Islamic State fighters pictured here in a 2014 propaganda video shot in Iraq's Anbar province.

By Jasmin Ramsey
WASHINGTON, Apr 17 2015 (IPS)

More than 25,000 fighters seeking to wage “jihad” or an Islamic holy war have left home to join terrorist networks abroad.

The foreign fighters, mostly bound for Islamic extremist groups like the Syria-based al-Nusra Front and the self-titled Islamic State (also in Iraq), come from more than 100 countries worldwide, according to a United Nations report released earlier this month.“Here, for the most part, Muslims feel they are part of the system and part of the country…they don’t feel alienated." -- analyst Emile Nakhleh

While the highest numbers are from Middle Eastern and North African countries, Western countries have also seen foreign recruits.

Out of the top 15 source-Western countries listed in February by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (I.C.S.R.), France, as well as Germany and the United Kingdom have had the highest numbers (1,200 and 500-600 respectively). Only 100 foreign fighters have come from the United States.

Why has the U.S. seen such a lower number of recruits compared to its Western European allies?

Integration vs. alienation

“In this country, the law enforcement authorities have worked much more closely with Muslim communities so that now, some elements within the Muslim community follow the phrase ‘see something, say something,’” Emile Nakhleh, who founded the Central Intelligence Program’s (C.I.A.) Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, told IPS.

“Here, for the most part, Muslims feel they are part of the system and part of the country…they don’t feel alienated,” said Nakhleh, a scholar and expert on the Middle East who retired from the C.I.A. in 2006.

While the majority of Muslims worldwide reject violent extremism and are worried about increasing rates in their home countries, American Muslims—an estimated 2-6 million who are mostly middle class and educated—reject extremism by larger margins than most Muslim publics.

A 2011 Pew Survey of Muslim Americans, the most current of its kind, found more than eight-in-10 American Muslims saw suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets as never justified (81 per cent) or rarely justified (5 per cent) to defend Islam from its enemies. That’s compared to a median of 72 per cent of Muslims worldwide saying such attacks are never justified and 10 per cent saying they are rarely justified.

Unlike their European counterparts, Muslim Americans come from more than 77 home countries, in contrast with Western European countries where Muslims are mainly from two or three countries.

Muslims in America—who make up a smaller percentage relative to the population than their counterparts in France and the U.K.— are also not dominated by a particular sect or ethnicity.

A 2007 Pew Survey also found that Muslim Americans were more assimilated into American culture than their Western European counterparts.

A majority of Muslim Americans expressed a generally positive view of the larger society and said their communities are excellent or good places to live. Seventy-two percent of them agreed with the widespread American opinion that hard work can help you succeed.

Western European Muslims are conversely generally less well off and frustrated with the lack of economic opportunities.

Ripe for recruitment

An estimated 1,200 fighters have left France to become jihadists in Syria and Iraq, according to the U.K.-based I.C.S.R., which has been tracking fighters in the Iraqi-Syrian conflicts since 2012. More British men have joined Islamic extremist groups abroad than have entered the British armed forces.

Ideologically centered recruitment—particularly online and through social media—and discontent with perceived domestic and foreign policies affecting Muslims, are the primary causes of Islamic radicalisation in Western countries, especially where Muslim communities are isolated from others.

The sense of alienation, especially among the youth of Muslim immigrants, mixed with antipathy toward their country’s foreign policy makes some Muslims prime targets for foreign recruiters.

“Algerian French-Muslim immigrants or South Asian Muslims in the U.K. feel excluded and constantly watched and tracked by the authorities,” said Nakhleh.

While surveillance programmes targeting Muslims are also in effect in the U.S.—more than half of the Muslim Americans surveyed by Pew in 2011 said government anti-terrorism policies singled them out for increased surveillance and monitoring—Muslim Americans have not expressed the same level of discontent with their lives as those in Western European countries such as France and the United Kingdom.

Indeed, the Muslim Americans surveyed by Pew in 2011 who reported discrimination still expressed a high level of satisfaction with their lives in the United States.

Conversely, French Muslims in particular complain of religious intolerance in the generally secular society.

The French law banning Islamic face coverings and burqas, which cover the entire body, resulted in a series of angry protests and clashes with police. Muslim groups have also complained of increasing rates of violent attacks since the ban became law in 2010.

A nine-month pregnant woman was beaten last month in southern France by two men who tore off her veil, saying “none of that here.” Another Islamophobic attack in 2013 resulted in a French Muslim woman in Paris suffering a miscarriage.

Obama embraces U.S. Muslims

But the U.S. government has been working to prevent its Muslim communities from feeling discriminated against and isolated.

Throughout his two terms in office, U.S. President Barack Obama has repeatedly distinguished between Islamic extremism and Islam as a religion.

“We are not at war with Islam, we are at war with those who have perverted Islam,” said Obama Feb. 18 at the White House-hosted Summit to Counter Violent Extremism.

He has also encouraged religious tolerance while calling for Muslim community leaders to work more closely with the government in rooting out homegrown extremism.

“Here in America, Islam has been woven into the fabric of our country since its founding,” said Obama.

“If we’re going to solve these issues, then the people who are most targeted and potentially most affected — Muslim Americans — have to have a seat at the table where they can help shape and strengthen these partnerships so that we’re all working together to help communities stay safe and strong and resilient,” he said.

The Jan. 7 terrorist attack in Paris, where two gunmen executed 11 staffers at the Charlie Hebdo magazine for what they considered deeply offensive portrayals of Islam, have put Western countries on heightened alert for so-called “lone-wolf” attacks, where individuals perpetuate violence to prove a point or for a cause.

The U.S. has not seen a similar major terror attack since April 2013, when two Chechnyan-American brothers deployed pressure-cooker bombs at the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring hundreds of others.

But with sophisticated foreign-terrorist recruitment efforts on the rise, Washington has increased its counter-terrorism measures at home and worldwide.

While the Islamic State and similar groups could plan attacks on U.S. soil if they see the U.S. as directly involved in their battles, according to Nakhleh, their primary goal at the moment is to recruit foreigners as combatants.

“The more Western Jihadists they can recruit, the more global they can present themselves as they seek allegiances in Asian countries, and in North Africa,” he said.

“This is how they present themselves as a Muslim global caliphate.”

Edited by Kitty Stapp

By Emile Nakhleh
WASHINGTON, Jan 14 2015 (IPS)

The horrific terrorist attack on the French satirical publication Charlie Hebdo has once again raised the question about violence and Islam. Why is it, some ask, that so much terrorism has been committed in the name of Islam, and why do violent jihadists seek justification of their actions in their religion?

Regardless of whether or not Said and Cherif Kouachi, the two brothers who attacked Charlie Hebdo, were pious or engaged in un-Islamic behavior in their personal lives, the fact remains they used Islamic idioms, such as “Allahu Akbar” or “God is Great,” to celebrate their bloody violence. Other Islamic terrorists have invoked similar idioms during previous terrorist operations.“Modern Pharaohs” and dynastic potentates continue to practice their repressive policies across the Middle East, totally oblivious to the pain and suffering of their people and the hopelessness of their youth.

Although many Muslim leaders and theologians worldwide have denounced the assault on the Paris-based magazine, many Muslim autocrats continue to exploit Islam for selfish reasons. For example, during the same week of the attacks in France, Saudi Arabia convicted one of its citizen bloggers and sentenced him to a lengthy jail term, a huge fine, and one thousand floggings. His “crime:” calling for liberal reforms of the Saudi regime.

Since Sep. 11, 2001, scholars of Islam have explored the factors that drive Islamic radicalism and the reasons why radical activists have “hijacked” or “stolen” mainstream Islam. Based on public opinion polls and expert analysis, most observers assess that two key factors have contributed to radicalisation and terrorism: a regime’s domestic and foreign policy, and the conservative, intolerant Salafi-Wahhabi Islamic ideology coming mostly out of Saudi Arabia.

For the past decade and half, reasoned analysis has suggested that Arab Islamic states, Muslim scholars, and Western countries could take specific steps in order to neutralise these factors. This analysis concedes, however, that the desired results would require time, resources, courage, and above all, vision and commitment.

What drives domestic terrorism?

In the domestic policy arena, economic, political, and social issues have framed the radical narrative and empowered extremist activists. These include: dictatorship, repression, corruption, unemployment, inadequate education, poverty, scarcity of clean water, food, and electricity, and poor sanitary conditions.

High unemployment, which ranges from 25-50 percent among the 15-29 cohort in most Arab and Muslim countries, has created a poor, alienated, angry, and inadequately educated youthful generation that does not identify with the state.  Many turn to violence and terrorism and end up serving as foot soldier “jihadists” in terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and others.

Autocratic regimes in several Arab and Islamic countries have ignored these conditions and the ensuing grievances for years while maintaining their hold on power. “Modern Pharaohs” and dynastic potentates continue to practice their repressive policies across the Middle East, totally oblivious to the pain and suffering of their people and the hopelessness of their youth.

In the foreign policy arena, public opinion polls in Arab and Muslim countries have shown that specific American policies toward Arabs and Muslims have created a serious rift between the United States and the Islamic world.

These include a perceived U.S. war on Islam, the continued detention of Muslims at Guantanamo Bay, unwavering support for the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, on-going violations of Muslims’ human rights in the name of the war on terrorism, and the coddling of Arab Muslim dictators.

Islamic radicals have propagated the claim, which has resonated with many Muslims, that their rulers, or the “near enemy,” are propped up, financed, and armed by the United States and other Western powers or the “far enemy.” Therefore, “jihad” becomes a “duty” against both of these “enemies.”

Although many mainstream Muslims saw some validity in the radicals’ argument that domestic and foreign policy often underpin and justify jihad, they attribute much of the violence and terrorism to radical, intolerant ideological interpretations of Sunni Islam, mostly found in the teachings of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence adhered to by Saudi state and religious establishment.

Some contemporary Islamic thinkers have accordingly argued that Islam must undergo a process of reformation. The basic premise of such reformation is to transport Islam from 7^th Century Arabia, where the Koran was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, to a globalised 21^st century world that transcends Arabia and the traditional “abode of Islam.”

Calls for Islamic Reformation

Reformist Islamic thinkers—including Syrian Muhammad Shahrur, Iranians Abdul Karim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar, Swiss-Egyptian Tariq Ramadan, Egyptian-American Khaled Abu El Fadl, Sudanese-American Abdullahi Ahmad An-Naim, Egyptian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, and Malaysians Anwar Ibrahim and Farish Noor—have advocated taking a new look at Islam.

Although their work is based on different religious and cultural narratives, these thinkers generally agree on four key fundamental points:

1. Islam was revealed at a specific time in a specific place and in a response to specific conditions and situations. For example, certain chapters or suras were revealed to Muhammad in Medina while he was fighting several battles and struggling to create his umma-based “Islamic State.”

2. If Islam desires to be accepted as a global religion with universal principles, Muslim theologians should adapt Islam to the modern world where millions of Muslims live as minorities in non-Muslim countries—from India and China to the Americas and Europe. The communal theological concept of the umma that was central to Muhammad’s Islamic State in Medina is no longer valid in a complex, multicultural and multi-religious world.

3. If the millions of Muslims living outside the “heartland” of Islam aspire to become productive citizens in their adopted countries, they would need to view their religion as a personal connection between them and their God, not a communal body of belief that dictates their social interaction with non-Muslims or with their status as a minority. If they want to live in peace with fellow citizens in secular Western countries, they must abide by the principles of tolerance of the “other,” compromise, and peaceful co-existence with other religions.

4. Radical and intolerant Islamic ideology does not represent the mainstream body of Muslim theology. Whereas radicals and terrorists, from Osama Bin Ladin to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have often quoted the war-like Medina Koranic suras, Islamic reformation should focus on the suras revealed to Muhammad in Mecca, which advocate universalist principles akin to those of Christianity and Judaism. These suras also recognise Moses and Jesus as prophets and messengers of God.

Reformist thinkers also agree that Muslim theologians and scholars all over the world should preach to radicals in particular that Islam does not condone terrorism and should not be invoked to justify violence. Although in recent years would-be terrorists invariably sought a religious justification or a fatwa from a religious cleric to justify their terrorist operation, a “reformed” Islam would ban the issuance of such fatwas.

Failed reformation attempts

Regimes have yet to address the domestic policies that have fueled radicalism and terrorism.

In terms of the Salafi-Wahhabi ideology, Saudi Arabia continues to teach the Hanbali driven doctrine in its schools and export it to other countries. It’s not therefore surprising that the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) bases its government and social “philosophy” on the Saudi religious ideology. According to media reports, some Saudi textbooks are currently being taught in schools in Iraqi and Syrian territory controlled by IS.

Semi Ghesmi, a Salafist student and elected head of the National Students Union in Tunisia, supports what he calls the “jihad” in Syria. Credit: Giuliana Sgrena/IPS

Calls for reformation have not taken root in the Sunni Muslim world because once the four schools jurisprudence—Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanafi—were accepted in the 10^th century as representing the complete doctrine of Sunni Islam, the door of reasoning or ijtihad was closed shut. Muslim theologians and leaders would not allow any new doctrinal thinking and would readily brand any such thought or thinkers as seditious.

An important reason why the calls for reformation have fallen on deaf ears is because in the past two decades, many of the reformist thinkers have lived outside the Muslim heartland, taught in Western universities, and wrote in foreign languages. Their academic arguments were rarely translated into Arabic and other “Islamic” languages.

Even if some of the articles advocating reformation were translated, the average Muslim in Muslim countries with a high school or college education barely understood or comprehended the reformists’ theological arguments renouncing violence and terrorism.

How to defeat Islamic terrorism

If Arab Islamic rulers are sincere in their fight against terrorism, they need to implement drastically different economic, political, and social policies. They must reform their educational systems, fund massive entrepreneurial projects that aim at job creation, institute transitions to democracy, and empower their people to become creative citizens.

Dictatorship, autocracy, and family rule without popular support or legitimacy will not survive for long in the 21^st century. Arab and Muslim youth are connected to the outside world and wired into massive global networks of social media. Many of them believe that their regimes are anachronistic and ossified. To gain their rights and freedoms, these youth, men and women have come to believe their political systems must be replaced and their 7^th century religion must be reformed.

Until this happens, terrorism in the name of Islam, whether in Paris or Baghdad, will remain a menace for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

By Christopher Occhicone
NEW YORK, Jan 4 2015 (IPS)

A concerted disinformation campaign is being conducted to manufacture consent for military action against the government in Tripoli and the town of Misrata, which has been at the forefront of toppling the despotic Gaddafi dictatorship.

It is ironic that the very same people who called in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) led airstrikes on satellite phones in 2011 are now being labeled as dangerous ‘Islamist militants’.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

It looks like Western policymakers and legislators in the U.S. and Europe, and the United Nations may all be misinformed, which in turn could unleash catastrophic consequences for the people of Libya.  Undoubtedly a protracted civil war in Libya will swell the numbers of refugees fleeing to Europe manifold.

Impact of Benghazi

To understand the difference between fact and fiction, I spent several days interviewing senior members of the government of Libya and Fajr Libya known in English as Libya Dawn (LD).  My main subject on the side of the government was Mustafa Noah, director of the Intelligence Service of Libya.

What was very clear throughout the interview is that both Noah and his supporters in the government in Tripoli and Libya Dawn are very much pro-U.S. and pro-NATO who they say are “the saviors of Libya”.The Libya story in 2015 is about disinformation, lies and a power-grab in motion clandestinely supported by the Egyptians and their Saudi and Emirati counterparts.

They are genuinely upset at the murder of U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and his three colleagues in Benghazi.  Ambassador Stevens is considered “an honourary Libyan who loved the country and its peoples” and who was “above all, a guest whose murder is sacrilege”.

Noah said that the “perpetrators have been paying a heavy price for their crime that is being slowly but surely being exacted upon them”.  He stated categorically for the record that “extremist Takfiri Islamists are clearly rejected by Libya Dawn and the government in Tripoli”.

In my four-hour interview, Noah made it clear that he was happy to talk about any issue, but did not want to be the focus or want it to appear as though he may be vying for power. This was something he came back to later on in the recorded conversation.

In fact, he spoke little about himself and his role despite several attempts to steer the conversation in that direction.

The major point Mustafa Noah made is that the government in Tripoli and Libya Dawn (as it stands now) is/are in the process of trying to set up an inclusive government for all Libyans.  His opinion is that opponents – specifically retired Libyan General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar – were “concerned about consolidating their own personal power base”.

There is mounting evidence that Hafter’s power-grab is being carried out with support of Egypt’s President Abdul Fattah al Sisi and his Saudi and Emirati backers. For example: the MiG-21 bombing runs from across the border, which are tantamount to a war crime for unprovoked and undeclared bombing of a neighbouring country.

And the recent purchase of six Sukhoi Su-30 warplanes delivered to Tobruk by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military (i.e. paid for allegedly by Egypt with funds that most probably originated from the Arab Gulf).

Mustafa Noah seemed genuine insofar as he always had a humble, well-composed, and thoughtful approach to any subject discussed.

He never framed anything in terms of his own accomplishments or involvement but in terms of the people and the revolution for change, stability and prosperity for all Libyans.

Noah was genuinely upset at the thought that someone-like Haftar, who is “working for his narrow personal interests and self-aggrandizement”, could be successful in building a personal power base without regard for the people.

He said Haftar was “using the divisive methods he learned from his time as a crony in the Gaddafi dictatorship”.  Noah found the “thought of a ‘strong man’ coming to power particularly offensive and abhorrent in light of recent history in Libya”.

Mustafa Noah clearly has put a lot of trust in the ability of Libya Dawn, however he is not blindly committed to them.  When I read a list of different militias, brigades, groups that composed Libya Dawn and asked about the character of specific militias, he painted them as all equally for the revolution and composed of good people.

Noah said any group that was not focused on the spirit of the revolution (i.e. anti-corruption, against arbitrary political violence, etc.) would not be a part of the future of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Libya.

His main focus is the Libyan people, creating better institutions, employment opportunities, social services, education, health services, etc.

