Thursday, November 19, 2026
Darius Bazargan
- The European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, the so-called ‘Barcelona Process’, is unlikely to bring economic benefits to the Maghreb countries. But the initiative may herald unexpected political and legal reforms.
The most significant part of the November 1995 agreement was the pledge to work towards the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA), a free-trade zone in industrial goods and services, by the year 2010.
The European Union (EU) states also pledged 6,000 million dollars of aid towards education and infrastructure projects by the turn of the century.
The establishment of such a free-trade zone would give the EU unimpeded access to North African markets, but many believe that insufficient funding of the Barcelona Process’ economic aid package will critically undermine the whole initiative.
“Because it’s not properly funded, the economic ‘basket’ will cause considerable damage to uncompetitive and unprotected industrial sectors in North Africa, and furthermore may force the other sectors into a form of dependence on European producers — they’ll become suppliers,” said George Joffe, of the London-based Royal Institute for International Affairs.
“What in effect you will then get are enclaves inside the south Mediterranean economies producing for European manufacturers, and those enclaves themselves will be satellites of the European economy.”
The implications for the remainder of the local economies are dire.
“The rest of the local economy will be effectively excluded from the benefits of EMEA. This will be particularly the case if the theory of ‘trickle-down’ — whereby the benefits gained by entrepreneurs are passed onto workers in terms of improved wages and conditions — fails. And it almost certainly will fail,” Joffe said.
A variety of concerns prompted the initiative. One factor was demographic. The combined population of the 12 non-EU countries represented in Barcelona is expected to increase by half to around 300 million by 2010. An imbalance exists between local expectations and the ability of North African economies to fulfil them. This has led to rising immigration into Europe — much of it illegal.
EU states were also concerned with a security element. They believed that social iniquities fuel the spread of militant Islamist politics. Today there are around 2.4 million economic migrants of North African origin amongst the 10 million foreign workers in the EU and some European governments believe they provide fertile ground for extremist politics.
Some fear the Barcelona process and EMEA are attempting to reconcile countries of too great a cultural diversity. Islamic fundamentalism, though proselytising, is culturally defensive too. But what the EU is proposing seems certain to flood the Maghreb with Western products, advertising and cultural values.
The wealth gap is also vast. Simply putting aid to productive use may be difficult for the Maghreb, let alone taking advantage of enhanced trading opportunities. How far the EU will be prepared to open its markets is another important question that remains unanswered.
Not everyone is pessimistic, however. “I don’t agree that ‘trickle down’ won’t work,” said Roger Garside, Chairman of GMA Capital Markets, a company that specialises in providing technical assistance to developing economies.
“My view is that socio-economic reforms are being undertaken in Egypt and other countries in the region, which hold out a good prospect of accelerated growth of GDP, and there is a good prospect that the benefits of higher growth will be very widely shared in society.”
The World Bank estimates that to cope with population growth rates of 2.5 percent — a typical figure in the Maghreb until very recently — GDP growth rates of five to seven percent are needed. That is high even in the context of relatively immature economies in the south Mediterranean.
Such GDP growth is needed because young populations are unproductive, they require services and these are expensive. According to EU statistics, however, average GDP growth from 1970 to 1990 in the South Mediterranean region including Israel — the most developed regional economy — has averaged only between 1.5 and two percent a year.
Some analysts remain positive. “To reduce the level of unemployment that you have now in Egypt according to official statistics, for whatever they’re worth, you need seven percent growth,” Garside said.
“Egypt is now getting five percent growth, with the reforms they are putting into place I believe it’s possible for them to achieve seven percent.”
Others consider Egypt a special case and in a better position than other North African economies. The oil shocks of the 1970s sparked an economic crisis that has left Morocco with a foreign debt of 22 billion dollars, Algeria owing 25 billion dollars, and even Tunisia with seven to eight billion dollars of foreign debt.
In the 1980s North African states found they couldn’t meet debt servicing requirements which led to rescheduling of debt and IMF intervention 1983 in Morocco, 1987 in Tunisia and as late as 1992 in Algeria.
The IMF saw debt as the result of misallocation of resources, and of inappropriate, unrealistic and inaccurate pricing policies. Their solution was to allow world markets to set prices, which would reestablish ‘appropriate equilibrium’ in the use of resources, while at the same time disconnecting governments from the economy.
This was a drastic and devastating step for countries that took the plunge. The Barcelona process was partly designed to ease the pain of such restructuring, but lack of funding means that many are sceptical about its chances for success.
“It’s one thing to say I feel optimistic about the Egyptian economy and some of the others in the region. To say I feel positive about the Barcelona Agreement is different,” said Garside.
“Firstly we have to see whether the countries concerned and the European Commission succeed in putting in place viable vehicles for the transfer of increased funds that the EU is committed in principle to making available — I haven’t seen them yet.”
Garside argued that this was important because the counterpart to increased flows of technical assistance and funds for development was the opening of these countries to European industrial goods.
“That’s the deal. The opening of these countries to European industrial goods isn’t due to start for another five years, but the increased flow of funds issupðosed to start now. If over the next five years they don’t see these funds materialise, will they open their borders to our industrial goods?” he said.
Joffe was equally pessimistic, but he argued that the Barcelona process might herald some surprising political changes.
“Alongside the economic basket, there’s a detailed political basket that requires good governance on the part of participating countries.” he said.
“The political basket is going to be under pressure to create conditions to attract foreign investors. One part of that is going to be to guarantee stable government — that could imply additional repression.
“But the other part will be to guarantee acceptable and reproducible legal systems and transparency, both in government and in economic life and that tends to militate against repression.
“It brings into play systems of government which have to be in some way acceptable to the population and cease to be arbitrary — in effect they will cease to be patronage systems.”