Thursday, November 19, 2026
Analysis - Jim Lobe
- While US generals rejoice at the damage NATO is wreaking on targets in Serbia and Kosovo, political strategists are far from confident over the outcome of the conflict in Yugoslavia.
Much depends on whether the crisis will be resolved militarily – permitting one side to impose terms – or through negotiations that would require both sides to compromise.
The big issue remains whether NATO will move to a ground war, for which political support has increased sharply here in the past 10 days. Such an escalation will make it much more difficult for Clinton to agree to any negotiated settlement with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
In fact, some analysts believe that if US ground troops are committed to the war, US war aims will escalate to include Milosevic’s ouster – if not his trial for war crimes. Either way, however, most observers agree that there are only four basic scenarios which are likely to emerge from the crisis, none of them particularly appealing.
“There are no good options,” says Jessica Matthews, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The least desirable, of course, would be a victory by Yugoslav forces that would permit them to retain control of Kosovo, perhaps with nominal autonomy but with many fewer Albanian Kosovars – about one million of whom have been displaced from their homes.
That option is rejected as politically unacceptable both to the NATO alliance, which will hold its 50th anniversary celebration here in just two weeks, and to President Bill Clinton for whom Kosovo has become the biggest foreign-policy crisis of his administration.
“(Milosevic) hopes we will accept as permanent the results of his ethnic cleansing,” Clinton said Friday. “We will not!”
Aside from the political problems for NATO and Clinton, a Yugoslav victory will only inflame the Balkans.
“If the Albanian Kosovars are not repatriated, you’ll have a Palestinian problem right in the middle of Europe,” notes Janusz Bugasjski, head of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) here.
The second possibility lies with a negotiated agreement based on the NATO-brokered Rambouillet accord whose rejection by Milosevic last month led to the air campaign. Its central provisions included a substantial withdrawal by Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the insertion there of 28,000 NATO peacekeepers, and autonomy for the province for at least three years.
Variations on this accord include a “Rambouillet-plus” – which could mean the withdrawal of all Serb forces from the province and the return of all of the displaced to their homes. These two conditions have been incorporated into NATO’s official war aims.
At the same time, there is also a “Rambouillet-minus” option which could, for example, mean diluting the NATO force.
NATO leaders last week began speaking of an “international security force” in Kosovo, instead of NATO peacekeepers as an element of any settlement, suggesting that Milosevic may be more inclined to accept such a deal even though the force itself would still be commanded by NATO.
But most independent analysts here believe that events have made Rambouillet obsolete.
“Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing has almost certainly doomed the multi-ethnic approach of Rambouillet,” wrote Warren Zimmerman, a former US ambassador to Yugoslavia, in the Washington Post. “It is doubtful that Serbs and Albanians can ever again live peacefully in the same state.”
A third option is Kosovo’s partition into separate Serb and Albanian territories. Like Rambouillet, this scenario has a plus and minus side.
A partition-plus would give the Kosovar Albanians, who constituted some 90 percent of the pre-war population of two million, virtually all of the province, leaving the Serbs only a northern slice that contains key historic and religious sites.
To sweeten such a deal, some analysts have proposed that the Serb part of Bosnia-Herzogina, could also be absorbed by Belgrade.
A partition-minus would permit Milosevic to hold on to much of northern and central Kosovo, which includes important mines and other economic enterprises. The displacement of Albanian Kosovars from this part of the province suggests that this may be the Serbian leader’s preferred outcome if he cannot win outright.
Either way, partition contains its own set of problems.
By itself, the Albanian Kosovars by themselves will not have a viable economy, making union with Albania, the poorest nation in Europe, all the more compelling. Any move toward a “Greater Albania,” according to this view, will only heighten ethnic tensions both with Serbia and elsewhere in the southern Balkans, especially in Macedonia.
Moreover, NATO likely would still have to deploy a peacekeeping force to keep the two communities in Kosovo apart for at least a decade, according to Anthony Cordesman, a CSIS strategic analyst.
A final option would result from Yugoslav forces being chased out of Kosovo either by NATO’s air war or a ground invasion, presumably in cooperation with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
But this result, too, risks a series of reactions that will likely only inflame regional tensions, particularly, if, as expected, an Albanian Kosovo seeks unity with Albania.
Like partition, according to Cordesman, independence likely would require a peacekeeping force to patrol the border between Kosovo and a revanchist Serbia.
“It is clear that the crisis in Kosovo cannot have a happy ending,” says Cordesman, who notes that the three last options all require a US/NATO presence. “One way or another, NATO and the US are probably stuck in the Balkans,” he says.
“The war in Kosovo, the tensions in surrounding states, and the hatreds now affecting the region mean that NATO must either use force to contain the situation or use it to create a solution and enforce it for years to come.”