Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Jim Lobe
- In the strongest challenge yet to President Bill Clinton’s “dual containment” policy in the Gulf, two former top U.S. national security officials are calling for Washington to take cautious steps towards a better relationship with Iran.
In an article to be published Monday in the influential ‘Foreign Affairs’ monthly, the ex-officials, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, argue that dual containment, which is designed to isolate both Iran and Iraq, is “at an impasse.”
“We’re recommending a policy of differentiated containment,” said Brzezinski, national security advisor under President Jimmy Carter, at a press conference here Friday.
Such a policy would begin “with the recognition that the current U.S. attempt at unilateral isolation of Iran is costly and ineffective,” according to the Foreign Affairs article, which was co-written by Richard Murphy, head of Mideast Studies at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
The article’s publication comes as dual containment boosters say the policy is finally beginning to bear fruit.
These proponents point, in particular, to the decision by the European Union (EU) to suspend its “critical dialogue” with Tehran. That decision followed last week’s finding by a German court that Iran’s top leadership had ordered the Sep. 1992 slaying of exiled Kurdish dissidents in Berlin.
The administration claimed the finding vindicated its treatment of Iran as a global pariah and has called on EU countries, which include Teheran’s most important trading partners, to review their commercial ties and align them more closely with Washington’s.
Also hardening U.S. antipathy towards Iran are reports that a Canadian-held Saudi dissident implicated in last year’s bombing of U.S. military barracks in Dhahran has told interrogators that he had met with a top Iranian intelligence official some time before the blast.
While U.S. officials have declined to endorse the reports, the fact that Clinton has vowed retaliation for the attack, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen, has fuelled speculation that U.S.- Iranian relations may be headed for a new crisis.
Brzezinski said Friday that he backed “strong retaliation” against Iran if it turns out that Teheran had a hand in the attack. But he and Scowcroft, who served as former President George Bush’s national security advisor, insisted that dual containment has outlived its usefulness. “At the present time, we’re frozen in immobility,” said Scowcroft.
Since the Gulf Crisis began with Iraq’s Aug. 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Washington has deployed thousands of troops, airmen, and sailors and many more kilotonnes of expensive military hardware to the region, ostensibly to protect its Gulf allies from the threats allegedly posed by Iran and Iraq. The total annual cost of this containment strategy against the two “rogue states” has been estimated at about 50 million dollars — or 20 percent of the total U.S. defence budget.
Before 1990, Washington had employed a balance-of-power strategy in the Gulf to ensure that those two regional powers would check each other while it remained comfortably over the horizon.
During the 1970s, the U.S. favoured the Shah of Iran against Soviet-backed Iraq but then switched sides during most of the Iran- Iraq War in the 1980s. While stressing that Washington should not withdraw from the region, Scowcroft urged the administration to return to that strategy “so we don’t have to be the balancer out there.”
But it is not just a question of saving money, according to the articles’ co-authors. Larger strategic issues, especially Washington’s ability to maintain dual containment in the face of growing allied fatigue and even opposition, are also at stake.
“Saddam Hussein is still in power six years after his defeat at the hands of a multinational coalition, and the international consensus on continuing the containment of Iraq is fraying. The strident U.S. campaign to isolate Iran, in turn, drives Iran and Russia together and the United States and its Group of Seven allies apart.” according to the article.
Finally, “the imposing U.S. military presence …is being exploited by hostile elements to take advantage of internal social, political, and economic problems,” the authors argue.
Their prescription for averting these dangers requires only minor modifications to existing policy with respect to Iraq.
The authors are calling on U.S. officials to “state that they would be prepared to deal with any Iraqi regime — including one that emerged from within the military or the (ruling) Baath Party — that is ready to fulfill Iraq’s basic international obligations.”
They also suggest Washington should do more to mitigate the effects of the ongoing U.N. economic embargo against Baghdad to “credibly demonstrate its concern for the Iraqi people even if their own ruler does not.” At the same time, it should “consult more closely” with Turkey on its concerns in Iraq, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Given the waning support for international sanctions, U.S. policy towards Iraq “is in danger of collapsing,” Scowcroft warned Friday. The declining of support was most recently demonstrated in Washington’s failure to gain a Security Council resolution condemning the flight from Baghdad last week of Islamic pilgrims to Saudi Arabia.
With respect to Iran, on the other hand, the authors propose more far-reaching changes beginning with the way much of Washington perceives the Islamic Republic. “It is a major error, if we assume homogeneity (among the mullahs) in Iran,” Brzezinski said.
And contrary to official opinion, “there is little reason to believe that Iran’s conventional military buildup will pose a direct challenge to U.S. regional supremacy,” according to the article which notes rising concern here about recent arms purchases by Teheran from Russia.
The article also recommends that Washington use carrots as well as sticks to coax Iran into abandoning a nuclear energy programme which the United States believes is aimed at building nuclear arms.
In the most controversial recommendation, the three authors say Washington’s unilateral trade embargo should be abandoned. The embargo includes a new law that penalises foreign firms which invest more than 40 million dollars in Iran’s oil and gas sector.
Instead, Washington should permit commercial deals, including large-scale energy deals, on a case-by-case basis “unless they contribute specifically to Iranian behaviour the United States opposes,” says the article.
The United States should also refrain from automatically opposing the construction of gas and oil pipelines from oil-rich Central Asia across Iran, as it has in the past. “An independent and economically accessible Central Asia is in the interests of both the United States and Iran,” the article states.
Washington should use the opportunity afforded by the suspension of the EU’s critical dialogue with Iran — as well as the advent of Clinton’s second term and the election of a new administration next month in Iran — to review its policies and consult with its allies, the authors advise.
How likely is it that the administration will do so? Despite the bipartisan and heavyweight status of his two co-authors, Murphy doesn’t yet see hints even of a serious debate within the administration.
Indeed, asked if a review of Iran policy was underway Thursday, a State Department spokesman replied, “I don’t sense any doubt in the leadership of the United States about the correctness of our policy.”