Mustafa Noah talked about an “inclusive future” for Libya.  He described the “old system of tribalism and manipulation by Gaddafi” and how the “mentality has to change in order for the country to progress”.  Regarding inclusivity in the future, Noah said that they are “open to people from the Gaddafi regime returning to public life once stability is created”.

In fact, Mustafa Noah’s senior advisor on Anti-Terrorism Operations, who joined the conversation halfway through, was in the Gaddafi regime for 37 years.  For Mustafa Noah, the government in Tripoli and Libya Dawn, “there is a place for people from the Gaddafi regime who could prove they were not stealing from the Libyan people or … involved in atrocities against the people”.

Quo vadis Libya 2015?

What I discerned from my recent visit to Tripoli and Misrata is that the power-grab spearheaded by Haftar has more to do with Libya’s oil and gas resources, which are coveted by their neighbours, rather than the red herring of ‘Islamist militants in Tripoli and Misrata’ that is being trumpeted in the news media.

The Libya story in 2015 is about disinformation, lies and a power-grab in motion clandestinely supported by the Egyptians and their Saudi and Emirati counterparts.  What will the U.S. and the Europeans do?

Will they play along in the new ‘Great Game’ or stop another Syria-like imbroglio unfolding where extremist Takfiri militant organisations like the Islamist State (ISIS or ISIL) can feed off and emerge to threaten peace and stability in the Mediterranean and beyond?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS-Inter Press Service.

Edited by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

Bondok Hassem (left) gets help to mount a mortar inside Zwara´s squat house. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
ZWARA, Libya, Dec 5 2014 (IPS)

It could be a squat house anywhere: music is playing non-stop and there is also a radio station and an art exhibition. However, weapons are also on display among the instruments, and most here wear camouflage uniform.

“The house belonged to a former member of the secret services of [Muammar] Gaddafi so we decided to squat it for the local youth in Zwara [an Amazigh enclave 120 km west of Tripoli, on the border with Tunisia],” Fadel Farhad, an electrician who combines his work with the local militia, tells IPS.It could be a squat house anywhere: music is playing non-stop and there is also a radio station and an art exhibition. However, weapons are also on display among the instruments, and most here wear camouflage uniform.

The centre is called “Tifinagh” after the name given to the Amazigh alphabet. Also called Berbers, the Amazigh are native inhabitants of North Africa.

The arrival of the Arabs in the region in the seventh century was the beginning of a slow yet gradual process of Arabisation which was sharply boosted during the four decades in which Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) remained in power. Unofficial estimates put the number of Amazighs in this country at around 600,000 – about 10 percent of the total population

Like most of the youngsters at the centre, Farhad knows he can be mobilised at any time. The latest attack on Zwara took place less than a kilometre from here a little over a week ago, when an airstrike hit a warehouse killing two Libyans and six sub-Saharan migrants.

Three years after Gaddafi was toppled, Libya remains in a state of political turmoil that has pushed the country to the brink of civil war. There are two governments and two separate parliaments one based in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk, 1,000 km east of the capital.

Several militias are grouped into two paramilitary alliances: Fajr (“Dawn” in Arabic), led by the Misrata brigades controlling Tripoli, and Karama (“Dignity”) commanded by Khalifa Haftar, a Tobruk-based former army general.

“Here in Zwara we rely on around 5000 men grouped into different militias,” Younis, a militia fighter who prefers not to give his full name, tells IPS. “We never wanted this to happen but the problem is that all our enemies are fighting on Tobruk´s side,” adds the 30-year-old by the pickups lining up at the entrance of the building.

Local militiamen gather outside their squat house in the Amazigh enclave of Zwara. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

The polarisation of the conflict in Libya has pushed several Amazigh militias to fight sporadically alongside the coalition led by Misrata, which includes Islamist groups among its ranks.

However, the atmosphere in this squat house seems at odds with religious orthodoxy of any kind, with an unlikely fusion between Amazigh traditional music and death metal blasting from two loudspeakers. This is the work of 30-year-old Bondok Hassem, a well-known local musician who is also an Amazigh language teacher as well as one of the commanders of the Tamazgha militia.

“Both Misrata and Tobruk are striving to become the alpha male in this war. We are all fully aware that, whoever wins this war, they will attack us immediately afterwards so we are forced to defend our land by any means necessary,” laments Hassem between sips of boja, the local firewater.

But can it be international partnerships that hamper an already difficult agreement between both sides?

Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and France are backing Tobruk and Misrata relies mainly on Qatar and Turkey. Meanwhile, NATO officials are seemingly torn between wanting to stay out of the war, and watching anxiously as the violence goes out of control. Today, most of the diplomatic missions have left Tripoli, except for those of Italy and Hungary.

A fragile balance

Moussa Harim is among the Amazigh who seem to feel not too uncomfortable siding with the government in Tripoli. Born in Jadu, in the Amazigh stronghold of the Nafusa mountain range – 100 km south of Tripoli – Harim was exiled in France during Gaddafi’s time but he became Deputy Minister of Culture in March 2012.

Although he admits that Islamists pose a real threat, he clarifies that in Misrata there are also people “from all walks of life and very diverse affiliations, communists included.”

It is the geographical location itself which, according to Harim, inexorably pushes the Libyan Amazigh towards Misrata.

“Except for a small enclave in the east, our people live in the west of the country, and a majority of them here, in Tripoli,” the senior official tells IPS.

But there are discordant voices, like that of Fathi Ben Khalifa. A native of Zwara and a political dissident for decades, Ben Khalifa was the president of the World Amazigh Congress between 2011 and 2013.

The Congress is an international organisation based in Paris since 1995 that aims to protect the Amazigh identity. Today Ben Khalifa remains as an executive member of this umbrella organisation for this North African people.

“This is not our war, it’s just a conflict between Arab nationalists and Islamists, none of which will ever recognise our rights,” Ben Khalifa tells IPS over the phone from Morocco. Although the senior political activist defends the right of his people to defend themselves from outside aggressions, he gives a deadline to take a clearer position:

“If Libya´s Constitution – to be released on December 24 – does not grant our legitimate rights, then it will be the time to take up arms,” Ben Khalifa bluntly claims.

At dusk, and after another day marked by exhausting shifts at checkpoints and patrols around the city, the local militiamen cool down after swapping their rifles for a harmonica and a guitar at the squat house. This time they play the songs of Matloub Lounes, a singer from Kabylia, Algeria´s Amazigh stronghold.

“I can´t hardly wait for the war to end. I´ll burn my uniform and get back to my work,” says Anwar Darir, an Amazigh language teacher since 2011. That was the year in which Gaddafi was killed, yet a solution to the conflict among Libyans is still nowhere near.

(Edited by Phil Harris)

One of the ancient yet vanishing Mandaean rituals in Baghdad, at the banks of the Tigris river. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
KIRKUK, Iraq, Nov 8 2014 (IPS)

“Going  back home? That would be suicide. The Islamists would cut our throats straight away,” says Khalil Hafif Ismam. The fear of this Mandaean refugee sums up that of one of the oldest yet most decimated communities in Mesopotamia.

“We had our house and two jewellery shops back in Baiji – 230 km north of Baghdad – but when ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] took over the area in June we had to leave for sheer survival,” recalls Khalil Ismam from the Mandaean Council compound in Kirkuk, 100 km east of Baiji. That is where he shares a roof with the family of his brother Sami, and the mother of both.

The Ismams are Mandaeans, followers of a religion that experts have tracked back 400 years before Christ, and which consider John the Baptist as their prophet. Accordingly, their main ritual, baptism, has taken place in the same spots on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates for almost two millennia.

In the sixteenth century, Portuguese Jesuit missionaries attempted to convert them to Christianity in Basra (southern Iraq). Young Mandaeans were sent, often abducted, to evangelise far-flung Portuguese colonies such as today´s Sri Lanka. They were called the “Christians of St. John”, although Mandaeans solidly dissociate themselves from Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The Ismams, a Mandaean displaced family, pose at the entrance of the Mandaean Council in Kikruk. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Khalil Ismam and his brother, both jewellers in their late thirties, also come from Iraq´s far south. Talking to IPS, they explain how they moved to Baghdad in the 1980s, “looking for a better life”. After the first Gulf War in 1991, they were forced to relocate again, this time to Baiji. Today they are in Kirkuk but they have no idea what tomorrow will bring.

“The council has told us that we cannot stay over a month, but we still don´t know where to go next because ISIS is already at the gates of the city,” says Sami.

Among the little they could take with them, the silversmiths did not forget their sekondola – a medallion engraved with a bee, a lion and a scorpion, all of them surrounded by a snake. According to Mandaean tradition, it should protect them from evil."The most striking thing about the killings of Mandaeans in Iraq is that it ranges from monetary gain by the extremists to the more sinister reason of ethnically cleansing the population of Iraq to get rid of the entire population of Mandaeans” – Suhaib Nashi, General Secretary of the Mandaean Association Union in Exile

Talismans are likely among the few things they can stick to while Mandaean ancient rituals begin to disappear as their priests are driven into exile in the best case scenario. In Kirkuk, the dry bed of the Khasa River – a tributary of the Tigris – is not an option so the increasingly rare ceremonies are held in a makeshift water well inside the complex.

“Every two or three weeks a genzibra – Mandaean priest – comes from Baghdad to conduct the ritual but the road is getting more dangerous with each passing day,” laments Khalil Ismam, standing by the pond.

According to a report released by Human Rights Watch in February 2011, 90 percent of Mandaeans have either died or left the country since the invasion by the U.S.-led forces in 2003.

From his residence in Baghdad, Sattar Hillo, spiritual leader of the Mandaeans worldwide, told IPS that his community is facing their “most critical moment” in history, adding that there are around 10,000 of them left in Iraq.

But that was his assessment a few months before the ISIS threat in the region. Today, the situation has worsened considerably, as Suhaib Nashi, General Secretary of the Mandaean Association Union in Exile, sums up:

“In the past two months, our community in Iraq is suffering a real genocide at the hands of radical Islamists, and not just by ISIS”. Nashi told IPS that the situation is equally worrying in southern areas, where the followers of this religion are easy victims of either Shiite militias or common criminals.

“The most striking thing about the killings of Mandaeans in Iraq is that it ranges from monetary gain by the extremists to the more sinister reason of ethnically cleansing the population of Iraq to get rid of the entire population of Mandaeans,” denounces Nashi.

Seeking asylum

Khalima Mashmul, aged 39, is among the Mandaean refugees staying today at the local council. She tells IPS that she is originally from the south, but that she came to Kirkuk at the early age of 15, dragged by a forced population displacement campaign through which Saddam Hussein sought to alter the demographic balance of Kirkuk, where the Kurds are the majority.

Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen dispute this city which lies on top of one of the world’s largest oil reserves. What Mashmul has called “home” for nearly 25 years is still considered as one of the most dangerous spots in Iraq. And she knows it well.

“My husband is a police officer. He lost his right leg and four fingers of one hand after a bomb attack last June. Despite his injuries, they still force him to keep working,” this mother of four tells IPS. Like the Ismams, they cannot stay indefinitely.

“We cannot go back home because my husband is threatened but we don´t have enough money to pay a rent,” laments Mashmul. Their only option, she adds, is that “Australia or any European country” grants them political asylum.

That is likely the dream of the majority in Iraq. In a report on the Iraq crisis released last month, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says that 1.8 million Iraqis have been internally displaced since January this year. The report also adds that 600,000 of them need urgent help due to the imminent arrival of winter.

While many wait impatiently to move to a Western country, some others have opted for an easier relocation in neighbouring countries.

Chabar Imad Abid, one of the policemen – all of them Mandaean – managing security at the compound, tells IPS that he does not regret being left alone by his family, saying: “My wife and my five children are in Jordan and I will join them as soon as I can.”

“We have just been told that ISIS is gathering forces in Hawija – 50 km west of Kirkuk,” says the policeman, meaning that the offensive over Kirkuk is “imminent”.

(Edited by Phil Harris)

By Emile Nakhleh
WASHINGTON, Oct 15 2014 (IPS)

As the international media is mesmerised by the Islamic State’s advance on Kobani or ‘Ayn al-Arab on the Syrian-Turkish border, Arab states and the United States would need to look beyond Kobani’s fate and the Islamic State’s territorial successes and defeats.

The crumbling Levant poses a greater danger than ISIL and must be addressed—first and foremost by the states of the region.Although the so-called deep security state has been able to maintain a semblance of order around the national capital, the state’s control of territories beyond the capital is fading and is rapidly being contested by non-state actors.

The British colonial term Levant encompasses modern-day Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, with a total population of over 70 million people. The population—mostly young, unemployed or underemployed, poor, and inadequately educated—has lost trust in their leaders and the governing elites.

The Levant has become a bloody playground for other states in the greater Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Iran, and Turkey. While dislocations in the Levant could be contained, the regional states’ involvement has transformed the area into an international nightmare. The resulting instability will impact the region for years to come regardless of ISIL’s short-term fortunes.

The Levantine state has become marginalised and ineffectual in charting a hopeful future for its people, who are drifting away from nationalist ideologies toward more divisive, localised, and often violent, manifestations of identity politics. National political identity, with which citizens in the Levant have identified for decades, has devolved mostly into tribal, ethnic, geographic, and sectarian identities.

The crumbling state structure and authority gave rise to these identities, thereby fueling the current conflicts, which in turn are undermining the very existence of the Levantine state.

The three key non-state actors—ISIL, Hizbollah, and Hamas—have been the beneficiaries of the crumbling states, which were drawn up by colonial cartographer-politicians a century ago.

Although the so-called deep security state has been able to maintain a semblance of order around the national capital, the state’s control of territories beyond the capital is fading and is rapidly being contested by non-state actors.

This phenomenon is readily apparent in Baghdad, Damascus, Ramallah, and Gaza, partially so in Beirut, and less so in Amman. Salafi groups, however, are lurking in the background in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine ready to challenge state authority whenever they sense a power vacuum.

Political systems in the Levant are often propped up by domestic ruling elites, regional states, and foreign powers for a variety of parochial and transnational interests. More and more, these ruling structures appear to be relics of the past. A key analytic question is how long would they survive if outside economic, military and political support dries up?

Levant regimes comprise a monarchy in Jordan; a perennially dysfunctional parliamentary/presidential system in Lebanon; a brutal, teetering dictatorship in Syria; an autocratic presidency in Palestine; and an erratic partisan democracy in Iraq. They have subsisted on so-called rentier or “rent” economies—oil in Iraq, with the rest dependent on foreign aid. Providers of such aid have included GCC countries, Iran, Turkey, the United States, the EU, Russia, and others.

Corruption is rampant across most state institutions in the Levant, including the military and the key financial and banking systems. For example, billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Iraq following the 2003 invasion have not been accounted for. According to the New York Times, American investigators in the past decade have traced huge sums of this money to a bunker in Lebanon.

The collapse of the Levant states in the next decade is not unthinkable. Their borders are already becoming more blurred and porous. The decaying environment is allowing violent groups to operate more freely within states and across state boundaries. ISIL is causing havoc in Iraq and Syria and potentially could destabilise Jordan and Lebanon precisely because the Levantine state is on the verge of collapse.

As these states weaken, regional powers—especially Saudi Arabia plus some of its GCC junior partners, Iran, and Egypt—will find it convenient to engage in proxy sectarian and ethnic wars through jihadist and other vigilante mercenaries.

Equally disturbing is that U.S. policy toward a post-ISIL Levant seems rudderless without a strategic compass to guide it. It’s as if U.S. policymakers have no stomach to focus on the “morning after” despite the fact that the airstrikes are proving ineffective in halting ISIL’s territorial advances.

Kobani aside, what should the Arab states and the United States do about the future of the Levant?

1. Iraq. If the Sunnis and Kurds are to be represented across all state institutions in Iraq, regional states with Washington’s help should urge Prime Minister Abadi to complete the formation of his new government on the basis of equity and fairness. Government and semi-public institutions and agencies must be made accountable and transparent and subject to scrutiny by domestic and international regulatory bodies. Otherwise, Iraq would remain a breeding ground for terrorists and jihadists.

2. Syria. If Washington remains committed to Assad’s removal, it should end its Russian roulette charade toward the Syrian dictator. Ankara’s view that Assad is more dangerous in the long run than ISIL is convincing and should be accepted and acted upon.

If removing Assad remains a serious policy objective, is the coalition contemplating imposing a no-fly zone and a security zone on Syria’s northern border any time soon to facilitate Assad’s downfall?

3. Lebanon. If Hizbollah and other political parties do not play a constructive role in re-establishing political dialogue and stability in Lebanon, it won’t be long before the ISIL wars enter the country. Are there regional and international pressures being put on Hizbollah to end its support of Assad and disengage from fighting in Syria?

The upcoming presidential election would be a useful barometer to assess the key Lebanese stakeholders’ commitment to long-term stability. If no candidate wins a majority, does Washington, in conjunction with its Arab allies, have a clear plan to get the Lebanese parliament to vote for a president?

Unless Lebanon gets its political house in order, religious sectarianism could yet again rear its ugly head in that fragile state and tear Lebanon apart.

4. Palestine. If the Obama administration urges Israel to facilitate a working environment for the Palestinian national unity government, to end its siege of Gaza, and dismantle its 47-year occupation, Palestine would no longer be an incubator of radical ideologies.

An occupied population living in poverty, unemployment, alienation, repression, daily humiliation, and hopelessness and ruled by a corrupt regime is rarely prone to moderation and peaceful dialogue. On the contrary, such a population offers fertile recruiting ground for extremism.

5. It is in the United States’ interest to engage Iran and Saudi Arabia—the two countries that seem to meddle most in the Levant—in order to stop their proxy wars in the region. These sectarian wars could easily lead to an all-out military confrontation, which would surely suck in the United States and other Western powers. Israel would not be able to escape such a conflict either.

The Saudi government claims that it opposes ISIS. Yet one would ask why hasn’t the Saudi clerical establishment denounced—forcefully and publicly—the ISIL ideology and rejected so-called Islamic State Caliphate? Why is it that thousands of ISIL jihadists are from Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Gulf countries?

