By Robert E. Hunter
WASHINGTON, Nov 18 2014 (IPS)

Nov. 24 is the deadline for six world powers and Iran to reach a final deal over its nuclear programme. If there is no deal, then the talks are likely to be extended, not abandoned.

But as I learned from more than three decades’ work on Middle East issues, in and out of the U.S. government, success also depends on Israel no longer believing that it needs a regional enemy shared in common with the United States to ensure Washington’s commitment to its security.

U.S. President Barack Obama talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as they walk across the tarmac at Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Mar. 20, 2013. Credit: White House Photo, Pete Souza

Much is at stake in the negotiations with Iran in Vienna, notably the potential removal of the risk of war over its nuclear programme and the removal of any legitimate basis for Israel’s fear that it could become the target of an Iranian bomb.

Success could also begin Iran’s reintegration into the international community, ending its lengthy quarantine. If President Barack Obama and his national security officials get their way, including the Pentagon—hardly a group of softies—a comprehensive final accord would be a good deal for U.S. national security and, in the American analysis, for Israel’s security as well.

Yet more is at issue for Israel, and for the Persian Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. They want to keep Iran in purdah.

Indeed, since the Iranian Revolution ran out of steam outside its borders, the essential questions about the challenge Iran poses have been the following: Will it be able to compete for power and position in the region, and, how can Iran’s competition be dealt with?

The first response, led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is to decry whatever might be agreed to in the talks, no matter how objectively good the results would be for everyone’s security. He has the Saudis and other Arab states as silent partners.

Between them, the Israeli and oil lobbies command a lot of attention in the U.S. Congress, a large part of whose members would otherwise accept that President Obama’s standard for an agreement meets the tests of both U.S. security and the security of its partners in the Middle East.

But a large fraction of Congress is no more willing to take on these two potent lobbies than the National Rifle Association.

Netanyahu will also do all he can to prevent the relaxation of any of the sanctions imposed on Iran. But even if he and his U.S. supporters succeed on Capitol Hill, President Obama can on his own suspend some of those sanctions—though exactly how much is being debated.

The U.S. does not have the last word on sanctions, however. The moment there is a final agreement, the floodgates of economic trade and investment with Iran will open. Europeans, in particular, are lined up with their order books, like Americans in 1889 who awaited the starter’s pistol to begin the Oklahoma land rush.

In response, U.S. private industry will ride up Capitol Hill to demand the relaxation of U.S.-mandated sanctions. Meanwhile, the sighs of relief resounding throughout the world will begin changing the international political climate concerning Iran.

Yet America’s concerns will not cease. While the U.S. and Iran have similar interests in opposing the Islamic State (ISIS or IS), and in wanting to see Afghanistan free from reconquest by of the Taliban, they are still far apart on other matters, notably the Assad regime in Syria, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas.

President Obama will also have an immediate problem in reassuring Israel and Gulf Arab states that American commitments to their security are sincere. To be sure, absent an Iranian nuclear weapon, there is no real Iranian military threat and all the Western weapons pumped into the Persian Gulf are thus essentially useless.

Iran’s real challenges emanate from its dynamic domestic economy, a highly educated, entrepreneurial culture that is matched in the region only by Israelis and Palestinians, and a good deal of cultural appeal even beyond Shi’a communities.

Obama thus faces a special problem in reassuring Israel, a problem that goes back decades. When the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979, the risks of a major Arab attack on Israel sank virtually to zero. So, too, did the risk of an Arab-Israeli conflict escalating to the level of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. All at once, U.S. and Israeli strategic concerns were no longer obviously linked.

Thus as soon as Israel withdrew from the Sinai in May 1979, then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin started searching for an alternative basis for linking American and Israeli strategic interests.

For him and for many other Israelis, then and now, it is not enough that the American people are firmly committed to Israel’s security for what could be called “sentimental” reasons: bonds of history (especially memories of the Holocaust), culture, religion, and the values of Western democracy.

But such “sentiment” is the strongest motivation for all U.S. commitments, a far stronger glue than strategic calculations that can and often do change, a fact that could be testified to by the people of South Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Yet for Begin and others, there had to be at least a strong similarity of strategic interests. Thus, in a meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance the day after Egypt retook possession of the Sinai, Begin complained that the US had cancelled its “strategic dialogue” with Israel. Vance tasked me, as the National Security Council staff representative on his travelling team, to find out “what the heck Begin is talking about.”

I phoned Washington and got the skinny: the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment had been conducting a low-level dialogue with some Israeli military officers. Proving to be of little value, it was stopped.

The reason for Begin’s outburst thus became clear: in the absence of the strategic tie with the United States that had been provided by the conflict with Egypt, Israel needed something else, in effect, a common enemy.

