Thursday, November 19, 2026
Dilip Hiro
- Israel is undoubtedly anxious about the likely long term outcome of Thursday’s talks between Palestine president Yasser Arafat and Syrian leader Hafez Assad.
Arafat arrived Thursday at Syria’s Mediterranean port city of Latakia, telling reporters before driving to meet Assad in his home town of Kardahah that he aimed to consult Assad “and listen to his precious advice”.
Details of the talks are not forthcoming, but Tel Aviv is still concerned that the two leaders — meeting for the first time in Damascus since the signing of the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organisation accord nearly three years ago — will draw together, to the detriment of Israeli interests.
But the ploy that the Israeli government used on Jul. 23 to preempt this prospect was so blatant that it could only be counter- productive.
After his meeting Tuesday with Arafat, Israeli foreign minister, David Levy, announced that he had handed over a message to his interlocutor to tell Assad that Israel wanted to “press ahead with peace negotiations” with Syria.
Levy’s move and its timing were odd. Just then Dennis Ross, the senior United States state department official who has been deeply involved in Israeli-Arab peace talks since the 1991 Madrid peace conference, was in Damascus to discuss ways of reviving negotiations between Syria and Israel.
Given the intimacy between Israel and Washington, Levy should have conveyed the message of Israel’s conciliatory intentions to Assad through Ross.
It is worth recalling that it was Israeli premier Shimon Peres who, following suicide bomb attacks in Jerusalem last spring, unilaterally suspended the peace negotiations then in progress between Israel and Syria at a secluded venue in Maryland state of the United States.
He deliberately overreacted in order to impress the Israeli electors that he was a strong leader, an exercise which proved to be worthless on election day.
Since then the newly elected Israeli premier, Binyamin Netanyahu, has bluntly stated that his country would not withdraw from the Syrian Golan Heights it occupied in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
As President Assad is committed to recovering all of the Golan Heights in return for a peace treaty with Israel — as stipulated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 — Netanyahu’s precondition effectively bars reopening the suspended talks.
Overall, Netanyahu’s unyielding stance has resulted in dissipating the persistent tensions and disagreements in the Arab ranks that arose before and during the 1991 Gulf War, not least between Syria and Palestine.
“Syria,” Arafat told reporters in Latakia, Thursday, “has always been supportive of the Palestine people in all circumstances.” However he has not been quite so supportive of the Palestinian leader.
Arafat and Assad have been at odds on several issues since 1983, a situation worsened by the two’s stance on different sides of the 1991 war and further deepened by Arafat’s assent to clandestine negotiations with the Israelis, culminating in the 1993 Oslo Accord.
In this way effectively subverting the Syrian-guided strategy of getting the four different Arab parties coordinating their positions in their bilateral talks with Israel, Arafat alienated himself from Assad.
It was only at the Arab summit in Cairo on 21-22 June, convened in response to Netanyahu’s hard line statements, that Arafat and Assad were persuaded by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to have a one-to-one meeting. To continue their talks Arafat agreed to visit Damascus.
Having realised that he had acted, albeit unwittingly, as a catalyst to help heal rifts within the Arab ranks, Netanyahu has backtracked somewhat, especially on the Palestinian front. The meeting of his foreign minister, Levy, with Arafat was an indication of this.
Yet Netanyahu cannot afford to overlook the rightist Jewish forces that installed him. This is clear from his interpretation of the Levy-Arafat encounter on the edge of the Gaza Strip.
“This is a significant meeting in order to put in place the mechanism for continued negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” Netanyahu said.
“The purpose of these negotiations will be to complete the interim agreements that have not been completed because of Palestinian Authority violations. They have certain requests from us that are dependent of their fulfilling their commitments.’
Netanyahu’s view is that the Palestinian Authority’s crackdown on the Islamic radicals of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad has been what he calls merely “ephemeral” and lacking in sustained commitment.
With up to 1,200 Islamists in jail, most of them without charges or trial, this is an astonishing charge to make against the Authority.
On their part Palestinian Authority officials, from Arafat down, have been almost mute about Israel’s violations of the interim agreements.
Israel has not met its contractual obligations in three important areas. It has failed to release female prisoners. It has yet to take the first step towards constructing a road linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank. Four months after the deadline of 28 March, Israel has still not vacated seven-eighths of Hebron.
Part of the reason for the Palestinian Authority’s meekness lies in the shock that Arafat received when Shimon Peres failed to win premiership in the first direct contest for the job on 29 May.
Arafat had no contingency plans to deal with Peres’s defeat. On top of that came a series of uncompromising statements by Netanyahu.
While even a small retreat from his earlier hawkish positions makes Netanyahu appear ‘reasonable’ and ‘pragmatic’, it provides ground to Arafat to reassure his increasingly sceptical Palestinian constituency that ‘the peace process is on track’.
Yet the reality is that Netanyahu’s victory and politics have severely undermined Arafat’s credibility among Palestinians. And most observers believe that if and when substantive talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority begin on the final agreement on the status of Jerusalem and the Jewish settlement, and the return of Palestinian refugees, the Netanyahu government will offer so little to the Palestinians that a deep crisis is inevitable.
It is the realisation of this depressing scenario that has made Arafat seemingly amenable for the first time since he assumed the presidency of the Palestinian Authority two years ago to engage in serious dialogue with the opposition, religious and secular.
Since all the opposition groups are based in Damascus, Arafat has an opportunity to attempt to build a bridge with them. It is this prospect that worries the Netanyahu government, and makes it attempt to mask its hardline policies with moderate gestures such as sending peace messages to Assad.
— IPS analyst Dilip Hiro is the author of ‘Dictionary of the Middle East’, published by Macmillan, London, and St Martin’s Press, New York.