6. Since Levant countries face high unemployment, it’s imperative to pursue serious job creation initiatives. Arab states, with Washington’s support, should begin massive technical and vocational education programs and entrepreneurial initiatives in the Levant countries. Young men and women should be trained in vocational institutes, much like the two-year college concept in the United States.

Vocational fields that suffer from shortages in Levant countries include plumbing, carpentry, home construction, electricity, welding, mechanics, automotive services, truck driving, computers and electronics, health services, hotels and tourism, technology management, and TV and computer repairs. Services in these fields are badly needed. Yet thousands of young men and women are ready to be trained and fill these needs.

In addition to vocational training, wealthy Arab countries should help the Levant establish funds for entrepreneurial, job-creation initiatives, and start-ups. A partnership between government and the private sector, with support from the U.S and other developed countries, could be the engine that drives a new era of job creation and economic growth in the region where the ISIL cancer is metastasizing.

Let’s be clear, the United States has significant leverage to help implement these policies should American leaders decide to do so. One could ask why should the US make such a commitment? If ISIL is primarily a threat to Levantine countries, why can’t they deal with it?

These are fair questions but, as we have discovered with Ebola, what happens in Liberia doesn’t stay in Liberia. A crumbling Levant will have ramifications not just for the region but for the United States and the rest of the world as well.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, IPS-Inter Press Service.

Editing by Kitty Stapp

Excerpt:

The Islamic State’s territorial expansion and barbaric executions in Iraq and Syria are a gathering threat and must be confronted. American air bombardment, however, is the wrong course of action, and will not necessarily weaken ISIS or DA’ISH, as it’s known in Arabic.

As a senator, President Barack Obama called George W. Bush’s intervention in Iraq a “dumb war” and promised to end it if he won the presidency. It would be tragic if Obama, in the name of fighting the Islamic State, waged a “dumber” war.In Iraq, the political vacuum, which Maliki inadvertently engineered, contributed to the recent rise and success of the Islamic State.

The Obama administration maintains that its humanitarian intervention and air campaign are aimed at protecting U.S. personnel and preventing human suffering and possible “genocide.” According to some media reports, the U.S. has ordered the evacuation of some of its personnel in Erbil. Yet the administration’s argument that the airstrikes against Islamic State positions near Irbil were requested by the Maliki government, and are hence justified, is unconvincing.

Much of the Islamic State’s anti-Shia and anti-Iran rhetoric may be traced to the conservative, intolerant Hanbali School of Jurisprudence, which underpins Salafi Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State’s ideology justifies the use of violence in the fight against Shia Islam, Iran, the Shia-Maliki government in Iraq and the Alawite Assad regime in Syria.

While the al-Saud regime publicly loathes the Islamic State and correctly views it as a terrorist organisation, Saudi leaders do not necessarily abhor its message against Iran and the Shia. A similar situation prevails among the Sunni al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain.

In Iraq, the political vacuum, which Maliki inadvertently engineered, contributed to the recent rise and success of the Islamic State. Many Sunnis with a privileged past under Saddam Hussein support the group because of its opposition to Maliki’s Shia-centric authoritarian policy of refusing to form a more pluralistic and inclusive government.

Many Shia, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, have criticised Maliki’s clinging to power. Sistani has called on the Iraqi people to “choose wisely,” urged Maliki to leave office, and blamed the prime minister for the deteriorating conditions in the country and, by implication, the territorial successes of the Islamic State.

In Syria, the ongoing bloody civil war has given the Islamic State a golden opportunity to fight a non-Sunni regime, especially one that is closely aligned with “Safavi” Iran and its perceived surrogate, Hezbollah. A combination of financial and monetary war loot, contributions from other Sunnis (especially in the Gulf), and initial arming by certain Gulf states, has helped the Islamic State fight effectively against the Syrian regime, the Maliki government, and more recently against the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq.

Many of these Sunni Muslims view the call for a new caliphate as a return to the Middle Ages. It certainly does not address the endemic economic, social, and political deficits that threaten the future of the region. According to media reports, many Sunnis this past week refused to declare allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a mosque in Mosul despite his call for their loyalty.

Mainstream Sunnis also view the public executions of soldiers and other Islamic State opponents as barbaric and thus repulsive. The Islamic State’s harsh treatment of women and non-Muslim minorities is equally appalling. The application of harsh Sharia punishments or hudud in Syrian and Iraqi areas under Islamic State control has also been condemned by the international community.

The Islamic State and the West

Western countries view the Islamic State as posing three principal threats: a possible collapse of the Iraqi state; increasingly bloody sectarian violence across state boundaries; and continued recruitment and training of potential jihadists coming from the West.

Of the three threats, recruiting Western jihadists should be the key concern for Western security services. Once these young jihadists return to their countries of origin, they would bring with them battle-hardened experience and a radical ideology that rejects Western democratic pluralism.

Jihadist groups have exploited violent sectarianism to spread their message. Regimes in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere have also cynically promoted sectarianism in order to divide their peoples and stay in power.

The Islamic State’s rejection of existing boundaries between Iraq and Syria indicates that the artificial borders set up by the colonial powers under the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 are no longer functional. Colonial demarcation of state borders in the Levant (especially Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine), North Africa, and the Persian Gulf was implemented without meaningful consultations with the populations of those territories.

After WWI, colonial powers either ruled some of these territories directly or by proxy through pliant autocrats and potentates. In an interview with the New York Times this past Saturday, Obama acknowledged this reality and added, “what we’re seeing in the Middle East and parts of North Africa is an order that dates back to World War I [which is] starting to crumble.”

The “crumbling” of state boundaries has started in Iraq and Syria under the Islamic State’s religious veneer of the caliphate, but it will not stop there.

Call for Action

Many Sunnis who support the Islamic State do not agree with its terrorist ideology, religious fervor, intolerant theology, or vision of a caliphate. Their opposition to specific regime policies in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere drives their support of the Islamic State. Combating this gathering threat, therefore, should come from within the region, not through airstrikes or drone targeting, which Obama also acknowledged in the NYT interview.

If the Islamic State’s threat is destined to damage Western interests and personnel in the region, Western countries should take several comprehensive steps to thwart the threat.

First, Western law enforcement agencies should pay closer attention to their own nationals who show interest in joining the jihadists in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region. They should partner with their Muslim communities at home to address this phenomenon.

These agencies, however, should not target these communities surreptitiously or spy on them. Community leaders should take the lead in reaching out to their youth and dissuade them from volunteering to do jihad regardless of the cause.

Second, the United States and other Western countries should impress on Maliki the necessity of forming a more inclusive government, which would include Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and other minorities. Maliki should heed Sistani’s call and step aside.

Once the Sunni community is provided with a legitimate, honourable, and fair avenue to pursue their economic and political aspirations, they would abandon the Islamic State and similar jihadist groups.

Had Washington reacted more effectively to the recent successes of the Islamic State and urged Maliki to form an inclusive government, there would have been no need for the current air strikes.

Third, following Mailki’s departure, the West should provide sustained military training with commensurate appropriate weapons for units of the Iraqi military, Sunni tribes in al-Anbar Province, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Syrian opposition. A weakening of the Islamic State requires the end of Nouri al-Maliki’s rule and the demise of Bashar al-Assad.

Fourth, as radicalism and terrorism have also spread south toward Jordan, Palestine, and Gaza, it is imperative that the ceasefire between Israel and Gaza be extended and the Gaza blockade lifted.

The war in Gaza is not about Hamas, Israeli protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Palestinians in Gaza cannot possibly live freely in dignity, peace, and economic prosperity while languishing in an open-air prison with no end in sight.

Fifth, it’s imperative for the Sisi regime in Egypt to halt the political arrests and summary trials and executions of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and supporters. It should provide the MB the necessary political space to participate in the country’s political life. The regime’s recent banning of the Islamist Freedom and Justice political party is a step in the wrong direction and should be reversed.

Emile Nakhleh is a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World.”

Editing by: Kitty Stapp

With the Kremlin’s attention fixated on Ukraine, the Caucasus Emirate, a terrorist group fighting to establish an independent Islamic state in the North Caucasus, threatens to undermine Russian domestic security in new ways.

The death of the emirate’s veteran leader, Doku Umarov, sparked an internal power struggle last fall that resulted in a significant shift in the group’s organisational structure and strategy.There is no shortage of new recruits for the Caucasus Emirate, due to the Russian government’s general disregard for basic rights.

Although not initially well-received by certain influential cells in the organisation, Umarov’s successor is now consolidating his authority and seems poised to abandon outdated ideology and broaden the movement’s scope of operational capabilities. Most significantly, the Chechen influence over the organisation appears to have diminished.

The major question at this point is how rapidly can Russian security officials adapt to the Caucasus Emirate’s changes? A Kremlin that is distracted by events in Ukraine could easily lose ground in its efforts to contain the morphing insurgency in the North Caucasus.

On Mar. 18, Kavkaz Centre, the primary news portal of the Caucasus Emirate, officially announced the “martyrdom” of the movement’s seasoned chief, Doku Umarov. Widely recognised as a major military figure in the First and Second Chechen Wars, he rose to prominence in 2007, assuming command of the insurgency and proclaiming himself first emir of a newly formed Caucasus Emirate.

Initially driven by national separatist aspirations, the group shifted toward the global jihadi movement and became an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

Umarov was closely linked to a spate of terrorist attacks in Russia over the past several years including the 2011 Moscow airport bombing, the 2010 suicide bombings on the city’s metro, and the 2009 bombing of a train from Moscow to St. Petersburg; each killed dozens of people and injured hundreds more. His last propaganda video called on Islamic militants to target the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

Although instrumental in publicising the Caucasus Emirate’s mission and in motivating its members, Umarov played a reduced role in recent years in operational planning. His departure from the scene, then, will not be a source of much disruption for the terrorist organisation, some experts suggest.

“The damage done to [the Caucasus Emirate] by the death of the leader is tangible, but will not be lasting,” Simon Saradzhyan, a research fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, wrote in an analysis published in March by the Moscow Times.

The circumstances surrounding Umarov’s death remain shrouded in mystery: speculation abounds, ranging from sickness to drone strike to even a coup.

A lengthy delay in the confirmation of his death suggests his loss triggered an internal power struggle, likely among Dagestani and Kabardino-Balkarian jamaats (units) vying to claim the top spot from the long-in-charge Chechen leadership. After months of tense deliberation, a six-man council of provincial emirs selected Avar theologian Aliaskhab Kebekov, aka Ali Abu-Muhammad.

Umarov’s successor lacks the military pedigree of past commanders, but notably possesses theological training to push the Caucasus Emirate in a different strategic and operational direction. Based out of Dagestan, Kebekov is a former qadi (supreme religious authority) and the first non-Chechen to lead the North Caucasus insurgency. He ordered the killing of Sufi Sheikh Said-Afandi Chirkeisky by a female suicide bomber in 2012, according to Russian security officials.

In a January audio clip, Kebekov condemned the “nationalism” and “nationalist spirit” of the Chechens in the ranks of the Caucasus Emirate. Such rhetoric aims to further distance the group from the original Chechen nationalist movement of the 1990s and reinforce its global jihadi orientation and battle for an autonomous Sunni Islamic State in Russia governed by a strict interpretation of Sharia law.

In a continuing push away from Chechnya, he will likely strengthen operations in Dagestan, possibly pursuing a less aggressive form of jihad. Despite some opposition, the latest pledges of allegiance indicate some jamaats, including certain influential Chechens who manage key funding channels and media outlets for the Caucasus Emirate, are now accepting of Kebekov’s ascendancy to leadership.

The choice of Kebekov as successor also indicates that the Caucasus Emirate may extend its mission beyond the North Caucasus region. Recent operations provide sound evidence of this possible shift outward. Since 2011, hundreds of militants from Russia have ventured abroad to fight alongside the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front in the Syrian civil war.

The organisation also sought to undertake operations in the Volga-Ural region of Russia. In 2012, the Mujahedeen of Tatarstan, an extremist group with strong ties to the Caucasus Emirate, perpetrated a series of terrorist attacks against Muslim religious leaders in the Russian city of Kazan.

More recently, suicide bombers from Dagestan killed dozens of people in separate strikes on a bus and a train station in Volgograd.

For now, Russian leaders seem intent on continuing a heavy-handed approach to counterinsurgency operations. On Mar. 19, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev convened a government meeting in Chechnya to discuss ways to disrupt militant financing channels, as well as the threat of terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus. Meeting participants reportedly did not mull the implications of the emirate’s leadership shift.

Russian security forces have succeeded in killing key extremist leaders and hundreds of militants in the North Caucasus over the last few years, dealing serious blows to the organisation. Even so, there is no shortage of new recruits for the Caucasus Emirate, due to the Russian government’s general disregard for basic rights, including religious freedom, socio-economic disparity and large-scale corruption.

Some observers suggest that under the present circumstances, the security threat posed by the Caucasus Emirate stands to rise.

“The growing importance of the organisation inside the Caucasus Emirate decisional structure represents an increased risk for terrorist attacks against touristic sites and transportation networks inside Russia,” wrote Jean-Francois Ratelle, a postdoctoral fellow at George Washington University, in a recent commentary.

Editor’s note:  Peter J. Marzalik is an independent analyst of Islamic affairs in the Russian Federation. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org.

Azerbaijan appears to be joining in Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s campaign against a religious movement led by U.S.-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen.

Erdogan claims that adherents of the Gülen movement are intent on bringing down his government, and over the past year, he has carried out a no-holds-barred crackdown on suspected Gülenists.Gülen movement representatives deny Erdoğan’s allegations about engaging in anti-state activity -- but jitters about groups critical of governments run strong in Azerbaijan.

On Apr. 8, Erdoğan told members of his Justice and Development Party that he had discussed the movement with Azerbaijani officials during an early April visit to Baku and handed over a list of Azerbaijanis considered to be Gülen supporters. Azerbaijan is Turkey’s closest regional ally.

For the past several years, the Azerbaijani government has tried to restrict the activities of Islamic groups, but, until recently, had made no public move against Gülen sympathisers.

Such individuals — called nurçular in reference to the 20th-century Sunni theologian Said Nursi, who inspired Gülen’s education-based initiatives — do not carry the same weight in Azerbaijani society as they do in Turkey. But over the past couple of weeks, there have been several indicators that Baku is toughening its stance.

Gülen movement representatives deny Erdoğan’s allegations about engaging in anti-state activity — but jitters about groups critical of governments run strong in Azerbaijan.

In recent weeks, rampant speculation on social networks and pro-government media outlets in Baku have focused on which Azerbaijani government members could sympathise with the Gülen movement. One purported Gülen sympathiser, presidential administration spokesperson Elnur Aslanov, was fired on Mar. 17.

The Azerbaijani government has not commented on the reports. But, arguably, events already speak for them.

In early March, Khalik Mammadov, vice-president of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR), announced that the government-run energy company had taken over 11 Turkish-language high schools, 13 university-exam preparation centres and the private, Baku-based Caucasus University, all run by a Turkish educational company called Çağ Öğrətim (Era Education).

Since 2011 SOCAR has run a network of schools with the purported aim of improving Azerbaijani educational standards. Çağ Öğrətim, now known as the Baku International Education Centre, has operated in Azerbaijan since 1992, and has enjoyed a reputation for producing disciplined students sensitive to Islamic ethics and capable of entering top-notch universities worldwide.

Çağ Öğrətim has never acknowledged a link with the Gülen movement, but most Azerbaijani education specialists and political experts have viewed its facilities as part of the Gülen movement’s 140-country network of schools.

Çağ Öğrətim is part of the International Association of Turkish and Azerbaijani Manufacturers and Businessmen, a group that contains many Turkish companies that advocate Gülen’s principles.

SOCAR representatives have not elaborated on the conglomerate’s interest in the Çağ Öğrətim schools – all but Caucasus University were acquired last year — but some observers see a link to Turkey’s suspicions of the Gülen movement.

“I think, for Azerbaijani authorities, the idea is certainly that ‘we can control them more efficiently if we manage them,’” commented Paris-based Turkey specialist Bayram Balci, who formerly worked in Baku for the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA).

In March, in a move seen as intended to target Gülen’s finances, Turkey shut down Gülen-associated private schools that, like Çağ Öğrətim’s Araz courses, prepare students for university-entrance exams. Erdoğan asked other countries to follow suit.

Balci reasons that the Turkish government likely urged “fraternal” Azerbaijan, a country that shares close linguistic and cultural ties with Turkey, to “pay attention” to such schools as well. “For the Azerbaijani government, this is a good opportunity to show to Ankara that Baku is always in solidarity with Ankara.”

SOCAR, Turkey’s long-time pipeline partner, would seem a natural candidate for any such exercise. The company’s spokespeople could not be reached for comment. Similarly, Çağ Öğrətim did not respond to requests for interviews about the switchover to SOCAR.

Caucasus University Rector Ahmet Saniç told EurasiaNet.org that he prefers not to discuss the issue “for awhile.”

Even if there was no pressure coming from Ankara, Azerbaijani leaders would seem to have reason to be wary of Çağ Öğrətim’s high schools and exam-preparation centres.

Aside from Baku, the schools exist in key regional population hubs such as Ganja, Lenkoran and Sumgait as well as more remote locations. That presence in the regions is a potential source of concern for the Azerbaijani government, which has faced large-scale regional protests in recent years, some observers believe.

“As alumni of those schools, like everywhere else in the world, they have their own community. In Azerbaijan, where political parties and other institutions have been weakened, their [school] network … looks even more distinguished,” said Altay Goyushov, a professor of Islamic history at Baku State University.

“That is what the Azerbaijani government does not like: the competition.”

Yet Erestin Orujlu, director of Baku’s East-West Research Centre, believes that certain officials are using the hub-hub about the movement in Azerbaijan simply “to weaken each other’s position.”

Aside from Aslanov, a published list of alleged Azerbaijani Gülenists also included Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov, State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations Director Elshad Iskenderov and, ironically, SOCAR’s Mammadov.

Like Aslanov, who now works in the Ministry of Communications, the Defense Ministry has denied the allegations about Defense Minister Hasanov’s alleged affiliation with the Gülen movement. The other named individuals above have not publicly commented.