That’s why many Israeli political stakeholders were ambivalent about the George W. Bush administration’s ambitions to topple Iraq’s Saddam Hussein: with his overthrow, a potential though remote threat to Israel would be removed, but so would the perception of a common enemy. Since Saddam’s ousting, Iran has gained even more importance for Israel as a means of linking Jerusalem’s strategic perceptions with those of Washington.

By the same political logic, Israel has always asserted that it is a strategic asset for the United States. As part of recognising Israel’s psychological needs, no U.S. official ever publicly challenges that Israeli assertion regardless of what they think in private or however much damage the U.S. might suffer politically in the region because of Israeli activities, including the building of illegal settlements in the West Bank.

So what must Obama do in order to eliminate the risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon, while also reassuring Israel of US fealty? On one side, to be able to honour an agreement with Iran, Obama has to undercut Netanyahu’s efforts with Congress to prevent any sanctions relief.

On the other side, he could reassure Israel through the classic means of buttressing the flow of arms, including the anti-missile capabilities of the Iron Dome that were so useful to Israel during the recent fighting in Gaza.

Israel would want even closer strategic cooperation with the U.S., including consultations on the full range of U.S. thinking and planning on all relevant issues in the Middle East. Israel (at least Netanyahu) would also want any notion of further negotiations with the Palestinians, and the relaxation of economic pressures on Gaza, put into the deep freeze—where, in effect, they already are.

Israel has an inherent, sovereign right to defend itself and to make, for and by itself, calculations about what that means. (The country is not unified, however: a surprising number of former leaders of the Israeli military and security agencies have publicly differed with Netanyahu’s pessimistic assessments of the Iranian threat).

As Israel’s only real friend in the world, the United States continues to have an obligation, within reason, to reassure Israel about its security and safety.

For Obama, this reassurance to Israel is a price worth paying in the event of a deal, which would be at least one step in trying to build security and stability in an increasingly turbulent Middle East. But that can only happen if Israel refrains from obstructing Obama’s effort to make everyone, including Israel, more secure.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS-Inter Press Service.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

“U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance,” President Obama told graduates at West Point on Wednesday May 28. Credit: West Point – The Military Academy/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

By Robert E. Hunter
WASHINGTON , May 28 2014 (IPS)

A supertanker sails a long way, they say, between the time the helmsman sets a new course and the moment when the vessel fully responds.

This was the task President Barack Obama took on this week, as he sought to set a new course for the U.S. ship of state in international waters.

What he said today in his commencement address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in New York was nothing less than turning the wheel hard over for U.S. foreign policy.

Even though, as commander-in-chief, he is the nation’s chief helmsman, it will be some time before the U.S. supertanker responds, and even then not necessarily on the new course Obama is trying to set. The balance of his presidency will show how well he can succeed.

To extend the metaphor, Obama must also navigate between the Scylla of critics who want the United States to continue to use military power as its principal tool of destiny, and the Charybdis of those who would like to see war abolished in favour of other, non-lethal instruments.

He has no lack of critics. Even before the last third of his speech, one leading U.S. news channel cut to an attack by one of Obama’s conservative Congressional adversaries. Another was ready to take Obama on while he still shaking the hands of newly commissioned army second lieutenants.

What is the president’s sin in the eyes of these naysayers?

Obama understands that the world has changed since the end of the Cold War, which saw the collapse of Soviet internal and external empires and European communism; the diffusion of power; the rise of new economic competitors and globalisation in general; and a shift from state monopoly of violence to what are euphemistically called “non-state actors.”

In fact, speaking in politically defensive-mode, Obama went to great lengths – perhaps too great – to argue that the U.S. “remains the one indispensable nation” and, tempting the lessons of history, that this “will likely be true for the century to come.”

He also paid the politically necessary homage to U.S. exceptionalism – “I believe in [it] with every fibre of my being” – but then usefully redefined it in terms of support for the rule of law and recognition that “more lasting peace…can only come through opportunity and freedom for people everywhere.”

In trying to defang critics who argue that Obama does not care for the use of military force, it was no accident that he spoke at West Point.

Furthermore, it was no accident that he visited with U.S. troops in Afghanistan this week; and no accident that he will travel to Omaha Beach in Normandy next week for the 70th anniversary of D-Day, when allied forces invaded northern France.

To be fair to critics who argue that Obama is less enamoured of the use of force than many of his predecessors, they have a point, at least in analysing his proclivities.

Indeed, if his approach to the outside world can be reduced to a single phrase – as is so often true of presidents – it would be “no useless wars.”

That injunction has surely coloured his successful withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the end of a U.S. combat role in Afghanistan at the end of this year (though he intends to leave some 9,800 troops behind, assuming that the new Afghan president agrees, as the likely winner has said he will do).

