Tuesday, November 17, 2026
Analysis - Jim Lobe
- Asia bedevils US policy makers even as it replaces Europe as the focus of their security concerns, according to a growing consensus among defence experts here.
Those concerns are especially worrisome because of the lack of multilateral security mechanisms in the region, wide gaps in understanding and confidence between key players, and the pace at which change – economic, political, and strategic – is taking place in Asia.
“Change in and vis-à-vis Asia is everywhere,” says Tom Robinson, head of American Asian Research Enterprises, a consultancy group here. “The message is, hold on to your hats.”
Asia’s rise to the top of the US security agenda ends a decade in which European issues dominated “about 90 percent of strategic thinking and effort,” according to Kurt Campbell, the top Asia policymaker in the Pentagon under former President Bill Clinton.
Those issues included the transition of the Soviet Union to Russia, German unification and the reconfiguration of NATO, and the protracted conflicts caused by the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Major challenges in Asia, likely to dominate the attention of strategic planners in this decade, include most immediately and most dangerously, the two Koreas, relations between China and Taiwan, the ever-present risk of war breaking out between nuclear- armed India and Pakistan, and the continuing deterioration in Indonesia.
The inclusion of South Asia as an integral part of the Asia region marks an important indication that defence analysts here now believe it no longer makes any sense to divide the Indian subcontinent from East Asia, at least in security terms.
With most energy supplies from the Persian Gulf now travelling eastward via the Indian Ocean, “the whole concept of South Asia for US security (may be) outdated,” according to Teresita Schaffer, who heads the South Asia programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
“Policy makers need to look more broadly at the region from the Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and into the West Pacific,” she says.
The process already is under way, as was shown when a top State Department official stopped in New Delhi recently after visiting Tokyo and Seoul, with which Washington has formal defence alliances, to brief the Indian leadership on President George W. Bush’s plans to build a national missile defence (NMD).
“India needs to be factored more into the Asia region,” a senior Pentagon official says. “I know (Defence) Secretary (Donald) Rumsfeld wants to go to India,” he adds in a remark guaranteed to cause concern in Beijing, which Delhi considers its main strategic rival.
However, the challenge likely to dominate Washington policy makers’ attention at least over the next decade is China’s emergence as a regional superpower and its presumed wish to reduce, if not eliminate, Washington’s presence and influence there, says Robinson.
The Bush administration appears divided about how to handle China’s aspirations and this division, according to Campbell, is “deeply discomforting” to Washington’s traditional allies in Asia.
Hard liners centred in the Pentagon appear to favour a policy of “containment” designed to forge regional alliances, certainly including South Korea, Japan and possibly India, around Beijing’s periphery and bolstering Washington’s military presence in the region.
At the same time, more moderate forces, backed by big business, believe that an engagement policy will succeed in co-opting Beijing into the Western-dominated international system.
Of special concern is Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province and whose formal independence it has vowed to prevent by any means necessary.
Bush, who recently approved a major arms sale to Taiwan, has gone further than any of his predecessors in indicating that Washington will intervene militarily if Beijing attacks the island, making it the most likely flashpoint of a future conflict between the two.
Adding to the danger surrounding Taiwan, Campbell says, are a combination of factors, including China’s drive “to make Taiwan feel as insecure as possible” and the absence of Washington or any other mediator between Beijing and Taipei. He adds that while both parties say they understand each other well, “I don’t know of two places that have such strategic misunderstandings between each other.”
But such misunderstandings are pervasive in Asia today, another reason why the region is seen as so combustible.
For example, Bush’s explicit hopes of dramatically increasing defence cooperation with Japan “have really alarmed people in Asia,” not least China, South Korea, and other countries which suffered under Tokyo’s occupation during World War II and before, according to Campbell.
In recent years, and with US encouragement, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung achieved a historic rapprochement with Japan, a development with what Campbell calls “huge strategic implications.”
Much of that achievement has been undone in recent months, especially over a controversy surrounding new Japanese history textbooks, an illustration of the deep distrust that underlies the relationship of Washington’s two closest allies in the region.
Indeed, if the 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea were withdrawn, either as a result of a peace agreement between North and South or because of rising nationalist sentiment in South Korea itself, “You’d see an arms race” in Northeast Asia, argues David Steinberg, a veteran Asia specialist at Georgetown University.
“South Korea wants to develop its own defences against Japan if the US is not around,” he says.
While such a development is quite improbable in the short term, the risk of conflict between North and South Korea – and one that would necessarily involve the United States due its troop presence – is one that competes with Taiwan for top billing among defence planners here.
Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy” to engage the North appears to have been stalled indefinitely since Bush voiced skepticism about the approach – and publicly humiliated Kim in doing so – last March. While the administration here has since stated its willingness to resume a security dialogue with the North, Pyongyang does not seem inclined to accept Washington’s desire to talk about conventional forces.
“Time is running out (for the North) to strike a deal with the powers that be in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul,” according to Douglas Paal, president of the Asia-Pacific Policy Center and the top Asia specialist in the National Security Council under Bush’s father.
He noted that Kim is almost certain to be replaced by someone less to Pyongyang’s liking in elections next year, just as Clinton, who was close to making a far-reaching deal freezing Pyongyang’s missile programme and overseas sales, was replaced by Bush, who is much less likely to make concessions.
“The North is trying to keep Japan, South Korea and the US on edge” by conducting tests on its rocket engines and taking other actions indicating that it may not abide much longer by a self- imposed moratorium on missile development, according to Paal. Ending the moratorium could well precipitate another crisis.