab, which means youth in Arabic, has realised the potential of Somalia’s young and are working to capitalise on it in our schools. We need to change that,” Yusuf said.

Climate change and international financial instability top a list of seven concerns that publics around the world consider “major threats” to their countries, according to the latest polling of global attitudes by the Pew Research Centre here.

Majorities of respondents in 24 of the 39 countries surveyed by Pew’s Global Attitudes Project (GAP) described climate change as a “major threat”, although the world’s two biggest contributors to greenhouse gases that most scientists believe are responsible for climate change – the United States and China – were not among them.

Only 40 and 39 percent of U.S. and Chinese respondents, respectively, said climate change constituted a “major threat” – the lowest percentages of all the nations surveyed except Pakistan (15 percent), Egypt (16 percent), Israel (30 percent) and Jordan and the Czech Republic (35 percent).

International financial instability ranked second with majorities in 22 of the 39 nations, calling it a “major threat” to their own country. Fifty-two percent of U.S. respondents agreed with that assessment, compared to a high of 95 percent of respondents in Greece, which has been hit especially hard by the Eurozone crisis, and a low of only 15 percent of Pakistanis.

Of the seven possible threats presented to all respondents in the 39 countries, majorities in 15 of the countries called “Islamic extremist groups” a “major threat”, followed by majorities in 13 countries who cited “Iran’s nuclear programme”, and majorities in 11 who named “North Korea’s nuclear program”.

“U.S. power and influence” was cited by majorities in three countries, as was “China’s power and influence”, while a seventh purported threat, “political instability in Pakistan,” was described as a “major threat” by no more than 37 percent of respondents (the U.S. and Italy) in any of the 39 countries surveyed.

The findings constituted one part of this year’s survey by GAP, which has carried out annual multinational polling since 2002. The latest survey, partial results of which are being released in stages over several months, was carried out between March and May this year. Nearly 38,000 respondents were interviewed in the 39 countries.

Co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former U.N. Ambassador John Danforth, GAP’s questions often reflect the particular interests and priorities of U.S. policymakers rather than a more global perspective. Thus, three of the seven questions dealt with threats with some relationship to Islam or predominantly Islamic nations.

In the Americas, this year’s survey included the United States, Canada, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela. In Europe, it included respondents from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and Russia, as well as Greece and the Czech Republic.

In the greater Middle East region, the survey covered Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Tunisia and Turkey, as well as Egypt, Jordan and Israel, while Asian countries included Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea, as well as Pakistan.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the survey included Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda.

In each of the questions about the seven selected “threats”, respondents were given the option of describing it as “major”, “minor” or “not a threat”.

The survey found some significant regional and national differences. In North America, for example, climate change ranked fifth of the seven threats for U.S. respondents, but it was number one in neighbouring Canada, where 54 percent of respondents said it was a major threat.

Similarly, North Korea’s nuclear programme, a major concern in the U.S. media when the poll was taken, topped the U.S. list (59 percent of respondents) of threats, while a mere 18 percent of respondents in the Middle East did so.

Not surprisingly, Iran’s nuclear programme evoked the greatest concern in Israel, where 85 percent of respondents called it a “major threat” to their country. But substantially fewer respondents in the Greater Middle East, including Turkey (36 percent), Egypt (42 percent), Jordan (41 percent), Lebanon (51 percent), Palestine (31 percent), Tunisia (26 percent) and Pakistan (7 percent) agreed with that assessment.

In China, only 18 percent of respondents said they considered Iran’s nuclear programme a “major threat”.

Concern about climate change was most prevalent in Latin America, the Asia/Pacific region, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, according to the survey.

An average of 63 percent of Latin American respondents labelled it a major threat, with the greatest concern registered in Brazil (76 percent) and Argentina (71 percent). Led by South Korea (85 percent) and Japan (72 percent), the median percentage among the eight countries polled in the Asia/Pacific region was 53 percent, although without Pakistan’s 15 percent, the percentage would have been on a par with Latin America.

An average of 61 percent of Europeans and nearly 54 percent of Africans also called climate change a major threat, with fears particularly pronounced in Greece (87 percent) and Uganda (66 percent). In the Middle East, the stand-out was Lebanon, where nearly three of four Lebanese (74 percent) saw warming as a major threat.

The greatest fear of international financial stability was found in Europe where an average of 73 percent of respondents called it a major threat. Concern was greatest in the southern European countries – Spain (70 percent) and Italy (75 percent), as well as Greece.

An average of 53 percent of respondents in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa agreed with that assessment.

In East Asia, only 38 percent of Chinese respondents cited financial instability as a major threat, compared to 83 percent of South Koreans, the highest percentage after Greece.

Besides financial worries, Europeans on average were found to be most concerned about Islamic extremist groups, Iran’s nuclear programme, and global climate change in that order.

In the greater Middle East, climate change was ranked as the greatest threat in both Lebanon and Turkey (47 percent), while in Tunisia and Egypt, international financial instability took its place.

That region was also the one which took the most worrisome view of U.S. power, which was ranked as a “major threat” by 68 percent in Palestine and by 44 percent of Turkish respondents.

Global climate change was rated the top major threat in six of the eight countries in the Asia/Pacific region. The two exceptions were Pakistan, where U.S. power topped the threat list (60 percent) followed by Islamic extremist groups (34 percent); and Japan, where 77 percent of respondents cited North Korea’s nuclear programme and 74 percent China’s power.

Climate change topped the list for respondents in all seven Latin American countries, where international financial instability was cited most frequently as the second biggest worry. Forty-one percent and 35 percent of respondents in Argentina and Venezuela, respectively, identified U.S. power as a “major threat”, while majorities of respondents in Brazil in Chile cited Iran’s nuclear programme.

In sub-Saharan Africa, climate change was cited most frequently in three of the six countries – Kenya, South Africa and Uganda, while Islamic extremist groups topped concerns in Nigeria and Senegal. In South Africa, 40 percent of respondents named China’s power as a “major threat.

Chinese power was also considered a major threat by 76 and 74 percent of South Korean and Japanese respondents, respectively, compared to 44 percent of U.S. respondents.

By contrast, 39 percent of Chinese respondents characterised U.S. power as a major threat. Significantly, 66 percent of South Koreans and 49 percent of Japanese, respectively, put the United States in the same category despite their country’s alliance status with Washington.