In fact, given that the 2003 invasion of Iraq remains one of the worst foreign policy blunders in U.S. history, and that no good U.S. national security interest has been served by our staying in Afghanistan as long as we have, Obama deserves credit for quieting most of his domestic critics as he has slowly extricated the U.S. from both military ventures.

Obama also used his speech to justify that the U.S. has not allowed itself to be sucked into the military conflict in Syria (where his stance has the support of most Americans, if not most of the Washington commentariat.)

He has also emphasised the U.S. choice of diplomacy over military power in dealing with the Iranian nuclear programme – though, in another mantra, he has stated: “we reserve all options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”

While he characterised Russian policy “toward former Soviet states” as “aggression,” and implied the same about Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, Obama did project an ambiguous position, preferring to define the range of debate while leaving his own choices unclear.

Instead, the president laid out standards for judging.

On the one hand, “the United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it – when our people are threatened; when our livelihood is at stake; or when the security of our allies is in danger.”

Even so, we have to ask “tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just,” he added.

In other circumstances, the “threshold for military action must be higher,” and we should seek allies and partners, he said.

Then, in his one sally into alternatives – otherwise a notable lacuna in the speech – he said “We must broaden our tools to include diplomacy and development.”

Obama also tried to put the best face he could on what has so far been Russian president Vladimir Putin’s tactical victory in Ukraine (though, in all likelihood, a long-term Russian strategic defeat), by stressing all the things that the U.S. and others did to soften the blow.

The best parts of Obama’s speech – at least, let us hope, the most lasting – dealt with longer-running problems facing humankind: the importance of democracy and human rights; the empowering of civil society; the fight against extremism, the promotion of useful international institutions; the need to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention; and, as a unifying theme, the role of U.S. leadership in all these areas and more.

Yet he made only a passing reference to climate change, supposedly a hallmark of his agenda.

What was lacking, unfortunately, was “connective tissue” in terms of process, especially the need to relate regional apples and oranges to one another – a strategic approach and the setting of priorities.

While renewing the U.S. priority on countering terrorism, Obama failed to identify its sources in the Middle East or to discuss the risks of regional conflict “…as the Syrian civil war spills across borders.”

He did not propose means for resolving the new Russian challenge to George H.W. Bush’s goal of a “Europe whole and free” and at peace, or indicate that the U.S. would stop ignoring the continent.

Nor did he even mention recent Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts championed by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, or introduce what is supposedly a keystone of his foreign policy, the “pivot” or “rebalancing” towards Asia.

In the final analysis, the test of Obama’s foreign policy for the balance of his term will be whether he will finally begin integrating different elements of his approach, relate different instruments of power and influence to one another, upgrade strategic thinking in his administration, and place resources where the new world he conjures requires.

Obama’s only money item today was to ask Congress to spend five billion dollars more on counter-terrorism: instead these funds should just be taken from a Pentagon budget still out of balance with his goals.

The president should instead be directing money to non-military areas, beginning with diplomacy and development, which can enable him to meet the goals he usefully set forth at West Point.

But the U.S. “Supertanker-of-State” cannot be set firmly on a new course “on the cheap” or without a coherent set of strategies.

Robert E. Hunter, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter administration and in 2011-12 was director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University. Read his work on IPS’s foreign policy blog, LobeLog.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif (left) and EU policy chief Catherine Ashton. Credit: European Commission

By Robert E. Hunter
WASHINGTON, Nov 25 2013 (IPS)

The devil is in the details. This cliché is already being invoked regarding the deal concluded this past weekend between Iran and the so-called P5+1 – the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany, along with the European Union’s High Representative, Baroness Catherine Ashton.

Devil and details, yes; but the “angel” is in the “big picture,” the fact of the agreement itself – interim, certainly; flawed, perhaps; but a basic break with the past.This is the end of the Cold War with Iran, (accurately) defined as a state when it is not possible to distinguish between what is negotiable and what is not.

It will now become much harder for Iran to get the bomb, even if it were hell-bent on doing so. The risk of war has plummeted. Israel is safer – along with the rest of the region and the world — even as Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu denies that fact.

This is the end of the Cold War with Iran, (accurately) defined as a state when it is not possible to distinguish between what is negotiable and what is not. Going back to that parlous state would require a major act of Iranian bad faith, perfidy, or aggression, not at all in its self-interest.

In the last few days, the Middle East has become different from what it was before. That happened, as a “moment in history,” when President Barack Obama called Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, on the latter’s way to Kennedy Airport.

That moment psychologically set in train a sequence of events that are causing an earthquake in the region. And like any good earthquake, the extent, the impact, and even the direction it travels will not soon be clear. But one thing is clear: despite down-side risks, changes taking place can be positive if people in power will make it so.

The struggle with Iran has never been just about the “bomb.” Even aside from whether Iran’s domestic nuclear energy programme would ineluctably morph into a nuclear weapons capability, it has posed problems ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Iran turned from being a supporter of Western, especially U.S., interests – a so-called “regional influential” – to being a challenger of U.S. hegemony, the predominance of Sunnis over Shiites in the heart of the Middle East, and the comfort level of close U.S. regional partners.