For some Azerbaijanis, the silence comes as no surprise. The allegations are “trumped up,” charged Orujlu. “The Azerbaijani government does not face any threat from the nurçu movement.”

Editor’s note:  Shahla Sultanova is a freelance journalist focusing on Azerbaijan. This story originally appeared on EurasiaNet.org

U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel participates in an arrival honours ceremony with then Egyptian defence minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo, Egypt, Apr. 24, 2013. Credit: public domain

By Emile Nakhleh
WASHINGTON, Mar 28 2014 (IPS)

The summary mass trial and sentencing of 529 Egyptians to death this week is yet another example of Egypt’s descent into lawlessness and blatant miscarriage of justice.

The rushed decision showed no respect for the most basic standards of due process under the military dictatorship.Sisi, much like Vladimir Putin and his land grab in Ukraine, feels empowered to defy the U.S. because he perceives it as unwilling or unable to confront him.

The Egyptian court spent less than a minute on each of the 529 defendants before sentencing them. Defence lawyers were barred from challenging state “evidence” and defendants were not allowed to speak. Yet, the Sisi government and the pliant Egyptian media did not question the sentences.

The U.S. State Department issued a statement in Secretary of State John Kerry’s name condemning the sentences. Kerry said he is “deeply troubled” and called on the Egyptian interim government to “remedy the situation.”

The decision, according to the statement, “simply defies logic” and fails to satisfy “even the most basic standards of justice.” Amnesty International deemed the death sentences “grotesque.” Most Western countries have expressed “deep concern” over the sham trial and convictions and the hope the decision would be overturned on appeal.

In his heady rush to seek the presidency, however, Field Marshall turned civilian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is not paying much attention to Washington’s warnings or to international condemnations of the Minya judge who dispensed the ruling.

Sisi sees the Barack Obama administration moving away from values of good governance and the rule of law in Egypt to a myopic doctrine of national interest, which includes coddling Arab dictators and tribal ruling potentates.

Since the Arab upheavals of 2011, President Obama has identified U.S. values of tolerance, justice, fairness, and democracy as a guiding principle of post “Arab Spring” relations with Arab countries. These values, the U.S. president frequently said, “define who we are” as a people and as a nation.

Sisi, on the other hand, much like Vladimir Putin and his land grab in Ukraine, feels empowered to defy the U.S. because he perceives it as unwilling or unable to confront him or to shun him or cut military aid to Egypt. He counts on Washington’s inaction against him despite rising lawlessness by state institutions because of Egypt’s pivotal standing in the region.

By ignoring the Egyptian constitution and its traditional claim of judicial independence, the Egyptian judiciary seemed to kowtow to the military-run interim government.

The mass death sentences coupled with Sisi’s announcement of his candidacy for the presidency seem to bring the coup that toppled President Mohamed Morsi full circle. For Sisi, the January 25 Revolution is history, and the demands for democracy are now subsumed under the rubric of fighting “terrorism”, which he equates with the Muslim Brotherhood.

It’s symbolic that Sisi made the announcement on Egyptian television in military uniform even though he had just resigned as minister of defence and as a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). He told the Egyptian public he would continue the struggle “against terrorism” and would fight to “regain Egypt” and restore its “dignity and stature.”

Sisi must have taken a page from the American Tea Party book about “taking back America” and from Putin about taking back Crimea. As if someone has stolen America from the Tea Party, or Ukraine from Russia, or Egypt from Sisi.

In fact, it was Sisi and the military junta that stole Egypt from the January 25 Revolution in a military coup. It was Sisi’s regime that has put over 15,000 Egyptians – Islamists and secularists – in jail through illegal arrests, sham trials, and without due process for challenging the coup.

Sisi envisions his presidency to rest on a three-legged stool of pliant media, submissive public, and adulation of him as a rising “selfie” star. In the name of “serving the nation,” Egyptians are being brainwashed not to question the personality cult of Sisi’s budding populist dictatorship.

In addition to frightening the public into submission, Sisi has also shuffled SCAF by sidelining potential challengers like General Ahmed Wasfi and promoting supporters like General Sidqi Sobhi. He sees these actions as an insurance policy against a possible coup that could topple him, much like he did against Morsi.

Although much has been written about Egypt in recent days, the death sentences and Sisi’s presidency have created two serious concerns, which Washington and other Western capitals must confront.

First, these actions likely will result in a growing radicalisation of some elements within the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups in Egypt. Radicalisation usually begets violence and terrorism.

It would be a nightmare scenario for any Egyptian government if the new radicals join forces with Salafi jihadists in Sinai. Such coordination, which could create an opening for al-Qa’ida in Egypt, would wreak havoc on the country and on Western interests and personnel there.

Second, continued instability, lawlessness, and repression in Egypt under a Sisi presidency would begin to attract Islamist jihadists from Syria to Egypt.

Unlike their counterparts from Afghanistan, the new jihadists are honed by combat experience and trained in the use of all kinds of weapons. A jihadist base in Egypt would certainly spread to neighbouring countries, including the Gulf tribal monarchies.

To stem this nightmarish tide, the United States and its Western allies must urge Gulf monarchies to start serious dialogue with their peoples toward inclusion and tolerance.

They also must convince Sisi that no stable political system would emerge in Egypt without including secularists and Islamists in the process. An adoring public, a pliant media, a sycophantic government, and an unfettered and corrupt military are a formula for disaster for the Egypt and the region.

Emile Nakhleh is a former Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico, and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World.”

Churches in Diabaly, central Mali, were looted and destroyed during the Islamist occupation. Credit: Marc-André Boisvert/IPS

By Bryant Harris
WASHINGTON, Jan 15 2014 (IPS)

A year after Mali’s civil war came to an end, experts here are increasingly concerned that the country risks an eventual return to violence, particularly as Malian authorities continue to marginalise the restive north while neglecting to pursue meaningful political and economic reforms. 

Indeed, a lack of equitable opportunity across Mali has caused northern Tuareg separatists to cite political and economic marginalisation as their reason for rebelling in the first place. The Tuaregs have contested Mali’s north since the 1990s, launching four separate rebellions, finally succeeding due to arms obtained from the Libyan Civil War against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.“There have been promises made for increased development and local autonomy, but the Malian government strategy is simply to buy off the leader of the rebellion." -- J. Peter Pham

In 2012, Al Qaeda-linked groups took advantage of the insurgency and a military coup to establish control over the area, though Malian authorities were eventually able to expel the Islamist militants with the aid of French intervention. This led to a June 2013 ceasefire accord known as the Ouagadougou agreement, which allowed the government to station soldiers in the north and paved the way for democratic elections last summer.

Yet today, analysts suggest the Tauregs feel that the Malian government has not lived up to its past promises.

“The Tuaregs as a whole regret their temporary alliance with extremists who pushed them out right away but are by no means fully reconciled with the government in Bamako,” J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank, told IPS.

“There have been promises made for increased development and local autonomy, but the Malian government strategy is simply to buy off the leader of the rebellion – but not address the underlying causes. People have to see some sort of benefit for being part of the state and that has not been the case.”

On Sunday, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacer Keita concluded a three-day trip to Mauritania, where he signed a joint statement increasing cooperation between Malian and Mauritanian security forces as France reduces its presence in Mali. Yet analysts from the International Crisis Group (ICG), a watchdog group, are warning that the country’s internal security remains fragile.

Further, a new ICG report cautions that “the urgent need to stabilise the [security] situation should not detract from implementing meaningful governance reforms and a truly inclusive dialogue on the future of the country.”

Similar sentiments recently came during an official mission to Mali by the International Monetary Fund.

“[G]rowth in Mali must be more equitable and more inclusive,” Christine Lagarde, the head of the Washington-based IMF, wrote in a blog entry last week. “This means that all sectors in Mali’s economy should have access to opportunity, including in the education sector and participate in the benefits of growth.”

Limited reconciliation

The Malian government’s inability to adequately include the north in the economic growth that Lagarde recently praised has hindered reconciliation attempts.

After the conflict, civil service workers staffing these institutions have been slow to return to the north, even as northern infrastructure is in need of rehabilitation.

The lack of public services and economic relief in northern Mali has reportedly made the Malian government even more unpopular, resulting in several protests. In late November, for instance, the Malian army opened fire at civilians attending a protest.

The ICG suggests that Malian authorities should focus on the reestablishment and improvement of judicial, health-care and education systems. The report also calls on the government to end its reliance on community-based armed groups to establish order and launch investigations into the army’s abuse and harassment of civilians.

The unrest has also hindered the shipment of humanitarian aid, while the country continues to lack the resources to restore services in the north. In October, the secretary-general reported that some 65 percent of health centres in conflict-affected areas are either partially functional or completely destroyed, while half of schools are closed.

Despite the government’s unpopularity in the north, a United Nations mission, known as MINUSMA, has worked to support Mali’s National Commission for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, established in March 2013 to foster improved relationships between the Malian government and northern separatists. But in an October report, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described the “dialogue and reconciliation activities” as “limited”.

Mali has also established a series of conferences focusing on northern decentralisation to soothe unrest by giving Tuareg separatists more autonomy. However, the ICG’s new analysis warns that “the meetings should be more inclusive … and result in prompt, tangible actions,” such as the delayed transference of some state resources to local authorities.

Critics of the reconciliation talks note that they are top-down initiatives from Bamako, Mali’s southern capital, rather than community-led. As a result, armed groups in the north have refused to participate in the meetings on the grounds that the government is uninterested in actual dialogue.

Volatile security

As southern Mali attempts to reconcile with the north, the security situation overall remains tenuous, with significant transitions underway.

“Because of limited resources, budget complaints, and demand elsewhere, you’ll soon be left with barely 1,000 French troops,” the Atlantic Council’s Pham says.” Most of these will be engaged in the southern part [of Mali] and not the northern two-thirds, leaving an undersized and under-equipped, predominantly African, force roughly trying to hold a very large territory.”

Rinaldo Depagne, the ICG’s West Africa director, tells IPS that while the Malian government has not violated the terms of the June 2013 ceasefire, “there’s a kind of will from the government to opt out of the frame of the agreement.”

However, Depagne believes that there is cause to be hopeful. “While certain parts of the agreement are not yet respected, that doesn’t mean they won’t be in the near future. We don’t know if they are ready to fully accept the arrangement but it’s predictable that they could.”

The U.N. secretary-general, meanwhile, found that both parties had violated the ceasefire through the “uncoordinated movement of troops”. Consequently, Malian forces and northern militias continue to clash amidst “armed banditry, new jihadi attacks, and inter-communal violence,” the report notes.

Pham also questions how successful the French intervention was in removing jihadist militants from northern Mali.

“If one believes the numbers put out by French spokesmen or African spokesmen, about 600 militants have been killed in the last year and roughly a little over 400 have been taken prisoner,” he says. “This leaves you with more than 1,000 militants who are unaccounted for and are either biding their time hiding in communities they’re well-integrated into or up in the mountains.”

In the face of northern unrest, MINUSMA has played an active peacekeeping role since France’s offensive in the north. Depagne says that while there are 6,000 MINUSMA troops in Mali right now, “there should be more than 10,000.”

Depagne suggests U.N. forces could be at “full scale” in the coming months.

In the city of Metlaoui in the Governorate of Gafsa, a mining region in the parched south of Tunisia, the streets are dust, filled with ruts, the skin of the men in the cracked lanes leathery brown from the heavy weather.

In Ibn Khaldoun, a neighbourhood on Metlaoui’s fringes, the area seems less of a city and more a chaotic village of one-storey homes of brick and concrete trying to hold fast to sudden rises in the earth.

Behind the flimsy steel gate of one home at the end of an alley in Ibn Khaldoun, locals take me into the courtyard of a home of hollow windowsills and empty doorframes. Used clothes spill out the doorway into the courtyard.“We are in a crisis of trust, between the Islamists on one side and liberals on the other."

Five young Salafists, guilty of nothing more than sporting long beards and praying five times a day, neighbours say, were arrested in a raid by security forces in late October.

“An officer from the security forces said [the Salafists] had weapons. But they didn’t. So the officer said ‘But they will build them!’”

A neighbour points to the earthen floor of the house. “But look; the Salafists were praying in the dust! No one is funding them or supporting them. They’re no threat – they don’t have anything.” Around him, other neighbours of the arrested Salafists loudly condemned the ruling Ennahdha party, who they saw as responsible for the arrests.

Tunisian authorities launched military operations into the Tunisian interior in response to attacks by armed militants in October which rocked a major tourism hub, nearly destroyed the tomb of a former president, and reportedly left six National Guard soldiers dead. Yet, it’s possible that the embattled ruling Ennahdha Party may be using the military operations as a card to appease powerful political adversaries.

According to Fabio Merone, an analyst living in Tunis who specialises in the politics of Salafi groups like those blamed for October’s attacks, the once-outlawed Ennahdha Party “has been refused power so long that they’re desperate to integrate into the elite.” He went on to say that, “Ennhdha is being asked by police forces and the wealthy to take a clear stand with the state against extremists.”

In doing so, he claims, they’re attacking the conservative base that brought them to power in 2011.

After the rise of a small extremist insurgency on Tunisia’s western border and the assassination of two prominent leftist opposition leaders earlier this year, accusations from leftist and liberal political groups against Ennahdha of being tolerant of terrorist groups rose to a crescendo.

Following the last assignation in July, 60 members of the National Constituent Assembly – charged with drafting a constitution and already far behind deadline – walked out, freezing the transitional process completely. This brought the ire of still more Tunisians to bear on the Islamist party, currently at the head of the transitional government.

In its attempts to appease well-off liberals who prefer the old regime of president Zine El Abdine Ben Ali and who feel “suffocated by the Islamists,” Ennahdha is turning its back on its once-thriving Salafist base.

The Salafists, at first wildly successful in channeling the frustration of Tunisia’s poor after the fall of former dictator Ben Ali, are now being publicly rejected by Ennahdha. After Ennahdha cancelled the national conference of ultra-conservative group Ansar Al Charia in May, and in August officially labeled it a ‘terrorist group’, average Tunisian Salafists are facing the heat, like those arrested in Metlaoui.

“Tunisian families are looking at Ennahdha like they once looked at the RCD [Constitutional Democratic Rally, which ruled Tunisia until 2011], because of the arbitrary arrests,” says Selim Kharrat, executive director of Al Bawsala, an NGO which encourages political participation in Tunisia.

Kharrat raised the possibility that arbitrary arrests of Salafists and raids are the work of security forces outside Ennahdha’s control. He notes that sections of the security forces are influenced by supporters of the old regime, who feel threatened by the rise of the Salafists and may be pursuing the crackdown.

“We are in a crisis of trust, between the Islamists on one side and liberals on the other,” Kharrat says plainly. Yet whether it’s the work of secular groups tied to the old regime or Ennahdha politicians trying to please them, the brunt of the war on terror being faced by Tunisians in the impoverished interior is the same.

In a farming village not far from Metlaoui, villagers mill silently around a home in the middle of freshly ploughed fields. My guide tells me that only days after the start of the military operations in October, eight locals were arrested from the house after a reported standoff with the National Guard.

The whole household was rounded up and jailed on suspicion that two of the young men in the home were plotting terrorist acts. However, evidence was reportedly thin, and the six others were simply family of the young men.

Though released soon after their imprisonment, my guide relays to me, the innocent family members are outraged with the security services and the government they see as complicit in the raid. Despite this, they are silent with me – eyes lowered and hands stuffed in their pockets. My guide tells me the family members of the suspected terrorists were given orders from the government not speak to journalists after their arrest.

Seif Eddine Belabed, a media supervisor for Ennahdha in one of its neighbourhood offices in Tunis, seemed unfazed by the story of Tunisians being swept up in raids with little or no evidence. “Maybe I arrest 100 people, and five or six are innocent,” he responds, in an office in downtown Tunis. “A mistake, but at the same time you’ve caught over 90 bad guys. This is what happens in a raid.”

Like the Ennahdha leadership since it began cracking down on the outwardly pious in Tunisia earlier this year, Belabed disowned the Salafists – violent or no. “There’s this idea that Salafis are a branch of Ennahdha. This is wrong.” Waving his hand, he said, “In their methods and ideology, they are something else completely.”

Women’s rights activists in Morocco have criticised the Islamist-led government for excluding them from drafting proposed legislation to combat violence against women and for seeking to dilute the bill through changes.

The long-awaited bill is currently under study in Morocco. It comes after the adoption of a new constitution in 2011 that enshrines gender equality and urges the state to promote it.

A preliminary version of the bill, which is still in the drafting stage, threatens prison sentences of up to 25 years for perpetrators of violence against women.

In addition, the bill would take unprecedented steps towards criminalising sexual harassment, risking possible three-year prison terms for suspects.

“We have waited for years for this law and we are now very disappointed by its content,” said Najat Errazi, who heads the Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights, speaking at a meeting held in Casablanca to discuss the bill, according to the AFP news agency.

Sara Soujar, another activist speaking at the meeting, argued that the bill fails to include provisions relating to single women.

“This category is totally absent… Reading the text, you get the impression that violence basically only affects married or divorced women, even though others may be more exposed,” she said.

“Young women who work in factories or as housemaids, many of whom are minors, are no less exposed.”

Government committee set up

In the face of these objections, the government has been forced to establish a committee, headed by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development, to review the draft law and demonstrate its willingness to cooperate.

Progress is being closely followed in Morocco, where many have had traumatic personal experiences of a kind that the proposed legislation is designed to deter.

Rights groups’ concerns resonate with the findings of a study recently published by the state planning commission (HCP).

The research says around one in every two unmarried women in Morocco was subjected to physical and/or verbal sexual violence during the year that it was carried out.

According to the study, nearly nine percent of women in Morocco have been physically subjected to sexual violence at least once.

Sexual violence of a physical or psychological nature has affected some 25 percent of women overall, and a startling 40 percent among 18- to 24-year-olds.

Published under an agreement with Al Jazeera.

Thousands of opposition activists have protested in central Tunis, demanding the resignation of Tunisia’s Islamist-led government, before a national dialogue aimed at ending months of political deadlock.

