Headlines, Middle East & North Africa

MIDDLE EAST: Hamas – Key Factor In The Peace Equation

Dilip Hiro

LONDON, Aug 6 1997 (IPS) - The general assumption, yet to be proved conclusively, is that the twin bombs in West Jerusalem on Jul. 30 were the work of the Ezzeddin al-Qassam, military wing of the Islamic Resistance, Hamas.

Western news agencies have all received leaflets purporting to be from the Ezzeddin al-Qassam. “We suggest Israel prepare its hospitals to take in their new guests who will be struck with panic by our attacks,” read one Tuesday. Another leaflet had demanded the release of Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails.

However Israeli police have acknowledged that some evidence, notably the kind of explosive used, indicated that the attack may have been carried out by foreign-based bombers. Their families have been slow to come forward to mourn the dead ‘martyrs’.

But assumed true, the killing of 13 Israelis on Jul. 30 achieved a dual purpose. It firstly demonstrated that, contrary to his election promise, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to deliver security with peace to Israel.

Equally importantly, they correctly anticipated that Netanyahu would then lean so heavily on Palestinian Authority president Yasser Arafat that it would reduce his popular support drastically, thus opening up opportunities for Islamist organisations.

Sure enough, by applying pressure on Arafat, when he is already domestically weak due to the recent disclosures of corruption and mismanagement at high places in his administration, Netanyahu is further pushing Arafat down the popularity ratings.

Netanyahu’s measures are unprecedented. Besides the routine sealing of the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Israel, and the banning of movement by the Palestinians within these territories, he has refused to hand over tax revenues collected by Israel to the Palestinian Authority. He has also ordered the quasi-independent Israel Broadcasting Authority to jam the broadcasts by the Palestine Broadcasting Authority.

The Israeli leader and his close advisers seem unaware, or unwilling to recognise, that there exists a zero-sum relationship between Arafat and the Islamists. That is, weakening Arafat and the Authority automatically means strengthening Hamas and its smaller but no less deadly sister, the Islamic Jihad.

They also seem to miss the vital point that it is their hard line policies that are engendering an environment in which the views of Islamists are become increasingly popular. Not for the first time they are confusing the effect with the cause.

It would be hard to argue, convincingly, that Netanyahu is taking a tough stance merely to see that Arafat keeps his side of the bargain by eliminating terrorist actions against Israel.

If there is punishment for failure then there should be reward for good performance. For a year, from March 1996 to the following March, no terrorist bombs exploded in Israel. How did Netanyahu respond?

He opened a controversial tunnel in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, triggering a mini-intifada of the Palestinians.

By persistent stalling, he succeeded in renegotiating the already signed and sealed Oslo II Accord of September 1995, altering the arrangements in Hebron to the detriment of the Palestinians, and acquiring for himself the right to decide unilaterally the areas of the West Bank from where the Israeli troops were to withdraw.

Finally he gave the go-ahead for the building of the massive Har Homa Jewish settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim in occupied East Jerusalem.

Both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have reasoned all along that contrary to what the Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) say, the Oslo peace process will not lead to the creation of a sovereign State of Palestine or the sharing of Jerusalem with Israel.

They also maintain that Israel wants the Authority and Arafat to become its handmaiden — like Tel Aviv’s proxy South Lebanon Army under Antoine Lahad in occupied southern Lebanon — mere sub- contractors hired to repress fellow-Palestinians.

In the final analysis, they say, Israel only understands force and violence. A few months after prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by a Jewish fanatic, came the violent intervention by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the first ever prime ministerial election in Israel.

It was the suicide bombs detonated by the al-Qassam Brigade activists in West Jerusalem on two successive Sundays in late February-early March 1996 that trimmed a fatal few points off the popularity rating of the then favourite, Shimon Peres.

Deeply opposed to the 1993 Oslo I Accord, which it regarded as unjust, the al-Qassam Brigade wanted to hurt Peres’s chance of winning by showing that Israelis were still vulnerable to random attacks of violence by militant Palestinians.

It also reckoned that by wrecking the chances of Peres it would also weaken Arafat, and create a political vacuum among Palestinians to be filled by Hamas.

However, the significance of Hamas in the shaping of the destiny of Israelis and Palestinians has a longer history.

It was Rabin’s decision to deport over 400 leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in December 1992 to the no-man’s land in southern Lebanon that first raised the profile and popularity of the Palestinian Islamists.

What the world saw through numerous TV interviews was not a motley crowd of crazed Muslim fanatics but soft-spoken, articulate doctors, engineers, teachers and pharmacists, who spent their year in exile pursuing educational courses set up by their more erudite colleagues.

By 1993 Hamas’ fast rising popularity was a major factor in persuading a reluctant Rabin to open serious talks with the secular PLO. The unpalatable fact, often ignored by many analysts and historians, is that but for the rise of Hamas the PLO would not have got what it did in the Oslo I Accord, however unsatisfactory it was to most Palestinians.

Something to this effect was said on the morrow of the signing of the Oslo I Accord in Washington on 13 September 1993 by none less than Chaim Herzog, president of Israel from May 1983 to April 1993.

“The rising strength of the Iranian-backed (Islamic) fundamentalist movements in the (Palestinian) territories administered by Israel, and in the Middle East as a whole, influenced the Israelis leaders to explore the possibilities of a deal with the PLO,” Herzog wrote in The Times of London.

Now, a wide gap has developed between Arafat and his political base, the secular, nationalist Fatah Movement. In the 88-member Palestinian parliament, 58 members of parliament either belong to Fatah or are allied to it. Yet the voting on the demand for the dismissal of the Authority cabinet due to corruption showed 56 for the motion and only 4 against!

Even allowing that all 30 opposition MPs participated in the voting, half of Fatah MPs voted with them while another half abstained.

In contrast is the growing popularity of Hamas. At six of the seven Palestinian universities, the Islamic Bloc, affiliated to Hamas, controls the Students Unions. On 19 July, a procession organised by Hamas in Hebron to celebrate the birthday of the prophet Muhammad drew 20,000 marchers.

This is happening against the background of steeply falling living standards of the Palestinians. On the eve of the Oslo I Accord, the per capita gross national product for the Occupied Palestinian Territories was one-seventh of Israel’s, which is on a per capita par with Britain.

Yet latest World Bank figures show that Palestinian GNP dropped by 39 percent during 1995 and 1996. The hopelessness of the life of the Palestinians, especially the young, can well be imagined.

Under the circumstances for Netanyahu to pile up pressure on Arafat is a recipe for destroying the secular, nationalist mainstream among the Palestinians — and thus inadvertently paving the way for the Islamists to fill the consequent political vacuum.

Hamas radicals would only be too pleased to see Netanyahu follow that course.

 
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