The United States led in devising a policy to contain Iran. It included diplomatic isolation, the introduction of economic sanctions, Washington’s support for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in its war against Iran, and U.S. buttressing of the military security of its regional partners.

There have also been widespread reports of external efforts to destabilise Iran, along with a U.S. predilection for regime change.

Why Iran has now decided to negotiate seriously about its nuclear programme will be long debated and be variously ascribed to economic sanctions; to progressive loss of popular support for the mullah-led regime and a “mellowing” of ideology; and to the election of an Iranian president with an agenda different from his predecessor and blessed by the Supreme Leader.

Current possibilities are helped by a U.S. administration prepared to negotiate seriously, unlike its two predecessors, from when Iran a decade ago put a positive offer on the table that went unanswered – as Secretary of State John Kerry noted Saturday night.

At heart, Iran is now back “in play” in the region and is beginning the march toward resuming a role in the international community – slow perhaps, abortive perhaps, but for now pointed in that direction.

Assuming that the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme can be dealt with successfully, that is clearly in the U.S. interest. It might lead toward renewed U.S.-Iranian cooperation, tacit or explicit, over Afghanistan, where complementary interests led Iran to support the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. It is also possible that Iran will come to value stability in Iraq over the pursuit of major influence there.

It is still a stretch to see Iran’s working to reconcile with Israel (a quasi-ally before 1979), although Iran’s full reengagement in the outside world and especially in relations with the United States can never be completed without Iran’s reaching out to Israel (and vice versa).

And for Iran to change its posture toward Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon would require not just alteration of Iran’s ambitions but also changes in policies by other states and groups.

Syria is both symbol and substance of the core problem of Iran’s re-emerging as a serious player in the Middle East. There is the slow-burning civil war between Sunnis and Shias that was reignited by the Iranian Revolution and then, when that fire began to die down, by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which overthrew a Sunni minority government dominating a majority Shia population.

The war in Syria is in part an effort by Sunni states to “right the balance.” In the process, however, Saudi Arabia in particular has been unwilling to control elements in its country that are both inspiring and arming the worst elements of Islamist extremism and which fuel not just Al-Qaeda and its ilk but also the Taliban.

There is also state-centred competition for influence in the Middle East – geopolitics. This is linked to the relationships of regional states, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, with the United States. Both stoutly oppose Iran’s reentry into that competition.

In addition to its continuing worries about an Iranian bomb, Israel is concerned that lessened tensions with Iran could swing attention back to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

But Saudi Arabia faces no potential military threat from Iran. Any Iranian challenge is denominated in terms of Sunni vs. Shia, cultural and economic penetration, and the greater vibrancy of Iranian society – none of which can be dealt with by the huge quantities of armaments these countries have accumulated.

Further, as Iran does again become a player, uncertainties regarding its potential challenges to neighbours will lead them cleave even more closely to the United States; and the U.S. will have to continue being a critical strategic presence in the region – its desire to “pivot” to East Asia notwithstanding.

It is thus not surprising that several regional states oppose the U.S.-led opening to Iran and have already signaled a no-holds-barred campaign, including in U.S. domestic politics, if not to scuttle what has been achieved so far at least to limit US (and P5+1) negotiating flexibility. (Iranian hard-liners will also be working to undercut President Rouhani.)

Israel and others can rightly ask that the U.S. not fall for a “sucker’s deal,” though, as Secretary Kerry correctly stated, “We are not blind, and I don’t think we’re stupid.”

But they are also worried that they will lose their long-unchallenged preeminence in Washington and with Western business interests. This is not Washington’s problem. Indeed, from Afghanistan to Iraq to Syria and even to Israeli-Palestinian relations, drawing Iran constructively into the outside world – if that can be done safely – is very much in U.S. interests.

Even at this early stage in moving beyond cold war with Iran, President Obama has earned his Nobel Peace Prize.

Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.

The talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries last week bring to mind Winston Churchill’s 1942 description of World War II: “It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”

This characterisation is even more profound than it first appears. Today we are witnessing a roll of the dice throughout the Middle East.If a potential deal does take shape, a titanic struggle will take place in this country.

The “negotiations” over Iran’s nuclear programme betoken a major shift in psychology and perceptions, notably about power, influence, and national interests. They involve the United States and almost all other countries in the region, which for so long have assumed the immutability of the Iranian-Western confrontation.

Of course, that confrontation could now begin to crumble, with wide-ranging geopolitical implications in the region and beyond.

Most immediately, the talks appear to be getting down to brass tacks regarding what Iran is doing with its nuclear programme; what it will do to reassure the world that it will not acquire a nuclear weapon or even move toward what is called a “breakout capability;” and what the United States and others will do in exchange.

