Africa, Headlines | Analysis

POLITICS-DRC: Rough-necks And Renegades

Analysis Chris Simpson

KIGALI, Sep 20 1999 (IPS) - The first three weeks of the Congolese peace process have been predictably fraught with ups and downs.

The first UN observers sent into the Great Lakes to try and monitor the implementation of the Lusaka agreement have arrived against a background of accusations and recriminations.

Congolese President Laurent Kabila and the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) have accused each other of numerous cease-fire violations and acts of provocation.

The governments of Rwanda and Uganda have engaged in a bitter verbal battle on who was to blame for last month’s confrontation in Kisangani.

The RCD’s internal rifts have shown no sign of healing, with ousted leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba setting up a new headquarters in Bunia, a Ugandan stronghold in the north-east of the DRC.

But all these actors are at least signatories of the Lusaka agreement, formally sworn to ending hostilities in Congo.

Much more dangerous to the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other would-be peacemakers are those groups and movements which did not sign at Lusaka, which have no interest in a political settlement and which are likely to be overwhelmingly hostile to any incoming peacekeepers.

The DRC currently plays host to any number of insurgencies. Some have limited, local agendas, others are clearly aligned with Laurent Kabila against the RCD and its Uganda, Rwandan and Burundian allies.

Lusaka provides for the surrender and disarmament of all such forces, but this will not be accomplished easily.

The problems loom largest in North and South Kivu, the eastern provinces of the DRC and the insurgents can be broken into four separate categories: Rwandan Interahamwe fighters and soldiers from the former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR); Ugandan rebel groups, like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which the government of President Yoweri Museveni insists are sponsored by Sudan; Burundian guerrilla movements like the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and Palipehutu; and indigenous Congolese fighters, notably the Mayi-Mayi, whose allegiance has shifted on several occasions, but who remain firmly hostile to Rwanda and to Congolese Tutsis in the Kivus.

The Rwandan government has talked of between 30,000 and 40,000 hostile Rwandan combatants being at large inside the DRC, but accepts there is no clear figure.

Rwanda has maintained throughout the Congolese rebellion that its first concern is the security of its borders. While denying accusations from Kabila of pursuing an expansionist agenda, the government has made it clear the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) will stay in the Kivus until the Interahamwe and other forces are neutralised.

Rwanda remains adamant that Kabila had been training and supporting the Interahamwe months before the rebellion broke out in August 1998, reneging on promises that he would force them off Congolese territory. Similar charges have been levelled at the Zimbabwean military.

More recently, Rwandan commanders claimed that ousted RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and his Ugandan allies had recruited over 70 Interahamwe fighters, a charge Wamba and his colleagues have strongly denied.

Few details have emerged on the composition and command structures of the ex-FAR. Augustin Bizimungu, FAR Chief of Staff during the genocide, has often been cited as the military coordinator of the Rwandan forces fighting for Kabila. The Rwandan Liberation Army (ALIR) has surfaced periodically, claiming to represent the anti-government forces.

A communique posted on the internet by the ‘AfroAmerica Network’ in July quoted the ALIR as firmly rejecting the Lusaka agreement.

An ALIR spokeswoman told the Network: “The agreement has no basis whatsoever. The word Interahamwe is used as a scapegoat by the Tutsi-led government of Kigali to designate not only any political opponent, but also any ethnic Hutu. The Interahamwe do not exist any more and have never existed in the DRC”.

ALIR repeated its demand for negotiations between the Rwandan government and the militias and accused the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPA) of using Hutu ex-FAR and prisoners as frontline troops in the DRC.

A report issued by the UN in November 1998 talked of an elaborate support network for the Interahamwe. Researchers hinted that large Interahamwe-ex-FAR contingents were based in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Congo-Brazzaville, while Nairobi was still the hub of the Interahamwe’s commercial operations, despite the Kenyan government’s agreement to clamp down on the Rwandan exile community.

The report alleged the Interahamwe were involved in the international drug trade, particularly through shipments of mandrax.

The Rwandan government and RCD Goma have both talked of curbing Interahamwe military operations in North Kivu and South Kivu, weakening the enemy’s hold on areas like Masisi. But attacks are still being reported.

There is also concern that Interahamwe fighters are spread right across the DRC, from Equateur in the north-west to Katanga in the south-east, complicating Rwandan counter-insurgency operations.

For the past two years, the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) have had troops stationed in eastern DRC specifically to take on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

But the ADF is still staging cross-border attacks. Operating from bases in the Rwenzori mountains, its fighters have hit western Uganda repeatedly, particularly around Bundibugyo and Kabarole, bringing into question the UPDF’s competence and commitment.

Its most notable action in western Uganda was an attack on Kichwamba Technical College at Kabarole in which 80 students were killed. Along with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and West Bank Nile Front (WBNF), ADF fighters were offered an amnesty by President Yoweri Museveni if they surrendered by the end of August this year.

Burundi has consistently denied being a protagonist in the DRC, with President Pierre Buyoya pointing out that he did not sign the Lusaka agreement. But there have been regular, reliable reports of a heavy Burundian presence, while Buyoya has emphasised: “our country has taken all necessary means to protect our territory against insecurity”.

Burundi, like Rwanda, had hoped Kabila would clamp down on insurgents operating in the Kivus, in this case the FDD and Palipehutu. Both, however, remained highly active, with hundreds of fighters reportedly crossing Lake Tanganyika from refugee camps in Kigoma to set up new bases in South Kivu.

FDD military activity inside the DRC appears to be sporadic. But with the Arusha peace process again on hold and violence inside Burundi on the increase, Buyoya’s security problems could become more critical.

Buyoya was in Kampala recently, holding talks with Museveni. But Rwanda will also want to keep Burundi on its side in the months ahead, particularly if it can find proof of an Interahamwe- FDD axis.

The position of the Mayi-Mayi is much less clear, not least because there is no clear agreement on who they are and what they represent.

Described by some Congolese as successors to the rebel movement headed by Pierre Mulele in eastern Congo in the early 1960s, the Mayi-Mayi have a strong following in the Kivus, particularly around Bukavu.

They initially fought for Kabila in the war against Mobutu Sese Seko, but then broke with the Congolese leader. During his first year in office, Kabila struggled to contain the Mayi-Mayi, but then staged a high profile reconciliation ceremony.

While the RCD routinely accuses the Mayi-Mayi of collaborating with the Interahamwe and FDD, it has also tried to win them over, holding meetings at grassroots level and trying to address the civilian grievances which have fuelled Mayi-Mayi support.

Kabila’s recent appointment of Mayi-Mayi veteran Sylvestre Luetcha as army chief drew fierce criticism from the RCD, which later claimed Luetcha had died.

The Mayi-Mayi remain strongly opposed to any Rwandan presence in the Kivus. But they are not Kabila loyalists, and the RCD appears to accept it will need to reach an accommodation with them if it is to keep its hold on eastern Congo.

 
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