POLITICS: Armed Groups Have Key Role in Peace Process, Says Study

By Thalif Deen Reprint | | Print |

Thalif Deen

UNITED NATIONS, Feb 14 2001 (IPS) - A two-year research study on five global flashpoints – Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, South Africa and the Basque Country in Spain – has concluded that lasting peace agreements are impossible unless they actively involve the various armed groups involved in these conflicts.

The study, a joint initiative of the UN University (UNU) in Japan and the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland, points out that the most recent successful peace processes have included warring parties who are in a position to prevent settlement.

The so-called “veto holders” are not only assorted armed groups but also political parties representing the fighters.

Titled “Coming out of Violence”, the study is based on interviews with senior politicians and policy-makers involved in five recent peace processes.

According to the study released Tuesday, the settlement in South Africa started with the release of Nelson Mandela and other African National Congress (ANC) prisoners in 1990.

In Northern Ireland, there were seven unsuccessful attempts to reach agreements through negotiations between constitutional politicians – until the inclusion of Sinn Fein and the loyalist parties that led to an agreement.

The unwillingness of the Spanish government to treat directly with Basque separatists was a serious obstacle to negotiations during most of the 1990s, the study noted.

And the absence of a political front for the Kosovo paramilitaries in early 1998 was a stumbling block to initiating peace talks with the Serbians.

In an attempt to settle the 18-year-old separatist war in Sri Lanka, the government has recently agreed to negotiate with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), using Norway as a “facilitator.”

The authors of the study, John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, identify six features that characterise the five peace processes – violence, progress towards a political settlement, the economy, external actors, public opinion and symbols.

The list is not exhaustive; disputes about territory, for example, are central to the conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka, and have less influence in Ireland, South Africa and Basque Country.

Nor do the factors carry equal weight. Of the six variables, violence and progression towards a political settlement are the main determinants of success or failure, and they are inextricably linked.

“Violence was usually the lever which moved governments to talks. It is more easily turned on than switched off,” the study notes.

The most disputed factor is the influence of developments on the ground in initiating and advancing peace processes. All five cases in the study resulted from elite accommodations between political leaders rather than from popular gesture, although the Basque peace movements were an important influence in mobilising public opinion there.

The study says the influence of external factors is often inconsistent. Diaspora support for ethnic intransigence, notably in Sri Lanka, Israel and Northern Ireland, can be swung round to support peace initiatives, as in the last two cases.

Economic factors, on the other hand, appear to have the lowest influence on the success or failure of a peace process. The correlation between background economic conditions and political progress is weak, although economic grievances can fuel opposition to compromise, as it did in Israel/Palestine.

The study says the power of symbols is under-estimated. In May 1994, as Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president of South Africa, part of the ceremony was a ritual flyover by the South African air force.

Their exhausts released the red, green and black of the new South African flag. For some ANC supporters, the planes had previously been associated with bombing their bases in border states. “It was the moment when I felt South African,” said one of them.

Mandela is also credited with having an “unerring eye for the uniting gesture.” His attendance at the Rugby World Cup Final, the sport of white South Africa, and donning a Springbok shirt, showed a generosity of spirit that set an example in the uneasy new state, the study notes.

Between 1988 and 1998, at least 38 formal peace accords were signed. The United Nations, a major player in most peace negotiations during the 1980s, was directly involved only in 16 of the 38.

Of the 15 peace agreements reached since the beginning of 1996, all but two were agreed without UN assistance. The others were primarily negotiated by parties engaged in the conflict itself, sometimes with external mediation.

The study warns that long-term success in any peace process also depended on providing work for ex-security force and paramilitary group members and easing their integration into society.

When violence ends, the study says, the shrinkage of the security industry – army, police, prison officers, private security guards -brings onto the unemployment register many people skilled in the use of arms.

Similarly redundant are paramilitaries whose lives have been devoted to armed resistance. Their speedy return to civil society is essential because they have the means to destabilise the peace process.

“Prudence demands that those who were engaged in the war must be provided with jobs and training.”