“In exchange” involves the sanctions that have been progressively imposed on Iran since the Islamic Republic’s birth in 1979. But it could also include other steps, some tangible, some intangible, whereby Iran would be readmitted as a legitimate state in international society, free from the shackles on its potential as a highly educated and creative nation with the most U.S.-friendly population in the region.

So much of what will happen now involves the technical details of Iran’s nuclear programme, which only a handful of people, both in Iran and the West, really understand.

More important, however, is the politics. Will the Iranian government move far enough to embrace a deal acceptable to the U.S. and the other P5+1 members (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany)?

Will the P5+1 accept that Iran does have the right to a peaceful nuclear programme and some level of uranium enrichment?

And, if there is a meeting of the minds, can a potential deal be sold to Iran’s Supreme Leader and the multiple constituencies in the West that claim the right to be heard?

The answer to the first part of this last question may depend on the will of a single individual (and his own complex politics). The answer to the second part will depend not just on President Barack Obama and the other P5+1 leaders, but also on the U.S. Congress and especially Israel. U.S. allies and partners lining the Gulf and outliers like Turkey must also be satisfied.

If a potential deal does take shape, a titanic struggle will take place in this country, pitting President Obama against those who would oppose virtually any deal, however reasonable by objective standards, measured in terms of U.S. national interests.

Those parts of Congress responsive to Israel’s perspective will be joined in opposition by the “Friends of Saudi Arabia” and other regional oil countries. Silently in the corner will be the Western companies that pour advanced weaponry into the Arab States of the Gulf — although, if the U.S. does take pressure off Iran, arms sales to still-anxious countries could even increase.

But far more is at stake in the Middle East than Iran’s nuclear programme and creating barriers against its ability to build a bomb. We are seeing the first break in the solid containment wall that was erected at the end of the 1970s due to fears that an Islamic revolution would spread its contagion.

Except in a few places, that did not happen. Indeed, the greater threat both to Western interests and to regional countries now comes from Al-Qaeda and its ilk (which, unlike Shia Iran, are Sunni).

In recent years, concerns have focused on Tehran’s nuclear programme. But even before that, there was a policy of containing Iran, in many ways reflecting a general regional contest for power and influence. This contest reflected worries that Tehran and Washington might one day be reconciled.

It is perhaps the best explanation for the (opaque) reasoning behind Saudi Arabia’s first campaigning for a seat on the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) and then, when successful, abruptly declining it. Indeed, with a break in the diplomatic barrier to Iran, Saudi Arabia is less sure that it will continue to stand higher in U.S. regard than an Iran that is “behaving itself” — thus its recent antics.

Ironically, the Saudis’ initial pursuit of the UNSC seat had always seemed strange: Security Council members are expected to set and follow standards that are alien to Riyadh.

For its part, Israel is competing for regional influence and to preserve, unchallenged, all the primacy it has in the U.S. It has effectively used the legitimate fears of an Iranian bomb to oppose any reconciliation between Washington and Tehran while positioning itself as Washington’s only friend there.

This gambit was always risky; should the U.S. and Iran come to terms on the nuclear issue and unfreeze other aspects of their relations, Iran could again become a “player” for influence, at least in the Middle East, with Israel and the oil-producing Arab states.

What happened in Geneva last week, therefore, is only “Act Two” of a lengthy play with elements of a psychological drama (“Act One“ was the Obama-Rouhani phone call).

But if Iran plays its part (by no means certain); and if — assuming that a reasonable nuclear deal can be struck — President Obama shows the mettle with domestic naysayers that he showed on debt and default, then major, positive developments may become possible in the Middle East for the first time in years.

Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.

The United States should think twice before intervening military in Syria, says Robert Hunter. Credit: FreedomHouse/CC by 2.0

By Robert E. Hunter
WASHINGTON, Aug 26 2013 (IPS)

President Obama got it right. He was picked by U.S. voters to put the nation’s interests first – not those of any ally, any member of Congress, or the media, even if they clamour for him to “do something” yet do not take responsibility for the consequences if things go wrong, as they have for some time in the Middle East.

Today, the issue raised by U.S. media and some of America’s allies are allegations that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used poison gas to kill or maim thousands of Syrians. The consensus among Western commentators, in and outside of the government, has been built around this proposition, and it may be right.

United Nations inspectors may be able to verify the causes and perpetrators of these deaths and injuries. Let us hope so, before the United States or other countries begin direct military action of any kind that will be crossing the Rubicon.

Perhaps U.S. intelligence knows the facts; again, let us hope so. And let us hope that we do not later discover that intelligence was distorted, as it was before the ill-fated U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the consequences of which are still damaging U.S. interests in the Middle East and eroding the region’s stability.

