Monday, November 16, 2026
Dilip Hiro
- Last week’s secret visit to Turkmenistan by a high level delegation from the Afghan Taleban exposed a breach in the common front that the five former Soviet Central Asian republics had up to then maintained on the Islamist radical force.
The Taleban team arrived in the Turkmen capital by helicopter — ostensibly to discuss the laying of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
So sensitive is the subject of relations with the Taleban regime that the Turkmen government has maintained total silence on the trip. The news of this top-secret mission by the Taleban government, based in the Afghan capital of Kabul, was leaked by a private source to British BBC radio late last week.
The Taleban delegation was reportedly led by Maulavi Ahmadjan, minister for energy and mining. During their trip to the Turkmen capital, Ashqabat, they also met with the Turkmen foreign minister, Boris Shaikhmuradov.
Though Turkmenistan is one of the three Central Asian states which share their frontiers with Afghanistan — the others being Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — it has shown remarkable lack of concern at the rise of the purist Islamic fundamentalist regime run by the Taleban movement, which captured Kabul a year ago.
At the Central Asian summit held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in April to discuss the threat posed by the emergence of the Taleban administration in Afghanistan, president Sapramurad Niyazov was the only head of state to stay away. He sent his deputy instead.
Economic and political considerations lie behind this stance of Niyazov. His country of barely 4 million people is incredibly rich in energy resources, especially natural gas. At 2,890 billion cubic metres, it has the seventh largest gas reserves in the world.
The demand for Turkmen gas is high — both in Europe, to be pumped through Iran and Turkey; and South Asia, to be pumped through Afghanistan. That gives Niyazov an extraordinary degree of independence in his foreign policy, which he has been exploiting adroitly ever since Turkmenistan became independent six years ago.
Also Niyazov reckons that by giving the Taleban regime an economic stake in the export of Turkmenistan’s natural gas through western and southern Afghanistan, controlled by it — in the form of hefty transit fees — he will dampen its militant ardour, and turn it into a stabilising factor. It will therefore refrain from stoking Islamist fires among Turkmenistan’s citizens.
Behind the Taleban regime stand Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the only states which recognised it soon after its forces captured Kabul in September 1996. All other countries continue to recognise the government of Afghanistan headed by president Borhanuddin Rabbani, which is based in northern Afghanistan outside the territory controlled by the Taleban.
Pakistan, the single most important neighbour of Afghanistan, has its own agenda. Deficient in energy and cotton, it is anxious to buy Turkmenistan’s cotton (for its textile mills), and natural gas.
For this trade to take off, it is incumbent that Afghanistan be pacified. It was primarily this consideration which led Pakistan in the first place to foster the Taleban militia in the Afghan refugee camps in its territory, and inject it into the fractured world of Afghan warlords in mid-1994
Two years earlier, Bridas Corporation (of Argentina), based in British Virgin Islands, specialising in oil and gas, set up a joint venture with the Turkmen government to develop the Yashlar gas field which has proved to contain a staggering 750 billion cubic metres of natural gas.
To export the commodity without using the current (Soviet-era) pipeline network, suitably bolstered, there has to be a new network either going westward through Iran or eastward through Afghanistan.
With Washington formalising its hostility towards Tehran in 1995 by imposing severe trade and investment restrictions on Iran, applicable to companies worldwide, Bridas turned its attention eastward, and came up with a project to erect a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
It proposed a pipeline from Mary, Turkmenistan, to Sui, Pakistan, through western and southern Afghanistan at an estimated cost of 2.5 billion dollars.
In early 1996 it signed a contract with the Taleban central authority, then based in Qandahar in southern Afghanistan. Soon Bridas found itself bidding against a serious rival from the United States, Unocal, operating in association with Delta Oil Company based in Saudi Arabia.
It is widely believed that the royal House of Saud, which subscribes to the puritanical Wahhabi sect within Islam, is a major financial backer of the Taleban movement whose leaders accept a puritanical interpretation of the Sharia, Islamic Law.
Unocal came up with a proposal to connect Mary with Multan in Pakistan, at the cost of 1.9 billion dollars, with an extension to India costing another 900 million dollars, thus undercutting Bridas.
Unlike Bridas, a few years ago Unocal had opened an office in Mazar- e Shariuf, the capital of north-western Afghanistan under the authority of general Abdul Rashid Dostum, an armed adversary of the Taleban.
Then in the spring of 1997 Unocal opened an office in Qandahar. It thus maintained a presence in each of the two competing Afghan factions.
Over the past few weeks the competition between the rival corporations, both of them active in Ashqabat, has intensified. An official announcement is due shortly on the awarding of the contract for the eastward pipeline.
Unconfirmed reports say that it was to seek the approval of the Taleban regime for its forthcoming decision that the high-powered delegation was invited to Ashqabat by the Turkmen government.
Seen in this context, the unprecedented contacts between Turkmenistan and the Taleban regime make business sense. But this is unlikely to assuage either Turkmenistan’s Central Asian neighbours, or Iran, or Russia.
They are all expected to condemn Ashqabat, privately and/or publicly, for giving legitimacy to the Taleban regime.Regarding the Taleban administration in Afghanistan as a destablising factor in the region, they want to contain it by treating it as a pariah.
So they are unlikely to accept Niyazov’s explanation for breaching the solid anti-Taleban front they had collectively maintained so far.
But, going by his past record, Niyazov will not be swayed. He will see his latest action as merely another step in the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.