EUROPEAN UNION IN THE BALANCE

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MIAMI, Apr 1 2005 (IPS) - The delicate point at which the EU currently finds itself could develop into one of the most dangerous crises in its half-century of history, writes Joaquin Roy, Jean Monnet Professor and director of the European Union Centre of the University of Miami. In this article, Roy writes that the drama will unfold in May. First, on May 5, British prime minister Tony Blair stands for re-election. If the conservatives prevail, which is improbable, they will seek to halt the euro-train and force it back into the station of pure free trade, far from the federalist path. If Blair wins, he will have to convince the British to enter Europe for real. France presents a different problem if on May 29 it rejects the Constitution. A French rejection would unleash a torrent of collateral damage: a bad example for the new members, deception in Germany, slow erosion of the euro, and a death blow to foreign policy. Not even the alternative of an economic Europe would be safe, tied as it would be to political commitments. Without the prospect of a real EU, the justification of the common currency would collapse of its own weight. The richest countries, with Germany at the top, could not only consider the euro as a temporary mechanism but also oppose it on the grounds it only serves to protect the new, and poorest members. And without a constitution, a common foreign policy, not to mention an autonomous defence system independent of NATO, makes little sense.

The existence of the European Union is fraught with paradox. During a few cycles of its existence it was plagued with what was dubbed eurosclerosis, which was overcome with the Maastricht Treaty, the adoption of the euro, and its expansion to 25 member countries. But euroskepticism remains latent and a formidable enemy.

This is a serious point. But the alarm is not centred in the poisoned darts launched at Washington, where the current administration is jealous of the potential foreign policy autonomy of the EU. The cancer is within. Although it is not of the same nature as the original reason for the foundation of the EU (to stop European wars), the disease is intimately linked to distrust of the EU and the feeling of not belonging to a common project.

Significantly, the Europeans (and especially those who apparently will never fully adapt to being so) frequently trip over the same stone.

The delicate point at which the EU currently finds itself could develop into one of the most dangerous crises in its half-century of history. The causes, again, will be two (or three if Holland falls into the trap): one is predictable, the eternally reticent United Kingdom. The other is, unusually, the irreplaceable founder, without which the EU makes no sense: France. As a finishing touch, there is the looming threat of a Dutch veto on June 1.

The drama will unfold in May. First, on May 5, British prime minister Tony Blair stands for re-election. With his support eroded by his polemical alliance with Bush in the Iraq war, and facing the pincer action of the conservatives and liberals, a victory for him would be a validation of the peculiar third way that transformed what is now an unrecognisable socialdemocracy, but that still has the support of the labour nucleus.

However, after the elections, the UK will face a double challenge: in the second semester of 2006 it will assume presidency of the EU and in the first semester of 2006 it will have to make good its promise to hold a referendum on the EU constitution. In any case, a cycle will have ended that began with the labourites opposed to entry into the EU and the conservatives in favour of what they always considered a trade agreement, developing subsequently into a split between a right opposed to a federalist EU and the vacillating, recycled labourites.

If the conservatives prevail, which is improbable, they will seek to halt the euro-train and force it back into the station of pure free trade, far from the federalist path. If Blair wins, he will have to convince the British to enter Europe for real. In any case, if the Constitution is vetoed in 2006, it will not be the end of the EU, but it might be the moment to chose: out of the euro, against the constitution, the exit must be elegant.

France presents a different problem if on May 29 it rejects the Constitution. France is the irreplaceable member, the country of Schuman and Monnet, who arranged to share steel and coal with Germany to seal the reconciliation of the two nations, of Jacques Delors, president of the most decisive commission in history, and of Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who directed the convention that approved the text of the Constitution. With more borders with other countries than any other European state, a rejection by the Gallic hexagon would unleash a torrent of collateral damage: a bad example for the new members, deception in Germany, slow erosion of the euro, and a death blow to foreign policy. Not even the ç alternative of an economic Europe would be safe, tied as it would be to political commitments.

Without the prospect of a real EU, the justification of the common currency would collapse of its own weight. The richest countries, with Germany at the top, could not only consider the euro as a temporary mechanism but also oppose it on the grounds it only serves to protect the new, and poorest members. And without a constitution, a common foreign policy, not to mention an autonomous defence system independent of NATO, makes little sense. Better to drop the idea and let the US pay for it.

Curiously, this catastrophe would have been caused by an unusual French coalition made up of a xenophobic right and a divided left, unrestrained by erratic leadership. Charles de Gaulle now would have preferred grandeur under the EU. France might be left with neither. (END/COPYRIGHT IPS)