Thursday, November 19, 2026
Dilip Hiro
- Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s honeyed words to his parliament Thursday may have seen his late night pact on the divided city of Hebron through another stage, but it failed to win over sceptical supporters of Jewish settlers.
Thus there is no guarantee that the accord — signed by Netanyahu and Palestinian president Yasser Arafat late Wednesday — will form a firm stepping stone towards the conclusion of a final, lasting peace settlement.
This is so because of the acute tension between the political pressures that Netanyahu leads at home, from his own cabinet as well as his parliament, and the pressures that he finds himself subjected to abroad — especially by Egypt and Jordan as well as the United States.
The ultra-nationalist ministers in Netanyahu’s government, belonging to both his Likud bloc and other more right wing parties, believe in the concept of biblical Eretz Israel (Land of Israel), and want to cede no more territory to the Palestinian Authority.
In the 18-strong Netanyahu cabinet, these hawks form a bloc of seven. The tenacity with which they fought their corner became apparent when it took the ministerial council nearly 12 hours to reach a decision on the latest accord, brokered by the United States, Egypt and Jordan.
The Israeli ultranationalists’ stance runs contrary to the basic premise on which the Middle East Peace Conference was convened by Washington and Moscow in Madrid in October 1991: return of Arab occupied territories by Israel in exchange for peace settlements with its Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
But Netanyahu insists that he has not compromised Israel’s security, and that he has obtained better terms for implementing the Interim Agreement — popularly called the Oslo II Accord — signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Arafat on 28 September 1995 in Washington.
The Oslo II Accord was to have been implemented in four stages every six months, requiring Israel to withdraw its troops from the West Bank, except from the 128 Jewish settlements and ‘still to be specified’ military locations. The Palestinians reckoned that the implementation of this provision would place 85-90 percent of the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.
During the first stage, ending in late March 1996, Israel was required to redeploy its troops from seven major Palestinian towns, including Hebron, forming only about four percent of the West Bank’s area. The Israeli withdrawals from six Palestinian towns was completed by the end of December as a prelude to the holding of the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council in January.
However, when suicide bombs exploded in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in late February-early March 1996, then prime minister Shimon Peres unilaterally postponed Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, scheduled for Mar. 28.
Arafat acquiesced, and the new date for redeployment was set at a fortnight after the Israeli elections on May 29. Arafat acted in this way in order to aid Peres win the poll for the premiership. In the event Peres lost.
Since then through his intransigence Netanyahu has changed the rules of the game. He transformed the talks about the implementation of the Oslo II Accord into renegotiating the very terms of the Accord what had been signed and sealed in September 1995.
He did so despite Arafat’s constant refrain that what had been signed by Israel must be honoured in full and unconditionally. In the end Arafat agreed to the extension of the Israeli evacuation of rural West Bank by a year — that is, by August 1998. The withdrawal is to be completed in three stages.
“We also won time, which will give us a greater margin in which to manoeuvre,” Netanyahu told the Knesset Thursday, referring to the August deadline.
But how much area Israel will actually evacuate remains to be seen. The Arafat camp wants 90 percent and the Netanyahu side is talking about 40 percent. The Israelis have stated that they will keep control of the Jordan Valley bordering the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the desert east of Jerusalem among others.
They may also decide that all hilltops in the West Bank are militarily important and so must be retained by them. All signs are that the subject will be highly contentious.
The major difference between now (under Netanyahu) and before (under Peres and his predecessor Rabin) is that during the Labour- led administrations there was a genuine commitment for peace and mutual goodwill.
That is missing now. Instead there is much mutual mistrust chiefly because Netanyahu’s personal commitment to peace and the inevitable compromises it will require, remains suspect, not least given the nature of his comments Thursday.
Netanyahu told the Knesset that his government aimed to “maintain the unity of Jerusalem, control the space needed to ensure the security of the country, and respect the right of Jews to settle in their country”. And he added that “to the Palestinians, we propose autonomy but without the attributes of a sovereignty which could endanger our country”.
Also Netanyahu has cobbled together a coalition government which includes such hawks as Ariel Sharon and Benny Begin (both Likud members), Rafael Eitan (of the Tsomet party) and Zevulun Hammer (of the National Religious Party). Their support for Netanyahu’s candidacy as prime minister, along with that of the ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, was instrumental in his electoral victory.
They perceive the partial withdrawal of Israel from Hebron — the City of the Jewish Patriarchs, as they see it — as a betrayal by Netanyahu, and will use their disappointment as a lever to limit his area of manoeuvre in his negotiations with the Palestinians.
Netanyahu faces a contrary situation when it comes to his talks with the leaders of Egypt and Jordan, the Arab countries which have concluded peace treaties with Israel. They constantly impress on the Israeli premier the urgent need to further the peace process with the Palestinians on the basis of land for peace.
Significantly, it was the last minute intervention by King Hussein of Jordan who rushed to Gaza City and then to Tel Aviv which saved the recent talks from collapse.
With more than half of Jordanian citizens being of Palestinian origin, King Hussein is only too aware that the only way he will be able to consolidate his country’s peace with Israel is to ensure that the Israeli-Palestinian track of the regional peace process does not wither. As for Egypt, which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, even Netanyahu has described it as ‘the pillar of peace’ in the region.
So far Netanyahu has muddled through the difficulties, perhaps because of his very lack of experience. Since he had been briefly a deputy foreign minister before winning the premiership, he was by and large an unknown quantity, and so the various parties with vested interest were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.
The signing of the latest accord signals the end of that honeymoon period.
As he enters the more demanding phase of implementing the troop withdrawals from the West Bank and the run up to final status talks — involving the future of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements and over four million Palestinian refugees — Netanyahu will find it exceedingly difficult to muddle through.