Europe, Headlines

POLITICS-N.IRELAND: Finding The Right Words For Peace

Malachi O'Doherty

BELFAST, Apr 24 1998 (IPS) - Language is everything in the proposed Irish peace agreement hammered out on Good Friday.

‘Decommissioning’ — as in the disarming of the armed groups on both sides of the Northern Irish divide — is a word that was first introduced by former British prime minister John Major.

Originally, he had wanted armed groups like the ‘nationalist’ Irish Republican Army (IRA), which demands a united Ireland, and the ‘loyalist’ Ulster Volunteer Force which demands that Northern Ireland stay within the United Kingdom, to surrender their weapons before joining the political process.

The concept of decommissioning was the first relaxation of that demand. It implied that weapons did not have to be handed over to the police or the army; they could simply be got rid of.

A Canadian army general, John de Chastelain became the official Decommissioner. He drew up plans to allow the groups to hand over their guns and explosives for destruction without giving the British or Irish authorities the chance to trace their former owners.

Decommissioning seemed to the governments to be a very good offer. Effectively it offered an amnesty for the ownership of illegal weapons and waived the right of the state to investigate murder and sabotage by nationalist and loyalist fighters.

For the IRA in particular, and the other armed groups too, it became a test of the governments’ good faith. They simply refused point blank to decommission, over and over again, and each time the government eventually gave ground and admitted them into talks on the new constitution, without so much as a bullet being dumped.

In 1985 the IRA imported tons of weapons and explosives from Libya. They are estimated to still hold about six hundred Kalashnikov-style assault rifles and a ton of ‘semtex’ plastic explosive. In addition to this they have a small number of machine guns and parts for SAM 7 ground-to-air missiles. This is on top of whatever weaponry they have acquired before and since from other sources.

The IRA has invented a massive bomb made of fertiliser mixed with diesel oil, triggered by a fuse made of surgical tubing filled with semtex explosive, coiled through the fertiliser.

This economical use of semtex, along with such simple ingredients was used to destroy massive buildings in the city of London. These devastating strikes, the IRA believes, have brought the British to the negotiation table.

Loyalist paramilitary resources are harder to estimate. They retain some assault rifles imported from South Africa in the late 1980s, though most of these have been captured. Some groups have developed skills in handling commercial explosive, demonstrated in occasional car bombings, at least one of targeted against another Loyalist.

The Loyalists are also believed to have been actively importing weaponry during the peace process itself.

The British government and the political parties on the pro- British ‘Unionist’ side in Northern Ireland, see decommissioning as the only credible signal of willingness to take the political route to a settlement.

They are also terrified that if the political unrest of Northern Ireland is resolved, this weaponry could end up in the hands of a new army of criminals.

There is also a danger that the paramilitary groups might fracture and that the weaponry might reach groups which are subject to little central control.

In the old days the IRA ran amok with old bolt-action rifles and gelignite. Yet in recent years its military cohesion has paradoxically allowed for a economical and restrained use of violence. A new group operating in the manner of the 1970s IRA but armed with the weaponry of the 1990s is a frightening prospect.

Britain’s failure to insist on decommissioning in the past means that its current insistence that weapons be decommissioned now lacks credibility.

The very wording of the first paragraph of the Good Friday agreement is an admission of failure, for it reminds the parties that they had originally accepted “that the resolution of the decommissioning issue (was) an indispensable part of the process of negotiation”.

However the Good Friday document merely reminds the paramilitary groups involved in the talks of their commitment to “resolution of the decommissioning issue” while the negotiations ended Apr. 10 without any weapons being decommissioned.

Clearly those parties did not understand resolution of the decommissioning issue to mean actual decommissioning of weaponry. It is more likely that they understood it to mean that everyone else would simply give up asking for their guns.

The timetable for the commencement of decommissioning is short. Both governments are to bring schemes for the decommissioning of weapons into force by the end of June.

But the document stipulates no clear linkage between prisoner release over the next two years and the decommissioning of weapons. The paramilitary groups which want their prisoners out of jail under a proposed ‘rapid release’ scheme are asked only that they should have established “a complete and unequivocal ceasefire”.

This language seems chosen to resurrect past ambiguities. The IRA, for instance, described its 1994 ceasefire as ‘complete’, and flatly refused to describe it as ‘permanent’. In time Britain, then insisting on a ‘permanent’ ceasefire, simply had to give ground.

The second ceasefire, said John Major, would have to be ‘unequivocal’. The IRA replied that it was an ‘unequivocal’ restoration of the first ceasefire.

It is inconceivable that these words in the Good Friday agreement were chosen without consideration for how they had been used in the past.

They appear to signal to the paramilitaries that the governments will be just as flexible in interpreting future commitments as they have been in the past.

If, for instance the Sinn Fein party leader Gerry Adams signs the agreement, he will be committing himself to pursuing the decommissioning of illegally held paramilitary weapons.

His party has a close relationship with the IRA. The British government and the Unionist parties hold him answerable for the behaviour of the IRA.

But Sinn Fein insists it is not directly answerable for the IRA, and these deadlocks have always turned into arguments over real intentions of the British government.

Sinn Fein will accuse Britain, if it stands by its stipulations, of putting unreasonable barriers in the way to Republican participation in the government of the province.

The precedents all indicate that the British Government would ultimately yield to that argument.

 
Republish | | Print |

Related Tags