Thursday, November 19, 2026
Analysis - Praful Bidwai
- India and Pakistan have a long way to go before they cast off the burden of history and reach a stable situation of detente. But a big start has been made as their leaders talk the language of peace and cooperation.
The true significance of the Lahore Declaration by the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers on Sunday, at the end of the Indian premier’s visit, lies in the fact that a strong political commitment has been made by them to normalise strained relations.
They are committed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir”, refrain from “intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs”, and take some confidence-building measures in the nuclear and conventional military fields.
They also agreed to consult each other on “WTO-related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions” and to cooperate in information technology, especially the Y2K problem.
The accords fall short of the hope that India and Pakistan would agree to a no-war or no-aggression pact and undertake specific measures of nuclear restraint, considered crucial after their explosions in May.
However, the agreements reached recognise the importance of “immediate steps” to reduce the risk of war, in particular “accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control”.
The two sides further agreed “to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war… ”
India and Pakistan agreed to engage in regular bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues. They also agreed to provide each other advance notification in respect of missile flight tests, and to conclude a “bilateral agreement in this regard”.
These steps do not constitute agreements not to press ahead with their programmes to develop nuclear weapons and missiles. They are but limited measures to promote transparency and better communication.
They are nevertheless welcome given the high risks of strategic misconception and miscalculation between India and Pakistan, and the potential for unintended, unauthorised or accidental use of weapons of mass destruction.
It has not been disclosed if these were founded on an informal, unwritten, commitment by India and Pakistan not to deploy nuclear weapons. But diplomatic sources believe that there may have been such an undertaking, albeit for a limited period.
This may well be a case of virtue being made out of necessity: neither India nor Pakistan is close to deploying nuclear weapons- carrying missiles yet, and may lack the capability to do so reliably.
But such an agreement would be a great advance over the boastful claims about technological prowess and the crude display of nuclear bellicosity between the two states in the weeks following their nuclear tests last summer.
Regrettably, they did not agree to convert their newly acquired nuclear status into a bargaining counter to demand rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament on the part of the five recognised nuclear states. Nor did they jointly make a commitment to abstain from nuclear testing or signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
From Pakistan’s point of view, one of the most significant gains from the dialogue was the inclusion of Jammu & Kashmir in the list of “issues” to be discussed and resolved. India has often resisted such a reference to Kashmir.
From India’s point of view, the reciprocal gain is that Kashmir will be effectively put on the backburner, to be negotiated slowly, even as substantial progress is registered on a range of other matters first.
Among the welcome signs of such progress is the mutual agreement to hold “consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime”, and release civilian detainees, as well as operate a Delhi-Lahore bus service, besides promoting “an environment of peace and security”.
Agreements apart, the Indian premier’s visit was significant in that he interacted with a wide range of Pakistani citizens, exuded bonhomie and confidence, and visited the Minar-e-Pakistan, a monument to commemorate a 1940 Muslim League resolution
demanding the creation of a separate state of Pakistan.
In the India-Pakistan context, such symbolic gestures have extraordinary importance far in excess of formal agreements. The fact that they were made by a leader of a political party (Hindu right Bharatiya Janata Party), which has never reconciled itself fully to Partition, adds to their importance.
The Pakistani public widely welcomed the gesture. The Indian public mood too has been one of support for the Vajpayee visit, and for the continuation of efforts to normalise relations, begun under the previous non-BJP United Front government.
If the framework agreements reached in Lahore are sincerely pursued, and substantive measures are rapidly agreed and implemented, India and Pakistan could soon reach a historic detente. They are not there yet.