INDIA: New Delhi Could Aggravate Northeastern Turmoil

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Analysis - Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI, Sep 1 1997 (IPS) - As ethnic discontent and separatist militancy wrack India’s northeastern states, the government is sending out confusing signals to the 35 million people of the region bordering China, Bangladesh and Burma.

On the one hand, it has offered high-level negotiations in Geneva to the principal militant group representing the Nagas, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Swu-T. Muivah faction), which could potentially end the 50 year-long insurgency. On the other, it has adopted a hardline posture vis- a-vis Assam, the northeast’s largest state, where it has appointed a hawkish former general, S.K. Sinha, as governor.

The two approaches are not part of a larger strategic design or game-plan, and neither is fully thought out. There is a danger that such ad hoc tactics will aggravate the already tense situation in a sensitive region marked by popular alienation from the Indian state.

In part, New Delhi’s Assam posture is a response to an outburst of violence — over 40 people were killed within a month in gunfights and bomb explosions — and the abduction of a well- known social activist, Sanjoy Ghose, by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), a guerrilla group that demands Assam’s secession from India. Ghose was abducted by ULFA in mid-July and is widely believed to have been killed.

The Ghose episode evoked widespread revulsion and exposed the government’s ineptitude. It could not rescue him despite the presence of a large contingent of the armed forces in the state. Yet ironically, it itself established contact with ULFA leaders, through senior-level diplomats. But it could not negotiate his release.

Now in panic, the government has appointed Sinha governor. Sinha is a known hardliner and contested the 1984 parliamentary election backed by the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP looks at the substantially non-Hindu Northeast with suspicion and opposes conciliatory approaches. It does not believe it necessary to address the root-causes of popular alienation.

Equally significant is the impending appointment of policeman K.P.S. Gill as security adviser to the Assam chief minister. Gill played a big role in putting down the pro-Khalistan Punjab militancy by using excessive force. This made him a hero of hardliners and brought him notoriety among human rights groups. (Ironically, the very forces, which 14 years ago demanded Gill’s exit from Assam, want him back.)

Since 1979, Assam has witnessed a series of militant agitations by ethnic groups demanding “homelands” or special status. They include Bodos, tribals living in the plains, scattered groups like Mishings and Rabhas, and hill-based Karbis, besides ethnic Bengalis. Ironically, many of them took their cue from the ethnic Assamese — now a minority in Assam — who launched the 1979 agitation against “foreigners”, allegedly illegal Bangladeshi migrants.

Assam is not the only northeastern state to have gone through ethnic convulsions and spells of direct rule by New Delhi. Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram have also witnessed such convulsions. Violence there has claimed more than a thousand lives. The only relatively peaceful northeastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim, annexed by India in 1976. The only state that has apparently “settled down” after a three decades- long militancy is Mizoram.

The peculiarity of India’s Northeast is that it has been on the periphery of “mainstream” Indian society, and pluralistically tribal. The caste system never fully penetrated the region. Nor did some male-hierarchical structures. (There is still a sizable matriarchal society in Meghalaya). The region was deliberately left undergoverned by the British, although Christian missionaries were encouraged. Although the northeast is economically backward, some of its tribal states have high literacy levels.

All these factors, coupled with rising aspirations, and frustration at neglect by New Delhi, have fuelled ethnic unrest. New Delhi’s response has been to put it down with armed force and also engage militants in devious manoeuvres, including bribery.

New Delhi’s credibility in the Northeast is rather poor, and has been damaged by three factors. First, it has armed and played off militant groups against one another for years. A former chief minister sponsored SULFA (surrendered ULFA) as a counter to ULFA, and set the Bodos and ULFA against each other. He also allowed militants to make money at the state’s expense. Informed people see the hand of official agencies in intra-Bodo rivalries and ethnic clashes in Manipur. The same tactic was used by Indira Gandhi in Punjab, where it backfired badly.

Secondly, in the Northeast, the government is widely seen as

parasitical, extremely corrupt, and monumentally callous. It has failed to catalyse development. The nexus between contractors, officials, police and politicians — sometimes with militants thrown in — is extremely tight. People who pay taxes to such a corrupt, purposeless state, and also to the militant groups, find it hard to grant legitimacy to the government.

And third, the state tends to be indiscriminately violent when under pressure to control militancy. Security forces, as numerous cases before the Supreme Court have shown, often fail to distinguish between hardcore militants and ordinary people, and inflict violence upon them in equal measure. This only increases popular alienation and feeds militancy.

This vicious cycle can only be broken if the government addresses the causes of popular alienation while controlling militancy through strict adherence to the law. But that means cleaning up the administration, upholding human rights, and preventing extreme forms of exploitation which sustain militant ideologies.

The Northeast has a gigantic developmental backlog estimated at 6 billion dollars. It receives less than half a percent of national investment. It has vast natural resources, including primeval forests. These must be conserved and used in keeping with the needs and skills of the people.

A breakthrough in the Northeast will above all require a change in New Delhi’s attitude towards the region’s people and culture. The present moment offers an opportunity. For the first time in 50 years, there is hope of a negotiated settlement of the Naga question. This will probably have a dramatic impact. The Nagas have the longest history in the Northeast of fighting for a “homeland” and have mentored many militant groups. An agreement with the NSCN could lay the foundation for peace in the region.

For that to happen, New Delhi must not send out confused signals to the Northeast.