In addition to being unable to turn back once the United States becomes directly engaged in combat, however limited, is the difficulty of believing that Assad would have been so foolish as to use poison gas, unless Syrian command-and-control is so poor that some military officer ordered its use without Assad’s permission.

If one invokes the concept of cui bono (“to whose benefit?”), those with the most to gain if the United States acted to bring down the current Syrian government would be Syrian rebels or their supporters, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Such a move would increase the likelihood of even more killing and perhaps genocide against Syria’s Alawites."It has long been clear that the Syrian conflict is not just about Syria."
-- Robert E. Hunter

But citing the possibility that we are all being misled about who used poison gas – a tactic known as a false flag – does not mean it is true. It does redouble the need for the United States to be certain about who used the gas before taking military action. Obama has gotten this right, too.

So if we become directly involved in the fighting, then what?

This question must always be asked before acting. Sometimes, such as with Pearl Harbour, Hitler’s declaring war on the United States, or pushing Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, striking back hard for as long as it takes is clearly the right course.

Less clear of a situation was Vietnam. Ugly consequences also ensued from arming and training Osama bin Laden and his ilk to punish the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and, in one of the worst foreign policy blunders in U.S. history, from invading Iraq in 2003.

It has long been clear that the Syrian conflict is not just about Syria. It is also about the balance between Sunni and Shia aspirations throughout the core of the Middle East. Iran, a Shia state, started the ball rolling with its 1979 Islamic revolution. Several U.S. administrations contained the virus of sectarianism, but invading Iraq and toppling its minority Sunni regime got the ball rolling again.

Now Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are bent on toppling the minority Alawite – a mystical offshoot of Shi’ism – regime in Syria. Even if they succeed, the region’s internecine warfare won’t stop there.

Meanwhile, there is a geopolitical struggle for predominance in the region, principally involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel. Iran has Shia-dominated Iraq, Assad’s Syria, and Hezbollah as acolytes. Saudi Arabia has the other Gulf Arab states, while Turkey has its regional ambitions extending to Central Asia. And since Israel’s conclusion that its Syrian strategic partner, the Assad family, is doomed, it has thrown in its lot with the Sunni states. But it wants change before Syria is completely dominated by the fundamentalists.

From the U.S. perspective, the regional situation is a mess, and the tipping point that would make things much worse could be direct military intervention in Syria.

It is too late for Obama to take back his ill-considered statement about the use of poison gas being a “red line” in Syria when he was not prepared to go for broke in toppling Assad. It is too late as well for him to reconsider his call for Assad to go, which further stoked the fears of the Alawites that they could be slaughtered.

It is also late for him to tell Gulf Arabs to stop fostering the spread of Islamist fundamentalism of the worst sort throughout the region, from Egypt to Pakistan to Afghanistan, where American troops have died as a result.

It is also late, but let us hope not too late, for a U.S.-led full-court press on the political-diplomatic front to set the terms for a reasonably viable post-Assad Syria rather than sliding into war and unleashing potentially terrible uncertainties. Let us recall what happened in Afghanistan after we stayed on after deposing the Taliban, and in Iraq after 2003. Neither place is in much better shape, if at all, even after the loss of thousands of U.S. lives and trillions in U.S. treasure.

And it is also late, but hopefully not too late, for the Obama administration to engage in strategic thinking about the Middle East; to see the region from North Africa to Southwest Asia as “all of a piece”, and to craft an overall policy towards critical U.S. interests throughout the area.

This week, President Obama should heed the clear wake-up call, resist the call to do something militarily in Syria, and place his bet on vigorous and unrelenting diplomacy for a viable post-Assad Syria and the reassertion of U.S. leadership throughout the region.

*Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.

Excerpt:

Publication this month of Vali Nasr’s “The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat” is well-timed.

The U.S. and the NATO allies are disengaging from Afghanistan, without clarity about the West’s continuing interests or how to secure them.

The Syrian civil war continues, without apparent U.S. efforts to fit that conflagration within regional developments as a whole. President Barack Obama has visited the Near East, but there is as yet no promise that serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will resume.

The standoff with Iran and its nuclear programme continues, without a viable U.S. strategy to resolve it short of war. And there is widespread questioning about future U.S. commitments toward the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

For some observers, including Vali Nasr, all this raises profound questions about U.S. foreign policy and leads him to judge: “retreat.”

The author, now dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, has had a special vantage point. From January 2009 until 2011, he was special advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (who died in December 2010), the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan – “Afpak.”

Dr. Nasr’s brief but intense experience in the U.S. government at a high level was both disappointing and disillusioning.

His principal conclusions are that the Obama White House failed to take seriously the diplomatic opportunities afforded the U.S.; that it tolerated excessive militarisation of U.S. policies, at the expense of a proper role for diplomatic instruments; that the president himself was long on language but short on action, thus failing to come to grips with a number of regional developments; that the best efforts by the State Department, including by Secretary Hillary Clinton, to intervene in critical policy-making, were often rebuffed or ignored by “the White House;” and that the U.S. thus failed in its essential leadership role.

