Thursday, November 19, 2026
Tschanguiz Pahlavan
- The collapse of the USSR in 1991 confronted Iran with a new global cultural and political configuration. Its attention was soon drawn to its new neighbours, no longer parts of the Soviet Union — in particular the newly independent Islamic republic of Azerbaijan.
In Teheran, the Azeris were at first seen as fellow Shi’a Muslims freed from foreign rule. But war soon engulfed Azerbaijan and its neighbour Armenia and while Iran’s sympathies at the outset were with the mainly Shi’a Azeris there were other issues at stake.
Turkey was aiming to establish a foothold in Azerbaijan before Iran and was working for the defeat of Armenia in order to increase its own influence at Armenia’s expense. Thus Iran adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Armenia, fuelling pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian elements in Azerbaijan and their view of Iran as a regional power trying, like Russia, to meddle in its internal affairs.
After Azerbaijani Popular Front leader Abulfaz Elchibey was elected president in 1992, pan-Azeri feeling increased in Azerbaijan. There were calls for political unification with Azeris across the border in Iran, and the creation of a greater Azeri state — dismaying words to Iranian ears.
But when Gaidar Aliyev took over in Azerbaijan in 1993, Iran tried again, with foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati visiting Baku in July 1993 to sign treaties on mutual relations.
But Aliyev soon embarked on a policy of building closer ties with Washington. Azerbaijan withdrew — reportedly at U.S. behest — permission for Iran to join a Azeri oil consortium in which Baku had planned to share some of the income with Iran and Russia. Iranian hopes to undertake geological exploration of oil-rich regions of the Caspian Sea and to lay the Naxjivan gas pipe-line were also dashed.
Nevertheless substantial quantities of Iranian goods continued to flow into both Azerbaijan and Armenia, partly because both Azerbaijan and Armenia were affected by trade embargoes.
The closure of the Russian-Azerbaijani border in 1994 following the outbreak of war in Chechnya cut off Azerbaijan’s main trading partner, further boosting Iran-Azeri trade.
In 1995, Azerbaijan’s ministry of economics reported that imports from Iran stood at 66 million dollars and exports at 242 million dollars (39 percent and 42 percent of Azerbaijan’s national totals). According to the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, trade turnover between the countries amounted to 500 million dollars — some 60 percent of Iran’s trade with the ex-Soviet CIS at that time.
But at the same time the Azeri embargo on Armenia and the civil unrest in Georgia had also cut off Armenia with its old trading partners in the former Soviet Union. Thus from 1991 to 1995, trade between Iran and Armenia increased 15 fold, so that Iran has become Armenia’s second trading partner after Russia.
Having established amiable political and economic relations with Georgia after its independence in 1991 and the rise of president Eduard Shevardnadze in 1992, Iran thus kept political and economic relations with all three Transcaucasian states. But tensions continued with Azerbaijan, the only non-Christian state among them.
Iranian views on policy towards the Caucasus are split between those who view national interest as the primary consideration, and those who give precedence to Islam. The former say Azerbaijan is not committed to Islam, and cite the influence of pan-Azerism.
Despite Iranian fears, pan-Azerism has made little impact as many Iranian Azeris live in relative economic prosperity. Iranian Azeris have held most of the high-ranking military posts in recent Iranian history and a fair share of top civilian and scientific positions.
The population is well integrated and intermarriage between Iranian Azeris and other Iranians is common; not least Iranian Azeris generally enjoy a better standard of living than their counterparts in Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, pan-Azerism remains a source of apprehension for Iran. It adds to the tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, thereby discouraging the establishment of full political and economic relations.
While economic relations with Armenia and Georgia continue to progress, another difficulty between Iran and Azerbaijan has evolved into a regional problem.
In the aftermath of Soviet disintegration, the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the ownership of its rich oil and gas deposits is in question. In the past, Iran had a single neighbour on the Caspian border; now it has four (Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan).
Except for Azerbaijan, all these states have expressed interest in a settlement. Russia sees eye to eye with Iran on the matter, as do Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Although Azerbaijan has made no public objections to the establishment of a legal settlement, it has never expressed a precise view on the matter. This indeterminacy may well deter foreign investment, or at least breed greater caution.
The Caucasus, however, extends beyond Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. In Chechnya, where a Muslim population still demands independence, Iran has adopted an attitude of extreme caution, for fear of jeopardising its relations with Russia.
Indeed, ever-increasing pressure from the US has steered Iranian national policy closer to Russia, even to the extent of coordination on certain issues. U.S. policy is to isolate Iran from regional developments as much as possible.
But the exclusion of Iran is not a realistic approach and serves only to promote instability in the region. The strategic situation of Iran is such that even if the country is marginalised in certain plans, this is certain to be at a heavy cost.
Opposition to some of the policies of the present Iranian regime should not be to the detriment of the whole country; bi- and trilateral treaties signed recently with Armenia, Turkmenistan and Georgia demonstrate the potential for new forms of regional cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Nevertheless, both Iran and the U.S. should revise some of their policies and recognise the principle of regional and global cooperation.
The official visit to Iran by Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan in August 1996 showed that neighbouring states have interests which cannot be overlooked, even if larger countries have little interest in extending cooperation with Iran.
— Dr Tschanguiz Pahlavan is a university professor in Teheran. This item comes to IPS via the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, London.