Thursday, November 19, 2026
Deborah Horan
- Officially the Hamas Islamic Resistance has given Palestinian president Yasser Arafat time to prove that talks, not bombs, will get the best deal from the Israelis. But the strategy is putting tremendous strain on the fragmented movement.
“We said ‘let the (Palestinian Authority) prove that there is fruit to negotiation’,” Hamas spokesman Ismail Abu Shanab has told IPS. “We are still saying this.”
Hamas, which still advocates a new ‘intifada’ (uprising) against Israeli troops still operating in the occupied West Bank, has nevertheless called a de facto truce in its bomb attacks on Israel proper since its devastating bus bombings in Tel Aviv in early 1996 that killed 58 people and the bombers themselves.
The deadly exceptions since then were carried out against Israelis carried out by a cell operating in the name of Hamas, notably the bombing of a Tel Aviv street cafe last month and the murder of an Israeli soldier seven months ago.
The attacks were carried out by the small West Bank based cell while the Hamas leadership in Gaza was formally engaged in a “national unity dialogue” with the Palestinian Authority that it had joined after effectively agreeing a ceasefire.
The timing of the attacks, which coincided with a breakdown in peace negotiations, led to accusations by Israel that Arafat had tacitly eased the reins on the militants because he was unhappy with progress in the talks.
The West Bank cell may have continued to operate despite the apparent decision on the part of the leadership to transform the movement into a political opposition party, either because of its allegiance to factions still committed to using arms or because of conflicting signals from the leadership itself.
“It’s difficult to make a judgment as to how far Hamas has been saying one thing and doing something else,” said Khalil Shkaki, director of the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, a well- respected West Bank think tank. “But it is likely that this group was following what it thought the leadership — either in Gaza or outside Gaza — wanted.”
Since the Palestinian Authority was set up in Gaza in 1994, Hamas has been faced with the unsavoury choice of either giving the despised Oslo peace agreements with Israel an opportunity to work in the Palestinians’ favour or risk civil war with the Arafat’s forces.
Whether because of Arafat’s brutal crackdown on the movement following last year’s bus bombings in Israel or the group’s sagging popularity with Palestinians, who suffered much economic hardship from the closures imposed after the 1996 Hamas attacks, the political leadership chose to give Arafat that chance.
According to Abu Shanab and Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Said Abu Musameh, the organisation decided to let Arafat reap what benefits he could from peace deals with Israel while Hamas concentrated on what it calls the “Palestinian house” — internal matters such as uniting Palestinian factions behind one political strategy and laying the foundations of a future independent state.
But Hamas’ leadership based in neighbouring Arab countries, which does not feel the crushing economic repercussions of Israeli security measures, has maintained a more militant line.
“Those inside Gaza and the West Bank support transformation into a political party, but those on the outside still resort to violence as a means of achieving goals,” said Shkaki.
Shkaki thought it possible that the West Bank Hamas cell, broken in a joint operation by Israeli and Palestinian security forces shortly after its Tel Aviv attack, was following the dictates of Hamas leaders outside of Gaza.
While leaders in Gaza remained conspicuously quiet following the discovery of the West Bank cell, Amman-based Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh accused the Palestinian Authority of stirring “inter-Palestinian conflicts” by helping Israel authorities arrest cell members.
Hamas officials in Gaza issued another appeal to Arafat to release Hamas activists held in his jails, Wednesday, but singled out around 100 activists held by the Palestinians since the 1996 bus bombings in Israel without reference to the latest detainees.
Hamas’ three top leaders are Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the movement’s blind spiritual leader; Abd el-Aziz Rantissi, the ex-spokesman for the 400 suspected Hamas members deported by Israel to southern Lebanon in 1992; and Moussa Abu Marzouk, accused of raising funds for the movement in the United States. All are in prison.
What is left is a number of lesser-known leaders and spokesmen whose opinions carry little weight outside their local support base.
Some, like Abu Shanab, a 44-year-old engineer released four months ago from an Israeli prison, clearly favour giving Arafat’s peace strategy a chance to gain control of the West Bank and Gaza, most of which is still occupied by Israel.
Others, like Ibrahim Maqadeseh, released in March from a Palestinian prison, told a Hamas rally of 10,000 in Gaza shortly after his release that Palestinians should strap explosives to their bodies and blow themselves up in Israel. He was quickly forced into hiding, pursued by the Palestinian police.
“There are too many voices trying to decide whether to keep quiet, to be active politically, or to apply violence,” said Ziad Abu Amr, a member of the Palestinian legislative council and a professor of political science at Birzeit University.
“They are debating whether the peace process is dead, not dead, and whether they should be against it or give it a chance.”
Shkaki said he thinks some of the confusion may be deliberate. Since the organisation is unsure whether the peace process will be successful, it is manoeuvring to keep all its options open by joining the national unity dialogue while at the same time preaching the purity of the armed struggle.
That way, if the process fails, they can tell their followers they never sold out. “If they embrace a new strategy that fails, they stand to lose some of their faithful supporters,” Shkaki said.
“Instead, they join the national dialogue while publicly, in the mosques, they cling to all the ideology. The result is the rank and file are confused or they think the leadership wants the military option.”
Israeli analysts say these nuances are lost on the Israeli public. The Tel Aviv bombing coincided with two Israeli government decisions that sparked a month of Palestinian riots: a smaller than promised Israeli troop pullout from the West Bank and the building of a new Jewish housing project in Arab east Jerusalem.
To them, it looked like Hamas was being used by the Palestinian Authority as a card played to exert political concessions from Israel. However even Israeli authorities say the bombing was planned by cell members before those government decisions were made, so the connection is unlikely.
The Palestinian Authority deny giving tacit approval to Hamas. Its officials in Gaza view Hamas activities against Israel as a threat to the power of the Palestinian Authority in areas under its control in the West Bank and Gaza.
“Arafat knows well what will happen if there is no results to the peace process,” said Ahmed Abd el-Rahman, secretary general of the Palestinian cabinet. “We will lose control .”
With as many as one out of every three Palestinians supporting Hamas in Gaza and parts of the West Bank, Arafat knows he cannot uproot the organisation. Instead, using a combination of threats and promises, he has been trying to bring them around.
Some of the heavyweights have agreed: notably Emad Faluji, one- time editor of Hamas’ newspaper al-Watan but now a Palestinian government minister, and Ahmed Bahar, a former Hamas leader who now heads a spin-off party, al-Ikhlas, concerned with social issues.
But at least one Israeli analyst says this threat is overblown: “It helps the Palestinian Authority to say, ‘look, if we don’t get what we need, Hamas will take our place’,” said Gadi Wolfsfeld, a political science professor at Jerusalem’s Hebrew University. “It’s very convenient.”