UNITED NATIONS: U.N. Blameless for Junking Costly Security System

By Thalif Deen Reprint | | Print |

Thalif Deen

UNITED NATIONS, Nov 13 1996 (IPS) - A U.N. oversight office has failed to finger the culprits responsible for an Ill-fated 1.5-million- dollar, high-tech security system which the United Nations was forced to abandon even before it could be activated.

“The investigation concluded that responsibility for the organisation’s financial loss could not be attributed to the acts of any particular employee — individually or collectively,” Under-Secretary-General Karl Pasche, head of the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), said Tuesday.

The project has been written off as a dead loss without an iota of accountability by any staff member.

The state-of-the-art U.N. Access Control System (UNACS) included identification cards, hands-free card readers, imaging systems, computerised data-collection technology, and turnstiles at all of the entrances to the Secretariat building in New York.

An OIOS report submitted to the 185-member U.N. General Assembly Tuesday catalogues the bungling of a project undertaken by a world body on the brink of bankruptcy.

The U.N. “upper management” apparently decided to drop the “unpopular project” because of concerns, among others, about the use of turnstiles.

“At the time the project was planned for implementation, the Chief of Protocol stated that delegates would object to going through turnstiles,” the report says.

The contract for the aborted project was given to one of the biggest U.S. defence contractors: Westinghouse Electric Company. The one-year warranty ran out even before the system was tried out under actual operating conditions.

With the requirement of access cards for 10,000 U.N. diplomats, 10,000 staffers and up to 7,000 temporary personnel, “Westinghouse’s delivery schedule was less than adequate,” the report concludes.

The Staff Union raised health issues pointing out that the access cards were a cancer risk because of special electronic strips embedded on them. The Union also raised concerns about the Security and Safety Service knowing the entry and exit times of all who entered the U.N. premises.

After the project was abandoned last year, the Investigation Section of the OIOS reviewed the System to see whether it could find that any current staff members had violated U.N. regulations in connection with the project.

The Section was specifically asked to determine whether the project had been properly planned, if the contract had been awarded in accordance with regulations, and whether the project was properly managed.

“Six persons who no longer work for the United Nations but were involved in the project either refused or were unavailable for interviews,” the report says.

It notes that the contract award did not violate any rules or regulations. However, the absence of rules governing the award of contracts by requests for proposals creates the potential for misunderstanding and manipulation. The most serious failure in the process was the absence of clear management over the life of the contract, the report says.

The contract of the consultant managing the project was terminated in mid-project. The Director of the Buildings and Commercial Services Division, who had initiated the project, was transferred.

The situation was made worse by five Under-Secretaries-General appointed during the contract period, “each with a different concept for and involvement with the project, resulting in management being shuffled between staff and departments.”

In an insight into the inner workings of U.N. management, the report says that staff members who were the primary planners of the new security system had only a limited knowledge of what such a system involved.

“This was a new technology with which nobody in the United Nations had any experience; the most qualified staff available were assigned and a consultant hired,” the report says.

“Unfortunately, the consultant’s experience was in building services and not in access control technology” it added.

The OIOS says that no feasibility study was conducted on the proposed project; nor were the needs of the Organisation clearly defined. Or more accurately, the needs were repeatedly re-defined by successive managers.

“Finally and crucially, even though there was a large turnover in upper management, which led to serious deficiencies in the management of the project planning and implementation phases, the project took a life of its own and was in perpetual motion until the decision was taken not to implement it,” the report says.