What Nasr says about the way in which the White House dominated and controlled foreign policy in Obama’s first term and made it subservient to domestic politics is a damning indictment – even if only partly true, and at this point in history, no outsider can judge.

This helps explain why a pre-publication book has gained so much attention, along with the Washington parlor game of welcoming “kiss and tell,” merged with a desire to see the sitting president stub his toe or worse.

Thus “Dispensable Nation” is a compelling read. And while Nasr is not part of the new cottage industry of “declinists”, he does warn that, without radical changes to the making and carrying out of U.S. foreign policy, this nation can do itself and its role in the world serious injury, not least to its reputation and others’ willingness to rely on us.

So far, so good. But some other facets of this book present a somewhat different perspective. One might be called an “old school” approach to government service: that someone who willingly “takes the King’s shilling” assumes a burden not to tell tales out of school, at least not until all the narrative’s senior players have left the stage. Breaking with that unwritten practice makes for a juicier read, but it does make one ponder.

A more serious question is raised by the assumption running throughout the book that if a different approach had been taken to X or Y — in particular a greater reliance on diplomacy and, even more so, diplomatic approaches advanced by the Special Negotiator, Ambassador Holbrooke — very different and positive things would almost surely have come about.

But with regard to the Middle East/Southwest Asia and its long history of complexities and imponderables, one must be chary of drawing straight-line conclusions about the impact of policies different from those pursed.

It is hard to believe that U.S. leadership on its own would have transformed Arab-Israeli peacemaking; that a different U.S. approach to Egypt and other Arab countries would necessarily have produced a better course for the Arab Spring; that earlier intervention (but just what?) would have stopped the slaughter in Syria; that following the negotiating strategy and tactics advocated by Ambassador Holbrooke would have brought the Afghanistan war to a successful conclusion — without taking us all back to Square One, with the Taliban in full control – and with U.S. relations with Pakistan on a better footing and the region stable.

In short, in addition to highly-relevant and well-argued analysis of the Obama administration’s shortcomings, most of the author’s suggestions for alternative approaches are more wishful thinking than the product of a depth of knowledge about the region and seasoned judgment concerning the limits of power.

Perhaps that conclusion is unfair, given that his role in Afpak has so far been the author’s only venture into government, but that argues for being doubly cautious about making sweeping predictions about the putative success of alternative strategies.

It might also have been useful if Vali had drawn upon his experience to discuss whether using special representatives instead of regular diplomacy is good or bad.

In some cases, appointing a U.S. special negotiator has proved to be good — like Arab-Israeli peacemaking, thus relieving a secretary of state from having to deal virtually full time with these demanding partners; or lengthy arms control negotiations, where having experts at the table is essential.

But in general, creating special representatives as substitutes for regular practices of the U.S. government is asking for trouble. This was certainly true regarding the plethora of special representatives appointed during the first Obama administration, such that the expertise and experience needed for effective policies was often missing or sidelined.

Certainly, balancing contending (and legitimate) points of view within the bureaucracy (e.g., state, defence, CIA, NSC staff) was regularly lost, to the detriment of coherent policy.

Add to this the appointment of a special representative for Afpak who had achieved almost superstar status, with personal ambitions to match and a well-deserved sobriquet of “bulldozer,” and it would be surprising if all had gone smoothly — not least because Holbrooke had no experience in the region and no prior knowledge either of the issues or the local political cultures.

Indeed, it did not go smoothly, predictably so given Amb. Holbrooke’s career-long disdain for anyone who got in his way (along with his methods for eliminating competitors for either position or limelight), his lack of capacity for genuine strategic thinking as opposed to short-term tactical fixes, plus his most undiplomatic approach to both friend and foe.

In fact, from the moment of his highly publicised spat with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, Holbrooke’s usefulness ended.

In sum, Nasr has given us not just a good read but also judgments about what happens when a U.S. administration does not place a high enough priority on getting right the U.S. role in the world; does not assess adequately what the nation truly needs to do abroad; that inserts domestic political judgments at the start of the process instead of (as is indeed necessary) after due consideration of foreign policy choices; that permits a continuing imbalance between military and non-military instruments of power and influence; and that fails to “think strategically” about the future, fully two decades after the end of the Cold War made such strategic rethinking imperative.

One conclusion, not in the book but flowing from its argument, is that a second-rate team appointed by the president and secretary of state cannot produce first-rate foreign policy, an outcome that Nasr argues forcefully.

*Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.

Women walk past destroyed shops in Al Qusayr, Syria. Credit: Sam Tarling/IPS

By Robert E. Hunter
WASHINGTON, Feb 8 2013 (IPS)

Every U.S. president since Harry Truman has sought to disentangle the United States from the Middle East, and all have been sucked back into the region and its problems.

