Europe, Headlines, Human Rights

CROATIA: Tudjman’s Aversion To Democratic Dialogue Ignored By West

Commentary Stjepo Martinovic

ZAGREB, Mar 15 1996 (IPS) - When Miko Tripalo, the charismatic leader of Croatia’s communist reform movement of 1970-71 died last December, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman sent no condolences to his family.

Most political and media commentators explained this maladroitness as tacit condemnation of Tripalo’s consistent rejection of the nationalist agenda of Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

The key to Tudjman’s behaviour, however, is his persistent obsession with being the sole creator of the new independent Croatian state — with no acknowledgement to any predecessors he had among the reformists and intellectuals who contributed to the Croatian spring of the early 1970s.

While Tudjman was wrong to deny Tripalo’s contribution to the ideas and actions that created an independent Croatia, he was right in denying Tripalo’s part in creating of today’s Croatia, for Tripalo and Tudjman’s Croatia differ in so many ways, it was unsurprising that Tudjman could not even be polite for his funeral.

In fact, an objective observer can find all the tragedy of Croatia’s present plight in this symbolic incident.

It wasn’t until the autumn 1995 parliamentary elections that the Croatian public realised the poverty of Tudjman’s excuses for not creating a ‘European democracy’ when setting up the institutions of a sovereign state.

As a result his unexpected failure to win a two-thirds majority in the Sabor’s House of Representatives (which he needed to change the constitution and augment his presidential powers), and his loss of control of Zagreb and its environs has made his mask slip.

Even the tightly controlled public media and the state offices dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) cannot conceal the purpose of Tudjman’s project — the substitution of a communist totalitarian system with a nationalist ideocracy where strictly limited steps of democratic choreography allay criticism by relevant western states or institutions.

Tudjman’s response to his pyrrhic victory in the 1995 polls was to establish a large Presidential Council in addition to the existing Council of Defence and National Security.

He appointed to this pseudo-parliament almost 300 dignitaries, including all Sabor, government and Constitutional Court officials.

Of course, a handful of the non-HDZ-members, including both opposition House of Representatives vice-presidents, promptly rejected serving simultaneously as elected MPs and Tudjman’s private counsellors, especially as it violates the constitutional division of parliamentary, judicial and executive roles.

In Zagreb, where the centrist coalition of seven opposition parties defeated the HDZ by a 65:35 margin, Tudjman tried to overturn the result by preventing the city and county assemblies from meeting to elect the mayor and the president of the two local government bodies.

Before their first session, he sent a message that he “will not accept the creation of an oppositional situation in the capital,” and used every occasion to demonise the victorious coalition and its leaders.

His party boycotted the first session on Dec.2 so both assemblies lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to make valid decisions, according to a controversial and out-of-date House act.

The opposition coalition delegates still held the sessions and elected both officials, Goran Granic (Croatian Social-Liberal Party) as mayor and Zdravko Tomac (Social Democrat Party) as president of both assemblies.

But the exclusively HDZ national government vetoed their decisions so the opposition coalition went to the Constitutional Court. The court rejected the claim, but obliged all members of both bodies to attend the new constituent session on Jan. 2.

At the reconvened constitutional meetings, now quorate, the electoral procedure was repeated — with the same result.

Infuriated, the vote was followed by a press conference by the three HDZ vice-presidents who vowed that Tudjman would not confirm the elected opposition members. They also warned the coalition that “the marginal parties and personalities among them will be responsible for the emerging political crisis in the country”.

Now, if President Tudjman exercises his constitutional right not to recognise the elected individuals, the opposition coalition could replace them by other candidates — and risk another refusal, since the president insists that the mayor of Zagreb should come from the HDZ, as the only majority single party.

Tudjman not only ignores the fact that the opposition coalition went to the October 1995 election as a single political body — but also that the support it got from the electorate obliges it to follow the democratic will of the voters.

That is why it is now clear that Tudjman’s triumphant post-vote exclamation, “We’ve got Croatia!” actually meant “I own Croatia!”

Sadly the environment in Croatia and neighbouring Bosnia- Herzegovina has made Tudjman successful in selling his brand of nation-state with the three key features of the former system slightly re-designed.

He has successfully advocted national, instead of ideological collectivism; ethnic cleansing as an alternative to communist class struggle; and the paternalism of ‘Father Of The Homeland’ to replace ‘The Greatest Son of Our Peoples’, as Josip Broz Tito was once officially named.

All this comes clothed in the flag of ‘real democracy’, tailored to make it “suitable for our conditions,” just as ‘real socialism’ was invented to make an historical idea its unhistorical parody.

In such an atmosphere, Croatia’s main political question is where to draw the line between the lost dreams of 1990 and reality.

The latter, was overshadowed by the U.S. promotion of Tudjman to one of president Bill Clinton’s key partners in securing the Dayton pact.

The Croatian public increasingly sees this as license for an “acceptable dictatorship.” The indications are quite plain: Tudjman’s aversion to dialogue with his own people is blatantly ignored, along with the domestic opposition to his version of the civil war against minorities, ethnic or otherwise.

At the outbreak of the Serbian aggression against Croatia, the West failed to recognise the facts and prevent a disaster that left no one innocent. Are the same countries now going to stand idle and watch their privileged Balkan partner betray the principles and values on which they have built their superiority?

— Stjepo Martinovic is general secretary of the Croatian People’s Party and a columnist with the daily Vjesnik. The preceding item comes to IPS via the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in London, publishers of WarReport magazine.

 
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