The protesters gathered on central Habib Bourguiba Avenue in the capital, waving Tunisian flags and shouting slogans such as: “The people want the fall of the regime”, “Get out” and “Government of traitors, resign!”

Wednesday’s demonstration took place amid a heavy security presence, with armoured vehicles and anti-riot police deployed along the Tunis boulevard, which was the epicentre of the January 2011 revolution that ousted former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

A rival rally planned by the League for the Protection of the Revolution, a controversial pro-government armed group, failed to materialise.

Wednesday’s demonstration came just hours before the start of a planned national dialogue between the ruling party Ennahda and the opposition, which has now been delayed until Friday.

Mediators hope the talks will bring an end to the political paralysis gripping the country since the July killing of opposition MP Mohamed Brahmi and will mark a crucial step in the country’s democratic transition.

“We hope that Larayedh will have enough courage to announce the resignation of his government within three weeks to save the country,” Hamma Hammami, a leader of the opposition Popular Front party, told the AFP news agency.

Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh on Wednesday confirmed Ennahda was ready to resign, but insisted on the completion of the country’s new constitution, the establishment of an electoral commission and a clear election date before handing over power.

Meanwhile, seven Tunisian police were killed and one injured in clashes with gunmen, as the country waited for the government’s expected resignation and the launch of talks on ending months of political deadlock.

Fighting erupted in the central Sidi Bouzid region, when members of the National Guard raided a house where the gunmen were holed up, a police source told AFP.

President Moncef Marzouki announced three days of national mourning.

“It is not a coincidence that they decided to attack the National Guard today. Every time we reach a consensus terrorism rises again,” he said.

Political roadmap

According to a political roadmap drawn up by mediators, the national dialogue will lead within three weeks to the formation of a new caretaker cabinet of technocrats.

Negotiators will also have one month to adopt a new constitution, electoral laws and a timetable for fresh elections, key milestones in the democratic transition which has effectively been blocked by wrangling between the Islamists, their coalition allies and the opposition.

A coalition of secular opposition parties are demanding the immediate departure of the government, which it accuses of clinging to power.

A senior member of Ennahda charged on Tuesday that the opposition was preparing to “destroy” the negotiations between the two sides by staging anti-government protests.

About 60 opposition MPs who have been boycotting parliament since the political crisis erupted also said they had received assurances that the national dialogue would begin with the government announcing its resignation.

The Islamist party was heavily repressed under the Ben Ali regime.

Since triumphing in the parliamentary elections in October 2011, they have been weakened by accusations that they have failed to fix Tunisia’s lacklustre economy and prevent attacks by armed groups.

After three months of political uncertainty, unkept promises and a false start to the national dialogue on Oct. 5, the Tunisian press has grown increasingly critical of the ruling elite and sceptical of efforts to end the crisis.

Published under an agreement with Al Jazeera.

The Muslim Brotherhood has its own army of the young that will not easily be defeated. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS.

By Emad Mekay
BERKELEY, California, Sep 29 2013 (IPS)

Gory social media images that fueled the global Jihadist influx into Syria 18 months ago are back. But this time the outpouring is coming from Egypt.

Pictures on Facebook and Twitter show dozens of bodies wrapped in white burial sheets lying in rows in morgues, hospitals and even mosque hallways. Others show charred bodies with the victims’ brains visible from sniper shots to the head. Most of the posts urge one thing: justice."There's a valid fear that some of them may turn to violence after they have despaired that democracy could ever be a means towards meaningful change.” -- Sami Al-Dalaal

“Our self-control now is not out of fear. It’s out of respect for human blood and for the safety of our country,” said one post on an Islamist Facebook page. “If we are pushed too hard and our back is to the wall, we’ll defend ourselves.”

Three months after a Jul. 3 military coup that removed Egypt’s first elected government, hundreds of anti-coup activists have been killed, thousands injured and many more, mostly Islamists, thrown behind bars without charge or trial. The achievements of the country’s brief two-and-a-half years of freedom have been all but erased.

Amnesty International estimates that at least 1,089 people were killed in just four days – the period between Aug. 14 and 18 during the military operation to disperse anti-coup protestors at Rabaa square and Al-Nahda square in Cairo.

Human Rights Watch called the carnage the largest mass killing in Egypt’s modern history.

Weeks later, the military crackdown is still raging, with casualty numbers reportedly rising almost by the day, prompting calls for self-defence among the country’s targeted Islamists.

Al-Qaeda’s ideology of violence as the only path to change, which was discredited by the mostly peaceful changes of the Arab Spring in Egypt, has now received a new lease on life as a possible and viable option after all, according to several observers of Islamic political movements.

“We followed Western democracy prescriptions to the letter, but the minute a Muslim man comes to office, the world looks away. Nobody really respects democracy,” said one Islamist’s Facebook page.

The urge to resist the bloody crackdown has been most pronounced among young people. In private discussions, many of them, especially from the Muslim Brotherhood, the country’s largest Islamist organisation, express frustration with their leaders for preaching gradual rather than “revolutionary” change.

Some activists described the top policy-making body of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Group’s Shura Council, as “dervishes”, an Arabic word connoting being detached from reality.

“The Iranian revolution model might not be so bad after all,” said one activist who asked not to be identified.

The current military crackdown is so ruthless, sweeping and indiscriminate that it has become a personal daily story for many young people, especially the Islamists. There’s hardly anyone who hasn’t had a brother, father or sister killed, arrested or tortured since the coup, the activist said.

If the young decide to take up arms, it will be on a massive scale. Senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Salah Sultan, before his arrest earlier this week, estimated the group’s active membership to be between 800,000 and a million, not including their families and sympathisers.

Pressure on Islamists towards self-defence comes from unlikely outside corners as well.

The militant Somali Shabab group, which was at the receiving end of preaching from the Muslim Brotherhood that violence was counter-productive, got a chance for payback.

In August, the Somali militant group issued a statement taunting the Brotherhood and urging them to condemn democracy. The call was spurred by the scenes of carnage against defenceless anti-coup protestors in Cairo.

“You are leading Muslims to extermination by your insistence on democracy,” the Shabab said.

The pressure on the Brotherhood’s aging leadership has been so intense since the coup that Essam Erian, parliamentary majority leader before the coup, had to issue several audio messages urging a continuation of “peaceful protests”.

On Sep. 25, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement insisting on “peaceful resistance”.

“We all should resist the coup and resist oppression peacefully and without any violence and in a civilised manner,” the group said. “The coup leaders and the oppressors want to create waves of violence that they can use as a cover for their murderous police practices that they excel at.”

Elder Islamists justify their pacifist position on the grounds that there are religious admonitions against bloodletting. From a political standpoint, taking on the U.S.-backed and armed military and their pro-government militias will drag both sides into a civil war that would only strengthen U.S. and Israeli hegemony, they argue. Impoverished and violence-torn Somalia is hardly a model, they say.

“Democracy is still the main option for most Islamists now,” Sami Al-Dalaal, an expert on Islamic movements in the Middle East, told IPS. “Yet there’s a valid fear that some of them may turn to violence after they have despaired that democracy could ever be a means towards meaningful change.”

Dalaal said excluding political groups by force often leads to violence.

“There’s a precedent to that. When the military thwarted democracy in Algeria after Islamist democratic wins, they found no option but to start an armed revolution,” he said.

Dalaal was referring to a bloody civil war two decades ago in Algeria that started after army generals launched a coup and denied the Islamists the chance to take power in elections. Some 100,000 people died in the violence that ensued. The Syrian pro-democracy protests also started peacefully until Bashar al-Assad reacted violently and bloody pictures went viral on social media, starting another civil war.

In Egypt, with the military showing no sign of letting up on use of excessive force, it might be only a matter of time before at least some young Egyptians decide to do what their elders have refused to do: defend themselves.

An FSA fighter has to look out on many fronts now. Credit: Shelly Kittleson/IPS

By Shelly Kittleson
AD-DANA, Idlib Province, Syria, Sep 24 2013 (IPS)

Scorching flames from a makeshift oil refinery sting eyes and the fumes choke throats near the top of a hill in northwestern Syria, where Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters gather for fuel, coffee and phone calls as darkness falls.

The population of the nearby town Al-Dana has swelled by “tens of thousands” over the past two years, one FSA fighter from the area told IPS, as many fled closer to the border from areas under more frequent attack.

This hill had been covered with trees before last winter, when inhabitants and the internally displaced were forced to cut them for fuel to keep warm. It now bears only rocks and stumps, but remains one of the few places in the area where a cell phone signal can be picked up.

A shopkeeper from the area who is active in the Farouq Brigades, one of the largest units of the FSA, said that when the Islamic State of Iraq, an Islamist group active in Iraq and Syria and Al-Sham (ISIS), an al-Qaeda linked organisation, set up checkpoints in the town and took over the area, all the shops were forced to shut down at prayer times. Punishments for crimes had grown in severity, he said.

He stressed, though, that we have “bigger problems to deal with right now.”“They kept us under the table for so long, but once you see what is on the table, you will fight.”

Another local person mentioned that the fundamentalist groups tended to occupy areas already taken by other anti-regime brigades, implying that they leave the tougher battles to others.

Many FSA fighters IPS spoke to in the Aleppo and Idlib regions in recent days said that their plan was that after the Assad regime fell, the more fundamentalist groups would be dealt with. A few even said they expected a full-blown war against them afterwards.

An early sign of this came on Sep. 18, when heavy fighting broke out in the northern town of Azaz between an FSA brigade and ISIS, reportedly after one of the Al-Qaeda affiliate’s fighters was filmed in a clinic by a German aid worker.

When this IPS correspondent crossed the town north of Aleppo a few days before, rubble from over two years of shelling and strikes was visible on the streets. Several armed foreign fighters locally known simply as ‘muhajiroun’ were clearly around.

However, this female correspondent – travelling in a vehicle with the commander of a small fighting unit – was easily waved through an ISIS checkpoint just outside of town.

As air strikes and shelling by the regime continue unabated, fighting between anti-regime factions is siphoning off ever more time, attention and manpower from FSA forces stretched preciously thin. Following the outbreak of fighting in Azaz, Turkey closed the nearby Oncupinar border gate indefinitely, thereby choking off the lifeline that had previously enabled humanitarian aid in, and refugees out.

In Ad-Dana, one fighter noted that until four months ago he had continued to go to regime-held Idlib city using a fake ID to pass regime checkpoints in order to pick up his government cheque as a secondary school English teacher. He still teaches part-time, but it has now become too dangerous to cross enemy lines to gain much needed cash, while basic goods grow ever more scarce.

Despite soaring costs, unremitting shelling and the over 100,000 deaths in some two and a half years of fighting, the FSA rebels gathered nevertheless expressed guarded optimism.

“We’re flying,” said Aref Najjar, a former government employee. He told IPS he had spent five years in prison on trumped-up charges after refusing to travel to join the funeral of former president Hafez Al-Assad.

“They kept us under the table for so long, but once you see what is on the table, you will fight.”

Given the danger, many of the fighters especially from the southern reaches of the province have moved women and children in their families across the border into Turkey.

Mohammad’s 19-year-old wife initially stayed with him in his family home, which has been half destroyed by regime shelling, but she joined his family who had crossed the border into Turkey after the rape of women in neighbouring villages by regime troops and Assad’s irregular shabiha militias became more frequent.

The 25-year-old anti-aircraft expert faulted the rebels for not taking advantage of defected officers’ experience, and for making numerous mistakes as a result. He also noted that of the 80 men he had under his command only 40 currently had Kalashnikovs, and that only fundamentalist groups were able to attract funding.

A few months earlier he decided to grow a beard in the Salafi manner in a bid to raise funds, but continues to smoke and eagerly whips out a picture of himself from earlier this year: shaved and smiling, sporting sunglasses, jeans and a bright red t-shirt.

He told IPS he admired the fundamentalist groups for their “bravery”, citing a number of important gains they had made such as taking the strategic Menagh air base in August after a year-long siege by FSA brigades had proved inconclusive.

Alarm has been brewing for some time among activists, however, and one Syrian journalist noted that “the safest place during an air strike on the ‘liberated areas’ is the ISIS headquarters. People run there because they know the regime won’t hit them,” implying that the most fundamentalist groups are actually collaborating with the regime.

Fighters on the ground, though, tread more carefully. “If foreign fighters come to help Syrians,” said one, “I’m thankful to them.”

The Egyptian military’s removal of the democratically-elected President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power upended the MB’s 20-year old political participation programme. If the new regime aims to achieve genuine reconciliation and political consensus, the MB and its supporters must be included in the restructuring of Egyptian politics.

The Egyptian military in the short-run might succeed in marginalising the MB but will not defeat or silence it."As vast majorities of Muslims worldwide reject the radical message and as Bin Ladin’s jihadism fades away, it’s more urgent than ever to continue engaging Muslim youth and other groups worldwide."

During his short tenure, Morsi was unable to move the country forward economically, politically, and socially. The Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, equally failed to transcend their narrow MB partisan ideology.

Elements from the old regime also conspired to make Morsi fail. Yet, political fracturing, which Morsi was accused of promoting, is likely to continue under the new regime.

The symbiotic military-liberal alliance, driven by a visceral dislike of the MB, is destined to be short-lived. Over the next year, the economy is not expected to improve measurably, food and energy prices would not go down noticeably, tourism would remain stagnant, and hundreds of thousands of youth would stay unemployed.

Dissatisfied Egyptians would again hit the streets demanding change. When that happens, will Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi yet again find it necessary to impose military rule? While Islam might or might not be inimical to democracy, military dictatorship most certainly is. Deposing an elected leader by decree is not a harbinger for democracy. What will Egyptian liberals do when they wake up to this unpleasant reality?

It would be naïve for today’s Egyptian liberals and secularists to believe the military could stamp out Islamic ideology from Egyptian society. Forcing the MB out of politics will push many youthful MB supporters to become angry and alienated. As their frustration and disappointment with democratic politics grow, some of them would turn to violence, radicalism, and even terrorism.

Excluding MB ministers from the recently appointed interim cabinet is a formula for failure. The new cabinet would not be able to gain the trust of the Egyptian people if Islamic parties are not in the political mix.

Contrary to the opinions of so many Western talking heads and analysts, Morsi’s ouster does not signal the failure of political Islam or the demise of the MB. Nor does it signal the end of the “Arab Spring”.

“People power”, which toppled Hosni Mubarak and which played a role in toppling Morsi, is a new reality in today’s Egypt. The military was able to ride the popular wave in the Morsi case but should not count on a similar outcome in future power struggles.

The Egyptian MB is down but not out. Islam has deep roots in Egypt, which has underpinned local and national politics for decades, if not centuries. It can’t be wiped out so easily by a new brand of military-liberal secularism.

Nor can Islamic tendencies be muted by the billions of dollars of promised aid from Gulf countries, which for years promoted Islamism against Egyptian-led Arab nationalism and other secular ideologies. The cynical exploitation of Islam and Islamism by these regimes has always backfired on them over the years. It will not be different this time either.

Since its founding in 1928, the MB was in conflict with the Egyptian state for most of the past century. Some of its leaders were jailed, executed, or exiled. Others went underground. Many of its members became radicalised, especially during the Nasser era, and some resorted to violence and terrorism. Others went to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries where they were received with open arms.

In partnering with Saudi Salafis and Wahhabis, the anti-Nasser MB preachers and proselytisers who fled to the Gulf articulated a more radical, intolerant worldview of political Islam. Beginning in the late 1960s, these radicalisers embarked on a global plan of proselytisation or da’wa. The call for jihad against the “infidels” and the “enemies” of Islam was funded by Saudi Arabia.

While radical MB activists were busy in the Gulf and worldwide, their “mainstream” MB counterparts remained more active in Egypt, albeit in jail or underground. Despite massive suppression by Egyptian security services under the Mubarak regime, the movement did not fade away.

By the early 1990s, the Egyptian MB concluded it could not defeat the Mubarak regime through violence and opted instead to turn to politics. They refocused their efforts on Islamising society from below, arguing that if they could Islamise society, power would change at the top.

In a conversation with a U.S.-educated MB activist over 20 years ago about transforming society from within, he invoked the U.S. baseball field analogy. He said, “Build it, and they will come; change society from below, and the rest would follow!”

By the end of that decade, the MB had participated in parliamentary elections first as members of the Wafd Party, then as partners with the Labour Socialist Party. Finally, they ran as “independent” representatives. They had to play that game, they argued, because religious parties were banned under Mubarak.

MB spokesmen often reached out to U.S. officials in Cairo telling them repeatedly about their commitment to participate in national elections openly and freely if they were allowed to do so. My CIA analysts and I occasionally met with MB activists in Cairo during the 1990s.

The debate among U.S. policymakers on this issue was whether the MB’s shift from violence to politics was tactical or strategic. U.S. officials generally supported including political Islam in the political process, including elections, on the grounds that the performance of Islamic political parties in national legislatures, not their ideology, should be the litmus test for their long-term commitment to “human-made” democracy.

Numerous Sunni Islamic political parties with MB roots in the Arab world and across many Muslim countries have participated in politics for over two decades. They have served in legislatures in many countries, including in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Morocco, Kuwait, Turkey, and others. Political Islam is here to stay regardless of the nature of the regime in which these parties operate.

The recent history of Islamic activism tells us including Islamic parties in national politics usually breeds pragmatism and political compromise. When they are forced underground, they become more radicalised, leading fringe elements to turn to violence and terrorism.

Engaging Muslim civil society communities, including political parties, has been the hallmark of U.S. foreign policy since 9/11, which was of course highlighted in President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech four years ago. As vast majorities of Muslims worldwide reject the radical message and as Bin Ladin’s jihadism fades away, it’s more urgent than ever to continue engaging Muslim youth and other groups worldwide.

U.S. officials should use their influence to persuade General al-Sisi to turn over the Egyptian political system to civilian control in which the MB would be free to participate. The alternative could bring more instability, violence, and chaos to Egypt, and of course to U.S. interests in the region.