So will it be in President Barack Obama’s second term. Last year, his team launched the “tilt” – or “rebalancing” – to Asia. But first they will have to deal with the immediacy of the Middle East, from one end to the other.

The United States has mostly withdrawn from Iraq, but it is still far from stable. In Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, the prospects for “success” are hardly a good bet. Syria’s civil war is intensifying, but no one seems to know what to do, either now or after President Assad departs, with risks of Lebanon-like threats to Israel (and Turkey). There may even be a slow-burning civil war across the region, pitting Sunni states against Shi’ites.

Then there is Iran. During the U.S. political campaign, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu extracted pledges from both candidates Obama and Mitt Romney that “containment” of a potential nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable. Unfortunately, this puts the U.S. president in a place where no president should ever go: where being able to decide, in the U.S. national interest, whether to go to war depends on the “good behaviour” of two other countries – in this case, Iran and Israel.

Meanwhile, the bloom is off the rose of the Arab Spring. Egypt is in incipient turmoil, unemployment is endemic among young people across the region, with its deficit in representative governance. And then there is continuing Islamist militancy – although how much (and where) that really matters to U.S. security is an open question, except in the unlikely event that a terrorist gets a nuclear weapon.

Then there is Palestine. Secretary of State John Kerry says that not moving to resolve that problem would be a catastrophe, and President Obama will visit Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan this spring. Indeed, creating positive change somehow engages America’s regional reputation.

Lastly, as the world’s “indispensable nation”, the U.S. must show it can lead and be seen as responsible for its own and others’ security. It must also get on with its most important national security challenge: to strengthen the U.S. economy, rebuild crumbling infrastructure, improve education and health care, and deal with budget and debt questions.

Some ideas:

First, the U.S. needs to understand that we can’t let go of the Middle East, as much as we are tired of war. We still have national security interests in the region that others will not just pick up.

Second, the administration needs to start seeing the entire region as an integrated whole, rather than as a series of individual crises. There can be no progress on Israel-Palestine so long as Israel is terrified of Iran, worried about Egypt and Syria, and isolates Gaza. A quieting down of the terrorist/Islamist threat cannot even begin so long as rich people in Saudi Arabia continue supporting doctrines and bankrolling fighters that spread instability and fear.

Afghanistan will continue as a source of concern until all relevant external countries agree on some framework for its future, if only to be proof against excessive external meddling; and the U.S. must return to its practice after 9/11 of seeking common ground there with Iran.

Third, the U.S. needs to understand that security in this region must be a combination of military forces, appropriately applied (and appropriately limited), and governance-reconstruction-development.

Yet U.S. agencies are still “stove-piped”, sufficient money for non-military activities is lacking, and we continue to judge contributions by our European allies to shared security in terms of defense budgets rather than in what they do to help societies progress. And we need to develop a long-term plan for a potentially all-inclusive security structure for the Persian Gulf.

Fourth, we need finally to see Iran with clear eyes. The issue is not just nuclear weapons. Deep and long-lasting regional competitions for influence are the heart of the matter. The last three administrations have been unwilling to advance a negotiating position with a chance to succeed, by recognising that the security interests of the U.S., Israel, and Iran must all be considered.

No country can negotiate seriously under military threat, facing sanctions (which may do more to strengthen the regime domestically than to produce acquiescence), and without serious proposals on the “plus” side.

Ironically, those who most talk about going to war with Iran also tend most to oppose the U.S.’s dealing directly with Iran and advancing realistic proposals. We should also pursue areas of common interest, such as freedom of the seas, an Incidents at Sea Convention – like that with the Soviet Union during the Cold War – and formal Iranian membership in counter-piracy cooperation.

Fifth, we need to prioritise and be clear about what really matters to us – to the U.S. – and develop some “strategic patience”, while remembering that others look to us for leadership and steadfastness.

Most important, 22 years after the Cold War ended, we must relearn how to “think strategically” about new circumstances and abandon reflexive, outdated approaches. We have become sclerotic in our methodology, while too many of our think tanks and “policy planning staffs” produce brilliant tactical suggestions but little strategic wisdom or “actionable” policy guidance.

Thus President Obama and his team must search for, engage, and listen to those Americans – some in relatively junior positions in the government, most outside – who know the Middle East and Southwest Asia region from one end to the other, who think strategically, who can make intelligent tradeoffs, and who can embed choices and decisions in U.S. domestic politics – which need to come second, not first.

The last-named task is most immediate and probably most consequential: “Hire good people and listen to them.” If the administration gets that right – which will be determined in the next few weeks – success for U.S. interests in the Middle East will still not be guaranteed. But if the administration gets that wrong, failure is assured.

*Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.