Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Kevin Sullivan
- Vladimir Srebrov staged a diverting protest in the centre of Sarajevo earlier this week. The maverick politician unfurled a Bosnian flag at a popular meeting-point one afternoon and proceeded to set it on fire.
Srebrov said he was protesting against the United Nations, the European Union, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
He described the flag — an oblique downward V topped by a row of stars, adopted as the national emblem by order of the United Nations High Representative Carlos Westendorp — as “looking more like the stripes of a non-commissioned officer than the flag of a people who suffered aggression”.
The High Representative, complained Srebrov, “is ruling over us like a colony.”
Srebrov characterised the 32,000 NATO-led troops in Bosnia- Hercegovina as a garrison maintained in NATO’s, not Bosnia’s, interests. He called on the Bosnian parliament to draw up and implement its own constitution, to replace the matrix of overlapping administrative bodies imposed through the 1995 Dayton peace agreement.
Srebrov’s argument is that since the OHR now effectively rules Bosnia-Hercegovina in the name of the international community, the country’s meaningful independence has been taken away.
Most Bosnians accept that their country is run by foreigners. The most common argument is whether or not these foreign rulers are doing a good job.
Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative, is charged under a U.N. Security Council mandate with supervising the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The agreement itself serves as Bosnia’s constitution.
Westendorp is legally empowered to dismiss obstructive officials, all the way up to the president; he has at his disposal a team of legal experts engaged in writing legislation which is presented to parliament when Bosnia’s own legislators are unable to agree on legal formulations.
In the last year Westendorp has unilaterally chosen Bosnia’s national flag and instituted a new system of car licence plates. He was the moving force behind the introduction of a new national currency.
The High Representative stands at the apex of a system of foreign administration. Bosnian elections are supervised by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the governor of the national bank is appointed by the International Monetary Fund; three of the nine constitutional judges are foreigners.
A foreign appointee serves as Human Rights Ombudsman, empowered to scrutinise legislation and bureaucratic practice in order to eliminate ethnic prejudice.
This administrative machinery comes with economic and military clout. The World Bank and the European Union are coordinating a four-year five billion dollar international aid project designed to restart the Bosnian economy, and NATO has deployed troops throughout the country to prevent a resumption of fighting.
The OHR, though, vigorously denies that it governs Bosnia as protectorate, either in name or in reality.
“Bosnia is not a protectorate,” said one senior OHR official, “We don’t have any executive power. Westendorp can remove obstructive officials and we can introduce legislation, but to have a real protectorate we would have to have implementatory power.
“Westendorp can introduce legislation, but who will make sure that it’s implemented? For a real protectorate you would need police and troops who have full power, and the international community is not ready to provide that.”
The role of the NATO-led stabilisation force (SFOR) has been contentious since peace-implementation troops began moving into Bosnia in the weeks after the Dayton peace accord was signed.
The deployment has been a success in terms of monitoring and restraining the activities of the military forces at the disposal of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, the two entities which function in uneasy harness within a unitary state.
But SFOR has been disinclined to undertake police work, such as the apprehension of war criminals. Likewise the lightly-staffed International Police Task Force has a mandate to “assist, advise, observe and monitor” police activities in both entities, without enjoying powers of arrest and detention.
The fact remains, however, that nothing gets done in Bosnia without the say-so of foreigners. As many as 10,000 foreign administrators and aid workers are based in Sarajevo, making up a conspicuous three percent of the Bosnian capital’s population.
“From day-one there were actually some elements of a protectorate because it was clear that the peace agreement would not just implement itself,” said Christopher Bennett, director of the Sarajevo Office of the International Crisis Group, a non- governmental think-tank.
“The system requires broad agreement and consensus, but given the absence of trust there is no consensus. Basically the OHR is an executive. It’s a body that can draw up laws and impose them.”
The problem is that foreign rule doesn’t bode well for an early return to normal politics. “It’s very unhealthy,” said Bennett.
“The domestic institutions are no longer taking responsibility for actions. They just leave tough decisions to foreigners and blame the international community. They can say the international community imposed this on us. The political system doesn’t function at all.”
The oddest manifestation of foreign rule is to be seen in TV discussion programmes, where foreign representatives of the OHR and other statutory bodies sit with Bosnian officials and politicians and contribute to the discussion, earphones fixed firmly on their heads, speaking in English with simultaneous translation into Bosnian for the benefit of viewers.
In other countries these scenes might involve visiting foreign dignitaries. In Bosnia, the people making the decisions are the ones speaking another language.
Christopher Bennett argues that the anomalies in Bosnia’s post- war politics stem from the way in which the three and a half year war ended.
“Either you can let a war run its course, and then you lose people, for example in Croatia (where hundreds of thousands of Serb citizens were evicted in the summer of 1995), or you try to build a system of ethnic security.
“That means not hammering out issues in an airport, like Dayton. You have to learn from places like Malaysia, Fiji, Mauritius, where an attempt has been made to build incentives (to bridge the ethnic divide). It’s not enough to end a war, you have to build a peace.”
Without a functioning domestic political establishment, many Bosnians are inclined to approve of rule by foreigners as opposed to the violence which afflicted the country after independence.
“A protectorate is better than what those thieves (Bosnian politicians) are doing to us,” said one Sarajevo pensioner whose house was destroyed during the war.
“I only get angry with our own government. It’s their fault that it’s come to this. It would be better if instead of just a few isolated cases they put foreigners everywhere to check how the money is spent, so that no one could steal anything.”