*Emile Nakhleh, a former Senior Intelligence Service Officer, is a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

During the decades when Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was a barely tolerated opposition party, it campaigned against the reigning secular autocrats under the banner “Islam is the solution.”

With the military’s removal on Jul. 3 of the Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, the region’s oldest exemplar of political Islam has lost its best and perhaps only chance to validate that slogan. Indeed, the rise and abrupt fall of the Morsi presidency are a timely comeuppance for a world view that, starting with Iran’s 1979 revolution, seemed to be gaining adherents throughout the Muslim world.

Political Islam has had a long arc, reviving in the modern era with the founding of the Brotherhood by Hassan al Banna in 1928 in opposition to a monarchy largely controlled by Western interests. Over the decades, monarchs and military-run governments of assorted Arab nationalist, socialist and capitalist hues have suppressed the Brotherhood and its various offshoots. Then came spring 2011.

While Islamic movements did not lead the rebellions against aging autocrats, they were well placed to benefit because of superior organisation, a history of providing social services to the poor and a record of repression by the state.

Once in power, however, these movements frequently overreached. Nowhere was this more evident than in Egypt, where the Brotherhood reneged on initial promises not to seek a parliamentary majority or the presidency – promises made to avoid provoking a backlash from secular forces.

Then, Morsi – a substitute for a more powerful Brotherhood official, Khairat el-Shater, who was disqualified from running – misinterpreted his narrow victory in a runoff a year ago as a mandate to  consolidate  power and essentially gut the Arab world’s most important democratic transition.

Given the magnitude of the problems Egypt faced after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, only a government that truly reached out beyond its political base stood a chance of succeeding.  Without that broad popular support, the Brotherhood was loathe to implement crucial economic reforms and incapable of concluding a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

The constitution rammed through by the Brotherhood last spring disappointed those looking for major improvements from the Mubarak era.  Morsi was also tone-deaf  in many of his appointments, going so far as to name a member of the once-violent Gamaa al-Islamiya that had massacred foreigners in Luxor to govern one of Egypt’s most important tourism hubs.

The Brotherhood mistook the piety and religiosity of ordinary Egyptians for allegiance to a largely one-party religious government. This is a common mistake among Islamists. Many people in the Middle East might like to have a pious Muslim as a president but even more, they want competent leaders who will listen to others and forge constructive relations with the outside world.

Morsi’s removal is a warning that Islamic parties cannot count on religious identity alone to govern successfully and need to work constructively with others. This lesson seems to have been internalised by the Al-Nour party, a nominally more hard-line group that supported Morsi’s ouster and pushed for a consensus choice for prime minister instead of Mohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel laureate and champion of secular forces.

The fate of the Brotherhood experiment in Egypt has important ramifications throughout the region – for Tunisia, still struggling to write a constitution, and for Syria, whose opposition includes numerous Islamic groups and whose regime is banking on the support of religious minorities terrified by the notion of Islamic rule.

Morsi’s fall is also a sobering lesson for Iran, the world’s only theocracy, and Turkey, whose ruling AK Party has strong Islamist roots. Both initially welcomed the Brotherhood victory but instead of validating an Islamic world view, the events in Egypt have underlined its limitations.

In Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan is still reeling from protests in Istanbul and other major cities against his government’s authoritarianism and creeping efforts to legislate Islamic morality. Erdogan’s behaviour in recent years has contrasted with the AKP’s tolerance of opposing views when it first came to power a decade ago. Increasingly, Erdogan has come to resemble previous Turkish autocrats with an Islamic veneer.

In Iran, meanwhile, the 1979 Islamic Revolution died years ago. Iran is now one of the least religious countries in the Middle East, a place where Muslim holidays such as Ramadan are barely observed compared to ancient Persian celebrations such as Nowruz.

In urging Iranians to vote in last month’s presidential elections, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had to resort to appealing to the electorate’s patriotism as Iranians, not their religious identity as Shiite Muslims – a telling sign that he recognises how unpopular the system has become. Iranians promptly chose the least hard-line candidate allowed to run, Hassan Rouhani. One of the reasons his victory was surprising is because he is a cleric and clerics are notoriously unpopular among the citizens of the Islamic Republic.

In a speech shortly after his election, Rouhani indicated that he understands that religious ideology is no substitute for competence and accountability. He promised to listen to the “majority of Iranians” who voted for him and added:

“In our region, there were some countries who miscalculated their positions, and you have witnessed what happened to them…The world is in a transitional mood, and a new order has yet to be established. If we miscalculate our national situation, it will be detrimental for us.”

All eyes have turned to Libya since Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou’s statement claiming that recent attacks in north Niger were perpetrated by Malian terrorists based in south Libya.

While some security analysts have claimed that Islamist groups from Mali have set up camp in southern Libya, other experts told IPS that this was impossible.

The director of the Centre for African Studies in Tripoli, Faraj Najem, refuted the presence of Malian terrorists in Libya. He said that Mali did not share a border with Libya, which prevented the movement of fighters into south Libya.

“Tripoli could throw the accusation back on its Algerian and Nigerien neighbours’ doorsteps: if Malian terrorists are in Libya, they would have had to pass through neighbouring countries before arriving here,” Najem told IPS.

The Jihadist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, claimed responsibility for two suicide attacks carried out on May 23 at the Agadez military base and the Arlit uranium mine in Niger. They said that the attacks were a punishment for Niger’s support of France’s intervention in Mali.

A coalition of armed Islamist groups allied with Al-Qaeda – composed of AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar Dine – held northern Mali from early 2012 until a French intervention in January allowed the Malian army to reclaim the north.

And according to the Niger government, the attacks on the country were planned in Libya. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, however, refuted these allegations as “baseless”.

Najem supported Zeidan’s view.

“South-eastern Libya is controlled by the Toubous who do not have any links with Islamist movements. The Tuaregs from Azawad and from Ansar Dine in Mali are wanted in Libya because they fought with pro-Gaddafi troops, and so they can’t return,” Najem said.

Former President Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 2011 after 42 years in power, and a newly elected government was sworn in in November 2012.

“I have no information about a terrorist presence in south Libya,” Hussein Hamed Al-Adsari, a Tuareg member of parliament in Oubari, south-east Libya, told IPS in Tripoli, the Libyan capital.

Abu Azoum, a councillor in Fezzan in south Libya, said the case was not clear cut. “I do not believe that the terrorists come from here. At the same time, it is entirely possible that they are getting arms supplies in the south. They are prepared to pay high prices for arms, and there are many weapons in circulation in Libya,” he told IPS.

Agila Majou Ouled, a representative of the Slimane community in Sebha, south Libya, observed that although “the southern borders with Chad, Niger and Sudan have been officially closed” since December 2012, “everybody crosses over as if it’s business as usual.”

He, however, did not believe that there were fighter camps in the south.

“It is possible that terrorists have passed through Libya on their way to Niger from Mali to cover their tracks. But it is not possible that they are still here. Everybody knows everybody in the desert. Any new arrivals are immediately known about,” Majou Ouled told IPS.

A Tripoli-based security analyst believes otherwise. “It is true that the tribes in the south are in full control of their territory. And therefore they know perfectly well that AQIM is on the ground,” he said, speaking anonymously.

His opinion is shared by Samuel Laurent, author of the book “Sahelistan” on the Jihadist movements in the region. “The Tuaregs (who control south-east Libya) harbour Islamic militants. As a general rule the reasons are purely financial rather than ideological,” he wrote, pointing out that “Belmokhtar is a millionaire.”

According to Laurent, who is a security consultant, Malian Islamists set up base in Libya in November 2012, well before the French intervention. “The real core of AQIM have been regrouping in south-east Libya for months,” he told IPS.

In Laurent’s view, unlike the Malian government, Tripoli will never agree to western intervention. “What’s more, thanks to the Gaddafi regime’s former arms caches, weapons are in full circulation. Libya is therefore by far a more profitable haven for terrorists than Mali,” he concluded.

In early June, the government of France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered support to the Libyan government against Al-Qaeda-linked fighters who had been pushed out of northern Mali. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian had said that France was “ready” to help Libya “secure its borders” in the south.

On Jun. 4, NATO announced that it would send a team of experts to Libya, but the head of the organisation, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was categorical in stating that the mission was in no way a deployment of ground troops.

Although the Libyan government has requested assistance from NATO and western countries to secure its borders, some members of the government remain wary.

“Intervention by the Libyan army and police in the south is the preferred option,” Al-Adsari said. “Even if these institutions haven’t been fully formed, it is for Libyans to take charge of the situation.”

Majou Ouled added: “I am not comfortable with the idea of external intervention. If the West wants to help us, they should train our army, not come and enforce the law in our territory.”

Speaking at the press conference on Jun. 3, Zeidan announced measures to bolster the Libyan army’s presence. This included raising salaries and benefits to up to 1,200 dollars as an incentive to soldiers and former rebels to agree to work in the difficult southern region of the country.

Togolese Soldiers line up on the tarmac after arriving at Bamako Senou International Airport in Mali in early February, 2013. The soldiers are a small part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. Credit: Thomas Martinez/IPS

By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON, Apr 12 2013 (IPS)

With France withdrawing troops after chasing Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from towns in northern Mali, the central government in Bamako should urgently launch a serious process of national reconciliation, particularly with the Tuareg and Arab minorities, according to a new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) released Thursday.

Among other steps, the authorities should prevent the persecution by the security forces of the civilian population, especially in communities allegedly associated with rebel or armed Islamist groups that controlled the north for the 10 months preceding the French intervention in January.

Bamako’s leaders also should not impose pre-conditions, such as immediate disarmament, that make dialogue with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Tuareg independence group, more difficult, according to the ICG.

They should also ensure that the country’s radio and television stations do not incite or aggravate existing ethnic divisions in the country, especially in the run-up to national elections that are supposed to take place in July, according to the 47-page report.

“Elections must be held soon but not at any cost,” according to Gilles Yabi, ICG’s West Africa Project director.

“The radicalisation of public opinion is a major risk, and Mali’s leaders and institutions must take firm action to prevent people, especially those in the south, (from) lumping together rebels, terrorists and drug traffickers with all Tuaregs and Arabs,” he said.

As if to underline the urgency of the challenge, the ICG report, ‘Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform’, was released just as Human Rights Watch (HRW) announced that two Tuareg men who had been detained by Malian soldiers in a small town near Timbuktu had died while in detention at Bamako’s Central Prison.

The two were part of a group of seven men, aged between 21 and 66, who were arrested in mid-February on suspicion of supporting Islamist groups, including AQIM. The men were subsequently transported to the Bamako prison, according to HRW which interviewed the men there Mar. 20.

HRW said the two men probably died of excessive heat, given the lack of ventilation in the room in which they were held, possibly combined with the injuries they received from the earlier abuse, which included repeated beatings and burning. The surviving five were reportedly moved to a different room after the two deaths, HRW reported.

The deaths came amidst continuing reports of abuses against Tuaregs, Arabs, and Fulanis by Malian soldiers who returned to the north alongside French forces in their drive to oust AQIM and its allies. Since then, HRW’s Sahel expert Corinne Dufka told IPS, at least 13 members of the three minority communities have been summarily executed by Malian security forces and at least another 15 have “disappeared”.

“These abuses by the army in reconquering the north are exacerbating already existing ethnic tensions,” she said.

The chaos into which Mali descended began at the beginning of 2012 when MNLA, whose forces were fortified by returning and well-armed veterans of Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi’s security forces, chased the Malian army out of the north, precipitating a military coup that ousted the democratically elected government in Bamako.

AQIM, initially a mainly Algerian movement that had dug deep roots into northern Mali after its defeat in Algeria’s civil war, was able to wrest control of most of the region from the MNLA by last June.

As its control spread over the succeeding months, Mali’s neighbours and Western countries, including the U.S., which had provided hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and training to Mali’s military as part of its Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership Initiative during the previous decade, became increasingly alarmed.

By December, the U.N. Security Council approved a plan for the eventual deployment of a West African force to take back the region. In January, however, one of AQIM’s affiliates launched an offensive southwards, triggering the France’s intervention.

French troops quickly took the region’s three most important towns – Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal – paving the way for both the return of the Chadian army and contingents of the West African peacekeeping force (AFISMA).

French and Chadian forces, backed by U.S. intelligence assets, notably reconnaissance drones newly based in neighbouring Niger, then entered the northern-most part of Mali to pursue AQIM militants into their sanctuaries as part of the ongoing “war against terrorism”.

Militants have since staged a number of suicide attacks against
targets in the cities. According to the ICG report, the ability of AFISMA, which is likely to absorb the remaining French troops as part of a rehatted U.N. stabilisation mission, to maintain security for the civilian population is “unclear”, while a senior Pentagon officials testified here earlier this week that it was a “completely incapable force”.

Paris announced this week that about 100 of its 4,000-troop intervention force have pulled out – the start of a phased withdrawal that will leave about 1,000 French soldiers as part of the proposed stabilisation mission by the end of the year.

At the same time, a 550-man European Union (EU) mission began training Malian soldiers last week in hopes that they will eventually play a major role in defending the country against the AQIM threat. The mission is also aimed at reforming the military institution, including fighting endemic corruption and subordinating itself to civilian control.

Meanwhile, some Republican lawmakers here, notably Sen. John McCain, who just returned from a trip to Mali, are pressing the administration of President Barack Obama to restore and expand military aid to the Malian army. Direct U.S. military assistance to the army was cut off after the coup, and the administration appears more inclined to defer to the EU at this point.

The ICG report stressed that political initiatives are at least as important as military measures.

“Focusing on terrorism alone risks distracting from the main problems,” according to Comfort Ero, ICG’s Africa director. “Corruption and poor governance are more important causes of the crisis than the terrorist threat, the Tuareg issue, or even the north-south divide.”

“The challenges for the region and the U.N. are to align their positions on the political process and to insist that Malians, especially their elites assume responsibility for reversing bad governance and preventing another crisis,” she said.

HRW’s Dufka agreed, noting that Mali’s collapse last year showed that “its so-called democracy was built on very, very weak foundations …but should also illuminate the challenges it faces – addressing endemic corruption, strengthening rule-of-law institutions, and ending chronic human-rights abuse.

“Addressing the Tuareg problem is key to the future of stability in Mali,” she noted, adding that top priority should be given to returning the tens of thousands of Malians now living in refugee camps to their homes.

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.lobelog.com.

Since two-year anniversary of the January 25 Revolution, Egypt has seen numerous clashes between anti-government demonstrators and security forces. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS

By Emile Nakhleh
WASHINGTON, Apr 9 2013 (IPS)

The governing programme of Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood has been disappointing. His commitment to genuine democracy has been faltering, and his efforts at inclusion and political tolerance have been wanting.

Morsi’s actions against the Egyptian comedian Basim Yousif belie his initial statements supporting tolerance, inclusion, and freedom of expression. Humor is the backbone of a mature democracy; muzzling the voices of dissent is an omen of a budding dictatorship.

These actions unfortunately confirm the suspicions of many Arab secularists, liberals, and non-Muslim Brotherhood citizens that once the MB reaches power through elections, they would scuttle democracy and replace it with their version of theocratic rule or divine hukm.

Many had feared that once mainstream Islamic parties are elected through “one man, one vote”, they would transform the process into “one man, one vote, one time” and choke the democratic impulse.

Morsi’s intolerance of secularists, women, Christians, and even liberal judges is generating fears in Egypt and elsewhere that the country has replaced the secular Mubarak dictatorship with a theocratic autocracy. Morsi’s rule does not allow a diversity of views, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of the role of religion in the state has emerged as the guiding principle for governing Egypt.

This disturbing phenomenon does not bode well for political Islam, especially as Islamic political parties become majorities in Arab and Muslim governments.

My former government colleagues and I have argued for years that as part of government, Islamic political parties would focus on “bread and butter” issues and relegate their religious ideology to the backburner. We believed their policy concerns would trump their ideology.

As minority government partners in Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Islamic parties focused on legislation that responded to the needs of their constituents, bargained with other parties to pass needed legislation regulating commerce, transportation, power, energy, food prices, and other issues of concern to their citizens.

They generally were not elected or re-elected because of their Islamic credentials and did not use their Islamic ideology to govern. They promoted moderate platforms during their election campaign and generally have governed as responsible factions in their respective parliaments.

As we briefed senior policymakers, we highlighted the difference between mainstream political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, and elsewhere, and extremist Islamic groups, which did not believe in man-made democracy and inclusive government.

At the time, all of those parties were in the minority. We also judged that when some of those parties become a majority, they would uphold the same democratic, inclusive tendencies.

The Turkish Justice and Development Party or AKP, which became the first Sunni majority governing party in the region, emerged as the poster child of our briefings. It governed democratically, defended Turkish secularism, and encouraged inclusion in the economic and political life of Turkey. Despite its Islamic roots, AKP supported the democratic notion of separating religion from politics.

Many had hoped the Muslim Brotherhood would bring a similar governing model to Egypt. In fact, that was the promise that President Morsi made upon his election as president. He consolidated his power the first one hundred days, but since then he’s begun to consolidate his control in undemocratic ways based on a constitution that he helped push through hastily and without much public discussion.

How can Morsi recapture democracy and move Egypt in the right direction?

First, rescind the sham constitution and replace it with a constitution that reflects the diverse political ideologies in Egyptian society. Second, include secularists, women, Christians, and non-MB leaders in high positions in government and promote a national programme of tolerance toward these groups and punish those who engage in sectarian and gender hate crimes.

Third, hold open, free elections for the next parliament, with much simpler and straightforward voting procedures and without stacking the decks in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Fourth, create a major fund to support young men and women in start-up initiatives in technology and entrepreneurship to develop businesses and create jobs. The young generation must have tangible incentives to have a stake in society in order to help build a prosperous future.

Fifth, convene a series of high-level meetings of leaders – men and women – from across Egyptian society from the business, banking, and tourism community, the professions, civil society, academia, and the high tech industry, with different political, social, and religious ideologies to discuss the immediate future of Egypt and develop specific strategies of how to get there.

The Muslim Brotherhood has no monopoly on the future vision of Egypt. If Morsi is to be the president of all of Egypt, he must take concrete steps to alleviate his citizens’ concerns about his leadership, create jobs for the youth, and partner with leaders of different ideological stripes to build a more democratic Egypt.

