Thursday, November 19, 2026
Analysis - Jim Lobe
- The United States remains unable to fashion a coherent policy toward Colombia at a critical moment in the South American country’s history.
So say independent experts who believe the US government is sending mixed signals to South America’s most conflicted nation – and the most important exporter of illicit drugs to the United States – even as elusive peace talks between the government in Bogota and its guerrilla opponents finally appear imminent.
The Bill Clinton administration has voiced strong support for the peace process initiated by Colombian President Andres Pastrana, they note. Yet, it also has acquiesced to Congressional Republicans’ demands for a sharp increase in military aid for Colombia’s police and army.
The Republicans have gained the upper hand partly because of the guerrillas’ actions – including the murder, in March, of three US environmentalists.
Pastrana also is perceived here as having made major concessions – for example, creating a demilitarised zone the size of Switzerland – without getting anything in return.
Moreover, the Colombian leader’s political position at home is judged to be weaker than when he launched the peace process after becoming president last August. Not only has the process stumbled, but Colombia is facing its worst economic crisis in seven decades.
“The administration is more on the defensive,” says Michael Shifter, a Colombia expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, an influential think tank here. “It was easier to support Pastrana when he was more popular.”
What’s more, “there is significant division within the (US) administration between (those who favour) the security approach and (those who back) the peace approach,” adds Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars here.
Officials at the Pentagon and in the intelligence community share Republican scepticism about the peace process, she notes, while those at the State Department, the US embassy in Bogota, and the National Security Council remain supportive of the initiative.
The latter support Pastrana’s view that peace talks offer the best chance to end the 35-year-old insurgency and curb drug production in Colombia. However, more security-minded forces believe that the peace process cannot succeed without first building a credible military force capable of taking on the guerrillas.
“The result is a lot of confusion and mixed signals,” Shifter argues. “While the administration continues to talk about support for the peace process and Pastrana, it’s not really prepared to spend political capital on it.”
The stakes are high. Colombia’s civil war – which involves several guerrilla factions, the army, the police, and right-wing paramilitary groups supported by drug-traffickers and elements in the army – has taken more than 35,000 lives over the past ten years and forced more than one million people from their homes.
The country’s status as the Americas’ dominant exporter of cocaine and heroin to the United States has propelled it to the top of Washington’s hemispheric agenda. Colombia now is the world’s third biggest recipient of US military aid, after Egypt and Israel.
That aid is supposed to be used only for anti-drug efforts. But the boundary between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency has become increasingly blurry here as Republican lawmakers and Pentagon hawks accuse the guerrillas, who control about 40 percent of Colombia’s territory, of active complicity with drug- traffickers.
About two-thirds the units of Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and one third of the second-largest, the National Liberation Army (ELN), are involved in some form of drug trafficking, earning them between 500 million dollars and 600 million dollars a year, the Pentagon says.
Independent analysts and some State Department officials say the emphasis on the insurgents’ alleged involvement in the drug trade is misplaced.
“The FARC is not a drug-trafficking organisation,” says Winifred Tate, of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a human-rights group. “It taxes drug (production) like it taxes all economic activities in areas it controls.”
Almost all US military aid has gone to the national police, rather than to the army, due to the latter’s alleged ties to the drug trade, its support of violent paramilitaries, and its own, poor human-rights record.
Under US law, no military aid can be provided to any Colombian army unit if there is credible evidence that it has committed gross abuses of human rights. Only three of six army brigades operating in major drug-producing areas have passed this test, according to the US General Accounting Office.
The Republicans and the Pentagon nevertheless favour more aid for the army and argue that the police cannot fight the drug war in insurgent areas without effective military support.
In their view, the guerrillas are unlikely to compromise at the negotiating table so long as the army – which has been defeated in several major engagements, including one on the outskirts of Bogota this week – is seen as being on the defensive.
A similar argument was made by the Ronald Reagan administration in defense of its huge military aid programme for El Salvador in the 1980s, notes Arnson.
Shifter acknowledges the hawks’ argument but adds: “I’m not sure that’s what they really have in mind. They really have a war strategy.”
The US Southern Command is training and equipping a special counter-narcotics army battalion and building a new army-police intelligence facility to replace one destroyed by the FARC last year. It also has begun routinely providing the army with intelligence reports on insurgents in drug-producing areas.