Egypt is endowed with a rich culture and a diverse social fabric and could not possibly prosper under a theocracy. Putting the country on the right path will be Morsi’s greatest legacy.

*Emile Nakhleh, a former Senior Intelligence Service Officer, is a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World.”

Booths and stands at the World Social Forum on the El Manar campus in Tunis. Credit: Alberto Pradilla/IPS

By Alberto Pradilla
TUNIS, Mar 29 2013 (IPS)

The World Social Forum’s traditional focus on economic, political and social injustice caused by globalisation shifted towards the revolts and unrest of the Arab Spring, in the current edition of the global gathering in Tunisia.

The WSF “contributed in Latin America to the construction of governments that are with the popular classes. We hope that will also happen in the Arab world,” said Tarek Ben Hiba, a human rights activist in Tunisia and France.

He was referring to the Tunisian left’s expectations with respect to the 12th annual WSF taking place Mar. 26-30 in the capital, Tunis, where demonstrations forced President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power in January 2011.

The WSF got its start in the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 2001, drawing together hundreds of NGOs and movements critical of the direction taken by the globalisation process.

The 2013 WSF was organised in Tunisia, the cradle of the Arab revolts, to express support for the processes of change triggered by the December 2010 self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, an impoverished fruit vendor whose desperate last act sparked the Tunisian revolution and, ultimately, the ongoing Arab Spring.

The first WSF edition hosted by an Arab country has become a reflection of the achievements and pending challenges in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, and of the contradictions and unresolved clashing visions.

On one hand is the broad conflict between secularists and Islamists, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. And on the other is the war raging in Syria and the uncertainty and instability in Libya.

The conflict in Syria has been one of the main sources of tension in the WSF workshops and panels held this week across the Tunis El Manar University campus.

Supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have been sharing space on a campus that has been turned into an encampment of heterogeneous global struggles.

On Thursday, for example, while four Syrian communist and two Kurd organisations discussed future action against the regime, supporters of al-Assad held a rally in the central square. The two groups did not cross paths, so no confrontation took place, but the tension was palpable.

Participants in the debate held by the Syrian communists and Kurds told IPS that they had agreed on a document recognising the importance of the individual and collective rights of all ethnic groups in Syria, which is especially significant for the Kurds, the largest minority.

They also agreed to hold a day of solidarity with the Syrian uprising, in the first week of May.

The sources said a congress was being planned for June, to bring together “the Syrian, European and Latin American internationalist left” to coordinate support for the revolt.

The situation in Libya has been another source of tension. On Wednesday, two groups clashed when one of them tried to hold up a sign in support of Muammar Gaddafi (who governed the country from 1969 to October 2011, when he was captured and killed by rebel forces).

That provoked a reaction by supporters of the uprising, who have several stands at the WSF, where the revolution’s tricolour flag and the flag of the nomadic Berber or Amazigh people can be seen.

“We are better off than they are saying,” Fatma, a woman from Tripoli who belongs to an organisation fighting for women’s participation in political life, told IPS. “There are problems, but we are learning from scratch, because there was no civil society before.”

The disputes between Islamists and secularists that are heating up the political processes in Tunisia and Egypt have also been reflected at this week’s WSF.

One of the novel aspects with respect to previous WSF sessions is the presence of organisations with ties to mosques, in booths on campus as well as specific protests.

For example, for over a month, female university students have staged a sit-in on campus to protest university regulations that prohibit the niqab – the full Muslim veil that only shows the eyes. Muslim students argue that the ban violates their freedom of religion.

The protests are occurring in a climate of growing clashes since the assassination of leftist politician Shokri Belaid in February.

“The participants in the Forum are demanding freedom, which is why we’re asking for your support,” said Nabi Wahbi, one of the young demonstrators taking part in the pro-niqab protest.

The integration of these groups in an environment marked by the struggle for women’s rights is a challenge for these gatherings.

Progressive groups in Tunisia accuse Islamists of trying to impose Sharia, or Islamic law, and of undermining the rights of women.

But the Arab revolutionary processes are not the only challenge facing this week’s WSF. There are also deeply-rooted nationalist conflicts.

The central ones involve Palestine and the Western Sahara. But while Palestine is the main cause espoused by several delegations, the Sahrawis are facing off with the enormous delegation from Morocco, who tried to discredit the demands for independence of the inhabitants of the former Spanish colony.

“The Polisario Front is lying,” read a sign referring to the political movement leading the struggle for the independence of Western Sahara, proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1976 by the independence fighters.

Moroccan activist Benis Ghitah complained about the Sahrawi refugees, who have been living for decades in remote camps in southwest Algeria.

But the Sahrawis combat the campaign against them. “Morocco tries to confuse people,” Dih Naocha told IPS, who expressed fears because this was the first time representatives of the Sahrawi people had come to Tunisia to defend their rights.

The change of region by the WSF also involved a shift in focus. But it is also true that, as Ben Hiba indicated, the WSF sessions in the first decade of the 21st century served as support for emancipatory processes in Latin America – something that the revolutionary Arab forces hope to repeat with this week’s event.

Bloggers, human rights groups and activists of different stripes have had a chance to meet face to face. Time will reveal the results.

Despite uncertainty and the ongoing conflict, Mali will work to rebuild and safeguard its cultural heritage, says the West African country’s minister of culture Bruno Maïga.

Maïga was in Paris this week to attend a “day of solidarity with Mali” organised by the United Nations cultural agency UNESCO at its headquarters here. The events brought together cultural experts, government officials, artists and academics to assess the damage done to Mali’s world heritage sites and ancient manuscripts, and to map out a plan of action.

“The jihadists…by burning manuscripts, prohibiting traditional practices in the occupied regions, forbidding the listening to music, sowing terror…wanted to crush our spirit, our very cultural essence,” Maïga said. “Their objective was to destroy our past, our culture, our identity, and overall, our dignity.”

Maïga told IPS that he hoped the day would lead to a “real beginning” of rebuilding Mali’s heritage. “I hope there will be concrete action, and that’s why I’ve come, despite all the difficulties.”

Sixteen mausoleums and the three major mosques in the iconic town Timbuktu were first inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 1988. The Tomb of Askia in the city Gao, dating from 1495, was added to the list in 2004.

Last July this tomb and the mosque Sidi Yahi were put on the agency’s “in danger” list following the destruction of 11 of the mausoleums, and of the doors of Sidi Yahi.

The destruction – attributed to armed Islamist rebels – took place during the year of conflict that began in northern Mali in January 2012. As French and Malian forces retook Timbuktu in late January this year, retreating rebels set fire to the Ahmed Baba Institute, destroying some of the precious ancient manuscripts that were held there.

Maïga told journalists that about 2,000 to 3,000 manuscripts may have been lost but that an estimated 300,000 other documents are in safe-keeping. He declined to give their location, citing security concerns. Many of the texts date from the 13th to 16th centuries and were produced by renowned scholars from the city and other areas.

The manuscripts were in the process of being digitalised, but the rebels shattered computers and other equipment installed to do this, Maïga said. “They broke everything,” he told IPS, adding that a renewed digitalisation process is a priority for the ministry of culture, once peace has been restored.

“Mali has a very rich culture and history that has served to cement social cohesion,” Maïga said. “For hundreds of years, different communities have lived together in respect for diversity. It’s this diversity, this spirit of tolerance, and this creativity…that the Islamists have been trying to destroy. We must resolutely oppose this.”

Following a day of talks on Monday, Mali and its partners adopted a draft action plan for the “rehabilitation of cultural heritage and the safeguarding of ancients manuscripts.” Lazare Eloundou, chief of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre’s Africa unit, said that the cost of digitalizing the manuscripts and rebuilding the mausoleums was estimated at between 10 million and 11 million dollars.

He said that the agency had set up a special account to receive funds for the work ahead, and the day of solidarity was also a means of drawing attention to the need for contributions from private and public donors.

Aurélie Filipetti, France’s minister of culture and communication, who attended the day’s opening ceremony, said that French institutions would participate in the training of Malian cultural experts in the areas of conservation and restoration of patrimony.

“Mali is an important artistic, cultural and spiritual source, and the role of France, of UNESCO and of the entire international community is to help the Malian people to rediscover their dignity and the pride in their culture,” Filipetti told journalists.

“When France intervened, it was to preserve the territorial integrity of Mali and above all to safeguard the Malian people,” Filipetti added. “And the Malian people need their heritage and culture.”

Institutions such as the Paris-based Quai Branly Museum, which focuses on indigenous art and civilisations, and the National Library of France will lend their expertise to the restoration and reconstruction work, Filipetti said.

“No spiritual or temporal principle can justify depriving a people of their history,” she said.

As the conflict continues, with sporadic attacks, experts fear that Malian cultural artifacts will become part of the international trade in illicitly obtained art objects that is valued at 6 to 8 billion dollars annually.

UNESCO officials said that some items were already believed to be on the market, but the agency hopes that neighbouring governments would act to prevent objects entering their countries.

UNESCO’s director-general Irina Bokova said that the agency would work with its partners and with the international police organisation Interpol to stem the sale of such art objects. She also stressed the importance of culture to nations.

“We want to send a very strong message about the importance of culture, about the importance of heritage,” she told journalists. “A message that rejects the destruction of heritage because it destroys the identities of people.”

Bokova, who visited Mali at the beginning of the month with French President François Hollande, said she saw firsthand the burnt remnants of some of the manuscripts.

“For us, Timbuktu, Gao, the heritage of Mali all go beyond the sheer description on the World Heritage List because (they show) the development of Islamic civilisation, and of dialogue among cultures. The manuscripts…have records of Islamic science, of medicine, of astronomy, of spirituality, philosophy,” Bokova said.

Churches in Diabaly, central Mali, were looted and destroyed during the Islamist occupation. Credit: Marc-André Boisvert/IPS

By Marc-Andre Boisvert
MOPTI, Mali, Feb 11 2013 (IPS)

At the entrance to the Evangelical church in Mopti, central Mali, military soldiers stood on either side of the door as Pastor Luc Sagara greeted his parishioners for Sunday mass.

The presence of the soldiers were a stark reminder that less than three weeks ago the town was under threat by Islamist extremists committed to the imposition of Sharia law in this West African nation.

“We feel safe now. With the French intervention, we are hopeful that the Islamists will not attack us,” Sagara told IPS.

France launched a military intervention in Mali on Jan. 11 at the request of the country’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré after extremists advanced on the town of Konna, 60 kilometres northeast of Mopti. As the Islamists occupied town after town, intent on seizing the capital Bamako, Sharia law was imposed, and Christians and moderate Muslims were persecuted.

Since April 2012, northern Mali has been taunted by a coalition of armed groups composed of Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar Dine, an Islamist group among Mali’s Tuareg population that live across the country’s southeast.

The rebels reportedly destroyed religious shrines and church buildings, and imposed extreme Sharia law – engaging in public floggings, executions and amputations.

International rights group, Human Rights Watch, said that the rebels engaged in extensive looting, pillage, the recruitment of child soldiers and the rape of women and young girls. “Armed groups in northern Mali in recent weeks have terrorised civilians by committing abductions and looting hospitals,” Corinne Dufka, senior Africa researcher at HRW, said in April 2012.

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, the recent conflict has led to the internal displacement of 250,000 people. Mopti was one of the towns that people from the north sought refuge in.

Many of the minority Christians, who constitute five percent of the country’s 15.8 million people, either fled Mopti or were living here in fear of Islamic occupation

A local Imam from the town, Abdoulaye Maiga, told IPS that no one had been safe from the extremists, regardless of their religious affiliations.

“We are all victims of those terrorists. We are all Malians and we all fled together,” he said. Members of his family had taken flight from northern Mali’s largest town of Gao.

“When my family came here, they brought with them a Christian family, and we loaned them some of our (traditional) clothes so the terrorists would let them travel without problems.”

In Diabaly, a liberated central Malian town, Pastor Daniel Konaté prepared for his first Christian service since the Islamists were ousted. The graffiti on the church wall that read, “Allah is the only one”, and the bullets scattered on the floor served as a reminder of the Islamist occupation.

“They made my church a military base,” Konaté told IPS. During the occupation he and his family fled to a village 20 kilometers away, returning only after Malian and French forces successfully repelled Islamists here on Jan. 21.

But Konaté still wonders how the extremists had known that this plain unassuming building, which has no signs to indicate that it is a place of worship, was a church.

“We think some people might have told them that this is a church,” said Konaté as 30 parishioners gathered and the service began with the singing of “It is not God who betrays us. It is men that betray God.”

Ever since locals recognised two former high-ranking Malian military soldiers who used to be posted in Diabaly among the Islamist forces, community members believe the Islamist fighters had local support. Now, neighbours who once lived peacefully together are suspicious of one another.

During the town’s occupation Pascal Touré’s small four-bedroom house on the outskirts of Diabaly hid 27 Christian refugees terrified of being singled out for persecution by the occupying Islamists.

“It seems obvious that some locals reported where the Christians were. Among the locals, everybody knows each other,” he told IPS.

But Touré, a Christian who also teaches catechism, is adamant that seeking revenge is not a solution.

The refugees have left Touré’s house and returned to their own homes in Diabaly “but life in the town will not be the same for Christians.”

Though there are some here who hang on to the memories of a peaceful past, optimistically believing that life will return to what it had been before the conflict. Bakary Traoré, a Muslim and a retired teacher, is one of them.

“Christians were targeted. But all of Diabaly has been a victim. The Islamists did not have the time to impose Sharia, but if they did, everyone would have suffered. They did not succeed. And now we can all live in harmony like we were before. As one people.”

Tunisia’s prime minister has said that he will dissolve the Islamist-led government and form a national unity administration, following the killing of prominent secular opposition figure Shokri Belaid in front of his home.

Hamadi Jebali announced during a speech to the nation on Wednesday he will form a technocrat government.

“After the failure of negotiations between parties on a cabinet reshuffle, I decided to form a small technocrat government,” said Jebali.

He said the ministers would not run for office but elections would subsequently be held as soon as possible.

An official source told Reuters earlier on that Jebali’s decision was a personal one taken in the interests of the country.

Belaid, leader of the left-leaning Democratic Patriots party, was killed on Wednesday as he was leaving his home.

He was transported to a hospital in the suburbs of Tunis where he died of his wounds, his brother confirmed.

Following news of Belaid’s death, violence and protests broke out on the streets of Tunis.

Al Jazeera’s Ahmed Janabi in Tunis reported violent clashes between Belaid’s supporters and police along the main Habib Borguiba Avenue, with the police using tear gas and batons to disperse the protesters and making numerous arrests.

Earlier, crowds of mourners, chanting “the people want the fall of the regime”, crowded around an ambulance carrying Belaid’s body.

As the protests intensified, four Tunisian opposition groups, including the Popular Front, of which the Democratic Patriots is a component, announced they were pulling out of the national assembly and called for a general strike.

Critical of Islamists

Belaid had been critical of Tunisia’s leadership, especially the Islamist party Ennahda that dominates the government.

He had accused authorities of not doing enough to stop violence by ultraconservatives who have targeted mausoleums, art exhibits and other things seen as out of keeping with their strict interpretation of Islam.

Samir Dilou, a government spokesperson, called Belaid’s killing an “odious crime”.

Moncef Marzouki, the Tunisian president, said he would fight those who opposed the political transition in his country after the death of Belaid.

Marzouki, who cut short a visit to France on Wednesday, told legislators at the European Parliament in Strasbourg to applause: “We will continue to fight the enemies of the revolution.”

Marzouki also cancelled a visit to Egypt scheduled for Thursday after the killing, which brought thousands of protesters onto the streets outside the Interior Ministry.

Chanting for the fall of the Ennahda-led government, demonstrators shouted “Shame, shame Shokri died”, “Where is the government?”, and “The government should fall”.

Omar bin Ali, a member of the Tunisian Trade Unions, was present at the demonstration site and said “the Islamists were responsible for Belaid’s death”.

“This is what they have been calling for in mosques,” bin Ali told Al Jazeera.

Ruling out the possibility of external factors, he said “Tunisia is a friend of all nations. It is hard to think of anyone from abroad to do this to us,” adding that “the people want the whole government out as they proved to be useless”.

Ongoing instability

The assassination comes as Tunisia is struggling to maintain stability and revive its economy after its longtime dictator was overthrown in an uprising two years ago.

Mohamed Jamour, another opposition leader, criticised the government in a press conference on Wednesday for failing to protect Belaid against stated threats.

“Threats of plunging into a whirlpool of violence that can be caused by a number of bodies, the state, the revolution guarding committees and armed groups,” Jamour said.

“Only yesterday, a number of questions were raised … and Shokri repeatedly emphasised this particular issue. He personally had felt threats to his personal safety. Yesterday I listened on the radio … a friend of Shokri, in broad daylight, said, “Warn that armed people are going after him.”

That revolution set off revolts across the Arab world and unleashed new social and religious tensions.

Ennahda won 42 percent of seats in the first post-Arab uprising elections in October 2011 and formed a government in coalition with two secular parties, Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol.

However, the government has faced many protests over economic hardship.

*Pubished under an agreement with Al Jazeera.

As Washington broadens its military “footprint” in the Sahel region of Africa, U.S. analysts are urging the administration of President Barack Obama to devote more effort to diplomacy, especially in Mali.

In particular, they are calling for Washington to press for a swift transfer of power to a democratically elected government in Bamako which can then reach out to rebel Tuareg forces in hopes of driving a wedge between them and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and other armed Islamist groups that, until this week, controlled northern Mali for most of the past year.

And they insist that the U.S.-backed French-led offensive that drove AQIM and its allies out of three key towns in northeastern Mali over the past 10 days will not be sufficient to secure the France-sized region indefinitely without some kind of settlement between Bamako and the Tuaregs.

“Clearly there has to be a political solution at some point,” according to David Shinn, an Africa specialist at George Washington University and former ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.

“What the latest military activity is not doing is dealing with the Tuareg problem which has to be addressed seriously,” he told IPS.

Since the French-Malian offensive against the AQIM and its allies was launched Jan. 11, Washington has taken a series of steps both to support the offensive and to broaden its own military involvement in the larger Sahel region.

The Pentagon confirmed Tuesday that it had concluded a new military accord with the government of Niger to set up a base for Predator drones to carry out surveillance missions over the region’s vast desert areas.

U.S. officials have not ruled out the possibility that the drones could eventually be deployed to carry out strikes against suspected AQIM militants, much as they have been used against the group’s ideological counterparts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

The base announcement followed Washington’s initially halting agreement to Paris’s requests for intelligence, logistical, and aerial-refuelling support during the French offensive, which reached the storied oasis town of Timbuktu earlier in the week.

“We will review further requests from the French,” Pentagon spokesman George Little said Tuesday. “We strongly support French operations in Mali; this is a key effort. AQIM and other terrorist groups have threatened to establish a safe haven in Mali, and the French have done absolutely the right thing.”

But those steps may be just the beginning of an expanded U.S. military presence in the region through its six-year-old Africa Command (AFRICOM), which has long been seeking a more-active role on the continent, particularly in conducting training missions and joint exercises with the region’s militaries.

Noting the continuing problems with renegade militias in Libya, AQIM’s advances in Mali, as well as the deadly siege by one of its factions at a gas facility in southern Algeria earlier this month, outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Congressional hearing last week, “We are going to see more and more demands on AFRICOM.”

Despite their public praise for the French campaign in Mali, U.S. officials, as well as independent analysts here, have voiced concern about what happens next.

France, which has so far deployed about 2,500 troops, has said it hopes to quickly reduce its role by transferring control of the towns it has taken to the Malian army and a U.N.-backed African Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) that could number as many as 6,000, mainly West African troops.

But the Malian army, which ousted the democratically elected civilian government last March, is notoriously undisciplined. The Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights, among other groups, has reported numerous abuses of human rights committed by Malian soldiers during the offensive, notably against Tuaregs, a lighter-skinned, nomadic people who have long sought independence from Bamako, and some of whose armed factions allied themselves with AQIM last year.

Because of last year’s coup, the U.S. has been barred by law from providing military aid to Mali until a democratically elected government takes power, a factor in Washington’s initially hesitant response to Paris’ requests to aid the military campaign.

A transitional regime, which, however, appears subordinate to a military junta headed by a U.S.-trained officer, Amadou Sanogo, has scheduled elections for July.

As for AFISMA, small contingents of which have only just begun arriving in Mali, international donors Tuesday pledged nearly 456 million dollars – including 96 million dollars from Washington – to support its operations.

But the original plan called for AFISMA to undergo training and other preparation for several months before deploying to Mali. France’s sudden intervention, which it defended as necessary to prevent a key air base from falling to the rebels, upended the process, calling into question precisely how the West African force will operate.

“The French intervention not only short-circuited the transitional political process in Bamako, but it also short-circuited the (AFISMA’s) preparation,” noted J. Peter Pham, head of African studies at the Atlantic Council here.

“These troops are now being thrown in to an unfamiliar setting without any training. They’ve never operated together; they literally don’t speak the same language.

“And in about eight weeks, the rains will come to Mali, which will render much of the country impassable until September, so they’ll be doing garrison duty in towns surrounded by a vast territory that the enemy knows much better.”

Instead of putting up stiff resistance to the French-led offensive, AQIM and its allies appear to have dispersed into desert hideouts in the region from which analysts fear they will be able to carry out hit-and-run attacks against the Malian and AFISMA forces.

“What’s clear is that they will strike and will continue to strike,” said Nicolas Van de Walle, a Maghreb expert at Cornell University. “We know from experience that they’re really hard to get rid of in strictly military terms.”

Pham agreed, noting that France’s unilateralism in undertaking its offensive has put Washington, which is determined avoid putting U.S. “boots on the ground”, in a bind.

“The quandary is that we have a long-standing ally who has now stretched itself out, and we can’t leave them dangling there, as gratifying as that might be. On the other hand, what they’re doing is not sustainable. They’ve now managed to secure two or three towns in northern Mali, but they’re certainly inadequate to securing any of the countryside.”

To both Pham and Van de Welle, the key now lies with applying pressure on Bamako to create a legitimate government that can persuade the Tuaregs to cut their ties to AQIM.

“The government in Bamako is still a military junta by another name,” said Pham, “and no Tuaregs are going to make any deal with that kind of regime.”

That may also mean pressing France itself to coordinate more closely with Washington on the political front, he added, noting that Paris has just convinced the European Commission to release 92 million Euros to Mali that it had withheld since the coup d’etat.

“That’s 92 million reasons for the regime not to give up power and restore the constitutional order,” he warned.

“The U.S. should be forcing a political settlement in Bamako,” Van de Walle told IPS. “Before the coup, Mali had a reasonable democracy, so they should be able to move pretty quickly toward elections.

“That’s the start of any political settlement. It’s possible to peel off the Tuaregs from their alliance with AQIM, and that would make a big difference because you could make at least the northeastern part of Mali secure.

“But there has to be a credible deal with Bamako, and the U.S. can’t broker that militarily,” he added.

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.lobelog.com.

A poster in Tunis declares that the revolution must continue. Credit: Simba Russeau/IPS

By Emile Nakhleh
WASHINGTON, Jan 4 2013 (IPS)

As the Arab Spring enters its third year, new Arab democracies and the international community should reflect on several critical lessons from the past two years.

Thinking about these lessons and learning from history, no matter how recent, could help us understand the trajectory for the next stage in Arab politics and regional stability. Some of the key issues raised in the questions below are also highlighted in “Global Trends 2030”, the recent publication of the U.S. National Intelligence Council.

Lesson 1. Domestic turbulence and the struggle for governance resulting from the toppling of dictators could take at least two to three years to abate. Washington and other Western capitals should stay out of these discussions and allow the new indigenous centres of power – Islamists and secularists – to chart a reasonable path without “advice” from the outside.

The internal debates to fill the “governance gap” are expected to be intense but largely peaceful. The euphoria that followed the precipitous fall of Mubarak, Egypt’s reputed third longest reigning dictator since Ramses II, understandably gave way to impatience and frustration about the slow pace of democratic transitions.

The heated disagreements in Egypt over the recently adopted draft constitution, as an example, should be afforded the opportunity to be reconciled through the ballot box, not by bullets. While staying out of domestic wrangling, the United States will remain a key player in the region for years to come – economically, militarily, and politically.

Lesson 2. Understanding complex, diverse Middle Eastern Muslim societies requires policy and intelligence analysts outside the region to acquire deep expertise in the cultural, historical, political, and religious dynamics of Arab societies.

Relying solely on quantifiable data and Western analytic paradigms often produces inadequate analysis. The inability to anticipate the Arab Spring two years ago is a case in point.

Because many policy analysts in the West could not quantify such demands as dignity, justice, and respect, which millions of Arab youth initially voiced in their protests against their dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya, they unfortunately dismissed them as nothing more than “Arab street” hyperbole.

These same demands are still at the heart of mass demonstrations in Bahrain and elsewhere.

Lesson 3. The emergence of Islamic politics in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, is fueling a serious conversation about whether Islamic political parties are moderating and whether political pragmatism will in the end trump religious ideology. Arab liberals and secularists and civil rights advocates are rightly concerned about the future trajectory of political Islam and governance in Egypt and elsewhere.

The new Egyptian constitutional document seems to embody the two arguments on both sides of the religious secularist divide. It establishes the primacy of Islamic law or Shari’a in governance, but it also recognizes basic individual freedoms of speech and assembly.

The fundamental question is whether Islamic law should be the source or a source of legislation in the new Egypt and whether practicing freedoms of speech and assembly will be subject to strict interpretations of Islamic law. Human rights advocates support extricating these freedoms from state control.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has lost much of its legitimacy as a governing party because it has not granted ethnic and religious minorities equal access to economic and political opportunity. The MB also must recognise that Shari’a cannot be the predominant ideology in Egypt.

Over a century ago, Egyptian luminary thinkers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Rashid Rida infused Egypt with a rich tradition of arguably liberal, reformist thought. The Muslim Brotherhood and its President Muhammad Morsi cannot hope to be accepted as the legitimate government of Egypt if they stifle this deeply ingrained reformist tradition.

Lesson 4. If Washington remains oblivious to human rights abuses in Arab countries, including those that are close allies of the United States, autocratic repression will continue unchecked. Consequently, we should expect that popular anger at the U.S. perceived hypocrisy and double standard would be directed at American interests and personnel in the region.

Violence rages in Syria, and while the world focuses on the Assad’s waning days, human rights abuses continue in other countries. Yet, the Arab Spring has resulted in democratically elected governments in four Arab countries.

The Arab Spring is a work in progress and requires the international community to remain vigilant regarding unlawful regime practices against peaceful protesters.

Many in the West are rightly concerned about the future of a post-Assad regime in Syria and the increasing carnage in that country, but the world should not lose sight of the plight of Shia communities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states.

Human rights advocates across the region are already accusing the United States of hypocrisy and a double standard because of Washington’s perceived mute response to what is happening in Bahrain.

Lesson 5. As job creation and entrepreneurship will be critical for the success of democratic transition, Arab governments will have to adopt creative economic policies to promote economic growth. Failure to do so will hinder their ability to build modern economies.

Highly focused stimulus packages and new investment, tax, and commercial laws must be passed with the aim of restricting the role of government in the economy and expanding the right of individual entrepreneurs and small business people, men and women, to pursue economic enterprises freely.

As I wrote elsewhere, the private sector is the engine that drives economic vibrancy and job creation. If the new governments can harness the power of the people by minimising regulations and enacting market place friendly laws, economic vibrancy would become possible. An employed population is the backbone of a democratic society.

As Arab upheavals continue, these five lessons yield two take-aways: first, the authoritarian paradigm is slowly being replaced by a new political architecture driven vaguely by people power.

Second, while the U.S. and other global powers remain involved in the Arab world, and while they are needed to help get rid of dictators, the people of the region will determine the future of their countries and the type of governance they feel comfortable with.

*Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

By Ahmed Usman
KANO, Nigeria, Oct 16 2012 (IPS)

Locals in the city of Maiduguri in the northeastern Nigerian state of Borno have intensified their calls for the military to withdraw from the town, the stronghold of the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, after claims that they are being maltreated and abused.

The people residing in Maiduguri have been paying a heavy price for the Islamists’ guerrilla war, as the security forces accuse them of non-cooperation and shielding the Islamists.

“We are terribly disturbed by the wave of incessant retaliatory attacks by security forces on us,” local resident Bulama Abbagana told IPS.

“Even if we were in a state of war with a rival country, civilians should not be killed and maimed in the way the military is doing,” Abbagana angrily told IPS over the phone.

Boko Haram, whose name means “western education is sin”, has for the past three years been attacking government institutions, including suicide bombings of the United Nations building in the capital, Abuja. The worst attack was the Jan. 20 assault at the ancient city of Kano that claimed over 180 lives.

Boko Haram has adopted a Taliban style approach and is alleged to have links with Al Qaeda in North Africa. They want to impose Islamic law in a country sharply divided between a majority Muslim north and Christian south.

One resident who does not want his name in print for fear of reprisals told IPS: “We wish to be left with Boko Haram, we would have incurred less trouble than with the military.”

Maiduguri, the headquarters of Boko Haram activity in Nigeria and the staging point for the insurgents, appears to have become a battleground.

The most recent attack was on Monday, Oct. 15 when sustained strikes on the city by government soldiers resulted in a number of bomb explosions and the lockdown of the city centre. On Sunday, Oct. 14 the city was rocked by a roadside blast and two separate gun attacks that killed at least four people including a local chief, residents and the military said.

Prior to this, on Oct. 8, indiscriminate shooting allegedly committed by the members of the Joint Task Force resulted in further violence.

It is claimed that Nigerian troops in Maiduguri went berserk after their patrol vehicle was hit with an Improvised Explosive Device, killing two soldiers, including a lieutenant, and injuring others. They were alleged to have started shooting indiscriminately in a densely-populated area of Lagos Street.

Residents say over 30 people were killed in the assault, and houses, businesses and shops were burnt down and vandalised.

“If you see the level of damage on our burnt houses and shops, you may shed tears,” Bana Modu, whose own house suffered severe damage, told IPS.

The feud between Nigerian security forces and residents in Maiduguri has reached its climax, with both sides pointing a finger of blame at each other.

The security forces claim that residents are not helping in the fight against Boko Haram. In several instances, the military have complained bitterly, accusing civilians of colluding with the attackers, as Islamists have launched attacks on them from rooftops and trees.

In turn, local residents complain that the security forces regard every person in civilian clothes as an enemy.

“Whenever there is a bomb explosion, the security used to besiege the area and beat any one found in their way. Some are killed in the process,” banker Abubakar Mohammed told IPS over the phone.

Businesses here have been crippled in the last three years.

“Many people have fled the area. I don’t have anywhere to go, but I could have left to escape from the attacks from two fronts: Boko Haram and the security forces,” Msheliza Dalwa told IPS.

The government of Borno state, where the crisis erupted in 2009, has shown no interest in withdrawing the troops, and has merely urged the security forces to respect individuals.

“Believe me, if the federal government withdraws the Joint Task Force from Borno, all of us will be chased out of the state by insurgents,” state Governor Kashim Shettima said, addressing journalists on the topic of the recent assault.

Shehu Sani, president of the Civil Right Congress, a local human rights group in Nigeria, told IPS: “The Nigerian security forces have been using disproportionate force which we see of equal magnitude with that of Boko Haram.”

According to the New York-based Human Rights Watch, no fewer than 2,800 people have been killed in the attacks largely claimed by the Islamists since the violence began in 2009. A report released by the global rights watchdog last week says Boko Haram’s assaults could be described as crimes against humanity.

“We will be happy to punish those committing wanton killings before the International Criminal Court so that those involved will not go free,” Ibarhim Badamasi, a resident in Maiduguri, told IPS.

The Joint Task Force is accused of embarking on house-to-house searches to hunt down the insurgents, and is alleged to have engaged in secret detentions.

“Some people arrested are dying in military cells without food, even the way people are being tortured could lead to the death of many,” a suspect arrested and subsequently released told IPS on condition of anonymity.

The security forces have denied committing killings and torture while restoring order. In a press statement to reporters, Lieutenant Colonel Sagir Musa said his men did not kill or assault civilians.

“There are no established or recorded cases of extra-judicial killings, torture, arson and arbitrary arrests by the JTF in Borno state,” Musa said in a statement.

“Very few cases of unprofessional conduct by some personnel are documented and those concerned have been punished while others are undergoing legal processes and Court Marshal,” he added.

The JTF has declared success in the fight against Boko Haram. It claims to have arrested over 60 members on Oct. 7 and killed a commander called Bakaka or “one-eyed man”, who is said to be close to the group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau. It also claimed to have killed the sect’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa.

However, in a video message posted on YouTube, Shekau refuted the claims of Qaqa’s death. He only admitted that some members have been killed and their wives arrested by Nigerian forces.

A recent report by a U.N. panel of experts highlights the connection between the recent political instability in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, and suggests that radical Islamists with links with Al Qaeda’s North Africa branch are attempting to strengthen their presence across Africa, Boko Haram included.

A suicide car bomber has killed 12 people in the Afghan capital, nine of them foreigners, officials said, in an early-morning attack claimed by an armed group which said it sent a female attacker to avenge an anti-Islam film.*

A number of those killed on Tuesday were foreign workers for an international courier company, a senior police source said, and one was an Afghan translator.

“At around 6:45am (0215 GMT) a suicide bomber using a sedan blew himself up along the airport road in District 15. As a result, nine workers of a foreign company and three Afghan civilians are dead, and two police are wounded,” police said in a statement.

Kabul police chief Mohammad Ayoub Salangi said the bomber blew herself up alongside a minivan, carrying foreigners.

“This (attack) happened on a busy main road just on the edge of the centre of the city of Kabul near the city’s airport,” said Al Jazeera’s Bernard Smith, reporting from Kabul.

“We are told that the woman-driven explosive-laden vehicle hit a small vehicle, perhaps a minibus, carrying foreign workers in that area.

“We understand that some of those foreigners (killed) are South Africans who work for a charter airline company,” he said.

A spokesman for NATO’s U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confirmed an explosion near the airport, but said there was no current report of casualties among its personnel.

Claims of responsibility

The armed group Hizb-e-Islami on Tuesday claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was carried out by a woman to avenge the controversial video deemed insulting to Islam.

The claim was made by spokesman Zubair Sidiqi in a telephone call to the AFP news agency from an undisclosed location.

It is extremely rare for the faction to claim a suicide attack in Afghanistan, and even rarer for women to carry out suicide attacks.

Hizb-e-Islami is Afghanistan’s second-biggest armed group after the Taliban and is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former warlord.

The group, which has thousands of fighters and followers across the north and east of the country, is not aligned with the Taliban, but it is against what it calls the U.S. occupation.

Its 65-year-old leader is a former Afghan prime minister and one-time U.S. ally during the war against the Soviet occupation, but is now listed as a terrorist by Washington.

This radical Islamist group was reportedly funded by Pakistan’s ISI against the Soviets.

“We have also had the Taliban confirming to us that Hizb-e-Islami is responsible for this attack,” said Al Jazeera’s Smith.

“As far as we understand this is the first time that this group has used a suicide bomber. It is also extraordinarily unusual that the suicide bomber is a woman,” he said.

Witnesses said there was smoke spewing into the sky and a heavy police deployment at the scene of the attack, contributing to a major traffic snarl-up on the busy road.

The attack came a day after protests turned violent for the first time in Afghanistan over the film Innocence of Muslims, as hundreds of angry men hurled stones at a US.. military base, clashed with police and shouted “Death to America”.

Tuesday’s attack also followed a devastating few days for NATO in which six of its soldiers were shot dead by suspected Afghan police, the Taliban destroyed six U.S. fighter jets in an unprecedented assault on a major base in the south, and one of its air strikes killed eight Afghan women.

*Published under an agreement with Al Jazeera.